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Office of  the Director of  Abbey Court Irish Life Centre 
Ireland  Telecommunications  Lower Abbey Street, Dublin  I 
Regulation  Tel.:+3531  804 <J600 
Fax::t  3 531  804 9680 
Dept of  Transport & Communications  Tel. +353  I 60 41  89 
Ely Court 7,  Ely Place, Dublin 2 
Ministero delle Poste e delle  Viale America. 20 I 
Italy  Telecomunicazioni/  1-00144 Roma 
Direzione Generate per Ia  Tel.:+  396 595X  2868 
Regolamentazione e Ia  Fax:+396 5414 ~ 12 
Qualita dei Servizi 
Institut Luxemburgeois des  45a avenue Monterey 
Luxemburg  Telecommunications  L-2922 Luxembourg 
Tel.: +352 458845  I 
Fax:+  352 45884~ 88 
Ministerie van Verkeer en  Post  bus 2090 I 
Netherlands  W aterstaat/Hoofddirectie  NL-2500 EX The Hague 
Telecommunicatie en Post  Tel.+3170 351  6941 
Fax::+-3170 351  7895 
Ministerie van V erkeer en  Postbus 90420 
Waterstaat/Directie Toericht  NL-2509 CK The Hague 
N etwerken en Dienst  en  Tel.+  3 1  7  0 3 1  5 3 5  00 
Fax:+  3 1  7  0 3 I 5 35 0 I 
OPTA 
Daendelstraat 57  Tel:  +31  70 315 35  0 I 
NL-2595 XT Den Haag  Fax : + 3 I 70 3 15  3 5 00 
INDEX  /14 Bundesministerium fur Wissenschaft  Kelsenstrasse 7 
Austria  und Verkehr,  A-1030 Wien 
Sektion IV  /Oberste Post- und  Tel.: +431  79731  4101 
F  ernmeldebehorde  Fax:+431  79731  41 09 
Telekom Control Gl\1BH  Mariahilferstrasse  I23 
A-1060 Wien 
Tel.: +4 3 1 5  99990 
Fax:+431  59999 455 
Instituto das Comunicac;oes de Portugal  Av. Jose Malhoa n.  12-21 A 
Portugal  (ICP)  P-1  070 Lisboa 
Tel. : +  3  5 1 I 72 I I  000 
Fax:+3511  721  1004 
Liikenneministerio  Etelaesplanadi  I  (l 
Finland  Box 235 
FIN-00 I  J I llclsinki 
Tel+3589  I60l 
Fax:+ 3589  I60 2588 
Telehallintokeskus  Vattuniemenkatu 8A 
Box 53 
FIN~00211 Helsinki 
Tel.: +3589 69661 
Fax: +3589 6966 4IO 
Post- och Telestyrelsen  Box 5398 
Sweden  SE-1 02 49 Stockholm 
Tel.:+468 678 5500 
Fax:+468 678 5505 
Ministry of  Transport  Tel: 46 8 2I.3794/4118394 
J  akobgatan 26  Fax: 46 8 405  1000 
SE-1 03  Stockholm 
Department of  Trade and Industry  151  Buckingham Palace Road 
UK  London SW I  W 9SS 
Tel.:+44 171  215  5000 
Fax:  +44  171  215  1800 
OFTEI.  50 Ludgatc llill 
I  ntcrnational Atl'airs Section  UK-London  F< '41\11  7.1.1 
Tel.: +44  171  {134  ~868 
Fax:  +44  17I  634 873 I 
intsection. otlel(li)gtnet. gov .u k 
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Belgium 
Conseil de Ia Concurrence (Belgique) 
North Gate III - Blvd. Emile Jacqmain 154,  B-1 000 Bruxelles 
T.  +32-2-2065224 
EFT  A Surveillance Authority- ESA 
Rue des Treves, 74, B-1 040 Bruxelles 
T.  +32-2-2861811 I Fax. +32-2-2861800 I e-mail : csa@surv.etta.bc 
Ministere des Affaires Economiques -I Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Belgique) 
North Gate III- Emile Jacqmainlaan 154,  B-1 000 Bruxelles 
- > Algemene Inspectie van Prijzen en de Mededinging 
T.  +32-2-2065015  I  Fax. +32-2-2065763 
~  Algemene Inspectie van Prijzen en de Mededinging 
T.  +32-2-2065168 I 
Tribunal de Commerce (Belgique) 
Palais de Justice- Place Poelaert, 1,  B-1 000 Bruxelles 
T.  +32-2-5086679 I Fax. +32-2-5086671 
Danmark 
Erhvervsministeriet (Ministry of  Business and Industry) (Danmark) 
Slotsholmsgade 10-12, DK-1216 K0benhavn-K 
T +45-33-923001  I  Fax. +45-33-123778 
Konkurrencestyrelsen- Danish Competition Authority (Danmark) 
N0rregade 49, DK-1165 K0benhavn-K 
T.  +45-33-177000  I  Fax. +45-33-326144  I  e-mail: kr@kr.dk400.dk 
s,,f~lrtsstyrelsen (Ministry of  Trade, Industry & Shipping) (Oanemark) 
Vcrmundsgade 38 C,  DK-21 00 K0bcnhavn-'' 
T.  +45-39-271515 
Trafikministcriet (Danmark) 
Frcdcriksholm Kanal 27, DK  .. J220 K0benhavn-K 
T.  f-45-33-923355  I  Fax.  f-45-33-123893 
Bundeskartellamt (Deutschland) 
Mehringdamm, 129,  D-1 0965 Berlin 
Germany 
T.  +49-30-69580200  I  Fax. +49-30-695803940 
INDEX  /16 Bundesministerium fur Verkehr (Deutschland) 
Robert Schuinanplatz 1,  D-53175 Bonn 
T.  +49-228-3000  I  Fax. +49-228-3007709 
Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft (Deutschland) 
Villemombler Strasse 76, D-53123 Bonn 
T.  +49-228-61 54170  I  Fax. +49-228-6 1  52278 
e-mail : BUERO-l@BONN I.BMW I.BUND400.de 
Greece 
Competition Committee (Greece 
Building ofMinistry ofCommerce (5th floor) 10, Kaningos Square, GR-10181 Athens 
T.  +30-1-3828990  I  Fax. +30-1-3829654 
Ministere des Transports et de Ia Communication (Greece) 
Sygrou 23, GR- Athens 
T.  +30-1-8947121  I  Fax. +30-1-3240506 
S  p  a  i  n 
Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda- Direccion General de ·politica El:oni,mica y Defensa  d~ Ia 
Competencia (Espana) 
Cl Alcala, ne 9 - 1  a Planta,  E-28071  Madrid 
T.  +34-1-595801 0  I  e-mail : dgdc@stnet.es 
Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Transportes y Media Ambiente (Espana) 
Plaza de San Juan de Ia Cruz, sin- Sa planta, despacho SDE-28071 l\1adrid 
T.  +34-1-5342954  I Fax. +34-1-5976550 
Tribunal de Defensa de Ia Competencia (Espana) 
Avda. de Pio XII, 17,  E-28016 Madrid 
T.  +34-1-3595764  I Fax. +34-1-3505406  I  e-mail: presltdc@stnet.es 
France 
CIQCEE-Comite lnterministeriel pour les Questions de Cooperation  l~conomiquc Europl~l'nnc­
Sc<.;tcur RENET (France) 
"Carre Austerlitz" - 2,  Bd  Diderot, F-75572 Paris Cedex  I i 
T.  f-JJ-1-4487121 5  I  Fax.  t-33-1-44871296 
Conseil de Ia Concurrence (France) 
II, rue de I'Echelle, F-7500 I Paris 
T.  +33-1-42603161  I  Fax. +33-1-42606099 
INDEX  /11 Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances- D.G. Concurrence de la Consommation et de Ia 
Repression des Frau  des (France) 
59, Boulevard Vincent Auriol; F-75703 Paris Cedex 13 
T.  + 33-1-44972701  I  Fax. +33-1-44973030 
Ireland  : 
Department of  Enterprise, Trade and Employment (Ireland) 
South Frederick Street, IRL Dublin 2 
T.  +353-1-6614444  I  Fax. +353-1-6795710 
Department of  Transport, Energy & Commnications (Ireland) 
Cetanta Center, South Frederick Street, IRL- DUBLIN 2 
T.  +153-1-6789522  I  Fax. +353-1-6711886 
Irish Competition Authority 
Parnell I louse - 14  Parnell Square, I  RL  Dublin  I 
T.  I 3 5J-I-X045400 I  Fax.  -tJ 5J-J .. g04540 I  I  e-mail : mcnultp(l~)cntcmp.  irlgov. ic 
I  t  a' I  y  : 
Autorita garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Italia) 
Via Liguria, 26,  1-00187 Roma 
T.  +39-6-48162395  I  Fax.  +39-6-48162207  I e  .. mail:  ANTITRUST~'.-\GCl\l.IT 
Ministero dei Transporti (ltalia) 
Piazza Croce Rossa 1,  1-001 00 Roma 
T.  1-J<J-6-41581  I  Fax. + 39-6-48162256 
Ministero dcll'lndustria (ltalia) 
Via Molisel-00 187 Roma 
T.  1·.1'J-6-47X87933  I  Fax.  139-6-47887745 
Ministero della Marina Mercantile (ltalia) 
Via deii'Arte,  1611-00144 Roma 
T.  +39-6-59081  I  Fax. +39-6-59084188 
I~  11  x  t'  111  ll  o  11  r g  : 
Ministcrc de !'Economic (Luxembourg) 
( 'asc Postalc 97 - I  9-21, Blvd RoyaiL  .. 2914 Luxembourg 
T.  I 352-4784172  I  Fax.  +  352-460448 
The  Nethe•·lnnds: 
Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Nederland) 
Bczuidenhoutseweg, 30, NL-2594 A V DEN HAAG 
T.  t-JI-70-J796104  I  Fax.  +31-70-3796128 
INDEX  /18 Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (Nederland) 
Postbus 20901, NL-2500 Ex Den Haag 
T. +31-70-3516646  I  Fax. +31-70-3516571 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMA) (Dutch Competition Authority) 
Johanna Westerdijkplein 107- Postbus 16 326NL-2521 EC Den Haag 
T. +  31-70-3303330  (Fax. +  31-70-3303560 
Austria 
Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten (Osterreich) 
Stubenring I,  A-1 01  I Wien 
T.  +43-1-0222171 I  00  I  Fax. +43-1-5874200 
Bundcsministerium flir Wissenschaft, Verkehr und  Kunst (C)sterrcich) 
Radctzkystrasse, 2A-I 030 Wicn 
T.  143-1-5.1464  I  Fax.  143-1-5.14(>420 13 
Ohcrlandesgcricht Wien als Kartellgericht (0sterreich) 
Sdunerlingplatz I I,  A-1 016 Wien 
T.  +43-1-521523566  I  Fax. +43-l-521523690 
Portugal 
Conselho da Concorrencia (Portugal) 
Av.  da Republica, ne 79 P-1 094 Lisboa Codex 
T.  +35 1-1-7934049  I  Fax. +351-1-7971910 
Direc~ao-Geral da Industria (Portugal) 
Av.  Conselheiro Fernando de Sousa,  I I,  P-1 099 Lisboa Codex 
T.  ·l.1SJ-J-38S9161  I  Fax.  +351-1-3831042 
Dircc~~1o-Gcral de  Avia~ao Civil (Portugal) 
Avenida da Liberdade,  193, P-1250 Lisboa 
T.  +351-1-3573517  I  Fax. +351-1-3527362 
Ministerio da Economia- Direc~ao-Geral do Comercio e da Concorrencia (Portugal) 
:\\'. \'isconde de Valmor, 72,  P-1 093  Lishoa Codex 
T.  +JSI-1-7933116  I  Fax. +351-1-7965158  I  e-mail: dgcomconc(5t)mail.telepac.pt 
Finland 
Competition Council (Suomi) 
Alcksanterinkatu, 4,  FIN-00 170 Helsinki 
T.  1.~SX-<>-Jh0.H>77 I  Fax.  l.lSX-'>-Ih0264C> 
Ministry of  Trade and  Industry (Suomi) 
Alcksantcrinkatu, 4,  Fl N-00 170 Helsinki 
T.  1158-9-1603621  I  Fax. +358-9-1604022 
INDEX  /19 Ministry of  Transport and Communications- Liikenneministerio (Suomi) 
PL 235, FIN-00131 Helsinki 
T.  +358-9-1601  I  Fax. +358-9-1602596 
Office of  Free Competition- Kilpailuvirasto (Suomi) 
Haapaniemenkatu 5- P.O.Box 332S~-00531 Helsinki 
T.  +358-9-73141  I  Fax. +358-9-73143328 
Sweden 
Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority) (Sverige) 
Malmskillnadsgatan 32, S-1 0385 Stockholm 
T.  +46-8-700 1600  I  Fax. +46-8-245543 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (Sverige) 
Fredsgatan 8,  S-1 03  33 Stockholm 
T.  ~ 4(>-8-405 IS I  0  I  Fax.  +-46-8-411J616 
Ministry of  Transport and Communications- Transport och Kommunikations DcpartctllL'Iltt't 
(Sverige) 
Jakobsgatan 26, S-1 03  33  Stockholm 
T.  +46-8-7631 000 I  Fax. +46-8-4118943 
United  Kin.:dom 
Department of  Trade and Industry (UK) 
1,  Victoria Street, GB-SW1 H OET London 
T. +44-171-215031 0  I  Fax. +44-171-2222629 
Department of  Transport (UK) 
Great Minster House - 76, Marsham  Street~ UK-SW I P 4DR London 
T.  1--44-171-2714825  I  Fax. +44-171-2714955 
Office of  Fair Trading (UK) 
Field House - 15-25 Bream's Buildings 
UK-EC4A 1  PR London 
T.  f 44-171-21 18000  e-mail : enquiries@oftuk.demon.co.uk 
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~European Institutions :  ..........................................................................................  http://europu.eu.int  \ 
DG IV : ...............................................................  http://europa.eu.int/en/t.·omnt/dg04/d~4honu.•.htnd' 
i.e.  Liberalisation Legislation : .....................  http://etu·opu.eu.int/en/l'omm/d~04/Iawlilwr/lilwra.htm 
i.e.  Speeches on telecom I post : ...................  htt(l:/ll•ut·opa.eu.int/enll·on•m/d~04/spt•N·h/tht•nu•f.htm 
Information Society Project Oflice: ...................................................... ..  http:  I  /www.  ispO.l'l'l" .lw 
Survey of telecommunications licensing regimes in  European Union 
Member States :  .......................................... http//www.ispo.l'el'.be/infosol'/prmno/pnhs/su•"Vt'Y  .hhnl 
The <ilohal  Inventory Project : ...... ..................... ...... ................... ............  .. .  http://www.~ip.int 
Community R&D lnt(Jrmation Programme :  ....................................................... http://www.&.·ordis/ln 
Council Press Releases :  .................................................................. http://ue.eu.int/Presse/latest.htm 
European Parliament :  ......................................................................... http://wwwdb.europarl.eu.int/ 
CEPT/ECTRA :  ........................................................................ http://www.&.•to.dk/pa~es/dt•&.·rt•&.·.htm 
European Telecommunications Otlice : ................................................................... http://www.&.·tt•.dk 
European Radiocommunications Ollice :  http://www  .t·ru.dl( 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute: ..............................................  http://www.&.·tsi.f•· 
International Telecommunication Union : ................................................................. http://www.itn.d1 
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IBE  I 
I  Federal  Internet sites : ............................................................................. http://www.belgium/fgov.he  j 
1 Belgian  Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications (BIPT)  - wehsile lo hecome availah/e in I  he j 
jirslltallol/CJCJ8 .................................................................................................... http://www.bipt.be  : 
jDK 
I KonkurrenceRadet  .................................................................................................  http://www.ks.dk 
10 
I  Regulierungsbeht)rde tlir Telekommunikation und  Post (Reg TP) : .  hUp://www.n·~tp.dt• 
\English homcpagc of Bundeskartcllamt : ................  http://www.hnndt•sl"artl'llamt.th•/informat.htm 
Y cdcra I 0 llice J(Jr  Post and Telecommunications :. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  It  It  Jl: I  /www. h:. pt. th· 
/GR 
~Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs : ...................................... :  ............................  http://www.ntfa.gr/  I  Hellenic Ministry of  Press and Mass Media : ................................................. http://weh.ari:.dm•-l.j!r 
~ES 
, Governemental infOrmation : ...................................................................... http://www  .ht-monrloa.es/ 
jFR 
f L' Autorite de regulation des telecommunications (ART) : .............................................. .. 
1  .  . . .. . . . . . . .  . ..................................... http://www.telerom.~ouv.fr/fnuu;ais/at·tiv/tf'lt•rmnhtrtpn·s.htm 
l  Conscil de Ia Concurrence : ..........................................  http://www.linann·s.gonv.fr/t·onrurh•rtivih·s 
Direction des posies et  telecommunications  hUp://www.h•lt•rom.gou\·.fr/franrais/minish·r/; 
....................................................... http://www.telerom.gouv.f•·/franc:tis/adh·/tderom/tl'lt•r•trt.htm 
IIU  .. 
Department of Enterprise & Employment : .............................  http://www.irl~ov  .ie./t•nh•mp.Jlnh.htm 
!I 
Autoriti1 garantc della Concorrenza e del  Mercato : ...................  ~1ttp://www  .agern.it/b  _ wt•lconu.•.htntl 
Italian National Agency f()r  New Technology, 
Energy and the Environment  :_ .................................................... http://www.sede.ene:a.it/menut•.hhnl 
INDEX  /22 LUX 
Government and administrations : ............................  http://www·.restena.lu:80/gover/ministeres.html 
NL 
OPTA, Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit 
(Independent Post and Telecommunications Regulator) : ........................................ http://www.opta.nl 
Nederlandse Mededingsautoriteit, NMa : .............................  http://info-0  l.mine~.nl/nm~t/ind~x~t.html 
lAU 
j  Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaftliche Augelenheiten 
~ (RMwA) : ............................................................  http://www.hmwa.~v.;lt/hmw~t/wt•Uiww/start.htm 
j Austrian (iovcrnment on-line:. .  ......... ................ ....... .........  ..  ...  ......  .  hUp://www.;lustria.'-!\'.at/ 
dlundcsministcrium liir Wisscnschall und  Vcrkchr .  ..  ............... . ...... ....  .  hii(J://www.hmwf.~:,·.:~tl 
jPT 
11 NFOC  I f) - I ntcrdcpartmcntal and citizen-oriented 
~information system in Portugal : ..................................... http://www.infodd.pt/En~dish/wt."lt'onu·.htnt  I  SAPO/ Entidades Govemamentais: ........................................ http://www.sapo.pt/rulturais/!!onmo/ 
l Fl 
I  Telecommunication's Administration Centre (T AC) :  ...........................  http://www.thk.ti/~n.gl:anti.htm 
I Ministry ofT  ran sport and Communications :  .............................. http://www.  ,·n.fi/nJ!Im/,· ho/1 )'\'. h hn 
lSW 
~:-
)  Kommunikationsdcpartementet ............................................................... . 
1· ........... http://wwww  .sh.gov  .se/info  _ rosenhad/departement/kommnn  ik:11 ion/kom  mnn  ika  1  ion.  h  1  ml 
~UK 
!  Oftel  : ............................................................................... http://www.op~n.gov.ukloft~l/oftt•lhm.htm 
!on:.  .. ......................................................  hU(l:(/www.npt·n.'-!o\·.uk/oft/ofthmnt•.htm 
j Monopolies and  Mergers Commission  ..................... http://www.opt•n.J!O\'.Uii/mmr/ 
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Iceland :the Icelandic Government:  .............................................. http://www.stjr.is/en/stjrenOl.htm 
Norway : Official Documentation and Information : ..........................  http://odin.dep.no/html/english/ 
Switzerland : Federal Office for Communications:  ··············~················  http://www.admin.ch/h~tkom/ 
US  : Federal Communications Commission :  ........................................................  http://www.fcr.gov 
US  : Department of Justice: ......................  http://infosector.com/thecapital/government/justin.·.htm 
US  : Federal Trade Commission : ............................................... .'...............  .. ..  http://www.ftr.go,· 
US  National Telecommunications & Information Administration : ................  http://www.ntia.dor.gov/ 
(Advisory committee on public interest obligations of  digital television broadcasters : 
........................................................................ http://www.ntia.doc.gov/puhintadvrom/puhint.hhn) 
Canada·  Bureau de Ia Concurrence: .............................................  http://data.etn.nn:.ra/ttrlrnnh.·nt 
G7 Information Society Pilot Projects:......................................................  http///honwr.ir.gr.ra/G7/ 
Japan: l\1inistry of Posts and Telecommunications: ....................  http://www.mpt.go.jp/indt·x-t·.html 
MT  I  .... : hU p://www  .s;atu.glorom.ar.j  p/N 1(\\'  S/1\ IITI-tlor.ht ml 
Austrialia  Australian Telecoms Authority :  .......... .  http://ww\\ .austl'l.guLau 
Telecom Policy Papers:........... .............. ................. ..................  http://ftp.dra.guY.an puh dors 
Australian Competition Law Pages ....................................... http:/1138.25.66.1 0 1/-slt.·ung/indt·x.html 
New Zealand, Ministry of  Cimmerce, 
Competition and Enterprise Branch ................................... http://www.moc.govt.nz/cat.•/bus_law.html 
ITU:  .................................................................................................... . 
World Telecommunications Policy Forum :  ............................................. .. 
....  http://www  .itu.int 
http://www.itu.int/wtpf/ 
WTO: ....................................................................................................... .  ........... http://wto.org ~ 
Legal texts and  instruments: ....................................... http://wto.org/wto/Puhlirations/wtopuh.html 
Qrganj~'->ation f(Jr  l·:conomic Co-operaton and  Development : .'...  .  http://www.nt•rtl.nrg. 
( 'ompl't it ilHl I Ant it rust  Poli~.:y llomcpagc  ht t p://ww\\ .twrtl.nrgitlaLrrp 
Telecommunications & Information Services Policy : .................... http://www  .ot.•nl.org/dst i/tisp.ht ml 
NAFT A : ........................................................................................... http://www.nafta.net/t.•fNii.htm 
World Bank : ...................................................................................... http://www-t.•st.l.wo.-ldhanl\.or~ 
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................. http://www  .inm;t rsat .org/inm;1 rsa t 
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COMMISSION  DIRECTIVE  95/51/EC 
of  18  October 1995 
amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the abolition of the restrictions 
on the use of cable television networks for the provision of already liberalized 
telecommunications services 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 




Und.:r  Cvmmission  Directive  90/388/EEC  of  28 
June 1990 on competition in the  markets for tele-
communications services (!),  as  amended by Direc-
tive  94/46/Ef. (2),  certain  telecommunications· 
services  were  opened  to  competition,  and  the 
Member States were  requested to  take the measures 
necessary  to  ensure  that any operator was  entitled 
to  supply such services ;  as  far  as  voice  telephony 
services  to  the  general  public  are  concerned,  the 
Council  Resolution  of  22  July  1993 (l)  acknow-
ledges  that  this  exception  can  be  terminated  by  1 
January  1998,  with  a  transitional  period  for  some , 
Member States ; the telex service, mobile communi-
cations and radio and television broadcasting to  the 
public were  specifically excluded from  the scope of 
the  Directive ;  satellite  communications  were 
included  in  the  scope  of  the  Directive  through 
Directive  94/46/EC.  · 
During  the  public  consultation  organized  by  the 
Commission  in  1992  on  the  situation  in  the  tele-
communications sector, following the Communica-
tion  of  the  Commission of  21  October  1992,  the 
effectiveness  of  the  measures  liberalizing the  tele-
communications sector and in particular the libera-
lization  of  data  communications,  value  added 
services and the provision of data and voice services 
to corporate users and closed user groups, was ques-
tioned by many service  providers and users  of such 
services. 
The  regulatory  restnct10ns  preventing  the  use  of 
alternative infrastructure for the provision of libera-
lized  services,  and  in  panicular the  restrictions  on 
the use of cable TV networks, are  the main cause of 
this  continuing  bottleneck  situation.  Potential 
service  providers  must  now  rely  on  transmission 
capacity - 'leased  lines'  - provided  by  the  tele-
communications organizations, which are often also 
(')  OJ  No  L  192,  14.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
(1)  OJ  No  L 168,  19.  10.  1994,  p.  15. 
(')  OJ  No  C  213,  6.  8.  1993,  p.  I. 
(3) 
(4) 
competitors  in  the  area  of liberalized  services. To 
remedy this  problem, the  European  Parliament, in 
its  Resolucion  of 20  April  1993 { 4), called upon the 
Commission to adopt as soon as  possible the neces-
sary measures to  take full advantage of the potential 
of the existing infrastructure of cable  networks for 
telecommunications services and to abolish without 
delay the existing restrictions in the Member States 
on  the  use  of  cable  networks  for  non-reserved 
services. 
Following  that  resolution  the  Commission 
completed  two  studies  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
networks and alternative infrastructures for the deli-
very  of  those  telecommunications  services  which 
have  already  been  opened  to  competition  under 
Community law :  The  effects  of  liberalization  of 
satellite  infrastructure  on the  corporate  and closed 
user group market', Analysis,  1994 and 'L'impact de 
l'autorisation  de  Ia  fourniture  de  services  de  tele-
communications  liberalises  par  les  cablo-
operateurs'  by  Idate,  1994.  The  basic  findings  of 
those  studies  emphasize  the  potential  role  for, 
amongst  other  things,  cable  TV  networks,  in 
meeting  the  concerns  raised  about  the  relatively 
slow  pace  of  innovation  and  delayed  development 
of liberalized services in  the European Community. 
Opening such  networks  would  help  to  overcome 
the  problems  of  high  pricing  levels  and  lack  of 
suitable  capacity,  which  are  largely due  to  current 
exclusive  provision  of  infrastructure  in  most 
Member States.  The  networks  operated  by autho-
rized cable TV providers indeed offer opportunities 
for  the supply of an increasing number of services, 
apart from TV broadcasts,  if  additional investment 
is  forthcoming.  The  example  of  the  US  market 
shows that new services combining image and tele-
communications  emerge  when  certain  regulatory 
barriers  are  removed. 
Some  Member  States  have  therefore  abolished 
previous  restrictions on the  provision  of some data 
services  and/or non-reserved telephone services  on 
cable  TV  networks.  One  Member  State  permits 
voice  telephony.  Other  Member  States  have, 
however,  maintained  severe  restrictions  on  the 
provision of services  other than  the distribution  of 
TV  broadcasts  on  those  networks. 
(•)  OJ  No  C  150,  31.  5.  1993,  p.  39. 




The current restrictions imposed by  Member States 
on  the  use  of cable TV networks  for  the  provision 
of  services  other  than  the  distribution  of  TV 
broadcasts  aim  to  prevent  the  provision  of  public 
voice  telephony by  means of  networks  other than 
the  public switched  telephone network,  to  protect 
the main source of revenue of the telecommunica-
tions  organizations. 
Exclusive  rights  to  provide  public voice  telephony 
were  granted  to  most  of  the  telecommunications 
organizations  of  the  Community,  to  guarantee 
them  the  financial  resources  necessary  for  the 
provision  and exploitation  of a  universal  network, 
that  is  to  say,  one  having  general  geographical 
coverage  and  provided  to  any  service  provider  or 
user  upon  request  within  a  reasonable  period  of 
time. 
Since  those  restrictions  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
networks  are  brought about by State  measures and 
seek,  in  each  of  the  national  markets  where  they 
exist,  to  favour  telecommunications  organization~. 
which  the  Member  States  own  or  to  which  they 
have granted special or exclusive rights, the restric-
tions  must be  assessed  under Article  90  (1)  of  the 
EC Treaty. This Article requires Member States not 
to  enact or maintain  in  force  any  measures  regar-
ding such undertakings which defeat' the object of 
Treaty provisions, and in particular of  the competi-
tion rules. It includes a prohibition on maintaining 
measures  regarding  telecommunications  organiza-
tions which result in  limiting the free  provision of 
services within the Community or lead to abuses of 
a dominant  position  to  the detriment of  the  users 
of  a  given  service. 
The granting of exclusive rights to  the telecommu-
nications  organizations  to  provide  transmission 
capacity  for  the  provision  of  telecommunications 
services  to  the  public  and  the  consequent regula-
tory  restrictions  on  the  use  of  cable  TV  networks 
for  purposes  other  than  the  distribution  of  radio 
and  television  broadcasting  programmes,  in  parti-
cular, for new services such as  interactive television 
and  video  on  demand  as  well  as  multimedia-
services  in  the  Community,  which  otherwise 
cannot be  provided,  necessarily limits  the  freedom 
to  provide  such services  to  or from  other Member 
States. Such  regulatory  restrictions  can not be  justi-
fied  for  public policy reasons or in  terms of essen-
tial  requirements, since the latter. and in  particular 
the essential  requirement of interworking networks 
wherever  cable  TV networks  and  telecommunica-
tions  networks  are  interconnected, can  be  guaran-
teed  by less  restrictive  measures, $UCh  as  objective, 
non-discriminatory and  transparent  declaration  or 
licensing conditions. 
{8)  The measures granting exclusive  rights to  the tele-
communications organizations for  the  provision of 
transmission  capacity and  the  consequent regula-
tory restrictions on the use  of cable TV infrastruc-
ture  for  the  provision of other telecom~unications 
services already open to competition are therefore a 
breach  of  Article  90,  read  in  conjunction  with 
Article  59  of the Treaty. The fact ..that. the  restric-
tions  apply  without  distinction  to  all  companies 
other than the relevant telecommunications organi-
zations  is  not sufficient to  remove  the  preferential 
treatment of the latter from  the scope of Article 59 
of the Treaty. Indeed it is  not necessary for all  the 
companies  of  a  Member  State  to  be  favoured  in 
relation  to  the  foreign  companies.  It  is  sufficient 
that  the  preferential  treatment  should  benefit 
certain  national  operators. 
(9)  Article  86  of the Treaty prohibits as  incompatible 
with  the common  market  any  cond~ct by one  or 
more  undertakings  holding  dominant  positions 
that  constitutes  an  abuse  of  a  dominant  position 
within the common market or a substantial part of 
it. 
(10)  In  each relevant national market the telecommuni-
cations organizations hold a dominant position for 
the provision of transmission capacity for  telecom-
munications services because they are the only ones 
with  a  public  telecommunications  network 
covering  the  whole  territory  of  those  States. 
Another factor  in  this dominant position concerns 
the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  market  and  in 
particular its highly capital-intensive nature. Taking 
account  of  the  amount  of  investment  needed  to 
duplicate a network. there is  a high reliance on use 
of  existing  networks. This  enhances  the  structural 
dominance  of  the  relevant  telecommunications 
organizations and constitutes a  potential  barrier to 
entry. Thirdly, as  a result of their market share, the 
telecommunications  organizations  further  benefit 
from  detailed  information  on  telecommunications 
flows  which  is  not  available  to  new  entrants.  It 
includes information on subscribers' usage  patterns, 
I  2 !6.  10.  95  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  No  L  256/51 
necessary to target specific groups of users,  and on 
price  elasticities  of  demand  in  each  market 
segment and region of the country. Finally, the fact 
that the relevant telecommunications organizations 
enjoy  exclusive  rights  for  the  provision  of  voice 
telephony  also  contributes  to  their  dominance  in 
the neighbouring, but distinct, market for  telecom-
munications  capacity. 
11)  The mere creation of a dominant position within a 
given  market  through  the  grant  of  an  exclusive 
right  is  not, as  such, incompatible with  Article  86. 
A  Member State  is,  however,  not allowed  to  main-
tain  a  legal  monopoly where  the  relevant  underta-
king is  compelled or induced to abuse its dominant 
position  in  a  way  that  is  liable  to  affect  trade 
between  Member States. 
: 2)  The  prohibition  of  the  use  of  other infrastructure, 
and in  particular CATV networks, for  the provision 
of telecommunications services has  encouraged the 
telecommunications  organizations  to  charge  high 
prices in comparison with prices in other countries, 
whereas  innovation  in  European corporate networ-
king and  competitive  service  provision  as  well  as 
the implementation of applications proposed in the 
'Report  on  Europe  and  the  global  information 
society', are  critically dependent on  the availability 
of  infrastructure,  in  particular of  leased  circuits  at 
decreasing  costs.  Tariffs  for  such  high-capacity 
infrastructure are on average  10  times higher in the 
Community than  equivalent capacity  o.ver  equiva-
lent distances in  North America. In  the absence of 
a  justification,  in  the form  of (for  example) higher 
costs,  these  tariffs  must  be  considered  abusive 
within the meaning of point (a) of the second para-
graph  of  Article  86. 
Those  high  prices  in  the Community are  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  restnctlons  imposed  by 
Member States  on  the  use  of  infrastructures  other 
than  those  of  the  telecommunications  organiza-
tions,  and  in  particular  of  those  of  the  cable  TV 
operators, for  the  provision of telecommunications 
services. Such high prices cannot only be ·explained 
by the underlying costs, given the substantial diffe-
rences  in  tariffs  between  Member  States  where 
similar cost  structures  could  be  expected. 
3)  Moreover, the State measures preventing the CATV 
operators  from  offering  transmission  capacity  in 
competition  wath  the  telecommunications  organi-
zations  for  the  provision  of  liberalized  services 
restrict the overall supply of capacity in  the market 
and  eliminate  incentives  for  telecommunications 
organizations  to  quickly  increase  the  capacity  of 
their networks, to reduce average costs and to lower 
tariffs.  The  resulting  high  tariffs  charged  by  the 
telecommunications  organizations  for,  and  the 
shortage  of,  the  basic  infrastructure  provided  by 
these  organizations over which  liberalized  services 
might  be  offered  by  third  parties  have  delayed 
widespread  development  of  high-speed  corporate 
networks,  remote  accessing  of  databases  by  both 
business  and residential  users  and the deployment 
of  innovative services such as  telebanking, distance 
learning,  computer-aided  marketing,  etc.  (See 
communication  to  the  European  Parliament  and 
the  Council  of  25  October  1994  'Green  Paper on 
the  liberalization of telecommunications infrastruc-
ture  and cable television  networks : Part One'). The 
networks  of  the  telecommunications organizations 
currently fail  to  meet all  potential  market demand 
for  transmission capacity for  the provision of these 
telecommunications  services,  as  emphasized  by 
users  and suppliers of such services rcommunica-
tion  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament 
on  the  consultation  on  the  review  o·{  th~  ~ituation 
in  the telecommunications sector' of 28  April 1993, 
page  5,  point  2;  the  findings  made  during  the 
review  thus  showed  that  the  mere  obligation  to 
provide  leased  lines on demand was  not sufficient 
to  avoid  restrictions  on  access  to  the  markets  in 
telecommunications  services  and  limits  on  user's 
freedom  of  choice). 
The  current  restrictions  on  the  use  of  CATV 
networks  for  the  provision  of  such  services  there-
fore  create  a  situation  in  which  the  mere exercise 
by  the  telecommunications  organization  of  their 
exclusive  right to  provide transmission capacity for 
public  telecommunications  services  limits,  within 
the  meaning of  point (b)  of the second  paragraph 
of Article 86 of the Treaty, the emergence of,  inttr 
alia,  new applications  such as  pay per view,  inte-
ractive  television  and video  on demand  as  well  as 
multimedia-services in the Community, combining 
both  audio-visual  and  telecommunications,  which 
often  cannot  adequately  be  provided  on  the 
networks of  the  telecommunications organizations. 
On  the  other hand,  given  the  restncnons  on  the 
number of services which they may offer, cable TV 
operators  often  postpone  investments  in  their 
networks and in particular the introduction of opti-
cal-fibre  which  could  be  profitable  if  they were  to 
be spread over a larger number of services provided. 
Consequently,  restrictions  on  the  use  of cable  TV 
networks  to  provide  services  other than  broadcas-
ting  also  have  the  effect  of  delaying  the  develop-
ment of  new  telecommunications and  multimedia 
services,  and  thus  holding back  technical  progress 
in  this  area. 
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(1<4)  Lastly, as was recalled by the Court of Justice of the 
European  Communities  in  its  Judgment  of  19 
March  1991  in  Case  C-202/88,  Franct  v.  Commis· 
sion (1), a system of undistorted competition, as  laid 
down in the Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equa-
lity  of opportunity is  secured  between  the  various 
economic operators. Resemng to  one undertaking 
which  markets  telecommunications  services  the 
task of supplying the indispensable raw material-
transmission  capacity - to  all  companies offering 
telecommunications  services  proved,  however, 
tantamount  to  conferring  upon  it  the  power  to 
determine at will which service could be offered by 
its  competitors, at which costs  and in which time 
periods, and to monitor their clients and the traffic 
generated  by its  competitors, thereby  putting that 
undertaking  at  an  obvious  advantage  over  its 
competitors. 
(15)  The exclusive rights granted to the telecommunica-
tions organization  to  provide  transmission capacity 
for  telecommunications services  to  the  public and 
the  resulting  restrictions  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
networks  for  the  provision  of  liberalized  services 
are  therefore  incompatible  with  Article  90  (1)  in 
conjunction with  Article  86  of  the  Treaty.  Article 
90  (2)  of  the  Treaty  provides  for  an  exception  to 
Article  86  in  cases  where  the  application  of  th~ 
latter would obstruct the performance, in law or itt 
fact,  of the particular tasks assigned to the telecom-
munications organizations. Pursuant to  that  provi-
sion,  the  Commission  investigated  the  impact  of 
liberalizing  the  use  of  the  cable  networks  for  the 
provision  of  telecommunications  and  multimedia 
services. 
Pursuant to  Directive 90/388/EEC, Member States 
may  until  a  certain  date  continue  to  reserve  the 
provision of  voi~e telephony to  their national tele-
communications  organization  so  as  to  guarantee 
sufficient  revenues  for  the  establishment  of  a 
r universal  telephone  network.  Voice  telephony  is 
defined in Article 1 of Directive 90/388/EEC as  the 
commercial  provision  for  the  public  of the  direct 
transport  and  switching  of  speech  in  real  time 
between  public  switched  network  termination 
points,  enabling  any  user  to  use  equipment 
connected to such a  network termination  point in 
order  to  communicate  with  another  termination 
point.  Where  cable  TV  networks  are  transformed 
into switched  networks  providing voice  telephony 
to  any subscriber, such networks should likewise be 
considered  to  be  public  switched  networks  and 
their  termination  points  as  termination  points  of 
such  networks.  The  relevant  voice  service  would 
(I)  [1991}  ECR  1-1271.  paragraph  51. 
then  become  voice  telephony, which according to 
Article 2 of Directive 90/388/EEC could further be 
prohibited on  cable  TV  networks  by the  Member 
States. 
It appears  that such  temporary prohibition  of the 
provision  of  voice  telephony  on  the  cable  TV 
network can be justified on the same grounds as  for 
telecommunications  networks.  Conversely  where 
switched  voice  services  for  closed  user  groups, 
and/or  transparent  transmission  capacity  in  the 
form  of  leased  lines,  are  provided  on  cable  TV 
networks,  those  networks  do  not  represent  public 
switched  networks  and Member States  should not 
restrict  the  relevant  services,  even  when  they 
involve  the  use  of one connection  point with  the 
public  switched  telephone  network. 
Besides  the  case  of  voice  telephony,  no  other 
restrictions  for  the provision of liberalized services 
is  justified  under  Article  90  (l),  particularly  if 
regard is  had to the small contribution made to the 
turnover  of  the  telecommunications  organizations 
by those services, currently provided on their own 
networks,  which  could  be  diverted  towards  the 
cable TV networks. It is  recalled  that the measures 
liberalizing the provision of voice telephony shoul~ 
take  into account the  need  to  finance  a  universal 
service  including any development in the concept, 
see  point  V  .2  in  the  Communication  from  the 
Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament of  3  May  1995. 
(16)  Notwithstanding  the  abolition  of  the  current 
restrictions on the use of cable TV networks, where 
the  provision  of services  is  concerned,  the  same 
licensing or declaration  procedures  could  be  laid 
down as  for  the  provision  of the  same services on 
the  public  telecommunications  networks. 
(17)  In  addition,  the  distribution  of  audiovisual 
programmes  intended  for  the  general  public  via 
those  networks,  and  the  content  of  such 
programmes, will continue to  be subject to specific 
rules adopted by Member States in accordance with 
Community law and is  not, therefore, subject to the 
provisions  of  this  Directive. 
(18)  Where Member States grant to  the same  underta-
king the right to  establish both cable TV and tele-
communications  networks,  they  put  the  underta-
king in  a situation whereby it  has  no  incentive to 
attract users to the network best suited to the provi-
sion of the relevant service, as  long as  it  has spare 
capacity  on  the  other  network.  In  that  case,  the 
undertaking  has,  on  the  contracy,  an  interest  for 
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overcharging for  use  of the  cable  infrastructure for 
the  provision  of  non-reserved services,  in  order  to 
increase  the  traffic  on  their  telecommunications 
networks. The introduction of  fair  competition will 
often  require  specific  measures  that  take  into 
account  the  specific  circumstances  of  the  relevant 
markets.  Given  the  disparities  between  Member 
States,  the  national  authorities  are  best  able  to 
assess  which  measures  are  the  most  appropriate, 
and in  particular to  judge  whether a separation  of 
the  activities  is  indispensable.  In  early  stages  of 
liberalization,  detailed  control  of  cross-subsidies 
and accounting transparency are  essential. To allow 
the  monitoring  of  any  improper  behaviour, 
Member States  should  therefore  at  least  impose  a 
clear  separation  of  financial  records  between  the 
two  activities,  though  full  structural  separation  is 
preferable. 
9)  In  order to  allow  the  monitoring of any improper 
cross-subsidies  between  the  broadcasting  tasks  of 
cable  TV  operators  which  are  provided  under 
exclusive  rights  in a given  franchise  area  and  their 
business as  providers  of  capacity  for  telecommuni-
cations  services,  Member  States  should  guarantee 
transparency  as  regards  the  use  of  resources  from 
one  activity. which  could  be  used  to  extend  the 
dominant position  to  the  other market.  Given  the 
complexity  of  the  financial  records  of  network 
providers,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  detect  cross-
subsidies  within  it  between  the  reserved  activities 
and the services  provided under competitive condi-
tions. It is  thus necessary to  require those cable 1V 
operators to  keep separate financial  records, and  in 
particular to  identify separately costs  and  revenues 
associated  with  the  provision  of  the  services 
supplied  under  their  exclusive  rights  and  those 
provided  under competitive  conditions  once  they 
achieve  a  significant  turnover  in  telecommunica-
tions  activities  in  the  licensed  area.  For  the  time 
being,  a  turnover  of  more  than  ECU  50  million 
should be considered a significant turnover. Where 
such  a  requirement would  constitute  an  excessive 
burden on the relevant undertaking, Member States 
may  grant deferments  for  limited  periods,  subject 
to  prior  notification  to  the  Commission  of  the 
underlying  justifications. 
The operators concerned should use an  appropriate 
cost  accounting  system  which  can  be  verified  by 
accounting experts and which  ensures  the  produc-
tion  of  recorded  figures. 
The  above  separation  of  accounts  should,  for  this 
purpose  at  least,  apply  the  principles  set  out  in 
Article  10 (2)  of Council Directive  92/~/EEC  of 5 
June  1992  on  the  application  of  open  network 
prov1s1on  to  leased  lines (1),  as  amended  by 
Commission  Decision  94/439/EC (2).  Hybrid 
services,  made  up  of  elemencs  falling  variously 
within  the  reserved  and  the  competitive  services, 
should  distinguish  between  the  coscs  of  each 
element. 
(20)  In  the event that.  in  the  meantime, no competing 
home-delivery system is  authorized by  the  relevant 
Member  State,  the  Commission  will  reconsider 
whether separation of accounts is sufficient to avoid 
impropec  practices  and  will  assess  whether  such 
joint provision does not result in a limitation of the 
potential  supply  of  transmission  capacity  at  the 
expense  of  the  services  providers  in  the  relevant 
area,  or  whether  further  measures  are  warranted. 
(21)  Member States should refrain from introducing new 
measures with the purpose or effc.:ct  of  jeopardizing 
the  aim  of  this  Directive, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECfiVE : 
Article  1 
Directive  90/388/EEC  is  hereby  amended  as  follows : 
1.  Article  1 (1)  is  amended  as  follows: 
(a)  the  fifth  indent  is  replaced  by  the  following : 
'- "telecommunications  services'"  means  services 
whose  provision  consiscs  wholly  or  partly  in 
the transmission and/or routing of signals on a 
telecommunications  network.' 
(b)  the  following  is  added  after  the  last  indent: 
'- "cable  TV  network"  means  any  wire-based 
infrastructure approved  by a  Member State  for 
the delivery or distribution  of  radio  or televi-
sion  signals  to  the  public. 
This  Directive  shall  be  without  prejudice  to  the 
specific  rules  adopted  by  the  Member  States  in 
accordance  with  Community  law,  governing  the 
distribution  of  audiovisual  programmes  intended 
for  the  general  public,  and  the  content  of  such 
programmes.' 
(I)  OJ  No  L  165,  19.  6.  1992,  p.  27. 
(l)  OJ  No  L  18"1.  15.  7.  1994,  p.  40. 
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2.  In  Article  4,  the  following  is  inserted  after the second 
paragraph: 
'Membe~r States  shall : 
- abolish  all  restrictions  on  the  supply of  transmis-
sion  ca.pacity  by  cable  TV  networks  and allow  the 
use  of cable networks for  the  provision of telecom-
munications services, other th.an voice telephony ; 
ensure  that interconnection  of  cable  TV networks 
with  the  public  telecommunications  network  is 
authorized for such purpose, in  particular intercon-
nection  with  leased  lines,  and that the  restrictions 
on the direct interconnection of cable TV networks 
by  cable  TV  operators  are  abolished.' 
Articlt  2 
When  abolishing  restncuons  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
networks,  Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary 
measures  to  ensure  accounting  transparency  and  to 
prevent  discriminatory  behaviour,  where  an  operator 
having an  exclusive right to  provide  public telecommuni-
cations  network  infrastructure  also  provides  cable  TV 
network  infrastructure ;  and  in  particular  to  ensure  the 
separation of financial accounts as  concerns the provision 
of each network and its activity as  provider of telecommu-
nication  services. 
Where an operator has an  exclusive right to provide cable 
television  network infrastructure  in  a given area  Member 
States shall also ensure that the operator concerned keeps 
separate  financial  accounts  regarding  its  activity  as 
network  capacity  provider  for  telecommunications 
purposes  as  soon  as  it  achieves  a turnover of  more  than 
ECU  50  million  in  the  market  for  telecommunications 
services other than the distribution of  radio and broadcas-
ting services  in  the relevant geographic area. Where such 
requirement would constitute an excessive  burden on the 
relevant  undertaking,  Member  States  may  grant  defer-
ments for  limited periods, subject to  prior notification  to 
the  Commission  of  the  underlying  justification. 
Where a  single operator provides  both  networks  or both ' 
services as  referred to in the first  paragraph, the Commis-
sion  shall,  before  1  January  1998,  carry  out  an  overall 
assessment of the imapct of  such  joint provision  in  rela-
tion  to  the  aims  of  this  Directive. 
Article J 
Member States shall supply to  the Commission, not later 
than  nine  months  after  this  Directive  has  entered  into 
force,  such  information  as  will  allow  the Commission to 
confirm that Articles 1 and 2 have been complied with. 
Article  4 
This Directive shall enter into force on 1 January 1996. 
Article  5 
This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  18  October  1995. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
1W.ember  of the  Commission 
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CORRIGENDA 
Corrigendum to Commission Directive 95/Sl/EC of 18  October 1995  amending Directive 
90/388/EEC with regard to the abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable television 
networks  for  the provision  of already  liberalized telecommunications services 
(Official journal of the  Europtan  Communities  No  L  256  of 26  October  1995) 
Page  53,  Article  1 (I)  point  (b): 
for:  ·- "cable TV network" means any wire·bued infrastructure approved by a Member Stale for 
delivery  or distribution  of  radio  or television  signals  to  the  public.', 
rtad·  '- ·cable TV network· means any mainly wire-based infrastructure approved  by a Member 
State  for  delivery  or distribution  of  radio  or television  signals  to  the  public.' 
No  L 308/59 
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COMMISSION  DIRECfiVE 96/2/EC 
of 16  January 1996 
amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with  regard  to  mobile  and  personal 
communications 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community,  and  in  particular  Article  90  (3)  thereof, 
Whereas: 
(1)  In  its  communication  on  the  consultation  on  the 
Green  Paper on mobile and  personal communica-
tions  of  23  November  1994,  the  Commission  set 
out the major actions required for the future regula-
tory environment necessary to exploit the potential 
of this means of communication. It emphasized the 
need  for  the  abolition,  as  soon  as  possible,  of  all 
remaining exclusive and special rights in the sector 
through full  application of CommunitY on compe-
tition  rules  and with  the  amendment of  Commis-
sion  Directive  90/388/EEC  of  28  June  1990 
competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services ('),  as  last  amended  by  Directive 
9  5/51 /EC (Z),  where  required.  Moreover,  the 
communication  considered  removing  restrictions 
on  the  free  choice of  underlying facilities  used  by 
mobile  network  operators  for  the  operation  and 
development of  their  networks  for  those  activities 
which are allowed by the licences or authorizations. 
Such a step was  seen  as  essential  in  order to  over  .. 
come current distortions of fair competition and, in 
particular, to allow such operators control over their 
cost  base. 
(2)  The  Council  Resolution  of  29  June  1995  on  the 
further  development  of  mobile  and  personal 
communications  in  the  European  Union (3)  gave 
general  support to  the  actions  required,  as  set  out 
in  the  Commission's  communication  of  23 
November  1994,  and  considered  as  one  of  the 
major  goals  the  abolition  of  exclusive  or  special 
rights  in  this  area. 
(3)  The  European  Parliament,  in  its  Resolution  of  14 
December  1995 concerning the  draft  Commission 
Directive  amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with 
(')  OJ  No  L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
(Z)  OJ  No  L  256,  26.  10.  1995,  p.  49. 
(l)  OJ  No  C  !88,  22.  7.  1995,  p.  3 .. 
regard  to  mobile and  personal  communications (4), 
welcomed  this Directive in  both its  principles and 
its  objectives. 
(4)  Several  Member  States  have  already  opened  up 
certain mobile communications services to  compe-
tition  and  introduced  licensing  schemes  for  such 
services. ·Nevertheless,  the  number  of  licences 
granted is still restricted in many Member States on 
the  basis  of discretion  or,  in the case  of  operators 
competing with  telecommunications  organizations 
subject  to  technical  restrictions  such. as  a  ban  on 
using  infrastrucrure  other than  those  provided  by 
the  telecommunications  organization.  Many 
Member States, for  example, have  still  not granted 
licences  for  DCS  1800  mobile  telephony. 
In  addition, some Member States  have  maintained 
exclusive  rights for  the provision of certain mobile 
and  personal  communications  services  granted  to 
the  national  telecommunications  organization. 
(5)  Directive 90/388/EEC provides for  the abolition of 
special  or  exclusive  rights  granted  by  Member 
States  in  respect of the  provision  of  telecommuni-
cations services. However, the Directive does not as 
yet  apply  to  mobile  services. 
(6)  Where  the  number of  undertakings  authorized  to 
provide  mobile  and  personal · communications 
services  is  limited  by  Member  St~tes through  the 
existence of special  rights  and a fortiori exclusive 
rights,  these constitute restrictions' which would  be 
incompatible  with  Article  90  in  conjunction  with 
Article  59  of the Treaty whenever such limitation is 
not justified under specific Treaty provisions or the 
essential  requirements,  since  these  rights  prevent 
other  undertakings  from  supplying  the  services 
concerned,  to  and  from  other Member  States.  In 
the  case  of  mobile  and  personal  communication 
networks  aud  services,  the  applicable  essential 
requirements  encompass  the  effective  use  of  the 
frequency  spectrum  and  the  avoidance  of  harmful 
interference  becween  radio-based,  space-based  or 
terrestrial  technical  systems.  Consequendy, 
provided  that  the  equipment  used  to  offer  the 
services  also  satisfies  these  essential  requirements, 
the  current special  rights  and  a fortiori exclusive 
(•)  Resolution  A4-0306/95. 
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(7) 
rights  on  the  provasaon  of  mobile  services  are  not 
justified  and  therefore  should  be  treated  in  the 
same way  as  the other telecommunications services 
already  ..:overed  by  Directive  90/388/EEC.  The 
scope of  application of  that Directive should accor-
dingly  be  extended  so  as  to  include  mobile  and 
personal  communications  services. 
When  opening  the  markets  for  mobile  and 
personal  communications  to  competition  Member 
States  should  give  preference  to  the  use  of  Pan-
European standards in the area,  such as  GSM,  DCS . 
1800,  DECf and  ERMES,  in  order to  allow deve-
lopment and  transborder  provision  of  mobile  and 
personal  communications services. 
(8)  Certain  Member  States  have  currently  granted 
licences  for  dig1tal  mobile  radio-based  services 
making  use  of  frequencies  in  the  1 700  to  1 900 
Mhz  band,  according  to  the  DCS  1800  standard. 
The Commission communication of  23  November 
1994  established  that  DCS  1800  is  to  be  seen  as 
part of the GSM  system family. The other Member 
States have  not authorized such se!)'ices even where 
frequencies  are  available  in  this  band,  thereby 
preventing  the  cross-border  provision  of  such 
services. This  is  also  incompatible with  Article  90 
in  conjunction  with  Article  59.  To  remedy  this 
situation, Member States  which  have  not yet  esta: 
blished  a  procedure  for  granting  such  licenceS'"· 
should  do  so  within  a  reasonable  time-frame.  In 
this  context,  due  account  should  be  taken  of  the 
requirement  to  promote  investments  by  new 
entrants  in  these  areas.  Member  States  should  be 
able  to  refrain  from  granting a  licence  to  existing 
operators, for example to operators of GSM systems 
already present on their territory, if  it can be shown 
that  this  would  eliminate effective  competition  in 
particular by  the extension of  a dominant position. 
In  particular,  where  a  Member State  grants or has 
already granted DCS  1800 licences, the granting of 
new or supplementary licences for existing GSM  or 
DCS  1800  operators  may  take  place  only  under 
conditions  ensuring  effective  competition. 
(9)  Dig1tal  European  cordless  telecommunicatibns 
(DECI) services  are  also  an  essential  element for 
the  development  towards  personal  communica-
tions. DEer provides  an  alternative  to  the current 
local  loop access  to  the  public switched  telephone 
network. On 3  June  1991,  the  Council,  by  Direc-
tive 91/287/EEC, designated coordinated frequency 
bands  for  the  introduction  of  DECT  into  the 
Community(') to be implemented not later than 31 




December  1991.  Certain  Member  States  are, 
however,  preventing  the  use  of  these  frequencies 
for  such  services  by  refusing  to  grant  licences  to 
companies  which  intend  to  start  offering  DECI' 
services.  Where  telecommunications  orgcmizations 
were granted exclusive  rights  for  the establishment 
of  the  public  switched  telephone  network,  the 
effect of  such refusals  is  to  strengthen  their domi-
nant  position  and also  to  delay  the  emergence of 
personal  communications  services  and  therefore 
restricts  technical  progress  at  the  expense  of  the 
users  contrary  to  Article  90  of  the  Treaty  in 
conjunction with  point (b) of Article 86. To remedy 
this  situation  Member  States  which  have  not  yet 
established  a  procedure  for  granting such  licences 
should also do so within a reasonable time-frame. 
Even  where  licences  were  granted  to  competing 
mobile  operators,  Member  States  have  in  certain 
cases  granted  to  one  of  them,  in  a  discretionary 
manner,  special  legal  advantages  which  were  not 
granted to  others. In  such  a situation, these advan-
tages  may  be  counterbalanced  by  special  obliga-
tions  and  do  not,  necessarily,  preclude  the  latter 
from  entering and  competing in  the  market. The 
compatibility of  these  advantages  with  the  Treaty 
must therefore  be  assessed  on a  case-by-case  basis 
taking  into  account  their  impact  on  the  effective 
freedom of other entities to  provide, in an  efficient 
manner, the same  telecommunications service  and 
their  possible  justifications  regarding  the  activity 
concerned. 
The  exclusive  rights  that  currently  exist  m  the 
mobile  communications  field  were  generally 
granted  to  organizations  which  already  enjoyed  a 
~ominant  position  in  creating  the  terrestrial 
networks, or to one of their subsidiaries. In  such a 
situation,  these  rights  have  the effect of extending 
the dominant position  enjoyed  by those  organiza-
tions  and  therefore  strengthe11ing  that  position, 
which,  according  to  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice, constitutes an abuse ot' a dominant position 
contrary to Article  86 of  the Treaty. The exclusive 
rights granted in the mobile and personal commu-
nications field  are  consequently incompatible with 
Article  90  read  in  conjunction  with  Article  86. 
These  exclusive  rights  should  consequently  be 
abolished. 
Moreover, as  regards new mobile services, given the 
difficulty  of  ensuring  that  telecommunications 
organizations  in  those  Member  States  with  less 
developed networks which would qualify for a tran-
sitional  time  period for  the  abolition of the exclu-
sive  rights  for  the establishment and use  of  infras-
tructures required for a given mobile service, would 
I  9 I 
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not use  this position to extend it  to the market of 
the  relevant  mobile  service,  the  Member  States 
should,  in  order  to  prevent  abuses  of  dominant 
positions contrary to the Treaty, abstain  from  gran-
ting such telecommunications organization, or any 
associated  organization,  a  licence  for  this  mobile 
service.  Where  telecommunications  organization, 
do  not or no longer enjoy exclusive  rights  for  the 
establishment  and  the  provision  of  the  public 
network infrastructure, they should, however,  not a 
prion· be excluded from such licensing procedures. 
{13)  Exclusive rights not only limit access to the market, 
but  they  also  have  the  effect  of  restricting  or 
preventing, to the disadvantage of users,  the use  of 
mobile  and  personal  communications  on  offer, 
thereby  holding  back  technical  progress  in  this 
area.  The  telecommunications  organizations  have, 
in  particular,  maintained  higher  tariffs  for  mobile 
radiophony  in  comparison  with  fixed  voice  tele-
phony which  hinders  competition  at  the  expense 
of  their  main  source  of  revenues. 
Where  investment  decisions  are  taken  by  under-
takings  in  areas  where  they  enjoy  exclusive  rights, 
these  undertakings are  in  a  position  whereby  they 
can decide to give  priority to fixed  network techno-
logies,  whereas  new  entrants  may  exploit  mobile 
and  personal  technology  even  to  compete  with 
fixed  services,  in  particular  as  regards  the  local 
loop. Thus, the exclusive rights imply that there  is 
a  restriction  on  the  development  of  mobile  and 
personal communications and this is  incompatible 
with  Article  90,  read  in  conjunction  with  Article 
86. 
(14}  In  order  to  establish  the  conditions  under  which 
mobile  and  personal  communications systems  are 
to be provided, Member States may introduce licen-
sing  or  declaration  procedures  to  ensure  compli-
ance with the applicable essential requirements and 
public  service  specifications  in  the  form  of  trade 
regulations, subject to  the proportionality principle. 
Public  service  specifications  in  the  form  of  trade 
regulations  relate  to  conditions  of  permanence, 
availability, and quality of the service. Such  condi-
tions  may  include  the  obligation  to  give  service 
providers  access  to  airtime  on  terms  at  least  as 
favourable  as  those available  to  a service  provision 
business  owned  by,  or with  ownership  links  to,  a 
mobile  network. This framework  is  without preju-
dice  to  the  harmonization  of  the  framework  for 
licensing  in  the  Community. 
The number of licences may be  limited only in  the 
case  of scarcity of the frequency resources. Conver-
sely,  licensing is  not justified when a mere declara-
tion  procedure  would suffice  to  attain  the  relevant 
objective. 
As  regards  airtime  resale  and other mere provision 
of  services  by  independent  service  providers  or 
directly  by  mobile  network  operators  on  already 
authorized  mobile  sytems,  none  of  the  applicable 
es'iential  requirements  would  justify  the  introduc-
tion  or maintenance of licensing procedures, given 
that such services do not consist of the provision of 
telecommunications services  or the  operation  of  a 
mobile  communications network.  but of  the  retail 
of  authorized  services,  the  provision  of  which  is 
likely to  be subject to conditions ensuring compli-
ance  with  essential  requirements or public service 
specifications  in  the  form  of  trade  regulations. 
They  could  therefore,  besides  the  application  of 
national fair trade rules concerning all similar retail 
activities,  only  be  subject  to  a  requirement  of  a 
declaration of  their activities to  the  National Regu-
latory  Authority of  the  Member States  where  they 
choose  to  operate. Mobile  network operators could 
on the other hand refuse to  allow service providers 
to distribute their services, in particular where these 
service  providers  did  not  adhere  to  a  code  of 
conduct  for  service  providers  in  conformity  with 
the competition rules  of  the Treaty,  as  far  as  such 
code  exists. 
(15)  In  the context. of mobile and personal communica-
tions  systems  radiofrequencies are  a crucial bottle-
neck  resource.  The  allocation  of  radiofrequencies 
for  mobile and personal communications system by 
Member  States  according  to  criteria  other  than 
those which are  objective, transparent and non-dis-
criminatory  constitutes  a  restriction  incompatible 
with  Article  90  in  conjunction  with  Article  59  of 
the  Treaty to  the extent that operators from  other 
Member States arc disadvantaged in these allocation 
procedures. The development of effective competi-
tion  in  the  telecommunications sector may  be  an 
objective  justification  to  refuse  the  allocation  of 
.frequencies  to  operators  already  dominant  ~n  the 
geographical  market. 
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Member States should ensure that the prot:edure for 
allocation of  radiofrequencies is  based  on objective 
criteria and without discriminatory effects.  In  this 
context Member States should, with regard to future 
designation of frequencies for  specific communica-
tions services,  publish the frequency  plans as  well 
as  the  procedures  to  be  followed  by  operators  to 
obtain frequencies within the designated frequency 
band~. Current  frequency  allocation  should  be  re-
viewed by the Member States at regular intervals. In 
cases where the number of  licences was  limited on 
the  basis  of  spectrum  scarcity,  Member  States 
should also  review whether advances in technology 
would  allow  spectrum  to  be  made  available  for 
additional  licences.  Possible  fees  for  the  use  of 
frequencies  should  be  proportional  and  levied 
according  to  the  number  of  channels  effectively 
granted. 
(16)  Most  Member States currently oblige mobile opera-
tors to use the leased line capacity of telecommuni-
cations  organizations  for  both  internal  network 
connections  and  for  the  routing  of  long distance 
portions  of  calls.  As  the  charges  for  leased  line 
rental  represent  a  substantial  proportion  of  the 
mobile operator's cost base,  this  requriement gives 
the supplying telecommunications organization, i.e. 
in  many cases  its  direct competitor, a considerable 
influence  on  the  commercial  viability  and  cost 
structure  of  mobile  operators.  In  addition,  restric,  .. 
tions on the self-provision of infrastructure and the 
use  of  third  party  infrastructure  is  slowing  down 
the  development  of  mobile  services,  in  particular 
because  effective  pan-European  roaming  for  GSM 
relies  on  th~  widespread  availability  of  addressed 
signalling systems,  a  technology which  is  not yet 
universally  offered  by  telecommunications  organi-
zations  throughout  the  Community. 
Such restrictions on the provision and use of infra-
structures  constrain  the  provision  of  mobile  and 
personal  communications  services  by  operators 
from  other Member States  and  are  thus  incompa-
tible with Article 90 in conjunction with Article 59 
of  the  Treaty. To. the  extent  that  the  competitive 
provision  of  mobile  voice  services  is  prevented 
because  the  telecommunications  organization  is 
unable  to  meet the  mobile  operator's  demand  for 
infrastructures  or will  only do  so  on  the  basis  of 
tariffs  which  are  not oriented towards  the costs of 
the  leased  line  capacity  concerned,  these  restric-
tions . inevitably  favour  the  telecommunications 
organization's offering .of  fixed  telephony services, 
for which most Member States still maintain exclu-
sive rights. The restriction on the provision and use 
of  infrastructure  thus · infringes  Article  90,  in 
conjunction  with  Article  86  of  the Treaty.  Accor-
dingly,  Member  States  must  lift  these  restrictions 
and grant, if  requested,  the  relevant  mobile opera-
tors  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  access  to  the 
necessary  scarce  resources  to  set  up  their  own 
infrastructure  including  radiofrequencies. 
(17)  Currently,  the  direct  interconnection  between 
mobile communications systems as well as between 
mobile  communications  systems  and  fixed  tele-
communications networks within  a single Member 
State  or  between  systems  located  in  different 
Member  States  is  restricted  in  mobile  licences 
granted by many Member States without any tech-
nical  justification.  Furthermore,  restrictions  e';cist 
for  the  interconnection  of  such  networks  via 
networks  other  than  the  public  telecommunica-
tions  networks.  In  the  Member  States  concerned, 
mobile operators are  required  to  interconnect with 
other mobile operators via  the telecommunications 
organization's  fixed  network.  Such  requirements 
result in additional costs and thus impede, in parti-
cular,  the development of transborder provision  of 
mobile communication services in the Community 
and  therefore  infringe  Article  90,  in  conjunction 
with  Article  59. 
As in  most Member States  exclusive  rights for  the 
provision  of  voice  telephony  and  public  fixed 
network  infrastructure  are  maintained,  potential 
abuses  of  the  relevant  telecommunications  organ-
ization's dominant position  can  be  prevented only 
if  Member  States  ensure  that  interconnection  of 
public  mobile  communications  systems  is  made 
possible at defined interfaces with the  public tele-
communications network of  those telecommunica-
tions  organizations  and  that  the  interconnection 
conditions are  based on objeqive  criteria. justified 
by  the  cost  of  providing  the  interconnection 
service,  are  transparent,  ·  non-discriminatory, 
published in advance and allow the necessary tariff 
flexibility,  including  the  application  of  off-peak 
rates.  In  particular,  transparency  is  required  in 
respect  of  cost-accounting  of  operators  providing 
both  fixed  networks  and  mobile  telecommunica-
tions  networks.  Special  and  exclusi~e  rights  in 
respect of the establishment of  cross-border infras-
tructure for voice telephony are  not affc;cted by this 
Directive. 
In order to be able to ensure the full application of 
this  Directive  as  regards  interconnection, informa-
tion  on  interconnection  agreements  must  be 
available  to  the  Commission  on  request. 
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The  drawing  up  of  such  national  procedures  for 
licensing and interconnection, is  without prejudice 
to  the  harmonization  of  the  latter  at  Community 
level  by  European  Parliament  and  Council  Direc-
tives,  in  particular within  the  framework  of  Direc-
tives  on  open  network  provision  (ONP). 
Article 90  (2)  of  the Treaty provides  for  an  excep-
tion to the Treaty rules, and in  particular to  Articl~ 
86,  in  cases  where  the  application  of  the  latter 
would obstruct the  performance, in  law  or  in  fact, 
of  the  particular  tasks  assigned  to  the  telecommu-
nications organizations. Pursuant to  that  provision, 
Directive 90/388/EEC allows exclusive  rights  to  be 
maintained  for  a  transitional  period  in  respect  of 
voice  telephony. 
Voice telephony is  defined in Article  1 of  Directive 
90/388/EEC  as  the  commercial  provision  for  the 
public  of  the  direct  transport  and  switching  of 
speech  in  real  time  between  public  switched 
network  termination  points,  enabling  any  user  to 
use equipment connected to such a network termi-
nation point in order to communicate with another 
termination  point.  The  direct  transporr-and  swit-
ching of speech via  mobile and personal communi-
cations  networks  is  not  implemented  between  two 
public switched termination points and is  therefore 
not voice  telephony within  the  meaning of  Direc-
tive  90/388/EEC. 
On the basis of Article 90  (2)  of  the Treaty,  public 
service  specifications  in  the  form  of  trade  regula-
tions  applicable  to  all  authorized  operators  of 
mobile  telecommunications  services  provided  to 
the  public,  are,  however,  justified  to  ensure  the 
fulfilment  of objectives  of  general  economic  inte-
rest, such as  ensuring geographical coverage  or the 
implementation  of  Community-wide  standards. 
(19)  In its assessment of current restrictions imposed on 
mobile operators concerning the establishment and 
use  of  their own  infrastructure  and/or  the  use  of 
third  party  infrastructures,  the  Commission  will 
further consider the  need  for  additional  transition 
periods  for  Member  States  with  less  developed 
networks  as  called  for  in  the Council's  Resolution 
of  22 July 1993  on  the  review  of  the  situation  in 
the  telecommunications  sector  and  the  need  for 
further .development in  that  market (I)  in  addition 
to  the Council's Resolution of 21  December  1994 
on  the  principles  and  timetable  for  the  liberaliza-
tion  of  tele.communications  infrastructures (2). 
( 1)  OJ  No  C  213,  6.  8.  1993,  p.  2. 
(1)  OJ  No  C  379,  31.  12.  1994,  p.  4. 
Although  not  covered  by  these  resolutions  there 
should  be  the  possibility  of  requesting  an  addi-
tional  transition  period as  regards  the direct inter-
connection of mobile networks. The Member States 
which  may  request  such  an  exception  are  Spain, 
lrdand, Greece and Portugal. However, only certain 
of  these  Member States do not allow  GSM  mobile 
operators  to  use  own and/or third party infrastruc-
tures.  A specific  procedure  should  be  provided  in 
order  to  assess  the  possible  justification  for  the 
maintenance  of  that  regime  for  the  provision  of 
mobile and personal communications services for· a 
transitional  time  period  as,  set  out  in  the  said 
Council  resolutions. 
(20)  This  Directive  does  not  prevent  measures  being 
adopted  in  accordance  with  Community  law  and 
existing  international  obligations  so  as  to  ensure 
that nationals  of  Member States  are  afforded  equi-
valent  treatment. in  third  countries, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECfiVE : 
Article  1 
Directive  90/388/EEC  is  amended  as  follows: 
1. Article  1  (I)  is  amended  as  follows : 
(a)  the  following  indents are  inserted  after  the  ninth 
indent: 
'- ·mobile  and  personal  communications 
services"  means  services  other  than  satellite 
services  whose  provision  consists,  wholly  or 
partly,  in  the establishment of  radiocommuni-
cations to a mobile user, and makes use wholly 
or  partly of mobile and  personal  communica-
tions  systems, 
- "mobile  and  personal  communications 
systems" means systems consisting of the esta-
blishment and operation of  a  mobile  network 
infrastructure  whether  connected  or  not  to 
public  network termination  points,  to  support 
the  transmission  and  ;-rovision  of  radiocom-
munications  services  to  mobile  users,' ; 
(b)  the  thirteenth indent is  replaced by the following: 
'- "essential  requirements"  means  the  non-
economic reasons in the public interest which 
may  cause  a  Member State  to  impose  condi-
tions on the establishment and/or operation of 
telecommunications networks or the provision 
of  telecommunications services. These  reasons 
are  the security of network operations, mainte-
nance of network integrity, and where justified, 
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interoperability of services, data  protection, the 
protection  of  the  environment  and  town  and 
country planning objectives as  well  as  the effi-
cient  use  of  the  frequency  spectrum  and  the 
avoidance  of  harmful  interference  between 
radio-based  telecommunications  systems  and 
other  space-based  or  terrestrial  technical 
systems. 
Data  protection  may  include  protection  of 
personal  data,  the  confidentiality  of  informa-
tion transmitted or stored as  well as  the protec-
tion  of  privacy.' 
2.  Article  1  (2)  is  replaced  by  the  following : 
'2.  This  Directive  shall  not  apply  to  telex.' 
3.  The  following  Articles  3a  to  3d  are  inserted : 
'Article  Ja 
In addition  to  the  requirements set 0_9t  in  the second 
paragraph  of  Article  2  Member States  shall,  in  atta-
ching conditions to  licences or general  authorizations 
for  mobile  and  personal  communications  systems, 
ensure  the  following : 
(i)  licensing conditions  must not contain  conditions 
other  than  those  justified  on  the  grounds  of  the 
essential  requirements and, in  the case  of systems 
for  use  by  the general public, public service  requi-
rements in  the form  of trade  regulation within the 
meaning  of  Article  3 ; 
(ii)  licensing conditions for  mobile network operators 
must  ensure  transparent  and  non-discriminatory 
behaviour  between  fixed  and  mobile  network 
operators  in  common  ownership; 
(iii)  licensing conditions should not include unjustified 
technical  restrictions.  Member States  may  not,  in 
particular,  prevent  combination  of  licences  or 
restrict  the offer of different technologies  making 
use  of  distinct  frequencies,  where  multistandard 
equipment  is  available. 
As far  as  frequencies are available, member States shall 
award  licences  according  to  open,  non-discriminatory, 
and  transparent  procedures. 
Member States  may  limit the  number of  licences  for 
mobile  and  personal · communications  systems  to  be 
issued only on the basis of essential requirements and 
only  where  related  to  the  lack  of  availability  of 
frequency  spectrum  and  justified  under  the  principle 
of  proportionality. 
,.· 
Licence award  procedures may consider public service 
requirements in the form of trade regulation within the 
meaning of Article 3, provided the solution which least 
restricts competition is chosen. The relevant conditions 
related  to  trade  regulations  may  be  attached  to  the 
licences  granted. 
Member States which are granted  ~n additional imple-
mentation period to abolish the restrictions with regard 
to  infrastructure as  provided for  in Article 3c, shall not 
during that period grant any further mobile or personal 
communications  licence  to  telecommunications  or-
ganizations in such Member States do not or no longer 
enjoy exclusive or special rights, within the meaning of 
points (b) and (c) of the first  paragraph of Anicle 2, for 
the  establishment  and  the  provision  of  the  public 
network  infrastructure,  they  shall  not  a  priori  be 
excluded  from  such  licensing  procedures. 
Article Jb 
The  designation  of  radiofrequencies  for  specific 
communication  services  must  be  based  on  objective 
criteria. Procedures must be  transparent and published 
in  an  appropriate  manner. 
Member  States  shall  publish  every  year  or  make 
available on request, the allocation scheme of frequen-
cies reserved  for  mobile and  personal communications 
services, according to  the scheme set out in the Annex, 
including  the  plans  for  future  extension  of  such 
frequencies. 
This designation  must  be  reviewed  by  Member States 
at  regular  appropriate  ,intervals. 
Article Jc 
Member  States  shall  ensure  that  all  restnct10ns  on 
operators  of  mobile  and  personal  communications 
systems with regard to the establishment of their own 
infrastructure,  the  use  of  infrastructures  provided  by 
third and  the  sharing of  infrastructure, other facilities 
and sites, subject to limiting the use of such infrastruc-
tures to  those activities provided for in their licence or 
authorization,  are  lifted. 
Article Jd 
Without  prejudice  to  the  future  harmonization  of 
national  interconnection rules  in  the context of ONP, 
Member States shall ensure that direct interconnection 
between  mobile  communications  systems,  as  well  as 
between  mobile  communications  systems  and  fixed 
telecommunications  networks,  is  allowed.  In  order to 
achieve  this,  restrictions  on  interconnection  shall  be 
lifted. 
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Member  States  shall  ensure  that operators  of  mobile 
communications systems for  the  public have  the  right 
io  interconnect their systems with the public telecom-
munications network. To this end, Member States shall 
guarantee access  to  the  necessary number of  points of 
interconnection  to  the  public  telecommunications 
network  in  the  licences  for  mobile  services.  Member 
States shall ensure that the technical interfaces offered 
at such  points of  interconnection are  the  least  restric-
tive  interfaces  available  as  regards  the  features  of  the 
mobile  services. 
Member States shall ensure that interconnection condi-
tions  with  the  public  telecommunications  network  of 
the  telecommunications  organizations  are  set  on  the 
basis of objective criteria, are  transparent and  non-dis-
criminatory,  and  compatible  with  the  principle  of 
proprotionality.  They  shall  ensure  that,  in  case  of 
appeal,  full  access  to  interconnection  agreements  is 
given to National Regulatory Authorities and that such 
information  is  made  available  to  the  Commission  on 
request.' 
4.  In  the  first  sentence  of  Article  4  the  word  'fixed'  is 
inserted  before  the  words  'public telecommunications 
networks'. 
Article  2 
1.  Without  prejudice  to  Article  2  of,..- Directive 
90/388/EEC, and subject to  the provision set out in  para-
graph 4  of  this Article,  Member States shall  not  refuse  to 
allocate  licences  for  operating mobile  systems  according 
to the DCS 1800 standard at the latest after adoption of a 
decision  of  the  European  Radiocommunications 
Committee  on  the  allocation  of  DCS  1800  frequencies 
and  in  any  case  by  I  January  1998. 
2.  Member States shall, subject to  the provision set out 
in  paragraph  4,  not refuse  to  allocate  licences  for  public 
access/Telepoint  applicaitons,  including  systems  opera-
tion on the basis of the DECT standard as  from  the entry 
into  force  of  this  Directive. 
3.  Member States shall not restrict the combination of 
mobile  technologies  or  systems,  in  particular  where 
multistandard  equipment  is  available.  When  extending 
existing  licences  to  cover  such  combinations  Member 
States  shall  ensure  that  such  extension  is  justified  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  paragraph  4. 
4.  Member States shall adopt, where required, measures 
to  ensure  the  implementation  of  this  Article  taking 
account  of  the  requirement to  ensure effective  competi-
tion between operators competing in the relevant markets. 
Article J  · 
Member States  shall supply to  the Commission, not later 
than  nine  months  after  this  Directive  has  entered  into 
force,  such  information as  will  allow  the Commission to 
confirm  that Article  I  as  well  as  Article  2 (2)  have  been 
complied  with.· 
Member States  shall supply to  the  Commission, not later 
than  1 January  1998, such  information  as  will  allow  the 
Commission  to  confirm  that  Article  2  (1)  has  been 
complied  with. 
Article  4 
Member States with less developed networks may request 
at the latest three months from the entry into force of this 
Directive  an  additional  implementation  period  of  up  to 
five  years,  in  which  to  implement  all  or  some  of  the 
conditions set out in  Article  3c and in  Article  3d (1)  of 
Directive  90/388/EEC,  to  the  extent  justifiable  by  the 
need to achieve the necessary structural adjustments. Such 
a  request  must  include  a  detailed  description  of  the 
planned  adjustments  and  a  precise  assessment  of  the 
timetable  envisaged  for  their implementation. The infor-
mation provided shall be made available  to any interested 
party  on  demand. 
The  Commission  will  assess  such  requests  and  take  a 
reasoned  decision  within  a  time  period  of  three  months 
on  the principle, implications and maximum duration of 
the  additional  period  to  be granted. 
Article  .5 
This  Directive  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  20th  day 
following  its  publication  in  the  Official journal of the 
European  Communities. 
Article  6 
This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  16  January  1996. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member  of the  Commission 
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ANNEX 
1.  Frequency  bands  allocated  to  mobile  systems. 
(specifying the number of channels, the service to which it is  allocated and the review date of the 
allocation) 
2.  Frequency  bands  which  will  be  made  available  for  mobile  systems  during  the  next year. 
3.  Procedures  envisaged  to  assign  these  frequencies  to  existing  or new operators. 
,.-
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CORRIGENDA 
Corrigendum to Commission Regulation (EC)  No 252196  of 9 February 19.96  temporarily 
altering the export refunds  on  beef 
(Official journal of the  European  Communities  No  L 32  of 10  February  1996) 
Page  18,  Article  2: 
for:  This Regulation  shall  enter into force  on the day following  its  publication  in  the  Official 
Journal of the  European  Communities.: 
read:  This Regulation shall  enter into force  on the day  follo~ng its  publication in  the  Official 
Journal of the  European  Communities. 
It shall apply from  10 February until 31  March 1996 except in the case of amendment within 
this  period.' 
Corrigendum  to Commission Directive 96/2JEC of  16  January 19.96  amending Directive 
90/381/EEC with  regard  to mobile and personal communications 
(Official journal of the  European  Communities  No  L  20  of 26  january 1  996) 
On  page  64,  in  the  last  paragraph  of  the  new  Article  3a,  fifth  line: 
for:  '. . . telecommunications  organizations  in  such  Member States  .  .... , 
read:  ' ... telecommunications organizations, or any associated organization. Where telecommuni· 
cations  organizations  in  such  Member States  ..  .'. 
16.  3.  96 
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COMMISSION  DIRECI1VE 96/19/EC 
of 13  March  1996 
amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with  regard  to  the  implementation  of  full 
competition  in  telecommunications  markets 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 




According  to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC 
of 28  June 1990 on competition in the markets for 
tderorl'mUI'\irations services { 1), as  last amended by 
Directive  96/2/EC (2),  telecommunications services, 
with  the  exception  of  voice  telephony  to  the 
general  publi~  and  those  services  specifically 
excluded from  the scope of that Directive, must be 
open to  competition. These services were  the telex 
service, mobile communications and radio and tele-
vision broadcasting to  the public. Satellite commu-
nications were  included in the scope of the  Direc-
tive  through  Commission  Directive  94/46/EC (l). 
Cable  television  networks  were  included  in  the 
scope of the  Directive through Commission  Direc-
tive 95/51/EC (
4
), and mobile and personal commu-
nications were  included in  the scope of the  Direc-
tive  through  Directive  96/2/EC.  Under  Directive 
90/388/EEC,  Member  States  must  take  the 
measures  necessary  to  ensure  that  any operator is 
entitled  to  supply such  services. 
Subsequent to the  publi~ consultation organized by 
the  Commission  in  1992  on  the  situation  in  the 
telecommunications  sector (the  1992  Review),  the 
Council, in its  resolution of 22 July 1993 (S),  unani-
mously  called  for  the  liberalization  of  all  public 
voice telephony services by 1 January 1998, subject 
to additional transitional periods of up to  five  years 
to  allow  Member  States  with  less  developed 
networks,  i.e.  Spain,  Ireland,  Greece  and Portugal, 
to  achieve  the  necessary adjustments,  in  particular 
tariff  adjustments.  Moreover,  very  small  networks 
should, according to  the Council also be granted an 
adjustment period of up to two years where so justi-
fied. The Council subsequendy unanimously recog-
nized.  in  its  resolution  of  22  December  1994 ('), 
that  the  provision  of  telecommunications  infras-
tructure  should  also  be  liberalized  by  1  January 
1998,  subject  co  the  same  transitional  periods  as 
(')  OJ  No  L  192.  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
(1)  OJ  No  L  20,  26.  I.  1996,  p.  59. 
(')  OJ  No  L  268,  19.  10.  1994,  p.  15. 
(•)  OJ  No  L  256,  26.  10.  1995,  p.  49. 
(~ OJ  No  C  213,  6.  8.  1993,  p.  1. 
(')·OJ  No  C  379,  31.  12.  1994,  p.  4. 
agreed  for  the  liberalization  of  voice  telephony. 
Furthermore,  in  its  resolution  of  18  September 
199 5 ('},  the  Council  established  basic  guidelines 
for  the  future  regulatory  environment. 
(3)  Directive 90/388/EEC establishes that the granting 
of special or exclusive rights to telecommunications 
services  to· telecommunications organizati?ns  is  in 
breach  of Article 90 of the Treaty, in conjunction 
with  Article 59  of  the Treao/. since  they limit the 
provision  of  cross-border  services.  As  far  as  tele-
communications  services  and  'netwOrks  -..are--
concerned such special  rights were  defined:  in  that 
Directive.  · 
According  to  Directive  90/388/EEC  exclusive 
rights granted for  the provision of telecommunica-
tions services are also incompatible with Article 90 
(I) of the Treaty, in conjunction with Article 86 of 
the Treaty, where they are granted to  telecommuni-
cations organizations which also  enjoy exclusive or 
special  rights  for  the  establishment and  the  provi-
sion  of 'telecommunications  networks  since  their 
grant  amounts  to  the  reinforcement or  the  exten-
sion  of a dominant position or necessarily leads  to 
other abuses  of  such  position. 
(4)  In  1990,  the  Commission,  however,  granted  a 
temporary exception under Article 90 (2)  in respect 
of exclusive  and special rights for  the provision  of 
voice  telephony,  since  the  financial  resources  for 
the  development  of  the  network  still  derived 
mainly from  the operation of the telephony service 
and  the  opening-up  of  that service  could,  at  that 
time, threaten the financial stability of the telecom-
munications organizations and obstruct the  perfor-
mance  of  the  task  of  general  economic  interest 
assigned  to  them, consisting in  the  provision  and 
exploitation  of a universal  network, i.e. one having 
general  geographic  coverage,  and  that  connection 
to  it  is  being  provided  to  any  service  provider or 
user  upon  request  within  a  reasonable  period  of 
time. 
Moreover,  at  the  time of the adoption of  Directive 
90/388/EEC,  all  telecommunications organizations 
. were also in  the· course of digitalizing their network 
to  increase  the  range  of  services  which  could ,be 
(')  OJ  No  C  258,  3.  10.  1995,  p.  I. 
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(5) 
provided  to  the  final  customers.  Today,  coverage 
and digitalization are already achieved in a number 
of Member States. Taking into account the progress 
in  radio  frequency  applications  and  the  on-going 
heavy investment programmes, optic fibre-coverage 
and  network  penetration  are  expected  to  improve 
significantly  in  the  other  Member  States  in  the 
coming years. 
In  1990,  concerns  were  also  expressed  against 
immediate  introduction  of  competition  in  voice 
telephony while price structures of the telecommu-
nications  organizations  were  substantially  out  of 
line with costs, becaase competing operators could 
target  highly  profitable  services  such  as  interna-
tional  telephony and gain  market share  merely on 
the  !Jasi~  .Jf  e)tisting  substantially  distorted  tariff 
structures. In the meantime efforts have been made 
to balance differences in  pricing and cost structures 
in  preparation  for  liberalization.  The  European 
Parliament and the Council have  in  the meantime 
recognized that there are  less restrictive means than 
the granting of special or exclusive rights to  ensure 
this  taSk  of  general  economic  interest. 
For  these  reasons,  and  in  accordance  with  the 
Council  resolutions  of  21  July  ·1993  and  of  21 
December 1994,  the continuation of  the exception 
granted  with  respect  of  voice  telephony  is  no 
longer justified. The exception granted by  Directive 
90/388/EEC  should  be  ended  and  the  Directive, 
including  the  definitions  used,  amended  accor-
dingly. In order to  allow telecommunications orga-
nizations to  complete their preparation  for  compe-
tition  and  in  particular  to  pursue  the  necessary 
rebalancing of tariffs,  Member States  may continue 
the  current special  and  exclusive  rights  regarding 
the  provision  of  voice  telephony  until  1  January 
1998. Member States with  less  developed networks 
or with very small networks  must be eligible  for a 
temporary exception where this is  warranted by the 
need to  carry out structural adjustments and strictly 
only to  the extent necessary for  those adjustments. 
Such  Member  States  should  be  granted,  upon 
request,  an  additional  transitional  period  respect-
ively of up co  five  and of up to  two  years,  provided 
it is  necessary  to  complete the  necessary structural 
adjusr~ne-nt~;.  The  Member  States  which  may 
request  such  an  exception  are  Spain,  Ireland, 
Greece  and  Portugal  with  regard  to  less  developed 
networks  and  Luxembourg  with  regard  to  very 
small networks. The possibility of such transitional 
periods  has  also  been  called  for  in  the  Council 
resolutions  of  22 July  1993  and  of  22  December 
1994. 
(7) 
(6)  The  abolition  of  exclusive  and  special  rights  as 
regards  the  provision  of  voice  telephony  will  in 
particular  allow  the  current  telecommunications 
organizations  from  one  Member  State  to  directly 
provide  their  service  in  other  Member  States  as 
from  1 January 1998. These organizations currently 
possess  the  skills  and  the  experience  required  to 
enter  into  the  markets  opened  to  competition. 
However,  in  almost  all  Member  States,  they  will 
compete  with  the  national  telecommunications 
organizations  which  are  granted  the  exclusive  or 
special  right  to  provide  not only voice  telephony 
but  also  to  establish  and  provide  the  underlying 
infrastructure, including Pte acquisition of indefea-
sible  rights  of  use  in  international  circuits.  The 
flexibility  and  the  economies of scope which  this 
allows  will  prevent  this  dominant  position  being 
challenged  in  the  normal  course  of  competition 
once  the  liberalization  of  voice  telephony  takes 
place. This will  make  it  possible  for  the  telecom-
munications organizations  to  maintain their domi-
nant  position  on  their  home  markets  unle~s  the 
new  entnlnts  in  the  voice  telephony  market were 
entitled to  the same rights and obligations. In parti-
cular, if new entrants are  not granted free  choice as 
regards  the  underlying  infrastructure  to  provide 
their  services  in  competition  with  the  dominant 
operator,  this  restriction  would  de  facto  prevent 
them from entering the market for voice telephony, 
including for  the provision of cross-border services. 
The  maintenance  of  special  rights  limiting  the 
number of undertakings authorized to establish and 
provide  infrastructure  would  therefore  limit  the 
freedof11  to  provide  services  contrary to  Article  59 
of  the Treaty. The fact  that the restriction on esta-
blishing own  infrastructure would apparently apply 
in  the Member State concerned without distinction 
to  all  companies  providing  voice  telephony other 
than  the  national  telecommunications  organiza-
tions  would  not be  sufficient  to  remove  the  prefe-
rential  treatment  of  the  latter  from  the  scope  of 
Article  59  of  the  Treaty.  Given  the  fact  that it  is 
likely  that  most  new  entrants  will  originate  from 
other Member States such a measure would in prac-
tice affect foreign  companies to a larger extent than 
national undertakings. On the other hand, while no 
justification  for  these  restrictions· appears  to  exist, 
less  restrictive  means such as  licensing procedures 
would  in  any  event be  available  to  ensure general 
intert::sts  of  a  non-economic  nature. 
In  addition,  the  abolition  of exclusive  and special 
rights  on  the  provision  of  voice  telephony would 
have  little  or  no  effect,  if new  entrants would  be 
obliged  to  use  the  public  telecommunications 
I  18 22.  3.  96  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  ,  No  L  74/15 
network  of  the  incumbent  telecommunications 
organizations,  with  whom  they  compete  in  the 
voice  telephony  market.  Reserving  to  one  under-
taking which markets  telecommunications services 
the  task  of supplying the  indispensable raw  mate-
rial,  i.e.  the transmission capacity, to all  its compe-
titors  would  be  tantamount  to  conferring upon  it 
the  power  to  determine  at  will  where  ? ad  when 
services  can  be  offered  by  its  competitors, at what 
cost,  and  to  monitor  their  clients  and  the  traffic 
generated by its  competitors, placing that underta-
king  in  a  position  where  it  would  be  induced  to 
abuse its  dominant position. Directive 90/388/EEC 
did  not  explicitly  address  the  establishment  and 
provision  of  telecommunications  networks,  as  it 
granted a temporary exception under Article 90 (2) 
of  the  Treaty  in  respect  of  exclusive  and  special 
rights  for  the  by  far  most  important  service  iR 
economic terms provided over telecommunications 
networks, i.e. voice  telephony. However, the Direc-
tive  provided for an overall review by the Commis-
sion of the situation in  the whole  telecommunica-
tions  sector  in  199 2. 
It  is  true  that  Council  Directive  92/44/EEC  of  5 
June  1992  on  the  application  of  open  network 
provision  to  leased  lines,  amended by  Commission 
Decision 94/439/EC (1),  harmonizes the basic  prin-
ciples regarding the provision of leased lines, but it 
only harmonizes  the  conditions  of  access  and  use 
of leased lines. The aim of  that Directive  is  not to 
remedy the conflict of interest of the telecommuni-
cations  organizations  as  infrastructure  and  servi"ce 
providers. It does not impose a structural separation 
between  the  telecommunications  organizations  as 
providers  of  leased  lines  and  as  service  providers. 
Complaints  illustrate  that  even  in  Member States 
which  have  implemented  that  Directive,  telecom-
munications organizations still  use  their control of 
the access conditions to the network at the expense 
of  their  competitors  in  the  services  market. 
Complaints show that  telecommunications  organi-
zations still apply excessive tariffs and that they use 
information  acquired  as  infrastructure  provid~rs 
regarding the services planned by their competitors, 
to  target  clients  in  the  services  market.  Directive 
92/44/EEC only provides for  the  principle of cost-
orientation  and  does  not  prevent  telecommunica-
tions organizations to  use  the information acquired 
as  capacity  provider  as  regards  subscribers'  usage 
pactems, necessary co  target specific groups of users, 
and on price  elasticities of  demand in  each service 
market  segment  and  region  of  the  country.  The 
current regulatory  framework  does  not  resolve  the 
conflict  of  interest  mentioned  above.  The  most 
(I)  OJ  No  L  165,  19.  6.  1992,  p.  27. 
appropriate  remedy  to  this  conflict  of  interest  is 
therefore  to  allow service  providers  to  use  own  or 
third  party  telecommunications  infrastructure  to 
provide their services to the final customers instead 
of the infrastructure of their main competitor. In its 
resolution  of  22 December  1.994  the Council also 
approved the principle that infrastructure provision 
should  be  liberalized. 
Member States should therefore abolish the current 
exclusive  rights  on  the  provision and use  of infra-
structure which infringe Article 90 (1) of the Treaty, 
in  combination  with  Articles  59  and  86  of  the 
Treaty, and allow voice  telephony providers  to use 
own  and/or any alternative  infrastructure  of  their 
choice. 
(8)  Directive  90/388/EEC states  that  the  rules  of the·  '· 
Treaty,  including  those  on  competition,  apply  to 
telex services. At the same  time it establishes  that 
the granting of special or exclusive  rights for  tele-
communications  services  to  telecommunications 
organizations  is  in  breach  of Article  90 (1)  of the 
Treaty,  in  conjunction  with  Article  59  of  the 
Treaty,  since  they  limit  the  provision  of  cross-
border services.  However,  it was  considered  in  the 
Directive  that  an  individual  approach  was  appro-
priate,  as  a  rapid  decline  of  the  service  was 
expected. It  the  meantime it  has become clear that 
the  telex  service  will  continue to  coexist with  new 
services  like  facsimile  in  the  foraeeable  future, 
given  that the  telex  network  is  still  the only stan-
dardized  network  with  worldwide  coverage  and 
providing  legal  proof  in  Court.  It  is  therefore  no 
longer  justified  to  maintain  the  initial  approach. 
(9)  fu  regards  the  access  of  new competitors  to  the 
telecommunications  markets,  only  mandatory 
requirements  can  justify  restrictions  to  the  funda-
mental freedoms  provided for in the Treaty. These 
restrictions should be  limited to  what is  necessary 
to -~chieve the objective of a  non-economic nature , 
pursued.  Member States  may therefore  only intro-
duce licensing or declaration procedures where it is 
indispensable to ensure compliance with the appli-
cable essential requirements and, with regard to the 
provision  of  voice  telephony  and  the  underlying 
infrastructure,  introduce  requirements in  the  form 
of trade regulations where it is  necessary in order to 
ensure,  in  accordance  with  Article  90  (2)  of  the 
Treaty,  the  performance  in  a  competitive environ-
ment  of  tht  particular  tasks  of  public  service 
assigned  co  the  relevant  undertakings  in  the  tele~ 
communications field  and/or to ensure a contribu-
tion  to  the  financing  of  universal  service.  Other 
public  service  requirements  can  be  included  by 
Member States  in  certain  categories of licences,  in 
line  with  the  principle  of  proportionality  and  in 
confc.uuity with Articles 56 and 66 of the Treaty. 
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The provisions of  Directive 90/388/EEC are  there-
fore  not to  prejudice che  applicability of  provisions 
laid  down  by  law,  regulation  or  administrative 
action  providing  for  the  pro~ction  of  public 
security and in  particular the  lawful  interception of 
communications. 
In  the  framework  of the adoption of  authorization 
requirements  under  Directive  90/388/EEC,  it 
appeared that certain Member States were imposing 
obligations  on  new  entrants  which  where  not  in 
proportion  with  the  aims  of  general  interest 
pursued.  To  avoid  such  measures  being  used  to 
prevent the dominant position of  the  telecommu- . 
nications  organizations  being  challenged  by 
competition  once  the  liberalization  of voice  tele-
phony takes  place,  thus making it  possible  for  the 
telecommunications organizations to maintain their 
dominant  position  in  the  voice  telephony  and 
pubHc  telecommunications  networks  markets  and 
thereby strengthening the dominant position of the 
incumbent  operator,  it  is  necessary  that  Member 
States  should  notify  any  licensing  or  declaration 
requirements  to  the  Commission,  before  they  are 
introduced,  to  enable  the  latter  to  assess  their 
compatibility with  the Treaty and in particular the 
proportionality  of  the  obligations  imposed. 
(10)  According  to  the  principle  of  proportionality,  the 
number of licences may only be limited where this 
is  unavoidable  to  ensure compliance with essential 
requirements  concerning  the  use  of  scarce 
resources. As  the Commission s~ted in its commu-
nication  on  the  consultation  on  the  Green  Paper 
on  the  liberalization  of  telecommunications  infra-
structure  and  cable  television  networks,  the  sole 
reason  in  this  respect  should  be  the  existence  of 
physical limitations, imposed by  the lack of  neces-
sary  frequency  spectrum. 
A3  regards the  provision of  voice  telephony, public 
fixed  telecommunications networks and other tele-
communications  networks  involving  the  use  of 
radio frequencies, the essential requirements would 
justify the introduction or maintenance of an indi-
vidual  licensing  procedure.  In  all  other  cases,  a 
general  authorization  or  a  declaration  procedure 
suffices  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  essential 
requirements.  Licensing  is  not  justified  when  a 
mere declaration  procedure would suffice  to  attain 
the  relevant  objective. 
A3  regards  the  provtston  of  packet- or  circuit-
switched  data  services,  Directive  90/388/EEC 
allowed  the  Member States  under Article  90  (2)  of 
' the  Treaty  to  adopt  specific  sets  of  public  service 
specifications in  the  form  of  trade  regulations with 
a  view  to  preserving  the  relevant  public  service 
requirements. The  Commission  has  in  the  course 
of  1994  assessed  the  effects  of  the  measures 
adopted  under  this  provision.  The  results  of  this 
review were  made  public in its Communication on 
the  status  and  the  implementation  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC.  On  the  basis  of  that  review,  which 
also  took  account  of  the  experience  in  most 
.Member  States  where  the  relevant  public  service 
objectives  were  achieved without  the  implementa-
tion  of  such  schemes,  there  is  no  justification  to 
continue  this  specific  regime  and  the  current 
schemes should be abolished accordingly. However, 
Member  States  may  replace  these  schemes  by  a 
declaration  or  a  general  authorization  procedure. · 
(11)  Newly. authorized voice  telephony providers will be 
able  to  compete  effectively  with  the  current  tele-
communications  organizations  only  if  they  are 
granted  adequate  numbers  to  allocate  to  their 
customers. Moreover,  where  numbers are  allocated 
by  the  current  telecom~unications organizations, 
the  latter  will  be  induced  to  reserve  the  best 
numbers for  themselves and to  give  their competi-
tors  insufficient  numbers  or  numbers  which  are 
commercially  less  attractive,  for  example,  because 
of their length. By  maintaining such  power  in  the 
hands  of  their  telecommunications  organizations 
Member States  would  therefore  induce  the  former 
to  abuse  their power on the market for  voice  tele-
phony and  infringe  Article  90  of  the  Treaty,  in 
conjunction  with  Article  86  of  the  Treaty. 
Consequently,  the  establishment  and  administra-
tion  of  the  national  numbering  plan  should  be 
entrusted to  a body independent from  the  telecom-
munications organization, and a  procedure  for  the 
allocation  of  numbers  should,  where  required,  be 
drafted,  which  is  based  on  objective  criteria,  is 
transparent  and  without  discriminatory  effects. 
Where a subscriber changes service  providers,  tele-
communications  organizations  should  communi-
cate,  in  the  way  and  to  the  extent  required  by 
Article  86  of  the  Treaty,  the  information  on  his 
new  number  for  a  sufficient  period  of  time  to 
parties  seeking  to  contact  him  under  his  old 
number.  Subscribers  changing  service  providers 
should  also  have  the  possibility  of  keeping  their 
numbers in  return  for  a reasonable  contribution  to 
the  cost  of  transferring  the  numbers. 
(12)  &  Member States  are  obliged by  this  Directive  to 
withdraw special and exclusive rights for  the provi-
sion and oper;'ion of  fixed  public telecommunica-
tions  netwo:-A.s,  the  obligation set out in  Directive 
90/388/EEC  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to 
ensure objective,  non-discriminatory and published 
access  conditions  should  be  adapted  accordingly. 
(13)  Subject  to  reasonable  compensation,  the  right  of 
new  providers  of  voice  telephony  to  interconnect 
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their service  fQr  call completion purposes with  the 
existing public telecommunications network at the 
necessary  interconnection  points,  including access 
to customer databases necessary for the provision of 
directory  information,  is  of crucial  importance  in 
the  initial period after the abolition  of the special 
and exclusive  rights regarding voice  telephony and 
telecommunications infrastructure  provisio=! Inter-
connection  should  in  principle  be  a  matter  for 
negotiation  between  .the  parties,  subject  to  the 
application  of  the  competition  rules  addressed  to 
undertakings.  Given  the  imbalance  in  negotiating 
power of new entrants compared with the telecom-
munications  organizations  whose  monopoly  posi-
tion results from  their special and exclusive  rights, 
it is  likely that, ·as  long as  a harmonized regulatory 
framework  has  not been  established  by  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament and the  Council, interconnection 
would  be  delayed  by  disputes  as  to  terms  and 
conditiQns to  be applied. Such delays would jeopar-
dize. the  market entry of new  entrants and hence 
prevent the abolition of special and exclusive rights 
to  become effective. The failure  by Member States 
to adopt the necessary safeguards to  prevent ·such a 
situation would  lead _to  a continuation  de faao of 
the current special  and exclusive  rights,  which  as 
set  out  above  are  considered  to  be  incompatible 
wi_th  Article  90  (1)  of  the  Treaty,  in  conjunction 
with  Articles  59  and  86  of  the  Treaty. 
In  order to  allow  for  effective  market entry and  to 
prevent  the  dt facto  continuation  of  special  and 
exclusive  rights  contrary  to  Article  90  (1)  of  the 
Treaty,  in·  conjunction  with  Articles  59  and  86  of 
the  Treaty,  Member  States  should  ensure  that, 
during the time period necessary for such entry by 
competitors,  telecommunications  organizations 
publish standard terms and conditions for intercon-
nection  to  the  voice  telephony  networks  which 
they  offer  to  the  public,  including  interconnect 
price  lists  and  access  points,  no  later  than  six 
months before  the  actual  date  of  liberalization  of 
voice  telephony and telecommunications transmis-
sion capacity. Such standard offers should be  non-
discriminatory and sufficiently unbundled to  allow 
the  new entrants to  purchase only those elements 
of  the  interconnection  offer  they  actually  need. 
Furthermore,  they  may  not · discriminate  on  the 
basis of the origin of the calls and/or the networks. 
fl4)  Moreover in order to allow the monitoring of inter-
connection obligations under competition  law,  the 
cost accounting system implemented with regard to 
the  provision  of  voice  telephony and  public  tele-
communications networks should. during the  time 
period necessary to allow for effective market entry 
clearly  identify  the  cost  eleq~ents  relevant  fo; 
pricing interconnection offerings and, in particular 
for  each  element  of  the  interconnection  offered, 
identify the basis for  that cost element, in order to 
ensure  in  particular that this  pricing includes only 
elements  which  are  relevant,  namely  the  initial 
connection  charge,  conveyance  charges,  the  share 
of the costs incurred in providing equal access and 
number-portability  and  of  ensuring  essential  re-
quirements  and,  where  applicable,  supplementary 
charges  aimed  to  share  the  net cost  of  universal 
service, and provisionally, imbalances in voice  tele-
phony  tariffs.  Such  cost  accounting  should  also 
make  it possible  to  identify when  a telecommuni-
cations  organization  charges  its  major  users  less 
than  providers  of  voice  telephony networks. 
The absence of a quick, cheap and effective  proce: 
dure  to  solve  interconnection  disputes,  and  one 
which would prevent the telecommunications orga-
nizations  causing  delays  or  using  their  financial 
resources  to  increase  the cost of available  remedies 
under applicable  national  law  or Community law, 
would make it possible for the telecommunications 
organizations to  maintain their dominant position. 
Member· States should therefore establish a specific 
recourse  procedure  for  interconnection  disputes. 
(15)  The  obligation  to  publish  standard  charges  and 
interconnection conditions  is  without  prejudice  to 
·the  requirement  on  undertakings  in  a  dominant 
· position,  under Article  86  of  the Treaty,  to  nego-
tiate  special· or tailor-made  agreements for  a  parti-
cular  combination  or  use  of  unbundled  public 
switched  telephony  network  components  and/or 
the  granting  of  discounts  for  particular  service 
providers  or  large  users  where  these  are  justified 
and  non-discriminatory.  Any  interconnection 
discounts  should  be  justified on an  objective  basis 
and  be  transparent. 
(16)  The requirement  to  publish  standard interconnec-
tion  conditions  is  also  without  prejudice  to  the 
obligation  of dominant undertakings under Article 
86 of  the Treaty to allow interconnected operators 
on  whose  network  a  call  originates  to  remain 
responsible  for  setting  the  tariff  for  the  customer 
between  the  calling  and  the  called  party  and  for 
routing its clients' traffic  up to  the interconnection 
point  of  its  choice. 
(17)  A  number  of  Member  States  are  currently  still 
maintaining  exclusive  rights  with  regard  to  the 
establishment and  provision of telephone directory 
and  enquiry  services.  These  exclusive  rights  are 
generally granted either to organizations which are 
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already enjoying a dominant position in  providing 
voice  telephony,  or to  one of  their subsidiaries. In 
such  a  situation,  these  rights  have  the  effect  of 
extending the dominant position enjoyed by  those 
organizations  and  therefore  strengthening  that 
position,  which,  according  to  the  case-law  of  the 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Communities, 
constitutes  an  abuse  of  a  domi'l-:.nt  position 
contrary to Article  86.  The exclusive  rights granted 
in  the  area  of  telephone  directory  services  are 
consequently  incompatible  with  Article  90  (1)  of 
the  Treaty,  in  conjunction  with  Article  86.  These 
exclusive  rights consequently have  to  be abolished. 
(18)  Directory  · information  constitutes  an  essential 
access  tool  for  telephony·  services.  In  order  to 
ensure  the  availability  of  directory  information  to 
subscribers to  all  voice  telephony services, Member 
States  may include obligations for  the provision  of 
..iirectory  information  to  the  general  public within 
individual  licences  and  general  authorizations. 
Such an obligation should not, however, restrict the 
provision of such information by new technological 
means,  nor the  provision  of specialized and/or re-
gional  and  local  directories  contrary  to  Article  90 
(1)  of  the Treaty,  in  conjunction with  point {b)  of 
the second paragraph of Article 86 of the Tleaty. 
(19)  In the case  where universal service can be  provided 
only  at  a  loss  or  provided  under  costs  falling 
outside  normal  commercial  standards,  different 
financing  schemes  can  be  envisaged  to  ensure 
universal  service.  The  emergence  of  effective 
competition by the dates established for  full  libera-
lization  would,  however,  be  seriously  delayed  if 
Member  States  were  to  implement  a  financing 
scheme allocating too  heavy a share of any burden 
to new entrants or were to determine the 'size of the 
burden  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  finance  the 
universal  service. 
Financing  schemes  disproportionately  burdening 
new entrants and accordingly preventing the domi-
nant position of  the  telecommunications organiza-
tions  being  challenged  by  competition  once  the 
liberalization  of  voice  telephony  takes  place,  thus 
making  it  possible  for  the  telecommunications 
organizations  to  entrench their dominant position, 
would  be  in  breach of  Article 90  of  the Treaty,  in 
conjunction  with  Article  86  of  the  Treaty. 
Whichever financing scheme they decide to  imple-
ment,  Member  States  should  ensure  ' that  only 
providers  of  public  telecommunications  networks 
contribute  to  the  provision  and/or  financing  of 
universal  service  obligations  harmonized  in  the 
framework  of  0 NP and that the method of  alloca-
tion amongst them is  based on objective and non-
discriminatory  criteria  and  is  in  accordance  with 
the principle of proportionality. This principle does 
not  prevent. Member  States  from  exempting  new 
entrants whtch  have  not yet  achieved  any signifi-
cant  market  presence. 
Moreover, the funding mechanisms adopted should 
seek only to  ensure that market participants contri-
bute to  the  financing of universal service,  and not 
t? other activiti.es  not directly linked to the. provi-
ston  of  the  umversal  service. 
(20)  ~  ~e~ds the cost structure of voice  telephony. a 
d1stmct1on  must  be  made  between  the  initial 
connection, the monthly·  rental, loeal calls, regional 
calls and long distance calls. The tariff struc'ture of 
voice  telephony  provided  by  the  telecommunica-
tions  ..  organizations  in  certain  Member  States  is 
c~rrently still out of line with cost. Certain catego-
nes  of  calls  are  provided  at  a  loss  and are  cross-
sub~i.d~zed out of  ~e profits from other categories. 
~f1~1ally low  p_nces,  however,  impede  competi-
tton stnce  potenual competitors have  no incentive 
to enter into the relevant segment of the voice tele-
phony market and are contrary to Article 86 of the 
Treaty,  as  long  as  they  are  not  justified  under 
Article 90 (2) of the Treaty as  regards specific iden-
tified 'end-users  or  groups  of  end-users.  Member 
States  should  phase  out as  rapidly  as  possible  all 
unjustified  restrictions on tariff  rebalancing by the 
telecommunications organizations and in particular 
those  preventing the .adaptation of  rates  which  are 
not in  line with  costs  and  increase  the  burden  of 
.  universal  service  provision.  Where  this  is  justified, 
the  p~portion of net costs insufficiently covered by 
the tanff structure may be reapportioned among all 
parties  concerned  in  a  non-discriminatory  and 
transparent  manner. 
{21)  As  .re-balancing  could  make  certain  telephone 
semce less  affordable  in  the short term for  certain 
group~ of  users,  Member States  may adopt special 
pr?vtstons to  soften  the impact of re-balancing.  In 
thts.  way,  the  affordabilicy of  the  telephone service 
du':ng the  transitional period would be guaranteed 
while  telecommunications operators would  still be 
able  to  continue their re-balancing process. This is 
in  line  with  the  statement  of  the  Commission 
concerning  the  Council  resolution  on  universal 
service ('),  which  states  that  there  should  be  rea-
sonable and affordable  prices throughout the terri-
tory  for  initial  connection,  subscription,  periodic 
rental,  access  and  the  use  of  the  service. 
(')  OJ  No  C  48.  16.  L  1994,  p.  8. 
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(23) 
Where Member States entrust the application of the 
financing scheme of universal service obligations to 
their  telecommunications  organization  with  the 
right to  recoup a share of it  from  competitors, the 
former will  be  induced to dtarRe a higher amount 
than  justified,  if Member States  would  not  ensure 
that  the  amount  charged  to  finance  universal 
service is  made separate and explicit ~tl, respect to 
interconnection  (connection  and  conveyance) 
charges.  In  addition·,  the  mechanism  should  be 
closely  monitored  and  efficient  procedures  for 
timely  appeal  to  an  independent  body  to  settle 
disputes  as  to  the .amount  to  be  paid  must  be 
provided, without prejudice to other available reme-
dies  under  national  law  or Community law. 
The  Commission  should  review  the  situation  in 
Member States  five  years  after  the  introduction of 
:ull  competition,  to  ascertain  whether  this  finan-
cing scheme does  not lead  to  situations which  are 
incompatible  with  Community law. 
Providers  of  public  telecommunications  networks 
require access to pathways across public and private 
property to place facilities  needed to reach  the end 
users.  The  telecommunications  organizations  in 
many  Member  States  enjoy  legal  privileges  to 
install  their  network  on  public  and  private  land, 
without charge or at  charges set simply to  recover 
incurred  costs  .. If  Member  States  do  not  grant 
similar  possibilities  to  new  licensed  operators  to 
enable  them  to  roll  out their network,  this  would 
delay  them  and  in  certain  areas  be  tantamount  to 
maintaining exclusive  rights  in  favour  of  the  tele-
communications  organization. 
Moreover  Article  90  of  the  Treaty,  in  conjunction 
with Article 59 of the Treaty, requires that Member 
States should not discriminate against new entrants, 
who  generally  will  originate  from  other  Member 
States,  in  comparison with  their national  telecom-
munications  organizations  and  other  national 
undertakings,  which  have  been  granted  rights  of 
way  facilitating  the roll  out of  their telecommuni-
. cations  networks. 
Where  essential  requirements,  in  particular  with 
regard to  the protection of the environment or with 
regard  to  town  and  country  planning  objectives, 
would oppose the granting of similar rights of way 
to  new  entrants  which  do  not  already  have  their 
own  infrastructure,  Member States  should  at  least 
ensure  that  the  latter  have,  where  it  is  technically 
(24) 
(25) 
feasible, access, on reasonable terms, 'to  the existing 
ducts or poles,  established under rights  of way  by 
the  telecommunications  organization, where  these 
facilities  are  necessary to  roll out their network. In 
the  absence  of  such  requirements  the  telecommu-
nications  organizations  would  be  induced  to  limit 
access  by their competitors to these essential facili-
ties  and  thus  abuse  their  dominant  position.  A 
failure  to. adopt such requirements would therefore 
be  contrary  to  Article  90  (1)  of  the  Treacy,  in 
conjunction  with  Article  86  of  the  Treacy. 
In addition, pursuant to  Article 86, all  public tele-
communications network operators having essential 
resources  for  which  competitors  do  not  have 
economic  alternatives  are  to  provide  open  and 
non-discriminatory  access  to  those  resources. 
The abolition of special and exclusive rights in  the 
telecommunications  markets  will  allow  underta-
kings  enjoying  special  and  exclusive  rights  in 
sectors other than telecommunications to enter the 
telecommunications markets. In  order to  allow for 
mo.nitoring under the applicable rules of the Treaty 
of  possible  anti-competitive  cross-subsidies 
between,  on  the  one hand, areas  for  which  provi-
ders of telecommunications services or telecommu-
nications  infrastructures  enjoy special  or exclusive 
rights arid,  on the other, their business as  telecom-
munications  providerS,  Member States should take 
the appropriate measures to achieve transparency as 
regards  the  use  of  resources  from  such  protected 
activities to  enter in the liberalized telecommunica-
tions market. Member States should at least require 
such  undertakings  once  they  achieve  a  significant 
turnover  in  the  relevant  telecommunications 
service  and/or  infrastructure  provision  market,  to 
keep  separate  financial  records,  distinguishing · 
between  inter alia,  costs  and  revenues  associated 
with  the  provision  of  services  under  their  special 
and  exclusive  rights  and  those  provided  under 
competitive  conditions.  For  the  time  being,  a 
turnover of  more  than  ECU  50  million  could  be 
considered  as  a  significant  turnover. 
Most Member States  al~o currently maintain exclu-
sive  rights for the provision of telecommunications 
infrastructure for the supply of telecommunications 
services  other  than  voice  telephony. 
Under  Directive  92/44/EEC, Member States  must 
ensure  that  the  telecommunications  organizations 
make  available  certain  types  of  leased  lines  to  all 
providers  of  telecommunications servies.  However, 
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the  Directive  provides  only  for  such  offer  of  a 
harmonized set of leased lines up to a certain band-
width. Companies  needing a higher bandwidth to 
provide  services  based on  new high-speed techno-
logies  such as SOH (synchronous digital  hierarchy) 
have  complained  that  the  telecommunications 
organizations  c6ncemed are  unable  to  meet their 
demand whilst  it could be  met by. the  ~ptic fibre 
networks  of other potential  providers of telecom-
munications  infrastructure,  in  the  absence  of  the 
current exclusive rights. Consequently, the mainte-
nance of these rights delays  the em'ergence of  new 
, advanced  telecommunications  services  and  there-
fore  restricts  technical  progress  at  the  expense  of 
the users contrary to Article 90 (1) of the :rreaty, in 
conjunction with point (b) of the second paragraph 
of Article  86  of  the Treaty. 
(26)  Given  that  the  lifting of  such  rights  will  concern 
mainly  services  which  are  not yet  provided  and 
does not concern voice telephony, which is still the 
main  source  of  revenue  of  those  organizations,  it 
will  not  destabilize  the  financial  situation  of  the 
telecommunications  orgartization.  There  is  conse-
quently no justification to maintain exclusive rights 
.on the establishment and use of network infrastruc-
ture  for  services  other  than  voice  telephony.  In 
particular,  Member  States  should  ensure  that  all 
restrictions on the provision of telecommunications 
services  other than voice  telephony over networks 
established by the provider of  the telecommunica-
tions service, the use of infrastructures provided by 
third  parties  and  the  sharing  of  networks,  other 
facilities and sites are lihed as  frorp  1 July 1996. 
In order to  take account of  the specific situation in 
Member States with less-developed networks and in 
Member  States  with  very  small  networks,  the 
Commission  will  grant,  upon  request,  additional 
transitional  periods. 
(21)  Whilst  Directive  95/51/EC  lifted  all  restrictions 
with regard to the provision of liberalized telecom-
munications services over cable television networks, 
some  Member States still  maintain. restrictions  on 
the use  of public telecommunications networks for 
the  provision  of  cable  television  capacity.  The 
Commission should assess the situation with regard 
to such restrictions in the light of the objectives of 
that  Directive  once  the  telecommunications 
markets  approach  full  liberalization. 
(28)  The  abolition  of  alL special  and  exclusive  rights 
which restrict the  provision of telecommunications 
services  and  underl}ring  networks  by  undertakings 
established in  the Community is without regard to 
tt-,~,c  destination  or  the  origin  of  the  communica-
tions  concerned. 
However.  Directive  90/388/EEC does  not  prevent 
mesures  regarding  undertakings,  which  are  not 
established  in the  Community,  being adopted  in 
accordance  with  Community  law  and  existing 
international  obligations  so  as  to  ensure  that 
nationals of Member States are affor;ded comparable 
and effective treatment in third countries. Commu-
nity undertakings should benefit from effective and 
comparable  access  to  third  country  markets  and 
enjoy a similar treatment in a  third country as  is 
offered hy  · the  Community framework  to underta-
kings owned, or effectiv~ly controlled, by nationals 
of the third country concerned. World Trade Orga-
nization  telecommunications  negotiations  should 
result  in  a  balanced  and  mu}tilateral  ~greement, 
ensuring  effective  and  comparable  access  for 
Community operators  in  third  countries. 
(29)  The  process  of  implementing full  compeuuon  in 
telecommunications markets raises important issues 
in  the  social  and  employment  fields.  These  are 
referred to in the Commission's communication on 
the consultation on the Green Paper on the libera-
lizatiol)  of  telecommunications  infrastructure  and 
cable  television  networks  of  3  May  1995. 
Alway:•  remaining  in  line  with a  horizontal  policy 
approach,  efforts  should  now  be  undertaken  to 
support the transition process to  a fully  liberalized 
telecommunications environment; responsibility for 
such measures  rests  mainly at  Member State  level, 
although Community structures, such as  the Euro-
pean Social Fund, may also play a part. In line with 
existing  initiatives,  the Community should  play  a 
role  in  facilitating  the adaptation and retraining of 
those whose traditional activities are likely to disap-
pear during the process of industrial restructuring. 
(30)  The establishment of  procedur~s at  national  level 
concerning  licensing,  interconnection,  universal 
service,  numbering  and  rights  of  way  is  without 
prejudice  to  the  harmonization  of  the  latter  by 
appropriate  European  Parliament  and  Council 
legislative  instruments,  in  particular in the· frame-
work  of  operi  network  provision  (ONP).  The 
Commission  should  take  whatever  measures  it 
considers  appropriate  to  ensure the consistency of 
these  instruments  and  Directive  90/388/EEC, 
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HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRBcriVE: 
Article  1 
Directive  90/388/EEC  is  amended  as  follows: 
1.  Article  1  is  amended  as  follows: 
(a)  Paragraph  I  is  amended  as  follows: 
{i)  The founh indent is  replaced by the following: 
"- •public  telecommunications  network" 
means a telecommunications network used 
inter alia for  the  provision of public tele-
communications  services; 
- •public telecommunications service" means 
a  telecommunications  service  available  to 
the  public,'. 
(ii)  The 15th indent is  replaced by the following: 
. '- "essential  requirements"  means  the  non-
economic  reasons  in  the  general  interest 
which  may  cause  a  Member  State  to 
impose  conditions  on  the  establishment 
and/or  operation  of  telecommunications 
networks or the provision of telecommuni-
cations services. These reasons  are  security 
of  network  operations,  maintenance  of 
network  integrity,  and.  in .justified  cases, 
interoperability of services, :data  protection, 
the  protection  of  the  environment  and 
town  and  country  planning  objectives  as 
well  as  the  effective  use  of  the  frequency 
spectrum  and  the  avoidance  of  harmful 
intederence  between  radio  based  telecom-
munications  systems  and  other,  space-
based  or  terrestrial,  technical  systems. 
Data  protection may i.nclude  protection of 
personal  data.  the  confidentiality of  infor-
mation transmitted or stored ;iS well  as  the 
protection  of  privacy.' 
{iii)  The  following  indents  are  added: 
'- "telecommunications  network"  means  the 
transmission  equipment and.  where appli-
cable,  switching  equipment  and  other 
resources  which  permit the  conveyance of 
signals  betweeen  defined  termination 
points  by  wire,  by  radio,  by  optical  or  by 
other electromagnetic  means; 
- "interconnection" means  the  physical  and 
logical  linking of  the  telecommunications 
facilities  of  organizations  providing  tele-
communicatio'ns networks and/or telecom-
munications services, in order to  allow the 
users  of one organization  to communicate 
with the users of the same or another orga-
nization  or to  access  services  provided  by 
third  organizations.' 
(b)  Paragraph  2  is  deleted. 
2.  Article  2  is  replaced  by  the  following: 
~rticie 2 
l.  Member States shall withdraw all  those  measures 
which, grant: 
(a)  exclusive  rights  for  the  provision  of telecommuni-
cations  services,  including  the  establishment  and 
the  provision  of  telecommunications  networks 
required  for  the  provision  of such  services;  or 
(b)  special  rights  which  limit  to  ~·o  or  more  the 
number of undertakings authorized to  provide such 
telecommunications  services  or  to  establish  or 
provide such n,etworks, otherwise than according to 
objective,  proportional·  and  non-discriminatory 
criteria;  or 
(c)  special  rights  which  designate,  otherwise  than 
according  to  objective, ·proportional  and  non-dis-
criminatory  several  competing  undertakings  to 
provide  such  telecommunications  services  or  to 
establish  or provide  such  networks. 
2.  Member States shall  take  the  measures necessary 
to  ensure  that  any  undertaking  is  entitled  to  provide 
the  telecommunications  services  referred  to  in  para-
graph  l or to establish or provide the networks referred 
to  in  paragraph  I. 
Without  prejudice  to  Article  3c  and  the  third  para-
graph  of  Article  4,  Member  States  may  maintain 
special  and  exclusive  rights  until  1 January  1998  for 
voice  telephony and  for  the  establishment  a~d provi-
sion  of  public  telecommunications  networks. 
Member States  shall,  however,  ensure  that all  remai-
ning restrictions  on  the  provision  of  telecommunica-
tions services other than voice  telephony over networks 
established by the  provider of the telecommunications 
services,  over infrastrucrures  provided  by  third  parties 
and  by  means  of  sharing of  networks,  other facilities 
and sites  are  lifted  and  the  relevant measures notified 
to  the  Commission  no  later  than  l  July  1996. 
&  regards  the  dates  set  out in  the  second and  third 
subparagraphs  of  this  paragraph,  in  Article  3  and  in 
Article  4a  (2),  Member  States  with  less  developed 
networks  shaH  be  granted  upon  request  an  additional 
implementation period of up to  five  years and Member 
States with very small  networks shall  be  granted upon 
request an  additional  implementation  period  of  up to 
two years,  provided  it  is  needed  to  achieve  the  neces-
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aary  structural  adjustments.  Such  a  request  ~ust 
include  a detailed  description  of  the  planned  adJUSt-
ments and a  preci~ assessment of the  timetable envi-
saged  for  their  implementation.  The  information 
provided  shall  be  made  availahle  to  any_  inter~sted 
party on demand having regard to. the  legttl~ate ~nte­
rest of undertakings in the protection of thetr busmess 
secrets. 
3.  Member States  which  make  the  supply  of  tele-
communications  services  or  the  establishment  or 
provision of  telecommun~ca~ons networks  s~bject to a 
licensing,  general  authonzauon  or declaration  proce-
dure  aimed  at  compliance with  the  essential  require-
ments  shall  ensure  that  the  relevant  conditions  are 
objective, non-discriminatory, proportionate and trans-
parent. that reasons are given for any refusal, and that 
there is a procedure for appealing against any refusaL 
The  provision  of  telecommunications  services  other 
than voice  telephony, the establishment and provision 
of public telecommunications networks and other tele-
communications  networks  involving  the  use  of radio 
frequencies,  may  be  subjected  only  to  a  general 
authorization  or a  declaration  procedure. 
4.  Member  States  shall  communicate  to  the 
Commission  the  criteria  on  which  licences,  general 
authorizations  and  declaration  procedures  are  based 
together wi[h  the  conditions  atuched  thereto. 
Member States shall  continue to  info(lll  the  Commis-
sion  of  any plans  to  introduce  new licensing, general 
authorization and declaration  procedures or co  change 
existing  procedures.' 
3.  Article  3  is  replaced  by  the  following: 
~rticle J 
&  regards voice telephony and the provision of public 
telecommunications networks, Member States shall, no 
later than  1 January  1997,  notify to  the Commission, 
before  implementation,  any  licensing  or  declaration 
procedure  which  is  aimed  at  compliance  with: 
- essential  requirements,  or 
- trade  regulations  relating  to  conditions  of  perma-
nence,  availability  and  quality  of  the  service,  or 
- financial  obligations  with  regard  to  universal 
service,  according  to  the  principles  set  out  in 
Article  4c. 
Conditions relating to ·availability can include. require-
ments to ensure access to customer databases necessaiy 
for  the  provision  of  universal  directory  information. 
The  whole  of  these  conditions  shall  form  a  set  of 
public-service  specifications  and  shall  be  objective, 
non-discriminatory,  proportionate  and  transparent. 
Member States may limit the number of licences to' be 
issued  only  where  related  to  the  lack  of  availability 
spectrum and justified  under the  principle of  propor-
tionality. 
Member States shall ensure, no later than 1 July 1997, 
that such  licensing or declaration  procedures  for  the 
provision of voice telephony and of public telecommu-
nications  networks  are  published.  Before  they  are 
implemented, the  Commission  shall  verify  the com-
patibility of  these  drafts  with  the  Treaty. 
As  regards  packet- or circuit-switched · data. services, 
Member States shall abolish the adopted set of public-
service  specifications. They may replace  these  by·  the 
declaration  procedures  or  general  authorizations 
· referred  to  in  Article  2.' 
4.  In  Article  3b,  th~ fol1owing  paragraph  is  added: 
'Member States  shall  ensure,  before  1 July  1997,  that 
adequate numbers are  available for all  telecommunica-
tions services. They shall ensure that numbers are allo-
cated  in  'In  objtctive,  non-discriminatory,  propor-
tionate  and  transparent  manner,  in  particular on  the 
basis  of  individual  application  procedures.' 
5.  In  Article  4,  the  first  paragraph  is  replaced  by  the 
following: 
'As long as  Member States  maintain special or exclu-
sive  rights  for  the  provision  and  operation  of  fixed 
public  telecommunications  networks  they  shall  take 
the necessary measures to  make the conditions gover-
ning  access  to  the  networks  objective  and  non-dis-
criminatory and shall  publish  them.' 
6.  The  following  Articles  4a  to  lrd  are  inserted: 
'Article  4a 
l.  Without prejudice to future  harmonization of the 
national  interconnection  regimes  by  the  European 
Parliament and the Council in  the framework ol ONP, 
Member States  shall  ensure  that  the  telecommunica-
tions  organizations  provide  interconnection  to  their 
voice  telephony -service  and their public switched tele-
communications network to other undertakings autho-
rized to provide such services or networks, on non-dis-
criminatory, proportional and transparent terms. which 
are  based  on  objective  criteria. 
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2.  Member States shall ensure in particular that the . 
telecommunications  "organizations  publish,  no  later 
than 1 July 1997,  the terms and conditions foe  inter-
connection to the basic functional components of their 
voice  telephony service and their public switched tele-
communications  networks, including the  interconnec-
tion  points  and  the  interfaces  offered  according  to 
mArket  needs.  ,
1
1 
3.  Furthermore,  Member  States  shall  not  prevent 
that  organizations  providing  telecommunications 
networks and/or services who so  request can negotiate 
interconnection  agreements  with  telecommunications 
organizations  for  access  to  the  public  switched ... tele-
communications  network  regarding  special  network 
access and/or conditions meeting their specific needs. 
If  commercial  negotiations  do  not  lead  to  an  agree-
ment within  a reasonable  time  period,  Member States 
shall  upon  request  from  either  party  and  within  a 
reasonable  time  period,  adopt  a  reasoned  decision 
which establishes the necessary operational and finan-
cial conditions and requirements for such interconnec-
tion  without  prejudice  to  other  remedies  available 
under the  applicable  national  law  or under Commu-
nity law. 
4.  Member States shall ensure that the cost accoun-
ting system  implemented  by  telecommunications  or-
ganizations with  regard  to  the  provision  of voice  tele-
phony and public telecommunications networks iden-
tifies  the  cost  elements relevant  for  pricing intercon-
nection  offerings. 
5.  The measures  provided  for  in  paragraphs  1 to  4 
shall apply for  a period of  five  years  from  the ciate  of 
the  effective  abolition  of  special  and  exclusive  rights 
for  the  provision  of  voice  telephony  granted  to  the 
telecommunications  organization.  The  Commission 
shall,  however,  review  this  Article  if  the  European 
Parliament and  the Council adopt a directive harmon-
izing interconnection conditions before the end of this 
period. 
Article  4b 
Member  States  shall  ensure  that  all  exclusive  rights 
with  regard  to  the  establishment  and  provision  of 
directory  services,  including  both  the  publication  of 
directories  and  directory  enquiry  services,  on  their 
territo.ry  are  lifted. 
Article  4c 
Without prejudice  to  the harmonization  by  the  Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council  in  the framework  of 
ONP, any national scheme which is  necessary to share 
the net cost of the provision of universal service obliga-
tions  entrusted  to  the  telecommunications  organiza-
tions, with other organizations whether it consists of a 
system of supplementary charges or a universal service 
fund,  shall:  · 
(a)  apply  only  to  undertakings  providing  public  tele-
communications  networks; 
(b)  allocate  the  respective  burden  to  each undertaking 
according  to  objective  and  non-discriminatory 
criteria  and  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
proportionality. 
Member States shall communicate any such scheme to 
the  Commission  so  that  it  can  verify  the  scheme's 
compatibility  with  the  Treaty. 
Member  States  shall  allow  their  telecommunications 
organizations  to  re-balance  tariffs  taking  account  of 
specific  market conditions and of the  need  to  ensure 
the  affordability  of  a  universal  service,  and,  in  parti-
cular, Member States shall allow. them to  adapt current 
rates  which  are  not  in  line  with  costs  and  which 
increase  the  burden of universal  service  provision,  in 
order to  achieve tariffs based on real costs. Where such 
rebalancing  cannot  be  completed  before  1  January 
1998  the Member States concerned shall  report to  the 
Commission  on the  future  phasing out of the remai-
ning  tariff  imbalances.  This  shall  include  a  detailed 
timetable  for  implementation. 
.f 
In  any case,··within  three  months after  the  European 
Parliament and the  Council adopt a Directive  harmo-
nizing  interconnection  conditions,  the  Commission 
will  assess  whether further  initiatives  are  necessa.ry  to 
ensure the consistency of both  Directives and take  the 
appropriate  measures. 
In  addition,  the  Commission  shall,  no  later  than  1 
January  2003,  review  the  situation  in  the  Member 
States  and  assess  in  particular  whether  the  financing 
schemes  in  place  do  not  limit  access  to  the  relevant 
markets.  In  this  case,  the  Commission  will  examine 
whether there are  other methods and make any appro-
priate  proposals. 
Article  4d 
Member  States  shall  not  discriminate  between  pro-
viders  of  public  telecommunications  networks  with 
regards  to  the  granting of  rights  of  way  for  the  pro-
vision  of  such  networks. 
Where  the  granting  of  additional  rights  of  way  to 
undertakings  wishing to  provide  public  telecommuni-
cations  networks  is ·not  possible  due  to  applicable 
essential  requirements,  Member  States  shall  ensure 
access  to  existing facilities  established  under rights  of 
way which may not be duplicated. at reasonable terms.' 
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7.  In the first pangraph of Article 7,  the words 'numbers, 
u  well  as  the•  are  inserted  before  the  word  'surveil-
lance'. 
8. 'Article  8  is  replaced  by the  following: 
~rticlt 8 
Member States shall, in the authorizatio."l,;.chemes for 
the provision  of voice  telephony and puolic teiecom-
mur1ications  netwOrks, at least ensure that where such 
authorization is granted to  undertakings to which they 
also  grant  special  or  exclusive  rights  in  ':leas  other 
than  telecommunications,  such  undertakings  keep 
separat~  financial  accounts  as  concerns  activities  as 
providers  of  voice  telephony  ancJJ_or  networks  and 
oUter activities,  as  soon as  they achteve  a turnover of 
more than ECU 50 million in the relevant telecommu-
nications  market.' 
9.  Article  9  is'  replaced  by the  following: 
'Article  9 
By  1 January 1998,  the Commission will  carry out an 
overall  assessment  of  the  situation  with  regard  to 
remaining  restrictions  on  the  use  of  public  telecom-· 
munications networks for the provision of cable televi-
sion  capacity.' 
Articlt 2 
Member States shall supply to the Commission. not later 
than  nine  months  after  this  Directive  has  entered  into 
force,  such information as  will  allow  the Commiasion to 
confirm that points 1 to 8 of Article 1 are complied· with. 
This Directive is  without prejudice to existing obligations 
of the Member States  to  communicate, no later than 31 
December 19.90,  8 August  1995 and 15  November 1996 
respectively,  measures  taken  to  comply with  Directives 
90/388/EEC, 94/46/EC and 96/2/EC. 
Article  3. 
This  Directive  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  20th  day 
following  its  publication  in  the  Official Journal of the 
European  Communities. 
Article 4 
This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  13  March  1996. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member of the  Commission 
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II 
(Acts  whose  publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 4  October 1.99 5 
concerning  the  conditions  imposed  on  the  second  operator  of  GSM 
radiotelephony services  in  Italy 
(Only  the Italian  text is  authentic) 
(95/489/EC) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNmES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community,  and  in  particular  Article  90  (3)  thereof, 
Having given the Italian authorities, by letter of 3 January 
1995,  and  Telecom  ltalia  SpA,  by  letter  of  30  January 
1995,  notice  to  submit their comments on  the  Commis-
sion's  objections_ to  the  intitial  payment  imposed  on 





The national measure in question 
The  Italian  Government  has  imposed  an  initial 
payment for  the  grant of  a second concession  for 
the establishment and operation on Italian territory 
of  a  network  for  the  provision  of  a  public  mobile 
radiotelephony  service  using  the  pan-European 
digital  system,  GSM  (global  system  for  mobile 
communications). This requirement was  laid down 
in  the  specifications  and  does  not  apply  to  the 
public  operator,  Telecom  ltalia. 
The undertaking and services  concerned 
Telecom  ltalia  SpA  is  controlled  by  the  Societa 
Torinese  Esercizi  Telefoni  (STET),  which  owns 
55 %  of  its  capital. STET  is  in  its  turn  controlled 
by the Istituco  per Ia  Ricostruzione lndustriale (IRl) 
(3) 
and thus by the Italian Government. Telecom ltalia 
thus  constitutes  a  'public  undertaking'  within  the 
meaning of  Article  90  (1). 
In  terms  of  its  turnover,  Lit  26 700  billion, 
Telecom  ltalia  is  the sixth  largest  telecommunica-
tions  operator  in  the  world.  It  has  a  workforce- of 
101  000 employees and over 25 million subscribers. 
When Telecom ltalia was set up in August 1994, it 
took over the exclusive  rights to  operate the public 
telecommunications  network  and  the  voice  tele-
phony service granted to Sociecl ltaliana per l'Eser-
cizio  Telefonico (SIP)  in  1984  for  a  period  of  20 
years. 
Cellular  digital  mobile  telephony  complying with 
the  GSM  standard  has  been developed  recently :  :1 
Europe and enables subscribers both to send an.d  to 
receive  calls  anywhere  in the  Community, as  well 
as  in some other European countries. This system, 
which  used  digital  technology,  a  compact  tele-
phone and  a subscriber  identity module  card,  has 
greater  potential  than  traditional analogue  radiote-
lephony  systems.  Digital  technology  provides 
higher  quality,  high-speed  data  transmission  and 
encryption  enhancing  the  confidentiality  of 
communications, and is  more economical in its use 
of frequencies  than analogue systems. Furthermore, 
the  GSM system is  based on common Community 
standards  regarding  common  frequency  bands 
approved at Community level  and, unlike analogue 
systems  which  are  often  incompatible  from  one 
Member State  to  another,  has  the  makings  of  one 
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of  the  pan-European  services,  whvse  promotion· is 
one  of  the  main  objectives  of  the  Community's 
policy on telecommunications (').  Lastly,  the emer-
ging  market  for  GSM  services  is  particularly 
dynamic : according to some studies, tlle number of 
users  in  western  Europe  c.:')uid  grow  from  a  little 
over  1  million in  199 3  to  15  to  20  million  in the 
year  2000 (2). 
The Council  has  adopred a  directive  reserving the 
890  to  915  and  935  to  960  MHz  frequency bands 
fnr the introduction of a common system of digital 
'-~SM radiotelephony (l).  1bese common  frequency 
bands allow several  competing operators to  coexist. 
The·  GSM service  began  operating commercially in 
the Community in  late  1992: since which time the 
great  majority  of  the  Member  States  (Belgium, 
Spain,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Finland,  Denmark, 
Germany, France, Greece,  Portugal  and the United 
Kingdom) have  each granted licences to  two opera-
tors,  while  the  other  Member States  (Austria  and 
Ireland)  have  announced  that they will  follow  the 
same  path  or have  already  initiated  the  necessary 
procedures to  that effect. Sweden has granted three. 
GSM  licences.  Germany,  France,  the  Netherlands 
and  the  United  Kingdom  have  authorized  or 
decided  to  authorize  a  third  operator  to  offer 
cellular digital  radiotelephony services, on a higher 
frequency  band,  on  the  basis  of  the  DCS  1800 
specifications. 
The  European  Conference of  Postal  and Telecom-
munications Administrations (CEP1), the  forum for 
the  national  regulatory  authorities  of  .16  countries 
(includinr,  Italy),  has  recommended  that  competi-
tion between  opcrawrs of GSM  :.crvices  be actively 
encouraged  and  the  rc.o,ru!acory  barriers  which  are 




By  letter  of  2.9  July  1993,  the  Commission 
requested  the  Italian  Government either to  termi-
nate  the  monopoly enjoyed  by Telecom  Italia  {at 
( 1)  Council  recommendation 87/371/EEC of  25  June  1987 (OJ 
No  L  196,  17.  7.  !987,  p.  81). 
(1)  'Scenario  Mobile  Communications  up  to  2010  - study  on 
forecast developments and future trends in  technical develop-
ment and commercial  provision  up to  the year  ZO 10'.  EuteJis 
Consult.  October  1993. 
(l)  Council  Directive  87/372/EEC of  25 June  1987 on  the  fre-
quency bands to  be  reserved  for  the coordinated introduction 
of  public  pan-European  cellular  digital  land-based  mobile 
communications  in  the  Community  OJ  No  L  !96,  17.  7. 
1987,  p.  8.5). 
(
4
)  'Review  of  the  Requirements  for  the  Fucure  Harmonization 
of  Regulatory Policy Regarding Mobile Communications Ser-
VICes'.  CEPT/ECT'RA  (92)  57,  p.  17 
that time, SIP) in GSM radiotelephony or to present 
arguments meeting the Commission's objections to 
that  monopoly.  In  response,  the  Italian  Govern-
ment decided to put out to tender a second conces-
sion  for  15  years  for  the  operation  of  a  GSM 
network.  A  notice  to  that effect  was  published  in 
the  Gautta Ufficiale  della  Repubblica  ltaliana, 
No  294  of  16  December 1993.  No  provision  was 
made  for  an  initial  payment. 
On 29  January 1994,  the  Italian  Government sent 
the  specifications  to  the  businesses  which  had 
responded. They state  that  tenders  must  indicate 
'the  lump  sum,  in  billions  of  lire,  which  the 
tenderer will  pay when  the  concession  is  granted' 
(Article 4.9.1,  page 44). The specifications also indi-
cate  that  that  amount  will  constitute  one  of  the 
selection  criteria  (p.  51),  without  mentioning  the 
W("ighting  to  be  attached  to  it.  The  deadline  for 
submitting tenders  was  1 March  1994 (Article  3.9, 
page  19). 
The  specifications  were  sent  to  the  Commission 
only on 2 March  1994, after the expiry of the dead-
line.  By  letter  of  1  April  1994,  the  Commission 
expressed its regret that the specifications for selec-
ting a second operator imposed on the firm  to  be 
selected  conditions  less  favourable  than  those 
enjoyed by SIP, in particular the requirement of an 
initial  payment (the  bid)  and  a  minimum  annual 
charge to  be  paid  by the operator for  the first  five 
years  irrespective  of  turnover,  while  for  SIP  this 
.charge  is  only 3,5 %  on  the  amount of  its  actual 
income .. 
The  Commission  then  suggested  to  the  Italian 
Government that these two requirements should be 
deleted and the bids of the two remaining consortia 
be  considered  solely  in  the  light  of  the  other 
criteria  mentioned  in  the specific;ations - that is 
to  say,  qualitative  criteria. 
On  18  April  1994,  the  Italian  Government offici-
ally  announced  the  consortium  selected,  Omnitel 
Pronto  Italia,  together with  the weighting used- in 
making the selection. The tenderers did not know 
the  weighting.  The  consortium  selected  obtained 
the  better  score  on  every  one  of  the  selection 
criteria. 
In  its  letter  of  11  May  1994,  the  Commission 
replied  that  it  continued  to  have  reservations 
concerning the initial  payment. Since Omnitel had 
heen  successful  on  all  the  other selection  criteria. 
the  Commission  requested  that  the  intitial 
payment  be  reconsidered  but  without  calling  in 
que!>tion  or  delaying  the  start  of  the  operator's 
serv1ce. 
I  30 23.  II. 95  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  No  L 280/51 
(6) 
Since there was no reply to  this letter, the Commis-
sion sent a reminder on 27 July 1994 pointing out 
that it could not terminate the infringement proce-
dure  before  the licence  had been  formally granted 
and again  inquired what the  Italian  Government's 
current  intentions  were  concerning  the  initial 
payment. Given the lesser impact of the minimum 
annual  charge  imposed  solely  on  the  second 
operator  as  compared  to  the  initial  payment,  the 
Commission decided  to  concentrate solely on  this 
latter  aspect,  without,  however,  accepting  the 
former. 
By  letter of  8 August  1994,  the  Italian  authorities 
replied  to  this  last  point  to  the  effect  that  the 
tenderers,  and  therefore  the  consortium  selected, 
were  well  aware  of  that  obligation  since  it  was 
expressly included in  the specifications, adding that 
in  the  course  of  meetings  between  officials  of  the 
Ministry  of  Posts  and  Telecommunications  and 
senior  management  of  Omnitel  Pronto  ltalia,  the 
problem  appeared  to  have  been  resolved.  On  31 
October  1994,  the  Commission  replied  that  the 
acceptance by the applicant second operator of the 
conditions  for  obtaining the  licence  had  no  effect 
on whether these conditions were discriminatory or 
not,  and  it  continued  to  press  its  request  for  the 
views  of  the  Italian  Government. 
On 3 January 1995,  the  Commission gave  formal 
notice  to  the  Italian  Government  either  to  annul 
the  second operator's obligation  to  make an  initial 
payment  or  to  submit  its  comments  on  the 
Commission's  arguments.  The  Italian  authorities 
replied  on  28  February,  17  May  and  10  August 
1995. 
THE  COMMISSION'S  ASSESSMENT 
Article  90  {1) 
Article  90  (1)  of  the  Treaty  provides  that,  in  the 
case  of  public  undertakings  to  which  Member 
States  grant  special  or  exclusive  rights,  Member 
States must neither enact nor maintain in force  any 
measure  contrary  to  the  rules  contained  in  the 
Treaty, in particular those relating to competition. 
Telecom  Itaiia  is  a  public  undertaking which  has 
been  granted exclusive  rights  to  operate  the  fixed 
telecommunications  network  and  offer  voice  tele-
phony  (within  the  meaning  of  Article  1  of 
Commission  Directive 90/388/EEC (1)) and  mobile 
analogue  radio  telephony  services.  On  22 
(')  Commission Directive of 28  June 1990 on competition in  the 
markets for telecommunications services (0  J No L 192, 24. 7. 
1990,  p.  1  0). 
December  1994,  the  Italian  Government  also 
granted  it  the  right  to  operate  a  GSM  radiotele-
phony  network,  which  qualifies  as  a special  right. 
since  the  operator had  been  designated  otherwise 
than according to objective and non-discriminatory 
criteria. 
In  accordance  with  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice (2),  the compatibility of  this  monopoly with 
the Treaty must be  assessed  in the  light of Article 
90  and  the  provisions  to  which  it  refers - in  this 
instance,  Article  86. 
Article  86 
Tht  rtltvant  market 
(7)  The  relevant  market  is  the  market  for  cellular 
digital  mobile  radiotelephony services. This should 
be  distinguished  from  the  market  in  voice  tele-
phony  and  that  (or  those)  in  other  mobile  tele-
phone  communications services. 
(8}  The Commission  has  defined  the  market in voice 
telephony in Directive 90/388/EEC. The Directive 
draws  a distinction  between  'services  whose  provi-
sion  consists  wholly  or  partly  in  the  transmission 
and routing of signals on  the public telecommuni-
cations  network'  and  mobile  radio  telephony 
services,  which  are  excluded  from  its  scope. 
(9)  Voice  telephony within  the  meaning of that Direc-
tive  is  the  principal  service  provided  on  the  fixed 
public  network,  meaning  between  given  network 
termination  points.  These  termination  points  are 
defined as  'all  physical connections and their tech-
nical  access  specifications'.  In  mobile  communica-
tions,  on the other hand,  the  termination  point is 
located  at  the  radio  interface  between  the  base 
station  of  the  mobile  network  and  the  mobile 
station,  which  means  that  there  is  no  physical 
termination  point.  The  definition  of  voice  tele-
phony services  in Article  1 of  the  Directive  there-
fore does not apply to mobile telephony services. 
(1 0)  According to  the  case-law of  the  Court of  Justice, 
for  a  product to  be  regarded  as  forming a  market 
which  is  sufficiently  differentiated  from  other 
markets, it must be  possible for  it to  be singled out 
by  such  special  features  distinguishing  it  from 
other  products  that  it  is  only  to  a  limited  extent 
interchangeable with  them and is  only exposed  to 
their  competition  in  a way  that  is  hardly  percep-
tible (l). 
(1)  See,  for  example, the judgment of  19  May  1993 in  Case-320/ 
91,  Corbeau,  paragraph  12. 
(l)  Case  27/76,  United  Brands  v.  Commission,  [1978]  ECR,  p. 
207,  paragraph  22. 
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Clearly,  there  is  very  little  interchangeability 
between  mobile  radiotelephony ' and  telephony 
using  the  fixed  network :  users  taking  out  a 
subscription  for  a  earphone  or portable  telephone 
do  not normally cancel  their  previous  subscription 
for  a  telephone  inst:tlled  at  their  home· or work-
pl<'lce. 1nerefore, mobile  radiotelephony is  indeed a 
new,  additional  service,  nor  a  substitute  for  tradi-
tional  telephony. 
This distinction  is  also  reflected  in  a  very  signifi-
c.:ant  price  differentiaJ. :  according  to  a  study 
conducted  by  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development (OECD) and based 
on  a  basket  of  services,  the  cost  of  mobile  tele-
phony to  the user is, on average in the OECD area, 
four times that of  the same services  offered  on  the 
fixed  network ('). 
Admittedly,  wider  dissemination  of  mobile  radio-
telephony  might  ultimately  lead  to  a  single  tele-
communications  system  catering  for  markets  that 
are  for  the  time  being  separate.  However,  the 
conditions on  which Article 86  is  to  apply must be 
assessed on  the  basis of  present demand and not of 
developments that could take  place  at  some unspe· 
cified  time  in  the  future. 
(ll)  It  having  been  established,  for  the  above  reasons, 
that mobile  radiotelephony should not be  regarded 
as  forming  part  of  the  market  voice-telephony 
services offered using the fixed  network, it remains 
to  be  seen whether, and to what extent, there might 
be grounds for  distinguishing between  the cellular 
mobile  radiotelephony services  based  on the  GSM 
standard which are  the subject of this Decision and 
cellular  radiotelephony  services  using  analogue 
technology. 
The GSM sysrem of cellular mobile radio telephony 
is  more  than  just  a  tec:hnical  refinement  of  the 
earlier  analogue  technology.  In  addition  to  the 
advantages  offered by GSM  in  terms of  the quality 
of voice  reproduction and more efficient use of the 
available  spectrum (thus accommodating substanti-
ally  more  users  on  a  given  frequency  allocation), 
this service  provides new facilities  that cater for the 
needs  of  only  some  users  of  mobile  radiotele-
phony: 
{i)  based  as  it  is  on  a Community standard, GSM 
can  become  a  pan-European  service.  Under 
(')  OECD  study,  published  24  February  1993. 
'roaming' agreements  between  network  opera-
tors,  the system permits any user to  make calls 
from his phone outside the national territory of 
the  operator  with  which  he  has  taken  out  a 
subscription ;  this  facility  is  availnble 
throughout  the  tl!rritory  of  the  parties  to  the 
GSM  Memorandum  of  Understanding  in 
Europe  and  other  parts  of  the  world.  Some 
users  who,  for  business  purposes,  use  mobile 
radiotelephony  services  only  within  the 
country or within  a  particular region,  are  not 
interested  in  this  new  feature.  For  others, 
however,  this  may be a  reason  for deciding to 
subscribe; 
(ii)  in  addition  to  voice  transmission,  the  GSM 
service can be used to transmit large quantities 
of  data ; again,  this  feature  meets  the  specific 
needs of only some of the existing or potential 
customers for mobile radiotelephony services; 
(iii)  the digital coding of messages means that a far 
greater degree of security can  be  achieved than 
via  the analogue system -again an  advantage 
of interest to only some users (particularly busi-
ness  customers); 
(iv)  digital  technology makes  it possible  to  offer a 
whole  range  of  advanced  telecommunications 
services  which  are  not available  (or which can 
be  made  so  only at  considerably higher cost) 
via  an  analogue  network ; 
(v)  in  the majority of the Member States, the tariffs 
applicable  to  GSM  services  currently  remain 
higher  than  those  for  analogue  mobile  tele-
phony. 
In  view  of  the  above,  the  simple  replacement  of 
analogue  radiotelephony by the GSM system is  not 
generally. envisaged,  in  the  short  tenn.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  likely  that, even  if  there  is  a discer-
nible drift of customers from  one to  the other, the 
two  systems  will  continue  to  exist  in  parallel  for 
several  years  to  come,  meeting  largely  different 
needs.  It  has  been  found  that,  even  in  countries 
where  the  GSM  system  is  fully  operational,  some 
operators  are  continuing to  invest in  the analogue 
network. 
(12)  On the basis of the abovementioned considerations 
and  the  current  circumstances,  and  taking  into 
account the  possible evolution of the market, GSM 
radiotelephony  services  should  therefore  probably 
be  regarded  a5  also  constituting a  market separate 
from  the  market  for  analogue  mobile  telephony. 
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In  any event,  the· conclusions of  the legal  analysis 
would  not  be  different,  even  if  analogue  mobile 
telephony  and  GSM  constituted  two  segments  of 
the  same  market. 
(13)  In  accordan<;e  with  judgments  of  the  Court  of 
Justice  this  market,  which  currently  extends  over 
the  whole  of  Italy,  is  a  substantial  part  of  the 
common  market. 
Ibe dominant position 
(14)  The Court of Justice has  held that an undertaking 
which  has  a  legal  monopoly  in  the  provision  of 
certain  services  may  occupy  a  dominant  position 
within  the  meaning of  Article  86  of the Treaty('). 
This  applies  in  the  case  of  Telecom  Jtalia  and  its 
subsidiary,  Telecom  Italia  Mobile,  created  in  July 
199 5,  which  together  are  the  only  undertakings 
permitted by  law  to  offer  the  telecommunications 
networks  for  the  public,  voice  telephony  and 
analogue  radiotelephony in  Italy,  three  markets  in 
which  they  therefore  enjoy  a  dominant  position. 
The  abuse  of a  dominant position 
(15)  The  Court of  Justice  has  ruled  that  ~a  system  of 
undistorted  competition,  as  laid  down  in  the 
Treaty,  can  be  guaranteed  only  if  equality of  op-
portllnity  is  secured  as  between  the  various 
economic  operators' (2}. 
Such  equality of opportunity is  particularly impor-
tant for  new entrants to  a market in which a domi-
nant operator on a related but separate market is  in 
the course ·Of  establishing itself, like Telecom Italia 
and  its  subsidiary,  Telecom  ltalia  Mobile. 
(16)  Telecom ltalia Mobile already enjoys the following 
major advantages for acquiring a dominant share of 
the  market  in  GSM  radiotelephony : 
- a  head  start :  it  is  already  in  a  posltlon  to 
market  its  service  while  the  second  operator 
will not be ready until the second half of 1995, 
- potential  customers:  Telecom  Italia  Mobile's 
analogue  radiotelephony  service,  TACS,  had 
more  than  2.2  .million  subscribers  (February 
(1)  Case  311/84, Centre  beige  d'ctudes  de  marche - Telemar-
keting (CBEM}  SA  v.  C?mpagni~  .luxembourgeoise de teledif-
fusion SA and Information pubhcate Benelux SA, [1985] ECR, 
p.  3261. 
(Z)  Case C-202/88, Prance v.  Commission, (1991] I,  p.  1223,  para-
graph  51.  p.  1271. 
1995) and is  acquiring 100 000 new subscribers 
each  month. 
However, this service will  become less attractive 
in future  in view of GSM's superior facilities. In 
addition, TACS  operates in wavebands reserved 
to  GSM  radiotelephony. With time some TACS 
subscribers  will  therefore  change  to  GSM. 
Accordingly, Telecom Italia Mobile already has 
potential  customers  for  its  GSM  service, 
- an existing distribution !network : the network is 
known  to  the  public,  since  Telecom  Italia 
Mobile  can  market its  GSM  service  through its 
T  ACS  distributors, 
- specific  information :  through  its  experience 
with  TACS,  it  has  specific  information  on  the 
calling  habits  of  Italian  subscribers,  by 
consumer  categories  and  region.  Moreover, 
since it also enjoys a monopoly in the supply of 
fixed  links  for  the·  networks  of  GSM  opera· 
tors (3),  it  will  continue  to  obtain  important 
information  on  traffic  flows, 
- economies of scale for  infrastructure : since it is 
at  present  the  sole  operator  of  fixed  and 
analogue mobile telephony, it has available sites 
and  aerials  for  establishing  its  GSM  network 
which  are  not available  to  its  competitor. 
Telecom Italia would be unable to  extend its domi-
nant position  on  the  market  in  wire  telephony or 
analogue  mobile·  telephony·  into  the  market  in 
GSM  radiotelephony by  increasing the costs  of  its 
rival,  for  example  by  imposing  interconnection 
charges  which  were  not  justified  by  the  costs 
involved,  without infringing Article  86 of  the  EC 
Treaty. 
(17)  Pursuant  to  Article  90  (1)  of the  EC Treaty,  Italy 
must  at  the  same  time  refrain  from  enacting 
measures  which  would,  by  increasing the  costs  of 
acceSs of the sole rival of a public undertaking on a 
market newly opened to  competition, significandy 
distort  this  competition.  Given  the  additional 
financial  burden  imposed  on  its  only competitor, 
Telecom ltalia Mobile  will  indeed have the choice 
between  two  commercial strategies,  of which  each 
would- be  in  breach  of  Article  90  (1)  read  in 
conjunction  with  Article  86  of  the  Treaty. 
(l)  Telecom  Italia  and  its  subsidiary  Telecom  ltalia  Mobile 
operate  the fixed  network and mobile services. On !he other 
hand, Omnitel Pronto ltalia can only establish radio links if it 
can show that Telecom Italia cannot provide it with the leased 
lines  requested  wi[hin  a  reasonable  time. 
I  33 No  L  280/54  Official  Journal  of  me  European  Communities  23., 11.  95 
(i)  Extension  of  the  dom1nanc  position C) 
of  the  public  undertaking 
The initial payment of  Lit 7  50  billion made by 
me second operator on  this market will  neces-
sarily  have  to  be  covered  by  income.  The 
second  operator will  merefore  have  difficulties 
in  competing  with  the  first  operator  through 
lower  tariffs.  The first  operator,  Telecom  Italia 
Mobile,  which  must  not  depreciate  me  same 
payment  and  which  moreover  is  aware  of  me 
second  operator's  cost  structure  through  its 
monopoly  of  the  infrastructure (1),  could  be 
encouraged by reducing its  tariffs,  to  extend its 
current dominant position  on  the  fixed  infras-
tructure  market and  me  analogue  mobile  tele-
phony  market  into  the  market  in  GSM  radio-
telephony. It is  "  qu~s'lioa of the extension of a 
dominant  position  thanks  to  the  competitive 
advantange  provided  by  the  distortion  of  the 
cost  structure  due  to  the  intitial  payment, 
rendering the State  measure contrary to Article 
90,  read  in  conjunction  with  Article  86. 
(ii)  Limitation of production, markets or of 
technical  ·development  within  the 
meaning  of  Article  8 6  (b) 
Moreover,  the  need  to  finance  Lit  7  50  billion 
will  also  delay  the  investments  of  the  new 
entrant, which will have  to  use  part of its initial 
capital  to  cover the initial payment, which will 
therefore not be available  for  investment in the 
development  of  its  network.  quite  apart  from 
the capital needed for establishing its service in 
compliance  wiht  the  minimum  requirements 
set  out  in  me  licence.  This  will  delay  the 
development  of  the  network  and  could  also 
encourage  Telecom  Italia  Mobile  to  delay 
marketing its GSM service (l). The T ACS system 
is  more attractive in that it guarantees Telecom 
(')  Sec,  for  example,  judgment  of  the  Court of  Justice  of  17 
November  1992.  Joined  Cases  C-271/90,  C-281/90  and  C-
289/90, The Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Belgium and 
the  Italian  Republic v.  Commission, [1992)  ECR  I,  p.  5833, 
·  paragraph  36. 
(l)  The specifications  provide  for  a  reduction  of  50 %  of  the 
public tariff  for  lines  leased  by SIP  to  the second  operator. 
Despite this reduction, the cost of leased lines for the second 
GSM  operator in  Italy  remains  three times  higher than  that 
applied by  BT in the U  niced  Kingdom to  cellular telephony 
operators. 
(')  At.  the Commission has already emphasized in its  letter of 29 
June 1993, 'since the public undertaking holds a monopoly in 
the supply of  mobile  radiotelephony services, it has  no great 
interest in introducing an  alternative, the GSM  service, quick-
ly'. 
ltalia  Mobile  a  definite  income  since  the 
services  are  operated as  a monopoly and more-
over  the  bulk  of  me  investments  have  already 
been  amortized. 
The Telecom  Italia group, which:  as  bas  been 
pointed  out,  is  aware  of  the  second operator's 
cost structure  through  its  infrastructure  mono-
poly,  would  therefore  be  encouraged  to  retain 
higher tariffs  for  its GSM services than it would 
otherwise  do,  in  the  absence  of  the  State 
measure in question. In so doing, it would limit 
production, output or technical development at 
the expense of  the users within the meaning of 
Article 86 (b)  as  regards GSM,  which involves a 
more advanced technology, so  as  to  benefit the 
older  analogue  service. 
In addition, mis would delay the move  towards 
personal  communication  combining  mobile 
and fixed  networks, which will only be possible 
if  the  tariffs  for  mobile  communications  fall 
substantially. 
As  the  Court of Justice  has  held e).  Article  90 
(1)  precludes  Member  States  from  enacting 
measures  likely  to  cause  an  undertaking  to 
infringe  the  provisions  to  which it  refers  - in 
particular, in the case  in  point, those contained 
in  Article  86. 
In  conclusion,  on  either  hypothesis,  the  State 
measure  concerned is  therefore  contrary to  Article 
90 (1'),  read in conjunction with Article 86 (b) of the 
Treaty. 
(18)  The  responsibility  of  Member  States  pursuant  to 
Articles  86  and  90  (1)  of  the  Treaty  only  arises 
where  the  improper behaviour of  the  company in 
question  is  capable  of  affecting  trade  between 
Member States. Such a potential effect exists in this 
instance  because  the  commercial  activity  of  the 
Italian  GSM  operators  may  affect  the  residents  of 
other Member States,  who  may  acquire  the 'SIM' 
cards  in Italy  just as  in  the territories of  the other 
Member  States,  thanks  to  the  roaming agreement 
with the· operators covering those Member States. 
(
4
)  See,  for  example, Case  C-41/90, Hefner v.  Macrotron [1991] 
ECR  I,  p.  1979  as  well  as  the  judgments of  18  June  1991, 
Case  C-260/89,  Dimotiki  Etairia  Pliroforissis  v.  EPT, [1991) 
ECR I,  p.  2925, and of 5 October 1994, Case C32J/93, Soci-
ete  civile agricole d'insemination de Ia  Crespelle v.  Cooperati-
ve d'elevage et d'inscmination aruficlelle du departemcnt de Ia 
Mayenne  (1994)  ECR  I,  p.  5077. 
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The reply  of the  Italian  authorities 
(19)  In  its  letter  of  28  February  1995,  the  Italian 
Government  emphasized  that  the  initial  payment 
had  been  one  factor  in  selecting  the  second 
operator. The sum proposed by the ·second operator 
would  therefore  be  determined as  part of  its  stra-
tegic  choice,  since  the  specifications  do  not 
mention either a minimum or a maximum figure. 
(20) 
Moreover,  the  specifications  allow  the  tenderer  to 
propose  further  conditions,  such  as  waiving  the 
initial  payment or· spreading  it  over  a  number of 
years. In addition, the tenderers knew that Telecom 
ltalia  Mobile  was  not  required  LO  make  an  initial 
payment. 
It was  impossible  to  oblige Telecom  Italia  Mobile 
to  make  the  same  payment  since  it  had  already 
made its investments -and  thereore relied on amor-
tizing them by operating the service as  a monopoly. 
By determining the amount of  the  initial  payment 
which  it  would  be  prepared  to  make,  the  second 
operator  of  necessity  took  into  account  positive 
factors  such  as  the  investments  already  made  by 
Telecom ltalia Mobile and its right to use Telecom 
Italia  Mobile  network  through  national  roaming. 
It  therefore denies  that the  dominant  positions  of 
Telecom  ltalia  and  its  subsidiary  Telecom  ltalia 
Mobile  have  been strengthened. It also  denies  that 
the initial  payment produced a negative impact on 
investments or on  the  level  of  tariffs,  in  so  far  as 
the second operator's concession fixes  specific obli-
gations  on  this  point. 
lastly, it  refuses  to  abolish  the initial  payment. In _ 
its  view,  relinquishment  of  this  criterion  would 
mean that the selection procedure would have to be 
begun  again  if  the  principles of transparency and 
non-discrimination were to  be respected. According 
to  the  Italian  Government,  the  removal  of  an 
element such as  the offer to  pay a sum in order to 
enter the GSM market would necessarily lead to the 
opening  of  a  new  bidding  process.  Without  the 
requirement of the initial payment, the competitors 
might  well  have  made  different  bids.  This .argu-
mentation was  confirmed by the  Italian authorities 
by  letter  of  10  August  1995. 
In  its  letter of  17  May  1995,  the  Italian  Govern-
ment  distinguished  between  the  question  of  the 
initial payment and the risk of extending the domi-
nant  position. 
As  far  as  the  initial  payment  is  concerned;  the 
Italian  Government  maintains  that,  in  the  past, 
Telecom  Italia  Mobile  has spent larger sums than 
that  on  developing  the  new  service  and  that 
furthermore  the opening up of the GSM service to 
competition  has  had  a  negative  effect  on  the 
expected  profits  of  Telecom  ltalia  Mobile  for 
running  the  service.  Moreover,  to  reimburse  the 
initial payment would allow the candidate who was 
not  chosen  to  attrack  Omnitel'  s  concession,  and 
the  selectio'n  procedure  would  have  to  start again. 
On  this  point,  the  Italian  Government  reaffirmed 
that the abolition of the obligatory initial  payment 
on the  part of  the second operator would  necessi-
tate  the  opening of  a  new selectio.n  process. 
As  for  the risk of extending the dominant position 
of Telecom Italia and its  subsidiary, Telecom ltalia 
Mobile,  the  Italian  Government emphasized  that, 
following  its  intervention,  agreements  had  been 
co_ncluded  between  Telecom  Italia  and  Omnitel 
relating  to  the  interconnection of Omnitel's GSM 
network to the fixed telephone network of Telecom 
Italia, to experimental roaming of Omnitel'  s service 
via  Telecom  Italia  Mobile's  GSM  network,  to  the 
distribution system of Telecom Italia Mobile's GSM 
and  to  the  keeping of  separate  accounts  for  GSM 
and Telecom  Italia's  other activities. 
The Commission's  rebuttal 
(21)  The  Commission  has  not  challenged  the  Italian 
Government's  decision  to  use  two  distinct  proce-
dures in awarding the GSM concessions. Neverthe-
less, it has repeatedly urged the Italian Government 
to  ensure that the procedures used and the criteria 
adopted in granting the second licence should not 
have  the effect of increasing the costs of access  by 
the  new entrant to  the  GSM  market, as  compared 
with  those  of  the  public  operator. 
The  initial  investment  for  establishing  a  GSM 
network in Italy amounts to about lit 2 000 billion. 
The  initial  payment,  when  added  to  the  initial 
investment,  therefore  increases  the  second  opera-
tor's  need  for  financing  by  more  than  one-third. 
Since Telecom ltalia mobile does not have to make 
the same payment, it is  wrong to say that the initial 
payment  has  not stengthened  its  position.  It can 
use  the money thereby saved to extend its distribu· 
tion  network  or  make  special  offers  to  potential 
subscribers. 
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Moreover,  Telecom  Italia  Mobile  possesses  a 
temporal  advantage  to  recoup  the  major  sums 
invested  for  the  development  of  GSM.  When  it 
puts  its  network  at  the  disposal  of  the  second 
national  operator,  in  the  context  of  national . 
roaming, the latter will  not benefit freely from  this 
investment but will  have  to  participate in financing 
it. 
(21)  The fact  that applicants for  the second licence were 
aware of the future distortion of competition on the 
GSM  market  in  Italy  in  favour  of  Telecom  ltalia 
Mobile  does  not mean  that there  is  any less  of  an 
imbalance here. Moreover,  firms which did wish  to 
enter  the  market  had  no  choice  but  to  take  this 
handicap  into  account  in  their  business  plan. 
It is  therefore wrong to  say that the initial payment 
will  have  no  impact  on  prices  charged  or  the 
coverage  offered. The second operator's concession 
adopts  the objectives which it has itself undertaken 
to  attain  after  making  allowance  for  the  initial 
payment The  Italian  Government  itself  concedes 
that,  without  the  initial  payment,  tenderers  'could 
have  modified their economic objectives for each of 
the  valuation  parameters'.  Moreover,  the  mere  fact 
that the  specifications  make  provision  for  national 
roaming  is  certainly  not  sufficient  compensation 
for  the  second operator's  disadvantage. The  Italian 
Government has  not as  yet  informed the  Commis-
sion  of  an  agreement  on  this  matter  with  the 
second  operator. 
(23)  Lastly,  the  argument  that,  if  the  initial  payment 
were  waived,  _the  tendering  procedure  would  have 
to  be  repeated in order to comply with the princi-
ples of  transparency and non-discrimination is  not 
convincing. 
Bearing.  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  consortium 
chosen  submitted  the  better  tender  on  all  other 
selection  criteria,  the  Commission,  in  its  letter of 
11  May  1994,  determined  that  it  was  possible  and 
necessary to  reconsider this initial payment without 
calling in  question or delaying the commencement 
of  the  second  operator's  service. 
Moreover,  the  weighting  of  the  various  selection 
criteria was  not communicated to  the various appli-
cants. The candidates  could  not therefore say that 
they would  have  made  a  better offer  it they  had 
known  that  the  initial  payment  would  be  aban-
doned.  The  weighting  attached  to  the  initial 
payment  could,  in  fact,  have  been  very  slight  or 
zero. 
In any case,  in  order not to  interfere in a question 
which relates in part to  the internal law of Italy, the 
Commission  leaves  to  the  Italian  Government the 
choice  of  the  means  of  remedying  the  breach, 
without expressly envisaging the reimbursement of 
the initial payment. Such reimbursement is  not the 
only  conceivable  means  of  redressing  the  imba-
lance that it creates. The Italian Government could 
either  impose  an  identical  pa}'ment  on  Telecom 
ltalia Mobile,  or it could adopt corrective measures 
such as  those mentioned in the context of contacts 
between  the  Commission  and  the  Italian  authori-
ties,  for  example : 
- a  grant  without  delay  to  any  operator  of  an 
unconditional right to  establish  its  own  infras-
trucrure (the  provision of the  radio  frequencies 
necessary  for  rnicroware  links)  or  to  use  the 
existing  infrastructure  .  of  other  undertakings 
such as  the  national railways,  the motorways or 
ENEL  (the  national  electricity  agency), 
- the  effective  application  of  the  roaming agree-
ment  between  the  two  GSM-radiotelephony 
operators,  which  from  a  technical  and  tariff 
standpoint  would  compensate  for  the  second 
operator's  delay, 
- the  grant  of  access  to  Telecom  Italia's  TACS 
900  customer  database,  while  maintaining  the 
confidentiality  of  personal  data, 
- the  revtston  of  the  tariff  conditions  for  inter-
connection with Telecom Italia's switched tele-
phone  network, 
- the grant to  any operator of the right to  apply 
alternative  technologies  such  as  DCS-1800  or 
DEer to  provide  its  service. 
The  revocation  of  the  concession  already granted 
can  in  no  circumstances  be  considered  to  be  an 
appropriate remedy for the breach, bearing in mind 
that that would eliminate the only existing comep-
titor to  the  public company Telecom Italia Mobile 
on  the GSM  market, and also  bearing in mind the 
current  monopoly  of  Telecom  ltalia  as  regards 
fixed  telephony and GSM  during the whole  period 
_necessary  for  the  opening of a new call  for  offers, 
thus  rendering  competition  even  more  difficult 
because  of  the  additional  time-lead. 
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(24)  The  Commission's  objections  to  the  initial 
payment imposed on  the  second operator but not 
on Telecom  Italia Mobile  are  not based on Article 
6 of the Treaty.  In  this  procedure  the  issue  is  not 
the  discrimination  in  itself  but  the  effect  of  the 
State measure which is, as has been shown at points 
17  and  18,  to  lead  the telecommunications agency 
to extend its dominant position or to limit produc-
tion,  markets  or  technical  development. 
The aim  of  this  procedure  is  to  cause  the  Italian 
Government to  take the necessary steps to  preclude 
that effect ; the  most  obvious  would  be  a  require-
ment that Telecom ltalia Mobile make an identical 
payment. 
(25)  Likewise, if the Italian Government so requests, the 
Commission  would  be  prepared  to  examine 
whether the  infringement could· be  terminated by 
adopting other measures,  provided  that they offset 
p:-:>pc:lj  Uti.!  second  operator's  disadvantage. 
It  is  incumbent  upon  the  Italian  Government  to 
make proposals in this matter. The Italian Govern-
ment should in  any case  provide  figures  for  these 
proposals, showing that they properly offset the  Lit 
750  billion  paid  by  Omnitel. 
Article  90  (2) 
(26)  Article  90  (2)  of  the  Treaty  provides  that  under-
takings  entrusted with  the  operation of services  of 
general  economic  interest  are  subject to  the  rules 
on com~ptition, in so far as  the application of such 
rules  does not obstruct the performance, in law or 
in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to' them. The 
Italian Government has not relied on this provision 
to  justify  imposing  the  initial  payment  on  the 
second  operator alone. 
(27)  The Commission considers for  its  part, that in  this 
case Article 90 (2) does not apply, because there are 
no factors which would permit the conclusion that 
the initial payment is  justified by  the performance 
in law  or in  fact  of  a service  of  general  economic 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
(28)  In  view  of  the  above  the  Commission  considers 
that  the  competitive  disadvantage  in  the  form  of 
the  initial  payment  imposed  on  the  second 
operator alone for  its· concession to  operate a GSM 
network  in  Italy  constitutes  an  infringement  of 
Article  90  (1)  of  the  Treaty,  read  in  conjunction 
with  Article  86, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION: 
Ar#cle  1 
Italy shall  take  the steps  necessary to  abolish  the distor-
tion  of  competition  resulting  from  the  initial  payment 
imposed  on  Omnitel  Pronto  Italia  and  to  secure  equal 
conditions  for  operators  of  GSM  radiotelephony  on  the 
Italian market at the latest by  1 January 1996,  by means 
of  the  following : 
- a  requirement  that  Telecom  Italia  Mobile  mak~ an 
identical  payment,  or 
- the  adoption,  after  receiving  the  agreement  of  the 
Commission,  of  corrective  measures  equivalent  in 
economic terms  to  the  payment made  by  the second 
operator. 
The  measures  definitively  adopted  may  not  impair  the 
competition created by  the  licensing of  the  second GSM 
operator on  2  December  1994. 
Article  2 
Italy shall  inform  the  Commission within  three  months 
of notification of this Decision of the steps it has taken to 
comply- therewith. 
Article J 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  Italian  Republic. 
Done  at  Brussels,  4  October -1995 .. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member of the  Commission 
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II 
(Acts  whose  publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 27  November  1996 
concerning the additional implementation periods requested by Ireland for the 
implementation of Commission Directives 90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as  regards 
full  competition  in  the  telecommunications markets 
(Only  the  English  text is  authentic) 
(fext with  EEA relevance) 
(97/114/Eq  • 
THE  COMMISSION  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNmES,  Whereas: 
Having ·regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Co_mmunity, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  establishing  the  Euro-
pean  Economic  Area, 
Having  regard  to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  of 
28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecom-
munications  services { 1),  as  last  amended  by  Directive 
96/19/EC (2),  and  in  particular  Article  2 (2)  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  Commission  Directive  96/2/EC  of  16 
January  1996  amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with 
regard to  mobile and personal communications (3),  and in 
particular Article  4  thereof, 
Having  given  notice (
4
)  to  interested  parties  to  submit 
their comments in accordance with Article 2 (2) of  Direc-
tive  90/388/EEC  and  Article  4  of  Directive  96/2/EC, 
(') OJ  No  L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
(1)  OJ  No  L  74,  22 3.  1996,  p.  13. 
(l)  OJ  No  L  20,  26.  1.  1996,  p.  59. 
( 4)  OJ  No  C  169,  13.  6.  1996,  p.  5. 
(I) 
A.  THE FACfUAL BACKGROUND 
I. The  Irish  request 
The  Irish  Government  has,  by  letter  of  15  May 
1996, requested additional implementation periods: 
- until  I  January 2000, regarding the abolition of 
the  exclusive  rights  currently  granted  to 
Telecom  Eireann  as  regards  the  provision  o( 
voice  telephony  and  the  underlying  network 
infrastructure,  instead  of  1  January  1.998  as 
provided  in  Article  2  (2)  of  Dir~ctive 
90/388/EEC, 
- until  1  July  1999,  regarding  the  lifting  of 
restrictions  on  the  provision  of  already  liber-
alized  telecommunications  services  om 
(a)  networks established by the provider of the 
telecommunications  service, 
(b)  infrastructures provided by third parties, and 
(c)  the sharing of networks, other facilities  and 
sites, 
instead of 1 July 1996 as  provided in  Article 2 
(2)  of  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC, 
- until 1 January 2000, regarding the direct inter-
connection  of  mobile  telecommunications 
networks, instead of immediately as  provided in 
Article  3d of  Directive  90/388/EEC. 
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(2) 
This  request  is  in  line  with  Council  resolutions 
93/C213/01  of 22 July 1993 (')and 94/C379/03 of 
22  December  1994 (Z). 
The  Irish  Government  considers  these  additional 
implementation periods necessary for the following 
reasons: 
2.1.  Ireland  has  been  carrying out major develop-
ment  of  the  telecommunications  networks; 
this  has  required  significant  capital  invest-
ment,  involving high  levels  of debt; Telecom 
Eireann  has been constrained in its  ability to 
achieve  the  necessary  structural  adjustments, 
particularly  of  tariffs,  because  of  those  high 
debt  levels,  the  high  cost  of  delivering  tele-
communications  services  · in  Ireland  and 
Telecom  Eireann's  high  cost-structure. 
2.2.  Further structural  adjustments  are  required  in 
order to  enable Telecom  Eireann  to  function 
effectively  in  a  fully  competitive  market,  but 
in  a  way  that  ensures  the  maintenance  of 
universal  service,  an  increase  in  telephone 
density and  reductions  in  Telecom  Eireann'  s 
debt  and  cost  structure;  these  adjustments 
involve: 
(I)  further  development of  Ireland's  telecom-
munications  networks, 
(2)  further  adjustment  of  Telecom  Eireann's 
tariff  structure, 
(3)  transformation  of  Telecom  Eireann,  in 
particular,  further  development  of  its 
products  and  services  for  the  home  and 
international  sectors,  restructuring  its  cost 
base  and  completion  of  the  management 
of  its  change  into  a  market-driven  and 
customer-focused  organization.· 
With the assistance of a  strategic partner this 
transformation  which  woul4  otherwise  take 
more time could be achieved before I  January 
2000. 
2.3.  Liberalization of  infrastructure significantly in 
advance  of  the  liberalization  of  voice  tele-
phony  would  enable  providers  of  liberalized 
services  to  erode Telecom Eireann's customer 
base. 
2.4.  In relation to mobile interconnection, freedom 
of interconnection by  mobile operators would 
enable  them  to  bypass  the  Public  Switched 
Telephone  Network  (PSTN)  for  trunk  and 
( 1)  OJ  No  C  213,  6.  8.  1993,  p.  l. 




international  traffic  and  furthermore  enable 
them to capture a significant share of Telecom 
Eireann's  international  call  traffic,  as  a  result 
of  which  Telecom  Eireann's  revenues  would 
be seriously reduced and the structural adjust-
ment  programme  disrupted. 
2.5.  The  derogation  sought  will  not  impede  the 
development of competition in other areas of 
the  telecommunications  sector  in  Ireland. 
The Irish Government provided a detailed descrip-
tion regarding the capital investments required for 
the  development  of  the  network,  the  tariff  rebal-
ancing  planned,  as  well  as  the  restructuring  of 
Telecom  Eireann  in  the  annex  to  its  letter of  15 
May  1996. 
The  Irish  Government announced that,  if  this de-
rogation  was  granted, it wou.lrl .in any.  case  imple-
ment  the  amendments  made  to  Directive 
90/388/EEC by  Directive 96/19/EC in national law 
according  to  the  following  time  table: 
- fourth  quarter  1996:  establishment  on  a  fully 
stand-alone basis of a telecommunications regu-
latory  authority with  appropriate  arrangements 
for  industry  funding, 
first  quarter  1998:  publication  of  proposed 
legislative  changes  to  implement full  competi-
tion  and  remove  all  restrictions  by  1  January 
2000, including proposals for funding universal 
services, 
third  quarter  1998:  target  for  achievement  of 
legislative  changes, 
fourth  quarter  1998:  communication  to  the 
Commission  of  draft  licences  for  voice  tele-
phony and/or underlying  network  providers, 
first  quarter  1999:  publication  of  licensing 
conditions  for  all  services  and  of  interconnec-
tion  charges  as  appropriate  in  accordance  in 
both  cases  with  relevant  EU  Directives, 
- July-December  1999:  award  of  licences  and 
amendment  of  existing  licences  to  enable 
competitive  provision  of  voice  telephony  and 
unrestricted  interconnection  of  mobile 
networks  from  1  January  2000. 
The  request  was  delivered  to  the  Commission 
services  on  Wednesday  15  May  1996. 
II.  The comments  received 
Fourteen undertakings as well as  the Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions provided comments following the 
notice  published  by  the  Commission  on  13  June 
1996. 
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(6)  According  to  these  comments: 
the  Irish  authorities  have  not  established  that 
the existing network is,  in  fact,  so undeveloped 
that they  require  any derogation  period  before 
full  liberalization. They have failed to satisfy the 
criteria established  in  Directive 90/388/EEC as 
amended,  and  in  Article  2 (2)  thereof  in  par-
ticular. A modern basic network is  now in place 
and  Telecom  Eireann's  real  concern  is  not  to 
shorten  waiting  lists  bur  rather  to  'encourage' 
demand, 
- although  Ireland's  telecommunications 
networks  have  been  less  developed  than  those 
of  some  other  EU  Member  States,  much 
progress. has  been  made  in  recent years.  Some 
of this protress has  been thanks to  EU funding 
(in  the order of  ECU  65  to  70  million for  the 
period  1989  to  1999).  Telecom  Eireann  has 
been  successfully  increasing  penetration: 
between  1 April  1994 and 31  March  199 5 line 
connections increased by 6 % which represents 
a  growth  of  new  line  connections  of  22 %, 
- Telecom  Eireann's  call  tariffs  have  reduced  by 
34 %  in  real  terms between  1986 to  1994; total 
traffic has increased by 7,4% in  I 994 to  199.5, 
the  commitmef1(s  to  tariff  restructuring and  to 
improving Telecom  Eireann's cost structure are 
so vague and general that they lack credibility, 
the  arguments  put  forward  in  the  application 
relating  to  Telecom  Eireann,  particularly  its 
indebtness, are greatly exaggerated and seriously 
misleading. The latest annual accounts  for  that 
company reveal  that its  financial  position  is  in 
many  respects  surprisingly  healthy, 
- as  regards the high cost of delivering services in 
Ireland,  any  competing  operator  would  be 
affected  by  such  costs, 
the  projected  investmencs  of  Telecom  Eireann 
to  complete  universal  telephone  coverage  (i.e. 
an  increase  of  investment  by  approximately 
43  %)  are  over  estimated.  These  investments 
cannot be  considered as  necessary  before  liber-
alization, since Ireland concedes it already has a 
modern  network,  including Integrated  Services 
Digital  Network (ISDN) capabilities, which is  as 
developed  as  the  networks  of  other  telecom-
munications  organizations  in  Europe.  These 
investments would  aim  at  the  establishment of 
nationwide  fibre-optic  Synchronous  Digital 
Hierarchy (SOH)  networks,  implementation  of 
non-hierarchical networks and establishment of 
low and high bandwidth copper access systems. 
To date  none of the  other EU  countries  have 
networks meeting such requirements. Moreover, 
some  doubts  were  cast  on  the  extent  of  the 
universal  service  obligation  entrusted  to 
Telecom Eireann. According to  the  Irish  Tele-
communications Act,  Telecom Eireann  is  only 
obliged  to  satisfy  user  needs  subject  to  its 
appreciation  that such  requests  are  'reasonably 
practicable'.  The  fact  that  Telecom  Eireann 
would  want  to  improve  the  level  of  the  tele-
communications  services  it  provides  results 
from  management  decisions  and  not  from  a 
State  measure, 
- the  introduction  of  a  new  partner,  P1T Tele-
com/Telia, for Telecom Eireann, announced in 
June, should not be allowed to delay the intro-
duction  of- corHpetition, 
- derogations  would  sanction  Telecom  Eireann 's 
continuing  dominance  in  the  Irish  telecom-
munications  market,  increasing  the  danger  of 
abuse  of  such  dominance.  Telecom  Eireann 
would actually discriminate against providers of 
liberalized  services  as  regards  for  example 
volume  discounts  that  are  granted  to  other 
customers with  a comparable volume of  traffic: 
it  would,  moreover,  underinvest  in  street 
payphones  and  delay  the  provision  of  com-
peting  companies, 
- a  market  in  which  operators  are  able  to 
construct  alternative  networks  and  provide 
value-added and data transmission services, will 
create  a  stable  environment  which  will  give 
incentive to  Telecom Eireann  to  restructure  its 
operations  and  complete  its  transition  ~to  a 
market-driven  and  customer-focused  organiza-
tion  quickly and effectively. This environment 
will  ensure  that Telecom  Eireann's  voice  tele-
phony  revenue  streams  are  protected,  and 
consequently that it can service its debt require-
ments  fully.  When  full  liberalization  takes 
place, operators will  be able  to  respond quickly 
to  consumer needs as  competing infrastructures 
will  already  have  been  developed, 
- the  derogation  on  the  use  of  alternative  infra-
structure  requested  would  in  particular  hurt 
cross-border  traffic  between  Northern  Ireland 
and  Ireland.  The  derogation  sought  would 
prevent  operators  in  Northern  Ireland  from 
being able to maintain margins on cross-border 
data  services  and  closed  user groups  calls, 
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{7) 
- the Irish Congress of Trade Unions fears  that if 
Telecom Eireann  is  not ensured sufficient  rev-
enues  to  sustain  the  unavoidable  increasing 
level  of investments, the reducing of tariffs  and 
remuneration of shareholders, the Irish Govern-
ment  will  be  faced  with  huge  ongoing  addi-
tional costs. This would damage the prospect of 
a new social  partnership agreement coming up 
for  negotiation  in  December and  could,  as  a· 
consequence, lead to  the Union's withdrawal of 
cooperation  with  the  liberalization  process  in 
this  crucial  strategic  industry. 
By  letter  dated  2.9  July  1996,  the  Commission 
transmitted  to  the  Irish  authorities  the  15 
comments  of  these  third  parties,  received  on  the 
occasion  of  the  publication  of  the  Commission's 
notice  of  13  June  1996  opening the  procedure. 
In  response  to  the  abovementioned comments the 
Irish  authorities  by  letter  of  19  September  I 99' 
stated  inter alia that 
- Telecom  Eireann  is  and  will  continue  to  be 
subject  to  all  the  normal  European  and  Irish 
competition  rules  and  any  aggrieved  party  has 
available  the  normal  remedies  which  apply. 
Any  suggestion  that  a  derogation  would  alter 
this  is  incorrect. 
- Telecom  Eireann's  debt  position,  while  it  has 
improved, is  still a serious constraint. The ratio 
of total debt to total  equicy (gearing) at the end 
of  the  fiscal  year  1995/96  was  139.9  for 
Telecom Eireann compared to,  for example 8.9 
for  British  Telecom,  124,3  for  Telef6nica  de 
Espana,  65,0  for  Portugal  Telecom,  39,4  for 
OTE,  59  for  France  Telecom,  242,5  for 
Belgacom,  and  405.9  for  Deutsche  Telekom, 
ESAT  Digifone  would  be  at  a  particular  ad-
vantage if it could run services other than GSM 
over  its  own  infrastructure, 
- telephone  penetration  rates  are  a  simple 
measure of network development and universal 
service  and  these  are  clearly  well  behind  EU 
averages. This gap cannot be  completely elim-
inated before the year 2000. The gap is  particu-
larly  evident  outside  the  main  urban  areas 
where  penetration  rates  remain  low  and  the 
local  access  network,  traditionally  the  most 
costly  part  of  the  network  to  develop,  will 
require significant upgrading to enable connec-
tion  and  adequate  quality  of  service, 
(8) 
- in  the year ended 4 April  1996, total operating 
costs  represented  55 %  of  total  revenue.  Staff 
costs  in  tum  represented  well  over  50 %  of 
operating costs. The main  focus  of cost  reduc-
tion  is  on  reducing  the  numbers  of  staff 
employed  by  the  company.  These  sr.aff 
severance schemes must be voluntary in  nature 
and  accordingly  can  only  be  implemented 
successfully  over  a  period  of  years.  The 
company is  also actively examining the possib-
ility  of  outsourcing  in  a  number of  areas  but 
this must be  managed carefully  in  conjunction 
with  staff  reduction  programmes.  For  that 
reason- a  period  of  three  years  is  required  to 
make the  necessary  changes  in  the  cast struc-
ture, 
- connection  and  rental  are  loss-making  for 
Telecom  Eireann. This needs  to  be  tackled on 
two  fronts: revenue increase and cost reduction, 
apart  from  the  average  price  levels  for  rentals 
and  calls,  the  structure  of  prices  needs  to  be 
revised. Two examples of possible change are: 
(i) rental  reductions  for  low-income  or  low-
calling-rate  users, 
(ii) introduction  of  duration-based  charges  with 
no  minimum  fee,  or  low  initial  charge. 
In  both cases  time is  needed to  alter structures 
to  a  more  market-oriented  system. 
III.  Application of the Article 90 (2) exception 
Article  90  (2)  provides  that undertakings entrusted 
with  the operation of services  of general economic 
interest are  to  be  subject to  the  rules  on competi-
tion  in  so  far  as  the application of such  rules  does 
not obstruct  the  performance,  in  law  or in  fact,  of 
the  particular tasks  assigned  to  them. The applica-
tion  of  this  provision  in  the  telecommunications 
sector has been specified in  Directive 90/388/EEC. 
Under  this  Directive,  as  amended  by  Directives 
96/2/EC  and  96/19/EC,  the  Commission  shall 
grant.  on  request.  to  a  number of  Member States 
the  right  to  maintain  during  additional  time 
periods the exclusive rights granted to undertakings 
to which they entrust the provision of a public tele-
communications  network and  telecommunications 
services,  as  well  as  restrictions  on competition,  in 
so far  as  these measures are necessary to ensure the 
performance of  the  particular tasks  assigned  to  the 
undertakings  benefiting  from  exclusive  rights. 
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(9)  As  regards  the provision of public telecommunica-
tions  scrvice:os  ;~nd  networks,  it  appears  that 
Telecom Eireann  is  a  relccommunication organiza-
tion  within  rhe  meaning of  Article  I  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC, since  it  is  entrusted with  a  service  of 
general  economic  interest  pursuant  to  Section  14 
(1)  of  the  Irish  Postal  and· Telecommunications 
Services  Act  of  1983,  requiring  it: 
(a)  to  provide  a  national  telecommunications 
service  within  the State  and  between  the State 
and  places  outside  the  State, 
(b)  to  meet  the  industrial,  commercial,  social  and 
household needs of the State for comprehensive 
and  efficient  telecommunications services  and, 
so  far  as  the  company  considers  reasonably 
practicable, to satisfy all reasonable demands for 
such  services  throughout  the  State,  and 
(c)  to  provide  such  consultancy,  advisory,  training 
and contract service inside and outside the State 
as  the  company  thinks  fit. 
(10)  This provision  in fact  permits Telecom  Eireann  to 
refuse  to  provide  telecommunications  services 
where it is  not reasonably practicable i.e. where it is 
not reasonably capable  of being done  or put into 
effect.  According  to  the  Irish  Government,  this 
exception  to  the general duty imposed by Section 
14  (I)  would  have  nevertheless  been  interpreted 
narrowly. Also  relevant  is  Section  IS  ( l) (a)  of the 
Act which imposes an  obligation on  the company 
to  provide  these  services  at  minimal  charges. 
(II)  Telecom Eireann operates on the basis that it shall 
meet all  reasonable  requests  for  telephone  service 
within standard delivery terms, irrespective of loca-
tion. In addition, the charges for connection to the 
telephone  network, rental charges and call  charges 
are  levied  on  the  same  basis  nationally.  Telecom 
Eireann  also  provides  and  maintains  uneconomic 
public  pay  phones  and  provides  access  to  emer-
gency services  without charge  to  the caller. These 
tasks  must  be  implemented  irrespective  of  the 
specific situations or the degree of economic prof-
itability of  each  individual  operation. 
(12)  The question which falls  to be considered is  there-
fore  the extent  to  which  the  requested  temporary 
exclusion  of all  competition  from other economic 
operators is  necessary in order to  allow the  holder 
of  the  exclusive  right  to  continue  performing  its 
task of general interest and in  particular to  have the 
benefit  of  economically  acceptable  conditions. 
{13)  The main  starting  point  for  such  an  examination 
must be the premise that the obligation on the part 
of  the  undertaking  entrusted  with  that  task  to 
perform  its  services  in  conditions  of  economic 
cquilibnum  presupposes that it  will  be  possible to 
offset  less  profitable  sectors  against  the  profitable 
sectors and hence justifies a restriction of competi-
tion  from  individual  undertakings  where  the 
economically  profitable  sectors  are  concerned. 
(14)  Indeed,  to  authorize  individual  undertakings  to 
compete with the holder of the _exclusive  rights in 
the sectors  of their choice corresponding to  those 
rights would make it possible for them to concen-
trate on the economically profitable operations and 
to  offer  more  advantageous  tariffs  than  those 
adopted by the holders of the exclusive rights since, 
unlike the latter, they are not bound for economic 
reasons  to  offset  losses  in  the unprofitable sectors 
against  profits  in  the  more  profitable  sectors. 
(15)  However,  the  restrictions  on  competition  are  not 
justified as  regards specific services dissociable from 
the  service  of  general  interest  - i.e.  voice  tele-
phony - which  meet  special  needs  of economic 
:lpe::a~or.;  ~n so far as such spe~ific services, by their 
nature  and  the  conditions  in  which  they  are 
offered, such as  the geographical area in which they 
are  provided,  do  not  compromise  the  economic 
equilibrium  of  the  service  of  general  economic 
interest  performed  by the  holder of  the  exclusive 
right. 
(16)  Some  comments  mention  that  in  practice  new 
entrants could also contribute to  the relevant tasks 
of  general  economic  interest.  In  the  short  term, 
however, Telecom  Eireann will  continue to be the 
only  undertaking  able  to  deliver  a  universal  tele-
phone service  to residential users in scarcely popu-
lated  areas.  For  this  reason,  the  Commission 
examined, regarding each  of  the additional imple-
mentation  periods  requested,  whether their grant-
ing  is  necessary  [O  allow  Telecom  Eireann  to 
perform its task of general interest and to have the 
benefit  of  economically  acceptable  conditions. 
B.  LEGAL  ASSESSMENT 
I. Request  for  an  additional  implementation 
period  regarding  voice  telephony  and 
underlying network  infrastrucrure 
Assessment  of the  impact  of the  removal  of the 
exclusive  rights  currently  granted  to  Telecom 
Eireann 
(17)  Voice telephony is defined in Article 1 of Directive 
90/388/EEC. The  extent  of  this  service.  has  been 
specified  in  the  Commission's  communication 
95/C275/02  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  the  status  and  implementation  of 
Directive  90/388/EEC  on  competition  in  the 
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markets  for  telecommunications services (1)  and in 
correspondence  between  the Commission  and  the 
Member States. Since the reservation  of voice  tele-
phony services  is  an  exception  to  the general  rule 
of  competition,  it  must  be  interpreted  narrowly. 
(18)  Pursuant to  the general principle of proportionality, 
any additional implementation period granted must 
~e  strictly  proportional  to  what  is  necessary  to 
achieve  the  necessary  structural  adjustment. 
mentioned by the Irish Government. with a view to 
the  introduction  of  full  competition,  i.e.: 
(i)  further development of Telecom Eireann's tele-
communications  networks; 
(ii)  further adjustment of Telecom Eireann 's  tariff 
structure; 
(iii)  transformation  of  Telecom  Eireann,  in  parti-
cular,  further  development  of  its  products, 
restructuring of its cost base and completion of 
the  management of  it'i  change into  a  market-
driven  and  customer-focused  organization. 
(19)  The  purpose  of  the  exclusive  rights  granted  to 
Telecom  Eireann  was  to  ensure  the  provision  of 
universal voice  telephony and the  establishment of 
a  public  telecommunications  network.  It  allowed 
the  latter  not only to  finance  more  cheaply - it 
could borrow under State guarantee and 2 %  of its 
fiscal  assets were financed by grants from  the Euro-
pean  Regional  Development  Fund  - important 
investment in  the digitalization of its  network, but 
also  to  maintain  higher tariffs  and  a  less  efficient 
cost structure- in particular due to overstaffing-
than  it  would  in  a  competitive  environment.  As 
one of  the  comments (2)  points  out.  'the legacy  of 
over-staffing  specifically  in  the  flagged  age  group 
35  to  44  was  created  by  Telecom  Eireann  in 
carrying out their modernization programme in  the 
early  1980s  employing  in-house  staff  as  against 
having  the  work  done  by  private  contractors'. 
(20)  This  shows  that  exclusive  rights  are  not  an 
adequate  means to  further the development of  the 
telecommunications  network.  In  its  resolution  of 
22 July 1993,  the  Council  in  this  regard  acknow-
ledged  that  the  maintenance  of  these  exclusive 
rights  should  be  terminated  by  1  January  1998, 
('}  OJ  No  C  275,  20.  10.  1995,  p.  2. 
(l)  Coin  and  card  technology (CCI),  p.  4. 
(21) 
with  a transitional  period for  those Member States 
requiring additional  time  to  implement structural 
adjustments. 
The  required  structural  adjustments  must  be 
examined  in  the  light  of  the  following  circum-
stances: 
- the  need  to  further  rebalance  tariffs, 
- the  low  telephone  density, 
- the  high  debt  and  cost  structure  of  Telecom 
Eireann. 
(a)  Rebalancing  of  tariffs 
(22)  Ireland states that since 1990 all  charges (excluding 
VAT  and  discounts)  including  rentals  and  local 
ca~ls  hav~ fallen  significantly in  real  terms.  Despite 
thts  achtevement.  Ireland  claims  that  Telecom 
Eireann still has a relatively high level of telephone 
prices and that certain  prices are  still out of align-
ment with costs. Telecom Eireann has set an objec-
tive  of  achieving price levels  in  the  lowest quartile 
of  OECD  countries  by  2000.  Rebalancing  by ad-
justing charges to bring prices closer still to  under-
lying  costs  is  still  required  also  to  achieve  this 
objective.  Ireland is  proceeding with  a gradual and 
flexible  approach to  tariff  rebalancing, while main-
taining safeguards for  consumers in  terms  of  price 
and  quality  of  service.  Due  to  the  limits  of  the 
proposed price-cap regime, Telecom Eireann needs 
about  five  years  to  implement  the  increases  of 
reduced-rate local calls, i.e.  from  1996 to  2000. On 
the  basis  of  the  most  likely  forecasts,  Ireland  be-
lieves  that Telecom  Eireann  would  be  in  a strong 
enough position to suxvive liberalization in 2000. 
(23)  The  following  table,  based  on  information  in  the 
Commission's  possession (l),  comparing  certain 
telephone tariffs of Telecom Eireann and the equi-
valent  figures  for  an  operator  which  has  already 
rebalanced  its  tariffs (4),  supports  the  arguments  of 
the  Irish  Government: 




)  A  direct  comparison  of  the  telephony  tariffs  of  Telecom 
Eireann with  the Community average (which  is  not a weight-
ed  average)  would  not  be  appropriate,  given  that  the  tariff 
structures. of  th~ .15  Cc;>mmunity  TO's are still  widely  diver-
gent and m addztJon, gtven that they are currently in the pro-
cess  of  rebalancing  tariffs. 
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Tanff:t  in  ccu  on  I  January  1996 
Bi-monthly  rental 
Local  c:a!ls,  resp.  3/1 0  minutes 
(Peak  hours) 
Trunk  calls,  resp.  3/10  minutes 
Intra  EC,  resp.  3/10  minutes 
(')  Social  payments  arc  provided  to  low-income  customers 
(24)  Given  that  due  to  technical  progress  in  the 
network,  cost  is  increasingly  less  dependent  on 
distance,  cost  orientation  of  tariffs  means  as  a 
general  rule  that  prices  are  adjusted  such  that 
revenues  are  rebalanced  with  costs,  i.e.: 
--- connection  and  rental  revenues  cover  fixed 
costs  (plus  a  standard  margin), 
local  call  revenues cover local  call  costs (plus a 
standard  margin), 
trunk  call  revenues  cover  trunk  calls  (plus  a 
standard  margin), 
international  call  revenues  cover  international 
call  costs  (plus  a  standard  margin). 
Consequently  telecommunications  organizations 
must raise  bi-monthly rental  and local  calls  (or  at 
least not decrease  these charges) and reduce  tariffs 
for  long distance calls. Telecom Eireann  has  made 
some  progress  on  rebalancing  local  charges,  but 
needs additional  time to  decrease  trunk and inter-
national  charges. 
(25)  According  to one comment('), the  overall  level  of 
the tariffs  for  the  provision  of telecommunications 
services  is  not  relevant  in  assessing  the  extent  to 
which  tariff  rebalancing  has  been  achieved.  But 
even  using  the  methodology  proposed  in  this 
comment, it still appears that in  Denmark and the . 
Netherlands, which decided to liberalize voice  tele-
phony  in  advance  of  l  January  1998,  imbalance 
between,  on  the  one  hand,  rental  and  local  call 
tariffs  and,  on  the  other  hand,  long distance  and 
international calls is  much further reduced than in 
Ireland. 
(')  Esat  Telecom,  p.  34,  No  49. 
--,------
Telecom  Bntish  Difference 
Eireann  Telecom  TE/BT 
(BT-100) 
23,57 n  19,53  151,4 
0,14  - 0,14  0,06- 0,19  2.33,.3  - 73,7 
0,14  - 0,56  0,14 - 0,47  100  ..:.  119,1 
1,12  - 3,37  0,.35- 1,16  320  - 290,5 
1,80  - 6,00  1,.2.9  - 4,31  139,5  - 139,2 
(26)  It is  argued in the same comment that a high level 
of  tariffs  may  indeed  result  from  specific  circum-
stances,  such  as  a  very  low  density  of  population 
which renders the provision of telecommunications 
services  proportionately  more  expensive,  when 
calculated  pro  capita.  This  might  be  the  case. 
However,  BT  and  MCL  provide  voice  telephony 
from  the UK to Ireland at prices which can be less 
than half those  of Telecom  Eireann (2).  It  is  there-
fore  reasonable  to  expect  that  if  voice  telephony 
were  liberalized  immediately, amongst others these 
companies  would  - at  least  in  certain  areas  of 
Ireland - provide  voice  telephony at tariffs  which 
are significantly lower (at  least as  regards trunk and 
international calls)  than  those  of  Telecom  Eireann 
and  thus  either force  the  latter  to  reduce  dramat-
ically  its  tariffs  in  the  relevant  market  segments 
which are the most profitable, or lose subscribers to 
the  new  entrants. 
(27)  The  continuation  of  the  gradual  approach  en-
visaged  .  by  Ireland  for  further  tariff  rebalancing 
seems therefore justified, in view of the rebalancing 
(bi-monthly  rental  and  local  charges)  already 
achieved  in  1993  and  the  firm  commitmen,ts  to 
complete the process by reducing trunk and incer-
national  tariffs  by  the  year  2000.  Moreover,  to 
accelerate  the  process  of  rebalancing  tariffs  would 
pose  related  political  problems since,  in  this  case, 
an  increase  in  local  communication  tariffs  would 
be  necessary. 
(b)  Telephone  density 
(28)  Telecom  Eireann  has  achieved  one  of  the  fastest 
telephone  penetration growths in  the  EU  over the 
last five  years. Today, Ireland nevertheless still has a 
(l)  lTL,  p.  8. 
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relatively low telephone penetration in comparison 
with  most  of  the  EU  Member  States.  Some 
comments are  rightly  emphasizing that  telephone 
penetration would improve as  a  result of competi-
tion. It may nevertheless be  assumed that in  a first 
stage  new  entrants  in  the  market  will  concentrate 
mainly on  high  users  to  acquire  sufficient  profit-
ability before focusing on new users. The argument 
of  the  Irish  Government  that  enabling  Telecom 
Eireann  to  pursue its  development programmes  to 
further improve  telephone density will  benefit the 
public  seems  therefore  acceptable,  even  if  the 
additional  time  given  to  ·Telecom  Eireann  will 
enable it to strengthen its position by improving its 
efficiency.  This  improvement  will  to  a  certain 
extent also  benefit  future  new  entrants  since  the 
more users connected to  the  public  telecommuni-
cations  networks,  the  more  calls  will  be  generated 
both for the incumbent and for the new entrants. 
{29)  In  fact,  the  figures  provided  by  the  Irish  Govern-
ment also  show  that  although  telephone  penetra-
tion  is  still  low  in  Ireland,  remaining demand  is 
also  limited.  It  appears  in  particular  that  waiting 
lists have dramatically decreased and this, notwith-
standing  State  social  welfare  payments  involving 
financial  support  for  telephone  rental  and  call 
charges for qualifying pensioners. Currently one in 
eight of all customers is already on such a scheme. 
(30)  The  development  programmes  with  a  view  to 
increasing penetration  can  therefore  justify  a  con-
tinuation  of  the  current  exclusive  privilege  of 
Telecom  Eireann  for  a  limited  duration.  Taking 
into  account  a  continuation  of  the  past  yearly 
increase  of  Telecom  Eireann's  density  of  2% 
. during the coming years in  1999, Telecom Eireann 
would  reach  the  penetration currently achieved  in 
Member States, such as  Italy or Belgium, which do 
not qualify  for  additional  implementation  periods. 
A  longer additional  implementation  period would 
not  be  justified,  even  if  the  increase  of  Telecom 
Eireann's  density  slows  down  during  the  coming 
years. As mentioned, it is  indeed possible that, due 
to  a  combination  of  amongst  others  demo-
graphic (') and economic factors specific to  ~reland, 
there  is  actually no demand for  further  telephone 
lines by households. Further market growth would 
(')  Household size  in  Ireland  is,  according to  the  Irish  request, 
3,2  people, e.g.  larger than in  most other EU  Member States. 
This  reduces  the  potential  for  additional  residential  penetra-
tion. 
then depend on the offer of new services, and the 
growth  of  business  customers,  which  can  best  be 
accelerated by the introduction of competition and 
therefore  would  not  justify  any  additional  imple-
mentation  period. 
(c)  Debt  and  cost  structure 
(31)  Ireland  emphasizes  two  liabilities  of  Telecom 
Eireann  in  a  future  competitive  environment:  its 
low productivity (one employee for 99 lines) and its 
level  of  debt (£  Irl  862  million  at  end  of  March 
1995  giving  a  debt/equity  ratio  of  1,9).  Between 
1985 and 1995, Telecom Eireann had already signi-
ficantly  improved  productivity,  which  is  reflected 
in  the  reduction of  its  staff costs  from  42 %  of  its 
turnover to 30 %. Staff numbers have  been reduced 
from  18  000  to  under  12  000.  A  low  number of 
lines per employee seems, nevertheless, a necessary 
result  of  the  low  population  density  in  Ireland. 
International  comparisons  show  that  operators  in 
countries  with  low  population  density  retain  a 
smaller  number of  lines  per  employee  even  after 
competition is  introduced and where  digitalization 
is  very  advanced.  The  planned  increase  of  tele-
phone  density  over  the  next  years  will  increase 
productivity  expressed  in  numbers  of  lines  per 
employee  before  1999  up  to  the  level  currently 
achieved  in  Finland. Overstaffing is  nevertheless a 
common  feature  of  telecommunications  organiza-
tions at the eve  of their privatization. The Commis-
sion,  however,  considers  that  it  could  not  justify 
any  additional  implementation  period  extending 
after  1 January  1999. 
(32)  As  regards  the  debt structure,  the  figures  provided 
by the Irish Government show that, since 1993, the 
financial  situation  of  Telecom  Eireann  has 
improved  significantly.  The  submission  states 
Telecom Eireann's debt at the end of the financial 
year  1995/1996 as  £  Irl 700  million giving a debt/ 
equity ratio of 1,4. Moreover, Telecom Eireann will 
receive  a total  of £  Irl  220  million of the  proceeds 
of  the  sale.  £  Irl  150  million  will  be  injected  on 
closing  and  the  balance  (£  Irl  70  million)  in 
approximately three years'  time on exercise  of  the 
option by the strategic  partners  or public offering. 
The balance of the funds over and above  this £  Irl 
220  million will  be used by the State  to  reduce its 
liability  to  the  pension  fund.  This  will  enable 
Telecom Eireann to use its own resources to  further 
reduce  its  debt until the end of  1998. At  this date 
the debt/equity ratio  of Telecom Eireann will  thus 
not be  out of  line with  those of  operators in coun-
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tries  which  will  open their market to competition, 
for  example  t_he  debt/equity  ratios  of  Deutsche 
Telekom  and  Oclgacom  in  1995  were C)  respecti-
vely  l,S  and  I ,4.  Cunsequencly,  the  debe  of 
'!'f"l("liHI1  Eireann  ulllld  not  ju:ilify  au  :ulditional 
implementation  period  cxtendinp,  over  I 99H. 
Effect  on  trade 
(33)  The aim of the postponement of the liberalization 
of  voice  telephony  is  to  delay  the  entry  of  com-
peting  carriers  in  the  voice  telephony  market. 
Mor~over, as  pointed out by a comment (2),  this will 
~ffect  trade  since  large  international  players 
including  AT&T,  BT,  C&W,  Global  One/Sprint 
and  France  Telecom  are  already  present  or  in-
terested  in  Ireland. The  emergence  of  alternative 
Irish carriers will  also be delayed, which will even-
tually  reduce  its  possibilities  to  expand  outside 
Ireland, given that in the mean time  new entrants 
will  enjoy  a  two-year  head  start  in  the  other 
Member Stares  which  will  liperalize  their  markets 
by  I  January  1998. 
(14)  Although  the  granting  of  a  derogation  to  Ireland 
would  foreclose  the telecommunications market in 
Ireland for two years, the negative effect on trade in 
the  Community will  be  reduced  due  to: 
the  limited  size  of  the  Irish  telecommunica-
tions market in comparison to  the Community 
market.  One· could  expect  indeed  that  on  1 
January  1998, massive  investments will  mainly 
occur  in  the  more  developed  Member  States, 
such. as  Germany, the  Netherlands and  France 
where a  higher return on investment might be 
expected, 
the  duration  of  the  derogation  requested:  the 
establishment of  new  public  telephony opera-
tors  requires  a  preparation  of  many  months. 
The  harm  done  to  potential  investors  by  an 
additional implementation period of 24 months 
will  be  limited  if,  in  the  mean  time,  they can 
already plan investments, so as  to be ready to be 
operational  in  advance  of  I  January  2000. 
(35)  Such effect will further be reduced in the following 
circumstances: 
- Telecom Eireann is  not expanding its operation 
in  Member States  which  have  liberalized  their 
markets.  If this  were  the  case,  the  derogation 
enabling Telecom  Eireann  to  maintain  higher 
prices on its domestic market could be used not 
only  to  achieve  the  necessary  adjustments  but 
also  to  cross-subsidize  operations  in  foreign 
(1)  Cable  &  Wireless,  p.  4. 
(1}  Esat  Telecom,  p. · 13. 
markets. This would obviously distort competi-
tion  at  the  expense  of  the  incumbents  and of 
other  new  entrants  in  the  relevant  Member 
States  and  would  be  against  the  Community 
inrercsr.  In  this  rc~;ml,  any  involvemt"nt  of 
Telecom Eircnnn alongside its stmtegic  pnrtnt'r~ 
fYfT  Telecom  and  Telia.  or  Unisourcc,  in 
investments outside  Ireland should. during the 
additional  time  period,  be  achieved  in  a  fully 
transparent way and at market conditions. This 
should be reviewed by an independent auditor, 
- the  Irish  Government  publishes  the  licensing 
conditions one year in advance ·of full  liberali-
zation and ensures that Telecom Eireann publi-
shes in  parallel  the interconnection conditions 
to  be  applied  to  new  entrants, 
the additional implementation period regarding 
the  use  of  own/alternative  infrastrucrures  is 
reduced as  mentioned below. This would allow 
potential  new entrants  t?  operate  and  provide 
already  liberalized  telecommunications services 
on  such  networks  in  preparation  for  full 
competition, and in  particular to  provide  voice 
services  to  corporate  networks  and  dosed  user 
groups  via  such  networks, 
the Irish Government takes all measures neces-
sary  to  ensure  that Telecom  Eireann  does  not 
make  use  of  its  additional  statutory  protection 
to  extend  its  dominant  position  in  neighbou-
ring  or  ancillary  markets  such  as  the  public 
payphone  market  or  the  cable  TV industry, 
without  prejudice  to  the  impact  assessment 
provided for  in the third paragraph of Article 2 
of Commission Directive 95/51/EC (1),  the Irish 
Government  ensures,  in  the  short  term,  that 
Cablelink  is  managed  at  arm's  length  of 
Telecom  Eireann  as  long  as  Telecom  Eireann 
remains  the  controlling  shareholder. 
CorzdtaioTl 
(36)  On the basis of the above assessment, the Commis-
sion  considers  that  the  negative  effects  on  trade 
which would result from the granting to  Ireland of 
an  additional  implementation  period  until  l 
January 2000 as  regards the abolition of the exclu-
sive  rights  currently  granted  to  Telecom  Eireann 
for  the  provision  of  voice  telephony  and  public 
network  infrastructure  instead  of  I  January  1998, 
pursuant to  Article  2 (2)  of Directive 90/388/EEC, 
are  not  incompatible  with  the  interest  of  the 
Com111unity,  in so far  as  the circumstances set out 
above  are  fulfilled. 
(l)  ,OJ  No  L  256,  26.  10.  1995,  p.  49. 
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II.  Request for an additional implementation 
period regarding dte lifting of restrictions 
on the provision of already liberalized tele-
communications  services  on  own  and 
alternative infrastructure 
Assessment of the  impact of the  immediate /Jfting 
of restrictions 
(37)  Ireland states  that the lifting of  restrictions on the 
use of alternative  infrastructure before  1 July 1999 
would  enable  providers  of  liberalized  services  to 
offer customers speech calls and connect such calls 
with  the  public  network  in  both  directions.  This 
practice would be indistinguishable from the provi-
sion  of  voice  telephony,  apart  from  minor  dif-
ferences  such  as  numbering  and  interconnection 
charges.  As  a  result  Ireland  fears  that  there  would 
be  effective  competition  for  voi(;c  telephony, 
despite  the  voice  telephony  derogation. 
(38)  Ireland  adds  that  such  lifting  of  constraints  may 
also  cause  Telecom  Eireann  losses  of  revenue 
contribution  from  leased  lines.  While not all  such 
revenue would be lost, there would be  a substantial 
impact  in  that  those  consumers  remaining  as 
Telecom  Eireann's  customers  would  expect  lower 
prices.  Ireland nevertheless acknowledges  the need 
to advance  the lifting of  restrictions on alternative 
networks in order to ensure that future competitors 
can  build and fund  networks  in  sufficient  time  to 
allow  for  full  competition  by  the  time  voice  tele-
phony is  liberalized. Given the small size of Ireland 
and  the  concentrated  nature  of  most  profitable 
customers,  Ireland considers  that  the  liberalization 
of  alternative  infrastructures  six  months  before 
voice  telephony would  not compromise the ability 
of  new  entrants  to  compete  fully  from  I  January 
2000. 
(39)  Comments  state  that  service-providers  would  be 
particularly affected if  they were  not allowed, as  the 
second mobile operator is,  to  use  alternative  infra-
structures  to  save  significant  leased-lines  costs· for 
the  provision  of  their  services.  Conversely,  the 
second GSM operator mentions that, given that it is 
not  allowed  to  convey  third-party  traffic,  the  de-
cision  to  establish  a  fully  separate  backbone 
network  invo~ves  high  sunk  costs  and  substantial 
risks given that excess capacity cannot be leased to 
other  providers  of  already  liberalized  services.  If 
Ireland  was  granted  the  right  to  postpone  the 
liberalization  of  alternative  infrastructures,  this 
would  therefore  also  affect  competition  on  the 
GSM  markets. 
(40)  TI1e  argument that restrictions must be  maintained 
on the provision of alternative network capacity for 
the  provision  of  alternative  infrastructures  to 
prevent authorized  providers  of  liberalized services 
to  circumvent  the  voice  telephony  monopoly 
cannot  be  accepted.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  as  the 
Commission  stated  in  its  Communication  on  the 
status  and  the  implementation  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC  on  competition  in  the  markets  for 
telecommunications  services,  such  'unofficial'  by 
pass will  not occur to any significant extent without 
being  noticed  by  the  relevant  Member  State.  A 
service which is  offered to  the public must be,  ipso 
facto,  public  knowledge. 
In  particular,  given  that  any  commercial  offer 
would  normally involve  advertising (of  the  services 
available)  or,  at  the  very  least,  issuing  price  lists, 
contracts  and  invoices,  such  by  pass  should  be 
evident  from  an  early  stage. 
New operators generally have  shown  that they will 
respect  the  voice  telephony  monopoly.  Service-
providers  do  not  want  to  take  the  risk  of  having 
their authorization  revoked  and  not  being able  to 
fulfil  their obligations  towards  their  clients.  Many 
service-providers did  therefore, before starting their 
services,  investigate  first  the  matter  with  the 
national regulatory authorities or with the Commis-
sion  services. 
(41)  The use  of alternative networks for the provision of 
already  liberalized  services  will  not alter this  state 
of  affairs.  Alternative  networks  must  indeed  be 
considered  to  be  public  switched  telecommunica-
tions  networks  within  the  meaning  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC, where  they  are  upgraded  to  switched 
networks  providing  voice  to  any  interested 
subscriber and  are  interconnected  with  the  public 
switched telephone network of the telecommunica-
tions organizations. The termination points of such 
alternative  networks should  likewise  be  considered 
as  termination  points of  public switched  networks 
and  voice  provided  to  the  public  from  or to  such 
points would then  become voice  telephony, which 
according to  Article 2 of  that Directive can further 
be  reserved  to  the  telecommunications  organiza-
tion,  in  this  case  Telecom  Eireann. 
(42)  Moreover,  Ireland  itself  recognizes  that  by  pass 
would  be  distinguishable  from  legal  voice  tele-
phony,  due  to  differences  as  regards  numbering 
and interconnection charges. Since the amendment 
of  Ireland's regulatory framework, and in  particular 
the new independent regulatory authority, will  only 
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(43) 
(44) 
be operational early next year, one could, however, 
not exclude  that in  the  mean  time,  Ireland could 
face certain difficulties in the effective enforcement 
of  the voice  telephony monopoly.  For this  reason, 
an  additional  implementation  period  until  the· 
entry into force  of this  new regulatory  framework, 
provided  it  is  clearly delimited  in  time,  could  be 
justified. 
The second argument put forward  by  Ireland,  i.e. 
that  such  lifting  of  constraints  may  also  cause 
Telecom  Eireann  losses  of  revenue  contribution 
from leased lines can also not be accepted. It is true 
that,  under  its  exclusive  privilege  to  provide 
network  infrastructure,  Telecom  Eireann  is 
enjoying guaranteed revenues from the provision of 
leased  lines  to  end-users  and  providers  of  liberal-
i:t. ... d  ~eleLoanmunications  services  (except  GSM 
mobile  telephony,  where  the  second  operator 
prefers  to establish  its  own  Jinks).  However,  as  the 
Commission  stated  in  its  Green  Paper  on  the 
liberalization  of  telecommunications  infrasttucture 
and cable television  networks - part one - prin-
ciples  and  timetable  (COM(94)  440  final, 
25.10.1994),  Directive  92/44/EEC (
1
)  requires  in 
particular  that  leased  lines  must  be  offered  on  a 
cost-oriented basis. Given this obligation and given 
that  Member  States  must  comply  with  it,  the 
opening of  alternative  supply  is  not  expected  to 
alter  the  market  position  of  TO's  in  this  area 
substantially. 
Although allowed in  Directive 92/44/EEC, Ireland 
did  not  request  any  deferment  in  favour  of 
Telecom  Eireann  for  the  implementation  of  the 
obligation  of  cost-orientation  of  leased  lines.  On 
the  contrary,  on  8  March  1996,  Ireland  informed 
the Commission  pursuant to Article 4  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC  that  it  had  authorized  Telecom 
Eireann to increase its leased lines tariffs as  from  I 
February  1996 as  regards  new  circuits  and  to  ex-
isting  circuits  at  the  next  billing  date  after  31 
March  1996.  The  justification  given  for  this 
increase was that leased lines charges had not been 
adjusted for many years and that Telecom Eireann 
had been recording significant losses  on its  leased 
lines  service.  International  comparisons show that 
Telecom  Eireann's  tariffs  are,  even  after  the 
increases, still  less  than  the  EU average  (e.g.  on  1 
January  1996 monthly rental  50  km circuit:  ECU 
265 (EU average: ECU 380) and connection charge: 
ECU 489 in comparison with EU average  of ECU 
596 (2)).  One can for this reason  hardly expect that 
('}  OJ  No  L  165,  19.  6.  1992,  p.  27. 
(l)  Data computed by Tarifica for the Commission- DG XJII. 
alternative  network  providers· could  offer  much 
becter  tariffs,  at  least  to  the  vast  majority  of cus-
tomers  of  Telecom  Eireann  and  that  the  latter 
would  be  forced  to  lower  its  prices  substantially. 
(45)  It is  true that charges for leased lines in Ireland are 
not  yet  fully  rebalanced.  A  cost-based  tariff 
proposal  is  being implemented on a  phased  basis. 
and this business is loss-making overall. If an alter-
native  infrastructure  is  available,  Telecom  Eireann 
would lose revenue  t.o  that alternative as  customers 
would  wish  to  diversify suppliers,  thus  increasing 
the  loss  on  the  business. 
(46)  Finally  Ireland,  while  acknowledging  the  need  to 
advance  the  lifting  of  restrictions  on  alternative 
networks in order to ensure that future competitors 
can  build and  fund  networks  in  sufficient  time  to 
allow  for  full  competition  by  the  time voice  tele-
phony is  liberalized,  states  that six  months  would 
suffice for this purpose. This argument is  based on 
the  small  size  of  Ireland  and  the  concentrated 
nature  of  the  most  profitable  customers.  As  a 
matter of fact, since the main cable 1V network in 
Ireland  is  controlled  by  Telecom  Eireann,  the 
ability  of  new  entrants  to  compete  fully  from  1 
January  2000  would  be  compromised  in  the 
absence of sufficient time to extend their network 
also  in  the  'local  loop'. 
Effect  on  trade 
(47)  As  a consequence of its monopoly on the provision 
of  public  telecommunications  infrastru~tures, 
Telecom Eireann is the sole supplier of leased lines 
and  interconnection  to  providers  of  liberalized 
services.  It  therefore  determines  to  a  large  extent 
the  costs  of  its  competitors  in  the  liberalized 
services  sector. This  was  illustrated  inur alia by 
the abovementioned increase in leased lines tariffs 
in  early  1996,  which  rendered  the  provision  of 
certain  liberalized  services  uneconomic.  This 
potential  knowledge  by Telecom  Eireann  of  the 
costs  of  its  competitors  will  increasingly  affect 
trade, since  the  Irish  public operator will  develop 
even  further  its  own  offer  of  liberalized  services 
with  the  technical support, expert and  managerial 
assistance,  software  and  systems  improvements 
provided by its strategic partners P'IT Telecom and 
Telia,  backed  by  their  Unisource  global  partner-
ship, which are  among the world leaders in  terms 
of  quality  and  efficiency.  Whereas  Telecom 
Eireann could use its own infrastructure to  provide 
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such  services,  competitors  providing global  liber-
alized  services,  such  as  VPN  or voice  services  to 
closed  user groups, would  thus  be  obliged  to  rely 
only on circuits leased from the operator they want 
to  compete  with.  This  situation  would  be  aggra-
vated  by  the  fact  that  according  to  comments (1), 
although  Telecom  Eireann  complies  fully  with 
current regulations under both EU and Irish law on 
, this matter, currently it does  not produce accounts 
to  a  sufficient degree  of  transparency to  allow  for 
adequate  separation  of  its  activities  in  the  mono-
poly sector from  those in  the liberalized sector and 
there  is  no structural separation  to  prevent staff  in 
the infrastructure side  of Telecom  Eireann  passing 
information  to  colleagues  selling  liberalized 
services. 
Conclusion 
(48)  }here  are  less  restrictive  regulatory  means  to 
prevent  bypass  of  the  voice  telephony  monopoly 
until  1  January  2000  and  such  means  could  be 
implemented  by  the  telecommunications  regula-
tory  authority  which  Ireland  will  set  up,  with 
appropriate  arrangements  for  industry  funding, 
during the first quarter of 1997. The granting of an 
additional  implementation  period  which  would 
extend after that date does not therefore seem justi-
fied. 
(4~)  MoreovN,  since  Telecom  Eirennn  will  he  1ahle  to 
provide on its own  nrtwork worldwide interconnec-
tion  to  Irish  industry and  business,  backed  by  the 
resources  of  its  strategic  partners  and  their global 
interconnection via  Unisource  and Uniworld, such 
additional  implementation  period  would  distort 
competition in global services from and to  Ireland 
at  the  expense  of  the  other global  alliances. 
(50)  For  these  reasons,  the  Commission  considers  that 
the  negative  effects  on  trade  which  would  result 
from  the  granting  to  Ireland  of  an  additional 
implementation period regarding the  liberalization 
of  alternative  infrastructure  will  be  incompatible 
with  the interest of  the  Community once the  new 
regulatory framework is in force and at the latest on 
1  July  1997. 
III.  Request for an additional implementation 
period regarding the lifting of restrictions 
on  the  direct  interconnection  of  mobile 
telecommunications networks 
Assessment of the impact of the  immediat~ IJfting 
of restrictions 
(51)  Ireland  considers  an  additional  implementation 
period as  regards  the direct international intercon-
(')  See  in  particular,  Cable  &  Wireless,  p.  2. 
nection  of  mobile  networks  necessary  to  avoid 
undermining the provision of national and interna-
tional  voice  telephony. 
(52)  Ireland  states  that  if  mobile · networks  were 
permitted  to  interconnect  freely,  it  would  be 
possible  for  a GSM  operator in  Ireland  to  connect 
to  a  fixed  network  or  mobile  network  in  another 
State and to  obtain delivery prices for  international 
calls  close  to  the  local  interconnection  rates 
applying in  that country. Similarly,  the  Irish  GSM 
operator  could  offer  to  deliver  incoming  inter-
national  traffic  at  prices  closely related  to  national 
interconnect  rates  in  Ireland.  The  GSM  operator 
could  therefore  offer  very  low  tariffs  to  customers 
and  could expect  to  obtain  a  substantial  share  of 
incoming international traffic. The public network 
would,  as  a  result,  lose  a  substantial  part  ui  the 
customer revenue and a large  part of the incoming 
settlements,  offset  only  partially  by  increased 
national  interconnect  income. 
(53)  Ireland  acknowledges  that  to  a certain  extent, this 
situation  already  exists  for  medium  and  large 
<.:ompanies,  as  resellers  active  in  the  Irish  market 
alrcndy  bypass  the  ~cttlement  regime.  Ireland 
expects that the grant ot full  interconnection rights 
to  mobile  operators  would  immediately  expose 
another large  segment of  international  revenue  to 
competition. 
(54}  Comments  emphasize  that  the  mobile  telephone 
market  is  a  new  growing  market  and  that  the 
restrictions  on  international connection will  there-
fore  affect  additional  mobile  traffic,  generated  by 
the mobile operators, from which Telecom Eireann 
already  derives  additional  revenues  from  call-
completion of calls originated from mobile phones. 
Moreover,  the second GSM  operator argued that in 
the  absence  of  the  right  to  interconnect  directly 
with  foreign  networks,  it  is  unrealistic  to  suggest 
that Telecom  Eireann  could offer acceptable  inter-
national  interconnect rates  without recourse  to  the 
available  judicial  remedies. 
(55)  In  practice,  two  issues  must  be  considered: (i)  the 
level  of  substitutability  between  mobile  and  fixed 
telephone services and (ii)  the risk of bypass of the 
voi~e  telephony  monopoly  via  services  consisting 
in  calling  a  mobile  number  to  be  switched  to  a 
foreign  fixed-voice  telephony  network. 
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(56)  As  regards  the  latter  risk,  the :ugument cannot be 
raken  inro account, since  there are  other regulatory 
means to deal  with such by  pass  of the legal  privi-
lege  of  Telecom  Eireann  (see  Commission  com-
munication  9 5/C27  5/02). 
(57)  As  regards  the  substitutability  between  fixed  and 
mobile telephone services, the Commission has,  in 
recent cases, discovered that such substitutability is 
not substantial, given  that these services respond  to 
different categories of demand, which are  reflected 
inter alia in  the higher tariffs of GSM-mobile tele· 
phony  in  comparison  with  voice  telephony. 
(58)  In  Ireland,  the  main  market-segment  for  GSM-
operators  is  the  segment  of  domestic  calls.  More-
over it appears that at least half the costs of mobile 
operators  in  handling  calls  are  traffic-insensitive 
costs.  It  can  therefore  not  be  excluded  that  a 
mobile  operator,  in  order  to  increase  overall 
turnover,  usage  of  its  network  and  market  share 
would  allot  a  higher  share  of  these  traffic-
insensitive  costs  to  domestic  calls  and offer  inter-
national  tariffs  which  are  at  the  same  level  as  the 
current international tariffs of Telecom Eireann. As 
stressed  in  one comment (1),  BT  and  MCL  provide 
voice  telephony from  the  UK  to  Irelanci  ar  prices 
which  can  be  less  than  half  those  of  Telecom 
Eireann.  By  directly  interconnecting  with  the 
networks  of  those  British  public  telecommunica-
tions  operators,  Irish  GSM  operators  could  offer 
similar  rates  to  Telecom  Eireann  without  selling 
below  cost.  Moreover,  the  offer  of  international 
mobile calls at the  fixed-network  tariffs  would be a 
powertul  marketing  tool  to  convince  new  sub-
scribers to  acquire and use  GSM  mobile  telephony. 
(59)  On  the  basis  of  the  current  differences  between 
tariffs for calls from Ireland to the UK and for calls 
from  the UK to  Ireland, the  risk of substitution of 
fixed  international  telephone  calls  by  GSM  calls 
can thus not be ruled out. This would affect one of 
two  voice-telephony  market  segments  which  are 
currently the  most profitable  for  Telecom  Eireann 
and could reduce its overall  profitability to such an 
extent  that  it  was  no  longer  able  to  provide  a 
universal  service  under  economically  aet.eptablc 
conditions. 
(60)  This risk will  however decrease as  Telecom Eircann 
reduces  its  international  tariffs.  Although  the argu-
ment  of  the  Irish  Government  can  thus  be 
(')  ITL,  p.  8. 
accepted,  the  additional  implemcntauon  period 
requested  is  too  long  in  view  of  the  justifications 
provided.  Taking  into  account  the  planned  tariff 
rebalancing,  the  threat of substitution  of  fixed  by 
GSM  calls  might only justify a  derogation  until at 
the  latest  the  end  of  1998,  which  is  the  date  at 
which  international  tariffs  of  Telecom  Eireann 
must be sufficiently reduced to' .rule out substitution 
by  GSM-mobile  calls.  A  liberalization  of  inter-
national  interconnection  of  mobile  networks  at 
least  one  year  in  advance  of  the  full  liberalization 
of  voice  telephony  will  furthem10rc  provide  a 
strong  incentive  in  favour  of  timely  implementa-
tion  of  rhc  gradual  rebalancing  envisaged. 
1:.1fect  on  trade 
'·  (61)  TI1e  effects  of  the  delayed  liberalization  of  direct 
international  interconnection  of  mobile  operators 
will  fall  on the second GSM-operator and provided 
they  are  licensed  in  time,  the  future  DCS-1800-
operators.  The  possibility  to  interconnect  directly 
with  other operators  would  be  a  significant factor 
in facilitating their establishment and development 
in the Irish market. Moreover, the additional imple-
mentation  period  will  also  affect  foreign  carriers, 
since it will  make more cumbersome and costly the 
handing-over of  traffic  for  call  termination  by the 
Irish  mobile  operators. 
(62)  This  negative  effect  on  trade  between  Member 
Stares  would  nevertheless  be  reduced  if  the  lri!)h 
Government were  to  ensure  that Telecom  Eireann 
provides  specific  and  volume  discounts,  to  be 
applied  to  mobile  operators,  which  would,  as  in 
other Member States, take into account the fact that 
contrary to  volume discounts gyanted to  large users, 
mobile  operators  are  generating  new  traffic. 
Conclusion 
(63)  The immediate lifting of restrictions on  the direct 
interconnection  of  mobile  telecommunications 
networks  pursuant  to  Article,  3d  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC as  ins{"rted  by  Directive 96/2/EC with 
regard  to  mobile  and  personal  communications 
would  put  at  risk  the  substanti:tl  inrernariunal 
traffic  revenues  of  Telecom  Eireann  and  threaten 
its  ability  to  further  ensure  the  universal  provision 
of  voice  telephony  in  Ireland  in  economically 
acceptable  conditions.  The  effect  on  trade  could, 
moreover  be  limited  if  tariff  reductions, similar to 
those in other Member States, are provided in inter-
connect agreements entered into between Telecom 
Eireann  and  the  mobile  operators. The  Commis-
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sion  therefore  considers  that  the  limited  negative 
effects  on  trade  which  would  result  from  the 
granting  to  Ireland  of  an  additional  implementa-
tion period until 31  December 1998 at the latest as 
regards the lifting of restrictions on direct intercon-
nection of mobile networks with  foreign  networks, 
is  balanced  by  the  certainty  that  universal  service 
will  not be affected and it is  therefore for the time 
being  not  incompatible  with  the  interest  of  the 
Community, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION: 
Article  1 
Ireland may postpone until  1 January 2000 the abolition 
of  the  exclusive  rights  currently  granted  to  Telecom 
Eireann as regards  the  provision  of voice  telephony and 
the  e~t~ blishment and provision  of  public telecommuni-
cations  networks  provided  that  the  conditions set out in 
Article 4 are  implemented according to  the timetable laid 
down  therein. 
Article  2 
Ireland  may postpone until  I January I 999 the lifting of 
restrictions on the direct  interconnection  of  mobile tele-
communications networks with  forei~n networks provided 
that the conditions set out in  Article  4 are  implemented 
acct;uding  to  the  timetable  laid  down  therein. 
Article 3 
Ireland  may  postpone  until  1  July. 1997  the  lifting  of 
restrictions  on  the  provision  of  already  liberalized  tele-
communications services  on: 
(a)  networks established  by the  provider of the  telecom-
munications  service, 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties,  and 
(c)  the  sharing of  networks,  other  facilities  and  sites. 
Article  4 
By  way  of derogation  from  the deadlines set out for  this 
purpose  in  Directive  90/388/EEC, as  amended by Direc-
tive  96/19/EC,  the  Irish  Government  shall  inform  the 
Commission of the implementation in national law of the 
following  obligations  according  to  the  following  time-
table: 
no  later  than  1 April  1997  instead  of  1 July  1996: 
publication  of  all  measures  necessary  to  lift  restric-
tions on the  provision  of already liberalized telecom-
munications  services  on: 
(a)  networks  established  by  the  provider of  the  tele-
communications  service, 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties,  and 
(c)  the sharing of networks, other facilities and sites, 
- before  1  April  1998:  publication  of  proposed  legis-
lative  changes  to  implement  full  competition  and 
remove  all  restrictions  by  1·  January 2000,  including 
proposals  for  the  funding  of  universal  services, 
before  1 November 1998: adoption of those legislative 
changes, 
- no  later  than  1 January  1999  instead  of  1 January 
1997: notification to  the Commission of draft licences 
for  voice  telephony  and/or underlying  network  pro-
viders, 
- no  later  than  1 April  1999  instead  of  1 July  1997: 
publication of licensing conditions for :1ll  ~::cvice::; and 
of  interconnection  charges  as  appropriate  in  accord-
ance  in  both  cases  with  relevant  EU  Directives, 
- no later than 1 November 1999: award of licences and 
amendment of  existing licences to  enable competitive 
provision  of  voice  telephony  and  unrestricted  inter-
connection of  mobile  networks  from  1 January 2000 
instead  of  I  January  1998. 
The  Irish  Government  shall  moreover  inform  the 
Commission  at  the  latest  three  months after  notification 
of  this  Decision  of  the  measures  taken  to: 
- achieve  transparency  as  regards  any  involvement  of 
Telecom  Eireann  alongside  its  strategic  partners PTf 
Telecom  and  Telia;  or  Unisource,  in  investments 
outside  Ireland  during  the  additional  time  period 
granted  pursuant  to  Article  1, 
- ensure that Telecom Eireann does not make use of its 
additional statutory protection  to extend its  dominant 
position  in the  public  payphone market or the  cable 
TV industry and in the short term ensure that Cable-
link is  managed  at  arm's  length  of  Telecom  Eireann 
as  long as  Telecom  Eireann  remains  the  controlling 
shareholder. 
Article  5 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  Ireland. 
Done  at  Brussels,  27  November  1996. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member  of the  Commission 
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(All.\  who.1t'  jmhliwtitm  1.1  twt  ohligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 18  December 1.996 
concerning  the  conditions  imposed  on  the  second  operator  of  GSM 
radiotelephony services  in  Spain 
(Only  th('  Spanish  text  is  authentic) 
(97/181/EC) 
THE COMMISSION  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  r~gard to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community,  and  in  particular Article  90  (3)  thereof, 
Having given the Spanish authorities, by letter of 23 April 
1996, and Telefonica de  Espana  SA,  by  letter of 30 May 
1996, notice to submit their comments on  the Commis-
sion's objections to the initial payment imposed on Airtel 




The national measure in question 
The Spanish  Government  has  imposed  an  initial 
payment for  the grant of a second concession  for 
the establishment and operation on Spanish  territ-
ory  of  a  network  for  the  provision  of  a  public 
mobile  radiotelephony  service  using  the  pan-
European  digital  system,  GSM  (global  system  for 
mobile  communications) (GSM  service'). 
That requirement is laid down  in  Articles 9 (4) and 
Article  16  of  the  tendering  criteria  which  were 
approved  by  Ministerial  Decision  (Orden)  of  26 
(2) 
September  1994 (').  That  requirement  does  not 
apply to  the public operator, Telef6nica de  Espana. 
The undertaking and services concerned 
Telef6nica de  Espana is a Spanish public undertak-
ing as  defined in Article 2 of Commission Direct-
ive  80/723/EEC of 25 June  1980  concerning the 
transparency of financial  rel~tions between Member 
States  and  public  undertakings (2). 
The  Spanish  Government  has  decisive  influence 
over  Telef6nica  de  Espana  for  three  reasons: 
(i)  The Spanish  State  is  the  single  largest  share-
holder  in  Telef6nica  de  Espana~  When  the 
Commission  opened  this  case,  the  Spanish 
State held 31,8 % of the issued share capital. It 
currently  holds  21,16%  of  the  issued  share 
capital.  The  remaining  shares  are  divided 
between  approximately  300 000  shareholders. 
(ii)  The  Spanish  Government  has  the. right  to 
appoint a representative with  the right of veto 
over the decisions of the board of directors of 
Telef6nica  de.  Espana.  Under Article  2  (9)  of 
Royal  Decree Law (Real Decreto-Lej) 6/1996 of 
7 June 1996 (l),  this post will only be abolished 
from  1 January  1998. 
(')  Boletin  Oficial  del  Estado  (BOE)  No  231,  27.  9.  1994,  p. 
29778. 
(l)  OJ  No  L  195,  29.  7.  1980,  p.  35. 
(')  BOE  No  139,  8.  6.  1996,  p.  18 975. 
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(iii)  By  virtue  of  the  concession  contract  of  26 
December 1991  (Concession Contract')('), the 
Spanish  Government  has  the  right  directly  to 
appoint 25 %  of the members or the  board or 
directors of Telef6ni<:a de Espana. As a resuh of 
this and the fact  that the Spanish State  is  the 
largest  shareholder,· the  Spanish  Government 
appointed 18 out of the 25 current members of 
the board of directors including the president. 
The shares  of Telef6nica  de  Espana  arc  listed  on 
the  Spanish  stock  exchanges  as  well  as  in  New 
York, London, Frankfurt and Tokyo. In terms of its 
turnover (PTA  1 740 500  million  in  1995)  and  its 
reults (PTA 133 200 million in  1995), Telef6nica de 
Espana  is  among  the  ten  largest  telecommunica-
tions operators in the world.  It  has  a workforce of 
69 570 employees and over  16 million subscribers. 
Telcf{mic:l  de  Hsp:ui:1  thu~  comtilllle~  a  public 
uru.Jcrtakin1:  or  au  undcJiaking  to  wl1ich  Memht•J 
States  grant  special  or exclusive  rights  within  the 
meaning  of  Article  90  {1)  of  the  EC  Treaty. 
(3)  Telef6nica de Espana provides 'transmission', 'final' 
and  'value  added'  telecommunications  services 
throughout Spain by virtue of Telecommunications 
Act (Ley de  Ordenaa"on  de  las  Telecomunicaa"ones) 
31/1987 of  18  December  ~987(2) (LOT') and the 
Concession  Contract.  Telef6nica  de  Espana  has 
been  the  monopoly  provider  of  some  of  these 
services  (such  as  voice  telephony  services  falling 
within  the  meaning of  Article  1  of  Commission 
Directive  90/388/EEC of  28  June  1990  on  com-
petition  in  the  markets  for  telecommunications 
services (l)),  whereas  there  is  limited  competition 
for other services (such as GSM services). Telef6nica 
de  Espafta has been also granted special rights to-
gether with  Ente  Publico  Retevisi6n  (Retevisi6n') 
and the Organismo Aut6nomo de Correos y  Tele-
grafos, both public undertakings, to  provide  trans-
mission  capacity  for  telecommunication  services. 
On 7 June 1996, by Royal Decree Law 6/1996 the 
monopoly on voice telephony and the oligopoly on 
corresponding  infrastructures  were  formally  abol-
ished. The  Spanish  Government  is  now  able  to 
grant  concessions  to  new  national  or  regional 
operators. Retevisi6n will  transfer its telecommun-
ication  assets  to  a  new  entity  which  has  been 
licensed  to  provide  full  telecommunications 
( 1)  BOB  No  20,  23.  I.  1992,  p.  2 132. 
(l)  BOB  No 303,  19.  12.  1987, amended,  inttr alia, by  Act  321 
1992  of  3  December  1992. 
(l)  OJ  No  L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
services and has been mandated to sell 80 %  of its 
shares  in  a  restricted  tender.  However,  it  is  not 
expected  that  the  new  entity  will  be  operational 
before  mid-1997. 
Under the LOT and its Concession Contract  Tele-
f6nica  de  Espana  has  been  able  to  provide' GSM 
services witho~t ?aving taken part in any tendering 
procedure. Thas  IS  more  fully  described  in  point 7 
· below. Telef6nica  de  Espana  has  been  authorized 
by the Spanish Government to  transfer its  licence 
for  the  provision  of  mobile  telephone  services  -
analogue  and  GSM  - to  Telef6nica  Servicios 
M6viles,  S.A.  ('Telef6nica  Servicios  M6viles'),  a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Telefonica de  Espana. 
All references in this Decision are to Tclef6nica de 
Espana because the licence  to  operate GSM  radio-
telephony  services  was  ori,ginally  granted  to  thi:' 
company. 
(4)  Cellular  digital  mobile  tdcphony  cuJnplying  wit!1 
the  GSM  standad  has  been  developed  recently  IIi 
Europe  and  enables subscribers  both  to  send  and 
receive  calls anywhere  in  the  Community, as  well 
as in some other European countries. This system. 
which  uses  digital  technology,  a  code  and  a 
subscriber identity module card, has greater poten-
tial  than  traditional  analogue  radiotelephony 
systems. Digital technology provides higher quality, 
high-speed  data  transmission  and  encryption 
enhancing  the  confidentiality  of  communications 
and is  more economical  in  its  use  of frequencies 
than  analogue  systems.  Furthermore,  the  GSM 
system is based on common Community standards 
regarding  common  frequency  bands  approved  at 
Community  level  and,  unlike  analogue  systems 
which  are  often  incompatible  from  one  Member 
State  to  another,  has  the  makings  of  one  of  the 
pan-European services,  whose  promotion  is  under 
Council Recommendation 87/371/EEC of 25 Jun(' 
1987 (4), one of the main objectives of the European 
Union's policy on telecommunications. Lastly,  the 
emerging market  for  GSM  services  is  particularly 
dynamic: according to some studies, the number of 
users in Western Europe could grow from  a  little 
over 1 million in 1993 to 15-20 million in the year 
2000 (~. 
(5)  The Council has adopted Directive 87/371/EEC of 
25  June  1987  on  the  frequency  bands  to  be 
reserved for the coordinated introduction of public 
(
4
)  OJ  No  L  196,  17.  7.  1987,  p.  81. 
(~ •Scenario  Mobile  Communications  up  to  20 1  0  - study  on 
forecast developments and future  trends in  techn'ical  develop-
ment and commercial provision up to  the year  2010', Eutelis 
Consult.  October  1993. 
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(6) 
(7) 
pan-European  <.ellula•  digital  land based  mobile 
communil:ations  in  thC'  Community(')  which 
reserve:.  the  H90  91.\  und  9.1.S  ')(,()  Ml Jz  frcyucncy 
bands fo1  the introdm:tion of  a <:ommon  system of 
digitul  GSM  radiotclcphouy.  'Iltcsc  l:ommon 
frequency bands allow several  competing operators 
to  coexist.  'The  GSM  service  began  operating 
commercially  in  the  Community  in  late  1992; 
since then, every Member State except Luxembourg 
has  granted  licences  to  two  operators,  while 
Luxembourg has announced that it will  follow the 
same path. Sweden has granted three GSM licences. 
The  European  Conference of  Postal  and Telecom-
munications Administrations (CEJYf),  the forum for 
the  national  regulatory  authorities  of  36  countries 
(including Spain),  has rerommendcd that competi-
tion between operators of  GSM  services be actively 
encouraged  and  the  regulatory  barriers  which  are 
t!stricting such  competition  be  abolished (2). 
Gcrm;my, (iH·t·u·,  hatH t',  tlw  Nl"!lu·tland:-.  :111d  tlu· 
United  Kingdom  lwv<'  ;mtholi7rd  oJ  tb.:idcd  to 
authorize  a  third  operator  to  oftcr  cellular  digital 
radiotelephony  services,  on  a  higher  frequency 
band, on the basis of  the  DCS  1800 specifications. 
Under Article 2 of Commission Directive 96/2/EC 
of  16  January  1996  amending  Directive 
90/388/EEC  with  regard  to  mobile  and  personal 
communications (3),  Member  States  must  grant 
licences for operating mobile systems according to 
the DCS  1800 standard by  1 January 1998  at the 
latest. Further, Member States  may not restrict the 
combination of mobile technologies or systems and 
in  all  circumstances  must  take  account  of  the 
requirement  to  ensure  effective  competition 
between  the  operators  competing  in  the  relevant 
markets. 
Background 
Following amendments to the LOT by Act 32/1992 
of 3  December 1992, the market for  the provision 
of  GSM  services  was  liberalized  as  from  31 
December 1993. Therefore, the  provision  of GSM 
services is  no longer regarded as a 'final' service for 
which special and  e~clusive. rights  ca~ be granted; 
GSM services are  now cons1dered  as  value  added 
services which should be provided in competition. 
( 1)  OJ  No  L  196,  17.  7.  1987,  p.  85.  .  .  . 
(J)  Rtflitw of the Rtquirtmtnls for tht  ~-uturt lla~on.'%al•on 
of Regulatory Policy Rtgardmg Mobrlt Communuatron Ser-
vices,  CEPT/ECTRA  (92)  57,  p.  17. 
(J)  OJ  No  L 20,  26.  I. 1996,  p.  59. 
(8) 
Following  this  amendment  to  the  LOT,  the 
Spanish Government adopted  Royal  Decree  J 486/ 
1994  of 1 July 1994 (
4
)  (the Royal  Decree), which 
iipprovcs  the  technical  regulation  (Rtglmnrnto 
Tlwit·o)  for  the  provision  of 'value  added'  mobile' 
automatic telecommunication services.  Article  2  of 
the  technical  regulation  (Annex  to  the  Royal 
Decree) states that GSM services are to be provided 
in competition. Article 4 of the technical regulation 
states that GSM services are to be provided by Tele-
f6nica de Espana and one competing licensee. The 
first  Transitional Provision  of the technical regula-
tion  indicate-s  the  procedure  for  Telef6nica  de 
Espana to obtain a licence without going through a 
tendering  procedure. 
The Royal Decree does not expressly provide for an 
initial  payment  for  the  GSM  licence.  However, 
Article 4,  fourth paragraph, subparagraph (a),  of the 
technical regulation states that one 0f th  ...  facwrs to 
be  taken into account when  assessing the applica-
tion  of  the  second  operator  for  a  licence  is  the 
'maximizatio11  of  financial  concrihution~'. 
By  Ministerial  Decision  of  26  September  1994 (S) 
the  Spanish. Government  adopted  the  tendering 
criteria and opened the tendering procedure  for  a 
second operator's licence for  the provision of GSM 
services. The second operator's concession is  for  15 
years  with  an  'extension  envisaged  for  five  years 
thereafter. The other terms of the  concession  are 
listed  in the  tendering criteria. 
Articles 9 and 16 of the tendering criteria provided 
for  a  minimum initial payment to the Treasury of 
P'I'  A 50 09  5 billion. Some indication of the relative 
weight  that  would  be  attached  to  the  different 
tendering criteria was given. The effect of the last 
paragrap~ of Article 16 was  that offers of less than 
PTA 50 000  million would automatically be elim-
inated.  ' 
The Ministry of Public Works, Transport and En-
vironment awarded  the  second operator's conces-
sion  by  Ministerial  Decision  of  29  December 
1994 (') to Airtel M6vil SA (at that time knowri as 
'Alianza lnternacional de Redes Telef6nicas, SA) in 
spite  of the  fact  that the  initial  payment of PTA 
85 000 million was  not the highest initial payment 
offered  (the  highest  initial  payment  offer  'being 
PTA  89 000  million). 
l~ 
BOB  No  168,  15.  7. · 1994,  p.  22 672. 
BOE  No  231,  27.  9.  199  .. ,  p.  1!J 779. 
'  BOB  No 4,  S.  I. 1995,  p.  464. 
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(9) 
In  accordance  with  Article  9  of  the  tendering 
criteria,  Airtel  M6vil  had  to  make  the  initial 
payment when it formally obtained the licence by 
signing  the  concession  contract  on  3  February 
1995. On the same day Tddonica de  Espana  was 
simultaneously  p,rnntecl  a  t:ouespondinr,  GSM 
licence  withoul  makin1~ any  such  payment. 
By  letter  of  6  February  199.5  the  Commission 
expressed its resevations about the procedure which 
had  been  adopted  for  the  selection  of  a  second 
operator which had included less  favourable  condi-
tions for the second operator than for Telefonica de 
Espana. 
By letter of 20 April 1995 the Spanish Government 
replied to  the Commission seuing out the circum-
stances of the licensing process which according to 
the  Spanish  Government  compensated  for  the 
initial  payment  made  by  Airtel  Mbvil. 
On  I  July  1995  Tcldbnica  de  Espai1a  bep,an  op-
erating  its  GSM  serviu·s  commercially. 
By  its letter of 18 July 199  5 the Commission asked 
the  Spanish  Government  for  clarification  on  the 
right  to  use  alternative  telecommunication 
networks, on the right to interconnect directly with 
leased  line networks and on the methodology that 
would be used to revise  the interconnection tariffs 
with  the  fixed  network.  This  was  so  that  the 
Commission  could  assess  whether  those  factors 
would  give  the  second  operator  benefits  which 
would  outweigh  the  competitive  disadvantage  es-
tablished by the imposition of the initial payment. 
On 3  October 1995, Airtel  Movil  began  its opera-
tions. 
By  its  letter  of  27  November  1995  the  Spanish 
Government  replied  to  the  Commission  stating 
that  the  second  operator could  establish  its  own 
infrastructure, and also use  Retevisi6n and Correos 
y Telegrafos  infrastructure  as  an  alternative  to  the 
Telef6nica de Espana network, that no request for 
direct  interconnection  had  been .received  by  the 
Spanish  Government and  that  the  issue  of tariff 
reductions  would  be  examined  in  1996. 
At  a  meeting  on  16  January  1996  between  the 
Spanish  Government  and  the  Commission,  the 
Spanish Government stated that it would be impos-
sible  to  redress  the  imbalance  between  Telef6nica 
de Espaiia and the second operator by imposing a 
similar initial  payment fee  of  PTA 85 000  million 
on Telef6nica de Espana. The Spanish Government 
proposed  that  a  possible  solution  would  be  to 
reduce  the interconnection  tariffs  over the  15-year 
period  of  the  concession.  The  reduction  would 
apply  to  both  Telefonica  de  Espana  and  to  the 
second operator. It  stated  that this would  be  final-
ized  in  September  1996  und  would  nrnouut  to  n 
15 %  reduction  in  these  tariffs. 
The  Commission  remained  of  the  view  that  this 
proposal  would  not  affect  the  imbalance  between 
the  two  operators. 
By  letter of  23  April  1996  the  Commission  gave 
formal  notice  to  the  Spanish  Government  either: 
(i)  to  reimburse the initial  payment to  the second 
operator or adopt other corrective measures; or 
(ii)  to  submit  its  commcnrs  on  the  Commission's 
arguments. 
By letter  of  30  May  1996  the  Commis~ion asked 
Tdef6nica de  Espai1a  for  observ~ttions on  its  letter 
of  23  April  1996  to  the  Spauish  Government.  A 
copy of the letter of  formal  notice of 23 April  1996 
was  enclosed. 
At  a  meeting  on  28  April  1996  between  the 
Spanish  Government  and  the  Commission,  the 
Spanish  Government proposed  that the imbalance 
between  Telef6nica  de  Espana  and  the  second 
operator could be corrected if Telef6nica de Espana 
transferred the cost of operating the "TRAC' project 
('Tecnologia  Rural  de  Acceso  Celular'  or Cellular 
Rural  Access Technology) to  its  mobile  telephone 
branch,  Telef6nica  Servicios  Moviles.  Under  that 
service, Telef6nica de  Espana charges customers in 
sparsely populated upland regions fixed  telephony 
rates for connections to the public fixed  telephone 
network  using  mobile  analog  technology  and 
infrastructure.  The  Commission  investigated  that 
proposal  further  and,  by  letters  of  29 April  1996 
and 10  May  1996 requested further information to 
complete  its  assessment  of  the  proposal.  Having 
received  no  reply  to  either  of  its  letters,  the 
Commission sent a  reminder on 3 June 1996. By 
its letter of 7 June 1996, the Spanish Government 
provided  some  of  the  information  .requested. 
However, the information provided did not contain 
sufficient data on the real cost of the TRAC system 
to Telef6nica Servicios  M6viles.  Consequently, the 
Commission could  not assess  the extent to which 
that  proposal  would  redress  the  balance  between 
the  two  GSM  operators. 
At a  meeting with  the Spanish Govem_ment  on 9 
July  1996,  the  Commission  emphasized· that  the 
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Government should put forward a new proposal. To 
date,  no  reply  has  been  receiv<"d  by  the  Commis-
sion to its leuer of formal  notice of  23  April  1996, 
no observations have been submiHed by Telef6nica 
de Espana on the letter of formal notice of 23 April 
1996 and no further proposals have  been made by 
the  Spanish  Government. 
TilE COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT 
Article  90  (1) 
(I 0)  Articl~ 90 (1)  provides  that,  in  the  case  of  public 
undertakings  and  underlakings  to  which  Member 
States  grant  special  or  exclusive  rights,  Member 
States must neither enact nor maintain in force  any 
measure  contrary  to  the  rules  mntaincd  in  the 
Treaty, in particular those relating to  competi~ion. 
Telefonica de Espana is a public undertaking which 
has  been  granted  exclusive  rights  to  operate  the 
fixed  telecommunications network  and offer voice 
telephony  and  mobile  analog  radiotelephony 
services. Tite Concession Contract also grants Tele-
fonica de Espana the right to operate a GSM radio-
telephony  network,  which  qualifies  as  a  special 
right to the extent that this operator was designated 
otherwise than according to objective and non-dis-
criminatory criteria. 
The  imposition  of  the  initial  payment  on  the 
second  operator  is  a  State  measure  within  the 
meaning of Article  90  (1). 
Article 86 
The  relevant  market 
(11)  The  relevant  market  is  that  for  cellular  digital 
mobile radiotelephony services. It should be distin-
guished from the market in fixed  voice  telephony 
/and from the market for all other mobile telephone 
communications services. 
(J 2)  The Commission has defined the market in voice 
telephony in Directive 90/388/EEC. The Directive 
draws a  distinction between 'services whose  provi-
sion consists wholly or partly in  the  transmission 
and routing of signals on the public telecommun-
ications  network'  and  mobile  radiotelephony 
services,  which  are  excluded  from  its  scope. 
(13)  Voice telephony within the meaning of that Direct-
ive  is  the  principal service  provided  on  the  fixed 
public  network,  that  is  between  given  network 
termination  points.  These  termination  points  are 
-----------------------
defined as 'all physical connections and their tech-
nical access specifications'. In  mobile communica-
tions, on the other hand, the termination  poim is 
located  at  the  radio  interface  between  the  base 
station  of  the  mobile  network  and  the  mobile 
stati~n,  _which  _means  that  there  is  no  physical 
termmat10n  pomt.  The  definition  of  voice  tele-
phony services in Article  1 of the  Directive  there-
fore does not apply to mobile telephony services. 
(14)  According to the case-law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities('), for  a  product to be 
r~garded_ as  forming a  market which  is  sufficicndy 
chffcrenttated  from  other  markets,  it  must  be 
possible  for  it  to  be  singled  out  by  such  special 
features  distinguishing it from  other products  that 
it is  only  ~o a  limited extent interchangeable with 
them and IS  only exposed to their competition in  a 
way  that  is  not significant. 
Clearly,  there  is  very  little  interchangeabilirv 
be~wcen  mo?ilc  radiotelephony  and  telephon~· 
usmg  the  f1xed  network:  users  taking  out  a 
subscription  for  a  earphone or  portable  telephone 
do not normally cancel their previous subscription 
for  a  telephone  installed  at  their  home  or work-
place. Therefore, mobile radiotelephony is  indeed a 
new,  additional  service,  not  a  substitute  for  tradi-
tional  telephony. This distinction  is  also  reflected 
in  a  significant  price  differential. 
Admittedly,  wider dissemination  of  mobile  radio-
telephony  might  ultimately  lead  to  a  single  tele-
communications  system  serving  markets  that  are 
for  the  time being separate.  However,  the condi-
tions  on  which  Article  86  is  to  apply  must  be 
assessed on the basis of present demand and not on 
developments  that could  take  place  at some  un-
specified  time in  the  future. 
(15)  It  having been established,  for  the  above  reasons. 
that mo~ile radiotelephony should not be regarded 
as  formmg  part of the  market in voice telephony· 
services offered using the fixed network, it remains 
to be seen whether, and to what exten~ there might 
be grounds for  distinguishing between the cellular 
mobile radiotelephony services based on the GSM 
sta":dar~ which are the subject of this Decision (in 
Spam gt.ven the brandname Movistar by Telef6nica 
de  Espana)  and  cellular  radiotelephony  services 
using  analogue  technology  (in  Spain  given  the 
brandname  Moviline by Telefonica  de  Espana). 
The  Commission  notes  that  the  GSM  system  of 
cellular mobile radiotelephony is more than just a 
technical refinement of the earlier analog techno-
( 1)  Case 27/76, Unittd Brands v.  Commission,(1978) ECR  207. 
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logy. In  addition to  the advantages offered by GSM 
in  terms of the  qualiry  of  voice  reproduction  and 
more  efficient  usc  of  the  available  spectrum (thus 
accommodating substantially more users on a given 
frequency  allocation),  this  service  provides  new 
facilities that cater for the needs of only some users 
of  mobile  radiotelephony: 
(i)  based  as  it  is  on a Community standard, GSM 
can  become  a  pan-European  sc1vicc.  Under 
'rtJOlrllillj~'  ;tgJC~t'lllC'lll~  h('IWt't'll  IWIWOJ k  OJ><' I 
:1tor~, the- ~y~trm pr1mil!>  :111y  ust·r  to makt· cdb 
from  his phone oubidc the n:1tional  tcrrit01y of 
the  operator  with  which  he  has  taken  out  a 
subscription;  this  facility  is  available 
throughout  the  territory  of  the  parties  to  the 
GSM  Memorandum  of  Understanding  in 
Europe  and  other  parb  of  the  world.  Some 
users  who,  for  business  purposes,  use  mobile 
radiotelephony  scn·ices  only  within  the 
country or within  a  particular  region,  arc  not 
interested  in  this  new  feature.  For  others, 
however,  this may  be  a  reason  for  deciding to 
subscribe, 
(ii)  in  addition  to  voice  transmission,  the  GSM 
service can be used to transmit large quantities 
of  data;  again,  this  feature  meets  the  specific 
needs of only some of the existing or potential 
customers  for  mobile  radiotelephony  services, 
(iii)  the digital coding of  messages means· that a far 
greater degree of security can  be  achieved  than 
via  the analogue system, again  an advantage of 
interest  to  only  some  users  (particularly  busi-
ness  customers), 
(iv)  digital  technology makes  it  possible  to  offer a 
whole  range  of  advanced  telecommunications 
services  which are  not available (or which can 
be  made so only at  considerably  higher cost) 
via  an analogue  network. These include soph-
isticated  call-line  identification,  voice  mail 
(including short  message  services  (SMS'))  and 
call-security services. 
In  view  of the  above,  the  simple  replacement  of 
analogue radiotelephony by the GSM system is  not 
envisaged, in the short term. On the contrary, it is 
likely  that,  even  if there  is  a  discernible  drift  of 
customers from  one to  the other,  the two  systems 
will continue to exist in  parallel  for several years to 
come('),  meeting  largely  different  needs.  It  has 
been found that, even  in  countries where the GSM 
system  is  fully  operational,  some  operators  are 
continuing  to  invest  in  the  analogue  network. 
These factors draw a distinction  between  the GSM 
and  analogue  markets. 
( 1)  Ministerial  Decision  of  13  March  1995,  BOE  No 101,  28.  4. 
1995,  p.  12 573. 
(16)  On the basis of the abovementioned considerations 
and  the  current  circumstances,  and  taking  into 
account the possible evolution of the market, GSM 
radiotelephony services  should  therefore  probably 
be  regarded  as  also  constituting a  separate  market 
from  the  market  for  analogue  mobile  telephony. 
In any event,  the conclusions of  the legal  analysis 
would  not  be  different,  even  if analogue  mobile 
telephony  and  GSM  constituted  two  ser,menb  of 
the same market. A~ will  lw  seeu  below (pan1graph 
21),  this  would  only  imply  :1  slightly  different 
formulation  of  the  fir:;!  hypothesis  of  ahu~c. 
(17)  In  accordance  with  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice,  this  market,  which  currently  extends  over 
the  whole  of  Spain,  is  a  substantial  part  of  the 
common  market. 
The  dominant poJ·ition 
(18}  In  accordance  with  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice,  an  undertaking  which  has  a  legal  mono-
poly  in  the  provision  of  certain  services  may 
occupy a dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 86 of the Treaty (2).  This applies in the case 
of  Telef6nica  de  Espana  and  its  wholly  owned 
subsidiary,  Telef6nica  Servicios  M6viles,  which 
until  recently  were  the  only  undertakings  legally 
able  to offer the telecommunications  networks  for 
the  public,  voice  telephony  and  analog  radiotele-
phony in Spain. These are  therefore three markets 
in which they enjoy a dominant position. As. stated 
above,  the  recent  authorization  granted  to  Rete-
visi6n to operate in  the market for voice telephony 
and  underlying  infrastructures  will  not  have  any 
significant impact on  the  market share enjoyed by 
Telef6nica  de  Espana  for  some  time. 
The  abuse  of a  dominant position 
(19)  The Court of Justice  has  ruled  that 'a system  of 
undistorted  competition,  as  laid  down  in  the 
Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equality of oppor-
tunity is secured as  between  the various economic 
operators' (3). 
Such equality of opportunity is  particularly import-
ant for new entrants to a market in which a domi-
nant operator on a related but separate market is in 
the course of establishing  itself,  like Telef6nica de 
Espana  and  its  subsidiary,  Telef6nica  Scrvicios 
M6viles. 
(1)  Case 311/84, Ctntr~  b~lg~ d'ltudts d~ march!- Ttl~mark~ting 
(CBEM) v.  CompaQni~ lux~mbourg~oiu d~ rllldiffusion and 
Information publlcitl Bentlux, (1985]  ECR  326i. 
(l)  Case  C-202/88,  Franc~ v.  Commission,  (1991)  ECR  1-1223, 
paragraph  51,  p.  1271. 
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(20)  Telef6nica de  Espana  already enjoys  the  following 
major advantanges for  acquiring a dominant share 
of  the  market  in  GSM  radiotelephony: 
(i)  a  head  st:trt:  it  began  developing  its  network 
hefore  the st•t·ond  operator nnd  cnn  therefore 
offer  better  geographical  <.·over;  it  began  its 
service  on  I  July  1995  while  the  second 
operator began its services on 3 October 199 5; 
(ii)  potential  customers:  Telef6nica  de  Espana's 
analog  radiotelephony  service,  Moviline,  had 
I 235 690  subscribers  in  October 1996 and is 
acquiring  I 0 000  to  20 000  new  subscribers 
each  month; 
existing  subscribers  to  Moviline,  the  analog 
service,  may  he  seen  as  a  potential  customer 
ha~c  for  Movistar,  the  GSM  service; 
(iii)  an  <.~xi~tinJ~  di~trihution  uctwork:  th<'  network 
is  known  to  the  public,  since_ Telcfonica  de 
Espafla  can  market  its  <-JSM  service  on  a 
shared  basis  with  it~  Moviline  distributors; 
(iv)  specific  information:  through  its  experience 
with  Moviline,  it  has  specific  informatin  on 
the  calling  habits  of  Spanish  subscribers,  by 
consumer  categories  and  region.  Moreover, 
since it also enjoys a dominant position in the 
supply of fixed links for the networks of GSM 
operators, it will continue to obtain important 
information on traffic flows.  In reality there is 
currently no realistic alternative for the second 
operator other than the Telef6nica de  Espana 
network; 
(v)  economies  of  scale  for  infrastructure:  Tele-
f6nica de Espana was until June 1996 the sole 
licensee of fb.ced  voice telephony services and 
is  currently  the  sole  operator  active  in  that 
market. Telef6nica de Espana was  also until 3 
October 199  5 the sole operator of mobile tele-
phony.  As  a  result  of  this,  Telef6nica  de 
Espana  has had sites  and aerials  available  for 
establishing  its  GSM  network  which  are  not 
available to its competitor. In addition, certain 
autonomous  communities  subsidise  the  de-
velopment  of  the  analog  radiotelephony 
network in those areas where there is an insuf-
ficient  wire  network  (via  the  TR.AC-project). 
Contrastingly, the second operator is,  as described, 
operating  under  more  onerous  constraints  than 
Telef6nica  de  Espaiia  as  a  result  of  the  initial 
payment  mentioned above. 
If Telef6nica  de  Espana  extended  its  dominant 
position on the market in wire telephony or analog 
mobile  telephony into the  market in  GSM  radio-
telephony by increasing  the  costs  of  its  rival  (for 
example  by  imposing  interconnection  charges 
which were not justified by the costs involved), that 
would infringe Article 86. 11te same analysis would 
apply if  there is  one market  for  all  mobile  radio-
telephony  service:;  and  Teld6nica  de  Espana 
strengthened  irs  position  in  that  market  in  the 
same  way. 
(21)  Under Article 90 (1)  of the EC Treaty, Spain must 
refrain  from  enacting  measures  which  would,  by 
increasing the costs of access of the sole  rival  of a 
public undertaking on  a  market newly opened  to 
competition, significantly distort  this  competition. 
Given  the additional  financial  burden imposed on 
its only competitor, Telef6nica de Espana will  have 
the  choice  between  two  commercial  strategies  of 
which  each  would  be  a  violation  of  Article  90  (I) 
n·ad  in  conju!·~·!i('~l  ·vi•h  Artidt'  86.  Those 
commercial  strategic~  aH·:  citht'r  (i)  to  extend  or 
strengthen  its  dominant  position;  or  (ii)  to  limit 
production,  markets  or  tc.·chnic'al  development 
within  the  meaning  of  Article  86  (b). 
(i)  Extension (')  or  strengthening  of  the 
dominant position of the public under-
taking 
The  inifial  payment  of  PTA  85 000  million 
made  by  the  second  operator on  this  market 
will  necessarily  have  to  be  covered  from 
income.  The  second  operator  will  therefore 
have  difficulties  in  competing  with  the  first 
operator  through  lower  tariffs.  The  first 
operator, Telef6nica de Espana, which does not 
have  to  make  the  same  payment  and  which, 
moreover, is aware of the second operator's cost 
structure through its current dominance in the 
market for infrastructure, could be  encouraged 
to extend its current dominant position on the 
fixed  infras.tructure  market  and  the  analogue 
mobile  telephony  market  into  the  market  in 
GSM  radiotelephony by reducing its  tariffs.  If 
there  is  only  one  market  for  radiotelephony 
services, instead of an extension there would be 
a strengthening of Telef6nica de Espana's dom-
inant  position  in  this  market. 
Moreover,  Telef6nica de  Espana could use  the 
PI'  A  85 000 million saving made to extend its 
distribution network, to price its services aggres-
(!)  See,  for  example,  the  Judgment of the  Court of Justice  in 
Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90, Kingdom of 
Spain,  Kingdom  of Belgium and Italian  Republic "·  Com· 
mission,  (1992)  ECR  1-5833,  paragraph  36. 
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:.ivdy in  th~ GSM  market whcr~ it  faces compe-
tition from the sewnd operator, to make special 
offer!'.  to pott"uti:ll :.uh:.uihrrs aud/or  to coudu<.:l 
i  lll«"ll:.ivr  ndvcrl i:.i 111~  ';un  pai1:n:.  for  t"Xllrnplt·. 
Thr d10i( «"  of  thi:.  :.lr;ri('J~Y indun·d by the·  Stair 
rnem.urC'  l"ould  tlucatc:-n  the c:-c.ouomic  viability 
of  the  second  operator. 
Thus,  Telcf6nica  de  Espana  is  in  a  position 
where  it  could  extend  or strengthen  its  dom-
inant  position  thanks  to  the  competitive  ad-
vantage  provided by  the distortion of the costs 
structure  resulting  from  the  initial  payment. 
This  renders  the  State  measure  contrary  to 
Article 90 read in conjunction with Article 86. 
(ii)  Limit:ttion of production, markets or of 
technical  tkvc-lopment  within  the 
llH"  <til in  r,  of  Art i c I c  H  6  (h) 
The  net'd  to  finarHc  lYJ"J\  ~.~ ()()()  million  will 
dd;ry the  inve:-.lmt•nt~ of  th<'  new c.·ntrant, which 
will  have  to  liM.·  pari  of  it:.  initial  capital  to 
cover the  initial  payment, which  will  therefore 
not .be  available  either  for  appwpriatc  invest-
ment in the development of its  network or for 
tariff  reductions.  The  second  operator  was 
indeed obliged  to  increase  its  capital  by some 
PTA 40 000 million  in  February 1996 in order 
to  be  able  to  follow  its  investment  plan. 
That  might  also  encourage  Telef6nica  de 
·  Espana to delay the development of the  GSM 
radiotelephony network and  to  concentrate its 
efforts  on  the  Moviline  analog  system.  The 
Moviline  system  is  more  attractive  since  the 
bulk  of  the  investments  have  already  been 
amortized  and  it  has  better coverage. 
The initial  investment  for  establishing  a  GSM 
network  in  Spain  amounts  to  about  P'f  A 
250 000  million.  The  initial  payment,  when 
added  to  the  initial  investment,  therefore 
increases  the  second  operator's  need  for  fin-
ancing by more  than  one-third. The  fact  that 
applicants  for  the  second  concession  were 
aware of the future distortion of competition on 
the  GSM  market  in  Spain  in  favour  of Tele-
f6nica de Espana does not affect the existence 
of an imbalance. Undertakings which wished to 
enter the market had no choice but to take this 
handicap  into  account  in  their business  plan. 
In the second hypothesis, Telef6nica de Espana 
which, as has been pointed out, is  aware of the 
second  operator's  cost  structure  through  its 
dominant position in the infrastructure market, 
·--------------------------------------------
might be encouraged to  retain higher tariffs for 
its  GSM services  than  it would  in  the absence 
of the State measure in  question. It could limit 
·production,  markC'ls  or  technical  development 
within  the  me;&ninH  of  Artic.lr  8() (h)  a~  rep,:ml~ 
GSM, which  involves n  more advanced techno-
logy,  to  the  benefit  of  the  older  analogue 
service.  This  would  delay  the  move  towards 
personal  communications  combining  mobile 
and fixed  networks  •.  which will only be possible 
if  the  tariffs  for  mobile  communications  fall 
substantially. 
The  fact  that  Telef6nica  de  Espana  could 
behave in  this way  would be  a  consequence of 
the fact  that, on the one hand, it benefits from 
a favourable position as  a result of its monopoly 
over the  Movilinc  system  :111d  is  granted  !>uffi. 
cicnt  wavebands  to  continue  this  service,  and, 
on'  the  'other,  the  Spani:.h  Government  has 
financially  penalized  the  only  undertaking 
authorized  to  establish  a  competing  GSM 
service.  The  delayed  roll-out  of  the  GSM  and 
the resulting limitation of  technical  progress to 
the detriment of consumers would therefore  be 
caused by the State measure in  question, that is 
the imposition  of the  P'fA  85 000  million  fee 
on  the  second operator alone. 
The Commission has adopted a similar analysis in 
a case involving an initial payment in Italy. Having 
demanded corrective  measures without  result,  the 
Commission  adopted  Decision  95/489/EC 
addressed  to  Italy under Article  90 (3)  of the  EC 
Treaty (1).  The  Commission  has  since  been 
informed that such corrective measures  have  been 
taken  or are  in  the  process  of  being  taken. 
In  accordance  with  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice (1),  Article  90  (I)  precludes  Member  States 
from  enacting measures  likely  to  cause  an  under-
taking to infringe the provisions to which it refers, 
in particufar, in the case in point, those contained 
in Article  86. 
In  conch.tsion,  under  either  hypothesis,  the  State 
measure concerned is contrary to Article 90 (1)  read 
in conjunction  with  Article  86  of  the Treaty. 
(
1
)  OJ  No L  280,  23.  11.  1995,  p.  49. 
(2)  See, for  example, Case  C-41/90, Hiifntr v.  Macrotron, [  1991 J 
ECR  1-1979~ Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Ti/eorassi 
Anonimi v.  Dimotiki Etairia P/iroforissiJ and Others, (1991] 
ECR 1-2925, and Case C-323/93, Sociltl civile agricolt d'insl-
mination dt Ia  Cresptllt!Cooplrativt d'l/evagt ti•d'imlmiTJa· 
tion  artificitllt du dlparttment de  Ia  Mayennt, (1994)  ECR 
1-5077. 
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(22)  Memher States are  liahle  pursuant to Article 90 (I) 
and Article 86 of the Treaty only where the beha-
viour  of  the  company  in  question  is  capable  of 
affecting  trade  between  Member  States.  Trade 
between  Member States  could  he  aHected  here for 
the  followin1~  reasons: 
Any  extension  or strengthening of  Telef6nica  de 
Espana's  dominant  position  as  well  as  any limita-
tion  of  production,  markets  or technical  develop-
ment  in  relation  to  GSM  is  likely  to  delay  the 
process of progressive  reduction  of tariffs  for GSM 
telephony.  In  fact,  in  the  absence  of  the  initial 
payment  of  PTA  85 000  million  imposed  on  the 
second  operator,  price  competition  would  have 
been  stronger  since  the  introduction  of  GSM 
services in Spain and GSM tariffs would have fallen 
more  quickly: 
if  GSM  tariffs  do  not  fall  as  quickly  as  they 
would  have  done  in  the  absence  of  the  State 
measure in  que:.tiou, residents in other Member 
States  will  be  less  likely  to  take  out subscrip-
tions with Spanish operators as  an alternative to 
other national  or foreign  operators.  By way  of 
illustration,  a  business  or  individual  based  in 
France  will  not  be  encouraged  to  purchase  a 
Spanish SIM card and to  make caiJs  using the 
card  under  the  roaming  agreements  between 
operators, because Spanish tariffs are not as low 
as  they  would  h~ve  been  had  the  second 
operator been able to use the initial payment of 
PTA  85 000  million  to  reduce  its  tariffs, 
- any  delay  in  the  process  of  reducing  tariffs 
would in turn delay the development of mobile 
telephony services  such as  improved subscrip-
tion  terms and conditions and  more advanced 
technical  services  described  above. This would 
discourage new investmentc; in the Spanish tele-
/  communication  services  markets  by  under-
takings, established  in  other  Member  States 
where there is effective competition and where 
new services  have  emerged, 
- any  delay  in  the  process  of  steadily  reducing 
tariffs may reduce generally the level of interna-
tional  telephone  traffic  from  Spain.  Under-
takings and individuals with large  mobile tele-
communications needs will tend to subscribe to 
foreign operators or to use 'call back' systems in 
order to take advantage of lower tariffs in other 
Member States, 
- any  limitation  of  production,  markets  or  of 
technical  development  within  the  meaning of 
Article  86 (b)  may  reduce the  level  of imports 
from  other Member States  of  technical  equip-
ment  required  for  investment  in  the  mobile 
telephony  market  and  for  development  of  an 
effective  and  efficient  infrastructure. 
The reply of the Spanish authorities 
(23)  The Spanish  Government has  made  the  following 
submissions  to  the  Commission: 
·- under the  terms of the concession  granted  by 
the  Spanish  Government  to  Telef6nica  de: 
Esp~tfia in 1991, Telef6nica de  Espana obtains 2 
GSM  concession  without any further  paymenr. 
Therefore,  the  Spanish  Government  cannot 
impose  an  initial  payment  of  PTA  85 000 
million  on  Tclef6nica  de  Espana.  Further  the 
Spanish  Government  argued,  whilst  rejcctinf! 
the principle of compensation, that the relevant 
figure  for  the  initial  payment  was  (Yf:'\ 
50 095 000  million  rather  than  PTA  85 000 
million. It argued  that Airtel  M6vil  had  raise  .. ! 
the original fee  requested from PTA 50 09  5 000 
million to PTA 85 000 million itself without an 
obligation  to  do  so.  The  minimum  initial 
payment imposed by law was  PTA 50 09  5 000 
million and that was the figure to be taken into 
account, 
- the  Spanish  Government  considered  that  a 
possible  solution would  be a  reduction  in  the 
interconnection  tariffs  for  the  duration  of  the 
15-year licence, 
- finally,  the Spanish Government also proposed 
to transfer to Telef6nica Servicios  M6viles  the 
cost  of the lRAC project 
The Commission's assessment 
(24)  Although the second operator itself offered a fee  of 
PTA  85 000  million,  the  Commission  disagrees 
with  the  argument  that  the  initial  payment  was . 
voluntary since it was  one of the selection criteria 
in the tendering procedure ('). Each tenderer had to 
offer the highest initial payment possible under its 
· business  plan  to  have  a  chance  of  winning  the 
( 1)  Case C-271191, Commission  11. :Italy, (1994) ECR 1-1409, para-
graph  11. 
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concession. Only some indication as  to the relative 
weight  that  would  be  attached  to  the  different 
selection criteria was given. The most clear indica-
tion was given with respect to the minimum initial 
payment. The initial  payment was  thus one of the 
selection  criteria  under  the  tendering  procedure 
and it  was  payable on the date that the concession 
was sip,ned. II is, therefore, dearly a State measure. 
The  selection  procedure  for  the  second  GSM 
operator was  not in  reality a tendering procedure as 
such.  The  selection  procedure  in  Spain  was  a 
hybrid  comhininp,  the  characteristics  of  compar-
ative  bids  and  a  tender.  One  of  the  criteria 
compared was  the initial payment which the appli-
cant  offered  to  pay  on  obtaining  the  second 
concession. It was therefore difficult to know which 
of  the  criteria  were  essential.  The  fact  that  the 
concession was awarded in the absence of any clear 
indication  implies ·that  any  of  them  could  have·  ~ 
been  of  importance. 
The  Commi:-.:.iou  doc:-;  1101  :tncpl  that  the  rcdu('-
rion  in  intc."rCOJlllC"<"fiOII  tariffs  proposed  by  the 
Spanish  Government  would  restore  the  level 
playing  field,  because  the  Spanish  Government 
refused  to  consider an  asymmetric tariff  reduction 
in  favour  of  the  second  operator alone. 
(26)  The solution  offered  by  the  Spanish  Government 
whereby investments  in  the TRAC project  would 
offset the second operator's initial payment cannot 
be  accepted  in  the  present circumstances. 
Apart from  the fact  that the information provided 
by the Spanish authorities does not allow a  proper 
evaluation of the real  impact of such investments, 
and that it is not possible to ensure that this solu-
tion  is  anything  more  than  a  pure  accounting 
operation, the solution  cannot be  accepted  at  this 
stage since the  provision  of a  universal  service  by 
Telef6nica  de  Espana,  including  the  service  in 
remote  areas,  is  in  the  current  circumstances 
balanced  out  by  the  exclusive  or  special  rights 
granted  to  Telef6nica  de  Espana.  Moreover,  in 
implementing  the  TRAC  system,  Telef6nica  de 
Espana  has  benefited  from  public  subsidies  in-
cluding  ERDF aids. 
(27)  The  Commission  considers  that  in  this  case  the 
obligation imposed on the second Spanish operator 
alone to make the initial  payment of PTA 85 000 
million is incompatible with Article 90 (1) together 
with  Article  86. 
(28)  The aim of this procedure is  to cause the Spanish 
Government to take the necessary steps to remove 
the  distortion  of  competition;  the  most  obvious 
step  would  be  to  reimburse  sum  paid  by  Airtel 
M6vil. 
(29) 
If  the  Spanish  Government  so  requests,  the 
Commission  would  be  prepared  to  examine 
whether the  infringement  could  be  terminated  by 
adopting  other corrective  measures,  provided  thar 
they properly balance our  th<.'  disadvantage sufk:-c:"d 
by  the  second  operator. 
It is  incumbent upon  the Spanish  Government  ro 
make  proposals  in  this  respect.  The  Spanish 
Government should in any case  provide figures  :or 
such  proposals,  showing  that  they  properly  ofiset 
the  PTA  85 000  million  paid  by  the  seco;'ld 
operator. 
However, imposing on Telef6nica Servicios M6\·i:es 
an  identical  payment would  not be  considered  .:n 
adequate  compensatory  measure  in  the  pre:;.:- :H 
circumstanres,  in  particular  as  lon.r,  a~  no  (o~l 
accounting  is  impl~mented scrvin.r,  ro  c:"n<.urc  rbt 
the  burden  of  such  payment  is  allo(ated  to 
Movistar  only. 
Certain  corrective  measures  have  already  been 
mentioned during bilateral  talks  with  the  Spanish 
Government: 
(i)  granting Airtel  M6vil  access  to  Telef6nica  de 
Espana's  TACS  900  customer database,  while 
maintaining  the  confidentiality  of  personal 
data; 
(ii)  revision  of the  tariff  conditions  on an  asym-
metrical  basis  for  interconnection  with  Tele-
f6nica de Espana's switched telephone network; 
(iii)  non-discriminatory  access  by  both  Telef6nica 
Servicios M6viles GSM service and Airtel M6vil 
to  the  same  number of GSM  frequencies  in-
cluding the acceleration of the liberalization of 
the  GSM  frequencies  currently  used  by  Tcle-
f6nica  de  Espana  for  its  analog  service; 
(iv)  extending  the  duration  of  Airtel  M6vil's 
concession  in  line  with  the  recent  Spanish 
decision regarding the cable television licences. 
Moreover,  the revocation  of the concession already 
granted to Airtel M6vil can in no circumstances be 
considered  to  be  an  appropriate  remedy  for  the 
breach.  It  would  eliminate  the  only  existing 
competitor to Telef6nica Servicios  M6viles on  the 
GSM  market and  the  monopoly enjoyed by Tele-
f6nica de Espana for analog mobile telephony and 
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GSM services during the period necessary for a new 
tendering  procedure  would  render  competition 
even  more  difficult  as  a  result  of  the  extra  time 
advantage. 
Article .90  (2). 
(30)  Article  90  (2)  of  the  Treaty  provides  that  under-
takings entrusted with  the operation of services of 
general  economic  interest  are  subject  to  the  rules 
on competition, in so far as the application of such 
rules  does not obstruct  the  performance,  in  law  or 
in fact. of the particular tasks assigned to them. The 
Spanish Government has  not  relied  on this  provi-
sion to justify imposing the initial  payment on the 
second  operator  alone. 
The .Commission considers, for  its  part, that in this 
case  a  derogation  under  Article  90  (2)  is  not 
warranted,  because  there  are  no  factors  to  support 
the conclusion  that the  initial  payment is  just;fie'~ 
by the performance in  law or in  fact  of a service of 
general  economic  interest. 
CONCLUSION 
(31}  In view of the foregoing. the Commission considers 
that  the  competitive  disadvantage  in  the  form  of 
the  initial  payment  imposed  on  the  second 
operator alone for  its concession  to operate a GSM 
network  in  Spain  constitutes  an  infringement  of 
Article  90  (1)  of  the  Treaty  read  in  conjunction 
with  Article  86, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION: 
Article  1 
Spain shall take the steps necessary to  remove the distor-
tion  of  competition  resulting  from  the  initial  payment 
imposed on Airtel  M6vil  SA  and  to secure  equal condi-
tions for operators of GSM radiotelephony on the Spanish 
market  by  24 April  1997  at  the  latest  by: 
(i)  reimbursing  the  initial  payment  imposed  on  Airtel 
M6vil,  or 
(ii)  adopting,  after  receiving  the  agreement  of  the 
Commission,  corrective  measures  equivalent  in 
economic terms to  the obligation  imposed  upon  the 
second  GSM  operator. 
The  measures  finally  adopted  shall  not  undermine  the 
competition  resulting  from  the  authorization  of  the 
second  GSM  operator on  29  December  I 994. 
Article  2 
Spain shall inform the Commission within three  months 
following notification of this Decision of the steps  it  has 
taken  to  comply  with  it. 
Article 3 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  Kingdom  of  Spain. 
Done  at  Brussels,  18  December  1996. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
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(Acts  whose  publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 12  February  1.9.97 
concerning the granting of additional implementation periods to Portugal for 
the  implementation  of  Commission  Directives  .90/j88/~EC  and  .96/2/EC  as 
regards  full  competition in  the telecommunications markets 
(Only the  Portuguese text is  authentic) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
(97  /31 0/BC) 
THE  COMMISSION  011 THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  establishing  the  Euro-
pean  Economic  Area, 
Having  regard  to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC of 
28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecom-
munications  services (1),  as  last  amended  by  Directive 
96/19/EC (2),  and  in  particular Article  2  (2)  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  Commission  Directive  96/2/EC of  16 
January  I 996  amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with 
regard  to mobile and  personal communications (l) and  in 
particular  Article  4  thereof, 
Having  given  notice (4)  to  interested  parties  to  submit 
their comments in  accordance  with  Article  2 (2)  of Dir-
ective  90/388/EEC and  Article  4  of  Directive  96/2/EC, 
( 1)  OJ No L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
(2)  OJ  No  L 74,  22.  3.  1996.  p.  13. 
(') OJ No L  20.  26.  1.  1996,  p.  59. 
(4)  OJ No C 189, 29. 6. 1996, p. 9 and OJ No C 260, 7. 9.  1996, 
P·  3. 
Whereas: 
(1) 
A.  THE FACfUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
I.  The requests of  the Portuguese Government 
Pursuant  to  Article  4  of  Directive  96/2/EC,  the 
Portuguese Government, by letter of  1  4 May  1  996, 
has  requested  the  following  implementation 
periods: 
- until  1 January 1998  as  to  the lifting of restric-
tions  on  operators  of  mobile  and  personal 
colllmunications  systems  with  regard  to  the 
establishment  of  own  infrastructure.  This 
de-restriction was  supposed to  be implemented 
without  delay  under Article  3  (c)  of  Directive 
90/388/EBC, 
- until  1 January 1999 as  regards the direct inter-
connection  of  mobile  telecommunications 
networks.  This  provision  was  supposed  to  be 
implemented without delay under Article  3 (d) 
of  Directive  90/388/EEC. 
The Portuguese  Government considers  these  addi-
tional  implementation·  periods  necessary  for  the 
following  reasons: 
1.1  As  regards  the  lifting of restrictions  on oper-
ators  of mobile  and  personal communications 
systems  with  regard  to  the  establishment  of 
own  infrastructure  and  the use  of  third  party 
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(2) 
(3) 
infrastructure, Portugal  states that .interconnec-
tion  circuits  leased  from  Portugal  Telecom 
generate  about  2 %  of  the  revenues  of  the 
latter. The loss of a part of those revenues (Esc 
7,423  billion  in  1997  on  a  turnover  of  more 
than  Esc  375 billion) could  have  implications 
for  the financing of the universal  service, since 
at  the  same  time  Portugal  Telecom  will  be 
affected  by  the  liberalization  of  satellite 
communications  and  of  the  provision  of 
services  to  dosed user groups. 
1.2  As  regards  the  right  of  mobile  operators  to 
interconnect  directly  with  foreign  networks, 
Portugal claims that the international tariffs of 
the  fixed  voice-telephony  service  of  Portugal 
Telecom are  still out of line with  costs. If  this 
right  was  to  be  implemented  without  delay, 
Portugal  Telecom  would  have  either  to  lower 
sharply  its  international- tariffs  (impact  estim-
ated  at  Esc  9,652  billion  in  J  997)  or lose  -
according to estimates - J 5 %  of its  interna-
tional fixed  traffic to the benefit of the mobile 
operators (i.e.  Esc  8,1 04 billion in  1997). More-
over,  it would  lose  the  revenues generated  by 
the  interconnection  of  the  mobile  networks 
with  foreign  networks  (Esc  5,519  billion  in 
1997). This could  also  have  negative  repercus-
sions on the financing of the universal service. 
The Portuguese  authorities  provided  a  description 
of the impact of the immediate implementation of 
Directive 96/2/EC. These elements are  attached to 
the letter of the  Portuguese  authorities  of  14  May 
1996. 
By  letter of 25 June 1996,  the Portuguese  author-
ities  have  furthermore  requested  the  following 
implementation periods pursuant to Article 2 (2) of 
Directive  90/388/BEC: 
- until 1 january 2000 as  regards the abolition of 
the  exclusive  rights  currently  granted  to 
Portugal  Telecom  as  regards  the  provision  of 
voice-telephony  and  the  underlying  network 
infrastructure. This provision  is supposed to be 
implemented  before  I  January  1998  under 
Article  2  (2)  of  Directive  90/388/EEC, 
- until  1  July  1999  as  regards  the  lifting  of 
restrictions on the provision  of already  liberal-
ized  telecommunications services  on: 
(a)  networks established  by the provider of the 
telecommunications  service; 
(b)  infrastructures provided by  third parties; and 
(c)  the sharing of  networks, other facilities and 
sites. 
Those  provas1ons  were  to  be  implemented  before 
1 July 1996,  according to  Article  2 (2),  third para-
graph of  Directive 90/388/EEC. They do not refer 
to the cable TV infrastructures, regulated by Article 
4  of  the  same  Directive. 
The Portuguese  Government considers  these addi-
tional  implementation  periods  necessary  for  the 
following  reasons: 
3.1  Portugal  Telecom  earns  about  6 %  of  its  rev-
enues from  the  provision  of  leased  circuits (in 
199 5  Esc  23  billion  out  of  a  turnover  of  Esc 
393  billion).  The  immediate  lifting  ~f restric-
tions  on  the  use  of  alternative  infrastructures 
could  lead  to  a  loss  of  Esc  24 _billion  over  a 
period of five  years,  resulting from  a substitu-
tion effect (loss of customers to the providers of 
alternative networks) and a revenue effect (need 
to  reduce  tariffs  to  remain  co~petitive). This 
loss could have implications on the level of the 
financing of  the  universal  service, since at the 
same time Portugal Telecom will be affected by 
the  liberalization  of  sateUite  communications 
and  of  the  provision  of seiVices  to  closed user 
groups; 
i 
.  3.2  rrelecom Portugal  ai~lS to  rebalance completely 
the voice-telephony tariffs. This rebalancing is 
1partly guaranteed by the present price conven-
tion, in force until 1998, via a real reduction of 
,the  global  level  of  prices and increases at  the 
rate  of  inflation  of  6 %  for  the  tariffs  below 
costs.  Further  structural  adjustments  are 
required  in order to  enable  Portugal  Telecom 
~o function  effectively  in  a  fully  competitive 
market and there is a need to complete studies 
to  assess  whether it is  necessary  to  adjust  this 
approach for  the  period from  1998  to 2000 so 
that at that date the tariff rebalancing would be 
complete. 
(4)  Further  details  were  provided  during  a  bilateral 
meeting held in  Brussels on 18 June 1996 and in a 
subsequent  letter  of  the  Portuguese  authorities 
dated 30 July 1996. The issue was  again  discussed 
during bilateral meetings held in Strasbourg on 12 
November and  in  Brussels on  18  November 1996 
and  in  a  subsequent  facsimile  transmission  from 
'the  Portuguese  authorities  dated  22  November 
1996. 
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(5) 
II.  111e  cotnnJCIIis received 
Four  undertakings  and  assoc1at10ns  provided 
comments  following  the  notice  published  by  the 
Commission  on  29  June  1996. 
As  regards the lifting of restrictions on operators of 
mobile and personal communications systems with 
regard  to  the  establishment  of  own  infrastructure, 
the  majority  of  comments: 
- state that there is  no justification for granting a 
derogation  in  order  to  allow  the  Portuguese 
Government  tu  snfegu;mf  itself  iiRuinst  tht< 
effects  of  implementinp, Commission  Dirct:tivc 
94/46/EC  of  13  October  1994 (
1
)  concerning 
satellite  communications and  of  the  liberaliza-
tion  of  non-reserved  services  including  voice 
services for Closed  User Groups fCUGs') under 
Directive  90/388/EEC  that  should  have  taken 
effec_t years ago. It is  noted that neither satellite 
communications  services  nor  non-reserved 
serv~ces,  including  CUG,  would  replace  any 
sufficient  amount of  traffic  originating or  ter-
minating on  the GSM  networks, as  neither are 
suited  for  this  purpose, 
- state  that  it  is  not  reasonable  to  assume  that 
both  GSM  operators  would  cancel  all  their 
leased  lines in  1997, given  that it takes  several 
years to  build an  alternative network or for  new 
entrants  truly  to  be  able  to  compete  with 
Portugal  Telecom.  The  estimated  losses  are 
therefore unnecessarily high. A comment refers 
to  a  study  showing  that  if  Portugnl  Telecom 
were  to  match  prices  of  competing  networks 
(competition  effect)  rather  than  keep  high 
prices (substitution effect), the negative financial 
impact on  Portugal  Telecom  of  the  Directive 
would  be  only equivalent to  1,3 %  of  revenue 
instead  of  15 %  as  stated  by  the  Portuguese 
authorities. Furthermore, comments pointed out 
that GSM  operators bring in  new traffic  rather 
than  replace  Portugal  Telecom's  traffic  in  the 
short  term, 
- claim  that  the  majority  of  the  statistics 
presented in  the Portuguese submission do  not 
take  into  account  all  relevant  information.  In 
particular it was mentioned that the calculations 
do  not account  for  the  companies  within  the 
Portugal  Telecom  Group  wl!o  will  benefit, 
rather than suffer,  from  the  Directive.  In  light 
(1)  OJ No L  268,  19.  10.  1994,  p.  15. 
of  this,  the  stated  impact  should  be  reduced 
greatly. 
As  regards  the  right of mobile  operators  to  inter-
connect directly with  foreign  networks, comments: 
- note that the analysis by the Portuguese author-
ities,  which  argues  that  direct  interconnection 
will  force  Portugal Telecom  to  lower  its  tariffs 
sharply  or also  lose  15 %  of  its  international 
fixed  traffic  to  competitors, does  not take  into 
account  the  decrease  in  costs,  as  well  as  the 
increase  in  usage,  both  which  would  greatly 
lower  the  impact  on  Portugal  Telecom, 
- state,  in  reply  to  the  Portuguese  authorities' 
argument  that  mobile  operators  will  reduce 
Portugal  Telecom's  international  traffic,  that it 
is  highly unlik~ly that users (most of whom are 
business  users)  will  use  their GSM  in  place  of 
the  PSTN  for  international  calls, 
- claim  that Portugal Telecom should be able to 
offer  a  reduction  of at  least  30 %  on  interna-
tional  tariffs.  These  discounts  are  supposedly 
already  given  to  various  large  end-users.  In 
addition, comments suggest that bulk discounts 
for mobile operators would create a fairer envir-
onment,  allowing  competing mobile  operators 
companies  to  offer  international  tariffs  which 
are  more  in  line  with  the  international  fixed 
voice-telephony  tariffs  that  Portugal  Telecom 
offers.  Currently,  G.SM  operators  are  charged 
nearly 100% of Portugal Telecom's retail inter-
national  call  rate (l). One comment shows  that 
this  decrease  in  tariffs  would  not greatly affect 
Portugal  Telecom's  ability  to  operate,  and 
would  bring the benefits  that come with  lower 
prices, 
- generally  agree  that  the  actual  impact  on 
Universal Service would be  in fact,  negligible. It 
is  noted  that  the  only figures  included  in  the 
documentation  offered  by  the  Government 
were the level of investment needed to fulfil the 
UnivCl'Sal  Service  Obligation  fUSO').  The 
evidence of a growing revenue that is generated 
from  these  investments . (installation  fees, 
monthly fees,  incoming calls,  inherent promo-
tion of Portugal Telecom's services) was  absent, 
as  was  the new technology used to implement 
the  USO  in  a  more  cost-efficient  manner. 
Comments  suggest  the  EC  concept  of  a 
(1)  GSM operators get a discount of Esc  16,4 per minute (no mat-
ter  where  the  call  is  placed). 
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(6) 
Universal  Service  fund  to  pay  for  any discrep-
ancy in providing the USO instead of imposing 
restrictions  on  the  mobile  operators  could  be 
used.  It  is  also  stressed  that  an  accounting 
system should he set up in order to estimate the 
cost of provision of the USO. Current estimates 
arc  not,  accordinR  to  the  comments,  reliable, 
- state  that  a  derogation  in  this  area  will  only 
delay  the  development  of  transborder  mobile 
communications and restrict growth and devel-
opment  in  the  mobile  market  which  has 
provided  employment  and  other  economic 
benefits  in  countries  where  early,  unrestricted 
competition  has  ht•t•n  allowed. 
By  letter dated  20  August  1996,  the Commission 
transmitted  to  the  Portuguese  authorities  the  four 
comments of these third parties, received  following 
the  publication of the  Commission's notice in  the 
Official journal of the European Communities on 
29 June t 996. The Commission invited the Portu-
guese  authorities  to  comment  on  the  third-party 
submissions. 
Seven  undertakings  and  associations  provided 
comments  following  the  notice  published  by the 
Commission on  7  September  J  996.  One of  those 
undertakinRs  nevertheless  informed  the  Commis-
sion  by  lt·tter datC"d  I H Novemhcr 1996  that  some 
of  its  comments  may  not  be  in  line  with  the 
t·urrent  situation  in  Portugal,  Riven  that  Portugal 
Telecom  was  intending  to  apply  cost-oriented 
interconnection  tariffs  for  international  calls. 
As  regards  the  abolition  of  the  exclusive  rights 
currently  granted  to  Portugal  Telecom  for  the 
provision  of  voice-telephony  and  the  underlying 
network  infrastructure  and,  further,  the  lifting  of 
restrictions  on  the  provision  of  certain  already 
liberalized telecommunications services, comments: 
- stress that the dominant position of the incum-
bent  public  telephone  operator should  not be 
reinforced by allowing it alone to invest heavily 
in  those  infrastructures  (such  as  cable)  which 
should be  the main alternative carriers of tele-
communications services. Comments state  that 
.there  is_  no need to protect an undertaking with 
more than a 90 % share of the telecommunica-
tions  markets and which  makes higher profits 
(a  profit  margin  after  tax  and  depreciation  of 
Esc 50 billion in  1996 which is a 40 % increase 
on  that  in  199.~ than  Br~tish Telecom, France 
Telecom,  TelcDanmnrk  and  AT&T.  It  is 
obvious  that  the  i"ncreased  efficiency  brought 
about  by  opening  the  market  will  benefit 
consumers  and  the  Portuguese  economy  as  a 
whole.  Comments  state  that  the  Portuguese 
authorities  might  be  confusing  the  public  in-
terest  with  the  interests  of  Portugal  Telecom. 
Any significant negative effects on the revenue 
of Portugal Telecom brought about by the full 
implementation  of  the  Directives  can  only 
mean  that  until  now  Portugal  TelecQm  has 
been allowed  to  impose excessive  prices for  its 
services  at  the expense  of  other parties  in  the 
market and consumers. Comments question the 
basic  assumption  that  losses  will  be  inevitably 
suffered  by  Portugal  Telecom  and  that  these 
losses  will  inevitably  lead  to  a  deterioration  of 
services.  Further,  it  is  argued  that  the  Portu-
guese  Government  has  assumed  too  high  an 
elasticity  of  demand  in  terns  of  prices.  TI1c 
comments  question  whether  it  is  sufficient  to 
rely  on  historical  figures  in  this  fast  growing 
market. Finally, any current price  control exer-
cised  by  the  Portuguese  authorities  is  · not 
realistic  or sufficient. 
- state  that  the  usa could  be  fulfilled  by  new 
entrants  into  the  market  and  that  the  Portu-
guese  authorities  have  always  emphasised  thar 
this  will  be  the  t.:asc.  Comments  argue  thai 
competition will  lead  to lower costs and thus a 
lower cost  for  the  USO.  Comments  point out 
that.  as  it  stands,  Portugal  Telecom  receives 
State subsidies for certain advanced services and 
ultimately  enjoys  the  marketing  advantage  of 
being the universal supplier. Further it is stated 
that' European  Regional  Development  Funds 
have been used to assist in  the fulfilment of the 
USO.- Comments state  that  it  is  impossible  to 
assess·  fully  estimates  given.  by  the  Portuguese 
authorities  due  to  the  lack  of  a  transparent 
accounting  procedure.  Most  comments  stress 
that the likely losses  quoted by the Portuguese 
authorities  appear  exaggerated.  It  is  very  un-
likely that Portugal Telecom will  lose all  of its 
leased-line customers as  many leased-line users 
are  subsidiaries  of  Portugal  Telecom. 
Comments  state  that  any  general  decrease  in 
revenues suffered by Portugal Telecom, if at all, 
will generate increased revenues in these subsi-
diaries.  By  way  of  example  it  is  stated  that 
Telepac  has  75%  of  the  datacoms  market, 
TMN  has  50 %  of  the  mobile  market, 
Contactel  and  TLM  have  67 %  of the  paging 
market.  TV  Cabo  has  75%  of  the  cable  TV 
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market and Radiom6vel has 70 % of the trunk-
inp,  market.  Portugal  Telecom  dearly  has  a 
monopoly  position  in  the  public  voice-
telephony  market  where  the  bulk  of  its  rev-
enues are generated. This  provides  the bulk of 
the funds for the USO rather than any revenues 
generated  from  leased  lines, 
- stress  that  Portugal  Telecom  is  profitable  and 
succeeding  well  financially.  Comments  state 
that profits showed an increase of 70 % in 1995 
whilst  tariffs  decreased.  The  share  price  of 
Portugal Telecom has  outperformed that of the 
general index in  Portugal and in  the US,  where 
Portugal  Telecom  is  quoted  on  the  New York 
Stock  Exchange,  its  February  1996 _price  was 
US$ 22,375 as  compared to its  launch price of 
US$ 18,275. A strategic partner is being sought 
to  position  Portugal  Telecom  in  the  market 
following  the  next  stage  of privatization  which 
is  hcin1~  prepared, 
- state  that  the  Portuguese  authorities  have 
misjudged  the  need  to  rebalance  the  tariffs  of 
voice-telephony.  It  would  appear  that  the 
average  cost of a local  call  in  Portugal  is  com-
parable  to  that  in  the  UK, Belgium,  Denmark 
and Austria but is  higher than that in Germany 
and  the  Netherlands.  On  the  other land,  the 
cost of a long-distance call is  43 % higher than 
the  European  average.  However,  comments 
stress that this comparison is  potentially flawed 
and cannot be  verified.  Local  calls  in  Portugal 
are  defined  as  calls  within  a  5-km  radius 
(whereas  in  the UK for example  it  is  a  30-km 
radius).  Further, in  Portugal  the unit compared 
is  three.minutes, which  is  longer than  in  other 
Member States. Arguably,  there  is  no need  for 
rebalancing as  tariffs simply need to be reduced 
in  all  sectors. If any  rebalancing is  required  it 
was,  in  any  case,  an  inevitable  result  of  the 
liberalization  process.  The comments continue 
that without a transparent accounting process, it 
is  impossible  properly  to  evaluate  the  Portu-
guese  authorities'  submissions, 
- state  that  for  2  Mbs  circuits  over  100  km, 
Portugal Telecom's prices  are  2,6  times greater 
than  those  of  British  Telecom.  Comments 
argue  that this differential  is  clearly not based 
on cost.  Further,  it  is  stated  that Council  Dir-
ective  92/44/EEC of  5  June  1992  on  the  ap-
plication  of open  network  provision  to  leased 
lines(!)  has  not  been  properly  adopted  into 
Portuguese law as otherwise prices would clearly 
( 1)  OJ No  L  165,  19.  6.  1992,  p.  27. 
(7) 
have come down. The comments argue that thc 
inability  of  Portugal , Telecom  to  match  the 
services  which  would  be  provided  by  compet-
itors on alternative infrastructure is  no reason to 
prevent  competitors  from  operating  in  the 
market.  In  addition,  the  wmmcnts  point  out 
that Portugal Telecom is  dominant in  the cable 
1V market which  is  one of the  best alternative 
telecommunications  infrastructures.  Any  de-
rogation as  requested by the Portuguese author-
ities  would  reinforce  that  position. 
By· letter dated  29  November  1996,  the  Commis-
sion  transmitted  to  the  Portuguese  authorities  the 
comments of these 7 third parties,  received  follow-
ing the publication  of  the Commission's notice of 
7  September  1996.  The  Commission  invited  the 
Portuguese  authorities  to  comment  on  the  third 
party  submissions. 
III.  Response of the Portuguese Government 
By letter of 3 October 1996, the Portuguese author-
ities  transmitted  their first  reply  to  the comments 
of  the  third  parties,  transmitted  by  letter  of  20 
August  1996. 
Therein, they emphasized  that  no  licence  fee  had 
been  requested  to  the  GSM  operators  in  Portugal 
(except  a  compensation  for  the  licensing  process) 
and  that  therefore  GSM  operators  could  afford  to 
continue to  pay  for  the  usage  of  the  infrastructure 
of  Portugal  Telecom.  Notwithstanding  this  addi-
tional  cost,  the GSM  operators  have,  according  to 
the Portuguese authorities, reached a  market pene-
tration  placing Portugal in  the sixth  position in  the 
EU. 
Subsequently, in its facsimile  transmission dated 22 
November  1996,  Portugal  repeated  that alternative 
infrastructure operators would  be able  to  undercut 
Portugal  Telecom's leased-line  prices  by 50 %  for 
interconnection  circuits  and  that  providers  of 
liberalized telecommunications services would only 
lease  10 %  of  the  lines  that  they  need  from 
Portugal  Telecom. Portugal  adds  that the decrease 
in demand would be immediate because capacity is 
already installed by public utilities, except at a local 
level.  The  Portuguese  authorities  estimated  that 
increased  competition  would  decrease  Portugal 
Telecom's revenues by Esc  2 billion  per annum as 
a  result  of  competitors'  decreased  costs  derived 
from  the  leasing  of  alternative  infrastructure  at 
lower  prices. 
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Portugal  continued  that,  if  in  the  alternative, 
PortUJ~ial Tclc<.:orn  rt'du<.:ed  substantially the price of 
inter<:onncction  leased  circuits  to  maintain  its 
market share  at  an  estimated  80 %,  then  Portugal 
Telecom  would  lose  revenue  of  Esc  14  billion  in 
this  sector. 
By  feller  d;1ted  3  Janucuy  1997,  the  Portuguese 
authorities sent  ohscrv;1tions  supporting their posi-
tion  on  the  second  set  of  <:omments  of  the  third 
parties.  These  obserVations  were  received  by  the 
Commission  on  I 7  January  I 997. 
IV.  Article 4 of  Directive .96/2/EC snd Article 
2  (2)  of Directive ..90/38811-.'EC 
(H)  Under Article 4 of Directive 96/l/EC and Article 2 
(l) of Directive 90/388/EEC the Commission shall 
grant, upon request, to a number of Member States 
the  right  to  derogate  from  the  dates  set  out  in 
Directive  90/388/EEC  and · to  maintain  during 
additional time periods, the exclusive rights granted 
to undertakings to which they entrust the provision 
of a  public telecommunications network and tele-
communications  services  in  so  far  as  these 
measures  are  necessary  to  carry out  the  structural 
adjustments and strictly to the extent necessary for 
those adjustments. The application of the exception 
in  Artide 90 (l) of  the  EC Treaty in  the  tclccom-
munications  sector  has  thus  been  specified  in 
Directive  90/JHH/EEC  modified  by  Directive 
96/l/EC  with  regard  to  mobile  and  personal 
communiu1tions  and  Din·c:tiVl'  96/19/EC  with 
regard  to  full  compt'tition  111  the  tcl<·c:onumanil:a-
tions  markets. 
As regards the provision of public telecommunica-
tions services and networks, it appears that Portugal 
Telecom  is  entrusted  with  a  service  of  general 
economic  interest  pursuant  to  Section  III  of  its 
Public  Service  Telecommunications  Concession 
approved  by  Decree-Law  No  40/95  of  15  Febru-
ary (1).  Under  its  concession  contract,  Portugal 
Telecom  has  a  universal  service  obligation  in 
respect  of  the  provision  of  fixed  telephone,  telex, 
telegraphy  and  data  transmission  services.  These 
tasks  must  he  implemented  in  terms  of  'equality 
and continuity' (1)  irrespective of the specific situa-
tions  or  the  degree  of  economic  profitability  of 
each individual operation. The Concession provides 
that, upon  liberalization  of the  provision of  public 
switched telephone services, Portugal Telecom may 
(')  DR  I  ~ric A  No 39/9  S of  I .5  February  199.5  as  amended  in 
DR  I  SCrit·  A  No  .50/95  of  28  February  1995. 
(l)  As  stated in  the definition of  universal  service in Article  I  (o) 
of  Portugal  Telecom's  Public  Telecommunications  Service 
concession. 
be compensated for its universal service obligations 
in  a  number of ways,  including tariff mechanisms, 
EU  funding  programmes  applicable  to  universal 
service  obligations,  deductions  from  the  annual 
concession  fee  (I  %  on  turnover)  payable  to  the 
Portuguese  authorities  and  through  the  establish-
ment of a Fund financed  by Portugal Telecom and 
other telecommunications operators. Currently, the 
financing method u~ed is  by applying higher prices 
to most of the users in ordl'f to finance those tariffs 
which  arc  below  <:ost. 
Owing to  the absence of  the implementation of an 
adequate cost accounting method, Portugal did not 
provide  precise  figures  on  the  cost  of  universal 
service  but only a gross estimate of Esc  HI  billion 
for  the  investment  as  a  whole  (taking  account  of 
the depreciation  rates (') used  by Portugal Telecom, 
the Commission will  therefore assume in  its assess-
ment that this  total  investment corresponds  to  an 
annual burden around Esc  I 5 billion, i.e.  one third 
of  the  net  profits  of  Portugal  Telecom  in  199  5). 
The cost of universal  service  provision  in Portugal 
encompasses  not  only  investment  costs  but  also 
operating costs,  including maintenance costs.  Part 
of this burden was  moreover subsidized by the EC 
in the framework of the grants received by Portugal 
Telecom for the development of its  network under 
the  Proter,  STAR,  Telematique  and  Thermic 
programs  as  well  as  loans  from  the  European 
Investment  Bank.  The  granting  of  this  aid  was, 
however, not directly linked to the cost of universal 
service. 
(9)  Under the  Directive, the question which falls  to ht• 
considered  is  therefore  the  extent  to  which  the 
requested  temporary  exclusion  of  all  competition 
from other economic operators is 'warranted by the 
need  to  carry  out  the  structural  adjustments  and 
strictly  only  to  the  extent  necessary  for  those 
adjustments'. 
The starting point of such  examination  is  that the 
obligation on an  undertaking entrusted with a  task 
of general economic interest to perform its services 
in conditions of economic equilibrium presupposes 
that  it  will  he  possible  to  offset  less  profitabk 
sectors  against  the  profitable  sectors  and  hence 
justifies a restriction of competition from individual 
undertakings  where  the  economically  profitable 
sectors  are  concerned.  Indeed,  to  authorize  indi-
vidual  undertakings to compete with  the holder of 
the exclusive  rights  in  the  sectors  of their choice, 
would make it  possible for  them to concentrate on 
(1)  Portugal  Telecom  Prospectus,  May  I 996,  p.  76. 
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the economically profitable operations and to offer 
more  advantageous  tariffs  than  those  charged  by 
the holder of  the exclusive  rights since, unlike the 
latter,  they are  not bound  for  economic reasons  to 
offset  losses  in  the  unprofitable  sectors  against 
profits  in  the  more  profitable  sectors. 
Directive 90/388/EEC therefore granted a tempor-
ary  exemption  under  Article  90  (2)  in  respect  of 
speci:tl  and  exclusive  rights  for  the  provision  of 
voic.:e-tdcphony.  This  wus  het:ause  finuncial 
rcsourt:cs  for  th<"  dcvdoprnent  of  the  public  tele-
communications  network  still  derive  mainly  from 
the  voice-telephony  service.  The  opening  of  the 
voice-telephony  market  to  competition  could,  at 
that time, obstruct  the  performance  of  the  task  of 
general economic interest and development of  the 
network assigned to the telecommunications organ-
izations. Restrictions on competition are only justi-
fied  as  regards  services  which,  by  their nature  and 
the conditions in  which they would be offered in a 
competitive  market,  would  compromise  the 
economic  equilibrium  of  the  provision  of  the 
service  of general  economic interest or affect  it  in 
some other way.  For this reason  the restrictions on 
the provision  of such  services can  only be  granted 
if substantive evidence is provided of such impact. 
(10)  Some  comments  mention  that  in  practice  new 
entrants could also contribute to  the relevant  tasks 
of  general  economic  interest.  The exception  aims 
indeed to  prote<.·t  the fulfilment of a task  of general 
economic interest and not to shelter specific under-
takings.  In  the  short  term,  however,  Portugal 
Telecom will  continue to  be  the only undertaking 
providing a  universal  public  telephony network in 
Portugal.  For  this  reason,  the  Commission 
examined  the  additional  implementation  periods 
requested  to  determine  whether  their granting  is 
necessary  to  allow  Portugal  Telecom  to  perform 
this  task of general economic interest and to  have 
the  benefit  of  economically  acceptable  conditions 
whilst  the  necessary  structural  adjustments  are 
made. 
B.  LEGAL  ASSESSMENT 
I.  Request lor sn additions/ implementation 
period regarding the lilting of  restrictions 
on  the  direct  interconnection  of n1obile 
teleconJnJunicstions networks 
Assessment of the  impact of the  immediate 
lifting of restrictions 
.Arguments  provided  by  the  Portuguese  Govern-
ment 
(II)  Portugal  considers  an  additional  implementation 
period  for  the direct international  interconnection 
of mobile networks to be necessary to avoid under-
mining the provision of national and international 
voice-telephony. 
Portugal  requests  first  that  the  effect  of  the  dif-
ferent  stages  of liberalization  be  deferred  to  allow 
Portugal  Telecom  to  assimilate  all  the  con-
sequences,  without  the  disturbances  which  would 
put  normnl  ~fevelopment  nt  risk.  Portugal 
announces that  1t  has approved satellite communi-
cations  under  Directive  94/46/EC  and  voice 
services  for  dosed  user  groups  under  Directive 
90/388/EEC.  It  ·estimates  the  impact  of  these 
measures  on  the  turnover  of  Portugal  Telecom at 
around Esc  11  billion  per annum, resulting from  a 
sizable  reduction  in  the  Portugal  Telecom  leased-
lines tariffs required to remain competitive with the 
new  alternatives  provided. 
This impact must, according to  Portugal, be added 
to  the loss of revenue which would  result from the 
· immediate  implementation  of  the  Directive 
96/2/EC  as  regards  direct  international  intercon-
nection:  Esc  50  billion  in  accumulated  terms. 
Currently,  Portugal  allows  direct  interconnection 
neither between the two  Portuguese GSM operators, 
nor between  those  operators  and  foreign  fixed  or 
mobile  networks.  This  restriction  is,  according  to 
Portugal, necessary because  the tariffs for the fixed 
telephone  network  are  not yet  cost-oriented.  The 
revenue  related  to  the interconnection was  around 
Esc  8,5  billion  in  1995.  If mobile  networks  were 
permitted  to  interconnect  freely,  it  would  be 
possible for  a GSM operator in Portugal to connect 
to  a  fixed  network or mobile  network  in  another 
State and to obtain delivery prices for international 
calls  close  to  the  (lower)  interconnection  rates 
applying  in  that  country.  Mobile  operators  could 
thus  offer  lower  tariffs  to  their  GSM  subscribers 
than  Portugal  Telecom.  If Portugal  Telecom  did 
not follow the reduction in prices, Portugal assumes 
that  it  would  not  only  lose  all  mobile-to-mobile 
and  mobile-to-foreign  network  traffic  but  also 
15 %  of  its  fixed  voice-telephony  traffic  to  the 
mobile operators, which would correspond to a loss 
of  Esc  27  billion  in  tkle  period  1996  to  2000,  or 
alternatively,  if  Portugal  Telecom  decreased  its 
international  tariffs,  the  loss  of  revenue  would 
correspond to a loss of Esc 25 billion in the period. 
However, Portugal confirms that the rebalancing of 
tariffs will continue independently from the imple-
mentation  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  as  amended. 
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(12) 
(13) 
In  addition,  Portugal  stresses a  possible  impact of 
the  immediate  implementation  of  direct  interna-
tional  interconnection  of  the  international  fixed 
voice-telephony  traffic,  i.e.  on  a  part  of  the  rev-
enues  which  the  Commission  considers  necessary 
for  the  finam:in~ of  the  USO.  h  ar~ucs that  the 
wrrcnt  intenational  mobile  tariffs  of  Esc  163  per 
minute could  he  lowered  to  Esc  I 00 (')  us  reR:mls 
culls  to  the  rest  of  Europe. As  rep,ards  t:alls  to the 
rest  of  tlu· world, prin.·s would rcm:tin around 60 % 
higher, hut  <:ould  h<"  lowt"l't·d  in  <:omparison  to  the 
current  t:harges  amounting  to  Esc  260  up  to  Esc 
490  per minute.  In  t·ornparison  the  fixed  interna-
tional  telephone  tariffs  (pcnk  rates)  of  Portugal 
Telecom arc (April  1996) Esc  112 per minute to the 
EU,  Esc  149  to  the rest  of  Europe, Esc  164  to  the 
USA,  Esc  183  to  Canada  and  Esc  237  to  Brazil. 
According  to  the  Portuguese  request,  Portugal 
Telecom would lose  15% of its international fixed 
voice-telephony  traffic  to  mobile  operators  from 
1997  onwards,  if it  docs  not  lower  its  prices  to 
compete effectively with  the potential international 
tariffs of the mohile operators. The resulting annual 
loss of revenut- would amount to  Esc  8,104 billion. 
Conversely  Portu~~al  Telecom  could  maintain  its 
share  of  tntHil'  hy  Jowerin~ its  international  fixed 
voice-telephony tariffs. The resulting loss  would  be 
Esc  9,6S2  billion  in  1997. 
Assessment  by  the  Commission 
First,  the.  Commission  cannot  consider  the  late 
implementation  of  previous  EC  Directives  as 
reason  for  delaying  the  implementation  of  other 
Directives.  The  impact  of  the  immediate  imple-
mentation  of Commission  Directives  on  the  per-
formance  of  tasks  of  general  economic  interest 
must  nevertheless  he  assessed,  taking  into account 
the  economic  conditions  in  which  Portugal 
Telecom  is  providing  this  service.  The  impact  of 
the  implementation  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  as 
amended  inttr alia by  Directive 94/46/EC would, 
according  to  the  Portuguese  authorities,  have 
brought  about  a  reduction  of  Portugal  Telecom's 
(')  This  assumption  is  based  o_n  the  average  of the _'acc?unting 
rates shares  charged by Brit•sh  ~elecom for  handl~ng mtema-
tional  traffic,  i.e.  Esc  35  per  mmute.  If the  mobile  operator 
were to transfer 75% of the saving to the final  consumer the 
end-user price would be  Esc  115 per minute (letter of 30 July 
1996,  p.  9). 
(14) 
leased-lined  tariffs  and  revenues  and  is  therefore 
linked to the impact of the lifting of restrictions on 
operators of mobile and  personal  communications 
systems  with  regard  to  the  establishment  of  own 
infrastructure. The effect  of  leased-lines  tariff  and 
revenue  reductions  hy  Portup,nl  Telecom  on  its 
ability to provide universal service will  be  examined 
in  tht~  framework  of  the  ussessmcnt  o(  the  midi 
tion11l  implementation  pt·riod  n·qucslcd  rdntinJ~ lo 
tilt·  implcnH.·ntntion  of  Artidt"  ]  (t")  of  l>in.·rtivt• 
90/.lHH/EEC. 
In its additional submission of 22 November 1996, 
Portugal stated that after the full implementation of 
Directive 96/2/EC, the Portuguese mobile operators 
will  have  the  opportunity  of  interconnecting 
directly with  public service  telephone networks  in 
other countries, thus  by~passing Portugal Telecom's 
services  and  infrastructure.  Under  this  scenario, 
mobile  operators  would  pay  a  termination  fee  to 
the foreign fixed  telephone operators instead of the 
amount  they  now  pay  to  Portugal  Telecom  (Esc 
106  per  minute  in  the  case  of  European  calls, 
corresponding  to  the  normal  public  service  tele-
phone network rate minus Est·  19,20 per minute). 
Portugal  submits  that  an  average  termination  fcc 
for  European calls is  Esc  35 per minute. Currently, 
mobile _operators  charge  Esc  164  per  minute  for 
international calls. This is  made up of an intercon-
nection fee  payable to Portugal Telecom of Esc  I 06 
per minute leaving the sum of operating costs and 
profit  margin  at Esc  58  per minute. To  reach  an 
estimation  of  the  price  of  European  calls  that 
mobile operators would charge  after liberalization, 
Portugal added the operational costs of Esc  58  per 
minute, the costs  of  the determination  fee  of  Esc 
35 per minute, and the costs of half of the interna-
tional  transmission  belonging  to  the  originating 
country. According  to  the  International Telecom-
munications  Union's  D300R  Recommendation 
(feurem), this would  amount to  -1 0 %  of  the  total 
price. The approximate  total  cost  would  therefore 
he  Es<:  100  per  minute. 
(1.5)  As  regards  the  sul>stitutabili.ty  between  fixed  and 
mobile telephone services, the Commission has, in 
recent  cases,  come  to  the  conclusion  that  such 
substitutability  is  not substantial, given  that  these 
services  correspond  to  different  categories  of 
demand,  which  are  reflected  inter  alia  in  the 
higher tariffs of GSM-mobile telephony in compar-
ison  to  voice-telephony. 
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Nevertheless,  in  Portugal,  the  main  market 
segment  for  GSM-operators  is  the  segment  of 
national calls. Moreover it appears that at  least half 
the costs of mobile operators in  handling calls  are 
traffic-insensitive costs. It cannot therefore be  ruled 
out  that  a  mobile  operator,  in  order  to  increase 
overall  turnover,  usage  of  its  network  and  market 
share,  would  allot  a  higher  share  of  these  traffic-
insensitive costs to  national calls and offer interna-
tional  tariffs  which  arc  at  the  same  level  as  the 
current  international  tariffs  of  Portugal  Telecom. 
The  number  of  GSM  customers  in  Portugal  is 
currently  estimated  at  approximately  600 000  and 
as  this market grows,  there  is  more scope  for  cus-
tomers  to  be  encouraged  to  substitute  fixed  voice 
international traffic  for  mobile international traffic. 
(16)  As  regards  the  estimates  provided  by  Portugal 
regarding losses which the immediate implementa-
tion  of international  direct  interconnection  would 
imply, the Commission notes, as various comments 
emphasize,  that the  mobile  telephone  market is  a 
new  and  growing  market,  from  which  Portugal 
Telecom  already  derives  additional  revenues  from 
completion of calls originated from  mobile phones. 
The  profitability  of  Portugal  Telecom's  fixed 
voice-telephony service  does  not depend on these 
additional  revenues.  The  mobile  operators 
generated an additional turnover of  Esc  8,5  billion 
for  Portugal  Telecom,  in  excess  of  the  Esc  301,5 
billion earned on the fixed to fixed voice-telephony 
service. 
(17)  Nevertheless, the Commission agrees that it cannot 
be ruled out, in the short term, in the case of direct 
interconnection  of  mobile  networks  with  foreign 
networks,  that  fixed  international  telephone  calls 
could  be  replaced  by  international  GSM  calls. 
Furthermore, the losses  resulting from  such substi-
tution  would  not  necessarily  be  compensated  by 
the  additional  revenues  generated  for  Portugal 
Telecom by the growth of the GSM  market. Indeed, 
this  would  affect  one  of  the  voice-telephony 
segments which is currently the most profitable for 
Portugal Telecom, i.e. international calls, and could, 
in addition to  the impact of  the  lifting of  restric-
tions on alternative networks for liberalized services 
from  I  of July 1997, reduce its overall  profitability 
to such an extent that it would no longer be able to 
provide  a  universal  service  under  economically 
acceptable  conditions.  This  conclusion  would  be 
different if  Portugal were  not to  lift the restictions 
on  the  use  of  own  and  alternative  network  infra-
structure  for  the  provision  of  liberalized  telecom-
munications  services. 
This  risk  will,  however,  decrease  as  Portugal 
Telecom reduces  its  international  tariffs.  Therefore 
the argument of  the  Portuguese  authorities can  be 
accepted  for  the  duration  requested.  Taking  into 
account the planned tariff rebalancing, the threat of 
substitution  of  fixed  by  GSM  calls  only  justifies  a 
derogation  until  at  the  latest  the  end  of  1998 
which  is  the  date  by which  international  tariffs  of 
Portugal  Telecom  should  already  have  been  suffi-
ciently  reduced  to  rule  out  substitution  by  GSM-
mobile calls. A liberalization of international inter-
connection of, mobile networks at least one year in 
advance of the full  liberalization of voice-telephony 
will  furthermore  provide  a  strong  incentive  in 
favour  of  timely  implementation  of  the  gradual 
rebalancing  envisaged. 
Development  of trade 
(18)  The effects  of  the  delayed  liberalization  of  direct 
international  interconnection  of  mobile  operators 
will  be on the second GSM  operator and, whenever 
they  are  licensed  in  the  ncar  future,  the  future 
DCS-1800  operators.  The  possibility  of  intercon-
. necting  direct  with  other  operators  would  be  a 
significant factor  in  facilitating  their establishment 
and development in  the  Portuguese  market. More-
over,  the  additional  implementation  period  will 
also affect foreign  carriers, since it will  make more 
cumbersome and costly the  handing-over of traffic 
for  call  termination  by  the  Portuguese  mobile 
operators. 
(19)  This  adverse  effect  on  the  development  of  trade 
between  Member  States  would  nevertheless  be 
reduced if  in  future  the  Portuguese  authorities,  in 
the  framework  of  the  concession  of  March  199 5, 
effectively  ensures  that  Portugal  Telecom  applies 
cost-oriented  rates  for  interconnection  between  its 
own  network and  mobile  telephony networks, and 
in  particular as  regards  charges for  handling inter-
national  calls. 
Conclusion 
(20)  The immediate lifting of  restrictions on the direct 
interconnection  of  mobile  telecommunications 
networks  under  Article  3  (d)  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC as  inserted by  Directive 96/2/EC with 
regard  to  mobile  and  personal  communications 
would  expose  the  substantial  international  traffic 
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(21) 
revenues  of  Portugal  Telecom  and  could  threaten 
its  ability to  further ensure the universal  provision 
of  voice-telephony  in  Portugal  on  economically 
acceptable  conditions.  The  development  of  trade 
would be  affected  by an  additional implementation 
period until  I January 1999 in such a way as  not to 
be  contrary  to  the  interests  of Community. 
II. Request lor an additional implementation 
period  regarding  the  use  of  own/ 
alternative networks lor the provision of 
mobile  and  personal  communicstions 
services 
Assessment of the impact of the immediate 
lifting of restrictions 
Arguments set out by the Portuguese Government 
The  lines  leased  by  mobile  operators  (including 
paging and trunking operators) represent currently 
about 35 %  of the  total  leased  circuits  and about 
2 %  of  the  total  revenue  of  Portugal  Telecom. 
Portugal  states  that  in  the  case  of  the  lifting  of 
restrictions  on  operators  of  mobile  and  personal 
communications systems  with  regard  to  the estab-
lishment  of  own  infrastructure  before  I  January 
1998, both GSM  operators would  set up their own 
infrastructure  and  Portugal  Telecom  would  there-
fore forgo a turnover of Esc 7,4 billion in 1997. The 
Portuguese  authorities  calculate  that  the  accumu-
lated turnover forgone  would be Esc 25,6 billion by 
the  end  of  2000.  This  is  explained  because 
although Portugal recognizes that in  fact  the dupli-
cation of Portugal Telecom's circuits currently used 
by mobile operators would take many years, on the 
other hand, given the fact that Portugal Telecom is 
in  any case  progressively  reducing its  leased-lines 
tariffs,  it  is  implicitly  acknowledged  that  the  in-
centive for  mobile operators to establish their own 
infrastructure will  also decrease. The impact of the 
reduction  in  leased-lines  turnover  forgone  by 
Portugal  Telecom  in  the  subsequent  years  will 
therefore  progressively  diminish. 
Furthermore,  according  to  the  Portuguese  author-
ities,  the  effect  of  the  lifting  of  restrictions  on 
mobile operators  must  be  examined  together with 
the effect of the liberalization of voice services for 
closed  user  groups  under  Directive  90/388/BBC. 
This  effect  would  amount  to  Esc  11  billion 
turnover forgone  by  Portugal  Telecom. Therefore, 
in  1997,  the  total  turnover forgone  would  thus be 
Esc  18,4  billion. 
Assessment  by  the Commission 
(22)  Neither the Commission nor the Council have ever 
considered that income from  leased  lines  is  indis-
pensable for  the  financing of the USO. This is  one 
reason  why  Article  1  0  of  Council  Directive 
92/44/EEC  on  the  application  of  open  network 
provision  to  leased  lines  states  that  leased-lines 
tariffs must be cost-oriented, i.e.  reflect only under-
lying  costs  and  not  the  cost  of  providing  fixed 
voice-telephony- which is  a distinct service- in 
unprofitable  areas  and  to  unprofitable  users  in 
profitable areas.  Although allowed  by  Article  13  of 
Directive  92/44/EEC,  the  Portuguese  Governmenl 
did not request any deferment in favour of Portugal 
Telecom for  the  implementation of  the obligation 
of  cost-orientation  of  leased  lines.  Since  Directive 
92/44/EEC requires  in  particular  that  leased  lines 
must be offered on a cost-oriented basis and, 'given 
that  Member  States  must  comply  with  it.  the 
opening of  alternative  supply [of  infrastructure)  is 
not expected to alter the market position of TOs in 
this area substantially' (1). Therefore the Portuguese 
Government  had  an  obligation  t_o  ensure  that 
Portugal Telecom put in practice, by 31  December 
1993,  a cost accounting system  for  leased  lines in 
conformity with Article 10 of Directive 92/44/EEC. 
As  mentioned  above,  restrictions  on  competition 
are,  however,  not  justified  as  regards  specific 
services  dissociable  from  voice-telephony,  unless 
Member  States  provide  substantive  evidence  that 
such  specific  services,  by  their  nature  and  the 
conditions in  which  they  are  offered,  compromise 
the  economic  equilibrium  of  the  provision  of 
voice-telephony.  Such  evidence  has  not  been 
provided. 
According to  the Portuguese  application,  Portugal 
Telecom earned 6 % of its revenues (Esc  23 billion) 
from  the  provision  of  leased  lines,  against  79 % 
from  the  provision  of  fixed  voice-telephony  (Esc 
310  billion). As  assumed above,  the annual burden 
of  the  USO  would  be  around  Esc  15  billion.  No 
evidence  has  been  provided  showing that the rev-
enues  of  fixed  voice-telephony  which  is  provided 
under exclusive  rights  do  not suffice  to  cover the 
universal  service  burden,  and  that  the  monopoly 
area has to be extended to other, distinct. markets. 
(')  Green Paper on  the liberalization of Telecommunications In-
frastructure  and  Cable Television  Networks  - Part One -
Principles and Timetable (COM(94) 440 final, 25.  I 0. 1994). 
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Moreover  the  Commission  considers  that  the 
estimated' impact  of  lifting  restrictions on  mobi~e 
operators  on  establ.is~ing  ow~  in.frastructures  as 
based  on  an  unreahst1c  scenano,  smce: 
- as  noted  by  the  second  GSM  operator,  estab-
lishing  a  fully  separated  backbone  network 
involves  high  irrecoverable costs, so  that such a 
duplication  would  only  be  implemented 
progressively, 
- a  fully  separated  backbone  network  al~o 
involves  substantial  risks  (as  in  the  case  of  tts 
failure). Therefore the GSM  operators would in 
any case  continue  t~ use  Po,rtugal  !elecom. or 
third  party lines, as  back-up  capac1ty  allowtng 
them  to  maintain  their  service  in  the  case  of 
the  failure  of  their own  network.  Furthermore, 
investing in  own  infrastructure  is  only justified 
in  the case of sufficient traffic flows,  which will 
probably  not  be  the  case  for  trunking  a~d 
paging service  operators. Moreover,  as  stated  m 
the  Portuguese  application,  whereas  tariffs  for 
long-distance  le.ased  lines  arc  the  leas.t  c?st 
oriented, this  is  less  the case  for  local  carcuats. 
On  the  other  hand,  if mobile  operators  were 
authorized to  establish their own  infrastructure, 
they could set up high capacity circuits (8,  34 
and  140  Mbs),  which  Portugal  Telecom  does 
currently not  provide  for  the  mobile  operators 
(according  to  one  co~ment).  ~erefore,  ~he 
assumption that there wall  ~e 100  ~o  redu~tiO~ 
in demand for  leased lines m  1997 as  not JUSti-
fied  and will  become even  more  unjustified  in 
subsequent  years  given  Portugal  Telec~m_'s 
planned  tariff  decreases.  A  more  reahstlc 
approach  would  be  to  assume  a  decrease  in 
demand  for  capacity over  the  next  three  years 
of up to  50%. This would  mean  a  maximum 
Esc  3,7  billion  forgone  per  annum (less  than 
1 %  of  annual  turnover).  However,  if  Portugal 
Telecom adjusted its  prices, the decrease would 
obviously be smaller and possibly could be fully 
compensated, if it induced the mobile operators 
to  install  additional  base  stations,  · 
- a loss  of turnover does  not constitute a loss  of 
profit,  since  Portugal  Telecom would  save  the 
costs related to the provision of the leased lines 
involved.  Only  the  profit  margin  would  be 
forgone.  Portugal  has  not  provided  evidenc.e 
regarding the latter. We could  as~me a  profat 
margin of a maximum of SO%, whtch could-
if  proved  correct  - already  con~titute  unfair 
pricing within the  m.e~ning of  ~rtt~le 86 (c)  of 
the EC Treaty in addat1on  to an  mfnngement of 
the  cost  orientation  requirements  in  Directive 
92/44/EEC given  that  it  would  be  more  than 
twice  the  usual  profit  margins  in  the  telecom-
munications  sector.  Even  on  this  basis,  the 
profit  forgone  would  he  less  than  Esl·  I  ,H 
hill ion, 
- as  already  mentioned,  one  of  the  two  GSM 
operators, TMN,  is  a  100 %  subsidiary  in  the 
Portugal  Telecom Group.  Portugal  considers (I) 
that,  notwithstanding  this  link,  TMN  would 
also  opt  for  own  infrastructure  in  order  to 
decrease its infrastucture costs by SO  %. But in 
this  case  the  profit  margin  of  TMN  would 
increase  ac~ordingly,  and  compensate  in  the 
consolidated accounts of the Portugal Telecom 
Group  half  of  the  negative  effect  of  lifting 
restrictions  on  mobile  operators on using own 
infrastructure. Accordingly, the net effect would 
be  only  Esc  0,9  billion  per year, 
..:,_  the Portuguese argumentation start from a static 
perspective.  In  fact,  with  the  liberalization  of 
the  mobile  market achieved  through  Directive 
96/2/EC, new operators should soon be author-
ized by the Portuguese authorities to operate in 
the  DCS  1800  frenquency  bands.  The  new 
operators will  require  Portugal Telecom  leased 
lines  to speed up the roll-out of their network 
in  order to compete with  the current two GSM 
operators.  This  new  demand  will  more  than 
offset  the  very  limited  impact  of  the  GSM 
operators cancelling some of their leased  lines. 
It must be emphasized in  this context that the 
Portuguese  authorities'  delays  in  launching  n 
call for tender for DCS 1800 and Ermes services 
are  causing a larger loss  in  leased  lines revenue 
for  Portugal  Telecom,  than  would  the  imme-
diate implementation of Article 3 (c) of Direct-
ive  90/388/EEC  as  inserted  by  Directive 
96/2/EC. The liberalization of voice services for 
closed  user  groups  should  also  boost  the 
demand for  leased lines for  fixed  complement-
ary  telecommunications  services  and  certainly 
constitute  an  alternative  use  for  the  transmis-
sion of capacity abandoned by GSM  operators. 
Given  this expected growth in the leased  lines 
market,  Portugal  Telecom  could  maintain  its 
total  profits  in  this  area  even  if it  introduces 
further volume discounts. Such discounts could 
even  further  reduce  the  incentive  for  mobile 
operators to establish  their own. infrastructures. 
( 1)  Letter  of  30  July  1996,  p.  5. 
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An:mding  ro  om·  t:omrncnt  received,  PortuKnl 
Tdt·,·om  ulrt·;~dy offt·rs oplintl fibu·  lt>used  lim·:-. 
tu  it:-.  u~soc:iulr 'ompauy, TV ( :ubo  P01 tup.ul,  ul 
prin·s whid1 :ur iu  somr u1scs  .~0  times lower 
than the price charged to the mobile operators. 
Finally  in  assessing  the  impact of  the  immediate 
implementation  of  Article  3  (c)  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC on the  Portugal  Telecom  Group,  the 
last  paragraph  of Article  3  (a)  must also  be  t~ken 
into account. According to this provision, 'Member 
States which are granted an additional implementa-
tion period to abolish the restrictions with regard to 
infrastructure as  provided for in Article 3  (c),  shall 
not during that period grant any further mobile or 
personal  comrnuni<.:ations  licence  to  telecommun-
ications  or~anizntions, or any  associated  organiza-
tion.  Where  telecommunications  organizations  in 
such Mernher States do not or no longer enjoy ex-
clusive  or  special  rights,  within  the  meaning  of 
points (h) and (c) of the first  para~raph of Article 2, 
for  tht·  t•stahlishmcut  and  tiH·  provision  of  thl· 
puhlit·  llt"lwork  inlmslrurtllll',  tht·y  shall  not  a 
f't·ion· he exc.:ludcd  from  SIKh liccusinlt procedures.' 
Consequently, given  that TMN would be excluded 
from  participating in  any call  for  tender for  DCS 
1800  during  the  whole  duration  of  the  possible 
additional time period requested by the Portuguese 
authorities for the lifting of restrictions on mobile 
operators  to  use  own  infrastructure,  the  possible 
profits  forgone  in  this  new  market  segment  by 
TMN  should  also  be  deducted  from  the  impact, 
calculated above, due to the cancellation of leased-
lines  contracts  by  GSM  operators. 
As  regards  the cffc<:l  of  the  liberalization  of voice 
services  for  dosed  user  groups,  the  Commission 
notes  that  this  liberalization  had  to  be  imple-
mented at  the latest on 31  December 1990, under 
Directive  90/388/EEC. 
Dt·vdojmrmt  of tradt 
(23)  Given  that the above  assessment shows that there 
are  no  reasons  for  justifying  the  derogation 
provided for under Article 4  of Directive 96/2/EC 
for  the  immediate  lifting  of  the  restrictions  on 
mobile operators with  regard  to the establishment 
of own  infrastructures and  the  use  of  third  party 
infrastructures,  there  is  no  need  to  examine  the 
effect on  trade of the granting of  such  exception, 
and its  possible compatibility with the interests of 
the  Community. 
Conclu.rion 
(24)  Given  that  it  is  not  demonstrated  that  Portugal 
Telecom needs the profits realized by the provision 
of leased lines to mobile operators in order to hrin~ 
nhuut  the  IH~u·ssury strul'turnl ndjustmt"nt:. nnd that, 
morrovt"r,  it  11ppcars  thnt  thr  Portup.al  Tclcnuu 
(.jroup  would  p,lobnlly  increase  its  rev<.'nucs  if  no 
exception  were granted  to  the  immediate applica-
tion  of Article  3  (c)  of  Directive 90/388/EEC, the 
granting of  the  requested  additional  implementa-
tion  period  is  not  justified. 
III.  Request lor sn additions/ implementation 
pen"od  regarding  voice-telephony  snd 
underlying network infrastructure 
Assessment of the impact of d1c  removal of 
the  exclusive  rights  currently  granted  to 
Portugal Telecom 
A r~ummt.1 fmwidt·d  h)•  tht·  l'o1"111~m·Jt  Got•tm 
mt'tll 
(25)  The Portuguese authorities has requested a deroga-
tion  on  the  follo~ing grounds: 
Portugal  Telecom  must significantly  rebalance 
its  tariffs, 
telephone  density  is  low. 
Assessment  by the  Commi.uion 
(26)  Pursuant to the general principle of proportionality, 
any additional implementation period granted must 
be  strictly  proportional  to  what  is  necessary  to 
achieve  the  necessary  structural  adjustment, 
mentioned  by  the  Portuguese  authorities  with  a 
view to the introduction of full competition, i.e. the 
further  adjustment  of  Portugal  Telecom's  tariffs, 
which  in  most  cases  appear  to  be  too  high,  the 
network  penetration  which  appears  to  be  too  low 
(approximately  37  main  lines  per  I 00  inhabitants 
against a  Community average  of 48  in  199  5)  and 
low average  spending for  the  usage  of each single 
main  line (in  1995, the average spending per  100 
inhabitants  was  ECU  20 720  as  opposed  to  ECU 
33 27  5  in  the  UK). 
(27)  The Commission notes that  Portugal Telecom  has 
on  the  other  hand  already  successfully  imple-
mented  the  modernization  of  its  network.  As  of 
1995,  70%  of  Portugal  Telecom's  switching  was 
digital with  100 %  of the trunk network and 89 % 
of the international network also digital. The rate of 
digitalization  of the  lo<.:al  switches should, an·ord· 
ing to  Portu~al, rca<:h  97 %  in  1998, which is  well 
ahead in  comparison with other Community oper-
ators such as  Deutsche Telekom or Telecom Italia. 
However,  telephone  penetration  for  voice-
telephony  is  still  very  low  in  Portugal,  by  com-
parison  with  the  rest  of the  Community. 
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(a)  Tariff  rebalancing 
(28)  Portugal  states  that  from  1989  to  1  996 all  charges 
except those of  local  and regional  calls  have  fallen 
in  real  terms.  Despite  this  achievement,  Portugal 
claims that most of its tariffs are still  too  high and 
out of alignment with  tariffs  of  other Community 
operators.  Rebalancing  by  adjusting  charges  to 
bring  prices  closer  to  underlying  costs  is  still 
required  also  to  achieve  this objective.  Portugal  is 
proceeding with a gradual and flexible  approach to 
tariff rebalancing, whilst maintaining safegtiards for 
consumers in  terms of price and quality of service. 
Every  operator  in  the  Community  is  or has  been 
carrying  out  a  programme  of  rebalancing.  For 
Tariffs  in  ecus  Portugal 
on  I  January  1996  Telecom 
Charge  for  new  connection  76,66 
Bi-monthly  rental  18,53 
Portugal  the  question  is  about  the  speed  of  reba-
lancing. Owing to  the limits of the proposed price 
cap regime, Portugal claims that Portugal Telecom 
needs  about  five  years  to  implement decreases  in 
long-distance  and  international  call  charges  and 
increases  of  installation  and  monthly  rental 
charges,  i.e.  from  1996  to  2000. 
(29)  The following  table,  based  on  information  in  the 
Commission's  possession (1),  comparing  certain 
telephone tariffs of Portugal Telecom and the equi-
valent  figures  for  an  operator  which  has  already 
rebalanced  its  tariffs (2),  supports  the arguments of 
the  Portuguese  authorities. 
British  Difference  PT/BT 
Telecom  (BT- 100) 
137,53  56 
19,53  95 
Local  calls,  resp.  3/1 0  minutes  0,06-0,12  0,06-0,19  100-63 
(peak  hours)  0,06-0,23  0,14-0,47  43-49 
Trunk  calls,  rcsp.  3/10  minutes  1,17-3,91  0,35-1,16  334-337 
lntra-F.C,  resp.  3/10  minutes  2,31-7,70  1,29-4,31  179-179 
Caution  is  required  in  this comparison  since  local 
tariff areas are  much smaller in  Portugal (radius of 
S km) than in the UK (radius of  more than 30 km). 
Many  short  distance  calls  are  thus  carged  as 
regional  calls  in  Portugal.  For  this  reason  'local 
calls'  in  Portugal  only  represent  7 %  of  the  rev-
enues of  Portugal  Telecom. 
(30)  Given  that  owing  to  technical  progress  in  the 
network,  cost  is  increasingly  less  dependent  on 
distance,  cost  orientation  of  trariffs  means  as  a 
general rule  that prices are  adjusted  such  that rev-
enues  are  rebalanced  with  costs,  i.e.: 
connection  and  rental  revenues  cover  fixed 
costs (plus  a  standard  margin), 
- local  call  revenues  cover  local  call  costs  (plus 
standard  margin), 
- trunk  call  revenues  cover  trunk  calls  (plus 
standard  margin), 
- international  call  revenues  cover  international 
call  costs  (plus  standard  margin). 
Consequently  telecommunications  . organizations 
would  normally  raise  bi-monthly rental  and  local 
calls  (or  at  least  not  decrease  these  charges)  and 
reduce  tariffs  for  long-distance  calls.  It  appears. 
however, that Portugal Telelcom's local charges are 
as  mentioned alredy high in comparison with other 
Member States and Portugal Telecom will  therefore 
not bel able to compensate decreases in trunk and 
international  charges  with  increases  in  local 
charges. 
( 1)  Tarifica  study  implemented  for  CEC - DG  XIII. 
(1)  A direct comparison of the telephony tariffs of Portugal Tele-
com  with  the Community average  (which  is  not a  weighted 
average) would not be appropriate, given that the tariff struc-
tures o( the 15 Community TOs are still widely divergent and 
in  addition, given  that  they  are  currently  in  the  process  of 
rebalancing  tariffs.  A  comparison  with  Britiah  Telecom  was 
also  made  in  the Commission Decision with  respect to  Ire-
land  of 27  November  1996. 




Given the need not to affect the resources required 
to  extend  further  tel~phone  penetration  in  the 
corninp.  yean;,  the  c:ontinuntion  of  the  grndual 
approach  envisaged  hy  Portugal  for  further  tariff 
decreases  seems  therefore  justified,  in view of the 
rebalancing already achieved  to date  and  the  firm 
commitments to complete the process by reducing 
trunk  and  international  tariffs  by  the  year  2000. 
(b)  Telephone density 
Portu,gal  Telecom  has achieved  one  of  the  fastest 
telephone  penetrntion  growths  in  the Community 
over lh<"  l:tsl  fiw yt<:trs  (from 24 main lines per I 00 
inhnhitunts in  I  CJCJ I  to ]7 in  J99S). Tod:ty, Portugul 
Tdcc:om  IJ("VC'rthrk~s  still  h:ts  the  st·c:ond-lowcsl 
telephone  pcnctrnlion  of  the  Commynity  (after 
Ireland).  Portugal  states  that  26%  of  Portuguese 
households  arc  still  without  a  telephone  and  that 
this  is  due  mainly  to  the  need  to  expand  the 
network  further. 
So~e comments are rightly emphasizing that tele-
phone  penetration  would  improve  as  a  result  of 
competition. It  may nevertheless  be  assumed  that 
in  a  first  stage  new  entrants  in  the  market  will 
concentrate mainly on high  users to acquire suffi-
cient  profitability  before  focusing  on  new  users. 
The  argument  of  the  Portuguese  authorities  that 
enabling  Portugal  Telecom  to  pursue  its  develop-
ment  programmes  to  further  improve  telephone 
density  will  ben('fit  the  public  seems  therefore 
acceptable,  even  if  the  additional  time  given  to 
Portugal  Telecom  will  enable  it  to  strengthen  its 
position by improving its efficiency. This improve-
ment  will  to  a  certain  extent  also  benefit  future 
new entrants since the more users connected to the 
public  telecommunications  networks,  the  more 
calls will be generated both for the incumbent and 
for  the  new  entrants. 
(34)  In  fact,  the  figures  provided  by  the  Portuguese 
authorities also show that although telephone pen-
etration  is  still  low  in  Portugal,  outstanding 
demand is also limited. It appears for example that 
the average waiting time for connection to the tele-
phone network has dramatically decreased, i.e. from 
ten  months  in  1989  to  only  eight  days  in  199  5. 
(.15)  The  need  to  increase  penetration  can  therefore 
justify a continuation of the current exclusive priv-
ilege  of  Portugal  Telecom  for  a  limited  duration. 
The slowing of  the  yearly  increase  in  penetration 
(from  14,5% in  1990 to 5% in  1995) shows that, 
due  to  a  combination  of  amongst  others  demo-
graphic (
1
)  and economic factors  (and  in  particular 
tht>  lower  PortuRursc  (jJ)p  rdlt>rtrd  in  a  lowrr 
avera~c  spcndin~ p<'r  tdcphorH·  line -- ECU  560 
per main line in  199S rompared with  ECtJ 605 in 
the  UK) specific  to  Portugal,  there  is  actually  no 
significant  demand  for  further  telephone  Jines  by 
households.  Further  market  growth  would  then 
depend  on  the  reduction  of tariffs  as  well  as  the 
offer of new services,  and  the growth  of business 
customers,  which  can  best  be  accelerated  by  the 
introduction  of  competition  and  therefore  would 
not  justify  any  additional  implementation  period. 
Developmmt  of tradt' 
(\(•)  AlrhoUJ~h thr wautillji of  a dnOJ~:Ition to thl·  Portu 
p,ucst·  Govt~rnmrnl  would  fon•dose  lht•  tdcuun 
rnuni<:ations  market  in  Portu~al during  two  years, 
the negative effect on the development of trade  in 
the  Community will  be  reduced  due  to: 
- the limited size of the Portuguese telecommun-
ications  market  in  comparison  to  the  Com-
munity market. One could  expect  indeed  that 
as  from  1  January  1998,  massive  investments 
will  mainly  occur  in  the  more  developed 
Member States, such  as  Germany,  the  Nether-
lands  and  France  where  a  higher  return  on 
investment  might  be  expected, 
the  duration  of  the  derogation  requested:  the 
establishment  of  new  public  telephony  oper-
ators  requires  a  preparation  of  many  months. 
The  harm  dom·  to  potential  investors  by  an 
additional  implementation  period  of  24 
months, will  be limited if  in the meantime they 
can already plan investments, so as to be  ready 
to be operational in advance of 1 January 2000. 
(37)  Such effect will further be reduced in the following 
circumstances: 
- Portugal  Telecom  is  not  expanding  its  opera-
tion  in  Member States  which  have  liberalized 
their markets. If this were the case, the deroga-
tion  enabling  Portugal  Telecom  to  maintain 
higher prices on  its  domestic market could be 
used not only to  achieve  the  necessary adjust-
ments but also  to cross-subsidize operations in 
foreign  markets.  This  would  obviously  distort 
competition  at  the expense  of  the  incumbents 
and  of  other  new  entrants  in  the  relevant 
Member  States  and  would  be  against  the 
Community interest, . 
(')  Household size in  Portugal is  2,9  people, i.e.  larger than in all 
other EU  member States except Ireland, and Spain (2,6  is  the 
Community average). This reduces the potential for additional 
residential  penetration. 
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- the lifting of restrictions on the use of own and 
alternative  infrastructures  is  effective  from  J 
July  1997,  as  mentioned  below.  'l11is  would 
allow  polrntial  new  entrant~  to  operate  and 
provide  already  liberalized  tclec.:ommunications 
services on such networks from  that date on, in 
preparation  for  full  competition,  and  in  par-
ticular to  provide  voice  services .  over corporate 
networks and/or to closed user groups via such 
infrastructures, 
the  full  implementation  of  the  prov1s1ons  of 
Directive  90/388/EEC  not  subject  to  the 
current derogation, and in  particular the aboli-
tion  of  the  current  complementary  licences 
scheme  in  order  to  allow  liberalized  services 
providers, such as  providers of  voice  services to 
closed  user  groups,  to  start  operating  their 
services  on  the  basis  of  a  mere  declaration, 
without  prejudice  to  the  impact  assessment 
provided for  in  the third paragraph of Article 2 
of  Commission  Directive  95/51/EC (1)  in  the 
short term TV Cabo is  mannged at  arm's length 
of  Portugal  Telecom  as  long  as  it  remains 
within  the  Portugal  Telecom  Group. 
Conclusion 
(38)  On the basis of the above assessment, the Commis-
sion considers that the development of trade which 
would  result  from  the granting to  Portugal  of an 
additional  implementation  period  until  l  January 
2000 as  regards the abolition of the exclusive rights 
currently  granted  to  Portugal  Telecom  for  the 
provision  of  voice-telephony  and  public  network 
infrastructure  insteud  of  ,  I  January  1998,  under 
Article  2  (l.)  of  Dircc.:tivc  90/JHH/EEC,  is  not 
affected  to such  an  extent as  to  he  contrary to  the 
interests  of  the  Community,  in  so  far  as  the 
circumstances  set  out  above  are  fulfilled. 
IV.  Request lor IJ/1  additiomJI irnplernentstion 
period regarding the lilting of  restrictions 
on  the  provision  of already  liberalized 
telecommunications services on own and 
alternative infrastructure 
Assessment of the impact of the  immediate 
lifting of restrictions 
Arguments  provided  by  the  Portuguese  Govern-
ment 
(39)  The  Portuguese  Government  has  requested  a  de-
rogation on the grounds that, due to a combination 
(')  0 J  No  L  256,  26.  I 0.  199.5,  p.  49. 
of,  amongst  others,  demographic  and  economic 
factors (and in particular the lower Portuguese GOP 
r~flected in .a  l~wer average spending per tdephont' 
line), there  as  lattle  sc.:opc  for  1m  inncast<  in  the sill" 
of  the  liberalized  services  mnrkct. 
(40)  Currently, Portugal Telecom derives more than Esc 
23  billion  from  the  provision  of  leased  circuits 
(approximately 6 % of its turnover). The Portuguese 
authorities state (2)  that the lifting of restrictions on 
the  use  of  alternative  infrastructure  before  1 July 
1999 would cause Portugal Telecom a loss of about 
Esc 4 billion per annum up to 2000 (i.e. about 1 % 
of  its  turnover)  due  to  the  substitution  by  liber-
alized  service  providers  of  (mainly  long-distance 
'interconnection')  leased  circuits  by  alternative 
infrastructure. According to  the Portuguese submis-
sion, if in the alternative Portugal Telecom reduced 
substantially the price of leased circuits to maintain 
its  market  share  at  an  estimated  80 %,  then 
Protugal Telecom would lose cumulated revenue of 
Esc  24  billion  up  to  2000. 
Assessment  by  the  Commission 
(41)  This argument cannot be  fully  accepted. It is  true 
that,  under  its  exclusive  privilege  to  provide 
network  infrastructure,  Portugal  Telecom  is 
enjoying guaranteed revenues from  the provision of 
leased  lines  to  end-users  and  providers  of  liber-
alized  telecommunications services.  However,  Dir-
ective 92/44/EEC requires that leased lines must be 
offered on a cost-oriented basis. Given  this obliga-
tion  and  given  that  Member States  must  comply 
with  it,  the  opening  of  alternative  supply  is  not 
expected to alter the market position of TOs in this 
area  substantially. 
(42)  It is  true  that charges  for  leased  lines  in  Portugal 
are  not  yet  fully  rebalanced.  A  cost-based  tariff 
proposal  could  nevertheless  be  iitlplemented 
rapidly to avoid Portugal Telecom losing revenue to 
potential  alternative  infrastructure  providers,  as 
customers would  wish  to  diversify  suppliers. Such 
tariffs  reductions  would  not  affect  Portugal 
Telecom as significantly as stated by the Portuguese 
authorities  for  the  following  reasons: 
(l)  Additional  submission  of  3  January  1997. 
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the  liberalized  services  market  (voice  services 
for  dosed  user groups  were  just  liberalized  in 
1996)  is  a  growing  market  in  the  long  term, 
although  it  is  recognized  that  this  growth  in 
Portugal  may  be slower than  in  other Member 
States  in  the  short  term.  Even  with  reduced 
tariffs,  losses  could  be  compensated  in  due 
course  by  the  increase  of  demand  of  leased 
circuits, 
moreover  a  fully  separated  backbone  network 
involves  substantial  risks  (as  in  the  case  of  its 
failure).  Therefore, operators would  in  any case 
continue to use Portugal Telecom or third party 
lines,  as  'back-up'  capacity  allowing  them  to 
maintain their service  in the case  of the failure 
of  their own  network, 
- a  loss  of turnover does  not constitue a  loss  of 
revenue, since Portugal Telecom would save the 
costs related to the provision of the leased lines 
involved, 
- other companies within  the  Portugal  Telecom 
Group,  by· providing · their  own  infrastructure, 
would  increase their profit margins accordingly 
and compensate in the consolidated accounts of 
the Portugal Telecom Group any negative effect 
of lifting the restrictions, with regard to them. 
Finally, Portugal Telecom docs not take account of 
the  revenues  that  it  will  receive  from  competitors 
for  the supply of interconnection services to them. 
Usually,  interconnection  charges  are  the  single 
biggest  cost  to  entrants  of  market  participation. 
Consequently; th~ lifting of restrictions on the use 
of  alternative  infrastructure will  in  fact  not reduce 
revenues, but in due course will  be  revenue gener-
ating. 
Development  of trade 
(4.1)  As  a consequence of its monopoly on the provision 
of  puhlil·  telecommunications  infraslrul"turcs, 
Portugal  Telecom  is  the  sole  supplier  of  leased 
lines and interconnection to  providers of liberalized 
services.  It  therefore  determines  to  a  large  extent 
the  costs  of  its  competitors  in  the  liberalized 
services  sectQr.  This  is  shown  inter  alia  by  the 
abovementioned  current  high  leased-lines  tariffs, 
which  makes  the  supply  of  some  liberalized 
services  uneconomic.  Furthermore,  this  potential 
knowledge by Portugal Telecom of the costs of its 
competitors will  increasingly affect trade, since the 
Portuguese public operator is likely to develop even 
further  its  own  offer  of  liberalized  services, 
although  this  growth  is  likely  to  be  slow  in  the 
short term. Whereas Portugal Telecom could use its 
own  infrastructure  to  provide  such  services,  com-
petitors  providing global  liberalized  services,  such 
as  VPN  or  voice  services  to  closed  user  groups, 
would  thus  be  obliged  to  rely  only  on  circuits 
leased  from  the  operator  they  want  to  compete 
with. This situation would be aggravated by the fact 
that,  according  to  comments,  Portugal  Telecom 
currently  does  not  produce  accounts  sufficiently 
transparently as  to allow an  adequate separation of 
its activities in  the monopoly sector from  those in 
the  liberalized  sector.  Furthermore,  there  is  no 
structural  separation,  to  prevent  staff  in  the  infra-
structure  side  of  Portugal  Telecom  passing  in-
formation to colleagues selling liberalized services. 
Conclusion 
(44)  Given  the  existing  obligation  under  Directive 
92/44/EEC  on  the  application  of  open  network 
provision to leased lines, which requires leased line 
tariffs  to  be  cost  oriented,  a  lengthy  additional 
implementation  period  would  not  be  justfied. 
However, given the relatively low average spending 
power of the  Portuguese  user,  it is  likely that any 
growth in the market for already liberalized services 
will  be relatively slow in  the short term. An imme-
diate lifting of restrictions on the provision of own 
or alternative infrastructure will  have  an  impact on 
the revenues of Portugal Telecom in the short term 
which,  together  with  the  current  rebalancing  of 
voice-telephony tariffs, could have an adverse effect 
on development of the network and the  provision 
of  Universal  Service. 
(45)  For this reason, the Commission considers that the 
development  of  tra,9e  will  not 
1 be  affected  by  the 
granting to Portugal  of an  additional  implementa-
tion  period  regarding  the  liberalization  of  altern-
ative  infrastructure  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be 
contrary to  the  interests of the Community if  the 
abovementioned period will  not go  beyond 1 july 
1997,  " 
I 
I 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION: 
Article  1 
Portugal may postpone until 1 January 1999 the lifting of 
restrictions on the direct interconnection of mobile tele-
communications networks with foreign  networks. It must 
notify to the Commission before  that date the legislative 
measures adopted  in  order to  implement Article  3 (d)  of 
Directive  90/388/EEC. 
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Article 2 
Portugal  may not postpone the  lifting of restrictions on 
operators  of  mobile  and  personal  communications 
systems,  pursuant  to  Article  3  (c)  of  Directive 
90/3RR/EEC,  with  rc~nrd to: 
(a)  the  establishment  of  their  own  infrastructure; 
(b)  the  usc  of  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties; 
and 
(c)  the sharing of infrastructure, other facilities and sites. 
The Portuguese authorities shall  inform the Commission 
of all  authorizations granted and frequency  allocated  -
upon request - to mobile operators wishing to establish 
their own  infrastructure and to owners of other telecom-
munications  infrastructure  wanting  to  lease  capacity  to 
mobile  operators. 
Article 3 
Portugal may postpone until 1 January 2000 the abolition 
of  the  exclusive  rights  currently  granted  to  Portugal 
Telecom as  regards the provision of voice-telephony and 
the establisment and provision of public telecommunica-
tions networks, provided that the following conditions are 
implemented  according  to  the  timetable  laid  down 
hereafter: 
- no later than 1 July 1997 instead of 1 July 1996: noti-
fication  to  the Commission of all  measures necessary 
to lift  restrictions on  the  provision  of ·already  libera-
lized  telecommunications  services  on: 
(a)  networks established  by  the  provider of  the  telecom-
munications  service; 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties;  and 
(c)  the  sharing of  networks,  other facilities  and  sites, 
- no  later  than  12  November  1997  instead  of  11 
January 1997: notification to the Commission of legis-
lative  changes  necessary  to  implement full  competi-
tion  by  1 January 2000,  including proposals  for  the 
funding of universal  services, 
- no  later  than  1  January  1999  instead  of  1  January 
1997: notification to the Commission of draft licences 
for  voice-telephony  and/or  underlying  network  pro-
viders, 
- no  later  than  I  July  1999  instead  of  1  July  1997: 
publication of licensing conditions for all services and 
of interconnection  charges  as  appropriate  in  accord-
ance  in  both cases  with  relevant  EU  directives, 
- no  later  than  1  January  2000  instead  of  1  January 
1998:  award  of  licences  anti  amendment  of  existing 
licences to permit the competitive provision of voice-
telephony. 
Article 4 
Portugal  may  postpone  until  1  July  1997  the  lifting  of 
restrictions  on  the  provision  of  already  liberalized  tele-
communications services  on: 
(a)  networks  established by the  provider of  the telecom-
munications  service; 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties;  and 
(c)  the  sharing of  networks,  other  facilities  and  sites. 
Portugal shall notify to the Commission, no later than  I 
July 1997 instead of 1 July 1996, all  measures adopted to 
lift  such  restrictions. 
Artt"cle  5 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  Portuguese  Republic. 
Done  at  Brussels,  12  February  1997. 
For  the Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member of the  Commission 
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Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Counc:il on the status 
and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for telecommuni-
cations services 
(95/C 275/02) 
(Text with EEA rclcvaocc) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose 
Commission Directive 90/388/EEC was  published on 28 
June  1'990  (hereaher referred  to  as  either •the  Services 
Directive' or 'the Directive'). It has come to be identified 
as  a  cornerstone of the  EU framework  for  liberalizing 
the European telecommunications  market. The Council, 
in  its  resolution  of  22  July  1993 (')  emphasized  the 
importance  of  rapid  implementation.  The  resolution 
noted  that  'there  is  a  need  for  rapi"d  ·and  effective 
implementation of the current regulatory environment, in 
particular Directive 90/388/EEC'. 
it is within this context that the Commission submits this 
communication on the status and implementation of the 
Directive ('). 
The communication  has  three  related  purposes ('): 
{i)  description  and  explanation  of the  current state  of 
implementation; 
(ii)  identification and clarification of central issues; 
(iii)  placing the Directive in  the context of the  package 
of reforms focused on the  1998  deadline, according 
to the  1993  Council resolution whiGh  'supports the 
Commission's intention to prepare, before 1 January 
1996, the necessary amendments to the Community 
regulatory  framework  in  order  to  achieve  liberal-
ization  of all  public  voice  telephony  services  by  1 
January 1998'. 
(')  Council resolution 93/C231 /0 l. 
(')  This communications does  not cover related subjects of EU 
telecommunication  policy  such  as  the  application  of open 
netWork provision to leased lines. These subjectS are covered 
extensivelv  in  other  recent  communications.  See  Green 
Paper  on' the  Liberalization  of  telecommunications  infra-
strUCture and cable television networks, Part I/11, COM(94) 
440;  COM(94)  682  and  communication  on  Present status 
and future approach for open access  to telecommunications 
netWorks  and  services  (open  network provision),  COM(94) 
513. 
e>  It should be noted that this communication does not replace 
in any way the formal procedures foreseen under the Treaty 
to ensure the full  implementation of Community Law. 
The context 
The  Services  Directive  set  down  four  dates  by  which 
specific  provisions  had to be  implemented: 
- 31  December  1990,  for  the  opening  up  to 
competition  of  telecommunications  services  other 
than  voice  telephony  and  the  simple  resale  of 
capacity, 
- 1 July 1991, for putting in place an independant body 
responsible  for  the  granting  of  licences  and  the 
surveillance of usage conditions, 
- 30 June 1992, for the notification of any licensing or 
declaration procedures for the provision of packet or 
circuit-switched data services for the public, 
- 31  December  1992,  for  the  opening  up  to 
competition of the simple resale of capacity C). 
Parliament  resolution  AJ-0113/93  of  20  April  1993 
called on the Commission to prepare the liberalization of 
both  intra-Community  as  well  as  domestic  voice 
telephony and to adopt as  soon  as  possible the necessary 
measures  to  take  full  advantage  of the  potential  of the 
existing  infrastructure  of cable  networks  for  telecom-
munications  services  and  to  abolish  without  delay  the 
existing  restrictions  on  the  use  of cable  networks  for 
non-reserved  services  as  well  as  to  adopt  measures  to 
obtain optimum utilization of the cross-border telecom-
munications  networks  of  railway  operators  and  elec-
tricity producers('). 
Council  resolution 93/C 213/01  set  out a  timetable  for 
the  development  of telecommunications  and  confirmed 
the date of 
- 1  January  1998  for  the  liberalization  of  voice 
telephony services for the general public('). 
(')  The  Directive  also  foresaw  the  possibility  of  granting 
defennent, until  I  January 1996, of the date for prohibition 
on  the simple  resafe  of capacity in  those  Member States in 
which the network for the provision of the packet or circuit 
switched services was not yet sufficiendy developed. 
(')  OJ No C 150, 31. 5.  1993, p. 42. 
(')  Although some Member States with less developed networks 
(i.e.  Spain,  Ireland,  Greece  and  Ponugal)  are  granted  an 
additional transition period of up  to five  years.  Very small 
networks (Luxembourg) can also, where justified, be granted 
a period of up to two years. 
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On  17  November  1994  the Council  adopted  a  funher 
resolution confirming the d:ue of 
- 1 January 1998  also for the liberalization of telecom-
munications infrastructure('). 
Following the Commission's action plan of 19 July 1994, 
published  under  the  tide  'Europe's  way  to  the 
information society, an action plan' (
1
), the Union is now 
profoundly engaged in  the  policy of implementing  the 
information  society.  These  resolutions,  the conclusions 
of  the  European  Council  at  Corfu r>  as  weU  as  the 
communication by the Commission on the consultation 
on the Green Paper on Mobile and personal communi-
citions (10)  and  the  results  of the  ongoing consultation 
on the Green Papers on Infrastructure (pan IIII) (
11
)  will 
set  a  framework  for  carrying  forward  the  funher 
amendments  to  the  services  o;&ec~ve tCrwards  the  full 
liberalization  of the  telecommunications  sector.  In  this 
context,  ongoing  review  of the  actual  situation  in  the 
Member  States  will  be  increasingly  important  in  the 
years leading up  to the deadline. 
II.  CURRENT STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
(a)  Gener:al comment 
Member  States  were  required  to r implement  the 
provisions  of the  Directive  and  to  communicate  to  the 
Commission  the  relevant  measures  adopted,  by  31 
December 1990,  1 July 1991  and 31  December 1992 (
12
). 
All  Member States,  but two,  complied. with  the  notifi-
cation  requirements (
11
).  In  order  to  assess  effective 
implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC in  the various 
Member  States  however,  a  checklist  identifying  the 
essential  constituent elements was  established.  Although 
(')  With  derogations  as  above,  see  Council  reselution  of 22 
December  199"'  on  the  principles  and  timetable  for  the 
liberalization  of  telecommunications  infrasuucwrcs, 
(9  ... /C 379/03); OJ No C 379, 31.  12.  199..,, p.  ""· 
(')  COM(9"') 3  ... 7. 
r>  Conclusions  of the  Europe:1n  Council,  Corfu,  2"'-25  June 
199  .... 
<'->  Towards the personal communications environment: Green 
Paper on a Common  approach  in  the  field  of mobile  and 
personal  communications  in  the  European  Union 
(COM(9"')  1"'5 final). 
(") Op. cit. 
( 11)  &  mentioned,  the  exceptions  to  the  31.  12.  1990  deadline 
relate  to (a)  specifications  regarding  simple  resale  of data 
services,  31.  12.  1992;  and  (b)  the  setting  up  of an  inde-
pendent regulator,  1. 7.  1991. 
{ 11)  Italy  (provisions  only  included  in  the  uue Comunitaria 
1994  are  incomplete),  and  Greece  (meuures  necessary  to 
render  the  independent  regulatory  authority  operational 
have still not been notified). 
this  does  not  represent  an  exhaustive  list,  progress  in 
effective  implementation  can  best  be  measured  against 
the following issues c·>: 
- defini~on of  'voi~  tel~phony' for  which  currently 
exclus1ve  and  spectal  nghts  can  still  be  maintained 
according to the provisions of the Directive (11), · 
- continuation of any other exclusive rights; 
access  by service  providers  to  transmission/  routing 
on PSTN and leased lines; 
conditions  imposed  via  any  licensing  or declaration 
scheme in existence; 
transp~en~ and ope~mess ~f procedure for granting 
authonzanon, 
- conditions  for  simple· resale  of  leased  capacity  for 
data communications; 
notification (within deadline) of any special licensing 
regime regarding such resale; 
justification of any special regime("), 
.. - condition~ of open access to public networks (formal 
and effective); 
availability of leased lines within a reasonable time; 
justification for usage  restrictions  (if any)  on leased 
lines, 
- justification for any restrictions on the  processing of 
data (before or after public network transmission C'); 
ensurance  by  the  Member  States  of  non-discrimi-
nation  in  usage  conditions  and  charges  between 
service providers (including the TO), 
- separateness and independence of effective and oper-
ational regulatory body; 
inclusion  within  its  tasks  of:  granting  licences, 
surveying  usage  conditions;  control  of  type  ap-
('•)  For the issues listed see  in  particular Anicles  I, 2,  3, 4,  5,  6 
and 7 of the Directive. 
{'
1
)  Subject  to the  time  deadlines  set by  the  Council  resolution 
of 22 July 1993. 
(
16
)  i.e. by the provisions set down in Articles 2 and 3. 
('') They  must  be  demonstrated  u  necessary  for  essential 
requirements or public policy. 
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proval  and  mandatory specifications,  and allocation 
of frequencies. 
On the basis  of these points the Commission  has  found 
that  the  extent  to  which  the  Directive  has  been 
effectively ·implemented (
11
)  throughout  the  Union  still 
varies  signific~1ndy between the  Member States. Various 
Member States  will  need to undenake funher measures 
before  the  Commission  may  consider  the  Directive 
correctly implemented ("). 
(b)  formal procedures 
AJ  far as  is  possible the Commission has sought to deal 
with  remaining  implementation  issues  via  bilateral 
communication and negotiation with the Member States 
concerned.  This  has  proved  particularly  efficient  (for 
both panics) where information requested is  prompt and 
transparent,  and  where  the  will  to  find  a  workable 
solution rapidly is  evident. 
Where  implementation  problems  cannot  be  solved  by 
informal  negotiation  within  a  re:tson2ble  timefr2me,  the 
Commission  is  obliged  to  commence  with  the  form2l 
procedure  for  non-implement2tion  of  a  Directive,  2s 
provided  for  by  Anicle  169  of the Tre2ty (Z
0
). 
··  Currently, a number of formal procedures 2re underway. 
Two  concern  Member  States'  failure!  to  notifv  all 
required national implementing legislation  (~'). A funher 
two  concern  incorrect  application  of  the  Directive  in 
Member States (1'). 
( 11)  Official . notification  does  not  necessarily  mean  effective 
implementation.  · 
('') Section  III of this  communication  goes  into  this  in  more 
decail. Comments on the individual Member States' progress 
is provided in the Annex. 
(") Article  169 of the EC Treaty de::ds  with  failure  to fulfil  an 
obligation  under  the  rules  of  the  Treaty,  including  the 
implementation of Directives. 
Under  Anicle  169  of  the  Treaty,  the  procedure  is  :u 
follows: 
(i)  The Commission sets out the points at issue by letter of 
'formal  notice'  and  invites  the  relevant  Member  State 
to submit its observations. 
(ii)  If the  Member  State  does  not  put  an  end  to  the 
infringement,  the  Commission  gives  a  (non-binding) 
reasoned  opinion  explaining  its  views  and  inviting  the 
Member States to take the appropriate measures within 
a flXed period. 
(iii)  If  the  Member  State  does  not  comply  with  the 
reasoned  opinion  within  the  given  period,  the 
Commission may bring the matter before the European 
Coun of Justice. 
(") Italy and Greece. 
(I') Germany and Spain. 
(c)  Extension  to  the  European  Economic  Area  and 
central and castem European States 
In  accordance  with  the  EEA  Agreement,  the  Services 
Directive  (including  amendments)  also  applies  to  the 
EEA Member States as  of 1 July 1994  (~J). 
Since the Services Directive only specifies the application 
of Anicle 90  in  conjunction with  Anicles  59  and  86  of 
the  Treaty  and  the  Europe  Agreements  and  Interim 
Agreements which the Union has  signed with six central 
and  eastern  European  .countries  contain  . similar 
provision,  the  general  principles  of this  Directive  (and 
any  amendments)  are  also  of  relevance  to  these 
countries. 
ill. SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Five main areas have emerged during the implementation 
of the  Directi,·e as  requiring specific attention: 
(a). general issues related to voice services; 
(b)  enforcement of the voice telephony monopolyi 
(c)  corporate Qetwork.s and closed user groups (GUGs); 
(d)  data services for the public; 
(e)  the separation of operation and regulation. 
(a)  General issues related to voice services 
Although  the Directive defines  in detail  the concept of 
'voice telephony' (1'), various issues  have  arisen e·>  over 
just  what  is  considered  to  be  'voice  telephony'  in .  the 
(")  Under  the  Competition  Annex  (XIV)  of  the  Agreement, 
Article 90 (J) Directives in the telecommunications field  i. e. 
the  Services  Directive  and  the  Terminals  Directive 
(88/301/EEC)  became  applicable  to  the  EEA  Member 
States  on  t  July  1994,  as  well  as  subsequent  amending 
Directives,  e. J·  amending  Directive  94/46/EEC  with 
regard to satellate communications. 
(u}  According  to  An.icle  1 of the  Directive  'voice  telephony 
means the commercial provision for the public of the direct 
uansport  and  switching  of  speech  in  real-time  between 
public  switched  network  termination  points,  enabling 
any  user  to  use  equipment  connected  to  such  a  network 
termination  point  in  order  to  communicate  with  another 
termination point'. 
(~')  See  also  European Court decision  ECR-1  S8JJ which  has 
guided the Commission in  the elaboration of the definition 
of exclusive and special rights (see below). 
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individual  Member  States  and,  hence,  the  degree  to 
which  special  or exclusive  rights (
26
)  on voice  services 
bad to be  abolished(''). 
According to the Servi_ces  Directive,  the Member States 
ensure  the  abolition  of special  and  exclusive  rights  for 
the  provision  of telecommunication  services  other than 
the  voice  telephony  service.  In  each  case  it  has  to  be 
examined  on  the  basis  of  the  crit¢ria  set  out  below 
whether a given  service  is  a voice  telephony service.  In 
order  to  allow  the  relevant  national  regulatory  auth-
orities  to  assess  the  envisaged  service,  the  service 




A regulatory approach  that identifies  only a  limited  set 
of permissible,  non-reserved  services  does  not conform 
to the requiremem.s or the :L>irective. 
A  voice  service  may  be  reserved  under  national  legis-
lation  only  if  it  includes  all  of  the  elements  of  the 
Community  voice  telephony  definition,  i. e.  it  must  be 
provided  on  a  commercial  basis  to  the  public  for  the 
purpose  of direct  transport  and  switching  of speech  in 
real  time  between· public  switched  network termination 
points. 
(I') According  to  Anicle  2  of amending  Directive  94/46/EC 
(see Section IV): 
•exclusive  rights'  means  the  ri!ihts  that  are  granted  by  a 
Member State to one  undertaking through  any  legislative, 
regulatory  or  administrative  instrument,  reserving . it  the 
right to provide a telecommunications service or undertake 
an activity within a given geographical area,  . 
'special  rights'  means  the  rights  that  arc  granted  by  a 
Member State to a limited number of undertakin~s through 
any  legislative,  regulatory  or  administrative  mstrument 
which, within a given geographical area: 
- limits to two or more the number of undertakings auth-
orized  to  provide  a  service  or undertake  an  activity, 
otherwise than  accordin~ to objective, proportional and 
non-discriminatory critena, or 
- designates,  otherwise  than  according  to  such  criteria, 
·  several  competing  undertakings  as  being  authorized  to 
provide a service or undertake an activity, or 
- confers on any underu.king(s), otherwise than according 
to  such  criteria,  legal  or regulatory  advantages  which 
substantially affect the ability of any other undertaking 
to  provide  the  same  telecommunications  service  or to 
undertake  the  same  activity  in  the  same  geographical 
area under substantially equiValent conditions. 
(") According  to  Article  2  of the  Directive,  "Member  States 
shall  withdraw all  special or exclusive  rights for the supply 
of ,telecommunications services  other than voice  telepnony 
(
11
)  This will  in particular be  the case concerning the provision 
of  voice  services  to  closed  user  groups  on  leased  lines 
networks connected at different ends to the public switched 
network.  In this  case  some  national  regulatory authorities 
request detailed information, such as  clients targeted, draft 
advertisements, envisaged tariffs ...  , to assess the nature of 
the envisaged service.  · 
It is  useful  to consider the significance of each of these 
elements: 
'Commercial' 
This  requires  that the  simple  technical  non-commercial 
provision  of a telephone  connection  between  two  users 
should  be  authorized.  'Commercial'  should  be 
understood  in  the  common  sense  of  the  word,  i. e. 
provided  against  payment  and  with  the  intention  of 
making a profit (or at least of covering all variable costs 
and  making  a  contribution  to  existing  fiXed  costs).  A 
leased  line,  for  example,  made  available  on  a  cost-
sharing basis between one or more users would only be 
considered  a  commercial  activity  if additional  capacity 
were  leased specifically to allow resale. 
It  also  means  that  companies  should  be  free  to  pool 
resources,  i. e. 'to  rent leased  lines  a·nd  benefit from  the 
flat rate rental. This pennits a more efficient use  of the 
telephone  network and, in particular, benefits small  and 
medium-sized enterprises  (SMEs) e'). 
'for the public' 
· The term  'for the public'  is  not defined  in  the Directive 
and  must  be  understood in  its  common sense:  a service 
for the public is a service available to all members of the 
public on the same  basis. 
Particular  examples  of  services  which  should  not  be 
considered 'for the public', and thus should not be made 
subject to special  or exclusive  rights,  are those provided 
over corporate networks  and/  or to dosed  user groups. 
Corporate  networks  and  closed  user  groups  (CUGs) 
cover  a  number  of  telecommunications  services,  both 
voice  and  data.  They  are  fundamentat" to  the  Services 
Directive particularly because they fall  outside the scope 
of the voice service which Member States may reserve to 
their telecommunications organizations. 
The  particular  issues  associated  with  liberalization  of 
these  services  are  discussed  in  more detail  below  (IIIc). 
(21  A disadvantage  for SMEs  existed  previously  because  they 
do  not  generally  use  the  switched  telephone  service 
sufficiendy  intensavely  to  make  it worthwhile for them  to 
pay the (high)  flat rate rentals for leased lines. As  a conse-
quence,  leased  lines  were,  in  practice,  reserved  to  larger 
companies. 
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'from  and to  public  switcbed network termination  points' 
'From  and  to  public  switched  network  termination 
points'  means  that,  to  be  reserved,  the voice  service  has 
not only to  be  offered commercially and to  the  public, 
but also  to  connect two  network termination  points  of 
the  switched  network {'
0
)  at the  same  time.  A5  long  as 
each customer of the service provider is  connected via a 
dedicated leased line, it is  possible to offer a commercial 
service which terminates on the public network("). The 
aim  is,  again, to ease technical restrictions on the use  of 
leased  lines.  In  this  way  lines  may  be  used  for  voice 
telephony offered to non-CUGs, as  long .as  there  is  no 
commercial  offer  of  'simple  resale'  of  the  switched 
telephone service {'
2
). On the other hand, 'simple resale' 
may be  legitimate when the service  is  not offered to the 
public,  but,  £or  instance,  is  provided  to  a  closed  user 
group('~). 
. 
~irect transport and switching of  speech  in  real time' 
This  pan  of  the  definition  excludes  any  store  aad 
forward  or voice  mail  applications  from  being  reserved. 
Least cost routing of telephone calls by a service provider 
on the public switched network or credit card telephonyp 
whereby access  is  given to the voice  telephony service of 
a TO in the framework of a financial transaction service, 
are further examples of liberalized voice services as  these 
do not constitute 'direct transport'. 
(l') The public switched network is  not formaUy defmed in  the 
Directive.  It must  be  given  iu common  meaning, i. e.,  the 
public  switched  telephone  necwork  (PSTN)  wliich. is  the 
collection  of switching  and  uansmission  facilities  used  by 
the telecommunications organization to provide the normal 
telephony service. 
(") i.e.  as  long  as  they  are  connected  via  a  dedicated  leased 
line,  customers of a liberalized voice  service  do  not neces-
sarily need  to demonsuate a pre-existing legal or economic 
relationship  with  the  recipients  of their ails. This  is  often 
referred to as 'dial-out' service or 'one-ended' service. 
C')  'Sim,Ple  resale'  refers to the situation where the call  is  both 
oriJ;tnated  and  terminated on  the  public  switched  network. 
It  as,  in  this  sense,  offered  to  the  general  public  since  the 
local  call  may  originate  from  any  user  of  the  public 
switched  network and  the  customer itself  is  not connected 
by the service provider via a dedicated leased line. 
(11)  Such  a  service  mav,  indeed,  include  features  requiring 
bypass  such  as  teleworking,  out  of  office  hours  calls 
d~version, paging,  Centrex services  or when  sm:dl  business 
units, whose call volume does not justify use of leased lines, 
need to communicate with each other. 
Since  the  reservation of voice services  is  an exception to 
the  general  rule  o~ competition,  it  must  be  interpreted 
narrowly.  When  new  voice  services  and  features  are 
introduced  and  meet demand which  is  not satisfied  by 
the  current  telephone  service,  they  should  normally  be 
considered non-reserved. If they are de(ined as  reserved, 
the burden of proof, as always should fall  to the Member 
State to justify such a restriction {'
4
). 
Calling card services offer a specific example of services, 
which  can,  from  the  point  of  view  of the  users,  be 
considered  to  be  different  from  the  reserved·  voice 
telephony service.  They fall  outside  the  definition  in  as 
much as the calling card service matches imponant needs 
which  the (normal)  voice  telephony does  not meet,  for 
example  as  a  result  of  additional  features  such  as 
payment via credit or debit card; least cost routing, desti-
nation speed dialling etc. Where additional features such 
as these, rather thari possible lower tariffs, are decisive in 
prompting users to use the calling ·card service instead of 
voice  telephony,  the  service  should  be  considered 
liberalized.  The  fact  that  a  calling  card  market  is 
emerging, although tariffs  are in  most cases  higher than 
those  of voice  telephony (l
5
),  is  evidence  that there  is  a 
calling  card  market  which  is  distinct  from  the  voice 
telephony  one.  Calling  card  providers  have  developed 
this  new  market  tailoring the  services  to  the  customers 
and blUing  them accordingly. This evolution creates new 
opportunities for the users  in  the  Union  and should not 
. be  delayed  by· restrictions aimed  at preserving  the  tradi-
.  tional  voice  telephony muket. 
The prohibition of leased  line  routing for the  provision 
of calling  card  services  would  put providers  of calling 
card services at a competitive disadvantage in this market 
relative  to calling  card providers  with  own  facilities.  In 
the  absence  of  the  routing  facility  they  are  merely 
rescUers  of  voice  telephony  and  would  have  no 
('•)  To  allow  the  relevant  national  regulatory  authorities  to 
assess the envisaged service, the  applicants may be  required 
to  provide  them  with  all  the  necessary  information, 
including draft advertisements and envisaged  tariffs  lists,  if 
any. 
(")  'conuarv to widespread  belief,  cost saving  is  not the  main 
driver  (for  the  development  of  calling  card  services). 
Indeed,  calling  card  and  international  direCt  dial  (100) 
tariff comparisons for calls  originating from  the  EC  reveal 
that  convenience  is  the  main  drivin'  factor  for  a  service 
essentially  targeted  at  business  users.  See:  New  forms  of 
competiuon  in  voice  telephony  services  in  the  European 
Community,  BIS  Strategic Decisions,  October  1993, study 
carried out for the European Commission. 
Additional  features,  such  as  billing and  usage  convenience 
(no  local  currency  required,  operator  speaking  the  same 
language)  seem  to  be  the  main  driving  faetor  for  this 
service. 
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conuol  over  their  main  costs.  They  'could  therefore 
hardly compete  with  the  telecommunications  operators 
(TOs). TOs have  a  further advantage  in  that they can 
offer their customers  both voice  telephony  and  calling 
card services  and develop  their card service  by building 
on their database of high volume users.  ) 
Such a state of affairs would promote possible scenarios 
whereby  national  TO's  offering  calling  card  services 
would  limit  their  offer  to  residents  of  their  national 
territory  without  entering  neighbouring  geographic 
markets. 
An individual  assessment · of the  envisaged  calling  card 
service  may,  however, be  necessary,  in  particular of the 
additional  features  offered,  in  order to  determine  the 
nature of the service and upon which  market it will  be 
offet c:d.  The criteria used should be  the degree of func-
tional  interchangeability  between  the  services  and  the 
possible  barriers  to  substitution.  Such  assessment  must 
take  into  account  the  specific  circumstances  of  the 
markets concerned. 
(b)  Enforcement  of the  voice  telephony  monopoly  in  a 
L'ber:alized environment 
Since  cenain  categories  of  voice  services  have  been 
opened up to competition, and since such categories may 
not  be  defined  in  a  rigidly  technical  sense,  cenain 
Member States  feared  that service provide.rs  would offer 
what  is  in  effect  'voice  telephony'  and  thereby  by-pass 
the  monopoly.  In  fact,  experience  has  shown  that such 
fears  were  not founded.  The  main  reason  is  that such 
'unofficial'  by-pass  will  not  occur  to  any  significant 
extent  without  being  noticed  by  the  relevant  Member 
State. A service  which  is  offered  to the  public  must be, 
ipso facto,  public knowledge. 
In  particular,  given  that  any  commercial  offer  would 
normally  involve  advertising  (of the  services  available) 
or,  at the  very  least,  issuing  price  lists,  contraCts  and 
invoices,  such  by-pass  should  be  evident  from  an  early 
stage.  Furthermore,  any breach  leading  to a  substantial 
diversion  of  traffic  on  to  a  competitor's  network  is 
rapidly  detected  by  the  public  operator  providing  the 
competitor's leased  line capacity. The TO would clearly 
have an interest in  bringing the situation to the attention 
of the appropriate national regulatory authority. 
In  the  framework  of  the  licensing  or  declaration 
procedures,  various  Member  States,  however,  still 
request  the  applicant  to  provide  a  description  of  the 
intended  service. Where networks  are  connected to  the 
public switched telephony network (PSTN), for example 
in  the  case  of voice  services  provided  on  leased  lines, 
Member  States  often  require  evidence  of  how  the 
applicant will prevent dial-in and dial-out facilities  being 
available at the same time. It should be noted that, under 
Article 4 of the Directive, technical restrictions may not 
be  imposed  on the service  provider.  It suffices  that the 
Service  provider clearly Sets  OUt  in  the COntractS,  signed 
with its  clients, the extent of services  authorized. 
New  operators  generally  have  shown  that  they  will 
respect the voice  telephony monopoly. Service  providers 
do  not want  to  take  the  risk  of having  their  author-
ization  revoked  or  having  the  national  regulatory 
authority  requesting  the  disconnection  of the  relevant 
leased lines  and not being able  to fulfil  their obligations 
towards  their  clients.  Many  service  providers  did 
therefore,  before starting their services,  investigate  first 
the  matter  with  the  national  regulatory  authorities  or 
with the Commission services. 
(c)  Corporate networks -and. closed user groups 
As  mentioned,  the  special  issue  of corporate  networks 
and/or closed user groups (CUGs) has been of panicular 
importance amongst the issues encountered in the course 
of implementation of the  Directive. 
Effective  liberalization of corporate networks  and  CUG 
services is,  without doubt, critical for the development of 
advanced  business  communications  and  therefore  the 
competitiveness  of EU  industry  vis-a-vis  its  conterpans 
in Japan and the United States. It is,  thus, a central goal 
of  the  Directive.  The  economics  of  competition,  and 
marketS  themselves  are  becoming  increasingly  global. 
Where business is denied the clear benefits of lower cost, 
anq  increased  quality  and  choice  which  competition 
ensures,  it  will  ultimately  either  suffer  from  the 
competitive disadvantage this implies, or, where possible, 
will  seek to relocate  to  a less  restrictive environment. 
In this  context, the goals of the  Directive have  still  not 
been  achieved  in  a  number  of  Member  States.  Two 
reasons  for this  are: 
(i)  disputes as  to the extent of allowed 'membership' of 
CUGs,  which  are  broader  than  strict  corporate 
networks.  This  has  led  to  lack  of  full  or effective 
implementation of the Directive; 
(ii)  bottlenecks  in  the  supply  of capacity  of  the  new 
service  providers  caused  by  restrictions  on  use  of · 
alternative  infrastructure  {this  will  addressed  more 
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The  Commission  has  considered  the  cases  where 
Member  States  have  issued  provisions  under  the 
Directive  for  authorizing  the  provision  of  voice  to 
CUGs.  Various  definitions  have  emerged C').  On  the 
basis of experience gained, the  Commission will  use  the 
following  definitions C'). 
'corporate  networks' 
those  networks  generally established  by a  single  organ-
ization  encompassing  distinct  legal  entities,  such  as  a 
company  and  its  subsidiaries  or its  branches  in  oth~r 
Member States incorporated under the relevant domesuc 
company law, 
'closed user groups': 
those entities,  not necessarily bound by economic links, 
but which can be  identified as  being pan of a group on 
the  basis  of  a  lasti.ng  professional  relationship  among 
themselves,  or with  another  entity  of  the  group,  and 
whose· internal  communications  needs  result  from  the 
common interest underlying this  relationship. In  general, 
the link between the members of the group is  a comfl\On 
business  activity.  \ 
Examples of activities  likely to fall  into this  category are 
fund  transfers  for  the  banking  industry,  reservation 
systems  for  airlines,  information  transfers  be~een 
universities  involved  in  a  common  research  proJect, 
re-insurance  for  the  insurance  industry,  inter-library 
activities  common  design  projects,  and  different  insti-
tutions  ~r services  of intergovernmental or international 
organizations. 
Services  provided  concerning  such  categories  of 
networks or entities are fully liberalized according to the 
definition  of  'voice  telephony'  in  Anicle  1  of  the 
Directive.  Some  Member  States  did,  however,  only 
authorize such services  after further discussions with the 
Commission. 
(I') For country by counuy information, see Annex. 
('') The Commission  has  acknowledged these  definitions  if!- itS 
'Green  Paper  on  the  liberali~":tion  of  telecommuni~atJ~ns 
infrasuucwre  and  cable  telcv1Slon  networks,  Put I,  Pnn-
ciples  and Timetable', COM(94) 440  final,  Brussels,  25.  10. 
1994, p.  27. 
(d)  Data services for the public (,.) 
Article  10  of  the  Services  Directive  provides  that  the 
Commission  shall  assess  the  effects  of  the  measures 
adopted by the  Member States  regarding simple  packet 
or circuit-switched  data services  under Article  3 of the 
Directive in  1994, to see whether any amendments need 
to be made to the provisions of that Article, particularly 
in  the  light  of technological  evolution  and  the  devel-
opment of trade within the Community. 
During  the  consultation  on  the  1987  Green  Paper, 
various  Member States  stressed  the  need  for  a  special 
regime  for basic switched data network services such as 
X.25 ("). No justification could be  found  for the main-
tenance  of exclusive  rights  as  regards  the  provision, of 
such  services  per  se.  The.  Commission,  however, 
acknowledged  that developed  data  switching  networks 
might  have  a  structural  effect  on  investments  and 
regional  planning,  and  could .therefore  qualify  for  a 
specific  regime,  set out in  Anicle 3 of the Directive,  in 
panicular  th~ application of public service  specifications 
in the form of trade regulations relating to conditions of 
permanence, availability,  an~ permanence of service. 
Moreover,  given  the  substantial  difference  between 
charges  for  use  of the  data transmission  service  on  the 
switched. network and charges for use  of leased  lines  at 
the  time of "adoption  of the Directive, Anicle 3 allowed 
· ·  that exclusive  rights for data services which represented 
'simple  resale  of capacity' {'
0
)  could be  maintained  until 
31  December 1992,  with  possible  additional  deferments 
until  1  January  1996  for  those  counuies  where  the 
relevant  network  for  the  provision  of  the  packet  or 
circuit  switched  services  were  not  yet  sufficiently 
developed (~
1 ). The aim  was  to  allow that equilibrium in 
such charges would be achieved gradually. Two Member 
States e')  initially  requested  such  an  extension  of 




)  Article  1 defmes  'packet and circuit-switched data  se~ces' 
as  'the  commercsal  provision  for  .the  public  of  dtre:t 
transport  of data between  public  SWttche~ network  tenm· 
nation poinu, enabling any us~r  t~ use  eq~upm~nt connected 
to  such  a  network  tennmauon  potnt  sn  order  to 
communicate with another termination point'. 
('') X-25  is  a standard protocol for packet switched  networ~. 
Another advanced  protocol for  nigh  speed  data transfer  IS 
frame-relay. 
(~ The Directive defines the latter as  'the commercial provision 
on  leased  lines  for  the  public  of data  transmissaon  as  a 
separate service,  including only such  switching,  processing, 
data storage or protocol conversion  as  is  necessary for the 
tranSmission  in  real  time  to  and  from  the  public  switched 
network'. 
e•>  Recital  11  of the Directive. 
("')  Greece and Spain. 
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1.3  regards  the  special  regime,  only  three  Member 
StateS (•1)  notified draft specifications to the Commission 
before  the  deadline  provided  in  the  Directive,  i.e. 
30  June  1992.  The  Commission  has  assessed  with  the 
Member States  concerned, whether the  planned specifi-
cations  were  objective,  non-discriminatory,  transparent 
and  proportionate  to  the  aim  pursued.  These  bilateral 
discussions  were  very  useful  and  provided  a  basic 
experience of how a liberalized service  can  be  regulated 
to  guarantee  cenain  public  service  objectives,  without 
restricting  competition.  It  appeared  in  panicular  that, 
given  the  different  staning  positions  of  incumbent 
operators  and  potential  new  entrants,  special  attention 
should be  given  to avoid  burdening the  latter in  a way 
which  could  constitute  a  barrier  to  entry  and  which 
would  confirm  the  market  power  of  the  dominant 
operator. In such cases Member States should not neces-
sarily  impose  the  same  conditions  on  new  entrants  as 
imposed on the dominant public operator. 
Over the last years, rapid technological evolution and, in 
particular,  the  development  alongside  the  traditional 
X.25 of ATM (  ..  ), has undermined the traditional justifi-
cations  for  the  current  specific  regime  for  basic  data 
services.  One can  assume  that  in  the  near  future  X.25 
public backbone networks will  continue to  co-exist with 
frame-relay-networks  and  the  new  emerging 
ATM-backbones.  Applying  the  same  service-specific 
regulation  to  such  different  technologies  will  prove 
difficult.  It  could  delay  new  offers  of vinual  private 
networks  and  value-added  services  and  thus  limit 
technical  progress  in  the  area.  Moreover  the  rationale 
behind quality. or coverage obligations decreases with the 
increasing differentiation of the offer. The emergence of 
new services requires a degree of flexibility which cannot 
be steered by regulation. 
(") Three  Member  States  (Belgium,  France  and  Spain)  have 
adopted additional licensing conditions for the provision of 
siml_)le  resale  for  packet  or  circuit-switChed  services.  In 
Spa.n,  for  example,  there  is  a  scheme  regulating  the 
granting  of  concessions  for  the  provision  of  packet  or 
circuit  switched  data  services  which  does  not  tie  in 
completely  with  the  Commission's  commenu  concerning 
this  area. The scope  of the  Spanish  scheme  is  too  broad, 
since  it  applies  to  data  services  between  'network  termi-
nation  poanu'  instead  of 'termination  poinu of the  public 
switehed network'. 
Italy  was  also  considering  the  adoption  of  additional 
conditions, but failed  to implement the  Directive within  an 
appropriate timescale.  Given  that under the direct effect of 
Articles  2 and  3 of the  Directive  simple  resale  of capacity 
was  liberalized in  Italy without any fUrther  restrictions, the 
Italian government shall have to provide appropriate jwtifi-
cations for the reintroduction of any additional  restrictions 
in that respect. 
(••)  ATM: •Asynchronous Transfer Mode', advanced high speed 
communications. See also Green Paper on the Liberalization 
of  telecommunications  infrastrUcture  and  cable  television 
networks,  op.  ciL 
The current specific  schemes  in  force  in  three  Member 
St:ttes  also  have  an  impact  on  trade  between  Member 
States.  The  limited  number  of  applicants  for  author-
izations under the current schemes in  the three Member 
States  can,  in  part,  be  explained  by  the  fact  that many 
providers of the relevant service prefer to limit their offer 
to CUG's instead of having to  apply for a licence under 
these circumstances. 
On the  basis  of its  assessment,  given  that  most  of the 
Member States  have  not deemed  it necessary  to  adopt 
specific  schemes  for  data  services,  without  noticeable 
negative  effect  as  regards  the  public  interest  objectives 
pursued  by  these  schemes,  the  .Commission  considers, 
that the  requirement for applying  specific public service 
specifications  with  regard  to  data  services  should  be 
reviewed in the framework of the general adjustment of 
the  telecommunications · .t:egulatory·· framework  to  be 
presented  before  1 January 1996  according  to  Council 
Resolution 93/C 213/01, and that the termination of the 
current  specific  schemes  for  data  services  should  be 
considered e'). 
(e)  The separation of operation and regulation 
The  separation  of the  regulation  of the  telecommuni-
cations  sector from  the  operation  of the  national  tele-
communications  oganization  was,  without  doubt,  the 
most  fundamental  condition  for  achieving  reform  and 
liberalization  of  the  EU  telecommunications  markets. 
Whatever institutional, legal or strUctural means  may be 
used to achieve it, Anicle 7 (  ..  ) of the Directive requires 
that  the  Member  States  must  separate  telecommuni-
cations regulatory and operational functions. 
(  ..  ) However,  such  schemes  may  be  required  as  regards  the 
provision of voice telephony for the public, once liberalized. 
See  licensing  criteria  proposed  for  licensing  mobile  and 
personal  communications  networks,  as  well  as  for  faxed 
networks (Green Paper for Mobile and  personal communi-
cations, Green Paper on the Liberalization of telecommuni-
cations infrastrUcture and cable television networks, op.  cit.). 
(••)  Article 7 requires Member States to ensure that 'from 1 july 
1991  the  grant  of operating  licences,  the  control  of type 
approval  and  mandatory  specifications,  the  allocation  of 
frequencies  and surveillance of usage conditions are carried 
out  by  a  body  independent  of  the  telecommunications 
organizations'. 
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Whilst  National  Regulatory  Authorities  (NRAs)  now 
formally  exist  in  most  Member Su.tes,  the  Commission 
considers  that  the  degree  of separation  between  these 
and those of the operator functions is still not sufficiently 
clear in  at least five  Member States ('
7
). 
This issue of the independence of the national regulatory 
authorities  was  raised  in  a  number  of  preliminary 
referrals  to  the  Court of Justice relating  to  Anicle 6 of 
Directive 88/301/EEC {the 'Terminals Directive'), which 
required  Member  States,  as  of  1 July  1989,  to  ens.ure 
that the  fixing  of technical  standards  as  well  as  super-
vision of type approval, were carried out by bodies inde-
pendent from  public or private undertakings involved  in 
the  marketing  of telecommunications  equipment.  In  its 
judgments of 27 October 1993 e•), the Court found that. 
this  requirement had been infringed  in  France where, at 
that  time,  departments  in  the  same  Ministry  were 
responsible for the commercial exploitation of the public 
network,  and  the  fixing  of  technical  standards,  the 
supervision  of conformity and  the  approval  of terminal 
equipment. 
Article  7  of  the  Services  Directive  to  a  large  extent 
mirrors  the  wording  of  Article  6  of  the  Terminals 
Directive. The implementation by  the Member States of 
the  former  must  be  considered  in  view  of  this  past 
judgment.  A  mere  legal  or  administrative  separation 
between  the  functions  - such  as  that  between  two 
services  of  a  Ministry  - would  only  be  sufficient  to 
comply  with  Article  7  under the  following  conditions: 
- it must be shown that there is  a 'real' separation, 
(•')  For example,  in  the  Netherlands,  the  regulation  is  carried 
out  by  the  Ministry  for  Transport  and  Public  Works 
through  the  Directorate-General  for  Post  and  Telecom-
munications.  The  Ministry  is,  however,  also  the  majority 
shareholder of KPN which  has  still  the  exclusive  right  to 
install,  maintain  and operate the telecommunications infra· 
structure,  and  provides  the  mandatory  services  to  each 
applicanL 
Some questions  have  also  been  raised  about how  distinct a 
separauon of powers existS  between  regulator and operator 
in  Belgium,  Spain  and  Greece.  The  Belgian  Government 
has,  however,  Stated  itS  intention  to  respect  the  complete 
autonomy of the  public  operator Belgacom  in  the  area  of 
non-reserved  services  in  response  to Commission  concerns. 
In  Spain,  the  Director-General  for  Telecommunications 
(responsible for regulation) is also the Government Delegate 
on the  Board  of directors  of Telef6nica,  although  such  a 
delegate could legally come from another Ministry. 
In Greece, while functions have been fomally separated, the 
continuous  movement  of  personnel  from  the  operational 
body to the regulatory body makes the practical separation 
of these bodies unclear. 
("')  The  cases  Decoster  et  al  (C-69/91)  and  Taillandier 
(C-46/90). · 
in  particular, there must be  financial independence of 
one from the other, 
- any movement of personnel from the regulatory body 
to  the.  ~perational body should  be  subject  to  special 
supeCVIston.  • 
Forms  of  structural  separation  offering  a  reasonable 
guarantee that such conditions would be upheld, include: 
(i)  the  granting  of  the  regulatory  functions  to  a 
depanment of the  relevant  Ministry when  the  tele-
communications  undertaking  is  itself  controlled  by 
private shareholders; or  I 
(ii)  the granting of the relevant regulatory functions to a 
body,  which  is  independent  from  the  relevant 
Ministry (except for the  co mol  of its  accounts  and 
the  legality  of its  decisions)  when  the  latter  is  also 
acting  as  sole  or  dominant  shareholder  of  the 
operator or where a considerable State shareholding 
in  the operator remains. 
Alongside the legal guarantees and general  rules implied 
by  the  Directive,  actual  practice  and  spirit  are  an 
important  test  of  compatibility  with  Anide  7.  How 
'independence'  is  actually  achieved  institutionaJly  will 
therefore vary, to a certain degree, according to the legal 
tradition and experience  in  each  Member State. 
IV.  INCLUSION  OF  SATELLITE  NETWORKS  AND 
SERVICES  DIRECTIVE 94/46/EC 
On 13  October 1994, the Commission adopted Directive 
94/46/EC.  This  Directive  extends  the  Terminal 
Directive ('")  to  include satellite  eanh station equipment 




("•)  Commission  Directive of 16  May  1988  on competition on 
the  marketS  in  telecommunications  terminal  equipment 
88/301/EEC (OJ No L 131, 27.  5.  1988, p. 73). 
C
0
)  Directive  94/  46/EC  constitutes  the  central  measure  for 
implementing  the  liberalization  objectives  for  the  satellite 
sector, set forth by Council resolution 92/C 8/01 (based on 
the  Green  Paper  on  Satellite  communications, 
COM(90) 490). 
Other  measures  in  this  field  are  Council  Directive 
93/97  /EEC of 29  October 1993,  relating to mucual  recog-
nition  of  type  approval  for  satellite  terminals  and  the 
proposal for a European Parliament and  Council Directive 
on a policy for the mutual recognition of licences and other 
national authorizations for the provision of satellite necwork 
services  and/  or  satellite  communications  services, 
COM(93) 652,  4.  1.  1994. 
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(a)  The significance of the amending Directive 
The  aim  of the  Union's  policy  in  the  area of satellite 
communications,  shared  by  the  Council  and  the 
Commission, is  to stimulate without delay greater use of 
satellite  communications in  the  EU.  This  is  particularly 
important given  the widening gap between the  delay in 
development  of  EU  business  satellite  communications 
compared to that which its  major competitors enjoy. 
The  Directive  requires  the  abolition  of  all  exclusive 
rights granted for the provision of satellite services,  and 
the abolition of all special rights (") to provide any tele-
communications service covered by  the Directive. 
(b)  Voice telephony 
The  amended  Directive  does  not  affect  restncuons  on 
offering  voice  telephony  for  the  public  via  satellite 
network.  However,  this  must  not  lead  to  technical 
restrictions.  While  recital  16  states  that 'in  the  case  of 
direct  transport  and  switching  of  speech  via  satellite 
earth  station  networks,  commercial  provision  for  the 
public  in  general can  take place  only when the satellite 
earth station network is  connected to the public switched 
network',  this  is  merely  a  guide  as  to what  is  normally 
the  case.  It  should  not  be  understood  as  allowing 
technical  restrictions  to  protect  the  voice  telephony 
monopoly.  The  burden  of  proof  that  the  new  service 
actually  constitutes  'voice  telephony'  rests  with  the 
regulator. 
In fact,  the provision of voice for closed user groups will 
often involve  such connections with  the public switched 
network, since some members of such groups will  not be 
connected to  the network via  satellite stations ('
1
). 
(c)  Broadcasting services 
The status of broadcasting services are also unaffected by 
Directive  94/46/EC.  One  has,  however,  to  distinguish 
C')  Special  rights  is  defined  in  the  Directive  as  'limiting  the 
number  of  undertakings  authorized  to  provide  telecom-
munications services  otherwise than  according to objective, 
proportional and  non-discriminatory criteria or designating 
otherwise  than  to  such  criteria  several  competing  under-
takings to provide such services'. 
('1}  According  to  the  definition  given,  closed  user  groups  are 
indeed  not  to  be  defined  technically,  by  the  network  to 
which  their  members  are  connected  and  which  should  not 
be  accessible  by  third  parties,  but  sociologically  by  the 
economic or professional relationship among their members. 
between  the  content  and  the  technical  provision  of 
broadcasting  services. ·As  mentioned  in  recital  17  the 
provision of satellite network services for the conve;ance 
of radio and television programmes is,  by its very nature 
also a  telecommunications service and there is  therefor; 
no justification for treating it differently from any other 
telecommunications service. The Directive, thus, makes a 
distinction between: 
- the.  services  provided  by  the  carrier  (transmission, 
SWitching  and  other  activities)  necessary  for  the 
conveyance  of the  signals,  which  are  telecommuni-
cations services liberalized under the Directive, and 
the  acuvmes  of  those  bodies  which  control  the 
contents  of the  messages  t.o  be  broadcasted,  which 
are broadcasting activities falling outside the scope of 
this Directive.  _. 
Satellite  broadcasting  services  wich  should  now  be 
liberalized under this Directive therefore include services 
provided over telecommunications operator's feeder links 
from  studios/  events  to  uplink  sites,  as  well  as  uplink 
services  for  point  to  point,  point to  multipoint,  direct-
to-home  (DTH) satellite broadcast services  and  services 
to  cable-heap ends. 
(d)  Access to space segment 
Member States  are  required by  the  Directive  to  abolish 
all  restrictions on the offer of space-segment capacity on 
their territory. 
This  means  that  the  Member  States  now  must  ensure 
that: 
any regulatory prohibition or restrictions on the offer 
of sp_ace  segment capacity to any authorized satellite 
earth station network operator are abolished, 
any  space  segment  supplier  is  authorized  to  verify 
within  itS  territory  that  the  satellite  earth  station 
network  for  use  in  connection  with  the  space 
segment of the supplier in  question,  is  in  conformity 
with the published conditions for  access  to his  space 
segment capacity. 
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In  iu  communication  of  10  June  199~  on  satellite 
communications  relating  to  the  provision  of  - and 
access to - space segment capacity ('
1
), the Commission 
announced  its  intention  to use  the competition rules  to 
remove  aU  national  restrictions  within  the  European 
Union  on  access  to  space  segment.  The  discovery 
procedures set out in  Article  3 of the  Directive will,  in 
particular,  be  implemented  to  gather  the  necessary 
information to achieve this  purpose. 
(e)  International satellite organizations 
The  new  obligations  related  to  space  segment  do  not 
directly  affect  the  position  of  the  telecommunications 
organizations as signatory of international organizations. 
However,  Member  States  are  obliged  to  ensure  that 
there are no restrictive provisions in  their national regu-
lations  which  would  have  the  effect  of preventing  the 
offer  of  space  segment  capacity  in  their  territory  by 
either another signatory of the  relevant org:mizations or 
by  independent  systems.  Similarly  Member  States  are 
obliged  to  ensure  that  there  are  no  regulatory  or 
npn-regulatory  restrictions  preventing  space  segment 
capacity  already  leased  by  a  licensed  operator  in  one 
Member State from being freely accessed from any other 
Member State. Such restrictions include those preventing 
parties other than the signatory in  the  Member State(s) 
concerned  from  verifying  the  technical  and  operations 
specifications of satellite earth stations. 
Article 3 of Directive 94/  46/EC requires Member States 
to  communicate  to  the  Commission,  at' its  request,  the 
information  relating  to  international  satellite  organ-
izations  they  possess  on  any  measure  that  could 
prejudice  in  panicular compliance with  the  competition 
rules  of  the  EC  Treaty.  Recital  21  explains  that  this 
provision  aims  amongst  others  to  monitor  the  review 
which  is  underway  within  these  international  organ-
izations to improve access. 
Ani  de 3 of Directive 94/  46/EC does therefore also  not 
directly affect the position of the signatories. However, if 
it appeared that signatories continue to maintain mech-
anisms  dissuading  multiple  access  and  thus  favouring 
market sharing  for the  provision of space  segment,  the 
Commission would have to assess whether action should 
be  taken  under  the  competition  rules  of  the  Treaty 
against the relevant signatories. 
The  coupling  of investment  obligations  and  utilization 
could  constitute such  a  dissuasive  mechanism,  where  it 
dissuades  signatories  to  market  space  segment  by  the 
threat of having  to  bear an  increased  investment  share. 
Which  international  organizations,  and  in  particular 
Eutelsat,  operating  in  increasingly  competitive  markets, 
( 11)  COM(94) 210 final. 
the  current  investment  requirements  will  therefore,  if 
they  are  not amended,  have  to  be  thoroughly  assessed 
under the Competition rules. 
(f)  TlDl.e table for implementation 
~. 
The  Directive  gives  Member  States  nine  months  to 
inform  the  Commission  of  the  measures  taken  to 
transpose  the  Directive into  national  law.  The Member 
States  should  thus  communicate  to  the  Commission 
before  8 August  1995,  a copy of the measures  taken to 
abolish  the  current  restrictions  on  the  provision  of 
satellite  services,  and  of  any  licensing  or  delcaration 
procedure which is  currendy in force or is  being drafted 
for  the  operation  of satellite  networks.  The  aim  is  to 
allow the Commission to assess whether these conditions 
are  necessary  with  a  view  to  satisfying  essential 
requirements.  The  informati~n  provided  to  the 
Commission should include possible fees  imposed as  pa.n 
of these  authorization procedures as  well  as  the criteria 
upon  which  these fees  are based  .. 
Recital 22 which mentions that the Commission will  also 
take  into  account the situation  of those  Member States 
in  which  the  terrestrial  network  is  not  yet  sufficiently 
developed must be seen in ·the  framework of this  notifi-
cation  requirement.  Member States  which  would  deem 
necessary a defennent of the  date of full  application of 
the  abovementioned  provisions (f')  should  request  it 
formally  and with the  necessary justification within  the 
time  period  provided  for  the  communication  of  the 
· · implementation  measures  of  the  Directive,  i.e.  before 
8 August 1995. The Commission will then assess whether 
it should refrain from insisting on the immediate liberal-
ization  of  the  relevant  satellite  services.  This  would, 
however,  not prevent possible  actions  in  national couns 
brought by third parties in  these  Member States. 
Given  the  wide  variety  of satellite  services,  the  moti-
vation given  should, in  the first  place, include the list of 
satellite  network  services  for  which  the  defennent  is 
requested,  accompanied  by  estimates  of  the  markets 
concerned. 
It  should further explain which  services  of the  national 
telecommunications  organizations  would  be  affected, 
and  on the  basis  of the  turnover of these  services  and 
their contribution to the financing of the public network, 
a potencial negative impact on the future development of 
the public network should' be  demonstrated~ 
The  Commission  will  apply  to  the  proportionality 
principle. The Commission will  in  any case insist on, for 
example,  the  liberalization  of services  which  are  econ-
omically insignificant. 
(u) This  derogation  can  apply  up- to  I  January  1966  at  the 
latest. 
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V.  FU11JRE  EVOLUTION  IN  THE  CONTEXT  OF 
SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTIJRE. LIBERA.LIZA  TION 
While major attention will have to continue to be paid to 
the  full  effective  implementation  of  the  Services 
Directive,  the future development of the  Directive  must 
be  considered  within  the  overall  context,  which  was 
determined  by  the  review  carried  out according  co  the 
provisions  of  the  Directive  during  1992,  leading 
to Council  resolution  93/C 213/01  of 22  july 1993  on 
full  service  liberalization  by  1  January  1998,  now 
supplemented  by  Council  resolution  94/C 379/03  of 
22  December  1994,  integrating  infrastructure  liberal-
ization into this time schedule. 
According  to  Council  resolution  93/C 213/01  the 
CommissiQn  should 
prepare,  before  1  January  1996,  the  necessary 
amendments to the Community regulatory framework in 
order  to  achieve  liberalization  of  all  public  voice 
telephony services  by  1 January 1998.' 
Given  its  central  role  in  lifting  the  restncttons  to 
compenuon  and  ensuring  fair  market  conditions, 
amendments  to  the  Services  Directive  will  represent  a 
foal point of these  measures. 
As set forth in the Green Paper (Part I)  on telecommuni-
cations infrastructure liberalization C'): 
under the  Directive  90/388/EEC on  competition  in  the 
markets for telecommunications services, the provision of 
all  telecommunications  services  was  opened  to 
competition,  subject  co  four significant exceptions: 
- satellite services, 
- mobile telephony and paging services, 
- radio and 1V broadcasting services to the public, and 
- voice telephony services to the general public. 
Directive  90/388/EEC  in  ics  original  form  did  not 
address  the  use  of alternative  infrastrUctures  and  cable 
(") Op. cit. 
TV networks  for  the  provts1on  of liberalized  services. 
Directive  90/388/EEC  only  required ·the  removal  of 
restrictions  on  the  use  of  a  single  source  of  infra-
StrUcture,  namely "leased  lines  provided by  the TOs, for 
the provision of liberalized services. 
As  regards  the  exceptions  set  out above,  the  following 
applies: 
- Commission  Directive  94/46/EC ('•),  amending 
Directive 88/301/EEC (telecommunications terminal 
equipment)  and  90/388/EEC  (telecommunications 
services)  in  particular  with  regard  to  satellite 
communications,  adopted  on  13  October  1994  has 
lifted  the  exception  with  regard  to  satellite  services. 
As  set  OUt  under IV,  Member States  are  given  ttine 
months  to  communicate  implementation  measures 
taken. 
On 21  December 1994, the Commission adopted, for 
consultation,  a draft ame.nding  Directive  concerning 
the liberalization of the use of cable TV networks for 
the  services  already  liberalized  according  to  the 
Services  Directive,  providing  for  substantial  opening 
of  the  further  development  of  these  networks, 
particularly with regard to multi-media. 
· ·- The Commission communication on the consultations 
following  the  Green  Paper on  Mobile  and  personal 
communications  was  published  on  23  November 
1994 (
57
).  It  proposed  the  lifting  of all  special  and 
exclusive  rightS  with  regard  to  mobile  services  by 
1 January  1996.  The corresponding  amendments  to 
the Services Directive will  have to be considered. 
Finally,  a major issue  will  be  the adjustment of the tele-
communications  regulatory  framework to  the  objectives 
of  the·  Council  resolutions  of  22  July  1993  ~d 
22  December  1994,  integrating  the  date  of  1 January 
1998  for  full  liberalization  (with  additional  transition 
periods  for  certain  Member  States),  to  be  proposed 
before  1 January 1996.  As  set forth in  the  Infrastructure 
Green Paper (Part II) ("), such an  approach must aim  at 
creating  the  optimal  environment  for  the  future  devel-
opment  of  the  European  Union's  telecommunications 
sector  by  combination  of both  competition  policy  and 
sector specific  regulation. 
('•)  See Section IV. 
(") COM(94)  492  final:  communication  to  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  Consultation  on  the 
Green Paper on Mobile and personlll communications. 
(") Op. cit. 
1/91 No C 275114  ·  Official Journal of the European Communities  20.10.95 
Besides  the  adjustment  hf the  ex1stmg  harmonization 
Directives  in  the  telecommunications  sector  (such  as 
ONP Directives)  and  the  working out of proposals  for 
maintaining  universal  service  ;tnd  ensuring  intercon-
nection,  as  well  as  the  review  of  the  institutional 
arrangements  for  regulating  the  sector,  this  will  in 
panicular  require  further  adjustment  of  the  Services 
Directive. 
At  the  Council  of  17  November,  the  Commission  has 
welcomed  the  agreement  on  the  date  of  1998  as  the 
deadline  for  the  liberalization  of infrastructure  for  all 
telecommunication services. It has also taken note of the 
concerns of a number of Member States expressed at this 
Council,  to  undertake  early  measures  for  the  liberal-
ization of alternative  infrastructures for services  already 
liberalized  according  to  the  Services  Directive.  This 
aspect will  need  further consideration. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC represents  the  most 
significant  legislative  measure  for  liberalizing  EU  tele-
communications  to  date.  The  Commission  will  ensure 
that maximum effort and resources are directed towards 
solving identified problems and filling gaps in  implemen-
tation. 
The 1992  Review  revealed  that the  effectiveness  of t};!.e 
measures  liberalizing  the  telecommunications  sector 
(concerning at that stage, in  particular the liberalization 
of data  communications,  value-added  services  and  the 
provision  of data  and  voice  services  to  corporate  usel'S 
and closed  user groups) was questioned by many service 
providers  and  users  of such  services.  It  has  also  been 
understood that implementation of the Services  Directive 
is  hampered  by  the  non-availability  of  infrastructure 
under reasonable conditions. 
In  pani~ul~r, high  tariffs  for and  lack of availability  of 
the  bas1c  anfrastructure  over  which  liberalized  services 
are  oper:aed  or provided  to  third  parties  have  delayed 
the  widespread  development  of  high  speed  corporate 
networks  in  Europe,  remote  :tccessing  of databases  by 
both  business  and  residential  users  and· the deployment 
of innovative  services  such  as  telebanking  and  distance 
learning.  Additionally,  the  regulatory  restrictions  in 
many Member States still  prevent the  use  of alternative 
infrastructure  operated  by  third  parties,  such  as  cable 
TV-networks and networks owned by energy companies, 
railways, or motorways to meet their· internal communi-
cations  needs.  Many  user  associations  and  companies 
have  stressed  that European business  is  less  competitive, 
that  innovative  services  are  more  slowly  deployed  and 
that  the  creation  and  development  of  pan-European 
networks and services  is  being delayed  as  a result. 
The importance of effective ;tnd 'affordable infrastructure 
is  increasingly  recognized  in  political  debate  within  the 
Member States themselves. The European Parliament has 
called on the Commission to  adopt, as  soon as  possible, 
the  necessary measures. 
The continued bottleneck situation has  been emphasized 
as  a  key  obstacle  to  the  development  of the  European 
information  infrastructure  in  the  report on  Europe and 
the global  infonnation society. The action  plan  towards 
the  European  information  society  adopted  by  the 
Commission  ~~  response  has  set  a  general  framework. 
Further emphasis on effective implementation of the tele-
communications  Services  Directive  and  its  future 
evolution will  take account of these general objectives. It 
is  with  this  intention  in  mind,  that  the  Commission 
transmits  this  communication  to  the  European 
Parliament and to the Council. 
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.ANNEX I 
MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECfiVE '0/388/EEC 
The following  represents  a  short overview of the  state of implementation of the  Directive  in  individual 
Member States. Given the rapid development in this field,  reference should be made to national regulatory 
authorities for more detailed information. 
The overview  does  not  include  information  with  regard  to  implementation  in  the  European  Economic 
Area. 
BELGIUM 
The Directive is  implemented in  Belgium by the  law of 21  March 1991 (").With regard to telecommuni-
cations it transforms the Rigit des  Ttligraphts tt des  Tilqhonts/Rtgit 'E1an  Telegraaf en Ttltfoon (RTI) into 
the public autonomous company Belgacom. 
As regards  the  definition  of the  reserved  service  in  the  Belgian  law,  Article  6fs  defines  the  'Telephone 
Service' as  the telecommunications service intended for the direct carrying and real time switching of vocal 
signals at the Start and at the destination of the  conne~on points, including the services necessiry for itS 
operation. In  letters of July  1991  and June  1993 the Belgian  Government confirmed .that it interprets the 
law in  the way intended by the  Directive.  ·  -
Where a provider wishes to supply liberalized services, a list of non-reserved services can be established by 
Royal  Decree  which,  by  derogation,  would  automatically  be  authorized  providing  that  the  applicant 
informs  the  IBIYf  of the service.  Thus far,  however,  the  Commission  is  not aware of such  a  list.  In  itS 
absence,  the applicant must give  the IBIYf  two months prior notice of itS  intention during which time the 
IBIYf can oppose the provision of the service  if it deems it contrary to the  1991  law.  Article  89  (5)  states 
that the  IBIYf  must provide  a reasoned decision  if it refuses  to authorize the provision of a service. 
Belgium is  one of three Member States to have adopted additional licensing conditions for the provision of 
packet or circuit-switehed  dat~ services  for the public. This is  allowed under Article  3 of the  Directive  as 
long  as  the Commission approves  the conditions, which  it did  in  July  1993. 
Under Anicle 85  of the  1991  Belgian  Law,  Belgacom c:1n  only refuse a user access to a leased  line  on  the 
basis of the essential requirements recognized by  Community Law.  Further,  as  defined in the management 
conuact (Anicle 21(3)), Belgacom must satisfy at least 90% of the registered applications for ONP-leased 
lines  within three  months  unless  otherwise agreed with the customer. 
With respect to the issue  of the independence of Belgacom  from  the regulatory authority as  required by 
Article 7 of the Directive,  under the  1991  law regulatory powers are assigned to the Minister responsible 
(assisted by the national regulatory authority, lnstitut Beige tks Seruices  Postaux tt des  Tilicommunications, 
IBPT). The Belgian Government has stated that it will respect the complete autonomy of Belgacom in  the 
area of non-reserved services. 
DENMARK 
The Directive has  been implemented in  Denmark by  Law  No 743 of 14  November 1990 and the Consoli-
dating Order No 398  of 13  May  1992. 
Under the  Act,  the  Minister of Communications can  grant  a concession  to TeleDanmark on the  estab-
lishment and operation in  relation to public radio and fixed services as well  as of voice telephony, text and 
data communication,  provision  of leased  lines,  mobile  communications  and  satellite  services,  and  trans-
mission of radio and TV programmes. 
e,  Monit~ur 8~/gt,  27  March  1991,  p.  6155  and  corrigendum  in  Monittur Btlgt  20  July  1991.  The  same  law  also 
implemenu  the  Directive  on  competition  in  the  markeu  for  telecommunications  tennmal  equipment,  Commission 
Directive 88/301/EEC. 
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An area of concern,  and  indeed  the  issue  which  led  to  the commencement of infringement proceedings 
against Denmark, was the definition of 'voice telephony' which is reserved to TeleDanmark. The initial law 
reserved  all  of the  non-public  transmission  of tr:~.ffic  to TeleDanmark with  the  sole  exception of voice 
telephony over leased  lines  between  different legal  entities  (i.e.  shared  use).  This clearly  left  too  many 
restrictions on the usage conditions of leased  lines  in  place,  in  contravention of the  Directive. 
The Commission dosed iu proceedings after the adoption by the Danish Government of Order No 90S. of 
2 November 1994  which allows anyone to provide domestic public voice  telephdlly without requiring any 
form  of authorization or declaration. As regards international calls,  a license  is  required where calls ong-
i'nating  from 'the PSTN are carried via  leased  lines  and  then returned back to the PSTN. Such  licence  is 
only granted for traffic  to  countries which  have  liberalized voice  telephony. 
The  Order was  adopted  under Article  3 of the  1990  Danish  Act,  which  entides  the  Minister  to  issue 
regulations  for  the  establishment  and  operation  of services  which  are  not covered  by  TeleDanmark's 
concession or special rights. 
The rules to be applied to packet and circuit-switched data services after 31  December 1992 were stated in 
the Danish Order of December 1992. There is  a slight discrepancy between the scope of thes~ rules, and 
that intended by Article 3 of the  Directive since  the Order covers  all  data communications services. 
GERMANY 
Two German Jaws  adopted on 8 June  1989  define the  legal  framework for the provision of telecommuni-
cations services: the Postvtr/assungsgtsttz (PVG), which  delimits the organization and tasks of the Ministry 
for Post and Telecommunications and of Dtutscht Bundtspolt Ttltltom; and an amendment of the  Ftmmtl-
J~an.Uttttsrtz (FAG),  defining  among  other  things,  the  monopoly  retained  by  the  State.  The  legal 
framework  was  substantially  amended  by  the  Law  of  14  September  1994  (Postntuordnungsg~sttz -
PTNruOG), which  came  into force  on  1 January 1995. 
The new Act did not however alter the  definition of the  'voice telephony' reserved to the DBP Telekom, 
although the  Commission  had in  April  1994  dr~wn the  attention of the  German Government to  the  fact 
that it  is  broader than  that in  the  Directive.  Essentially  three  issues  arise.  Firsdy,  the  definition  uses  the 
wording  'for third  parties'  as  opposed  to  'for the  pub lit'. As  a consequence,  the switching  of voice  for 
closed user groups is  part of th~ monopoly. Secondly, the terms  'switching of voice' in  the  Law are inter-
preted in  practice as including also mixed telecommunications (v:oice combined with data or images) in the 
monopoly, when  the exchange of speech can technically be dissociated from  data communication as  is  the 
case as  regards videophony on ISDN. Finally,  the  definition covers  all  switching of voice,  without distin-
guishing whether the voice both originates in  and  is switched to the public switched network. According to 
the  Directive the switching of voice  originating in  a leased  line  network or switched co  such a leased  line 
network should not be  reserved.  -
Following bilateral contactS,  the  first issue  was  provisionally setded to a large extent. The German  Law 
(FAG)  reserves voice  telephony for  third parties, which  is  more  than voice  telephony 'for the public'  as 
allowed  according to  the  Directive. To restore  conformity  between  German  and  Community Law,  the 
Gennan Mi~istry for Post and Telecommunications, instead of changing the Law, used iu licensing powers 
co  allow  by  order (Vtrfiigung)  No 1/1993, of 6 January  1993  and  8/1993  of 13  January 1993,  private 
companies to provide telephony to closed user groups. The order eStablished  a class license  (Allg~mtingr­
nrhmigung) for the provision of the service to  entities which are economically integrated. 
A.J  regards  Article  6  of the  Directive,  Section  29  TKV  provides  that a connection  licence  (Anschaltttr-
laubnis) is  required for terminal equipment for connection to the network termination of transmission lines. 
The Commission views such a restriction as  contrary to Article 6 of the Directive since it delays the use of 
equipment. already type approved, used  in  the switching and processing of signals  (such as concentrators) 
to connect leased lines  networks with the public switched  telecommunications network. The issue has  been 
raised with the German authorities which will abolish the relevant provision. In the meantime, the Ministry 
has  granted a class connection licence  (Vfg  269/1994). 
The powers  referred  to  in  Anicle  7  of the  Directive  were  until  31  December  1994  exercised  by  The 
Minister  for  Posts  and  Telecommunications.  Under the  new  regime,  the  Ministry will  be  assisted  by a 
Regulation  Council  (Rtg,[itrungsrat),  including  representatives  of the  Undtr and the  Federal  Parliament 
·  (Butul~stag). On the other hand,  the  government share  in  DBP Telekom, which  was  transformed  into  a 
joint scock company,  will  now be  managed  by  a distinct office:  the  Bund~sanstalt for Post utul Teltltom-
muniltation (  BAnst PT). 
20. 10. 95 
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GREECE 
Greece implemented the DireCtive  by means of Law No 2075/92 of 21  July 1992, which has  never been 
brought fully into effect as the Greek government failed to adopt the order setting out the internal working 
rules of the independent regulatory body set up by the Act. On 20 October 1994, this law was replaced by 
Law  No  2246/94.  The  legislation  does  also  not  provide  a  complete  regulatory  framework  and  will 
necessitate fun.her secondary  l~gislation wpi~h has  not yet been adopted. 
Given  the  failure  of the  Greek  Government  to  adopt  timely  implementation  measures  of the  Services 
Directive  the  Commission  has  staned proceedings  before  the  Coun of Justice  under Article  169  of the 
Treaty. 
Article  2  (1 5)  of Law  No 22-46/94  defines  'voice  telephony'  using  the  same  wording  as  the  Directive. 
However, Article  3 (2)  of the  Law States  as  principle  that voice  telephony  is  reserved and acknowledges 
only in  a second stage that all  other services  are liberalized.  Consequently,  there is  a threat of a broader 
definition  of the  reserved  voice  telephony  in  Greece.  Moreover,  this  Anicle  makes  the  liberalization  of 
these services  subj'ect  to the condition that their provision  is  compatible with the proper fulfilment of the 
mission  assigned  to the public operator OTE. 
Liberalized  services  are,  according  to this  Article  3  (2),  subject  to either an  individual  licence  or to  a 
declaration,  depending on  the  limit of the capacity of leased  lines  used. The threshold has  not yet been 
established.  · 
As regards simple resale of packet - and circuit - switched data uansmission, Greece applied by letter of 
7  February  1992  for  the  derogation  until  1 January. 1996  under Recital  11  of the  Directive.  After the 
adoption of Law  No  2075/92,  which  did  not distinguish  packet and  cricuit-switched  data transmission 
from  other liberalized telecommunications services, Greece confinned by letter of 27 May 1993, that it did 
no  longer seek such a derogation and  that packet and circuit-switched data transmission was  liberalized. 
According  to  Law  No  2246/94,  the  independent  regulatory  authority 'referred  to  in  Article  7  of the 
Directive,  is  the  National Telecommunications Commission  (EE'T),  under the supervision of the  Minister 
of Transport and Communications. The EET is  the relevant authority for frequency alloc:uion, numbering, 
licensing and type approval, as  well  as  for ensuring compliance with national and EEC Treaty competition 
rules.  It is  not yet operational.  In  the  mean  time,  the  Ministry exercises  its  competence. 
SPAIN 
The Ley  de  Ordenaci6n  de  las  T~lecomuniCJUiones, Law No 31/1987 of 18  Decemb(ir 1987,  ('LOT') is  the 
legislation in force relating to telecommunications aCtivities in Spain. In light of the DireCtive, the LOT has 
been amended by  Law  No 32/1992 of 3 December 1992, which limited the reserved services to the basic 
telephone service, telex and telegrams, and a Royal Decree 804/1993 of 28  May 1993 implementing Article 
3 of the  DireCtive  as  regards basic data switching services. 
As has  been the case  in some other Member States, the major issue  in  the  Directive's implementation has 
concerned the definition of voice telephony and, hence,  the reserved area. The LOT defines  'basic voice 
telephony',  in  paragraph  15  of its  Annex,  in  terms  identical  to the definition  of 'voice  telephony'  in  the 
Directive. However, following a complaint to the Conunission, it seems that the Spanish authorities' under-
standing of this definition was  not so clear and that, although defined in  the Law, an administrative order 
would be  required to define funher Telef6nica's basic voice telephony monopoly. This definition is  not yet 
adopted. 
Spain  originally  requested  an  extension  period  for  exclusive  rights  for  simple  resale,  as  allowed  under 
Recital  11  of  the  Directive,  although  such  a  request  was  not  maintained.  As  regards  the  grant' of 
concessions  for the  provision  of packet or circuit switched data services,  a scheme for  its  regulation was 
created by the Royal Decree of 28  May 1993. The draft had been notified to the Commission, but the text 
adopted  did  not  take  account  of  all  the  Commission's  remarks.  Issues  relevant  to  this,  particularly 
regarding the scope of the  scheme,  are being further discussed  with  the  Spanish authorities. 
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·nte  rer,ulawry powers  referred  to  in  Article  7 of the  Directive  are the  responsibility of the  Directorate· 
General  for  Telecommunications  (DG1). The DGT wu created  by  Royal  Decree  of 19  June  1985.  It 
grants concessions,  authorizations  and  administrative  licences  for  equipment and services. The Director-
General for telecommunications is,  however, also  the Government Delegate on the Board of Directors of 
Telef6nica. He has the right to veto decisions of the Board on grounds of public policy. Moreover, Article 
15  of the LOT allows  for  the  appointment by the Government of five  other members of the Board. 
FRANCE 
The French government has  implemented the Directive  ~ainly through the adoption of Law  No 90-1170 
of 29 December 1990 on the regulation of telecommunications. This Law is a modification of the Code dts 
Postts  tt Telecommunications  (the Code) which  gives  France Telecom an exclwive right to establish  tele-
communications network infrastrUctUres  open to the  general public. 
Article L.34 specifies that only services provided to the public are covered by the Law. Article 1..32-7 of the 
Code defines reserved voice telephony as the commercial provision of  a system of direct,  real-time voice 
transmissions between users  connected to tennination points of a telecommunications  network. All  other 
services  provided  to  the  public  are  liberalized  subject  to  a  declaration  procedure  or,  for services  of S 
mbits/second or more,  to a licensing  procedure ('
0
). 
According to Article  1..34-21  Franr.e  Telt-~cm is  :tuthorized to supply any bearer service  (this  is  how the 
French  regulation  qualifies  the  provision  of simple  resale  of packet or circuit-switehed  services).  Other 
providers  need  a  licence.  France· has  adopted  additional  licensing  conditions  for  the  provision  of such 
bearer-service. A final  draft Decree  for  the  application  of Article  L.34.2  relating  to bearer-services  was 
transmitted to the Commission which decided, on  26  November 1992, not to object to its entry into force. 
The Decree was  formally adopted on  30 December  1993 and published in  the  French Official Journal of 
31  December  1993  (p.  18276). This decree sets  out a  number of conditions relating to: 
- the essential requirements, 
- the  measurement  and  the  publication  of the  characteristics  and  the  area  of coverage  of the  service 
(Anide 2), 
- the respect of technical constraints concernidg access to the service {Article 3), 
- the interconnection with other bearer services (Anicle 4), 
national defence and public security as regards the encryption of data (Article 5), 
fair competition. 
The authorization  of France  Telecom  to  provide  this  service,  cannot be  transferred  to  its  subsidiaries. 
Transpac,  which  is  a  subsidiary  of the  Compagnie  G~n~rale des  Communications  (Cogecom),  itself  a 
100 Ofo  subsidiary of France Telecom, had therefore to requeSt a licence which was granted by order of 15 
July  1993 (French Official Journal of 8 August  1993, p.  11224). 
As  regards  the  separation of regulation  and  operation  (Article  7), the  Minister for  Industry,  Posts  and 
Telecommunica~ions and Foreign Trade ensures that the regulations are respected by the public operators 
and, furthermore, that the regulation of the telecommunications sector on the one hand, and the operation 
of netWorks  and  the  provision  of telecommunications  services  on the  other hand,  are  performed  inde-
pendently.  He exercises  his  rights  through  the  'Direction  Generale  des  Pastes  et  Tel~communications' 
(DGP1). 
IRELAND 
Ireland  has  adopted specific  regulations to give  effeet to the  Directive. These are contained in  'Statutory 
Instrument S.I.  No 45  of 1992, European Communities (Telecommunications Services)  Regulations  1992' 
which  have  amended the  Postal  and Telecommunications Services Aet,  1983. 
(  ..  ) The following oompanies were granted a licence: SITA, BT, Sprint, Sligos, GSI, EDT and Esprit Telecom. 
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In  the area of voice telephony,  the definition of 'public voice  telephony' expressed  in S.I. No 45  mirrors 
that in the Directive. The exclusive·right granted to Telecom Eireann under Section 87 of the 1983 Act is 
restricted  to offering,  providing  and  maintaining  the  public  telecommunications  network  and  offering, 
providing  and  maintaining voice  telephony services  under Regulation  3 {1)  of S.l.  No <45.  Value-added 
licences can be obtained under Anicle 111  of the Act of 1983 for provision of any other service, including 
voice for closed user groups or voice services making use of only one connection point between leased lines 
o.nd  the public switched  network.  By end  1994, 20  such  licences  were granted. 
Statutory Instrument No 45 of 1992 seu out the rights of these licensees as regards access to and use of the 
public  telecommunications  network.  The  conditions  applied  must  be  objective,  non-discriminatory  and 
published.  Similarly, under Regulation  4 (3)  of the S.I.,  requests  for leased  lines  have  to be  met within  a 
reasonable period, and there should be  no restrictions on their use  other than to ensure non-provision of 
telephone  services,  the  security  of network  operations,  the  maintenance  of network  integrity  and,  in 
justified cases,  the  interoperability of services and data protection. 
With  respect to ;Article  7 of the Services  Directive, The Minister for Transport, Energy and Communi-
cations  is  responsible  for surveillance of Telecom Eireann according to Regulation  5 of S.I.  No 45. 
ITALY 
The Directive has  been  included in Law No 142  of 19  February 1992,  Leggt Comunitaria for 1991  (LC 
1991), which delegated to the Government the power to issue, within one year after iu coming into force 
(i.e. by 5 March 1993), a number of legislative decress for the implementation of the EEC Directives listed 
in  Annexe's  A  and  B,  including  the Services  Directive.  The legislative  decree  implementing  the  Services 
Directive was,  however,  not adopted within  this  deadline. Subsequendy,  the  Italian Government included 
the Services  Directive  in  Anicle 54  of Law  No 146  of 22  February  1994  (Ltggt ComunitAriA  1993). 
This Anicle repeatS  the  specific  principles  and criteria to  be  followed  in  the  preparation of the legislative 
decree implementing the Directive, which were mentioned in  LC  1991. C:onsequendy it still provides for a 
specific licensing procedure for the supply of packet or circuit-switched data services although the deadline 
set out in Anicle 3 of the Service Directive for the introduCtion of such scheme had already elapsed. Given 
that under the direct effect of Anicles 2 and 3 of the Directive simple resale of capacity was  liberalized in 
Italy without any further restrictions, the Italian government shall have to provide appropriate justifications 
for the reintroduction of any additional restriCtions  in  that respect.  · 
The legislative decrees have  not been  adopted yet, and the Commission is  considering taking Italy to the 
Coun of Justice for failure  to  notify the implementation measures  of the Services  Directive. 
In the meantime, Anicle 1 of the Italian Postal Code of 1973, Stating that 'telecommunication services ... 
exclusively  pertain  to the  State'  remains  applicable  although  Article  2 of the  Directive  implies  that this 
Anicle,  as  well  as  all  other provisions  setting  out the  State  monopoly for  telecommunications  services, 
should be changed to allow private operators the right to provide all telecommunications services excluding 
well  defined  areas  reserved  to  the  State.  According  to the  Italian  legal  framework,  only  value  added 
services listed in Article 3 (paragraph 2)  of the National Regulatory Plan for Telecommunications, enacted 
by a  Ministerial  Decree of 6 April  1990, may  be  provided. 
However, in a decision of tO January 1995, the Italian AntitrUSt Authority (Autorita  Garant~) stated, disre-
garding  the  mentioned  Italian  regulation,  that  a  refusal  of Telecom  Italia  to provide  leased  lines  to  a 
private company W:lnting  to  offer voice services  liberalized  under the  Directive  is  an  abuse  of dominant 
position and  requested Telecom Italia (
61
)  to present, within 90 days,  the actions taken in  order to remove 
the restrictions to competition in  the market for voice services for corporate networks/  closed user groups, 
including  vinual  private  networks.  The Antitrust  Authority  bases  this  decision  on  the  direct  effect  of 
Anicles  1 and  2 of the Services  Directive  in  Italy.  Telecom ltalia has  appealed against the decision. 
(") Telecom Italia was created on 18 Augun 1994 out of a merger betWeen SIP, Italc:able, IRITel, Telespazio and SIRM. 
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With the implementation of Act 58/92 on the reorganization of the telecommunications sector, regulatory 
and operational functions were, in principle, separated by transferring the operating bodies of the Minisuy, 
namely ASST, to Iritel, a company of the IR.l Group. A bill' on 'Public Utility Services Regulatory Auth-
9rities' (No 359)  is  currently pending at the Italian Parliament, which will, if adopted, create, inter alia,  a 
regulatory body for  post and  telecommunications.  However,  no  date is  ye~ anticipated  for iu adoption. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Two legislative acu were adopted in  1990 in  order to implement the Directive, the Regulation ( Reglement 
grand-ducal)  of 3  August  1990  establishing  the  general  rules  applicable  to  public  telecommunications 
services  and the regulations of 8 October 1990  concerning public telephone service,  telecommunications 
leased  lines,  public  'luxpac'  service,  public  alum  transmission  service  and  public  aucomatic  telephone 
service - Serviphone. 
The LuxeQlbourg  authorities  have,  by letter of 22  October 1991,  declared their intention to amend the 
definition of 'basic telephonic service'  in  the Regulation and add the term 'to the public'. 
The Law of 20  February 1992 transformed the former Administration tks P& T into a public .undertaking 
with  a  sepa.r:ue  legai  identity, ·co  comply with the requirement of Article 7 of the  Directive  to separate 
regulatory and operational functions. The Minister for Posu and Telecommunications exercises all  regu-
latory responsibility in respect of the establishment and operation of the telecommunications ne~orks. 
NETiiERlANDS 
The  basic  telecommunications  legislation  in  the  Netherlands  (Aet  No  520  on  the  telecommunications 
facilities  (Wet op de  Te/ecommunicatit'fJoorzimingm) (W'l"V') of 26  Ocwber 1988, which came into force 
on  1 January  1989,  was  drafted  before  the  publication  of the  Commission  Green  Paper of  1987.  It 
therefore uses  a  terminology which  is  substantially different from  the terminology used  in  the  Directive. 
Reserved  voice  telephony is  defined in  Article  2 of De~fee No 551  of f December 1988  which lists  the 
mandatory services  of KPN (Koninklijke  PTT Netherlands).  According  to the  definition,  the  reserved 
service is  not limited to a service which is  provided on a commercial basis. Secondly, it does not limit the 
monopoly to voice telephony 'for the public'. Thirdly, it does  no~ take into account whether the provision 
of the service implies the use of two connection poinu of the relevant leased lines. These issues have been 
discussed  in  bilateral  contaCts  between  the  Dutch authorities  and  the  Commission  services.  The Dutch 
authorities  have  subsequently published  a  notice on 30  May 1994  allowing voice services  to closed  user 
groups. However, the issue of voice services provided on leased lines  and using only one connection with 
the public switched network is  still under discussion. 
The Ministry for Transport and Public Works {Vtrkeer tn Watmtaat) is  the body entrUsted with  regu-
latory responsibilities for telecommunications and it may give detailed insuuctions co  KPN concerning the 
execution of the general Directives (BART) and the  obligations relating to mandatory services. This minis-
terial  responsibility  includes  general  tariff  policy  for  public  telecommunications  services  (which,  in 
application,  is  similar to 'price capping'  in  the  UK). 
AUSTRIA 
Austria  implemented  the  Directive  mainly  through  its  Telecommuniations  Aet  (Femmeldegesetz)  Nr 
908/1993, which entered into force on 1 April  1994. Austria has however not yet notified the implementing 
decrees of this  law,  nor the general usage conditions of the public network. 
The reserved  telephone service  is  defined in  An.icles  44i2)  and 2(6) of the Aet. This definition does  not 
fully correspond tO the definition in the Directive. However, no licenses are required for the provision of 
liberalized services. Conditions for access to the public network and use of leased lines will,  under Article 
44(6) of the Aet be  laid down in  the general  usage conditions (Gtscha./isbedingungm). 
The public telecommunications operator is the Post unJ TeltgraphtnfJerwaltung (PTV). The law entrustS the 
regulatory tasks to the Ministry of Public Economy and Communications. 
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PORTUGAL 
As  in  the case of the Netherlands, the regulatory framework for telecommunications in· Portugal predates 
the adoption of the Directive. The 'Basic Law on the Establishment, the' Management and the Exploitation 
of Telecommunications  Infrastructures  and  Services',  Law  88/89,  ('Basic  Law')  was  adopted  on  11 
September 1989 before the adoption of the Directive. This explains in part why the terminology used often 
diffen markedly from  that of the Directive. This explains in  part why the terminology used often diffen 
markedly from  that of the  Directive. The Basic  Law,  and  in  particular the distinction between  comple-
mentary and value added  services,  is  technology-based rather than services-based. 
On the issue  of reserved  services,  the  Portuguese legislation does  not define services whose provision  is 
reserved to public carrien as  narrowly as  the Commission Directive. Firstly, Article 2 (2) of the Basic Law 
defines 'telecommunications for public use' as all services which are designed to meet the generic collective 
requirements for transmitting .and receiving messages and information. This is a broader definition than the 
concept of public in the Directive. It is  trUe  that the Basic Law lists telecommunications for private use in 
Article  2 (3)  and  that this  list  encompasses  at point (h)  'other communications  reserved  for  the  use  of 
specific public or private entities by means of an authorization granted by the government under the terms 
of treaties or international agreements or special  legislation'.  However, since the entry into force  of the 
law, the Portuguese government has not adopted the necessary legislation to liberalize voice telephony or 
telex services provided for closed user groups. In September 1991, the Portuguese government announced 
the  adoption  of a  ministerial  order (diploma)  on private  networks  to  resolve  this  issue.  By  letter of  18 
November  1993,  the  Portuguese  authorities  confirmed  that they were still  studying  the  issue  and,  in  a 
subsequent bilateral  meeting on  31  January 1994, no more  precise undertaking on timing could be  given. 
Secondly, under Portuguese legislation voice telephony is  defined more broadly than in the Directive. The 
Basic Law does not define voice telephony. The definition is included in Article 1 of the former Regulation 
of the Public Telephone Service annexed to the Decree (Decrrto-Lei)  199/87 of 30 April  1987. The Basic 
Law  refers  to  the  technical  operation of a fixed  subscriber access  system  (which  it defines  as  the  set of 
transmission  means  located  between  a  termination  point  and  the  first  concentration,  switching  or 
processing node) without distinguishing between the situation, where this 'access system' is  a leased line or 
the PSTN; nor does it take into consideration the number of connections to the leased line which may be 
used. 
A third issue  is  the licensing  con.ditions.  According to the Directive,  Member St:a.tes  may make the supply 
of telecommunications  services  subject  to  a  licensing  scheme,  but  only to  warrant compliance  with  the 
essential requirements listed  in  the Directive. However, the Portuguese licensing scheme encompasses other 
obligations. 
The liberalized  services  are  divided  in  two  categories:  'complementary telecommunications  services'  and 
'value added services'  according  to a technical criterion: the  use  of own infrastrUcture, and in  particular, 
concentration, processing and switching nodes. Therefore, most liberalized services come within the fixed 
complementary services  category. The two  types of services  each  have  their own licensing conditions. 
Article  4 (2) of the Directive require Member States to ensure that there are no restrictions on the use  of 
leased  lines  except  those  justified  by  essential  requirements  or  the  existence  of  the  voice  telephony 
monopoly.  Article  H  of the  Basic  Law  appean more  restrictive  as  it allows  only the use  of leased  lines 
voice traffic to the suscriber's own use or to the provision of complemental'}' and value added services, and 
even  requires a licence for the shared use  of leased circuits. 
Portugal claims that its complementary services  sche~e (Portaria 930/92) is in accordance with Article 3 of 
the  Directive. This issue  is  however not settled. 
Portugal separated regulatory and operational functions in  1989. According w  the Basic Law,  the Ministry 
is  responsible  for  supervising  and  monitoring telecommunications. This includes  the planning and coordi-
nation of the  national  public  infrastructure and services  which  are  considered essential. 
In  pr:tctice the  regulatory functions  are delegated to the  Institute for Communications of Portugal (ICP), 
leaving  the  Ministry to  supervise  the  ICP and  approve  directives  proposed by  the ICP. 
1/99 No C 275/22  Official Journal of the  European Communities 
FINLAND 
The basic regulatory framework of telecommunications is the Telecommunications Act 87/183 (Teletoimin-
talalti),  which  was  amended in  1988',  1990  and  1992.  . 
Under this  framework,  there  are  no  more  special  or exclusive  righu for the  provision  of telecommu'rii-
cations  services,  including  voice  telephony,  in  Finland.  The whole  telecommunications  sector has  been 
opened  to  competition.  Public  telecommunications  networks  arc  operated  by  organizations  with  an 
operating licence granted by the Government. 
Anicle 10 of the Act sets out the rights and duties of subscribers and in  particular the right to lease lines as 
well  as  to use  them  to provide telecommunications services or to sub-lease them  to others. 
Public switched data communications are subject to notification only (Article S (2) of the Act).  In 199•, 
there  were  63  organizations  with  operating  licences  and  13  notified  organizations  operating  public 
switched data communications. 
Article.s  18  to  23  of the  Act  entrUSt  the  Ministry  of Transport and  Communications  with  the  general 
supervision and promotion of telecommunications. The day to day enforcement of the Telecommunications 
Act is, however, entrUsted to the Telecommunications Administration Centre, which is an agency under the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications. In principle the costs of the centre are covered by li.ccnce and 
inspection fees.  .  · 
Telecom  Finland  is  100% state-owned but operates at  arms  length  from  the  Ministry of Transport and 
Communications,  although  the  members  of iu board  as  well  as  the  top  executives  are  appointed  by the 
Government. 
SWEDEN 
There has  never been  a legal  telecommunications monopoly  in  Sweden. The  de facto  monopoly of Telia 
("Televerkct' at the time)  was  the.  result of a commercial process. 
The  current  regulatory  frame~ork of  telecommunications  is  set  out  in  the  Telecommunications  Act 
(Teielagen)  of 1993.  Under this  Act  there  are  no  exclusive  rights  to  provide  telecommunication services 
(Article  2.1  and  4).  Any  operator has  the  right  to  obtain  a  licence  and  to  supply  telecommunications 
services.  Reasons  are  given  in  case of refusals  and Article  37 of the  Act states that appeals  against such 
refusals  may be lodged with  the administrative court of Appeal. 
Licences  are required only for the operation of public networks and  the  provision of leased  lines.  Other 
services  are subject only to a registration procedure. 
There are no  restrictions on  the processing of signals  before or after transmission via  the public  network 
(Anicle 6.1), nor is  there any discrimination in the conditions of use or in the charges payable (Article 6.2). 
As regards the separation of regulation and operation (Article 7 of the Directive), the  Teltstyrelsen (telecom 
agency)  is  responsible for ensuring that regulations arc  respected by  all operators. The agency was  set up 
on  1 July  1992.  Its  functioning  is  laid  down  in  FOrording  1992:895. The agency  may  adopt sanctions, 
including the revocation of licences,  against operators which do nQt  comply with  their obligation. 
The agency is  headed by a Director-General, under the supervision of a board, which  is  appointed by the 
Government.  Ttlesz.yrelsen has responsibilities also in the defence area. The agency is  financed through fees 
levied on the basis  of gross  turnover of licencees and parties which  registered. 
The main  telecommunication  operator in  Sweden  is  T elia,  which  was  incorporated  as  a  private  limited 
liability company on  1 January 1993  according to Law  1992:100. It is  a 100% publicly owned company, 
supervised by the  Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
The legislation in force applying to telecommunications services is the 1984 Telecommunications Act which 
predates  the  Commission's  Green  Paper  and  Directive.  The  Act  has  been  extended  by  a  new  policy 
building on the 1991  White Paper comprising amendmenu to existing licences, extensions of-cable licences 
to include the provision of voice  telephony services  and the  issuing of new  licences. 
UK legislation has generally preceded the Commission's Directive. For example, the exclwive rights of BT 
to provide the telecommunications services covered by Article 2 of the Directive were abolished in  the UK 
by Section 2 of the Telecommuniations Act of 1984. Section 5 requires all persons who run telecommuni-
cations systems  to have  a licence  (which  may be  an individual or class  licence). 
As regards the provisions of Article 4 of the Directive, no precise definition of infrastructure, such as exists 
in Germany or the Netherlands has  been set down. Section 4 of theTA instead defines a 'telecommuni-
cations system' as: a system for the conveyance,· through the agency of electric, magnetic, elearo-magnetic, 
electro-chemical or electromechanical energy, of  · 
- speech, music and other sounds, 
- visual images, 
- signals  serving  for  the  impartation  (whether  as  between  persons  and  persons,  things  anp  things  or 
persons and things) of any matter otherwise than in the fonn of sounds or visual images, or 
- signals serving for the actuation or control of machinery or apparatus. 
The  Secretary  of  State  designates  certain  of  these  systems  as  'public  telecommunications  systems'. 
Operators of public  telecommunications  systems  arc  authorized  by  individual  licences  and  are  generally 
granted PTO statw. Around twenty public fiXed  link operators have been granted such licences, as well  as 
126 able TV franchisees.  · 
The 1984 Telecommunications Act, in conjunction with the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 also ensures that 
the  regulatory functions  specified  in  Article  7  are  carried out independently of the Telecommunications 
Operators. This is  largely through the work of Oftcl, a non-ministerial government department under the 
Director General  of Telecommunications  who,  for  the  duration  of his  appointment,  is  independent  of 
ministerial control. 
ANNEX II 
LIST  OF  NATIONAL  REGULATORY  AUTHORmES  IN  THE  FIELD  OF  TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS 
The survey of the national regulatory framework of the Member States in Annex I has been drafted on the 
basis of the infonnation officially notified to the, Commission. 
For more  detailed  information,  interested  persons  should  contact directly  the  national  regulatory auth-
orities of the Member States. The full  address of these authorities were published in  the  Officia/foumal of 
th~ Europ~an Communiti~s No C  277/9 of IS  October 1993. 
Belgii!/Belgique 
Dan  mark 
Belgisch  l.nstituut voor Postdiensten en Telecommunicatie (BIPl)/ 
l.nstitut beige des services posu.ux et des telecommunications (IBPl) 
Astronomielaan/  Avenue de I'  Astra  nomic  14 
B-1 000  Brussel/Bruxelles 
T elestyrelsen 
Holsteingade 63 
DK-2100 Kopenhagen 0 
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Bundesministerium for Pon und Telekommunikation 
Postfach 80 0 I 
D-53005  Bonn 
Ministry of Transport 
Sygrou +9 
GR-Athen 
Direcci6n General de Telecomunicaciones 
Sa.  planta 
Plaza de Cibeles S/N 
E-28701  Madrid 
Direction  g~n~rale des postes et ~~~communications 
20, avenue de  S~gur 
F-75700 Paris 




Ispettorato generate delle  telecomunicazioni 
Viale Europa 190 
1-001 +4  Roma 
Minis~re des  communications 
18,  mon~e de  Ia  P~uusse 
L-2945  Luxembourg  · 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
Hoofddirectie telecommunicatie en Post 
Postbus 20901 
NL-2500 E."'{  's-Gravenhage 




Av. Jose Malhoa, Lote  1683 
P-1  000 Lisboa 
T  elehallintokcskus 
V attuniemenkatu 8 A 
PL 53 
FIN-00211  Helsinki 
T elestyrelsen (Telecom Agency) 
Box  5398 
S-10249 Stockholm 
DTI 
151  Buckingham Palace Road 
UK.-London SWl 9SS 
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REQUEST  FOR  TRANSITION  PERIOD 
Greece 
(96/C  257 /OJ) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
(Artide  90  (2)  o/  tb~  Trtaty  tstablishing  th~ European  Community) 
Commission  notice  to  Member  States  and  other interested  parties  concerning  the  additional 
implementation period  requested  by  Greece 
Pursuant  to  Article  2  (2)  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  as 
modified  by  Directive  96/19/EC,  the  Greek 
Government,  by  letter  of  25  June  1996,  has  requested 
transition  periods: 
- until  1 January  2003  as  regards  the  abolition  of the 
exclusive  rights  currently granted  to  OTE as  regards 
the  provision  of voice  telephony  and  the  underlying 
network  infrastructure  which  under  Article  2  (2)  of 
Directive  901388/EEC  as  modified  by  Directive 
96/  19/EC  had  ro  be  implemented  before  1 January 
1998, 
• 
until  I  July  200 I  as  regards  the  lifting  of restrictions 
on  the  provision  of already  liberalized  telecommuni-
cations serv1ces  on: 
(a) networks  established  by  the  provider of the  tele-
communications  service; 
(b) infrastructures provided by  third  parties; and 
(c) the sharing of networks, other facilities  and sites, 
which  under  Article  2  (2)  of  Commission  Directive 
90/388/EEC on  competition  in  the markets for  telecom-
munications  services  as  modified  by  Article  1  (2)  of 
Directive 96/  19/EC regarding the  implementation  of full 
competition  in  telecommunications  markets  had  to  be 
imple.mented  before  1 July  1996. 
The  Greek  Government  considers  the  above  five  year 
transition  periods  to  be  indispensable  for  the  following 
reasons: 
1.  Greece  is  currently  carrying  out  a  programme  for 
digitalization  and  general  modernization  of  OTE's 
infrastructure  which  requires  significant  capital 
investment.  The  constraints  on  Greece's  financial 
resources,  the  high  cost  and  the  size  of  OTE's 
modernization  programme,  aggravated  by  the 
considerable  expense  of  delivering  telecommuni-
cations  services  throughout the  Greek territory (given 
its  particular  topography),  necessitate  a  gradual  pace 
of modernization.  Even  though  advanced  services  are 
gradually  being  introduced  over  the  already  digi-
talized  partS  of the  network,  OTE's  revenue  will  for 
several.  years  continue  to  depend  heavily  on  voice 
telephony. 
OTE'  s  substantial  investment  programme  (exceeding 
Dr 1,1  trillion  in  the years  to  2003)  for  digitalization 
and  modernization  would.  be  · prejudiced  if  full 
competition  was  introduced  in  1998;  this  would 
deprive  OTE of revenue  needed  both  to  finance  the 
modernization  of  Greece's  telecommunications  infra-
structure and  to  provide  universal  service  to  dispersed 
customers in  remote areas of Greece. 
The process  of digitalization  did  not  begin  in  Greece 
until  1990  due  to  the  lack  of  necessary  financial 
resources.  The  size  of ·the  investment  required  for 
digitalization  of  the  network  dictates  the  pace  of 
modernization  of OTE's  services.  Of the  abovemen-
tioned  total  expenditure  approximately  29 %  will  be 
spent  on  the  modernization  of  the  urban  networks 
and  14 % on the digitalization  of the  exchanges. 
2.  In  1993  Greece  started  to  implement  a  policy  of 
adjusting  tariffs  to  costs,  which  has  resulted  in 
increases  in  local  call  rates  and  reductions  (in  real 
terms)  in  long  distance  rates.  However,  despite  the 
progress  achieved,  the  current  tariff  structure  is  still 
marked by a considerable  g~p between  tariffs  for local 
and  long-distance  calls.  Funher rebalancing  of  tariffs 
in  the  transition  period  will  need  to  ensure  OTE'  s 
financial  stability  and  revenues  (which  are  indis-
pensable  to  the  completion  of  digitalization  and 
moderni-zation).  The  pace  of adjustment  of  tariffs  to 
costs  will  depend,  inter  alia,  upon  further  modern-
ization  of  OTE's  networks,  the  introduction  of 
analytical  cost-accounting  systems  and  customer's 
acceptance of tariff increases. 
3.  Structural  adjustments  are  carried  out  in  order  to 
transform  OTE  into  a  commercial  organization, 
including  the  adaptation  of  its  personnel  in  the 
environment  of  modern  telecommunications  tech-
nology,  services,  management  and  marketing 
methods. 
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4.  Liberalization  of alternative  infrastructure cannot take 
place  in  Greece significantly  in  advance of the  liberal-
ization  of  voice  telephony  and  public  telecommuni-
cations  networks.  Were  this  to  happen,  providers  of 
telecommunications  services  over  such  infrastructure 
would  be  able  to circumvent  the  derogation  for  voice 
telephony  and  consequently  deprive  OTE  of 
significant  revenue  which  is  crucial  for  the  modern-
ization  of  the  public  telecommunications  networks 
and services in  Greece. 
The  Greek  Government  will,  if  this  derogation  is 
granted,  implemem  Directive  96/19/EC  in  national  law 
according  to  the  following  calendar: 
first  half  of  1997:  proposals  for  the  introduction  of 
appropriate  legislation  in  order  to  introduce  full 
competition, 
- second  half  of  1997:  publication  of  proposed  legis-
lative  changes  to  implement  full  competition  and 
remove  all  restrictions  on  the  provision  of · voice 
telephony  and  public  telecommunications  networks, 
and  alternative  infrastructure  by  1 January•2003  and 
1  July  2001  respectively,  and  consultation  with 
interested  parties, 
1  999: target for achievement of legislative changes, 
- second  half  of  1999:  publication  of  licensing 
conditions  for  all  services  and  of  interconnection 
charges  as  appropriate  in  accordance  in  both  cases 
with  relevant  European  Union  directives, 
end  2000:  target  for  the  a ward  of new  licences  and 
amendment  of existing  licences  to  enable  competitive 
provision  of  voice  telephony  and  for  the  estab-
lishment  of telecommunications  networks. 
The  Commission  will  assess  this  request  in  the  light 
of  the  detailed  description  provided  by  the  Greek 
Government  regarding  the  capital  investments  required 
for  the  development  of  the  network,  the  tariff  rebal-
ancing  planned  as  well  as  the  restructuring  of  OTE 
together  with  the  timetable  envisaged  for  implemen-
tation.  These  elements  are  attached  to  the  letter  of  the 
Greek Government of 25  June  1996. 
The  Commission  hereby  gives  the  other Member  States 
and  other  parties  concerned  notice  to  submit  their 
comments on the measures in  question  within one month 
of the publication  of this  notice. The Commission,  when 
taking  its  decision  on  the  request  of  the  Greek 
Government,  will  take  into  account  any  information 
provided  within  this  time  limit. 
The comments  will  be  communicated  to  Greece. 
In  this  context, under the  Directive  mentioned above, the 
information provided  by  the  Greek Government shall  be 
made  available  to  any  interested  party  on  demand, 
except  data  which  should  be  withheld  due  to  the  need 
for  business  secrecy. 
Member States  or other interested  parties  seeking  access 
to  the  file,  should  request  this  in  writing to the  address 
below· within  three  weeks  of the  publication  date of this 
notice.  In  the  case  of  requestS  from  parties  other  than 
Member States,  this  request should  contain  l  description 
of the  interest  involved.  Access  shall  only be  granted on 
the  premises  of DG IV. 
European  Commission, 
DG IV- C.l, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/Wetstraat 200, 
C-158  3/48, 
B-1 049  Brussels. 
Fax:  (32-2)  296 98  19. 
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REQUEST FOR TRANSITION  PERIOD 
Luxembourg 
(96/C 257 /04) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
(Article  90 (2). of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community) 
Commission  notice  to  Member States  and other interested  parties  concerning  the  additional 
implementation period requested by  Luxembourg 
Pursuant  to  Article  2  (2)  of Directive  90/388/EEC on 
competition  in  the  marketS  for  telecommunications 
services,  as  amended  by  Directive  96/19/EC, · the 
Luxembourg Government, by letter of 28  June 1996,  has 
requested  transition  periods: 
until  l  January 2000 in  respect of the exclusive rights 
currently  granted  to  l.uxembourg's  postal  and  tele-
communications  service  provider  Emreprise  des 
Postes  et  Teltcommunications  (EIYJ.)  for  the 
provision  of  voice  telephony  and  the  underlfing 
network infrastructure, which  - in  accordance with 
Anicle  2 (2)  of Directive 90/388/EEC, as  amended 
by Directive 96/19/EC- are due to be abolished by 
1 January 1998, 
- until  1 ·July  1998  in  respect  of  restncttons  on  the 
provision  of  already  liberalized  telecommunications 
services on: 
(a)  networks established  by  the provider of the tele-
communications service; 
(b)  infrastructures provided by third parties; and 
(c)  shared networks, other facilities and sites, 
which  - under  Article  2  (2)  of  Commission 
Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the marketS 
for  telecommunications  services,  as  amended  by 
Anicle  1 (2)  of Directive 96/19/EC- were due to 
be  lifted by 1 July 1996. 
The Luxembourg Government considers these additional 
transition  periods  to  be  necessary  for  the  following 
reasons: 
1.  Liberalization  of . the  telecommunications  market 
(consequent  upon  the  immediate  transposal  of  the 
Directive) before a suitable regulatory framework has 
been put in  place and the necessary structural changes 
made  would  expose  Luxembourg  to  the  risks  of an 
unregulated  market.  The  derogation  requested  will 
not  impede  the  development  of  competition  in  the 
other  areas  of  the  telecommunications  sector  in 
Luxembourg.  Once  the  new  law  on  telecommuni-
cations  enters  into  force,  firms  will  be  invited· to bid 
for  a  licence  to  operate  the  second  national  GSM 
network.  The  selection  procedure  will  be  open  and 
objective,  ::md  the  licer.ce  will  be  granted to  the  firm 
that best meets the published qualitative criteria. 
2.  EIYf currently charges itS  customers a single, standard 
rate,  but a  refonn of the  tariff structure  is  planned. 
The considerable  imbalance  between  current charges 
is  a  major  factor  hampering  liberalization  in 
Luxembourg. The new independent supervisory body 
now being set up {the  ICL) will  oversee the ongoing 
process of adjusting charges in  Luxembourg. 
3.  The ICL will  also be responsible for laying down the 
accounting rules and the rules for cost-based charging 
that will apply to EPT  .. 
In  Luxembourg  the  liberalization  process  entails 
disproportionate  commitments,  particularly  in  terms 
of human. resources,  for the  ministry  responsible,  the 
ICL and EPT. 
4.  In  1995  international calls accounted for 71  %  of the 
overall telephony turnover of Lfrs 6 346 million. Over 
50 %  of  those  calls  were  made  by  960  business 
customers based in the city of Luxembourg. Outgoing 
calls  accounted  for  62 °/o  of  international  calls. 
Opening up the Luxembourg market before a suitable 
regulatory framework  has  been put in  place  and the 
necessary  structural  changes  made  would  leave  tele-
communications  companies  based  in  other countries 
free  to  offer  international  telephony  services  to 
Luxemb<;>urg  firms  and  to divert  business  away  from 
EPT's  network.  This could  pose  a  serious  threat  to 
the  viability  of the  national  operator's  infrastructure 
and to its  future development in  a competitive market. 
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The  regulatory  framework  needed  to  avert  such  a 
threat  is  curremly being  adopted,  and  the  transition 
period requested would enable it to be put in  place. 
S.  l.uxemhour~ recently  placed  its  postal  :1nd  telecom-
munications  administration on  a  commercial  footing. 
EI1T  devotes  an  .annual  budget of Lfrs  32  million  to 
equipping its staff with the skills they need in  order to 
work in  a  commercial environment. At the beginning 
of  1995,  EJYf  commissioned  an  independent  firm  of 
consultants  to  undertake  a  thorough  review  of  its 
organizational  structure.  The  restructuring  process, 
which  entails  introducing  business  accounting 
methods and adjusting the tariff structure, will  not be 
completed before I January 1998. 
The Commission  will  assess  this  request  in  the  light of 
the  detailed  description  provided  by  the  Luxembourg 
Government in  the  annex  to  its  letter of 28  June  1996. 
The Commission  hereby gives  the other Member States 
and interested parties notice to submit their comments on 
the measures in  question within one month of the publi-
cation  of this  notice.  When  taking  its  decisio5  on  the 
request  by  the  Luxembourg  Government,  the 
Commission  will  take  into  account  any  information 
provided befort'  that deadlin<". 
Any  comments  submitted  will  be  passed  on  to 
Luxembourg. 
In  accordance  with  the  Directive  mentioned  above,  the 
information  provided  by  the  Luxembourg  Government 
will  be made available to any interested party on rcqu<"st, 
with  the  exception  of  material  that  is  commercially 
senslllve. 
Member  States  or  other  interested  parties  wishing  to 
have  access  to  this  information should submit a  written 
request to  the  address  below within  three  weeks  of the 
publication  date  of  this  notice.  Interested  parties  other 
than  Member  States  must  explain  why  they  require 
access. The information will be available for consultation 
only on  DG  IV's  premises.  Any additional  information · 
that  the  Commission  might  request  from  the 
Luxembourg  Government  will  likewise  be  made 
available,  as  soon  as  it  is  received,  to  parties  which 
express an interest within the deadline mentioned above.  - . 
European Commission, 
DG IV- C  1, 
Rue de Ia  Loi/Wetstraat 200, 
C-158,  3/48, 
B-1049  Brussels. 
Fax:  (32-2)  2969819. 
1/106 8.  1. 97  Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities  No C 4/5 
REQUEST  FOR  IMPLEMENTATION  PERIODS 
Spain 
(97/C 4/03) 
(Text with  EEA rdcvancc) 
(Article  90  {2)  of the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community) 
Commission  notice  to  Member  States  and  other  interested  parties  concerning  the  additional 
implemC11tatioo  periods  requested  by  Spain 
Pursuant  to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC,  as  last 
amended  by  Directive  96/19  /EC,  and  in  particular 
Article  2  (2)  thereof,  the  Spanish  Government,  in  a 
bilateral  meeting  of  9  October  1996  and  further 
conftrmed  by  letters  of  8  and  26  November  1996,  has. 
requeSted  the  following  additional  implementation 
periods  concerning  Articles  3  and  4a  (2)  of  this 
Directive: 
- until  1 January  1998  (instead  of 1 January  1997),  as 
regards  the  notification  to  the  Commission  of 
licensing schemes  for the provision of voice telephony 
and  the  establishment  of  public  telecommunications 
networks,  and  of the  details  of the  national  scheme 
envisaged  to  share  the  net  cost  of the  p~ovision of 
universal  service  obligations, 
- until  1  August  1998  (instead  of  1  July  1997),  as 
regards  the  publication  and  entry  into  force  of 
declaration and licensing procedures for the provision 
of  voice  telephony  and  public  telecommunications 
networks,  including  the scheme  to share the  net  cost 
of the provision of universal service obligations, 
- until  30  November  1998  (instead  of  1 July  1997)  to 
ensure  that  adequate  numbers  are  available  for  all 
operators  of telecommunications  services  in  order  to 
give  full  effect  to  the  liberalization  of  the  Spanish 
market. 
The  Spanish  Government  considers  these  additional 
implementation  periods  necessary  for  the  following 
reasons: 
1.  the  introduction  of  competauon  on  1  January  1998 
will  oblige  Telef6nica  to speed  up  the  rebalancing  of 
its  tariffs  which  will  affect  significantly  its  profit 
margin up to end 1998; 
2.  the  introduction  of  competition  also  requires  further 
capital  investment  in  Telef6nica's  ·network,  in 
particular  to  implement  the  new  numbering  plan 
allowing  the granting of adequate  numbers  to  all  new 
entrants.  In  order to  allow  T elef6nica  to  spread  the 
required  efforts  in  time,  at  as  necessary  to  grant  it  a 
time  period  of at least  10  months  between  the  inter-
connection  of  the  first  operators  which  will  be 
licensed  early  January  1998  and  the  interconnection 
of  all  other  new  operators  in  the  voice  telephony 
market. 
~  confirmed  in  its  letter  of  8  November  1996,  the 
·spanish· Government  will  nevertheless: 
- grant early January  1998  a  third  nation-wide  licence 
to  operate  voice  telephony  and  public  telecommuni-
cations  networks,  in  addition  to  the  license  which 
will  be  grante~ in  the  course  of  1997  to  a  second 
operator, 
- authorize  cable  operators,  who  apply  for  it  in 
compliance  with  the  conditions  set  out  in  the 
applicable  law  and  regulations,  to  providr  voice 
telephony  from  the  beginning  of  January·  1998 
onwards,  including  the  possibility  to  interconnect 
their networks for  this  purpose. 
The Spanish  Government  does  not seek  any  derogation 
for  the  lifting  of restrictions  on the  provision  of already 
liberalized  telecommunications  services  on: 
(a)  networks  established  by  the  provider of the telecom-
munications  service; 
(b)  infrastructures provided by third panics; 
(c)  the sharing of networks, other facilities  and sites; 
on  1 July  1996  as  provided  in  Article  2 (2)  of Directive 
90/388/EEC.  Consequently  such  networks  can  be 
provided  without  restrictions. 
In  addition  Spain  will  abolish  foreign  ownership 
requirementS  in  the  conditions  for  licensing  telecom-
munications  operators,  in  line  with  the  Community 
position  in  the  wro. 
Finally,  the Spanish Government confirmed that it would 
ensure  that  on  30  November  1998,  licenses  are  granted 
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effectively,  without  further  conditions,  for  the  provision 
of  voice  telephony  and  public  telecommunications 
network.s  to all  undertakings which  applied  in  the course 
of August  1998,  in  compliance  with  the  conditions  set 
out in  the  law  and  its  implementing  regulations. 
The  Commission  will  assess  the  request  for  additional 
implementation periods  in  the  light  of.  the  argumentation 
provided  by  the  Spanish  Government  regarding  the 
investment  requirements  of T  elef6nic:1. 
The  Commission  hereby  gives  the  Member  States  and 
other interested  parties  notice  to  submit  their  comments 
on  the  measures  in  question  within  one  month  of  the 
publication  of this  notice. 
Th~ comments  will  be  communicated  to  Spain. 
In  this  context~ under the abovementioned  Directive,  the 
infonnation  provided  by  the  Spanish  G~vemment shall 
be  made  avail~ble  to  any  interested  party  on  demand, 
except  data which  should  be  withheld  due  to  the  need 
for  business  secrecy. 
Member States  or other interested  parties seeking  access 
to the  file,  should  request  this  in  writing  to  the  address 
below  within  three  weeks  of the  publication 'date  of this 
notice.  Interested parties other than Member States  must 
.  explain why they require access. The file  will  be  available 
for  consultation  only  in  DG  IV's  premises. 
European  Commission, 
DG IV- C.l, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/Weutraat 200, 
C-158  3/48, 
B-1 049  Brussels, 
Fax:  (32 2)  296 98  19. 
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Communication  from  the  Commission  on  the  application  of the  competition  rules  to  access 
agreements  in  the  telecommunications  sector - framewori(;  relevant&  markets  and  principles 
! 
(97/C 76/06) 
(fext with  EEA  relew.ncc) 
!The  Commission approved a draft notice on the  application of the competition  rules  to  access 
agreements  in  the  telecommunications  sector. 
The Commission intends to  ~dopt the notice after having heard any comments  from  interested 
parties. 
··The Commission  invites  interested parties  to submit  their possible  observations  they may have 
. on  the  draft notice  published  hereunder. 
Observations must reach  the  Commission not later than  two months following  the date. of this 
publication.  Observations  may  be  sent to the  Commission  by  fax  (No (32:..2)  296 98 19) or by 
mail  to  the  following  address: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate  C, 
Office  3/48, 
Avenue  de  Conenberg/Kortenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
e-mail:  access.notice@ dg4.cec.be 
PREFACE 
ln  the  telecommunications  industry,  access  agreements  are  central  10  aJlowing  market 
participants  the  benefits  of liberalization. 
The purpose  of this  notice  is  th~eefold: 
- to set out access  principles stemming from  EU competition law as  shown in  a large number 
of  Commission  decisions  in  order  to  create  greater  market  cenainty  and  more  stable 
conditions  for  investment  and  commercial  initiative  in  the  telecommunications  and 
multimedia  sectors, 
- to define and clarify the relationship between competition law and sector specific legislation 
under  the  Article  lOOA  framework  (in  particular  this  relateS  to  the  relationship  between 
competition rules  and open network provision  (ONP) legislation), 
- to  explain  how competition  rules  will  be  applied  in  a consistent way across  the converging 
sectors  involved  in  the  provision  of new  multimedia  services,  and  in  particular  to  access 
issues  and gateways in  this  context. 
This draft notice  is  now published  for public consultation only. The final  version  of the  notice 
will  be  adopted  only  once  the  ONP interconnection  Directive  has  been  finally  approved  by 
Parliament  and  Council.  This  will  guarantee  complete  coherence  between  the  ONP intercon-
nection  framework  and  the  application  of the  competition  rules  as  set out in  this  draft  notice, 
and the taking into account of the  final  version of the  ONP interconnection  Directive,  in  order 
to  create  market certainty before  the  I  January  1998  liberalization  deadline. 
No C 76/9 
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Introduction 
1.  The timetable  for  full  liberalization  in  the  telecom-
munications  sector  has  now  been  established,  and 
Member  States  are  to  remove  the  last  barriers  to 
the  provision  of  telecommunications  services  in  a 
competitive environment to consumers by  1 January 
1998 (
1
).  As  a  result  of this  liberalization  a  second 
set, of  related  products  or 'services  will  emerge  as 
well  as  the  need  for  access  to  facilities  necessary to 
provide  these  services.  In  this  sector,  intercon-
nection  to  the  public  switched  telecommunications 
network  is  a  typical  example  of such  access.  The 
Commission  has  stated  that  it  will  define  the 
treatment  of  access  agreements  under  the 
competition  rules (
2
).  This  notice,  therefore, 
addresses  the  issue  of  how  competition  rules  and 
procedures  apply  to  access  agreements  in  the 
context of hannonized  EU· and  national  regulation 
in  the  telecommunications  ~er.ror.  · 
2.  The regulatory  framework  for  the  liberalization  of 
telecommunications  consists  of  the  liberalization 
directives  issued  under Anicle  90  of the  EC Treaty 
and the open network provision (ONP) framework. 
The  ONP  framework  provides  harmonized  rules 
for  access  and interconneCtion  to the telecommuni-
cations  networks  and  the  voice  telephony  services. 
The legal  framework  provided  by  the  liberalization 
and  harmonization  legislation  is  the  background to 
any  action  taken  by  the  Commission  in  its 
application  of  the  competition  rules.  Both  the 
liberalization  legislation C)  and  the  harmonization 
legislation e>  are  aimed  at ensuring  the  attainment 
of the  objectives  of the  Community  as  laid  out in 
Article  3  of  the  EC  Treaty,  and  specifically,  the 
establishment  of  'a  ·  system  ensuring  that 
competition  in  the  internal  market  is  not distoned' 
and  'an  internal  market  charaCterised  by  the 
abolition,  as  between  Member  States,  of obstacles 
to  the  free  movement  of goods,  persons,  services 
and capital'. 
3.  The  Commission  has  published  guidelines  on  the 
application  of  EEC  competition  rules  in  the  tele-
communications  sector  (OJ  No C  233,  6.  9.  1991, 
p.  2).  The  present  notice  is  intended  to  build  on 
those  guidelines,  which  do  not  deal  explicitly  with 
access  issues. 
4.  In  the  telecommunications sector,  liberalization  and 
harmonization  legislation  permit  and  simplify  the 
.  ..,  .~  .. 
task  of  Community  firms  in  embarking  on  new 
activities  in  new  markets  and  consequently  allow 
users  to  benefit  from  increased  competition.  These 
advantages  must  not  be  jeopardized  by  restrictive 
or  abusive  practices  of  undertakings:  the 
Community's  competition  rules  are  therefore 
essential  to  ensure  the  completion  of  this  devel-
opment.  New  entrants  must  in  the  initial  stages  be 
ensured the right to have  access  to the  networks of 
incumbent  telecommunications  operators  (fOs  ). 
Several  authorities,  at  regional,  national  and 
Community  levels,  have  a  role  in  regulating  this 
seetor. H the competition process is  to work well in 
the  internal  market,  effective  coordination  between 
these institutions must be ensured. 
5.  Pan I  of the  notice  sets  out  the  legal  framework 
and  details  how  the  Commission  intends  to achieve 
its  intention  of avoiding  unnecessary  duplication  of 
procedures  while  safeguarding  the  rights  of under-
takings  and  users  under  the  competition  rules.  In 
this  context, the  Commission's  efforts  to encourage 
decentralized  application  of  the  competition  rules 
by  national  courts  and  national  authorities  aim  at 
achieving.  remedies  at  a  national  level,  unless  a 
significant .. Community  interest  is  involved  in  a 
panicular  case.  In  the  telecommunications  sector, 
specific procedures in  the ONP framework  likewise 
aim  at resolving access problems in  the first  place at 
a decentralized,  national  level,  with a further possi-
bility  for  conciliation  at  Community  level.  Pan  II 
defmes  the  Commission's  approach  to  market defi-
nition  in  this  sector.  Pan III  details  the  principles 
that  the  Commission  will  follow  in  the  application 
of  the  competition  rules:  it  aims  to  help  telecom-
munications  market  participants  shape  their  access 
agreements  by  explaining  the  competition  law 
requirements. 
6.  The notice  is  based  on the Commission•s experience 
in  several  cases ('),  and  cenain studies  in  this  area 
carried out on behalf of the Commission ('). 
7.  This  notice  docs  not in  any  way  restriCt  the  rights 
conferred  on  individuals  or  undertakings  by 
Community  law,  and  is  without  prejudice  to  any 
interpretation  of the  Community  competition  rules 
that may be given  by the Court of First Instance or 
the  European Court of Justice. 
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PART I 
FRAMEWORK 
I. Competition  rules  and sector specific  regulation 
8.  Access  problems  in  the  broadest sense  of the  word 
(e.g.  provision  of  leased  lines,  interconnection  to 
networks,  access  to  data  concerning  subscribers  to 
voice  telephone  services)  can  be  dealt  with  at 
different levels  and on the basis  of a  range of legis-
lative  provisions,  of both  national  and  Community 
origin.  A  service  provider  faced  with  an  access 
problem such as  a TO's unjustified  ~efusal to supply 
(or  on  reasonable  terms)  a  leased  line  needed  by 
the  applicant  to  provide  services  to  its  customers 
could  therefore  contemplate  a  number of routes  to 
seek  a  remedy.  Generally  speaking,  aggrieved 
panies will  experience a number of benefits, at least 
in  an  initial  stage,  in  seeking  redress  at a  national 
level.  At  a  national  level,  the  applicant  has  two 
main  choices  namely,  firstly,  specific  national  regu-
latory  procedures  now  established  in·  accordance 
with  Community law  and  hannonized  under open 
network  provision  (see  footnote  4)  and,  secondly, 
an  action  under  national  and/  or  Community  law 
before  a  national  coun  or  national  competition 
authority ('). 
Complaints  made  to  the  Commission  under  the 
competition  rules  in  the  place  of or in  addition  to 
national  couns,  national  competition  authorities 
and/or  to  national  regulatory  authorities  under 
ONP  procedures  will  be  dealt  with  according  to 
the  priority  which  they  deserve  in  view  of  the 
urgency,  novelty  and  transnational  nature  of  the 
problem  involved  and taking into  account the  need 
to avoid  duplicate  proceeding (see  below,  points  t 3 
et  seq.). 
9.  The  Commission  recognizes  that  ·national  regu-
latory  authorities  (NRAs) (
1
)  have  different  tasks, 
and  operate  in  a  different  legal  framework  to  the 
Commission.  First,  the  NRAs  operate  under 
national  law,  albeit  often  implementing  European 
law.  Secondly,  that  law,  based  as  it  is  on 
considerations  of  telecommunications  policy  has 
objectives  different  to,  but  consistent  with,  the 
objectives  of  Community  competition  policy.  The 
Commission  cooperates  as  far  as  possible  with  the 
national  regulatory  authorities,  and  invites  the 
national  regulatory  authorities  to  cooperate  as  far 
as  possible  between  themselves.  Under  Community 
law,  national  authorities,  including  regulatory auth-
orities  and  competition  authorities,  have  a  duty not 
-~-~ 
to  approve  a  practice  or . agreement  contrary  to 
Commun~ty competition  law. 
10.  Community  competttaon  rules  are  not  sufficient  to 
remedy  the  various  problems  in  the  telecommuni-
cations  sector.  NRAs  therefore  have· a  significantly 
wider ambit  and a  significant  and far-reaching  role 
in  the  regulation  of the  sector.  It  should  also  be 
noted  that  as  a  matter  of  Community  law,  the 
NR.As  must  be  independent('). 
11.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  the  0 NP 
framework  imposes  certain  obligations  on  national 
telecommunications  operators that go beyond those 
that would  normally  be  imposed  by Article  86  of 
the  EC  Treaty.  NR.A.,  may  require strict standards 
relating  to  transparency,  obligations  to  supply  and 
pricing practices. These obligations can  be  enforced 
by  the  national  regulatory  authorities,  which  also 




12.  This  notice  is  written,  for  convenience,  m  most 
respectS  as  if the  law was  conceived  with  only one 
telecommunications  operator  controlling  the  only 
nationwide  public  switched  telecommunications 
network  in  each  Member  States.  This  will  not 
necessarily  be  the  case:  new. telecommunications 
networks  offering  increasingly  wide  coverage  will 
develop  progressively.  These  alternative  telecom-
munications  networks  may  ultimately  be  large  and 
extensive  enough  to  be  panly  or  even  wholly 
substitutable for the existing  national  networks,  and 
this should be  kept in  mind. 
13.  Given  the  Commission's  responsability  for  the 
Community's  competition  policy,  the  Commission 
mwt serve  the  Community's  general  interest.  The 
administrative  resources  at  the  Commission's 
disposal  to  perform  its  task  are  necessarily  limited 
and  cannot  be  used  to  deal  with  all  the  cases 
brought  to  its  attention.  The  Commission  is 
therefore  obliged,  in  general,  to  take  all  organiz-
ational  measures  necessary  for  the  performance  of 
its  task and, in  particular, to establish priorities C 
1 
). 
14.  The  Commission  has  therefore  indicated  that  it 
intends,  in  using  its  decision-making  powers,  to 
concentrate  on  notifications,  complaints  and 
own-mmauve  proceedings  having  panicular 
political,  economic  or  legal  significance  for  the 
Community (
12
). Where these  features  are  absent  in 
a  panicular case,  notifications  will  not  normally  be 
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dealt with by means of a fprmal decision, but rather 
a  comfort  letter  (subject  to  the  consent  of  the 
parties),  and  complaints  should,  as  a  rule,  be 
handled  by  national  courts  or other relevant  auth-
orities.  In  this  context,  it  should  be  noted  that the 
competition  rules  are  directly  effective (u)  so  that 
EC  competition  law  is  enforceable  in  the  national 
courtS.  Even  where  other  Coaimunity  legislation 
has  been  respected,  this  docs  not remove  the  need 
to ·




IS.  Other  national  authorities,  in  particular  national 
regulatory  authorities  acting  within  the  ONP 
framework,  have  ju~sdiction  over  certain  access 
agreements  (which  mu:t  be  notified  to  them). 
However,  notification  of an  agreement to  an  NRA 
docs  not make  notification of an  agreement to the 
Commission  unnecessary.  The  national  regulation 
authorities  must. ensure  that actions  taken  by  them 
arc  consistent  with  EC  competition  law es),.  this 
duty  requires  them  to  refrain  from  action  that 
would  undermine  the  effective  protection  of 
Community  law  rightS  under  .  the  competition 
rules (").  Therefore,  they  may  not  approve 
arrangementS which are contrary to the competition 
rules (
11
).  If the  national  authorities  act  so  as  to 
undermine  those  rightS,  the  Member· State  may 
itself  be  liable  in  damages  to  those  harmed  by  this 
action C
1
).  In  addition,  national  regulatory  auth-
orities  have  jurisdiction  under  the  ONP Directives 
to take steps  to ensure effective competition C'). 
16.  Access  agreements  in  principle  regulate  the 
provision  of  certain  services  betwe~n  independent 
undertakings and do not result in the creation of an 
autonomous  entity  which  would  be  distinct  from 
the  parties  to  the  agreementS.  Access  agreements 
are  thus  generally outSide  the  scope  of the · Merger 
Regulation eo). 
17.  Under Regulation  17 e'),  the  Commission  could  be 
seised  of an  issue  relating  to  access  agreements  by 
way of a notification of an  access  agreemeiu by one 
or  more  of the  parties  involved (
12
),  by  way  of  a 
complaint  against  a  restrictive  access  agreement  or 
against  the  behaviour  of  a  dominant  company  in 
granting  or  refusing  access e'),  by  way.  of  a 
Commission  own-initiative  procedure  into  such  a 
grant or refusal,  or by  way of a sector inquiry e~). 
In  addition,  a  complainant  may  request  that  the 
· ~  ~ollUilission take interim  measures  in  circumstances 
where  there  ~s  an urgent risk  of serious  and  irrep-
arable  harm  to  the  complainant  or  to  the  public 
interest (u).  It should,  however,  be  noted  in  cases 
of  great  urgency  tha~  procedures  before  national 
coUrtS  can usually  result  more  quickly  in  an  order 
to end the infringements than procedures before the 
Commission ("). 
18.  There are a number of areas where agreementS  will 
be  subject  to  both  the  competition  rules  and 
national  or  European  sector  specific  regulation, 
most  notably  internal  market  regulation.  In  the 
telecommunications sector,  the  ONP Directives  aim 
at  establishing  a  regulatory  regime  for  access 
agreements.  Given  the  detailed  nature  of  ONP 
rules  and  the  fact  that  they  may  go  beyond  the 
requirements  of Article  86,  undertakings  operating 
in  the  telecommunications  sector  shoUld  be  aware 
that  compliance  with  the  Community  competition 
rules  does  not absolve  them  of their duty to  abide 
by  obligations  imposed  in  the  ONP  context,  and 
Nice  versa. 
2~ Commission  action in relation to access  agreements C') 
19.  Access  agreements  taken  as  a  whole  are  of  great 
significance,  and  it  is  therefore  appropriate  for  the 
Commission  to  spell  out  as  clearly  as  possible  the 
Community  legal  framework  within  which  these 
agreements  should  be  concluded.  Access 
agreementS  having  restrictive  clauses  will  involve 
issues  under Article  85.  Agreements  which  involve 
dominant,  o~  monopolist,  undertakings  involve 
Article  86  issues:  concerns  arising  from  the 
dominance  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  will 
gen·erally  be  of greater significance  in  the  context 
of a panicular agreement  than  those  under Article 
85. 
20.  In  applying  the  compeuuon  rules,  the  Commission 
will  build  on the ONP framework, and the national 
regulatory  authorities  act  within  that  framework. 
Where  agreements  fall  within  Anicle  85  (1),  they 
must  be  notified  to  the  Commission  if  they  are  to 
benefit  from  an  exemption  under  Article  85  (3). 
Where  agreements  are  notified,  the  Commission 
intends  to  deal  with  one  or more  notifications  by 
way  of  formal  decisions,  following  appropriate 
publicity  in  the  Official  Journal,  and  in  accordance 
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with  the  principles  set  out  below.  Once  the  legal 
principles  have  been  clearly  established,  the 
Commission  then  proposes  to  deal  by  way  of 
comfort  letter  with  other  notificatio-ns  raising  the 
same  iss\Jes. 
3.  Complaints e•> 
21.  Natural  or legal  persons  with  a  legitimate  interest 
may,  under  certain  circumstances,  submit  a 
complaint  to  the  Commission,  requesting  that  the 
Commission  by  decision  require  that  an 
infringement  of Anicle  85  or Anicle  86  of the  EC 
Treaty  be  brought  to  an  end.  A  complainant  may 
additionally  request  that  the  Commission  take 
interim  measures  where  there  is  an  urgent  risk  of 
serious  and  irreparable  hann C').  A  prospective 
complainant  has  other  equally  or  even  more 
effective  options,  such  as  an  action  before  a 
national  court.  In  this  context,  it  should  be  noted 
that procedures before the national courts can offer 
considerable  advantages  for  individuals  and 
companies, such as  in  panicular C
0
): 
- national couns can deal with and award a claim 
for  damages  resulting  from  an  infringement  of 
the  competition  rules, 
national  couns  can  usually  adopt  interim 
measures  and  order  the  termination  of  an 
infringement  more  quickly  than  the  Commission 
is  able  to do, 
- before  national  courts,  it  is  possible  to  combine 
a  claim  under  Community  law  with  a  claim 
under national law, 
- legal  costs  can  be  awarded  to  the  successful 
applicant before a national coun. 
Furthermore,  the  specific  national  regulatory  prin-
ciples  as  harmonized  under  ONP  principles  can 
offer recourse both  at the  national  and  if  necessary 
at Community level. 
3.1.  Use  of  national and 0  NP procedures 
22.  As  referred  to  above ('
1
)  the  Commission  will  take 
into  account  the  Community  interest  of each  case 
brought  to  its  attention.  In  evaluating 
.  :~ i". Community interest,  the Commission examines: 
the 
the  significance  of the  alleged  infringement  as 
regards the functioning of the common market, the 
probability  of  establishing  the  existence  of  the 
infringement  and  the  scope  of  the  investigation 
required  in  order to  fulfil,  under  the  beSt  possible 
conditions,  its  task of ensuring that Articles  85  and 
86  are complied with' C
1
). 
Another  essential  element  in  this  evaluation  is  the 
extent to which  a  national judge is  in  a position  to 
provide  an  effective  remedy for  an  infringement of 
Article  85  or  86.  This  may  prove  difficult,  for 
example,  in  cases  ilwolving  extra-territorial 
elements. 
23.  Article  85  (1)  and  Anicle  86  of  the  EC  Treaty 
produce · direct  effeets  in  relations  between  indi-
viduals  which  must  be  safeguarded  by  national 
couns (u).  As  regards  actions  before  the  national 
regulatory  authority,  the  ONP  Directive  provides 
that such  an  authority has  power to  inteiVene  and 
order changes  in  relation to both the  existence  and 
content  of  access  agreements.  National  regulatory 
authorities  must  take  into  account  'the  need  to 
stimulate  a  competitive  market'  and  may  impose 
conditions  on  one  or  more  panies,  inter  alia,  'to 
ensure  effective  competition' c~). 
24.  The  Commission  may  itself  be  seized  of a  dispute 
either  pursuant  to  the  competition  rules,  or 
pursuant  to  an  ONP  conciliation  procedure. 
Multiple  simultaneous  proceedings  might  lead  to 
unnecessary  duplication  of  investigative  efforts  by 
the  Commission  and  the  national  authorities. 
Where  complaints  are lodged with  the  Commission 
under  Article  3  of Regulation  17  while  there  are 
related  actions  before  a  relevant  national  or 
European  authority  or  coun,  the  Directorate-
General  for  competition  will  generally  not initially 
pursue  any  investigation  as  to  the  existence  of an 
infringement  under  Article  8  5  or  86  of  the  EC 
Treaty.  This  is  subject,  however,  to  the  following 
points. 
3.2.  Safoguarding  complainant's  rights 
25.  Undertakings  are  entitled  to  effective  protection  of 
their Community Jaw  rights ("). These  rights  would 
be  undermined  if  national  proceedings  were 
allowed  to  lead  to  an  excessive  delay  of  the 
Commission's  action,  without  a  satisfactory 
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reJolution  of the  matter at a  national  level.  In  the 
telecommunications  ·  sector,  innovation  cycles  are 
relatively  shon,  and  any  substantial  delay  in 
resolving  an · access  dispute  would  in  practice  be 
equivalent  to  a  refusal  of  access,  thus  prejudging 
the proper determination of the  cas~. 
26.  The  Commission  therefore  takes  the  view  that  an 
access  dispute  before  a  national  regulatory 
'  authority  should  be  resolved  within  a  reasonable 
period  of  time,  normally  speaking  not  extending 
beyond  six  months of the matter first  being  drawn 
to the  attention of that authority or after initiation 
of  ONP  procedures,  including  the  ·Conciliation 
procedures e·>·  This resolution could  take the form 
of  either  a  fmal  determination  of  the  action  or 
another  form  of relief  which  would  safeguard  the 
rights  of  the  complainant.  If the  matter  has  not 
reached  such  a  resolution  then,  prima  facie,  the 
rights  of  the  panics  are  not  being  effectively 
protected,  and  the  Commission  would  in  principle, 
upon  request  by  the  complainant,  begin  its  investi-
gations  into the case  in  accordance with its  normal 
procedures,  after  consultation  and  in  cooperation 
with the national authority in  question. 
3.3.  Interim  measures 
27.  As  regards  any  request  for  interim  measures,  the 
existence  of national  proceedings  is  relevant  to  the 
question  of whether  there  is  a  risk  of serious  and 
irreparable  harm.  Such  proCeedings  should,  prima 
facie,  remove  the  risk  of' such  hann and  it  would 
therefore not be appropriate for the Commission to 
grant interim  measures  in  the  absence  of evidence 
that the risk would nevenheless remain. 
28.  The availability  of and  criteria  for  injunctive  relief 
is  an  imponant factor which  the  Commission  must 
take  into  account  in  reaching  this  prima  facie 
conclusion. If injunctive relief were not available, or 
if such  relief was  not likely adequately to take into 
account the  complainant•s  rights  under Community 
law,  the  Commission  would  consider  that  the 
national  proceedings  did  not  remove  the  risk  of 
harm,  and  would  therefore  commence  its  investi-
gation of the case. 
4.  Own-initiative  investigation  and  sector inquiries 
29.  If it  appears  necessary,  the  Commission  will  open 
an own-initiative  investigation.  It can also  launch  a 
sector  inquiry,  subject  to  consultation  of  the 
Advisory  Committee ·of  Member State  competition 
authorities. 
5.  Fmes 
30.  The Coriunission  may  impose  fines  of up  to  10% 
of the  annual  worldwide  turnover  of undenak.ings 
which  intentionally or negligently breach Anicle 85 
( 1)  or Ani  de 86 C').  Where  agreements  have  been 
notified  pursuant  to  Regulation  17  for  an 
exemption  under  Article  85  (3 ),  no  fine  may  be 
levied  by  the  Commission  in  respect  of .  activities 
described  in  the  notification c·>  for  the  period 
following  notification.  .flow  ever,  the  Commission 
may  withdraw  the  immunity  from  fines  by 
informing  the  undenak.ings  concerned  that,  after 
preliminary  examination,  it  is  of the  opinion  that 
Anicle  85  (1)  of  the  Treaty  applies  ~nd  that 
application of Article 85  (3) is  not justified C'). 
31.  The  ONP  interconnection  Directive  has  two 
panicular  provisions  wQich  should  be · taken  into 
account with  respect to the question of fines  under 
the  competition  rules.  First,  it  provides  that  inter-
connection  agreements  must  be  communicated  to 
the  relevant  national  regulatory  authorities  and 
made  available  to  interested  third  panics,  with  the 
exception  of  those  parts  which  deal  with  the 
commercial  strategy of the  panics eo).  Secondly,  it 
provides that the national regulatory authority must 
have  a  number  of  powers  which  it  can  use  to 
influence  or  amend  the  interconnection 
agreements e•).  These provisions ensure that appro-
priate  publicity  is  given  to  the  agreements,  and 
provide  the  n·ationaJ  regulatory  authority  with  the 
'  opponunity  to  take  steps,  where  appropriate,  to 
ensure effective competition on the market. 
32.  Where an  agreement has  been notified to a national 
regulatory  authority,  but  has  not  been  notified  to 
the Commission,  the Commission does  not consider 
it  would  be  generally  appropriate  as  a  matter  of 
policy to impose  a  fine  in  respect of the agreement, 
even  if  the  agreement  ultimately  proves  to  contain 
conditions  in  breach  of Anicle  85.  A  fine  would, 
however,  be  appropriate in  some cases,  for  example 
where: 
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(a)  the  agreement  proves  to  contain  pro"VUions  an 
breach of Anicle 86; and/  or 
(b)  the breach of Article 85  is  particularly serious. 
The size of the fine  will depend on the gravity and 
duration of the infringement. 
33.  Notification  to  the  NRA is  not a  substitute  for  a 
notification  to  the  Commission  and  does  not  limit 
the  possibility  for  interested  parties  to  submit  a 
complaint  to  the  Commission,  or  for  the 
Commission  to begin  an own-initiative investigation 
into  access  agreements.  Nor does  such  notification 
limit the rights of a party to seek damages before a 






34.  In  the  course  of  investigating  cases  within  the 
framework set out in  Pan I above,  the Commission 
will  base  itself  on  the  following  approach  to  the 
definition of relevant markets _;n  this sector. 
3  5.  Firms  are  subject  to  three  main  sources  of 
compeuuve  constraints;  demand  substitutability, 
supply  substitutability  and  potential  competition, 
with  the  fust  constituting  the  most  immediate  and 
effective  disciplinary  force  on  the  suppliers  of  a 
given  product or service.  Demand substitutability  is 
therefore  the  main  tool  used  to  define  the  relevant 
product  market  on  which  restrictions  of 
competition  for the purposes of Articles  85  {I) and 
86 can be  identified. 
36.  Supply  substitutability  is  generally  not  used  to 
define  relevant  marketS.  In  practice  it  cannot  be 
clearly  distinguished  from  potential  competition. 
Supply  side  substitutability  and  potential 
competition  are  used  for  the  purpose  of  deter-
mining  whether  the  undertaking  has  a  dominant 
position or whether the restriction of competition  is 
significant  within  the  meaning  of  Anicle  85,  or 
whether there is  elimination of competition. 
37.  In  assessing  relevant markets  it  is  necessary to  look 
at developments in  the market in  the shon term. 
1.  Relevant  product market 
38.  Section 6 of  Form AlB defines the relevant product 
market as  follows; 
'A  relevant  product  market  comprises  all  .. those 
produCtS  and/  or  services  which  are  regarded  as 
intetchangeable  or  substitutable  by  the  consumer, 
by.  reason  of  the  produCtS'  charaCteristics,  their 
prices and their intended use'. 
39.  The ending of the legal  monopolies  in  the  telecom-
munications  sector,  whereby  third  panics  can 
provide  services  to  end-users,  will  lead  to  the 
emergence  of a  second  type  of market,  related  to 
the  market for provision  of  se~ices, that of access 
to facilities  which are currently necessary to provide 
these  services.  In  this  sector,  interconnection  to the 
public  switched  telecommunications  network would 
be  a typical  example  of such  access.  Without inter-
connection,  it  will  not be  commercially possible  for 
third  parties  to  provide,  for  example,  compre-
hensive  voice  telephony services. 
40.  It is  clear, therefore,. that in  the telecommunications 
sector  there  are  at  least  two  types  of  relevant 
product markets to consider - that of a service  to 
be provided to end users and that of access  to those 
facilities  necessary  to  provide  that  service  to  end 
users  {information,  physical  network,  etc.).  In  the 
context of any  panicular case,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  define  the  relevant  access  and  services  markets, 
such  as  interconnection  to  the  public  telecommuni-
cations  network,  and  provision  of  public  voice 
telephony  services,  respectively. 
41.  When appropriate, the Commission will  use  the  test 
of  a  relevant  market  which  is  made  by  asking 
whether,  if  all  the  suppliers  of  the  services  in 
question  raised  their  prices  by  5  to  10 %,  their 
collective  profits  would  rise.  According to  this  test, 
it their profitS  would  rise,  the  market considered  is 
a separate relevant market. 
42.  The Commission considers  that the principles  under 
competition  law  governing  these  markets  remain 
the  same  regardless  of  the  panicular  market  in 
question.  Given  the pace of technological  change in 
this  sector, any attempt to define panicular product 
markets  in  this  notice would  run  the  risk  of rapidly 
becoming  inaccurate or irrelevant. The definition  of 
panicular product marketS  is  best  done  in  the  light 
Of a detailed examination of an individual case. 
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1.1.  Services  market 
43.  This can be broadly defined as  the provision of any 
telecommunications  service  to  a  user.  Different 
telecommunications  services  wiJI  be  considered 
substitutable  if  they  show  a  sufficient  degree  of 
interchangeability  for  the  end-user,  which  would 
me~n  that  effective  competition  can  take  place 
'I  between the different providers of these services. 
1.2.  Access  to facilities 
44.  For  a  service  provider  to  provide  services  to 
end-users  it  will  often  require  access  to  one  or 
more  (upstream  or  downstream)  facilities.  For 
example,  to  deliver  physically  the  service  to 
end-users,  it  needs ·access  to the termination  points 
of the  telecommunications  network to  which  these 
end-users  are  connected.  This  access  can .  be 
achieved  at the physical  level  through dedicated or 
shared  local  infrastructure,  either  self  provided  or 
leased  from  a  local  infrastructure  provider.  It  can 
also  be  achieved  either  through  a  service  provider 
who  already  has  these  end-users  as  subscribers,  or 
through  an  interconnection  provider  who  has 
access  directly  or  indirectly  to  the  relevant  termi-
nation  points. 
45.  In  addition  to  physical  access,  a  service  provider 
may  need  access  to  other  facilities  to  enable  it  to 
market  its  service  to  end  users:  for  example,  a 
service  provider  must  b~  able  to  make  end  users 
aware  of its  services.  Where,  as  is  often  the  case, 
for example, with directory information,  the facility 
can  only be obtained from  the  telecommunications 
operator,  similar  concerns  arise  as  with  physical 
access  issues. 
46.  In  many  cases,  the  Commission  will  be  concerned 
with  physical  access  issues,  where what is  necessary 
is  interconnection  to  the  network  of the  telecom-
munications  operator (
0
). 
47.  Some  incumbent telecommunications operators may 
be  tempted  to_ resist  providing  access  to third-pany 
service  providers  or  other  network  operators, 
panicularly in  areas where the proposed service will 
be  in  competition  with  a  service  provided  by  the 
telecommunications  operator  itself.  This  resistance 
will  often  manifeSt  iuelf  as  a  reluctance  to  allow 
access or a  willingness to allow it only under disad-
vantageous  conditions.  It  is  the  role  of  the 
competition  rules  to  ensure  that  these  prospective 
access  markeu  are  allowed  to  develop,  and  that· 
incumbent operators are not permitted to use  their 
~  fJ}ntrol  over  access  to  stifle  developments  on  the 
service~ markets. 
It  should be  stressed  that in  the telecommunications 
sector,  liberalization can be  expected  to  lead  to the 
development  of  new,  alternative  networks  which 
will  .  ultimately  have  an  impact  on . access  market 
definition  involving  the  incumbent  telecommuni-
cations  operator. 
2.  Relevant  geographic  market 
48.  Relevant  geographic  markets  are  defined  in  Fonn 
AlB as  follows:  · 
'The relevant geographic market comprises  the area 
in  which  the  undertakings  concerned  are  involved 
in  the  supply  and  demand of products or services, 
in  which  the  conditions  of  competition  are 
sufficiently  homogeneous  and  which  can  be  distin-
guished  from  neighbouring  areas  because  the 
conditions  of competition  are  appreciably  different 
in  those areas.' 
49.  As  regards  the  provtston  of  telecommunication 
services  and access  markets, the relevant geographic 
market  will  be  the  area  in  which  the  objective 
conditions  of  competition  applying  to  service 
providers  are similar.  It will  therefore  be  necessary 
to examine the possibility for  t~ese service providers 
to access  an end-user in  any pan of this area, under 
equ,ivalent  and  economically  v~able  conditions. 
Regulatory conditions such as  the terms of licences, 
and  any  exclusive  or  special  rights  owned  by 




50.  The Commission will  apply  the  following  principles 
in  cases  before it. 
51.  The Commission  has  recognized  that: 
'Anicles  85  and  86 ... constitute  law  in  force  and 
enforceable  throughout  the  Community.  Conflicts 
should  not  arise  with  other  Community  rules 
because· Community  law  forms  a  coherent  regu-
latory framework  . . .  it  is  obvious that Community 
actS  adopted  in  the  telecommunications  sector  are 
to  be  interpreted  in  a  way  consistent  with 
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competition  rules,  so  as  to  ensure  the  best  possible 
implementation  of  all  aspects  of  the  Community 
telecommunications  policy  ... This  applies,  int~r 
alia,  to  the  relationship  between  competition  rules 
applicable to undenakings and the ONP rules' (
4
'). 
52.  Thus,  competition  rules  continue  to  apply  in 
circumstances  where  other  Treaty  provisions  or 
secondary legislation  are applicable.  In  the context 
. of  access  agreements  the  internal  market  and 
competition provisions  of Community law are both 
important  and  mutually  reinforcing  for  the  proper 
functioning  of the  sector.  Therefore  in  making  an 
assessment  under  the  competiti9n  rules,  . the 
Commission will  seek to build  as  far as  possible on 
the  principles  established  in  the  hannonization 
legislation.  It  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  a 
number  of  the  competition  law  principles  set  out 
below  are  also  covered  by  specific  rules  in  the 
context of the  ONP framework.  Proper application 
of these  rules  should  often  avoid  the  need  for  the 
application of the competition  rules. 
53.  As regards  the  telecommunications sector,  attention 
should be  paid  to  the cost of universal  service obli-
gations. Anicle 90 (2) of the EC Treaty may justify 
exceptions to the principles of Anicles 85  and 86  of 
the EC Treaty. The details of universal service obli-· · 
gations  are  a  regulatory  matter.  The  field  of 
application  of Anicle  90 (2)  has  been  specified  in· 
the Anicle  90  Directives  in  the  telecommunications 
sector,  and  the  Commission  will  apply  the 
competition rules in  this  context. 
54.  Anicles  85  and  86  of the  EC Treaty  apply  in  the 
normal  manner  to  agreements  or  practices  which 
have  been  approved  or  authorized  by  a  national 
authority (
46
),  or where  the  national  authority  has 
required  the  inclusion  of terms  in  an  agreement  at 
the request of one or more of the panics involved. 
55.  However, if a  national  regulatory authority were to 
require  terms  which  were  contrary  to  the 
competition  rules,  the  undenakings  involved  would 
in  practice not be  fined,  although the Member State 
itself would be  in  breach of Anicles  3 (g) and 5 of 
the  EC  Treaty (
47
)  and  therefore  subject  to 
challenge  by the  Commission  under Anicle  169  of 
the  EC  Treaty.  Additionally,  if  an  undertaking 
having  special  or  exclusive  rights  within  the 
meaning  of  Anicle  90,  or  a  state-owned  under-
taking,  were  required  or authorised  by  a  national 
regulator  to  engage  in  behaviour  constituting  an 
abuse  of its  dominant  position,  the  Member  State 
would  also  be  in  breach  of Article  90 (1)  and  the 
Commission  could  adopt  a  decision  requiring 
termination of the infraction c··). 
56.  National  regulatory  authorities  may  require  strict 
standards  of  transparency,  obligations  to  supply 
· and  pricing  practices  on  the  market,  particularly 
where this  is  necessary in the early stages of liberal-
ization.  When  appropriate,  legislation  such  as  the 
ONP framework will be used as  an aid in  the inter-
pretation  of  the  competition  rules e').  Given  the 
duty  resting  on  national  regulatory  authorities  to 
ensure  that  effective  competition  is  possible, 
application  of  the  competition  rules  is  likewise 
required  for  an  appropriate  interpretation  of  the 
ONP principles.  It should also  be  noted  that many 
of the issues set out below are also covered by rules 
under  the  full  competition  Directive  and  the 
existing  and  proposed  ONP,  licensing  and  data 
protection  Directives:  effective  enforcement  of this 
regulatory  framework  should  prevent  many  of the 
competition issues set out below from  arising. 
1.  Dominance  (Article  86) 
57.  In  order for  an undenaking  to  provide  services  in 
the telecommunications services  market, it will  need 
to  obtain  access  to  various  facilities.  For  the 
prov1s1on  of  telecommunications  services,  for 
example,  interconnection  to  the  public  switched 
telecommunications  netW-ork  will  usually  be 
necessary. Access to this  network will  almost always 
be  in  the  hands of a  dominant telecommunications 
operator. As regards access  agreements, dominance 
stemming from control on facilities  will  be  the most 
relevant to the Commission's appraisal. 
58.  Whether or not a  company  is  dominant  does  not 
depend  only  on  the  legal  rights  granted  to  that 
company.  The  mere  ending  of  legal  monopolies 
does  not  put  an  end  to  dominance:  Indeed, 
notwithstanding  the  liberalization  Directives,  the 
development  of  effective  competition  from  alter-
native  network  providers  with  adequate  capacity 
and geographic reach will  take time. 
59.  In  the  telecommunications  sector,  the  concept  of 
'esse'ntial  facilities'  will  in  many cases  be  of direct 
relevance  in  detennining  the  duties  of  dominant 
telecommunications  operators.  The phrase  essential 
facility  is  used  to  describe  a  facility  or  infra-
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suucture  which  is  essential  for  reaching  customers 
and/  or  enabling  competitors  to  carry  on  their 
business,  and  which  cannot  be  replicated  by  any 
reasonable  means {'
0
). 
A  company  controlling  the  access  to  an  essential 
,  facility  enjoys  a  dominant  position  within  the 
i;  meaning of Anicle 86.  Conversely,  a company may 
enjoy  a  dominant  position  pursuant  to  Article  86 
witHout  controlling an  essential  facility. 
1be  following  facilities  could  at  present  be 
expected  to constitute  essential  facilities  in  the tele-
communications  sector:  for  example,  the  public 
telecommunications networks for voice and/  or data 
services,  leased  circuit  or  and  related  network 
terminating  equipment,  basic  data  regarding 
subscribers  to  the  public  voice  telephony  service, 
numbering schemes and other customer or technical 
information. 
I . I .  Services  market 
60.  One  of  the  factors  used  to  measure  the  market 
power of an  undertaking  are  the  sales  attributable 
to  that  undertaking,  expressed  as  a  percentage  of 
total sales  in  the  market for substitutable services  in 
the  relevant  geographic  area.  As  regards  the 
services  market,  the  Commission  will  assess,  inter 
alia,  the  turnover  generated  by  the  sale  of 
substitutable  services,  excluding  the  sale  or internal 
usage  of  interconnection  services  and  the  sale  or 
internal  usage  of  local  infrastructure("),  taking 
into  consideration  the  competitive  conditions  and 
the structure of supply and demand on the market. 
1.2.  Access  to  facilities 
61.  The  concept  of  'access'  as  referred  to  above  in 
point  45  can  relate  to  a  range  of  situations, 
• including  the  availability  of leased  lines  enabling  a 
service· provider  to build  up  its  own  network,  and 
interconnection  problem  in  the  strict  sense,  i.e. 
interconnecting  two  telecommunication  networks, 
e.g.  mobile  and  fixed.  In  relation  to  access, 
incumbent  operators  often  occupy  a  monopoly 
position,  and  even  in  areas  where  liberalization  of 
the  legal  framework  has  begun,  it  is  probable  that 
the  incumbent  will  remain  dominant  in  the· future. 
The  incumbent  operator,  which  controls  the 
facilities,  is  often  also  the  largest  service  provider, 
and they have  in  the past not needed  to distinguish 
· :.,  ~"'between  the  conveyance  of  telecommunications 
services  and  the  provision  of  these  services  to 
end-users. Today, an operator who is  also  a service 
provider does  not require  its  downstream operating 
arm to pay for  access,  and  therefore  it. is  not easy 
to  calculate  the  revenue  to  be  allocated  to  the 
facility.  In  a  case  where  an  operator  is  providing 
both  access  and  services  it  is  necessary  to  separate 
so  far as  possible  the revenues  for the  two  markets 
before  using  revenues  as  the  basis  for  the  calcu-
lation  of the  company's share of whichever  market 
is  involved.  Anicle  8 (2)  of the  proposed  intercon-
nection  Directive  should  be  helpful  in  this  context 
as  it  calls  for  separate  accounting  for  'activities 
related  to  interconnection  - covering  both  inter-
connection  services  provided  internally  and  inter-. 
connection services provided to others - and other 
activities'.  · 
62.  The economic  significance  of obtaining  access  also 
depends on the coverage of the network with which 
interconnection  is  sought. Therefore,  in  addition  to 
using  turnover figures,  the  Commission  will,  where 
this  is  possible,  also  take  into  account  the  number 
of  customers  who  have  subscribed  to  services 
comparable  with  those  which  the  service  provider 
requesting  access  intends  to  provide.  Accordingly, 
market  power  for  a  given  undertaking  will  be 
measured  panly by  the  number of subscribers  who 
are connected  to termination points of the telecom-
munications  network of that undertaking expressed 
as  a  percentage  of the  total  number of subscribers 
connected  to  termination  points  in  the  relevant 
geographic  area. 
Supply-side  substitutability 
63.  As  stated above  (see  point 37), supply-side substitu-
tability  is  also  relevant  to  the  question  of 
dominance.  A  market  share  of  over  50 % (u)  is 
usually  sufficient  to  demonstrate  dominance 
although  other  factors  will  be  examined.  For 
example,  the  Commission  will  examine  the 
existence  of other network providers,  if  any,  in  the 
relev~nt geographic area  to determine whether such 
alternative  infrastrUctures  are  sufficiently  dense  to 
provide  competition  to  the  incumbent's  network 
and  the  extent  to  which  it  would  be  possible  for 
new access providers to enter the market. 
Other relevant factors 
64. In  addition  to  market  share  data,  and  supply-side 
substitutability,  in  determining  whether an  operator 
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is  dominant  the  Commission  will  also  examine 
whether  the  operator  has  privileged  access  to 
facilites  which cannot be  duplicated, either for legal 
reasons or because it  would cost too much. 
65.  As  competing access providers appear and challenge 
the  dominance of the  incumbent,  the  scope of the 
rights  they receive  from  Member States' authorities, 
and  notably  their  territorial  reach,  will  play  an 
important  pan  in  the  detennination  of  market 
power. The Commission  will  closely follow  market 
evolution  in  relation  to  these  issues  and  will  take 
account  of  any  altered  market  conditions  in  its 
assessment  of  access  issues  under  the  competition 
rules. 
1.3.  joint dominance 
66.  The  wording  of Article  86  makes  it  clear  that the 
· Article applies  when more than one company shares 
a  dominant position. The circumstances  in  which  a .. 
joint  dominant  position  exists,  and  in  which  it  is 
abused,  have  not yet been  fully ·clarified  by the case 
law of the Community Courts or the practice of the 
Commission,  and  the  law  is  still  developing. 
67.  The  words  of Article  86  ('abuse  by  one  or more 
undertakings')  describe  something  different  from 
the  prohibition  on  ami-competitive  agreements  or 
concerted practices in  Article 85. To hold otherwise 
would  be  contrary to the  usual  principles  of inter-
pretation  of  the  Treaty,  and  would  render  the 
words  pointless  and  without  practical  effect.  This 
does  not,  however,  exclude  the  parallel  application 
of  Ani  des  8  5  and  86  to  the  same  agreement  or 
practice, which  has  been  upheld by  the Commission 
and the Court in  a number of cases C,),  nor is  there 
anything  to  prevent  the  Commission  from  taking 
action  only under one of the provisions,  when both 
apply. 
68.  Two  companies,  each  dominant  in  a  separate 
national  market,  are  not  the  same  as  two  jointly 
. :, .... 
69. 
70. 
dominant  companies.  National  public  voice 
telephony  telecommunications  operators  are  not 
likely to become jointly dominant until  after liberal-
ization  in  the  Community.  For  two  or  more 
companies  to  be  in  a  joint dominant position,  they 
mwt together  have  substantially  the  same  position 
vis-a-t~is their customers and competitors as  a single 
company  has  if it  is  in  a  dominant  position.  With 
specific  reference  to  the  telecommunications  sector, 
joint dominance could  be  attained by two  telecom-
munications  infrastructure  operators  covering  the 
same geographic market. 
In  addition,  for  two  or  more  companies  to  be 
jointly dominant  it  is  necessary,  but  not  sufficient, 
for there to be  no effective competition between the 
companies  on  the  relevant  market.  This  lack  of 
competition may in  practice be  due  to the fact  that 
the  companies  have  links  such  as  agreements  for 
cooperation,  interconnection  or  roaming 
agreements.  The  Commission  does  not,  however, 
consider  that  either  economic  theory  or 
Community  law  implies  that such  links  are  legally 
necessary for a  joint dominant position  to exist C'). 
It is  a sufficient economic link if there is  the kind of 
interdependence which  often  comes  about in  oligo-
polistic  situations.  There  does  not  seem  to  be  any 
reason  in  law or in  economic theory to require any 
other economic link  between  those companies. This 
having  been  said,  in  practice  such  links  will  often 
exist  in  the  telecommunications  sector  where 
national  telecommunication  operators  nearly 
inevitably  have  links  of  various  kinds  with  one 
another. 
To  take  as  an  example  a  cess  to  the  local  loop,  in 
some  Member  States  this  could  well  be  controlled 
in  the  near  future  by  two  operators  - the 
incumbent telecommunications operator and a  cable 
operator.  In  order to  provide  particular services  to 
consumers,  access  to  the  local  loop  of either  the 
telecommunications  operator or .  the  cable  television 
operator  is  necessary.  Depending  on  the  circum-
stances  of  the  case  and  in  particular  on  the 
relationship  between  them,  neither  operator  may 
hold  a  dominant  position:  together,  however,  they 
may  hold  a  joint  monopoly  of  access  to  these 
facilites. 
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2.  Abuse  of dooiliwlce 
2.1.  Refusal  to  grant  access  to  essential  facilities  and 
e  application  of un/awurab/e  terms 
11.  A  refusal  to  give  access  may  be  prohibited  under 
Anicle  86  if  the  refusal  is  made  by  a  company 
which  is  dominant  because  of  its  control  of 
facilities,  as  incumbent  telecommunications 
operators will  usually  be  for  the foreseeable  future. 
· A refusal may have: 
,. 
'the  effect  of  hindering  the  maintenance  of  the 
degree of competition still  existing in  the market or 
the growth of that competition' ('
1
). 
A  refusal  will  only  be  abusive  if  it  affects 
competition.  Service  markets  in  the  telecommuni-
cations  sector  will  initially  have  few  competitive 
players  and  refusals  will  therefore  generally  affe~t 
competition  on  those  markets.  In · all  cases  of 
refusal,  any justification will  be  closely examined' to 
determine whether it  is  objective. 
72.  Broadly there are three releVant scenarios: 
!  I 
(a)  a  refusal  to  grant access  for  the  purposes  of a 
service  where  another  operator  has  been  given 
access  by the  access  provider to operate on that 
services  market; 
(b)  a  refusal  to  grant  access  for  the  purposes  of a 
service  where no other operator has  been  given 
access  by the access  provider to operate on that 
services  market; 
(c)  a  withorawal  of  supply  of  access  from  an 
existing  customer. 
73.  As  to the first of the above scenarios, it  is  clear that 
a refusal  to supply a new  customer in  circumstances 
where  a  dominant  facilities  owner  is  already 
supplying  one or more  customers  operating  in  the 
same  downstream  market  would  constitute 
discriminatory  treatment which,  if  it  would  restrict 
competition  on  that downstream  market,  would  be 
an abuse.  Where network operators offer the same, 
or  similar,  retail  services  as  the  party  requesting 
:,  ~cce.u, they  may  have  both  the  incentive  and  the 
opportunity  to  resuict competition  and  abuse  their 
dominant  posicion  in  this  way.  There  may,  of 
course,  be  justifications  for  such  refusal  - for 
example  f.lis-ti-vis  applicants  which  represent  a 
potencial credit risk.  In the absence of any objective 
justifications, . a  refusal  would  usually  be  an  abuse 
of the dominant position on the access  market. 
74.  In  general  terms,  the  dominant  company's  duty  is 
to provide access  in such a way  ~hat the' goods and 
services  offered  to  downstream·  companies  are 
available  on  terms  no  less  favourable  than  those 
given  to  other  parties,  including  its  own  corre-
sponding  downstream  operations. 
75.  As  to  the  second  of  the  above  situations,  the 
question  arises  as  to  whether  the  access  provider 
should  be  obliged  to  contract  with  the  service 
provider  in  order  to  allow  the  service  provider  to 
operate  on  a  new  service  market.  Where  capacity 
constraints are not an  issue  and where the company 
refusing  to  provide  access  to  its  facility  has  not 
provided  access  to  that facility,  either to  its  down· 
stream  arm  or to  any other company operating on 
that setvices  market,  then it  is  not clear what other 
objective  j~utification there could  be. 
76.  If there  were  no  commercially  feasible  alternatives 
to  the  access  being  requested,  then  unless  access  is 
granted,  the  pany requesting  access  would  not be 
able  to  operate  on  the  service  market.  Refusal  in 
this  case  would  therefore  limit  the  development  of 
new  markets,  or  new  products  on  those  markets, 
contrary to Anicle  86 (b).  In  the  transport field (''), 
the  Commission  ruled  that  a  firm  controlling  an 
essential  facility  must  give  access  in  certain  circum-
stances e').  The  same  principles  apply  to  the  tele-
communications  sector. 
77.  The  principle  obliging  dominant  companies  to 
contract  in  certain  circumstances  will  often  be 
relevant  in  the  telecommunications  sector. 
Currently,  there  are  monopolies  or  vinual 
monopolies  in  the  provision  of  network  infra-
structure for most telecom services  in  the  EU.  Even 
where  restrictions  have  already  been,  or will  soon 
be,  lifted,  competition  in  downstream  markets  will 
continue to  depend upon the  pricing and conditions 
of  access -to  upstream  network  services  that  will 
only  gradually  reflect  competitive  market  forces. 
Given  the  pace of technological  change  in  the  tele-
communications  secto.r,  it  is  possible  to  envisage 
situations  where  companies  would  seek  to  offer 
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new  products  or  services  which  are  not  in 
competition  with  products  or  services  already 
offered  by  the  dominant  access  operator,  but  for 
which this  operator is  reluctant to provide access. 
78.  The Commission  must  ensure  that the  control over 
facilities  enjoyed  by  incumbent  operators  is  not 
used  to  hamper  the  development  of a  competitive 
telecommunications  environment.  A  company 
which  is  dominant  on  a  market  for  services  and 
which  commits  an  abuse  contrary to  Article  86  on 
that  market  may  be  required,  in  order  to  put  an 
end to  the  abuse,  to  supply access  to  its  facility  to 
one  or  more  competitors  on  that  market.  In 
particular,  a  company  may  abuse  its  dominant 
position  if  by  its  actions  it  prevents  the  emergence 
of a new product or service. 
79.  The  starting  point  for  the  Commission's  analysis 
will  be  the  identification  of an  existing or potential 
market  for  which  access  is  being  requested.  In 
order  to  determine  whether  access  should  be 
ordered  under  the  competition  rules,  account  will 
be  taken  of a breach  by  the  dominant company of 
iu duty  not  to  discriminate  (see  below)  or of  the 
following  clements,  taken  cumulatively: 
(a)  access  to  the  facility  in  question  is  generally 
essential  in  order for  companies  to compete  on 
that related  market (
11
). 
The key issue  here is  therefore what is  essential. 
It  will  not be  sufficient  that the  position  of the 
company  requesting  access  would  be  more 
advantageous  if  access  were  granted  - but 
refusal  of  access  must  lead  to  the  proposed 
activities  being  made  either  impossible  or 
seriously and unavoidably uneconomic. 
Although,  for  example,  alternative  infra-
structure  may as  from  1 July  1996  be  used  for 
liberalized  services,  it  will  be  some  time  before 
this  is  in  many cases a satisfactory alternative to 
the  facilitcs  of  the  incumbent  operator.  Such 
alternative  infrastructure  does  not  at  present 
offer  the  same  dense  geographic  coverage  as  · 
that  of  the  incumbent  telecommunications 
operator's network. 
(b)  there  is  sufficient  capacity  available  to  provide 
access. 
(c)  the  facility  owner fails  to satisfy demand on  an 
existing  service  or product  market,  blocks  the 
emergence  of  a  potential  new  service  or 
product, or ·impedes competition on an existing 
or potential service or product market; 
(d) the  company seeking access  is  prepared  to pay 
the  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  price 
and  will  otherwise  in  all  respectS  accept 
non-discriminatory access  terms  and conditions. 
(e)  there  is  no  objective justification for  refusing  to 
provide  access. 
Relevant  justifications  m  this  context  could 
include . an  overriding  difficulty  of  providing 
access  to the·· requesting  company,  or the  need 
for  a  facility  owner  which  has  undenaken 
investment  aimed  at the  introduction  of a  new 
product  or service  to  have  sufficient  tim'e  and 
opportunity to  use  the'  facility in  order to place 
that  new  product  or  service  on  the  market. 
.However,  although  any  justification  will  have 
to  be  examined  carefully  on  a  case-~y-case 
basis.  It is  particularly important in  the  telecom-
munications  sector  that  the  benefits  to 
end-wers  which  will  arise  from  a  competitive 
environment arc nbt undermined  by  the actions 
of the  former  state  monopolists  in  preventing 
competition  from  emerging and  developing. 
In  determining  whether  an  infringement  of Article 
86  has  been  committed,  account will  be  taken  both 
of the factual situation in  that and other geographic 
areas,  and,  where  relevant  the  relationship  between 
the access  requested and ·the technical  configuration 
of the facility. 
80.  The  question  of objective  justification  will.  require 
particularly  close  analysis  in  this  area.  In  addition 
to  determin,ing  whether  difficulties  cited  in  any · 
particular  case  are  serious  enough  to  justify  the 
refusal  to grant access,  the  relevant authorities must 
also  decide  whether  these  difficulties  are  sufficient 
to  outweigh  the  damage  done  to  competition  if 
access  is  refused  or  made  more  difficult  and  the 
downstream service  markets are thus limited. 
8  1.  Three  imponant  elements  relating  to  access  which 
could  be  manipulated  by  the  access  provider  in 
order,  in  effect,  to  refuse  to  provide  access  are 
timing,  technical  configuration and price. 




Dominant  telecommunications  operators  have  a 
duty  to  deal  with  requests  for  access  efficiently: 
undue  and  unexplained 'delays  in  responding  to  a 
request  for  access  may  constitute  an  abuse.  In 
panicular,  however,  the  Commissipn  will  seek  to 
compare the response to a request for access with: 
(a)  the  usual  time-frame  and  conditions  applicable 
'when the  responding pany grants  access  to  its 
facilities  to  its  own  subsidiary  or  operating 
branch; 
(b.)  responses  to  requests  for  access  to  similar 
facilities  in  other Member States; 
(c)  the explanations given  for  any delay in  dealing 
with requests for access. 
Issues  of  technical  configuration  will  similarly  be 
closely  examined  in  order  to  determine  whether 
they  are  genuine.  In  principle,  competition  rules 
require  that  the  party  requesting  access  must  be 
granted  access  at  the  most .  suitable  point  for  the 
requesting  party,  provided  that  this  point  is 
technically  feasible  for  the  access  provider. 
Questions  of technical  feasibility  may  be  objective 
justifications for  refusing  to supply - for example, 
the  traffic  for  which  access  is  sought  must  satisfy 
the  relevant  technical  standards  for  the  infra-
structure  - or  questions  of  capa~ity  restraints, 
where questions of rationing may arise ("). 
84.  Excessive  pncang  for  access,  as  well  as  being 
abusive  in  itself (
60
),  may  also  amount  to  an 
effective refusal to grant access. 
85.  There  are  a  number  of  elements  of  these  tests 
which  require  careful  assessment.  Pricing  questions 
in  the  telecommunications  sector will  be  facilitated 
by  the  obligations  un  ONP  Directives  to  have 
transparent cost-accounting systems. 
86.  As to the third of the situations referred to in  point 
72  above,  some previous  Commission  decisions  and 
the  case-law  of  the  Court  have  been  concerned 
with  the  withdrawal  of  supply  from  downstream 
competitors  (the  third  case,  above).  In  Commercial 
Solvents,  the Court held  that: 
'an undenaking which  has  a  dominant position  on 
the  market  in  raw  materials  and  which,  with  the 
object of reserving  such  raw material  for  manufac-
turing  its  own  derivatives,·  refuses  to  supply  a 
customer,  which  is  itself  a  manufacturer  of  these 
· ~.., "'<ierivatives,  and  therefore  risks  eliminating  all 
competition on the pan of this  customer, is  abusing 
'  its  dominant position within  the meaning of Anicle 
86.' (")  . 
87.  Although  this  case  dealt with  the withdrawal  of a 
product, there  is.  no difference in  principle between 
this  case  and  the  withdrawal  of  access.  The 
unilateral  termination  of  access  agreements  raises 
substantially  similar  issues  to  those  examined  in 
relation  to  refusals.  Withdrawal  of access  from  an 
existing  customer  will  usually  be  abusive.  Again, 
objective  reasons  may  be  provided  to  justify  the 
termination.  Any  such  reasons  must  be 
proportionate  to  the  effects  on  competition  of the 
withdrawal. 
2.2.  0 ther forms  of  abuse 
88.  Refusals  to  provide  access  are  only  one  form  of 
possible  abuse  in  this  area. Abuses  may also arise in 
the  context  of  access  having  been  granted.  An 
abuse  may  occur  inter alia  where  the  operator  is 
behaving  in  a  discriminatory  manner  or  the 
operator's ..  actions  otherwise  limit  markets  or. 
technical  development.  The  following  are 
non-exhaustive  examples  of abuses  which  can  take 
place. 
Network configuration 
89.  Network  configuration  by  a  dominant  network 
operator  which  makes  access  objectively . more 
difficult  for  service  providers (
62
)  could  constitute 
an  abuse  unless  it  were  objectively  justifiable.  One 
objective  justification  would  be  where  the  network 
configuration  improves  the  efficiency  of  the 
network generally. 
Tying 
90.  This  is  of particular  concern  where  it  involves  the 
tying  of services  for  which  the  telecommunications 
operator  is  dominant  with  those  for  which  it  is 
exposed  to  competition (u).  Where  the  vertically 
integrated  dominant  network  operator obliges  the 
party  requesting  access  to  purchase  one  or  more 
services (
64
)  without  adequate  justifications,  this 
may exclude  rivals  of the dominant access  provider 
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from  offering  these  elements  of the  package  inde-
pendently.  This  requirement  could  thus  constitute 
an abuse under Anicle 86. 
Pricing 
91.  Pricing  problems  in  connection  with  access  for 
service  providers  to  a  dominant  operator's 
(essential)  facilities  will  often  revolve  around 
excessively  high  prices ("):  in  the  absence  of 
another  viable  alternative  to  the  facility  to  which 
access  is  being  sought  by  service  providers,  the 
dominant  or monopolistic  operator my  be  inclined 
to charge excessive  prices. 
The  problem  of unfairly  low  prices  could  arise  in 
the  context  of  competition  between  different  tele-
communications  infrastructure  networks,  where  a 
dominant operator may tend  to charge unfairly low 
prices  for  access  in  order to  eliminate  competition 
from  othet  (emerging)  infrastructure  providers,  in 
violation  of  Anide  8(>  (a).  In  general  a  price  is 
abusive  if  it  is  below  the  dominant ·company's 
average variable costs or if it  is  below  average  total 
cons and pan of an anti-competitive plan ("). 
If  a  case  arises,  the  ONP  rules  concerning 
accounting  requirements  and  transparency will  help 
tO  ensure  the  effective  application  of Article  86  in · 
this  context. 
92.  Where  the  operator  is  domin.ant  in  the  product or 
services  market,  the  margin  between  the  price 
charged  to  all  competitors  on  the  downstream 
market  (including  the  dominant  company's  own 
downstream  operations,  if  any)  for  access  and  t~e 
price  which  the  network  operator  charges  in  the 
downstream  market must be  large  enough  to  allow 
a  reasonably  efficient service  provider in  the  down-
stream  market to obtain  a  normal  profit  unless  the 
dominant  company  can  show  that  its  downstream 
operation  is.  exceptionally efficient (
67
). If this  is  not 
the  case,  competitors  on  the  downstream  market 
are  faced  by  a  'price  squeeze'  which  could  force 
them out of the market. 
Discrimination 
93.  A  dominant  access  provider  may  not  discriminate 
between  different  access  agreements  where  such 
discrimination  would  restrict  competition.  Any 
differentiation  based  on  the  use  which  is  to  be 
made  of the  access  rather than  differences  between 
the  transactions  for  the  access  provider itself,  if  the 
discrimination  is  sufficiendy  likely  to  restrict  or 
diston  actual  or  potential  competition,  would  be 
·..,  ...  contrary  to  Anicle  86.  This  discrimination  could 
take  the  form  of  imposing  different  conditions, 
including  the  charging  of  different  prices,  or 
otherwise  differentiating  between  access 
agreements,  except  where  such  discrimination 
would  be  objectively  justified,  for  example  on  the 
basis  of cost or technical  considerations or the fact 
that the users  are operating at different levels.  Such 
discrimination  could  be  likely  to  restrict 
competition  in  the  downstream  market  on  which 
the  company  requesting  access  was  seeking  to 
operate, in  that it  might limit the possibility  for that 
operator  to  enter  the  market  or  expand  tts 
operations on that market ("). 
94.  With  regard  to  price  discrimination,  Anide  86  (c) 
prohibits  discrimination  by  a  dominant  firm 
between  customers  of  that  firm ("),  including 
discriminating  between  customers  on  the  basis  of 
whether or not they  agree  to  deal  exclusively  with 
that dominant firm. 
95.  Discrimination  without  objective  justification  as 
regards  any  aspects  or  condition  of  an  access 
agreement  may  constitute  an  abuse.  Discrimination 
may  relate  to  elements  such  as  pricing,  delays, 
technical  access,  routing ('
0
),  numbering, 
restncuons  on  network  use  exceeding  essential 
requirements  and  use  of  customer  network  data. 
However,  the  existence  of discrimination  can  only 
be  determined  on  a  case  by  case  basis.  Discrimi-
nation  is  contrary  to  Anicle  86  whether  or  not  it 
results  from  or  is  apparent  from  the  terms  of  a 
panicular access  agreement. 
96.  There  is,  in  this  context,  a  general  duty  on  the 
network operator to treat independent customers in 
the  same way as  its  own subsidiary or downstream 
service  arm.  The  nature  of  the  custOmer  and  its 
demands  may play a  significant role  in  determining 
whether  transactions  are  comparable.  Different 
prices  for  customers  at  different  levels  (e.g. 
wholesale  and  retail)  do  not  necessarily  constitute 
discrimination. 
97.  Discrimination  issues  may  arise  an  respect  of  the 
technical  configuration  of  the  access,  given  ats 
importance in  the context of access. 
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The  degree  of  technical  sophistication  of  the 
access:  restrictions  on  the  type  or  •level'  in  the 
network  hierarchy  of  exchange  involved  in  the 
access  or the  technical capabilities  of this  exchange 
arc· of direct  competitive  significance.  These  could 
be  the  facilities  available  to suppon a connection or 
the  type of interface  and signalling  system  used  to 
determine  the type  of service  available  to  the  party 
requesting  access  (e.g.  intelligent network facilities) .  . 
The  number and/  or location  of connection  points: 
the  requirement  tO collect and  distribute  traffic  for 
particular areas  at the  switch  which  directly serves 
mat  area  rather  than  at  a  higher  level  of  the 
network  hi~rarchy  may  be  imponant.  The  party 
requesting  access  incurs  additional  · expense  by 
. either providing links  at a greater distance from  its 
own switching centre or being  liable  to pay higher 
conveyance  charges. 
Equal  access:  the  possibility  for  customers  of  the 
pany  requesting  access  to  obtain  the  services 
provided  by  the  access  provider  using  the  same 
number  of  dialled  digits  as  are  used  by  the 
customers  of  the  latter  is  a  crucial  feature  of 
competitive  telecommunications. 
Objective  justification 
98.  These  could  include  factors  relating  to  the  actual 
operation  of  the  network  owned  by  the  access 
provider,  or  licensing  restrictions  consistent  with, 
for  example,  the  subject  matter  of  intellectual 
propeny rights. 
2.3.  Abuses  of  joint oominance 
99.  In  the case of joint dominance (see  above, points 65 
et  seq.)  behaviour  by·  one  of  several  jointly 
dominant companies  may  be  abusive  even  if  others 
are not behaving in  the same way. 
t  00.  In  addition  to  remedies  ·under  the  competition 
rules,  if  no  operator  was  willing  to  grant  access, 
and  if. there was  no  technical or commercial justifi-
cation  for  the  refusal,  one  would  expect  that  the 
national  regulatory  authority  would  resolve  the 
problem  by ordering one or more of the companies 
to  offer  access,  under  the  terms  of  the  ONP 
·~ "1>ircctive or under national law. 
3.  Access  agreements  (Anidc 85) 
t  0 t.  Restrictions  of  competauon  stemming  from  access 
agreements may have two distinct effcets: to restrict 
competition  between  the  two  parties  to  the  access 
agreement,  or  to  restrict  competition  from  third 
panics,  for example  through exclusivity  for  one or 
both  of the  parties  of the  agrccme~t. In addition, 
where  one  party  is  dominant,  conditions  of  the 
access  agreement  may  lead  to  a  strengthening  of 
that dominant  position,  or to  an  extension  of that 
dominant  position  to  a  related  market,  or  may 
constitute an unlawful  exploitation of the  dominant 
position  through the imposition of unfair terms. 
t 02.  Access  agreements  where  access  is  in  principle 
unlimited  are  not  likely  to  be  restrictive  of 
competition  within  the  meaning  of Article  85  (1 ). 
Exclusivity  obligations  in  contracts  providing a~ 
to  one  company  are  likely  to  restrict  competition 
because  they limit access  to infrastructure  for other 
companies.  Since  most  networks  have  more 
capacity than  any single  user  is  likely  to  need,  this 
will  nonntlly be  the case  in  the telecommunications 
sector. 
103.  Access  agreements  can  have  significant 
pro-competitive  effects  as  they  can  improve  access 
to  the  downstream  market.  Access  agreements  in 
the  context of interconnection are essential  to inter-
operability  of  services  and  infrastructure,  thus 
increasing  competition  in  the  downstream  market 
for services,  which  is  likely to involve  higher added 
value  than local  infrastrUcture. 
104.  There  is,  however,  obvious  potential  for  anti-
competitive  effects  of cenain access  agreements_ or 
clauses  therein.  Access  agreements  may,  for 
example: 
(a)  serve  as  a means of coordinating prices; 
(b)  or market sharing; 
(c)  have  exclusionary effects on third panics (
11
); 
(d)  lead  to an  exchange  of  commercially  sensitive 
infonnation between the panics. 
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105.  ·nle  risk  of price  coordination  is  p:articularly  acme 
in  the  telecommunications  sector  since  intercon-
nection  charges  often  amount  to  50 % or more  of 
the  total  cost of the  services  provided,  and  where 
interconnection  with  a  dominant  operator  will 
usually  be  necessary.  In  these  circumstances,  the 
scope  for price  competition  is  limited  and  the  risk 
(and  the  seriousness)  of price  coordination  corre-
spondingly greater. 
106.  Furthermore,  interconnection  agreements  between 
network operators may under certain circumstances 
be  an  instrument  of  market  sharing  between  the 
network operator providing access  and the network 
operator  seeking  access,  instead  of  the  emergence 
of network competition between them. 
107.  In  a  liberalized  telecommunications  environment, 
the  above  types  of  restrictions  of  competition  will 
be  monitored  by  the  national  authorities  and  the 
Commission under the competition rules. The right 
of  parties  who  suffer  from  any  type  of  anti-
competitive  behaviour  to  complain  to  the 
Commission is  unaffected by national regulation. 
Clauses falling within Article 85 (1) 
108.  1be  Commission  has  identifi~d  cenain  types  of 
restriction  which  would  potentially  infringe  Aniclc 
85  (I) of the  EC Treaty and  therefore require indi-
vidual  exemption.  These  clauses  will .  most 
commonly  relate  to  the  commercial  framework  of 
the  access. 
109.  In  the  telecommunications  sector,  interconnecting 
panics may wish  to exchange, customer and traffic 
information. This exchange is  likely to influence the 
competmve  behaviour  of  the  undertakings 
concerned,  and  could  easily  be  used  by the panics 
for  collusive  practices,  such  as  market  sharing {'
2
). 
Safeguards  will  ~herefore  be  necessary  to  ensure 
that  either  confidential  inform~tion  is  only 
disclosed  to  those  parts  of the  companies  involved 
in  making  the  interconnection  agreements,  or  to 
ensure  that  the  information  is  not  used  for  ami-
competitive  purposes. 
I I 0.  Exclusivity  arrangements,  for  example  where traffic 
would  be  conveyed  exclusively  through  the  tele-
communications  network  of  one  or  both  panics 
rather  than  to  the  network  of  other  parties  with 
whom  access  agreements  have  been  concluded  will 
similarly require analysis under Article 85  (3). If no 
justification  is  provided  for  such  routing,  such 
. :.,  ·""- clauses will  be prohibited. 
111.  Access agreement that have been concluded with an 
anti-competitive  object  are  extremely  unlikely  to 
fulfil  the criteria for an individual exemption under 
Article 85  (3 ). 
112.  Funhermore,  access  agreements  may  have  an 
impact on  the  competitive  structure of the  market. 
Local  access  charges  will  often  account  for  a 
considerable ponion of the total cost of the services 
provided  to  end-users  by  the  pany  requesting 
access,.  thus  leaving  limited  scope  for  price 
competition.  Because  of the  need  to safeguard  this 
limited  degree of competition,  the Commission will 
therefore  pay  particular  attention  to  scrutinizing 
access  agreements  in  the  context  of  their  likely 
effects  on  the  relevant  markets  in  order to  ensure 
that such  agreements do not serve as  a  hidden and 
indirect  means  for  fixing  or  co-ordinating 
end-prices  for  end-users,  which  constitutes  one  of 
the  most serious  infringementS  of Article  85  of the 
EC Treaty  (73).  . 
113.  In·  addition,  clauses  involving  collective  discrimi-
nation  leading  to  the  exclusion  of third  parties  are 
similarly  restrictive  of  competition.  The  most 
important  is  discrimination  with  regard  to  price, 
quality or other commercially significant  aspects  of 
the  access  to  the  detriment of the party  requesting 
access,  which  will  generally  aim  at  unfairly 
favouring  the operations of the access  provider. 
4.  Effect  on trade  between  Member States 
114.  The  application  of both  Article  85  and  Article  86 
requires an effect on trade between Member States. 
115.  In  order  for  an  agreement  to  have  an  effect  on 
trade  between  Member States,  it  must  be  possible 
for the Commission to: 
'foresee  with  a  sufficient  degree  of  probability  on 
the  basis  of a  set of objective  factors  of law or of 
fact  that  the  agreement  in  question  may  have  an 
influence,  direct or indirect,  actual or potential,  on 
the pattern of trade between Member States.' ('
4
). 
It  is  not  necessary  for  each  of  the  restrictions  of 
competition  within  the  agreement  to  be  capable  of 
affecting  trade {'
1
),  provided  the  agreement  as  a 
whole does so. 
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116.  ~  regards  access  agreements  in  the  telecommuni-
cations  sector,  the  Commisiion  will  consider  not 
only the  direct effect  of restrictions of competition 
on inter-state  trade in  access  markets,  but also  the 
effeets  on inter-state  trade in  downstream  telecom-
munications  services.  The  Commission  will  also 
consider  the  potential  of  these  agreements  to 
foreclose  a  given  geographic  market  which  could 
.·  prevent  undertakings  already  eStablished  in  other 
'I  Me'mber  States  from  competing  in  this  geographic 
market. 
117.  Telecommunications  access  agreementS  will 
normally  affect  trade  between  Member  States  as 
services  provided  over  a  network  are  uaded 
throughout  the  EU  and  access  agreementS  may 
govern  'the  ability  o( a  service  provider  or  an 
operator  to  provide  any  given  service (").  Even 
· ~  ,._ where  marketS  are mainly  national,  as  is  generally 
the  case  at present given  the  stage  of development 
of liberalisation,  abuses  of dominance will  nonnally 
speaking  affect  market structure,  leading  to  reper-
cussions on trade between Member States. 
118.  Cases  in  this  area involving  issues  under Anicle  86 
will  relate  either  to  abusive  clauses  in  access 
agreements,  or  a  refusal  to  conclude  an  access 
agreement on appropriate  terms  or at aU.  &  such, 
the criteria listed above  for detennining whether an 
access  agreement  is  capable  of  affecting  trade 
between  Member  States  would  be  equally  relevant 
here.  · 
Conclusions 
119.  The  Commission  considers  that  competition  rules  and  sector  specific  regulation  form  a 
coherent set  of measures  to ensure  a liberalized  and  competitive  market environment  for 
telecommunications markets  in  the EU. 
120.  In  taking action in  this  sector, the Commission will  aim  to  avoid  unnecessary duplication  . 
of  procedures,  in  panicular,  competition  procedures  and  national/EU  regulatory 
procedures as set out und~r the ONP framework: 
121.  Where  compeuuon  rules  are  invoked  the  Commission  will  consider  which  marketS  are 
relevant and will  apply Anicle 85  and 86  in  accordance with the principles set out above. 
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(
1
)  AccordinJ  ~o  Dire~ve 96/19/EC  ~~ 96/2/E_C:,  certain  Member  States  may  requ~ a  derogati~!J. from  fuU  liberalization  for 
cenam  luruted  penods.  See  Comm&SSion  Deasaon  of  27  November  1996  concerrung  the  addiuonal  implementation  riods 
requested  by  Ireland  for. the  implementation  of Commission  Directives  90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as  regards  fuU  compeJclon  in 
th~ telecommunications  mark~ts. This notice  ~s without  prej~~ice to such derogations, and the  Comm.issi~n will take account of the 
exsstence of any such derogauon when applyang the compeuuon rules to access agreements, as  dcscnbed m this notice. 
(Z)  Communication by the Commission .  to the European Parliament and the Council, CoDsultation  on the Green Paper on the liberal-
ization of telecommunications infrastructUre and cable  television networks, COM(95)  158  final,  3 May 1995. 
(I) Commission  Directive  881301/EEC of 16  May 1988  on competition in  the  markets  in  telecommunications terminal equipment (OJ 
No L 131,  27.  5.  1988, p. 73); Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommuni-
cations  services  (OJ  No  L  192,  H. 7.  1990,  p.  10);  Commission  Directive  9_./46/EC  of  13  Oetober  199_.  amending  Directive 
88/301/EEC and  Directive 90/388/EEC in  panicula.r with regard to satellite communications (OJ No L 268,  19.  10.  1994  p.  15)· 
Commission  Directive  95/51/EC  of  18  Oetober  1995  amending. Directive  90/388/EEC  Wlch  regard  to  the  abolition'  of  th~ 
restrictions  on  the  use  of cable  television  networks  for  the  provision  of already liberalized  telecommunications services  (OJ No L 
256,  26.  10.  1995,  p.  _.9);  Commission  Directive  96/2/EC of 16  January  1996  amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with  regard  to 
mobile  and  personal  communications  (OJ  No  L  20,  26.  1.  1996,  p.  59);  Commission  Directive  96/19/EC  of  13  March  1996 
amending Directive 90/388/EEC with  regard  to the implementation of fuU  competition in  the telecommunications markets (OJ No 
L 7_.,  22.  3.  1996, p.  13). 
(•)  Interconnection agreements are the  most significant form  of access  agreement in  the  telecommunications sector. A basic  framework 
for  interconnection agreements  is  set  up  by the  rules  on open  network frovision  (ONP), and  rhe  application of competition  rules 
must  be  seen  against this  background: Council  Directive  90/387/EEC o  28  June  1990  on rhe  establishment of rhe  internal market 
r~r tdecomanunications  services  through  the  implementation of open  network provision  (OJ No L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  t); Council 
Directive  92/44/EEC of 5 June  1992  on  the  application  of open  network  provision  to leased  lines  (OJ No  L  165,  19.  6.  1992, 
p.  27);  European  Parliament and Council  Directive 95/62/EC of 13  December  1995  on the application of open network provision 
to voice  telephony  (OJ  No L 321,  30.  12.  1995,/. 6);  Common  position  for  a European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  on 
interconnection  in  telecommunications  with  regar  to  ensuring  uruversal  service  and  mteroperability  through  application  of the 
principles of open network provision  (ONP) (OJ No C 220,  29.  7.  1996,  p.  13); Proposal for a European Parliament and  Council 
Directive  amending  Council  Directives  90/387 /EEC and 92/H/EEC for  the  purpose  of adaptation to a  competitive  environment 
in  telecommunications, COM(95) 543  final,  H. 11.  1995. 
(')  In rhe  telecommunications area, notably Commission  Decision of 18  October 1991,  Eirpage (OJ No L 306, 7.  II.  1~91, p.  22),  and 
Commission  Decisions of 17 July 1996, Adas and  Phoenix (OJ No L 239,  19.  9.  1996,  p.  23  and 57).  There are  also  a number of 
pending cases  involving  access  issues. 
(') Competition  aspects  of interconnection  agreements  in  rhe  telecommunications  sector, June  1995;  Competition  aspectS  of access  by 
service  providers  to the  resources  of telecommunications operators, Decembet 1995. See  also  Competiuon aspects  of access  pricing, 
December  1995. 
(')  In  rhe  case of the ONP leased  line  directive, ONP foresees  the first stage which allows  the aggrieved  user to appeal  to the  national 
regulatory  aurhority.  This  can  offer  a  number  of  advantages.  In  the  telecommunications  areas  where  experience  has  shown  that 
comP.anies  are  often  hesitant to  be  seen  as  complainants against the TO on which  they heavily depend  not only with  respect  to the 
specific  point  of  conflict  but  also  a  much  broader and  far-reaching  sense,  the  procedures  foreseen  under  ONP are  an  attractive 
option.  ONP procedures  furthermore  can  cover a broader range of access  problems  than could  be  approached  on  the  basis  of the 
competition  rules.  Finally,  these  procedures can  offer users  the  advantage  of proximity  and  familiarity  with  national  administrative 
\J
occdures; language is  also  a factor to be taken  into account. 
nder  ONP procedures,  if  matters  cannot  be  resolved  at  the  national  level,  a second  stage  is  organized  at  the  European  level 
(conciliation  procedure).  Pursuant  to  the  ONP leased  line  Directive,  an  agreement  between  rhe  parties  involved  must  then  be 
reached within two month.s,  with a possible extension of one month if the parties agree. 
It should  be  noted  rhat  in  the proposed  ONP interconnection  Directive,  as  opposed  to  rhe  leased  line  Directive,  a  conciliation 
procedure  is  foreseen  for  transfrontier .cases  only,  that  is  interconnection  disputes  in  which  more  than  one  national  regulatory 
aurhority is  involved. If rhe  national regulatory authorities dealing wirh  an interconnection problem do not reach  a solution  to the 
problem,  then one of rhem  may  notify the  Commission  thereof and invoke  the conciliation  procedure (Article  17  of the proposed 
Directive).  .  -
(')  National  regulatory authority is  a sector specific  national  telecommunications  regul~tory created by  a Member State in  the  context 
of the Services Directive as  amended, and the ONP framework.  ·  ' 
(
9
)  Article  7  of the  Services  Direcuve  (Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC,  referred  to  above  in  footnote  3  ),  and  the  Com~ission's 
communication  95/C  275/02  to  the  European  Parliament  and ·rhe  Council  on  rhe  status  and  implementation  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC on  competition  in  the  markets  for  telecommunications  services  (OJ  No  C  275,  20.  10.  1995,  p.  9 tt stq.).  See  also 
Case  C-91/9_.,  Thierry  Tranchant  and  Telephones  Stores  Sari,  Judgment  of the  Coun of Justice,  9  November  1995,  not  yet 
reported. 
(~')  Proposed ONP interconnection Directive cited  in  footnote  4,  Article 9 (3). 
(") Case  T-24/90,  Automec  v.  Commission,  1992  ECR  11-2223,  paragraph  77;  and  Case  T-114/92,  BEMIM  v.  Commission,  1995 
ECR-U  147. 
(~~)  Notice on cooperation between national courts and  the Commission  in  applying Articles  85  and 86  of the  EC Treaty (OJ No C  39, 
13.  2.  1993,  p.  6,  paragraph  1_.);  draft  notice  on  cooperation  between  national  competition  aurhorities  and  the  Commission  (OJ 
No 262,  10. 9.  1996, p.  5). 
('•)  Case  127/73, BRT v.  Sabam,  1974  ECR 51. 
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4
)  Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed,  1989 ECR 838. 
(
11
)  They  must  not,  for  example,  encourage  or reinforce  or approve  the. 5CSUits  of anti-competitive  behaviour:  Ahmed  Saeed  above 
footnote  14;  Case  153/93, Federal  Republic  of Germany v.  Delta Schiffahrts,  1994  ECR-1  2517;  Case  267/86, Van  Eyck~, 1988 
ECR 4769. 
(") Case  13/77,  GB-Inno-BM/ATAB,  1977  ECR  2p5, paragraph  33:  'while  it  is  true  that  Anicle  86  is  directed  at  undertakings 
nonetheless  it  is  also  true  that the Treaty imposes  a duty on Member States  not to  adopt or maintain in  force  any measure which 
could  deprive the provision of its  effectiveness.' 
(
11
)  For funher duties of national authorities see  Case  103/88, Fratelli CoStanZo SpA,  1989 ECR 1839 . 
.  ·'  See  ,Ahmed  Saeed,  above  footnote  14:  'Articles  5  and  90  of the  EC Treaty must  be  interpreted  as  (i)  prohibiting  the  national 
1  auth'orities  from  encouraging the conclusion of agreements  on  tariffs  contrary  tO Article  85 (1)  or Anicle  86  of the  Treacy,  as  the 
case may be; (ii)  precluding the approval by those authorities of tariffs resulting from such agreements'. 
(") Joined Cases C-6 and 9/90, Francovich,  1990-1  ECR 5357; joined Cases  C-46/93, Brasserie de Pecheur SA  v.  Gennany and Case 
C-48/93, R v.  Secretary of State for Transpon tx partt Factoname Ltd and others, judgment of 5 March 1996,  not yet reponed. 
(") For example,  recital  18  of the  leased  line· Directive  referred  to  in  footnote  4 and  Article  9 (3)  of the  draft  ONP interconnection 
Directive. 
(") Council  Regulation  No  4064/~9 of 21  December  1989  on  the  control  of concentrations  between  undertakings  (OJ  No  L  395, 
30.  12.  1989, p.  I). 
(
11
)  Council  Regulation  No 17  of 6  February  1962,  first  Regulation  implementing Anicles  85  and 86  of the_Treaty (OJ  No  13,  21.  12. 
1962,  p.  204/62), as  amended. 
(
12
)  Anicl~s 2 and  4 (I) of Regulation  17. 
(u) Article 3 of Regulation  17. 
·  C')  Articles  3 and  12  of Regulation 17. 
C')  Case 792/79 R,  Camera Care v.  Commission,  1980  ECR 119.  See  also  Case T-44/90, La Cinq v.  Commission,  1992  ECR II-1. 
C')  See  point  16  of the  notice on cooperation between national courts and  the  Commission cited above in  footnote  12. 
(") Article 2 or 4 (1) of Regulation  17. 
(") Arucle 3 (2) of Regulation  17. 
C')  Camera Care and  La  Cinq, referred to above in  footnote 25. 
C
0
)  Notice on cooperation between national  COUrtS and  the  Commission cited  above  in  fpotnote  12,  point  16. 
e')  Paragraph  14. 
( 11)  See  Automec, footnote  II  above,  paragraph  86. 
(
11
)  BRT v.  Sabam,  footnote  13  above. 
(") Anicles 9  (I) and  9  (3) of the  proposed ONP interconnection  Directive. 
(,) Case  14/83, Von  Colson,  1984  ECR  1891. 
(") Telecommunications:  open  network  provision  (ONP) for  leased  lines;  Conciliation  procedure; 94/C 214/04  (OJ  No  C  214,  4.  8. 
1994,  p.  4). 
('') Article  IS  (2)  of Regulation  17. 
C')  Article  15  (5) of Regulation  17. 
e')  Article  15  (6) of Regulation  17. 
eo)  Article 6 (c) of the proposed ONP interconnection  Directive. 
(  ..  )  lnttr alia,  in  Article 9 of the proposed ONP interconnection Directive. 
(•
1
)  See  footnote  18  above. 
(") Interconnection  is  defined  in  Directive 96/19/EC as: 
' ... the  physical  and  logical  linking  of the  telecommunications  facilities  of organisations  providing  telecommunications  networks 
and/or telecom.munications services,  in  order to allow the  users of one organization to communicate with  the  users  of the same or 
another organization or to access services provided  by third organizations.' 
In  the  full  liberalization  Dire~tive and ONP Directives,  telecommunications services  are defined  as: 
'services,  whose provision consists wholly or panly in  the  transmission and/or routing of signals on a  telecommunications network.' 
It  therefore  includes  the  transmission  of broadcasting signals  and  CATV  networks.  A telecommunications  network  is  itself defined 
as: 
•  ... the  transmission  equipment  and,  where  applicable,  switching  equirment and  other  resources  which  permit  the  conveyance  of 
signals  between defined  termin~tion points by wire,  by radio,  by optica  or by other electromagnetic means.' 
(  ..  )  Eurotunnel (0  J No L 354,  31.  12.  1994,  p.  66 ). 
("')  Guidelines on the  application of the competition  rules  in "the  telecommuniqtions sector, see  point 3 above, paragraphs  15  and  16. 
(") Commission  Decision  82/896/EEC BNIC/AROW (OJ No L 379,  31.  12.  1982,  p.  1). 
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(•')  See footnote  15  above. 
( 04)  Joined Cases  C·4-8/90 and C-66/90, Netherlands and others v.  Commission,  1992  ECR 1-565. 
C')  See  Ahmed  Saeed,  fomno~.e 14  above,  where internal  market legislauori relating to pricing was  used  as  an  aid  in  detennining what 
level of prices  should be  rer,arded as  unfair for  the  purposes of Ar"?cle  86. 
C'>  See  also  t~1e  definition  induded  in  the  ·  Additi~nal  commiun~nt .on  r~~ulatory principles  by  the  Europ.ean  Communities  ~nd their 
Mem~er. States  u~ed  by  the  Group  on  bas1c  telecommumcauons  111  the  context  of  the  World  lrade  Organisation  (WfO) 
negouauons: 
'Essential  facilities  mean facilities  of a public  telecommunications transport network and service  that: 
(a)  are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of suppliers; and 
(b)  cannot feasibly  be  economically or technically substituted in  order to provide a service.' 
(,.)  Case 6/72 Continenul Can,  1973  ECR 215. 
It should  be  noted  in  this  context that under  the  ONP framework  an  organization  may  be  notified  as  having  significant  market 
power  ..  The determination  of whether an  organization  does or does  not have  significant  market power depends  on a  number of 
faetors,  but the starting presumption is  that an organization with a  market share of more than 25 % will  normally be  considered to 
have  significant  market  power.  The  Commission  will  take  account  of  whether  an  undertaking  has  been  notified  as  having 
significant market power under the ONP rules  in  its  appraisal under the competition rules. 
(,) Case  85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche,  1979  ECR 461; Racal  Decca, Commission Decision of 21  December 1988  (OJ No L 43,  15.  2. 
1989,  p.  27). 
('•)  NestlUPerrier, Commission  Decision of 22 July  1992  (OJ No L 356, 5.  12.  1992, p.  1). 
C')  Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche,  1979  ECR 461. 
('-)  Commission  Decision  94/19/EC,  Sea  Containers  v.  Stena  Sealink  (OJ  No  L  15,  18.  1.  1994,  p.  8);  Commission  Decision 
94/119/EC, re  access  to facilities of Port Redby (0  J  No L 55,  26.  2.  1994, p.  52). 
(")  See  :~!so  (:~.mong mhe1s):  Judgments  of  the  Court.:  Cases  6  and  7/73, Commercial  SolventS  v.  Commission,  1974  ECR  223;  Case 
311/84,  Telem:uketin~~. 1985  ECR 3261; Case  C-18/88 RTf v.  GB-Inno,  1991  ECR 1·5941; Case C-260/89, Elliniki  Radiophonia 
Teleorassi,  1991  ECR I-2925;  C;~.ses T-69, T-70  and  T-76/89,  R'IT,  BBC  and  ITP v.  Commission,  1991  ECR  II-485,  535,  575; 
Case  C-271/90,  Spain  v.  Commission,  1992  ECR  1-5833;  Ca.ses  C-241  and  242-91P,  RTE and  ITP Ltd  v.  Commission  (Magill), 
1995  ECR I-743. 
Commission  Decisions: 76/185/EEC- National Carbonizing Company (OJ No L 35,  10.  2.  1976, p.  6};  88/589/EEC- London 
European- Sabena (OJ  No L 317,  24.  11.  1988,  p.  47); 92/213/EEC- British  Midland v.  Aer Lingus (OJ No L 96,  10.  4.  1992, 
p.  34); B&I/Sealink, (1992) 5 CMLR 255; EC  Bulletin, No 6- 1992, point 1.3.30. 
C')  Community  law  !rot~CtS  competition  and  not  competitors,  and  therefore.  it  would  be  insufficient  to  demonstrate  that  one 
competitor  neede  access  to  a  facility  in  order to  compete in  the  downstream  market.  It would  be  necessary  to  demonstrate  that 
access  is  necessary for all  except exceptional competitors in  order for access  to be  made compulsory. 
C')  As  noted  above in  paragraph 80. 
('
0
)  See  paragraph 91  below. 
(
61
)  Case 6/73 and  7/73, Commercial Solvents,  1974  ECR 223. 
(") That is  to use  the  network w  reach  their own  custOmers. 
(") This  is  abo dealt  with  under the  ONP framework:  see  Article  7  (4)  of the  Interconnection  Directive,  Article  12  (4)  of the  voice 
telephony, Directive and Annex II  of the ONP framework DireCtive. 
(u) That is  including  those which are superfluous  to the  latter, or indeed  those  which may constitute services  the  access  requester itself 
would like  to provide for  its  customers. 
("')  The Commission  communication  on assessment  criteria  for  national  schemes  for  the  costing  and  financing  of universal  service  and 
guidelines  for  the  operation  of such  schemes  will  be  relevant  for  the  determination  of the  extent  to  which  the  universal  service 
obligation can be  used  to justify the prices charged. See also  the  reference to the universal service obligation in  paragraph 53  above. 
(
66
)  See  AKZO, Case C·62/86, [1991]  ECR-3359. 
However,  the  average  variable  cost rule  cannot be  applied  in  many  situations in  the  telecommunications  sector,  since  the  variable 
costs  of  providing  access  to  an  already  existing  network  are  almost  zero.  Accordingly,  the  test  which  the  Commission  considers 
should  be  applied  is  whether a company charges  a price  for  goods and services - other than in  the context of a new  product or 
service - which although above the average variable cost of providinl?  the specific goods or services for which the price m question 
is  paid  is  so  low  that  the  overa11  revenues  for  all  the  goods or  serv~ces in  question  would  be  less  than  its  average  total  costs  of 
providing them  if  it  sold  the same proponion of its  output at the same price on a continuing basis,  even  where no  intent to exclude 
a competitor is  proved. 
(") Commission  Decision  88/518/EEC, Brown  Napier/British Sugar (OJ No L 284,  19.  10.  1988,  p.  41): the  margin between industrial 
and  retail  prices  wa.s  reduced  to  the  point  where  the  wholesale  purchaser  with  packaging  operations  as  efficient  a.s  those  of the 
wholesale supplier could  not profitably serve  the  retail market. See  also  National Carbonizing, footnote 57  above. 
(  ..  )  However,  when  infrastructure  capacity  is  under-utilised,  charging  a  different  price  for  access  depending  on  the  demand  in  the 
different downstream markets  may be  justified  to the extent that such differentiation permits a  better utilisation of the  infrastructure 
and  a better development of cenain markets, and  where such differentiation does  not restrict or distort competition. In such a case, 
the  Commission  will  analyse  the global effects  of such  price differentiation on all  of the downstream markets. 
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(") Cue C-JI0/93 P,  BPB  lndwtrie.s pic and British Gypsum Ltd  v.  Commission [1995] ECR 1-865, 904, applying to discrimination by 
BPB among customers in  the related market for dry plaster. 
(") That is to a preferred list of correspondent nework operators.  · :"f4"l. 
(") Commission  Decision  94/663/EC: Night Services  (OJ No  L 259,  7.  10.  1994,  p.  20);  Commission  Decision  94/894/EC, Euro-
tunnel (OJ No L 354, 31. 12. 1994, p. 66). 
(11)  Case  T-34/92,  Fiata~ri UK  Ltd  and New Holland Ford Ltd  v.  Commission; Case T-35/92, John Deere Ltd  v.  Con1p1issiqn;  Both 
on appeal to the-ECJ; Appealing aga~  Commission decision, UK Agricultural TractOr Registration Exchange (OJ No L 68,  13.  3. 
1992, p.  19). 
('~)  Case  8/72 Vereniging van  Cementhandelaaren v.  Commission  (1972]  ECR 977;  Case  123/83  Bureau  National  Interprofessionnel 
_.,  du Cognac v.  Clair (1985] ECR 391.  ' 
('•)  Case 56/65, STM, 1966 ECR 235 at 249. 
(") Case 193/83, Windsurfing International Inc v.  Commission,  1986  ECR 611. 
(") See  telecommunications guidelines,  point 3  above. 
Non-opposition  to  a  notified  concentration 
(Case  No IV  /M.859 - Generali/Prime) 
(97 IC  76/07) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
On  18  December  1996,  the  Commission  decided  not  to  oppose  the  above  notified  concen-
tration and to declare it  compatible  with  the  common market.  This  decision  is  based  on Arti-
cle  6  (1)  (b)  of  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89.  The.  full  text  of  the  decision  is 
available only in  Italian and will  be  made public after it is  cleared of any business secrets it  may 
contain.  It  will  be  available: 
- as  a  paper version  through  the  sales  offices  of the  Office  for  Official  Publications  of the 
European Communities (see  list on the last page), 
- in  electronic  form  in  the  'CIT'  version  of the  Celex  database,  under  document  number 
396M0859.  Celex  is  the  computerized documentation system  of European  Community law; 
for  more information  concerning subscriptions please  contact: 
EUR-OP, 
Information,  Marketing and  Public  Relations  (OP/4B), 
2, rue Mercier, 
L-2985  Luxembourg. 
Tel.: (352)  2929-424 55,  Fax:  (352)  2929-427 63. 
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II 
(Acts  whose  publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 14  May  1997 
on the granting of additional  implementation periods to Luxembourg for  the 
implementation  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  as  regards  full  comp~titic.n, fn·  the 
telecommunications markets 
(Only the French text is authentic) 
(Text with EEA  relevance) 
(97/568/EC) 
iE COMMISSION  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
aving  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Dmmunity, 
aving  regard  ro  the  Agreement  establishing  the  Euro-
:an  Economic  Area, 
aving  regard  to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC of 
: June 1990 on competition in  the markets for telecom-
unications  services ('),  as  last  amended  by  Directive 
;/19/EC (2),  and  in  particular  Article  2 (2)  thereof, 
aving  given  notice(')  to  interested  parties  to  submit 
eir comments in  accordance with Article  2 (2)  of Dir-
tive  90/388/EEC, 
hereas: 
I.  THE FACfUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Luxembourg request 
Pursuant to  Article  2 (2)  of  Directive 90/388/EEC, 
the  Luxembourg  authorities,  by  letter  of  28  June 
1  996, have requested the following implementation 
periods: 
until  1 January 2000 in respect of the:  exclusive 
rights  currently  granted  to  the  Luxembourg 
postal and telecommunications service provider 
OJ  No  L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
OJ No  L 74,  22.  3.  1996,  p.  13. 
OJ  No C  257,  4.  9.  1996,  p.  5. 
(2) 
known as  Entreprise des Postes et Telecommu-
nications (EP'I), for  the  provision of voice  tele-
phony and  the  underlying  network  infrastruc-
ture.  Under  Article  2  (2)  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC,  this  provision  was  to  have  been 
implemented  by  J  January  1998, 
- until  1 July 1998  in  respect  of  restrictions on 
the provision of already liberalized telecommu-
nications  services  on: 
(a)  networks established by  the provider of  the 
telecommunications service; 
(b)  i~frastructures provided by third parties; and 
(c)  shared  networks,  other  facilities  and  sites. 
· Under Article  2  (2)  of  Directive  90/388/EEC, 
these  provisions  were  to  have  been  imple-
mented before  1 July 1996. The provisions do 
not apply to cable 1V infrastructures, governed 
by Article  4  of  the same  Directive. 
The  Luxembourg  authorities  consider  these  addi-
tional  implementation  periods  to  be  necessary for 
the  following  reasons: 
- liberalization of the telecommunications market 
(consequent upon the immediate transposing of 
the  Directive)  before  a  suitable  regulatory 
framework  has  been set up and  the  necessary 
structural changes made would· expose Luxem-
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The derogation  requested  will not impede  the 
development of competition  in  other areas  of 
the telecommunications sector _in  Luxembourg. 
Once the new Law on telecommunications (the 
Law') enters into force  the liberalization process 
can  be  implemented in  an  orderly fashion.  For 
example,  firms  will  be  invited  to  bid  for  a 
licence  to  operate  the  second  national  GSM 
network. The selection  procedure will  be  open 
· and objective, and the· licence will be granted to 
the  firm  that best  meets  the  published  qualit-
ative  criteria, 
- EPT  currently  charges  its  customers  a  single, 
standard rate, but a reform of the tariff structure 
is  planned.  The  considerable  imbalance 
between  currently estimated  costs  and  current 
charges  is  a major factor  hampering liberaliza-
tion  in  Luxembourg.  The  new  independent 
supervisory body now being set up (the ILT-
Institut  Luxembourgeois  des  Telecommunica-
tions)  will  oversee  the  ongoing  process  of  ad-
justing  charges  in  Luxembourg;  the  ILT  will 
also  be  responsible  for  laying  down  the  ac-
counting  rules  and  the  rules  for  cost-based 
charging  that  will  apply 'to  EPT, 
.. 
- in Luxembourg the liberalization process entails 
disproportionate  commitments,  particularly  in 
terms  of  human  resources,  for  the  ministry 
responsible,  the  ILT  and  EPT, 
- in  I995 international calls accounted for  71  % 
of the  overall  telephony turnover of  Lfrs  6 346 
million. Over 50 % of those calls were made by 
960  business  customers  based  in  the  City  of 
Luxembourg.  Outgoing  calls  accounted  for 
62 %  of  international  calls.  Opening  up  the 
Luxembourg market before a suitable regulatory 
framework has been put in place and the neces-
sary  structural  changes made would  leave  tele-
communications  companies  based  in  other 
countries  free  to  offer  international  telephony 
services  to  Luxembourg  firms  a~d  to  divert 
business away  from  EPT's  network. This could 
pose  a  serious  threat  to  the  viability  of  the 
national  operator's  -infrastructure  and  to  its 
ability  to  complete  the  necessary  structural 
adjustments  and  future  development  in  a 
competitive  market. The  regulatory  framework 
needed to avert such a threat. is currently being 
adopted,  and  the  implementation  period 
requested  would  enable  it  to  be  set  up, 
- Luxembourg recently placed itS  postal and tele-
communications administration  on a commer-
cial  footing.  EPT devotes  an  annual  budget of 
Lfrs  32 million to  equipping its staff with  the 
skills they need in order to work in a commer-
cial  environment.  At· the  beginning  of  1995, 
(3) 
EPT  commissioned  an  independent  firm  of 
consultants  to  undertake  a  thorough  review  of 
its  organizational  structure.  The  restructuring 
process,  whkh  entails  introducing  business 
accounting  methods  and  adjusting  the  tariff 
structure,  will  not  be  completed  in  time  for  a 
full  liberalization  of  the  telecommunications 
market  on  1 January  1998. 
The Luxembourg authorities  have  not given  a de-
finitive  time  for  the  adoption  of  the  Law  by  the 
Luxembourg Parliament, but it would appear that it 
will  be  adopted  in  the  first  half  of  I  997.  The 
Luxembourg  authorities  have  stated  that  it  is~ not 
able  to  influence  the  speed  at  which  the  Law  is 
passing  through  the  Parliament.  The  Law,  once 
adopted,  will  transpose  the  Community  open-
network-provision  (ONP)  interconnection  require-
ments  into  national  law  (in  the  meantime,  the 
Luxembourg  Government  has  informed  the 
Commis~i9q  t,ha~ this law  had been enacted on  I  9 
March  1997  and  entered  into  force  on  1  April 
1997). Other dates in the timetable proposed by the 
Luxembourg  authorities  have  been  estimated  on 
the  advice  of  independent  consultants  who  are 
advising EPT and the Luxembourg authorities. The 
following  timetable  is  anticipated: 
- first  half  of  1997:  adoption  of  the  Law, 
- March  I997:  introduction  of  the  new  client 
billing and  management  system, 
- five  months after adoption of  the  Law:  ILT es-
tablished  and  operational, 
- six months after adoption of the Law: principles 
of  the  financing  of  the  Universal  Service  Ob-
ligations  (USO) settled, 
- six  months after adoption of the  Law:  grant of 
second  GSM  licence, 
- second  half of  I997:  new  system  of  regulation 
under  IL  1'  operational, 
- 1  January  1998:  new  cost-based  accounting 
system  for  EPT  started, 
- March ·1998:  new  client-billing  and  manage-
ment system  fully  implemented, 
- July 1998: new client-billing and management 
system  fully  operational  and  necessary  reform 
of  internal  procedures  and  staff  retraining 
nearing completion, 
- 1  January  2000:  new  cost-based  accounting 
system  for  EPT  fully  implemented. 
The request was  delivered  to  the  Commission on 
28  June  1996.  . 
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(4) 
(5) 
B.  The comments received 
Two  undertakings  provided  comments  following 
the notice published in the Official journal of  the 
European  Communities (
1
). 
According  to  these  comments: 
- the telecoms market in Luxembourg is  particu-
larly  healthy.  The  revenues  per  line  and  per 
employee of EPT are  very  high in comparison 
to  the  EU  average.  Telephone  density  in 
Luxembourg  is  considerably  higher  than  the 
EU  average, 
- the  international  tariffs  charged  by  EPT  are 
already competitive and  there is  little need for 
tariff  rebalancing, 
- Luxembourg has failed  to  implement EU  legis-
lation  and  has  thus  impeded  competition.  A 
cost-based  accounting system  for  EJ.Yf  suitable 
for  the  implementation  of  Article  10  (l)  of 
Council Directive 92/44/EEC (1)  and Article  13 
(I)  of  Directive  95/62/EC  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council (l) have not been 
implemented as  they should  have  been  by 31 
December  1993  and  31  December  1996  re-
spectively.  Furthermore,  no  second  GSM 
licence, for example, has  not yet been granted. 
Therefore, EPT retains a monopoly over public 
voice telephony, infrastructure and mobile tele-
phony, 
- the consistent case-law  of the  European  Court 
of  Justice  has  established  that  delays  in  the 
implementation  of  EU  legislation  cannot  be 
justified on grounds of administrative  or prac-
tical  difficulties  in a  Member State.  Therefore, 
limited governmental resources cannot be given 
as a justification for an additional implementa-
tion period. Under Directive 96/19/EC Luxem-
bourg is  requesting additional  implementation 
periods  as  a  Member State  with  a  very  small 
network.  Adequate  reasoning  ought  to  be 
provided as  to why the smallness of its network 
should  justify  an  additional  implementation 
period, 
- any derogation would have a negative effect on 
trade.  EPT is  the sole  supplier of leased  lines 
and interconnection services in Luxembourg to 
any actual  or potential  providers ·of liberalized 
services.  This  is  a  determining  factor  on  the 
costs of competitors and the  knowied~ of the 
costs involved will  have an  impact on trade. In 
addition, Luxembourg is an important financial 
centre in  the  EU,  and  both  financial  services 
OJ No C  257,  4.  9.  1996,  p.  5. 
OJ  No  L 165, ·19.  6.  1992.  p.  27. 
OJ  No L 321,  30.  12.  1995,  p.  6. 
and trading are largely based on 1e1«oms. Any 
derogation will have an impact on the finmcial 
services  market, 
- Luxembourg  has  failed  to give  an)'  particular 
reasons as  to why there should be any dctoga-
tion from the requirement to lift restrictions, by 
1 July 1996, on the provision of alreadr liber-
alized  telecommunications services,. 
- it is  generally accepted  that the  concentnlion 
of EPT's revenues on 960 business customers is 
a  peculiarity within  the  EU.  Howe,-er.  this  is 
not necessarily a weakness. A dose relationship 
with a fewer number of customers is a powerful 
marketing tool  which  is  potentially conducive 
to good  Ct,IStomer  management.  Further. since 
the coming into force of  Directi~ 90/388/EEC 
on 28  July 1990. EPTs competitors haft been 
allowed  to  provide  non-public  international 
telephon}'  s'!rvice~  to  customers  connected 
directly by leased lines. EPT has thus aln:adf d~ 
facto  been  exposed  to  competition  f<W  more 
than  five  years  in  its  most  lucrati\-e  mukcr 
segment. Without unequivocal cost and ~omue 
data  related  to  the  specific  geographical  and 
economic structure of Luxembouf8 (as  ~u  as 
the network configuration of EP1) showing that 
fundamental structural adjustments an: required 
to  preserve  the viability of EPT in the faa of 
the liberalization of the voice telephony semce 
for  residential  customers, there  is  no justi.6ca-
tion  for  an·  extension  of  the voice  telephony 
monopoly beyond  1 January  1998. The szm.e · 
analysis applies to the establishment and provi-
sion  of  underlying infrastructu.re. 
(6)  By  fax  of  18  October; later  confirmed  by  Jcuer 
dated 6  December 1996, the Commission Rnl on 
to  the  Luxembourg  authorities  the  COillDlmts 
received. 
C. The Luxembourg response 
In  response  to  the  comments above  the  l..uzan-
bourg authorities by letter dated 19 Dec:embcr 1996 
stated,  inter alia,  that: 
- EPT was the only Telephone Operaror (1'0') in 
Europe  to experience falling revenues in 199  5 
and  1996.  The  profits  of  EPT  (Urs  2300 
million in 1995) have fallen by 1.1,2% ~ 
other European  operators, 
- as  a  result  of  the  high  penetration  mre  in 
Luxembourg,  which  has  been  .chiew:d  by 
EPrs concentrating on the supply of a  l«h-
nically  high  quality service_  COilSUIIlf:IS  'WOUld 
not suffer at a  technological lew:l  &om a  late 
introduction  of  competition  in  the  tdrcams 
markets, 
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- comparing  EPT  with  British  Telecom  or  any 
other  large  TO  is  unhelpful  since  such  TOs 
enjoy,  inter alia, economies of scale which are 
not available to  EPT. The provision of Universal 
Service  is  more  costly  in  Luxembourg than  in 
most  Member  States  because  BPT  cannot 
benefit  from  those  economies  of  scale, 
- although  profits  per  employee  are. currently 
high  in  Luxembourg,  this  does  not  take  into 
account  EPT's  current structure.  EPT  needs  to 
restructure  its  personnel,  for  example  by 
creating  a  maketing  department.  This  will 
reduce  the  profits  per  employee, 
- there are fewer than 100 analogue mobile radio-
telephony subscribers, so  that the  high  average 
revenues  per user  from  this  service  are  in  fact 
insignificant  in  terms  of  total  revenues.  Rev-
enues  from  the  GSM  mobile  radiotelephony 
service  will  fall  when  a licence  is  granted  to  a 
second  operator, 
- EPT's  market  position  is  very  vulnerable 
because  of  its  reliance  on  only  960  business 
customers  to  generate  the  greater  part  of  its 
revenues, 
- the required rebalancing of tariffs will  involve a 
substantial  increase  in  subscription  costs  and 
yet international tariffs will probably decrease, 
- Luxembourg  is  not late  in  implementing Dir-
ective  96/19/BC,  because  it  has  exercised  its 
right  to  request  a  derogation, 
Luxembourg enjoys  a very  low  unemployment 
rate_ and  it will  be  very  difficult  to  recruit  new 
personnel  to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  EPT, 
- it is  highly likely that new market entrants will 
seek  to  compete  on  the  Luxembourg  market 
without having to invest in the fixed  infrastruc-
ture  market.  It  will  be  easy,  relative  to  other 
Member States, for competitors to move quickly 
into  the  Luxembourg  market. 
In  the  same  letter,  the  Luxembourg  authorities 
stressed  again  the  need  for  additional  time  to 
complete structural  changes within BPT so  that it 
can  function  on  a  commercial  basis. 
The Luxembourg authorities supplied further infor-
mation  to  the  Commission  during  a  bilateral 
meeting held in  Brussels on  18  February 1997 and 
in fax  message sent on its behalf on 6 March  1997. 
The  Luxembourg  authorities  confirmed  that  the 
new client-billing and management system· is likely 
to be installed in March  1997 and thereafter a trial 
period of about twelve  months is  scheduled before 
the system  becomes operational. By July 1998  the 
new client billing and  management. system should 
be  operational  and  the  necessary  internal  pro-
cedures and staff  training will  be  nearing comple-
tion. 
D.  Article 2  (2)  o£  Directive .90/388/EEC 
(7)  The application of Article  90  (2)  of  the  EC  Treaty 
in the telecommunications sector has  been set out 
in  Directive  90/388/EEC,  which  provides  for  the 
introduction of full competition in the telecommu-
, nkaliont markets at  the  latest  by  1 January  1998. 
However,  under  Article  2  (2)  of  Directive 
90/388/BEC the Commission is  to grant additional 
implementation periods, upon request, to a nu~ber 
of Member States with the right to (i) derogate from 
the dates  set out in Directive 90/388/BBC and (ii) 
maintain  duringt additional  time  periods  the  ex-
clusive  rights  granted  to  undertakings  to  which 
they entrust the  provision  of a public telecommu-
nications network and telecommunications services. 
This  serves  to  allow  for  the  implementation  of 
measures which are necessary to carry out structural. 
adjustments and strictly to the extent necessary for 
those  adjustments. 
.(8)  As  regards  the provision of public telecommunica-
tions services and networks, it appears that EPT is a 
telecommunication  organization  within  the 
meaning of Article 1 of Directive 90/388/EEC, and 
is  entrusted  with  a  service  of  general  economic 
interest  pursuant  to  Luxembourg  law. 
(9)  Under the Directive, the question which falls  to  be 
considered  is  therefore  the  extent  to  which  the 
requested  temporary  exclusion  of  all  competition 
from  other economic operators is wamnted by the 
need  to  carry  out  the  structural  adjustments  and 
strictly  only  to  the  extent  necessary  for  those 
adjustments. 
(1 0)  The starting point of such examination is  that the 
obligation on an undertaking entrusted with a task 
of general economic interest ~o pedorm its services 
in conditions of economic equilibrium presupposes 
that  the  undertaking  will  be  able  to  offset  less 
profitable sectors against the profitable sectors. This 
justifies a restriction of competition from individual 
undertakings where economically profitable sectors 
are  concerned.  To  authorize  individual  under-
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takings to compete with  the holder of the exclusive 
rights in  the sectors of  their choice would  make  it 
possible  for  them  to  concentrate  on  the  econom~ 
ically  profitable  operations  and  to  offer  more  ad-
vantageous tariffs than those charged by the holder 
of the exclusive rights since, unlike the latter, they 
are not bound for economic reasons to offset losses 
in  the  unprofitable  sectors  against  profits  in  the 
more  profitable  sectors. 
(i 1)  Directive  90/388/EEC  therefore  granted  a  tem-
porary exemption under Article 90 (2) in respect of 
special  and  exclusive  rights  for  the  provision  of 
voice  telephony.  This  was  because  financial 
resources  for  the  development of  the  public  tele-
communications  network  and  the  maintenance  of 
the  USO  still  derive  mainly  from  the  voice  tele-
phony service. The opening of the voice  telephony 
market to competition could,. at  that time, obstruct 
the  performance  of  the  task  of  general  economic 
interest and development of  the  network  assigned 
to  the  telecommunications  organizations.  Restric-
tions  on  competition  are  only justified  as  regards 
services which, by their nature and  the .conditions 
in  which  they  would  be  offered  in  a competitive 
market,  would  compromise  the  economic  equi-
librium  of  the  provision  of  the  service  of  general 
economic  interest  or affect  it in  some  other way. 
For this reason  the restrictions on  the provision  of 
such  services  can  only  be  granted  if  substantive 
evidence  is  provided  of  such  impact. 
.2)  In  practice  in  the longer-term  new entrants could 
also  contribute  to  the  relevant  tasks  of  general 
economic  interest: The  exception  aims  to  protect 
the  fulfilment  of  a  task  of  general  economic  in-
terest  and  not to  shelter specific  undertakings.  In 
the short term,  however,  EPT will  continue  to  be 
the  only  undertaking  providing  a  universal  tele-
phone service to residential users in sparsely popu-
lated areas. Moreover Luxembourg is a specific case 
because  it  has  a  very  small  telecommunications 
network located between two large telecommunica-
tions markets. The TOs operating in those markets 
would  be  able·  to  com pete  in  Luxembourg  very 
easily. Many international calls to and from  Luxem-
bourg are made to and from these two markets. For 
this reason, the Commission examined both of the 
additional  implementation  periods  requested  to 
determine  whether granting  them  is  necessary  to 
allow EPT to perform its  task of general economic 
interest  and  to  have  the  benefit  of  economically 
acceptable  conditions  whilst  the  necessary  struc-
tural  adjustm~nts are  being made. 
II.  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A.  Request for an additional implementation 
period  regarding  voice  telephony  and 
underlying network infrastructure 
Assessment  of the  impact  of the  removal  of the 
exclusive  rights  currently grantrd to  EPT 
(13)  In  pursuance  of  the  general  principle  of  propor-
tionality,  any  additional  implementation  period 
granted  must .be  strictly  proportional  to  what  is 
necessary to achieve the necessary structural adjust-
ments,  mentioned  by  the  Luxembourg authorities, 
on  condition .  ~hat  such  adjustments  fall  within 
Article 2 (2)  of Directive 90/388/EEC, with  a view 
to  the  introduction  of  full  competition. 
The reqt.:ired structural adjustments must examined 
in  the  light  of  these  issues. 
(a)  Tariff rebalancing 
(14)  The Luxembourg authorities state that the connec-
tion costs in Luxembourg· must incre·ase  substanti-
ally (!)  if the  network  costs  of  EPT  are  to  be  re-
covered.  The  Luxembourg  authorities  state  that 
international tariffs  in Luxembourg are  lower than 
the European average and will probably continue to 
fall. 
(15)  The  following  table,  based  on  information  in  the 
Commission's possession ·(1),  compares certain tele-
phone tariffs of EPT and  the equivalent figures  for 
two  operators which  have  already  rebalanced  their 
tariffs (British Telecom and TeleDanmark) and one 
operator  which  still  has  to  rebalance  its  tariffs 
(Deutsche  Telekom) (3).  The  terms  of  comparison 
have  been  chosen  on ·the  following ·grounds.  A 
comparison with British Telecom was also made in 
Commission Decision 97/114/EC (4) with respect to 
Ireland  and  in  its  Decision  97/31 0/EC (5)  with 
respect  to  Portugal.  The  choice  of  TeleDanmark 
allows  a  comparison  with  a  similarly  relatively 
small  TO  providing  services  in  relatively  similar 
conditions in another Member State. A comparison 
has  ~een made with Deutsche Telekom as a neigh-
bounng TO. Deutsche Telekom is  a neighbouring 
TO which  could  easily  take  advantage  of  the  li-
beralization  of  the  Luxembourg  telecoms  market. 
This  table  shows  a  certain  need  for  rebalancing: 
(
1
)  Exact figures are omitted for reasons of commercial confiden-
tiality. 
(1)  Tarilica study implemented  for  CEC - DG XIII. 
(3)  A direct ~omparison of the telephony tariffs 'of EPT with the 
Commumty average (which  is  not a weighted avera8e) would 
not be  appropriate, given  that the tariff structures of the 15 
~mmunity TO's  are  still  widely divergent  and in  addition, 
gtven  that they are  currently  in  the  process  of rebalancing 
tariffs. 
(4)  OJ No  L 41,  12.  2.  1997,  p.  8. 
(!)  OJ No  L  133,  24.  5.  1997,  p.  19. 
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Tariffs  in  BCU  BPT  British  Deutsche 
on  1 January  1996  Telecom  Telelcom  TcleDanmarlc 
initial  connection  charge  74,29  137,53  ·53,07  212.50 
bi-monthly  rental  13,08 (1)  19,53  26,11  27,33 
local  calls,  resp.  3/10  minutes (cheap  rate)  0,13-0,26  0,06-0,19  0,06-0,19  0,11-0,22 
local  calls,  resp.  3/10  minutes  (peak  rate)  0,13-0,39  0,14-0,47  0,13-0,45  0,16-0,44 
tmnk  calls,  resp.  3/10  minutes  (peak  rate)  Not  0,35-1,16  1,02-3,38  0,33-0,99 
Applicable 
intra  HC,  rcsp.  J/1 0  minutes  (peak  rate)  1,61-5,23  1,29-4,31  1,66-5,54  1,71-5,65 
(').Estimated  for  comparative  purposes. 
(16)  Given  that  due  to  technical  progress  in  the 
network,  cost  is  increasingly  less  conditioned  by 
distance,  cost  orientation  of  tariffs  means  as  a 
general rule  that prices are  adjusted  in  such· a way 
that revenues are  rebalanced with costs. This means 
that  connection  and  rental  revenues  must  cover 
fixed  costs  (plus  a  standard  margin)  and  call  rev-
enues must cover call costs (plus standard margin). 
(17)  Consequently  telecommunications  organizations 
have  had  to  raise  bi-monthly rental  and  local  calls 
(or  at least,  not decrease  these charges) and  reduce 
tariffs  for  long-distance  calls.  There  is  clearly  a 
need  for  further  rebalancing and  the  Commission 
accepts that this will be more difficult for EPT than 
most TOs because  of  its  reliance· on  960  business 
customers generating a large  proportion of  its  rev-
enues  from  international  calls  and  thus  because 
EPT does not enjoy economies of scale.  However, 
the  figures  for  Deutsche Telekom show that other 
TOs have in some cases a greater need for rebalan-
cing  than  EPT.  Moreover,  in  the  future  flexible 
tariff structures will  more and more be applied, as 
is currently the case for GSM  telephony, whereby a . 
user chooses the tariff package which best suits his 
needs. With such an approach, there would be little 
immediate  need  to  reduce  international  tariffs, 
since large users could chose a tariff package with a 
higher  monthly  rental  and  lower  usage  tariff. 
However,  the Commission accepts  that because  of 
its  reliance  on  960  business  customers,  EPT  will 
have  to  concentrate  particularly  in  assessing  the 
specific needs of these customers in order to main-
tain  revenues  at  a  level  sufficient  to  provide  a 
Universal  Service  in  the  short  term. 
(18)  Nevertheless,  EPT  is  -currently  making  profits 
annually with connection charges  at curre.nt  levels 
(19,2% of its turnover in  1995 in comparison with 
only 12,5 %  for British Telecom in the same year). 
Although  there  is  a  need  to  increase  connection 
charges  fairly significantly, there is  no clear reason 
as  to  why  connection  charges  would  have  to  be 
increased  as  substantially  as  is  suggested  by  the 
Luxembourg authorities because fixed  costs are  not 
apparently  any  higher  in  Luxembourg  than  in 
other  Member  States.  The  population  density  of 
Luxembourg is  above  the EU average and is  higher 
than that in  Denmark. The percentage of the popu-
lation  in  urban areas  in  Luxembourg is  comparable 
to  that in both Denmark and the United Kingdom. 
(19)  The  Luxembourg  authorities  have  submitted  that 
full  tariff  rebalancing  will  only  be  possible  once 
EP'rs new  cost  accounting system  is  fully  opera-
tional. Whilst accepting this statement in principle, 
the  Commission  does  not  accept  that  the  imple-
mentation of cost accounting is  any more difficult 
for  EPT as a result of the small size of the network 
in Luxembourg. On the contrary, allocating costs is 
easier  for  EPT,  given  that there  are  only two  cat-
egories  of  calls,  namely  local  and  international 
calls,  than for  TOs in other Member States  where 
the cost of regional and long-distance calls must be 
taken into account. Further, the timetable given by 
the  'Luxembourg  authorities  for  the  implementa-
tion of cost accounting is too long when se.t against 
the  experience  in  other  Memb~r States.  Finally, 
Luxembourg  had  to  implement  cost  accounting 
systems  by  31  December  1993  under  Directive 
92/44/EEC  and  by  31  December  1996  under 
Directive  95/62/EC.  Even  if  the  Commission  was 
minded  to  grant  an  additional  implementation 
period  for  this  reason  (which  it  is  not),  the 
Commission  cannot  adopt  a  Decision  which  ef-
fectively  would  amend  a  Council  Directive. 
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(20)  Given the high number of telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants  in  Luxembourg and  the  high  level  of 
digitalization (amongst the highest in  the  EU). it is 
clear that  there  is  already  the  infrastructure  for  an 
Universal Service in  Luxembourg and that no extra 
financial  menns  are  required  to  develop  the 
network. EPT may wish  to provide new services but 
this can  most effectively be  done within a compet-
itive  market.  The  Commission  cannot  accept  the 
submission of the Luxembourg authorities that as a 
result of  the  high  penetration  rate, consumers will 
not suffer from  a late  introduction of competition. 
It  is  clear  that  any  delay  in  the  introduction  of 
competition  will  delay  the  introduction  of  price 
competition  and  tariff  flexibility  in  Luxembourg, 
which  will  not  benefit  consumers. 
(b)  Adressing  the  specific  problems  of 
Luxembourg  as  a  country  with  a  very 
small  network 
(21)  Specific  to  Luxembourg  is  that  international  calls 
account for  approximately 70 % of the overall  tele-
phony turnover of  EPT.  Over 50 %  of  those  calls 
are  made  by  960  business  customers  based  in  the 
City  of  Luxembourg.  As  soon  as  telecommunica-
tions companies based in other countries are free  to 
offer  international  telephony  services  to  these 
customers;  they  will  be  able  to  divert  substantial 
business  away  from  EPT,  obliging  it  to  raise 
substantially  the  rates  for  residential  users.  This 
might  have  negative  short-term  effects  on  the 
provision  of  universal ·service  in  Luxembourg and 
make difficult the necessary structural adjustments. 
This  threat  will  only  be  averted  when  EPT  has 
implemented  and  is  operating  a  new  client-
relationship with  its major customers. A close rela-
tionship with  a client is  a key to serving a client's 
needs and responding to  the solutions sought by a 
client. Indeed, the basis for such a new approach is 
already  being  implemented. 
22)  The  Luxembourg  authorities  state  that  the  new 
client billing and  management system  will  be  set 
up  in  January  1997  and  that  it  should  be  fully 
implemented  by  March  1998.  The  ·Commission 
acknowledges that, given EPT's unique small client 
base  and  its  current  client  orientation,  this  new 
billing system  is  a key measure  in  the current re-
organization of working methods within  EPT.  For 
this  reason  a  limited  additional  time  period  until 
the  full  implementation  of  this  billing and  man-
agement  should  be  considered.  The  Commission 
also considers that a further additional implementa-
tion  period  to  allow  this  billing and management 
.  system  and  related  tariff  rebalancing  to  be  fully 
operational should also be granted. This will  allow 
EPT to  improve  its  knowledge  and  understanding 
of  its  clients'  specific  needs  and  to  allow  for  the 
transition  to  a  competitive  environment,  without 
major negative consequences on the affordability of 
the  residential  service. 
As  far  as  the  other arguments  arc  concerned,  the 
Commission  does  not  accept  that  the  EPT's  reli-
ance on 960 business consumers to provide a large 
part of its revenues is  necessarily a disadvantage in 
this area. If EPT can acquire the necessary market-
ing skills, a close relationship with  a client is a key 
to  serving a client's  needs  and  responding  to  the 
arrangements  sought  by  a  client.  Moreover,  the 
limited  size  of  EPT  does  not  prevent  it  from 
enjoying the benefits of economies of scale: it may 
conclude  agreements  and  alliances  with  other 
service  provi~~rs to ensure that it is able to provide 
the  global  arrangements  sought  by  its  clients.  In 
addition, the small size of EPT and its  reliance on 
subcontractors allows  it  to enjoy a great degree  of 
flexibility. It can more easily implement changes in 
the  scope  of  its  activities  by  taking  on  new 
contracts, than a fully  integrated large organization 
which  has  to  retrain  personnel  and  change 
company organization  to  respond  to  the  needs  of 
its  customers. 
(23)  The  Commission  can  also  not  agree  with  the 
submission  that it will ·be  difficult  to  recruit  new 
personnel for EPT in Luxembourg. EPT should be 
able  to  find  staff  from  other  Member  States.  In 
other industries, there is already a large work force 
in  Luxembourg,  as  admitted  by  the  Luxembourg 
authorities,  which  commutes  daily  from  neigh-
bouring  Member States. 
{24)  Legislative amendments themselves and any poten-
tial  delays  in  this  process  cannot  be  regarded  as 
structural  changes  under  Directive  90/388/EEC 
such  as  would  justify a derogation. The  Directive 
refers  to  the  necessary  structural  changes  of  the 
operator wherever they are necessary to protect the 
provision of the service of general economic  int~r­
est.  According  to  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice (
1
), in  the absence  of  the  specific  justifica-
tion  referred  to  in  the  Directive,  Member  States 
may  not  plead  provisions,  practices  or  circum-
stances  existing  in  its  legal  system  in  order  to 
justify  an  additional  implementation  period  to 
comply with  Community Directives. 
(25)  In  any  case,  from  the  timetable  provided  by the 
Luxembourg  authorities  it  would  appear  that  all 
legislative  changes  and  the  consequent  establish-
ment of  the  ILT,  the  issuing  of  a  second  GSM 
licence, will be achieved by 1 January 1998. There-
fore,  the key regulatory and structural reforms will 
have  been  implemented  by  I  January  1998. 
(
1
)  Cue 1/86,  Commission  v.  Belgium  (1987)  ECR  2797. 
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(26) 
Development  of trade 
The aim of the  postponement of the liberalization 
of  voice  telephony  is  to  delay  the  entry  of  com-
peting  carriers  in  the  voice  telephony  market. 
Moreover, as  was  pointed out by one commentator, 
this  will  affect  trade  since  large  international 
players  are  already  present  or  interested  in  the 
Luxembourg  market. 
(27)  Although  the granting of  a derogation  to  Luxem-
bourg  would  foreclose  the  Luxembourg  telecom-
munications  market,  the  negative  effect  on  the 
development  of  trade  in  the  Community will  be 
reduced owing, on the one hand, to the limited size 
of  the Luxembourg telecommunications market in 
comparison  with  the  Community market  and,  on 
the other, to  the very  limited duration of the dero-
gation  envisaged  by  the  Commission. 
(28)  Such  effect will  be  further reduced  if  the  lifting of 
restrictions  on  the  use  of  own  and  alternative 
infrastructures is effective from  1 July 1997, will  be 
discussed  below.  This  would  allow  potential  new 
entrants to  operate  and  provide  already liberalized 
telecommunications  services  on  such  networks 
from  that  date  onwards,  in  preparation  for  fulL 
competition,  and  in  particular  to  provide  voice 
services  over  corporate  networks  and/or  to  closed 
user  groups  via  such  infrastructures. 
Conclusion 
(29)  The  Commission  accepts  that,  as  in  the  case  of 
other Member States which have  requested an addi-
tional  implementation  period,  telephone  tariffs 
must  be  substantially  rebalanced.  Moreover,  the 
Commission acknowledges that owing to the small 
size  of  the  network,  there  are  necessary  structural 
adjustments which may be more difficult to imple-
ment in Luxembourg than in  other Member States. 
In  particular, the  risk that EYf will  lose significant 
revenues  is  real,  as  a  result  of  its  specific  client-
.  portfolio. This could  harm  in  the  short term  the 
financial  position  of  this  operator and  be  a threat 
both  to  the  structural  adjustments  which  are  still 
necessary  and  to  the  provision  of  a  Universal 
Service.  However,  the  Commission  cannot accept 
fully  the  arguments  of  the  Luxembourg  Govern-
ment. 
On the basis of the above· assessment, the Commis- · 
sion considers· that the development of trade is  not 
affected by the granting to Luxembourg of an addi-
tional  implementation period until  1 July 1998  as 
regards  the  abolition  of  the  exclusive  rights 
currently pnted to EPr for the provision of voice 
telephony and public network infrastructure iqstead 
of  1 January 1998, being the date envisaged under 
Article  2 (2)  of  Directive  90/388/EEC, to  such· an 
extent  as  to  be  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the 
Community,  provided  that  the  conditions set out 
above  are  fulfilled.  · 
B.  Request for an additional implementation 
period regarding the lifting of restrictions 
on the provision of already liberalized tele-
communications  services  on  own  and 
·alternative infrastructure 
Assessment of the impact of the immediate ·lifting 
of restrictions 
(30)  The Luxembourg authorities state that the lifting of 
restrictions on the use  of alternative  infrastructure 
before  1  July  1998  would  enable  providers  of 
liberalized services  to  offer customers speech  calls 
and connect such calls with  the  public network in 
both directions. As  a result of the peculiar circum-
stances  of  Luxembourg,  where  EPr relies  heavily 
on the revenues of 960 clients, competitors - it is 
argued - could cream off these  lucrative  business 
clients in  the City of Luxembourg without making 
any significant  investments  in  infrastructure. 
(31)  The  argument  that  the  lifting  of  the  current 
constraints  may  cause  EYf revenue  losses  cannot 
be  accepted. It is  true  that, under its exclusive  pri-
vilege  to  provide  network  infrastructure,  EPT  is 
enjoying guaranteed revenues from the provision of 
leased  lines  to  end-users  and  providers  of  liber-
alized  telecommunications  services.  However, 
Directive 92/44/EEC requires that leased lines shall 
. have been offered on a cost-oriented basis since 31 
.December  1993.  Further,  Directive  95/62/EC 
requires  that fixed  public  t~lephone networks  and 
voice telephony services shall have  been offered on 
a  cost-oriented  basis  since  31  December  1996. 
Given  this  obligation  with  which  Member  States 
n:tust comply, the opening of the market to private 
operators  is  not expected  to  alter  the  position  of 
TO's  in  this  area  substantially. 
(32)  The  threat  of  a  creaming-off  of  the  leased-line 
market  by  other  potential  infrastructure  providers 
can only become a reality in  the absence of a clear 
regulatory  framework  and  of  possible  monitoring 
by an independent regulatory authority. Article 8 of 
Directive 90/388/EEC acknowledges such a threat, 
inasmuch as  it requires Member States to ensure, as 
re8ards  undertakings  enjoying special  or exclusive 
rights in areas other than telecommunications, that 
such undertakings keep separate financial accounts 
as  concerns  activities  as  providers  of  networks. 
This threat may. be greater in  Luxembourg than in 
other Member States  having developed  alternative 
telecommunications infrastructures, 'because  of the 
location  of  a  small  number  of  highly  lucrative 
clients  in  a small  area  which  would  allow  a  new 
entrant  to  supply  them  in  a  satisfactory  way 
without  depending  on  EPT  for  leasing  lines  or 
using EPT's  network,  and without very  substantial 
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investments.  However,  according  to  the  Luxem-
bourg  authorities,  the  necessary  regulatory  frame-
work  as well  as  the independent regulatory author-
ity should  be  set  up in  the first  half  of  1997.  For 
this  reason  no  additional  implementation  period 
extending  beyond  1 July  1997  could  be  justified. 
Possible  delays  in  the  calendar  set  out  in  the 
submission  cannot  be  taken  into  account  by  the 
Commission  ~hen considering the  request  for  an 
additional  implementation  period,  since  this 
calendar  appears  reasonable  and  indeed  since 
Member States  may  not, according to  the Court of 
Justice's  judgment  cited  above,  plead  provisions, 
practices  or  circumstances  existing  in  their  legal 
systems in  order to  justify additional  implementa-
tion  periods  to  comply  with  Community  Direct-
ives. 
Development of trade 
:33)  The postponement of  the  lifting of restrictions on 
the  use  of  own  and  alternative  infrastructure  will 
affect trade, since large  international companies are 
already  present  or  interested  in  the  Luxembourg 
market. 
34)  Although  the granting of  a derogation  to  Luxem-
bourg  would  foreclose  the  Luxembourg·  telecom-
munications market, the negative effect on trade in 
the  Community  will  be  reduced,  owing  to  the 
limited· size  of  the  Luxembourg  telecommunica-
tions  market  in  comparison  with  the  Community 
market and  with  the  very  limited  duration  of  the 
derogation  envisaged  by  the  Commission. 
Conclusion 
S5)  Once  the  regulatory  framework  is  in  place  there 
will  be  no threat of an  abusive creaming-off of the 
market. According to the  Luxembourg request this 
framework will be set up by  1 July 1997. Any grant 
of  an  additional  implementation  period  which 
would extend beyond  that date  does  not therefore 
seem  justified. 
·6)  For these  reasons,  the  Commission  considers  that 
the development of trade which would result from 
the  granting  to  Luxembourg  of  an  additional 
implementation period regarding the liberalization 
of  alternative  infrastructure  is  not affected  to such 
an  extent as  to  be  contrary to  the interests of  the 
Community once the  new  regulatory framework  is 
in force and at the latest from  1 July 1997 onwards, 
AS  ADOPTED THIS  DECISION: 
Article  1 
axembourg  may  postpone until  I July 1998  the  aboli-
m of the excl_usive  rights currently granted to Entreprise 
des  Postes  et Telecommunications as  regards  the  provi-
sion of voice  telephony and the establishment and provi-
sion  of  public  telecommunications  networks,  provided 
that the  following  conditions are  implemented according 
to  the  time-table  laid  down  hereinafter: 
(a)  No  later  than  11  July  1997  instead  of  11  January 
1997:  notification  to  the  Commission  of  legislative 
changes necessary to implement full competition by 1 
· July  1998,  including  proposals  for  the  funding  of 
universal  services; 
(b)  No later than  1 July 1997 instead of 1 January 1997: 
notification  to  the  Commission  of draft  licences  for 
voice  telephony and/or underlying network providers; 
(c)  No later than  1 January 1998  instead of 1 July 1997: 
publication of licensing conditions for all services and 
of interconnection ·.charges  as  appropriate,  in  accord-
ance  in  both  cases  with  relevant  Community direct-
ives; 
(d)  No later th!ln  1 July 1998  instead of 1 January 1998: 
award of licences and amendment of existing licences, 
to enable the competitive provision of voice telephony 
to  commence. 
Article 2 
Luxembourg may  postpone until  1 July 1997 the lifting 
of restrictions on the provision of already liberalized tele-
communications  services  on: 
(a)  networks established  by  the  provider of  the  telecom-
munications  service; 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties;  and 
(c)  the  sharing of  networks,  facilities  and  sites. 
Luxembourg  shall  notify  to  the  Commission,  no  later 
than  1 July  1997  instead  of  1 July  1996,  all  measures 
adpted  to  lift  such  restrictions. 
Article J 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  Gr.and  Duchy  of 
Luxembourg. 
Done  at  Brussels,  14  May  1997. 
For  the Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member of the  Commission 
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(Acts  whose  publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 10  June 1997 
concerning the granting of additional-implementation periods to Spain for the 
implementation  of  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  as  regards  full 
competition in the telecommunications markets 
(Only  the  Spanish  text is  authentic) 
(Text with  EEA .relevance) 
(97/603/EC) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  establishing  the  Euro-
pean  Economic  Area, 
Having  regard  to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC of 
28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecom-
munications  services (1),  as  last  amended  by  Directive 
96/19/EC (2),  and  in  particular Article  2 (2)  thereof, 
Having  given  notice (l)  to  interested  parties  to  submit 
their  comments  in  accordance  with  Article  2  (2)  of · 
Directive  90/388/EEC, 
Whereas: 
A.  THE FACfUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
I. The requests of Spain 
(1)  In  a  bilateral  meeting  on  9  October  1996  and · 
further confirmed by  letter of  26  November  1996, 
Spain  requested  the  following  additional  imple-
( 1)  OJ  L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
(l)  OJ  L 74,  22.  3.  1996,  p.  13. 
(')  OJ C  4,  8.  1.  1997,  p.  5. 
mentation  periods concerning Articles  3 and 3b of 
Directive  90/388/EEC  as  amended  by  Directive 
96/19/EC: 
(a)  until  I  January  1998  for  notification  to  the 
Commission  before  implementation  of  any 
licensing or declaration procedure for the provi-
sion  of  voice  telephony and  the  establishment 
of public telecommunications networks, and of 
the details of  the national scheme envisaged to 
share  the  net  cost  of  the  provision  of  the 
Universal  Service  Obligation  CUSO').  This 
provisions had to be implemented no later than 
1  January  1997  under  Article  3  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC; 
(b)  until  1  August  1998  for  publication  of  any 
licensing or declaration procedure for the provi-
sion  of voice  telephony and  the  establishment 
of public telecommunications networks, and of 
the details of  the ·national scheme envisaged to 
share the net cost of the  provision of the  USO. 
This provision  has  to  be  implemented no later 
than  1 July 1997  under Article  3 of  Directive 
90/388/EEC; 
and 
(c)  until  30  November  1998  for  the  requirement 
that adequate numbers are available for all  tele-
communications  services.  This  requirement  is 
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in  order to give  full  effect  to  the liberalization 
to  the  telecommunications market. This provi-
sion has to be  implemented before  I  July 1997 
under  Article  .lh  of  Dire<'livc  90/JHH/EHC. 
As a consequence of the additional implementation 
periods  mentioned  under  (a),  (b)  and  (c),  and 
although  by  January  1998  there  will  be  three 
nation-wide  licences  to  operate  voice  telephony 
and public telecommunications networks  in Spain, 
in  addition  to  the  licences  granted  to  cable 
operators  to  provide  voice  telephony,  the  Spanish 
Government intends to delay the full  implementa-
tion  of  the  liberalization  of  the  Spanish  telecom-
munications  market  until  1  December  1998.  As 
from  that date, further licences will  be  granted for 
the  provision  of  voice  telephony  and  public  tele-
communications  networks  to  all  the  undertakings 
which  apply  for  them  in  compliance  with  tht' 
conditions set out -in  the  relevant Spanish  law  and 
implementing  regulations. 
(2)  Spain  considers  those  additional  implementation 
periods  necessary  for  the  following  reasons: 
(a)  the  introduction  of competition  on  1 January 
1998  would  oblige  Telef6nica  de  Espana  SA 
("Telef6nica),  the  Spanish  telecommunications 
operator,  to  speed  up  the  rebalancing  of  its 
tariffs  which  will  affect  significantly  its  profit 
margin  up  to  the  end  of  1998; 
(b)  the  introduction  of  competition  also  requires 
further  capital  investment  in  Telef6nica's 
network,  in  particular  for  the  implementation 
of the new numbering plan  allowing the gran-
ting  of  adequate  numbers  to  all  new  market 
entrants. For Telef6nica to complete the neces-
sary  work  in  time,  it  is  necessary  to  grant an 
additional  implementation  period  of  at  least 
eleven  months between  the  interconnection of 
the  operator  which  will  be  licensed  in  early 
Janaury  1998  and  the  interconnection  of  all 
other  new  operators  in  the  voice-telephony 
market.  The  conditions  for  interconnection 
b~tween the  first  and  second  operators will  be 
established  during  1997. 
(3)  In  response  to  the  Commission's  letter  of  8 
November 1996, the Spanish authorities confirmed 
in  their letter received  by  the  Commission  on  1.5 
November  1996  that  they  will: 
(a)  not  seek  any  derogation  for  the  lifting  of 
restrictions  on  the  provision  of  already  liber-
alized  telecommunications  services  on: 
(i) networks established by the provider of tele-
communications  services; 
(ii) infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties; 
and 
(iii) shared  networks,  other  facilities  and  sites, 
as from  1 July 1996 as  provided in Article 2 (2) 
of  Directive  90/388/EEC.  Consequently,  such 
networks can be provided without restrictions; 
(b)  allow in the course of  1997, as  already decided, 
cable  operators  who  apply  in  compliance with 
the  conditions set  out  in  the  relevant  law  and 
implementing regulations to  provide voice  tele-
phony, including the possibility to interconnect 
their  networks  for  this  purpose; 
(c)  ensure  that  the  new  General  Telecommunica-
tions Law (Ley General de Telecomunicaciones) 
is  adopted  before  the end of  1997, which will 
implement  all  outstanding  prov1s1ons  of 
Community  law  in  the  telecommunications 
sector; 
(d)  grant in early January 1998 a third nation-wide 
licence  to  operate  voice  telephony and  public 
telecommunications  networks,  in  addition  to 
the licence already granted in  1996 to a second 
operator; 
(e)  ensure  that  all  laws  and  regulations  necessary 
for  the complete opening of the telecommuni-
cations market to  competition will  be  in place 
before  the  end of July  1998; 
(f)  ensure  that on  1 December  1998,  licences  are 
granted  effectively,  without  further  conditions, 
for the provision of voice  telephony and public 
telecommunications  networks  to  all  under-
takings which  applied  in  the course  of August 
1998, in compliance with the conditions set out 
in  the  relevant  law  and  implementing regula-
tions  and  in  conformity  with  Directive 
90/388/EEC;  and 
(g)  abolish  foreign  ownership  limitations  in  the 
conditions  for  licensing  telecommunications 
operators in line with  its obligations under the 
World  Trade  Organization. 
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(.5) 
Further  details  were  provided  by  the  Spanish 
authorities  by letter of 6  February  1997. 
II.  The comments received 
Four  undertakings  and  assocaat1ons  provided 
comments  following  the  notice  published  by  the 
Commission  on  8  January  1997,  which  amongst 
others: 
(a)  state  that  Spain  has  a  developed  and  highly 
digitalized  telephone  network.  According  to 
those  comments, the  cost  of  tariff  rebalancing 
has  been  overestimated  by  the  Spanish 
authorities.  It  is  also  noted  that Telef6nica  is 
strongiy  positioned  and  that this was  reflected 
in  the  oversubscription  for  shares  offered  for 
sale  by the Spanish Government at the begin-
ning  ·Of  1997. Furthermore, reference is made to 
the  investments  of  Telef6nica  in  America; 
(b)  state that in order to give undertakings the time 
to  submit  licence  applications,  the  licensing 
and  USO  financing  schemes  should  be 
published  as  soon  as  possible  following 
notification  to  the  Commission;  and 
(c)  state  that  the  cost  of  renumbering  has  been 
overestimated  by  the  Spanish  authorities. 
Although  there  will  be  some  expenditure  by 
Telef6nica,  the  largest share of  the  cost of  the 
new  numbering  scheme  will  be  borne  by 
subscribers;  and 
(d)  stress  that  licensed  voice  telephony  operators 
should  still  have  equal  access  to  the  numbers 
available  from  1 January  1998; 
(e)  refer  to  late  implementation  of  various 
Community provisions in Spain and state  that 
the  timetable  for  the  other provisions  set  out 
above  to  which  the  Spanish  authorities  have 
agreed  should  be  rigorously  followed  by  the 
Spanish  authorities;  and 
(f)  state the licensing procedure for the· third voice 
telephony operator should be published during 
September  I 997  to  allow  undertakings  to 
submit applications and a licence to be awarded 
early  i~ January  I 998. 
By  letter dated 28  February  1997, the Commission 
transmitted to Spain the comments of third parties 
received following the publication of the Commis-
(6) 
(7) 
sion's notice of 8 January 1997. The Commission 
invited the Spanish authorities to comment on the 
third  party  submissions.  The  Spanish  authorities 
replied  to  those  comments  by  letter  dated  19 
March 1997 and confirmed their original request. 
III.  Article 2  (2)  of Directive 90/388/EEC 
Detailed  rules  for  the application  of Article 90  (2) 
of  the  Treaty  in  the  telecommunications  sector 
were  laid  down  in  Directive  90/388/EEC  which 
provides for the introduction of full competition in 
the telecommunications markets at the latest by 1 
January  1998.  However,  under  Article  2  (2)  of 
Directive  90/388/EEC,  as  amended  by  Directive 
96/19/EC,  the  Commission  will  grant  additional 
implementation periods, upon request, to a number 
of  Member States  giving  the  right  to  (a)  derogate 
from the dates set out in Directive 90/388/EEC and 
(b)  maintain  during additional  periods the special 
or  exclusive  rights  granted  to  undertakings  to 
which  they entrust the  provision  of a  public tele-
communications  network  and  telecommunications 
services. 
Unlike  to  the  requests  of  Ireland  (Commission 
Decision  97/114/EC ('))  and Portugal (Commission 
Decision  97/31 0/EC (2)),  which  pertained  to  the 
continuation of the exclusive rights granted to their 
respective  telecommunications  organizations,  the 
Spanish  request  for  additional  implementation 
periods relates mainly to the time schedule for the 
implementation of full competition in Spain, in the 
context of a progressive opening to competition of 
the  Spanish  telecommunications  market.  On  7 
June 1996, by Royal Decree Law 6/1996 on Libera-
lization  of Telecommunications, the monopoly on 
voice  telephony and  the  oligopoly on public  tele-
communications networks were  formally abolished, 
and  the  publ~c  body  Retevisi6n  was  granted  a 
licence  to  provide voice  telephony and the corres-
ponding  infrastructures.  Moreover,  during  1997 
Spain  will  authorize  the  cable  TV  companies  to 
provide  the  voice-telephony  service  and  in  early 
January  1998  it  will  grant  a  third  nation._wide 
licence to operate voice  telephony and public tele-
communications networks; it is  fully  committed to 
(')  OJ  t  41,  12.  2.  1997,  p.  8. 
(l)  OJ  L  133,  24.  5.  1997,  p.  19. 
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completing the introduction of  competition by  the 
end  of  November  1998.  Telef6nica  remains, 
however,  under obligation  to  provide  the  USO  in 
Spain  under the Telecommunications  Law  (Ley  de 
Ortlmacion  de  laJ  1t:lt•tmmmit"Ut'irmcJ) 3 I I J9H7  of 
18  Dc<:cmhcr  1987 (')  and  Tdcf6nica's concession 
contract  of  26  December  1991  (2). 
The  starting  point  of  the  examination  of  the 
Spanish  request  is  the assessment  whether Telef6-
nica,  which  is  entrusted  with  a  task  of  general 
economic interest within the meaning of Article 90 
(2) of the Treaty, could continue to  perform its task 
in  conditions of economic equilibrium .  during this 
transition towards full  competition, if the timetable 
set  out  in  Directive  90/388/EEC  is  strictly 
complied  with. 
B.  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
Arguments adduced  by Spain 
(9)  The  Spanish  authorities  state  that: 
- in  order  to  face  the  competition  from  Retevi-
siCm, Telef6nica must significantly rebalance its 
tariffs, 
-=- Telef6nica  must  introduce  cost  accounting 
mechanisms, 
- Telef6nica must further develop and modernize 
its  network. 
Spain  has  moreover decided  by  Resolution  of  16 
October  1996 ('),  to  introduce  a  new  national 
numbering  plan  to  solve  the  current  numbering 
shortage in Spain and to prepare the market for full 
competition  under  Article  3b  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC. This  new  numbering scheme  is  also 
being used  to  implement  the:  common  European 
emergency  number.  The  numbering shortage  has 
been caused by increases in demand brought about 
by increases in telephone penetration and develop-
ment  of  the  market  to  date.  It  is  expected  that 
further growth  in this market will  be  strong. Tele-
f6nica expects to  rebuild or modernize its analogue 
telephone  exchanges,. to  rebuild  its  small-capacity 
digital exchanges and to develop further exchanges 
( 1)  BOB No 303, 19. 12. 1987, p. 37409. Amended, inter alia, by 
Law 32/1992 of 3 December 1992 (BOB  No 291, 4.  12.  1992, 
p.  41268). 
(l)  BOE  No  20,  23.  I.  1992,  p.  2132. 
(')  BOB  No  262,  30.  10.  1996,  p.  32538. 
to  meet  growing  demand.  In  addition,  a  large 
public awareness campaign must be organized. This 
will  require  significant  capital  investment. 
Assessment by the Commission 
(1 0)  Given the fact  that Spain refrained from  asking for 
an  additional implementation period for  the aboli-
tion  of  the  former  exclusive  rights  of  Telef6nica, 
the latter now needs to address in a period of a few 
months  and  in  competition  with  the  newly 
authorized  operators,  structural  adjustments  for 
which  the public operators in other Member States 
with  less  developed  networks  were  granted  addi-
tional  periods of up to  three years whilst sheltered 
by  continued  monopoly  rights.  In  the  ~~~ _of 
Spain,  those  structural  adjustments  encompass  (a) 
the  completion  of  the  rebalancing of Telefonica's 
tariffs, (b)  the introduction of cost accounting; and 
(c)  the improvement in  network  penetration which 
appears  to  be -too  low. 
(a)  Tariff rebalancing 
(II)  The Spanish authorities state  that most of Telef6-
nica's tariffs are  too high and out of alignment with 
the tariffs of other Community operators. Rebalan-
cing by adjusting charges to  bring prices  closer to 
underlying costs is also still required to achieve this 
objective.  Telef6nica  is  proceeding with  a  gradual 
and  flexible  approach  to  tariff  rebalancing,  while 
maintaining safeguards  for  consumers  in  terms  of 
price  a~d  quality  of  service.  The  Commission 
recognizes that every operator in the Community is 
or has been carrying out a programme of  rebalan-
cing. 
(12)  The following. table,  based  on  information  in  the 
Commission's  possession (4),  comparing  certain 
telephone  tariffs  of Telef6nica  and  the  equivalent 
figures  for  an  operator  which  has  already  re-
balanced its tariffs (5), supports the arguments of the 
Spanish  authorities: 
(
4
)  Tarifica  study  implemented  for  CBC  - DG  XIII. 
(~ A  direct  comparison  of  the  telephony  tariffs  of Te,ef6nica 
with  the Community average (whtch  is  not a weighted avera-
ge) would not be appropriate, given that the tariff structures of 
the 1  5 Community telecommunications organizations are still 
widely divergent and in addition, given that they are currently 
in  the  process  of rebalancing tariffs.  A comparison with  Bri-
tish  Telecom  was  also  made  in  Decisions  97/114/BC  with 
respect  to  Ireland,  97/31 0/BC  with  respect  to  Portu_P-1  and 
Decision 97  I 568/EC with  respect  to Luxembourg (0  J  L 234, 
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Tariffs  in  ecus  Difference 
on  I  January  1996  Telef6nica  British  Telecom  Telef6nica/8T 
(BT- 100) 
Charge  for  new  connection  154,6  137,53  112 
Bi-monthly  rental  18,07  19,53  93 
Local  calls,  resp.  3/10  minutes  (cheap  rate)  0,08-0,17  0,06-0,19  133-89 
Local  calls,  rcsp.  3/10  minutes  (peak  rate)  0,08-0,21  0,14-0,47  57-45 
Trunk calls,  rcsp.  3/10  minutes  (peak  rate)  1,16-3,58  0,35-1,16  331-309 
Intra  EC,  resp.  3/1 0  minutes  (peak  rate)  2,08-6,15  1,29-4,31  161-143 
(1 3)  Given  that  due  to  technical  progress  in  the 
network,  cost  is  increasingly  less  dependent  on 
distance,  cost  orientation  of  tariffs  means  as  a 
general  rule  that  prices  are  adjusted  such  that 
revenues  are  rebalanced  with  costs,  that  is: 
- connection  and  rental  revenues  cover  fixed 
costs  (plus  a  standard  margin), 
- call  revenues  cover  call  costs  (plus  standard 
margin). 
Consequently,  telecommunications  organizations 
should  normally  raise  connection  charges, 
bi-monthly  rental  and  local  calls  (or  at  least  not 
decrease  these charges) and reduce  tariffs  for  long-
distance  calls.  It  appears,  however,  that  some  of 
Telef6nica's  cheap  rate  local  charges  are  already 
high  in  comparison  with  British  Telecom  and 
Telef6nica will therefore not be able to compensate 
decreases  in trunk and international  charges  with 
increases in local cheap-rate charges. Consequently, 
it is difficult for Telef6nica to align its tariffs which 
are  excessive  in  comparison  to  cost  before  1 
January  1998,  which  it  would  have  to  do  if,  in 
addition to  the limited number of voice-telephony 
operators  already  authorized  or  to  be  authorized, 
other new providers were authorized by that date to 
enter  the·  market.  Those  new  entrants  would 
concentrate  on  those  segments  of  the  voice-
telephony market where the difference between the 
tariffs  of Telef6nica and costs  is  substantial  with  a 
view to conquering a share of that lucrative market. 
The Spanish request to  delay the granting of addi-
tional  Hcl!a1e~~  until  the  end  of  November  1998 
therefore  seems  justified.  On  the  other  hand,  as 
long  as  the  voice-telephony  market  is  not  fully 
liberalized, Spain should not introduce a scheme to 
share the USO burden of Telef6nica. The introduc-
tion  of  such  a  financing scheme should therefore 
also  be  delayed  until  that' date.·· 
(14)  Given the need not to affect the resources required 
to develop further the telecommunications network 
and  to  satisfy  the  USO,  the  Commission  would 
expect  a  gradual  tariff  rebalancing  process  to  be 
implemented  by  Telef6nica.  The  Commission 
accepts  that  the  introduction  of  competition  in 
voice  telephony is  obliging Telef6nica to speed up 
the  rebalancing  of  its  tariffs  which  will  affect 
significantly  its  profit  margin  up  to  the  end  of 
1998.  That  effect  would  not  be  mitigated  by  the 
establishment of the  national scheme envisaged  to 
share  the  net  cost  of  the  provision  of  the  USO, 
given  that  competitors  will  need  time  to  acquire 
significant market share and that Telef6nica would 
for  this reason  remain the main contributor to the 
cost  of  the  USO  in  the  course  of  1998. 
(b)  Cost  accounting 
(1 S)  The  Spanish  authorities  have  submitted  that  full 
tariff rebalancing will only be possible once Telef6-
nica's  new  cost  accounting  system  is  fully  opera-
tional.  However,  the  Commission  cannot  accept 
that as  a  reason  for  granting an  additional  imple-
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mentation  period  because  Member  States  had  to 
implement  cost  accounting  systems  by  31 
December 1993  at  the latest under Council Direc-
tive  92/44/EEG of  5 June 1992 on the application 
of open network provision  to leased  lines (') and by 
31  Occember  1996  at  the  latest  under  Directive 
95/62/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  of  13  December  199 5 on the application 
of  open  network  provision  to  voice  telephony (2). 
(c)  Development  of the  network  and provision  of 
universal service 
(16}  In  1994  approximately 48% of  Teld6nica's local 
exchanges  were  digitalized  against  a  weighted 
Community average  of 67 %. Moreover, Telef6nica 
has  not  achieved  particularly  fast  telephone  pen-
etration  growth  in  the  Community until  recently 
(from  32 main lines per 100 inhabitants in  1990 to 
37  lines  against  a  Community  average  of  48  in 
1994).  Telef6n_ica  has  the  third  lowest  telephone 
penetration  of  the  Community  (after  Ireland  and 
Portugal),  although  in  the  last  two  years  (1994-
1996)  Telef6nica  has  intensified  its  efforts  to 
modernize the  network  in Spain and has  increased 
penetration  to  40  main  lines  per  l 00  inhabitants 
and the  rate  of  digitalization  to  60 % (3).  It is  al~o 
noted  that  due  to  the  relatively  low  population 
density  in  Spain  in  comparison  with  most  other 
Member  States,  combined  with  the  relatively  low 
digitalization  rate  of  Telef6nica's  network, 
increasing  telephone  penetration  and  developing 
the network generally is likely to be more costly in 
Spain  than  in  other Member States. 
(17)  The  Commission  therefore  acknowledges  that, 
combined with  the need for further development of 
the  network  in  Spain  and  for  the  more  rapid 
rebalancing  of  Telef6ncia'  s  tariffs,  the  cost  of 
implementing the new numbering scheme is likely 
to  affect  a  significant  proportion  of  Telef6nica'  s 
revenues. The Commission considers that the  fact 
that Spain intends to complete the implementation 
of  the  new  national  numbering  plan  by  1 
December  1998,  in  order  to  allow  Telef6nica  to 
spread  the  cost  in  time  and  avoid  its  financial 
!
'l  OJ L  165,  19.  6.  1992.  p.  27. 
2  OJ  L 321,  30.  12.  1995,  p.  6. 
3  Internal  data  CEC  DG  XIII. 
stability being affected in the crucial year of transi-
tion  to  full  competition,  is  not incompatible with 
the Spanish Government's obligation under Article 
3  b  of  Directive  90/388/BBC,  as  amended  by 
Directive 96/19/EC, to ensure by  1 July 1997 that 
adequate  numbers  are  available  for  the  liberalized 
telecommunications  services.  In  any  case,  such 
numbers  must  be  allocated  in  an  objective,  non-
discriminatory,  proportionate  and  transparent 
manner,  in  particular  on  the  basis  of  individual 
application  procedures., 
(18)  As  r~gards comments by third  parties  referring to 
the  mvestments  by  Telef6nica  outside  Spain,  the 
Commission  notes  that investments  by Telef6nica 
in  Central and South America are  profitable. Such 
investments  have  diversified  Telef6nica's  activities 
so  that  it  is  better  placed  to  fulfil  the  task  of 
gcn\..ral economic interest and in due course to face 
competition  in  the  Spanish  telecommunications 
market.  Those  investments  have  thus  helped  to 
avoid  the  need  for  Spain  to  request  for  an  addi-
tional  implementation  period  in  other  market 
segments  of  up  to  five  years  as  foreseen  by 
Directive  90/388/EEC. 
Development of trade 
(19)  The  gra~ting of  the  requested  additional  imple-
mentation periods to Spain would not foreclose the 
voice-telephony  market  in  Spain.  A  second 
operator  has  already  been  authorized  to  provide 
voice  telephony  and  public  telecommunications 
networks.  Cable  1V  operators  are  going  to  be 
granted the right to  provide voice  telephony and a 
third voice-telephony operator will  be  licensed  by 
early January 1998. Further applicants will  only be 
prevented from entering the Spanish market during 
a limited period (until 1 December 1998). Since the 
establishment  of  a  new  public  telephony  service 
requires  a  preparation  of  many  months,  the 
possible  harm  to  potential  investors  by this  addi-
tional  implementation  period  of  eleven  months 
will  be limited due to the following circumstances: 
(a)  those  investors  can  already  plan  their  invest-
ments and (b)  the formal  licensing conditions will 
be published no later thafl 1 August 1998. That will 
mean  that new entrants will  be  ready to  be opera-
tional in advance of full  liberalization. In addition, 
the  effective  iiberalization  of  the  market  will  be 
more rapidly achieved to the benefit of new market 
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entrants given that the access conditions will in the 
meantime  be  settled  between  Telef6nica  and  the 
initial  competitors.  Finally,  no  additional  imple-
mentation  period  with  regard  to  any other market 
segment  has  been  requested  by  the  Spanish 
authorities. 
On the  basis  that  the  publication  of  licences will 
take  place  no  later  than  1  August  1998,  and 
mindful  of Article  9  (2)  of  Directive 97/13/EC of 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  10 
April  1997  on  a  common  framework  for  general 
authorizations  and  individual  licences  in  the  field 
of  telecommunications  services (1),  the  Spanish 
authorities have  stated that they will grant licences 
for  the  provision  of  public  fixed  voice  telephony 
within  four  months of publication, to those under-
takings which  submit licence  applications in good 
time. This will coincide with the completion of the 
implementation  of  the  new  numbering  plan  and 
will  achieve  the  full  liberalization  of  the  voice-
telephony  and  public  telecommunications 
networks  market  in  Spain. 
(20)  The Commission moreover takes note that the new 
numbering plan has already been decided and that 
Spain will only spread over time the completion of 
its  full  implementation and will  respect its obliga-
tions  under  Article  3b  of  Directive  90/388/EEC. 
Sufficient  numbers will  be  granted  already  before 
that date  to  Retevision,  to  the  new operator to  be 
licensed  in  early  January,  to  the  cable  1V 
companies and to  providers of services  other than 
voice  telephony. 
Conclusion 
(21)  On the basis of the above assessment, the Commis-
sion considers that the development of trade which 
would  result  from  the  granting  to  Spain  of  the 
following additional implementation periods under 
Article  2 (2)  of  Directive  90/388/EEC will  not be 
affected  to such an extent as  to  be  contrary to the 
interests  of  the  Community,  in  so  far  as  the 
circumstances  set  out above  are  fulfilled: 
(a)  until i January 1998  instead of 1 January 1997 
as  regards  the  notification  to  the  Commission 
(')OJ L  117,  7.  5.  1997,  p.  15. 
of  licensing  or declaration  procedures  for  the 
provision  of voice  telephony and the establish-
ment  of  public  telecommunications  networks, 
and  of  the  details  of  the . national  scheme 
envisaged to share the net cost of the provision 
of  the  USO; 
and· 
(b)  until  1 August  1998  instead of  1 July 1997  as 
regards  the  publication  of licensing or declara-
tion  procedures for  the  provision of voice  tele-
phony  and  public  telecommunications 
networks,  including  details  of  the  national 
scheme envisaged  to  share  the  net cost of the 
provision  of  the  USO; 
(c)  as  a consequence of  those  two  extensions,  and 
in  accordance  with  the  deadlines  set  out  in 
Article  9  (2)  of  Directive  97/13/EC,  further 
licences  for  the  provision  of  voice  telephony 
and  public  telecommunications  networks  (in 
addition  to  those  mentioned in  paragraph  7 of 
this  Decision)  will  only  be  granted  as  from  I 
December  1998, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION: 
Article  1 
Spain  may  postpone  until: 
(a)  1 January  1998  the  notification  to  the  Commission 
before implementation of any licensing or declaration 
procedure for the provision of voice telephony and the 
establishment of public telecommunications networks, 
and of the details of the national scheme envisaged to 
share  the  net  cost  of  the  provision  of  the  Universal 
Service  Obligation; 
(b)  .1  August  1998  the  publication  of  any  licensing  or 
declaration  procedure for  the  provision  of voice  tele-
phony and the establishment of public telecommuni-
cations  networks,  and  of  the  details  of  the  national 
scheme evisaged to share the net cost of the provision 
of  the  Universal  Service  Obligation;  and 
(c)  1  December  1998  the  effective  granting  of  further 
licences  for  the  provision  of  voice  telephony  and 
public  telecommunications  networks,  in  compliance 
with the conditions set out in the relevant Spanish law 
and implementing regulations and in conformity with 
Directive  90/388/EEC. 
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Article 2 
Spain  shall  inform  the Commission of the  implementa-
tion  in  national  law  of  the  following  obligations  in 
accordance  with  the  following  timetable: 
(a)  during 1997, cable operators who apply in  compliance 
with  the  conditions  set  out  in  the  relevant  law  and 
implementing regulations shall  be  allowed  to provide 
voice  telephony including the  possibility of  intercon-
necting  their  networks  for  this  purpose; 
(b)  before  the  end  of  1997,  the  new  General  Telecom-
munications  Law  (Ley  General  de  Telecomunicaci-
ones),  which  will  implement  the  outstanding  provi-
sions  of  Community Ia.w  in  the  telecommunications 
sector,  shall  be  adopted; 
(c)  in  early Janu'ary  1998,  a third  nation-wide  licence  to 
operate  voice  telephony  and  public  telecommunica-
tions  networks  shall  be  granted.  in  addition  to  the 
licence  .which  was  granted  in  1996  to  a  second 
operator;  and 
(d)  before  the end of July 1998, all  laws  and regulations 
necessary  for  the  complete opening of  the  telecom-
munications market to competition shall be in place. 
Article 3 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  Kingdom  of  Spain. 
Done  at  Brussels,  10  June  1997. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIBRT 
Member  of the  Commission L  245/6  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  9.  9.  97 
II 
(Act.r  whose  publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 18  June  1.9.97 
concerning the granting of additional implementation periods to Greece for the 
implementation  of  Directive  .90/388/EEC  as  regards  full  competition  in  the 
telecommunications markets 
(Only  the Greek  text  is  authentic) 
(fext with  EEA  relevance) 
(97/607/EC) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  establishing  the  Euro-
pean  Economic Area, 
Having  regard  to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC of 
28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecom-
munications  services ('),  as  last  amended  by  Directive 
96/19  /EC (2),  and  in  particular Article  2  (2)  thereof, 
Having given  notice (')  to  to  interested  parties  to  submit 
their  comments  in  accordance  with  Article  2  (2)  of 
Directive  90/388/EEC, 
Whereas: 
(1) 
A.  THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
I. The requests submitted by Greece 
Pursuant to  Article  2 (2)  of  Directive 90/388/EEC, 
the Greek Government, by Jetter of 25 June 1996, 
has requested the following additional implementa-
tion  periods: 
( 1)  OJ  L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
(1)  OJ  L 74,  22.  3.  1996,  p.  13. 
(l)  OJ  C  257,  4.  9.  1996,  p.  3. 
- until  l January 2003 in  respect of the abolition 
of  the exclusive  rights  currently granted  to  the 
Hellenic Telecommunications Organization AE 
(OTE') for  the provision of voice telephony and 
the underlying network  infrastructure. Pursuant 
to  Article  2  (2)  of  Directive  90/388/EEC,  that 
provision  is  to  be  implemented  before  1 
January  1998, 
- until  1 July 2001  in  respect  of  the  lifting  of 
restrictions on  the  provision  of  already  liberal-
ized  telecommunications. services  on: 
(a)  networks established  by  the  provider of  the 
telecommunications  service; 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties; 
(c)  shared  networks,  other  facilities  and  sites. 
Within  the  meaning of  Article  2 (2)  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC,  those  provisions  were  to  be  imple-
mented  before  1  July  1996.  Those  provisions  do 
not  relate  to  cable  1V infrastructures,  which  are 
regulated  by  Article  4  of  the  same  Directive. 
The request is in conformity with the provisions of 
Council  resolutions  93/C  213/01 ('')  and  94/C 
379/03 (5). 
(4)  OJ C  213,  6.  8.  1993,  p.  I. 
(~ OJ C  379,  31.  12.  1994,  p.  4. 
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(2)  Greece  considers  those  additional  implementation 
periods  necessary  for  the  following  reasons: 
2.1.  Greece  is  currently carrying out a  programme 
of digitalization  and general modernization of 
OTE's infrastructure which requires significant 
capital  investment.  The  constraints  on 
Greece's financial  resources,  the high cost and 
the  size  of OTE's modernization  programme, 
aggravated  by the considerable expense of de-
livering  telecommunications  services 
throughout Greece (given  its  particular  topo-
graphy), necessitate a gradual  pace of modern-
ization.  Even  though  advanced  services  are 
gradually  being  introduced  over  the  already 
digitalized  parts  of  the  network,  OTE's 
revenue  will  for  several  years  continue  to 
depend  heavily  on  voice  telephony. 
2.2.  OTE's  substantial  investment  programme 
(exceeding  Dr J, J  trillion  in  the  year  J  996  to 
2003)  for  digitalization  and  modernization 
would  be  prejudiced  if  full  competition  was 
introduced  in  1998. This would  deprive  OTE 
of revenue  needed  both  to  finance  the  mod-
ernization  of  Greece's  telecommunications 
infrastructure and to  provide  universal  service 
to  dispersed  customers  in  remote  areas  of 
Greece. 
2.3.  The process  of digitalization did  not begin  in 
Greece until  1990 owing to  the lack of neces-
sary financial  resources. The size of the invest-
ment required for digitalization of the network 
dictates  the  pace  of  modernization  of  OTE'  s 
services.  Of  the  abovementioned  total  ex-
penditure,  approximately  29 %  will  be  spent 
on  the  modernization  of  the  urban  networks 
and  14 %  on  the  digitalization  of  the 
exchanges. 
2.4.  In  1993  Greece started to implement a policy 
of adjusting tariffs  to costs, which  has  resulted 
in  increases  in  local  call  rates  and reductions 
(in real  terms) in long-distance rates. However, 
despite the progress achieved, the current tariff 
structure is  still  marked by a considerable gap 
between  tariffs  for  local  and  long-distance 
calls.  Further  rebalancing  of  tariffs  in  the 
implementation  period  will  be  necessary  to 
ensure  OTE's financial  stability and  revenues 
(which are  indispensable to the completion of 
digitalization and modernization). The pace of 
adjustment of tariffs to costs will depend, ;nter 
alia,  on  further  modernization  of  OTE'  s 
networks,  the  introduction  of  analytical  cost-
accounting systems and customer's acceptance 
of  tariff  increases. 
25. Structural adjustments arc  being carried out in 
order  to  transform  OTE  into  a  commercial 
organization,  including  the  adaptation  of  its 
personnel to  the environment of modern tele-
communications technology, services, manage-
ment and  marketing  methods. 
2.6.  Liberalization  of  alternative  infrastructures 
cannot  take  place  in  Greece  significantly  in 
advance  of  the  liberalization  of  voice  tele-
phony  and  public  telecommunications 
networks.  Were  this  to  happen,  providers  of 
telcommunications  services  over  such  infra-
structures  would  be  able  to  circumvent  the 
derogation  for  voice  telephony  and  con-
sequently deprive  OTE of  significant  revenue 
which  is  crucial  for  the  modernization  of  the 
public  telecommunications  networks  and 
services  in  Greece. 
(3)  The Greek authorities provided a detailed descrip-
tion  of  the  capital  investments  required  for  the 
development of the network,  the tariff  rebalancing 
planned and the restructuring of OTE in  an  annex 
to  their  letter of  25 June  1996. 
(4)  The Greek authorities stated that, if the derogations 
requested  were  granted,  Greece  would  implement 
Directive  90/388/EEC  as  amended  by  Directive 
96/19/EC into national law  in accordance with the 
following  timetable: 
- first  half of 1997: proposals for the introduction 
of appropriate legislation  in  order to  introduce 
full  competition, 
- second  half  of  1997:  publication  of  proposed 
legislative  changes  to  implement full  competi-
tion  and  remove  all  restrictions  on  the  provi-
sion  of  voice  telephony  and  public  telecom-
munications networks and on alternative  infra-
structure  by  1 January 2003  and  1 July 2001 
respectively:  consultation  with  interested 
parties, 
1999: target for adoption of legislative changes, 
- second  half  of  1999:  publication  of  licensing 
conditions  for  all  services  and  of  interconnec-
tion  charges  as  appropriate  in  accordance  in 
both cases with relevant Community directives, 
- end  of  2000:  target  for  the  award  of  new 
licences and amendment of existing licences to 
allow  the  competitive  provision  of  voice  tele-
phony  and  for  the  establishment  of  telecom-
munications  networks. 
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In  addition, the Greek authorities stated that by the 
end of 2000 digitalization will  have reached 80,3 % 
and that by the end of 2003, digitalization will  have 
reached  approximately  100 %  and  tariff  rebalan-
cing will  have  been  achieved  to  a great  extent. 
The  request  was  delivered  to  the  Commission  on 
25  June  1996. 
II.  The comments received 
~~~  'f  -- .. 
(5)  Three undertakings submitted comments following 
the  notice  published  by  the  Commission  on  4 
September  1996. 
(6)  According  to  those  comments: 
- the  Greek  authorities  have  exaggerated  the 
financial  burden  of  satisfying  the  universal 
service  obligation  (USO')  based  on  Greece's 
particular  topography  and  the  high  cost  of 
supplying  some  customers.  According  to  the 
comments, the Greek authorities also ignore the 
potential for  new entrants to supply services in 
remote/rural  areas  using,  for  example,  wireless 
technology, 
- it  has  proved  extremely  difficult  to  obtain 
leased  lines  and  high-capacity bandwidth  lines 
such as  ISDN from  OTE, despite its obligations 
under  the  relevant  Community legislation, 
- delays  in  implementing  Community  telecom-
munications  Directives  (notably  Directive 
90/388/EEC,  Commission  Directive 
94/46/EC (1)  with  regard  to  satellite  commun-
ications and Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 
june 1992 on the application of open network 
provision to leased lines (2)),  is  not a justification 
for  the  short-term  protection  of  OTE  which 
will  lead  to  further delays  in crucial  regulatory 
reforms.  According  to  those  comments,  any 
further delay is  a threat to  the development of 
telecommunications  in  Greece, 
- the Greek authorities have not included in their 
calculations  the  ECU  200,7  million  allocated 
from  the  Community  Structural  Funds  (CSF) 
under the Crash  Programme for  modernization 
of OTE and its infrastructure and for  reforming 
the  Greek  regulatory  framework, 
- any  additional  implementation  period  would 
reinforce  OTE's  dominance  in  the  telecom-
(')  OJ  L  268,  19.  10.  1994,  p.  15. 
(2)  OJ  L  165,  19.  6.  1992,  p.  27. 
(7) 
(8) 
munications market in Greece and increase the 
danger  of  abuse  of  such  dominance, 
- all  the  major  existing  potential  providers  of 
alternative  infrastructures are  controlled by  the 
Greek  authorities  which  maintain  a  majority 
stake  in  OTE. 
By  leter dated  21  October  1996,  the  Commission 
sent  the  Greek  authorities  the  comments  of  the 
third  parties,  received  following  the  publication  of 
the Commission's notice of 4 September 1996. The 
Commission  invited  the  Greek  authorities  to 
comment on  the  third  party  submissions. 
III.  The response of Greece 
In response to  those comments, the Greek author-
ities, by letter dated 8 November 1996, stated inter 
alia that: 
- expenditure  under  the  telecommunications 
heading of  the  Crash  Programme  amounts  to 
ECU  260,4  million.  ECU  241,4  million  was 
spent  up  until  31  December  1995  and  the 
remainder was  to  be  spent  in  1996. While  the 
Community  was  initially  to  contribute  up  to 
50 %  of  total  expenditure,  its  actual  contribu-
tion amounted to  only 27% (ECU  71  million) 
of  eligible  costs  up  until  31  December  1993. 
The reduction  of  the  Communtiy contribution 
was  due  to  Greece's  inability  to  complete  the 
implementation of the planned measures before 
the  end  of  1993  as  forecast.  The delay in  the 
implementation  of  the  project  was  caused  by 
administrative  difficulties  which  arose  in  the 
start-up  phase.  The  reduction  was  also  caused 
by insufficient funds in the Community budget 
being  available  for  the  CSF  to  support  any 
expenditure  after  1993, 
- assistanc.e  from  the  CSF  was  never  considered 
to  be  sufficient  to  sustain  the  major  part  of 
OTE's  planned  modernization  and  digitaliza-
tion  programme.  The  new  operational 
programme for  1994 to  1999 earmarks a total of 
ECU  321,821  million  for  Greece,  whereas  the 
costs of OTE's investments over the  years  1996 
to  2000 are  estimated at  Dr 1,245 trillion (ECU 
4 130  million), 
- as far as the difficulties of obtaining leased lines 
in  Greece are  concerned, demand will  be  satis-
fied  once  the extension  of  the  ISDN  network 
has been completed. This is currently in a pilot 
phase.  Such  an  extension  is  necessary  since 
there is no spare capacity on OTE's network, 
1/151 • 
9.  9.  97  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  L  24Sf9 
(9) 
- the  planned  privatization  and  commercial 
operation  of  the  public  undertakings  which 
control  alternative  networks  means  that  these 
undertakings  could  compete  with  OTE  in  the 
future,  either  alone  or  in  an  alliance  with 
private  partners. 
On  6  December  1996,  these  issues  were  further 
discussed  during  a  bilateral  meeting  between  the 
Greek  Minister  for  Telecommunications  and  the 
Member  of  the  Commission  responsible  for 
competition. The latter expressed the view that as a 
result  of  the  delays  in  implementing Community 
law  in  Greece,  the  market situation  was  currently 
significantly distorted to the advantage of OTE and 
that  it  was  therefore  not  established  that  OTE 
would  be  affected  to  the  extent  claimed  in  the 
Greek application  in  the event of early  liberaliza-
tion  of  voice  telephony. The  market  situation  in 
Greece  was  further  discussed  during  a  bilateral 
meeting  between  experts  of  the  Commission  and 
the  Greek  authorities  in  Brussels  on  24  January 
1997.  By  letter  of  24  March  1997,  the  Greek 
Minister  for  Telecommunications  subsequently 
confirmed a time-schedule for the full  implementa-
tion  of  Directives  90/388/EEC,  92/44/EEC  and 
94/46/EC and  repeated  Greece's  request  for  addi-
tional  implementation  periods  pursuant to  Direct-
ive  96/19/EC. 
On  21  and  22  April  1997,  the  Commission  also 
heard  the  position  of OTE  regarding the situation 
of  the  Greek  network  and  the  need  for  further 
implementation periods. On 29  April  1997, a final 
meeting took place between the Greek Minister for 
Telecommunications  and  the  Member  of  the 
Commission responsible for competition to discuss 
the Greek request and  the  preliminary assessment 
of the Commission at that date. By letter of 29 May 
1997,  the  Greek authorities summarized  the  argu-
ments given  orally  in  these  meetings. 
IV.  Article 2  (2)  of Directive .90/388/EEC 
Detailed  rules  on  the application  of  Article  90  (2) 
of the EC Treaty in the telecommunications sector 
were  laid  down  in  Directive  90/388/EEC  which 
provides for the introduction of full  competition in 
the telecommunications markets at the latest  by  1 
January 1998. However, pursuant to Article 2 (2) of 
Directive 90/388/EEC, the Commission is  to grant 
additional implementation periods, on request, to a 
number  of  Member  States  allowing  them  (i)  to 
derogate  from  the  dates  set  out  in  Directive 
90/388/EEC,  and  (ii)  to  maintain  for  a  further 
period the exclusive rights granted to  undertakings 
to which they entrust the provision of a public tele-
communications network  and  telecommunications 
services. This is  to allow for  the implementation of 
measures which are necessary to carry out structural 
adjustments  and  is  strictly  to  the extent necessary 
for  those  adjustments. 
(1 0)  As  regards  the provision of public telecommunica-
tions services and networks, it appears that OTE is 
entrusted with a service of general economic inter-
est  pursuant to  Articles  1,  3 and  12 of Presidential 
Decree  No  437/1995,  based  on  Law  No  2257/94 
on  the  organization  and operation of OTE. Article 
I  of that  Decree  provides,  inter alia,  that the ac-
tivities  of  the  licence  holder,  OTE,  not only con-
tribute  to  the country's regional  and industrial de-
velopment but also ensure the  provision  of a tech-
nically  reliable  and financially  accessible  telecom-
munications service  in a competitive environment. 
Pursuant  to  Article  12  of the  Decree,  OTE  must 
provide voice telephony to  the public, operate pay-
phones  and  provide  assistance  services  as  well  as 
emergency  calls. 
(11)  Within the meaning of  the Directive, the question 
which falls  to be considered is  therefore the extent 
to  which  the requested  temporary exclusion  of all 
competition  from  other  economic  operators  is 
'warranted  by  the  need  to  carry  out the  structural 
adjustments  and  [is]  strictly  only  to  the  extent 
necessary  for  those  adjustments'. 
(12)  The starting point for such an  examination is  that 
the obligation on an  undertaking entrusted with  a 
task  of  general  economic  interest  to  perform  its 
services  in  conditions  of  economic  equilibrium 
presupposes  that  the  undenaking will  be  able  to 
offset  less  profitable  sectors  against  the  profitable 
sectors.  This  justifies  a  restriction  of  competition 
from  individual  undertakings  in  economically 
profitable  sectors.  Indeed  to  authorize  individual 
undertakings  to  compete  with  the  holder  of  the 
exclusive rights in the sectors of their choice would 
make  it  possible  for  them  to  concentrate  on  the 
economically  profitable  operations  and  to  offer 
more  advantageous  tariffs  than  those  charged  by 
the  holder of the exclusive  rights since, unlike the 
latter, they are  not bound for  economic reasons to 
offset  losses  in  the  unprofitable  sectors  against 
profits  in  the  more  profitable  sectors. 
(13)  Directive  90/388/EEC  therefore  granted  a  tem-
porary  exemption  pursuant  to  Article  90  (2)  in 
respect of special and exclusive rights for the provi-
sion of voice  telephony. This was  because financial 
resources  for  the  development of  the  public  tele-
communications  network  and  the  maintenance of 
the  USO  still  derived  mainly  from  the  voice-
telephony  service.  The  opening  of  the  voice-
telephony  market  to  competition  could,  at  that 
time,  obstruct  the  performance  of  the  task  of 
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general economic interest and  development of  the 
network  assigned  to  the  telecommunications  or-
ganizations.  Restrictions  on  competition  are  only 
justified  as  regards  services  which,  by  their nature 
and the conditions in  which they would  be  offered 
in  a  competitive  market,  would  compromise  the 
economic  equilibrium  of  the  provision  of  the 
service  of general  economic  interest or affect  it  in 
some other way.  For this reason, the restrictions on 
the  provision  of  such  services  can  only  be 
permitted  if substantive  evidence  is  provided  of 
such  impact. 
(14)  Some  comments  mention  that  in  practice  new 
entrants could also contribute to  the relevant tasks 
of  general  economic  interest.  The  exception  is 
indeed intended to  protect the fulfilment of a task 
of  general  economic  interest  and  not  to  shelter 
specific  undertakings.  In  the  short term,  however, 
OTE  will  continue  to  be  the  only  undertaking 
providing a universal  telephone service  to  users  in 
sparsely  populated  areas.  For  this  reason,  the 
Commission examined the additional implementa-
tion  periods  requested  in  order  to  determine 
whether their granting is  necessary to allow OTE to 
perform its task of general economic interest and to 
have the benefit of economically acceptable condi-
tions while the necessary structural adjustments are 
made. 
B.  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
I.  Request for  an additional implementation 
period  regarding  voice  telephony  and 
underlying network  infrastructure 
Assessment of the impact of the removal of 
the exclusive rights currendy  granted to OTE 
Arguments submitted  by  Greece 
(15)  Generally, according to the Greek authorities, OTE 
faces  particular  difficulties  in  satisfying  the  USO 
because of the problems associated with developing 
the  network  taking  into  account  the  following: 
the  topography  of  Greece  characterized  by 
numerous  sparsely  populated  and  remote 
mount~in regions  and  islands, 
the  low  GDP  per  capita  (approximately  ECU 
7 357,82  below  the  EU  average), 
- the high cost of supplying a disproportionately 
large  number  of  customers.  This  is  due  to 
varying  levels  of  demand  because  of  high 
seasonal  demand  in  numerous  remote  holiday 
resorts  and  isolated  residential  subscribers. 
(  16)  More  specifically,  Greece  considers  an  additional 
implementation  period  of  five  years  indispensable 
in  order to  achieve  the following structural adjust-
ments. 
(a)  Digitalization and modernization of the 
network 
(17)  Greece  emphasizes  the  poor level  of  digitalization 
of OTE's network, namely 31  % at the end of 1994 
which  was  the  lowest  percentage  in  the  Com-
munity.  Digitalization  rates  at  that  time  in 
Germany and  Italy were  45 %  and  67 %  respect-
ively.  Significant  capital  investment  is  therefore 
required  to  upgrade  OTE's  network  before  com-
petition  is  introduced. 
(18)  The  Greek  authorities  have  planned  for  a  total 
expenditure  of  Dr  946 000  million  in  the  years 
1996 to  2000  to  upgrade  OTE's domestic network, 
infrastructure,  telematics,  international  networks 
and  international  relations.  Further investments of 
Dr 300 000  million  in  the  years  2001  to  2002 are 
planned.  Greece  states  that  part  of  those  invest-
ments  will  improve  the  level  of  digitalization  to 
nearly  1  00 %  by  2003. 
(19)  The  Greek  authorities  maintain  that  due  to 
constraints on national financial resources, the high 
cost  and  the  size  of  OTE's  modernization 
programme, aggravated by the burden of delivering 
telecommunications  services  throughout  Greece, 
full  digitalization  by  the  year  2003  can  only  be 
achieved  if  OTE  is  further  guaranteed  sufficient 
revenues via  the continuation until that date of its 
current  exclusive  rights. 
(b)  Improvements in telephone density and 
universal  service 
(20)  While  the  precise  cost  of  OTE'  s  USO  is  not 
known,  because  OTE  has  not  implemented  an 
appropriate  cost-based  accounting  system  which 
would  allow  such  a  calculation, Greece  has  stated 
that the approximate connection costs of customers 
living  in  the  14 000  small  rural  conurbations  in 
Greece would  average  at  Dr 400 000  per customer 
as  opposed to Dr 50 000 to  1  00 000 for  an  average 
customer.  This  additional  cost  could  not  be  re-
covered from  the relevant users in view of the aver-
age  household  income  in  Greece.  The  Greek  au-
thorities  estimate  that total  investment costs  until 
2003  for  these  uneconomic  users  are  Dr  100 000 
million. 
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(c)  Further  adjustments  in  OTE's  tariff 
structure 
(21)  The Greek  authorities  state  that  the  current  tariff 
structure of OTE is characterized by a considerable 
gap  between  local  and  long-distance  rates 
compared  with  other  Member  States.  The  Greek 
authorities  state  that  rates  for  local  calls  do  not 
cover  costs  and  are  subsidized  by  revenue  from 
long-distance  national  and  international  calls. 
OTE's tariff policy since 1 January 1993 has aimed 
at  rebalancing tariffs  and gradually adjusting them 
to costs, thereby fostering the convergence of tariffs 
for  local,  national  and  international  calls.  This 
policy has  however  been  subject  to  the  provisions 
of Article 2 of Law  No 2257/94 which provides for 
a  cap  on  tariff  increases  until  the  end of  1997. 
(22)  OTF.'s  rebalancing  has  led  to  increases  in  local 
tariffs  of  2.5 %, 2H,S%  and  13,3 %  in  1993,  199.5 
and  I 996 respectively, starting from  very low prices. 
Long-distance  national  tariffs  (more  than  160  km) 
have  increased  by  only  25 %,  7,1  %  and  2 % 
respectively  in  the  same  years.  In  1993  interna-
tional tariffs decreased by an  average of 2,3 %. The 
increases in  international tariffs  of 5 %  and  1,5 % 
in  199 5  and  1996  respectively  were,  according  to 
the Greek authorities, dictated by the overall  finan-
cial  strategy  of  OTE  and  the  temporary  need  to 
cross-subsidize  local  calls. 
(23)  According to  the Greek authorities, there has been 
considerable  public  and  political  opposition  to 
tariff  rebalancing.  The  tariff  policy  followed  from 
199 3  to  date  was  designed  both  to  avoid  causing 
serious  negative  reactions  from  subscribers  and  to 
make  gradual  steps  towards  the  necessary  rebal-
ancing and  the cost-based  tariff structure. In  1994, 
for  instance,  tariffs  were  not increased  because  of 
the  increases  in  1993. 
(d)  Improvements  in  OTE's efficiency and 
effectiveness,  including  traintng  of 
personnel  and  staff  redundancies 
(24)  The  Greek  authorities  argue  that  unless  OTE's 
exclusive  rights  over  voice  telephony  and  public 
telecommunications  networks  are  continued  until 
2003,  OTE  will  not  be  able  to  implement  the 
restructuring of its personnel which is  necessary to 
prepare for a competitive market. This restructuring 
_will  involve training and retraining staff to improve 
their  ability  to  manage  modern  technology,  to 
market effectively and to supply sophisticated tele-
communications services. 
(25)  The  Greek  authorities  claim  that  under  the 
currently  applicable  legal  and  regulatory  frame-
work,  OTE is  not allowed  to  reduce  its  workforce 
(except by retirement or voluntary redundancy) and 
would thus not be able to reduce staff levels in  time 
for  competition on  I  January  1998.  Moreover,  the 
Greek authorities state  that any attempt to  reduce 
personnel  will  cause  grave  social  and  political 
problems, especially if done rapidly. OTE currently 
has  24 500  staff.  For  the  next  five  years  (1996  to 
2000) a package of measures aimed at the voluntary 
retirement  of  a  substantial  number of  employees 
has  been  discussed  with  OME-OTE,  the  relevant 
trade union. It is  expected that by the end of  1999 
the number of personnel will be reduced to 21  000. 
- Assessment  by  the  Commission 
(26)  The Commission must assess whether those adjust-
ments can  be  included within  the scope of Article 
2  (2)  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  and  whether  the 
implementation  of  those  adjustments  would  be 
jeopardized if there were  new entrants in  the sector 
currently  reserved  to  OTE. 
(27)  Legislative amendments themselves and any poten-
tial  delays  in  this  process  cannot  be  regarded  as 
structural adjustments for  the purposes of Directive 
90/388/EEC  which  would  justify  an  additional 
implementation period. That Directive refers to the 
necessary structural adjustments of the  operator to 
the  extent  that  they are  necessary  to  protect  the 
provision  of  the  service  of  general  economic  in-
terest.  In  the  absence  of  the  specific  justification 
referred to in the Directive, Member States may not 
plead  provisions,  practices  or  circumstances  ex-
isting in its legal system in order to justify an addi-
tional  implementation  period  to  comply  with 
Community  Directives (1). 
(28)  Pursuant to the general principle of proportionality, 
any additional implementation period granted must 
be  strictly  proportionate  to  what  is  required  to 
achieve  the  necessary  structural  adjustments, 
mentioned by the Greek authorities, with a view to 
the introduction of full competition, that is (i) digi-
talization,  modernization  and  increased  density  of 
the  network, (ii)  the further  rebalancing of OTE'  s 
tariffs,  and (iii)  improvements in OTE's efficiency 
and  effectiveness. 
( 1)  Judgment of the Court of Justice of  the European  Commu-
nities in  Case  1/86 Commission v.  Belgium [1987) ECR  2797. 
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(a)  Digitalization,  modernization  and 
penetration  of  the  network 
(29)  The  Commission  recognizes  that  modernization, 
digitalization  and  improvements in  the penetration 
of  the  network  are  required  in  Greece  during the 
rebalancing of  tariffs  period. The Commission also 
recognizes that the cost of this required moderniza-
tion  (Dr  1 246 000  million)  is  particularly  high  in 
the  specific  case  of  OTE'  s  fixed  network  for  two 
main  reasons:  the  digitalization  rate  is  low  (38 %) 
whereas  the  other Member States,  including those 
to  which  an  exemption  has  been  granted,  have 
higher  digitalization  rates  (80 %  in  the  case  of 
Portugal). The cost of improvements in penetration 
is also high since Greece is  characterized by sparse 
population,  numerous  mountain  regions  and 
numerous  island  regions. 
(30)  While  recognizing  that  further  digitalization  and 
modernization is  required in Greece,  the  Commis-
sion  notes  that  the  Greek  authorities  themselves 
acknowledge  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the 
delayed  start  of  digitalization  was  that  OTE's 
investment  programme  had  been  hampered  by 
policy  considerations  and  legal  problems.  In  par-
ticular delays  had  been  caused  by  legal  challenges 
to  OTE's procurement decisions  by  private  parties 
before  the  national courts. The abolition of OTE's 
special  and  exclusive  rights  to  operate  voice  tele-
phony  and  establish  public  telecommunications 
network  would  therefore  speed  up  the  investment 
programme since, pursuant to Article 8 of Directive 
93/38/EEC, the public procurement rules set out in 
this Directive must no longer be applied as soon as 
other entities are  free (1)  to  offer the same  services 
in  the same geographical  area  and under substan-
tially  the  same  conditions. 
According to the submissions of the Greek author-
ities, the investments have, in the past, deliberately 
been  delayed  in  favour  of  other  priorities.  For 
example  substantial  subsidies  were  granted  to 
postal  services  out  of  OTE's  profits  until  1992. 
Therefore the lack of investments to date is not due 
to  a  lack  of  resources. 
(31)  However, the issue at stake is whether OTE can, in 
a  competitive  environment, generate  the  required 
means  to  pursue  the  further  modernization  of  its 
network.  which  would  cost . Dr  946 000  million 
during  1996  to  2000  and  a  further  Dr  300 000 
million during the years  2001  to  2002, that is  less 
than  Dr  190.  billion  per  annum,  or  whether  the 
introduction of competition could endanger OTE's 
economic balance  and  therefore  also  its  ability  to 
( 1)  For an entity to benefit from the  dero~tion, there must be  de 
facto  a  sufficient  degree  of  competition  Uudgment  of  the 
Court of Justice  in  Case  C-392/93  British  Tefecommunica-
tions  {1996)  BCR  1-1631). 
provide  the  service  of  general  economic  interest 
which  is  entrusted  to  it.  From  this  point of view 
the  following factors  should be taken into account; 
(32)  In 1993 the total revenues of OTE were Dr 356 754 
milli~n of which Dr 321  145 million was generated 
by vo1ce  telephony. The net profit of OTE was  Dr 
129 520·  million (2).  The  telecommunications 
market is a growing market. It is  forecast that voice 
telephony  revenues  in  Greece  will  increase  from 
approximately  ECU  1 135  million  in  1993  to 
approximately  ECU  I 818  million  in  1998  (an 
annual growth of approximately 5 %) (3).  Moreover, 
Greece  has  recently  implemented  Directive 
90/388/EEC. It has  been possible to provide liber-
alized telecommunications services without restric-
tions in Greece since January 1997. This liberaliza-
tion will  increase traffic on the public telecommu-
nications network and generate additional revenues. 
However,  the expected growth  of revenues will  be 
negatively affected  by various  factors  in relation  to 
the  very  poor  level  of  digitalization.  This  is 
creating,  and  will  continue  to  create,  in  the 
medium  term,  large  congestion  problems  in  the 
fixed  network, which  is  substantially slowing down 
the growth  rate  of  telephony services  and explains 
why the growth of  telephony revenues i" Greece is 
lower  than  in other Member States  with  a digital-
ized  network.  Moreover,  and  for  the  same  reason, 
OTE  cannot  offer  advanced  services,  which 
generate significant growth of revenues for the tele-
phone operators.  In  all,  a share  of  the  investment 
cost  can  be  borne  by  the  profits  of  OTE. 
(33)  Moreover,  OTE has  relatively  little  debt compared 
with  operators which  have  invested  heavily in  the 
modernization  of  their network: at the end of  the 
fiscal  year  1995/1996,  the  debt/equity  ratio  or 
gearing of OTB was  39,4 as  compared to  139,9 for 
Telecom  Eireann,  124,3  for  Telef6nica  de  Bspaila, 
and 65 for  Portugal Telecom. In June 1996, long-
term debt was  Dr  123 000  million  relative  to  total 
investments by shareholders of Dr 600 000 million. 
OTE  has  thus  still  considerable  room  for  debt 
financing  of  the  relevant  investments. 
(34)  Finally, a share of the necessary investments will be 
subsidized by the CSF.  Under the new operational 
programme for Greece for the period 1994 to 1999, 
. the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) 
should  provide  ECU  173,243  million,  of  which 
ECU  112,377  million  is  earmarked  to  support the 
improvement  of  the  quality  of  service  of  OTE. 
However,  the  share  of  the  necessary  investments 
(ECU  4 130  million~ which  will  be  thus financed, 
is still modest, more than 90 % of their cost having 
to  be  borne  by  OTE. 
(2)  Public  -:we~.~ services in Europe 1995, CIT research, p. 88. 
(l)  Op.  cit.  p.  303.  . 
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(35)  However,  as  long  as  OTE'  s  tariffs  are  not  suffi-
ciently  rebalanced,  new  entrants  will  be  able  to 
undercut the high tariffs applied by OTE for  trunk 
and international calls. OTE would then either lose 
traffic or have to rebalance its tariffs faster than the 
growth of market demand. This could, in the short 
term,  depress  the  rise  of  revenues  of  the  public 
operator,  and  reduce  its  margin  to  finance  its 
investments. 
(36) 
This  state  of  affairs  justifies  an  additional  imple-
mentation  period  to  allow  OTE  to  continue  its 
progressive  tariff  rebalancing. 
Once  tariffs  are  sufficiently  rebalanced,  both  the 
price reductions and the emergence of competition 
will  indeed  lead  to  increased  usage  of  OTE's 
network.  Experience  in  other  Member  States  has 
shown that the growth of the market can  compen-
sate  for  loss  of  market  share. 
(b)  Telephone 
service 
density  and  universal 
Generally, the Commission accepts that, compared 
with other Member States, the estimated cost of the 
USO  in Greece is  relatively high owing to,  in  par-
ticular,  more  difficult  geographical  conditions 
which cause higher infrastructure costs. This means 
that  the  provision  of  the  service  of  general 
economic interest may  be  more difficult  in  Greece 
than  in  other Member States. 
(37)  Telephone  penetration  in  Greece  has  already 
reached a level comparable to Member States whkh 
do  riot  qualify  for  additional  implementation 
periods. In  1994 there were  48  main  lines per 100 
inhabitants  in  Greece,  in  comparison  with  55  in 
France,  48  in  Germany,  43  in  Italy.  Telephone 
penetration  in  the  other  Member  States · which 
qualify  for  additional  implementation  periods  is 
significantly lower than in Greece: 37 in Spain and 
35  in Ireland  and  in  Portugal.  It would  therefore 
appear  that  there  is  less  unsatisfied  demand  for 
further  telephone  lines  for  households  in  Greece 
than  in  those  Member States.  Greece  claims  that 
those  figures  misrepresent  the  reality  of  network 
coverage. Much  of  this  telephone density figure  is 
attributable  to  the  fact  that  there  are  a  large 
number of holiday resorts with  significant concen-
trations of lines which are only used seasonally, and 
to the fact  that many subscribers  have  more  than 
one home. The Greek authorities maintain that the 
level of telephone penetration must be increased to 
meet  demand. 
(38)  Moreover,  taking  into  account  geographical  and 
demographic constraints, the cost of improving the 
penetration  rate  will  be  comparatively  high.  GDP 
per capita in Greece is  also  below the EU average 
and  below  that  of  the  most  directJy  comparable 
countries  which  have  requested  an  additional 
period  for  the  implementation  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC.  For  both  those  reasons,  a  higher 
penetration rate. is  linked to  the pace  and level  of 
tariff rebalancing as regards both financing capacity 
and  evolution  of  the  relevant  demand. 
(.19)  The Commission  is,  in  principle, of  the  view  that 
there is no reason  to delay competition until a high 
level  of  telephone  penetration  is  achieved.  The 
United Kingdom for example introduced competi-
tion  when  telephone  penetration  was  below  the 
level achieved by OTE in 1994 so that new entrants 
could  improve  penetration.  Nevertheless,  the 
Commission accepts that enabling OTE, while it is 
rebalancing its  tariffs,  to  pursue  its costly develop-
ment  programmes  to  improve  further  telephone 
penetration  will  benefit  the  consumer  generally. 
This  improvement  will  to  a  certain  extent  also 
benefit future new entrants since the more users are 
connected  to  the  public  telecommunications 
networks, the more calls will be generated both for 
the  incumbent  and  for  the  new  entrants.  Once 
OTE's  tariffs  are  sufficiently  rebalanced,  new 
entrants  will  generate  additional  traffic  instead  of 
diverting  the  current  traffic  of  the  Greek  public 
operator. 
The  need  to  increase  penetration  can  therefore 
justify a continuation of the current exclusive rights 
granted to OTE but only for  the time necessary for 
OTE  to  rebalance  its  tariffs. 
(c)  Tariff  rebalancing 
(40)  The Commission notes that although the increases 
in  local  tariffs,  especially  in  the  years  1993  and 
1995  appear  substantial,  it  should  be  noted  that 
OTE did not previously charge for local calls at all. 
Nevertheless,  the  following  table,  based  on infor-
mation  in  the  Commission's  possession (1), 
compares certain telephone tariffs  of OTE and the 
equivalent  figures  for  one  operator  which  has 
already  rebalanced  its  tariffs  (British  Telecom) (2) 
and one operator (Portugal Telecom) of a Member 
State, which was granted an additional implementa-
tion  period by Commission Decision 97/31 0/EC (-') 
of  12  February  1997. This table shows  that OTE's 
need  for  further  rebalancing  is,  on  average,  quite 
similar  to  that  of  Portugal  Telecom. 
(')  Tarifica  study  implemented  for  tfie  European  Commission 
DG  XIII. 
(l)  A direct comparison of the telephony tariffs of OTE with the 
Community average (which  is  not a weighted average) would 
not be appropr}ate,  given  that the tariff  structures  of the  15 
Community TOs are  still  widely  divergent  and  in  addition, 
given  that  they are  currently  in  the  process  of rebalancing 
tariffs. 
(l)  OJ L  133,  24.  5.  1997,  p.  19. 
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Tariffs  in  c:cu  on 
OTE  British  Telecom  Portugal  Telecom  I  January  1996 
Initial  connection  charge  188,98  137,53  76,66 
Bi-monthly  rental  12,47  19,53  18,53 
Local  calls,  resp.  3/10  minutes  (cheap  rate)  0,04-0,08  0,06-0,19  0,06-0,12 
Local  calls,  rcsp.  3/  I 0  minutes  (peak  rate)  0,04-0,15  0,14-0,47  0,06-0,23 
Trunk  calls,  resp.  3/10  minutes (peak  rate)  1,16-3,86  0,35-1,16  1,17-3,91 
Intra  EC,  resp.  3/  I 0  minutes  (peak  rate)  I ,62-5,41 
(41)  Given  · that  due  to  technical  progress  in  the 
network,  cost  is  increasingly  less  dependent  on 
distance,  cost  orientation  of  tariffs  means  as  a 
generstl  role  that  prices are  adjusted  such  that rev-
enues  are  rebalanced  with  costs,  that  is  to  say: 
- connection  and  rental  revenues  cover  fixed 
costs  (plus  a  standard  margin), 
- call  revenues  cover  call  costs  (plus  a  standard 
margin). 
Consequently,  telecommunications  organizations 
have  had to raise  bi-monthly rental  and  local  calls 
(or at  least  not decrease  these  charges)  and  reduce 
tariffs  for  long-distance  calls.  It  is  clear  from  the 
above  that significant tariff rebalancing is  required, 
in particular as  regards the tariffs for  trunk calls. 
Given  the need not to affect the resources required 
to modernize the network in the coming years,  the 
continuation  of  the  gradual  approach  envisage  by 
Greece  for  further  tariff  decreases  of  trunk  and 
international  calls  does  therefore  appear  justified. 
In  fact,  taking  into  account  the  average  GDP in 
Greece,  a  progressive  approach  is  justified. This is 
in  order  to  avoid  increases  which  would  be  too 
large  and  too  fast  in the context of the  necessary 
rebalancing,  hence  slowing  down  demand  and 
therefore  reducing the  development of  the  opera-
tor's  revenues  and  profits  (which  could  in  turn 
affect  its  ability to  finance  the  network's  modern-
ization),  possibly also  to  the  detriment of  its capa-
city  to  ensure  the  provision  of  the  service  of 
general  interest  with  which  it  is  entrusted. 
Taking  irito  account  the  necessarily  progressive 
pace  of  rebalancing  and  the  heavy  burden  of 
modernizing the network both. in terms of penetra-
tion  and  of  digitalization,  the  Commission  con-
siders that OTE's tariffs can be  sufficiently restruc-
tured by 31  December 2000. OTE could even  ac-
celerate  the  pace  of  rebalancing,  if  it  introduced 
1,29-4,31  2,31-7,70 
flexible  tariff  structures  instead  of  implementing 
across-the-line  tariff  adaptations. 
(42)  The  further  arguments  provided  by  the  Greek 
authorities  to  justify  delays  in  the  rebalancing  of 
OTE's tariffs  cannot be  accepted,  however,  and  in 
particular,  the  argument  that  OTE  does  not 
currently  use  a  modern,  cost-based  accounting 
system  providing accurate  information on the cost 
per  category  of  service  does  not  justify  an  addi-
tional  implementation  period. Greece  was  obliged 
to  implement  cost-accounting  systems  by  31 
December  1993  pursuant  to  Directive  92/44/EEC 
and  by  31  December  1996  pursuant  to  Directive 
95/62/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  of  13  December  199 5 on  the  an  plication 
of open network provision to voice telephony('). As 
a  matter of  fact,  the  relative  costs of such  services 
do not vary substantially from  one Member State to 
another and,  pending the  establishment of such  a 
cost-based  accounting  system,  OTE  can  use  the 
examples  of  tariff  rebalancing  implemented  in 
other Member States where competition has already 
been  introduced. 
(d)  The  restructuring of  OTE 
(43)  Generally,  the  Commission  does  not  accept  the 
submissions of Greece on the restructuring of OTE 
because the problems mentioned are not specific to 
Greece  or  to  countries  with  less  developed 
networks.  More  specifically,  the  submission  is 
rejected  for  the  following  reasons: 
- although  the  productivity  of  OTE  can  be 
improved,  it  is  already  better  than  in  some 
Member  States,  which  are  not  entitled  to 
request  additional  implementation  periods. 
OTE operated 217 lines  per employee in  1996 
in  comparison with  183  for  Belgacom,  17 4  for 
Deutsche  Telekom,  162  for  Portugal  Telecom 
and 99 lines per employee in  Ireland. However, 
revenue  per employee is  substantially higher in 
Belgium  and  Germany  whereas  telephone 
penetration  is  lower  in  Portugal  and. Ireland, 
( 1)  OJ L 321,  30.  12.  1995,  p.  6. 
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- Greece  will  receive  under  the  agreed  opera- · 
tional  programme (1994 to  1999), over ECU 45 
million  for  the  reorganization  of OTE and  the 
training  of  personnel  (of  which  ECU  30,5 
million  will  be  provided  from  the  European 
Social  Fund).  In  that context, OTE committed 
itself to reach the levels of productivity and effi-
ciency  that  the  Commission  considers  import-
ant  in  order  to  function  as  a  competitive  and 
modern  company  by  the  end  of  1999. 
Development  of trade 
(44)  The aim of  the postponement of  the liberalizatiQn 
of  voice  telephony  is  to  delay  the  entry of  com-
peting carriers in  the voice-telephony market. This 
will  affect trade since it will  prevent large  interna-
tional  players  from  investing  and  providing  their 
services  in  Greece.  The  emergence  of  alternative 
national telecom operators will also be delayed and 
this will,  in  due  course,  reduce  the ability of  such 
alternative  national  operators  to  expand  outside 
Greece. 
The  establishment  of  a  new  public-telephony 
operator  must  be  prepared  over  many  months or 
even  years  if  the operator is  not yet  present in  the 
neighbouring market of liberalized telecommunica-
tions services and has not yet been able to acquire a 
customer  base. 
When  assessing  the  Greek  request  for  derogation, 
the  Commission  noticed  that  due  to  delays  in 
implementation  of  Community  law,  no  effective 
competition had yet been authorized in markets for 
data  services  and  voice  services  to  closed  user 
groups.  Moreover,  OTE  had  been  granted  the 
exclusive  right to  establish  cable  TV  networks.  In 
this  context,  allowing  competition  on voice  tele-
phony by 1 January 1998  could have  had a signi-
ficant  impact  on  the  turnover  of  OTE. 
Moreover,  it  appears  from  the  Greek  submission 
that  the  planned  digitalization  of  OTE's  network 
aims at  increasing the  range of services which  can 
be  provided  to  end  users.  While  the  old  analogue 
lines have  capacity to carry only voice  services, the 
Greek  authorities  state  that  new  digital  lines  will 
also  provide  enhanced  telecommunications 
services,  liberalized  pursuant  to  Directive 
90/388/EEC.  This  means  that  the  goal  of  the 
ongoing network investments is  to enable OTE to 
extend  its  range of  services  beyond universal  voice 
telephony. 
In  such  circumstances,  the  granting of  additional 
implementation  periods  could  affect  the  develop-
ment of trade  to  an  extent incompatible with  the 
interest  of  the  common  market  since  it  could 
enable  OTE  to  extend  its  current dominant posi-
tion  into  new  markets  distinct  from  the  voice-
telephony  market. 
However, by letter of 24 March  1997, expanded on 
orally  by  the  Greek  Minister  for  Telecommunica-
tions  during a bilateral  meeting in  Brussels on 28 
April  1997,  the  Greek  authorities  announced  the 
following: 
(1)  Directive  94/46/EC  on  satellite  communica-
tions  will  be  implemented  by  Presidential 
Decree in Greek law by  1 August  1997. In  the 
meantime,  the  Greek  National  Regulatory 
Authority,  the  National  Telecommunications 
Committee  (EET)  'Yill  already  accept  applica-
tions for satellite communications. They'  will be 
examined  without  delay  and  licences  will  be 
granted,  in so far  as  they meet the criteria set 
out in  the Decree, to the applicants as  soon as 
the  relevant  Decree  is  published.  -·  -
(2)  The  Presidential  Decree  implementing  Dir-
ective 96/2/EC will  be published and enter into 
force  by  December  1997. 
(3)  Law  2328/95  will  be  modified  regarding  the 
establishment of cable 1V infrastructure  before 
1  May  1998.  This  modification  will  be  made 
simultaneously  with  the  transposition  into 
national  law  of  Directive  95/51/EC. 
(4)  The Presidential Decree completing the  imple-
mentation  of  Directive  92/44/EEC  will  be 
adopted  and  brought into force  by  the  end of 
1997. 
In so  far  as  those announced measures are  adopted 
and  implemented  in  good  time,  an  additional 
implementation  period  for  the  abolition  of  the 
exclusive  or special  rights granted to  OTE for  the 
provision of voice telephony and the establishment 
of  public  telecommunications  networks  until  31 
December 2000 could be  envisaged, since it would 
not  completely  foreclose  the  telecommunications 
market in  Greece. As  a matter of fact,  the negative 
effect  of  such  additional  implementation  periods 
on  the  development  of  trade  in  the  Community 
will  be  limited  owing  to: 
- the  limited  size  of · the  telecommunications 
market  in  Greece  in  comparison  to  the 
~ommunity market; it  is  probable that, as  from 
1 January  1998,  the  largest  number of  invest-
ments will  mainly occur in Member States with 
more developed markets where a higher return 
on  investment  might  be  expected, 
- the  duration  of  the  derogation  granted;. the 
harm  done  to  potential  investors  by  an  addi-
tional implementation period of 36 months will 
1/158 t I  ! . 
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be  limited  if,  in  the  mean  time,  they  can 
already plan investments so as  to  be  ready to be 
operational in advance of 31  December 2000 in 
particular  in  the  framework  of  the  lifting  of 
restrictions  on  the  use  of  own  and  alternative 
infrastructures  from  I  October  1997,  as 
mentioned  below, 
- the  fact  that  the  additional  implementation 
period will apply to voice telephony as narrowly 
defined  in  Article  1 of  Directive  90/388/EEC, 
and  that  all  other  voice  services  are  fully 
liberalized. 
(45)  Such effect will further be reduced in the following 
circumstances: 
- OTE is not expanding its operations in Member 
States  which  have  liberalized  their  markets.  If 
that  were  the  case,  the  derogation  enabling 
OTH  to  maintain  higher prices on  its  domestic 
market  could  be  used  not only  to  achieve  the 
necessary  adjustments  hul  also  to  cross-
subsidize  operations  in  foreign  markets.  This 
would  obviously  distort  competition  at  the 
expense  of  the  incumbents  and  of  other  new 
entrants  in  the  relevant  Member  States  and 
would  be  against  the  Community  interest, 
- the lifting of restrictions on the use of own and 
alternative  infrastructures  is  effective  from  I 
October 1997, as  mentioned below. This would 
allow  potential  new  entrants  to  operate  and 
provide  already  liberalized  telecommunications 
services on such networks from  that date on, in 
preparation  for  full  competition,  and  in 
particular  to  provide  voice  services  over 
corporate networks and/or to closed user groups 
via  such  infrastructures, 
- the  full  implementation  of  the  prov1s1ons  of 
Directive  90/388/EEC  is  not  subject  to  the 
current derogation  or  Directive  95/62/EC. 
Conclusion 
(46)  On the basis of the above assessment, the Commis-
sion  considers  that  the  granting of  an  additional 
implementation  period  until  at  the  latest  31 
December  2000  as  regards  the  abolition  of  the 
exclusive  rights  currently granted  to  OTE  for  the 
provision  6f  voice  telephony  and  public  network 
infrastructure,  instead  of  1 January  1998  pursuant 
to Article  2 (2)  of Directive 90/388/EEC, does  not 
affect the development of trade to .such an extent as 
to be contrary to the interests of the Community in 
so  far  as  the  circumstances  set  out  above  are 
fulfilled. 
II.  Request for an additional implementation 
period regarding the lifting of restrictions 
on the provision of already liberalized tele-
communications  services  on  own  and 
alternative  infrastructures 
Assessment of the impact of the immediate 
lilting of restrictions 
Arguments submitted  by  Greece 
(47)  Greece  states  that  the  liberalization  of  alternative 
infrastructures  cannot  take  place  in  its  territory 
significantly  in·  advance  of  the  liberalization  of 
voice  telephony  and  public  telecommunications 
networks.  Were  this  to  happen,  providers  of  tele-
communications  services  over  such  infrastructures 
would  be  ~b)P.  -to  drcumvent  the  derogation  for 
voice  telephony and consequently deprive  OTE of 
significant  revenue  which  is  crucial  for  the  mod-
ernization  of  the  public  t~lecommunications 
networks  and  services  in  Greece. 
(48)  Secondly,  Greece  states  that  the  loss  of  revenue 
from  leased lines (approximately 3 to 4% of OTE's 
forecast turnover for  the years  1996 to 2000) would 
further  aggravate  the  risk  of  jeopardizing  the 
completion of the planned structural adjustments. 
Assessment  by  the  Commission 
(49)  The argument that restrictions must be maintained 
on the  provision  of alternative  network capacity to 
prevent authorized providers of liberalized services 
from circumventing the voice-telephony monopoly 
cannot be accepted. There are  less  restrictive  regu-
latory means to  prevent the bypassing of voice tele-
phony until 31  December 2000. Under Greek  Law 
No 2246/94  as'  modified  on 6  February  1997,  the 
provision  of  liberalized  services  on  leased  lines  is 
subject to a declaration regime. In that context, the 
Greek  national  authorities  can  check  that  the 
service  provided  is  not voice  telephony as  defined 
in Article  1 of Directive 90/388/EEC. According to 
that definition,  the  voice-telephony service  which 
may  be  reserved  must  be  offered  to  the  public. 
For  this  reason,  as  the  Commission  stated  in  its 
communication on the status and the implementa-
tion  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  on  competition  in 
the  markets  for  telecommunications  services(!), 
'unofficial' bypassing cannot occur to  any signific-
ant extent  without  being  noticed  by  the  relevant 
Member  State.  A  service  which  is  offered  to  the 
public  must,  ipso  facto,  be  public  knowledge. 
( 1)  OJ C  275,  20.  10.  1995,  p.  2. 
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In  particular,  given  that  any  commercial  offer 
would  normally involve  advertising (of  the services 
available)  or,  at  the  very  least,  issuing  price  lists, 
contracts  and  invoices,  such  bypassing  should  be 
evident  from  an  early stage.  Bypassing  would  also 
be  distinguishable from  legal  voice  telephony, due 
to  differences  as  regards  numbering and  intercon-
nection  charges. 
New operators generally have  shown  that they will 
respect  the  voice-telephony  monopoly.  Service-
providers  do  not  want  to  take  the  risk  of  havir1g 
their registration revoked and being unable to fulfil 
their  obligations  towards  their · clients.  Many 
service-providers  therefore,  before  starting  their 
services,  first  checked with  the  national  regulatory 
authorities  or with  the  Commission  whether  the 
voice  service  they envisaged  providing was  liberal-
ized. 
In their letter of 24 March  1997, the Greek author-
ities  confirmed  that  all  necessary  measures  under 
Law  No  2246/1994  have  been  taken  in  order  to 
secure  the  administrative  and  financial  independ-
ence  of  the  national  telecommunications 
committee  (EEl)  and  that  the  draft  Presidential 
Decree setting out the staff regulation of that body 
would  be  adopted  and  brought  into  force  by  I 
August  1997. EET  will  be  fully  operational  by  the 
end  of  September  1997  and  able  to  monitor that 
the  companies  registered  for  the  provision  of 
liberalized services do not provide voice  telephony. 
For  this  reason,  no  additional  implementation 
period extending beyond  1 October 1997 could be 
justified. Possible delays  in  the calendar set out by 
the Greek authorities cannot be taken into account 
by the Commission when considering this request 
for an additional implementation period since that 
calendar appears  reasonable  and  also  since,  as  the 
Court of Justice has  held, Member States  may  not 
plead  provisions,  practices  or circumstances  exist-
ing in their legal  systems  in order to  justify addi-
tional  implementation  periods  to  comply  with 
Community directives. 
(SO)  The Commission  also  cannot accept  the  submis-
sion  that loss  of  revenue  from  leased  lines would 
further  aggravate  the  risk  of  jeopardizing  the 
completion  of  the  planned  structural  adjustments 
for  the  following  reasons: 
- pursuant to  Directive 92/44/EEC, OTE  had  to 
offer  leased  lines  on  a  cost-oriented  basis. 
Pursuant to Article  10 of that Directive, Greece 
had  the  obligation  to  ensure  that OTE  put  in 
practice,  by  31  December  1993,  a  cost-
accounting  system  for  leased  lines.  Although 
such  a  possibility  was  allowed  in  Directive 
92/44/EEC, Greece  did  not request any defer-
ment in favour of OTE for the implementation 
of this obligation. The present non-compliance 
of Greece with  this obligation has already been 
recognized by  the Court of Justice in its judg-
ment of  6 July  1995 (1). Given  this  obligation 
and  given  that  Member  States  must  comply 
with it,  the opening of alternative supply poss-
ibilities  is  not  expected  to  alter  the  market 
position  of  TOs  in  this  area  substantially, 
- all  major  alternative  network  providers 
presently  belong  to  public  entities  (railways, 
water  utilities,  etc.)  and  most  fall  within  the 
competence  of  the  same  Ministry  as  OTE. 
Therefore, it is  unlikely that they will  cut their 
prices  and  really  compete  with  OTE,  another 
undertaking  in  the  public  sector, 
- competition would be  an  incentive for  OTE to 
accelerate  digitalization  and  modernization  of 
its  network, 
- the  revenues  generated  by  the  prov1s1on  of 
leased  lines  are  marginal  in  comparison  with 
those  from  voice  telephony, 
- if  potential  alternative  network  operators  were 
authorized to establish  their infrastructure, they 
would focus on high-capacity circuits (8, 34 and 
140  Mbs),  which  OTE  currently  does  not 
provide.  Therefore,  the  assumption  that  OTE 
will  suffer a loss  of leased  lines revenue  is  not 
accepted  fully, 
- the  arguments  of  the  Greek  authorities  start 
from  a static perspective. In fact,  if Greece fully 
implemented  Directive  90/388/EEC  and  au-
thorized  new  entrants  to  provide  all  telecom-
munications services other than voice telephony 
making use of more than 2 times 64 kbits, that 
would  increase  the demand for  leased  circuits. 
That new demand will  more  than  compensate 
the possible  impact of  the  provision  of altern-
ative  infrastructure capacity in  Greece. If must 
be emphasized in  this context that many oper-
ators  of  liberalized  services  using  alternative 
networks will in any case lease lines from  OTE 
in  addition  to  ensure  sufficient  back-up  capa-
city. Given  the expected growth  in  the  leased-
lines market, OTE could  probably maintain its 
total  profits  in  this-area  even  if  it  introduces 
volume  discounts  on  its  current  leased  lines 
tariffs,  to  further  align  them  with  the  under-
lying  costs. 
( 1)  Case C2S9/94 Commission v.  Hellenic Republic [1995] BCR, 
.  1-1947. 
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Development  of trade 
(51)  As a consequence of its monopoly for the provision 
of  public telecommunications infrastructures, OTE 
is the sole supplier of leased lines and interconnec-
tion to providers of liberalized services. It therefore 
determines to .a large  extent the costs  of its  com-
petitors  in  the  liberalized  services  sector.  This  is 
shown  inter alia by  the  abovementioned  current 
high tariffs for leased lines, which make the supply 
of some  liberalized  services  uneconomic.  Further-
more, this potential knowledge by OTE of the costs 
of  its  competitors  will  increasingly  affect  trade, 
since  OTE  is  likely  to  develop  even  further  the 
liberalized services it offers, although this growth is 
likely to be slow in the short term. Whereas OTE 
could  use  its  own  infrastructure  to  provide  such 
services,  competitors  providing  ~lob,al  liberalized 
services,  such  as  VPN  or voice  services  to  closed 
user groups, would  thus be  obliged to  rely only on 
circuits  leased  from  the  operator  they  want  to 
compete  with. This situation  would  be  aggravated 
by  the  fact  that OTE currently does  not produce 
accounts which are sufficiently transparent to allow 
an adequate separation of its activities in the mono-
poly  sector  from  those  in  the  liberalized  sector. 
Furthermore,  there  is  no  structural  separation,  to 
prevent staff in the infrastructure side of OTE from 
passing information to colleagues selling liberalized 
services. 
Conclusion 
(52)  There  are  less  restrictive  regulatory  means  to 
prevent  the  bypassing  of  the  voice-telephony 
monopoly until  1 January 2000  and  such  means 
could be implemented by BET which was set up in 
Greece,  but  which  is  not  yet  fully  operational. 
Given that the presidential decree defining the staff 
regulations  of  BET  will  be  in  force  by  1 August 
1997,  allowing  EET  to  be  fully  operational  by  I 
October 1997, the granting of an  additional imple-
mentation period extending after that date does not 
therefore  seem  justified. 
(53)  The  Commission  therefore  considers  that  the 
development of trade resulting from the granting to 
Greece  of  an  additional  implementation  period 
regarding the liberalization of alternative infrastruc-
tures  is  not  affected  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be 
contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  Community 
provided that the abovementioned period does not 
extend  beyond  1 October  1997, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION: 
Article  1 
Greece may postpone until 31  December 2000 the aboli-
tion  of  the  exclusive  rights  currently  granted  to  the 
Hellenic Telecommunications Organization AB as regards 
the  provision  of  voice  telephony  and  the  establishment 
and  provision  of  public  telecommunications  networks, 
provided  that the following  conditions are  implemented 
according  to  the  following  timetable: 
- no later than  I  October 1997, instead of  I  July 1996: 
notification to the Commission of all  measures neces-
sary  to  lift  restrictions  on  the  provision  of  already 
liberalized  telecommunications  services  on: 
(a)  networks  established  by  the  provider .of  the  tele-
communications  service; 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties; 
(c)  the sharing of networks, other facilities and sites, 
- no later than nine months after the adoption of this 
Decision,  instead of  11  January 1997:  notification  to 
the  Commission  of  legislative  changes  necessary  to 
implement  full  competition  by  31  December  2000, 
including  proposals  for  the  funding  of  universal 
services, 
- no later than 31  December 1999, instead of 1 January 
1997: notification to the Commission of draft licences 
for  voice  telephony  and/or  underlying  network-
providers, 
- no later than 30 June 2000,  instead  of  1 July  1997: 
publication  of  licensing  conditions  for  public  voice 
telephony and  of  interconnection  charges  as  appro-
priate  in  accordance  in  both  cases  with  relevant 
Community directives, 
- no later than 31  December 2000, instead of 1 January 
1998:  award  of  licences  and  amendment of  existing 
licenses to enable competitive provision of voice  tele-
phony. 
Article  2 
Greece may postpone until  1 October 1997 the lifting of 
restrictions  on  the  provision  of  already  liberalized  tele-
communications services  on: 
(a)  networks established  by  the  provider of the  telecom-
munications  service; 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties; 
(c)  shared  networks,  other facilities  and sites. 
Greece  shall notify to  the Commission,  no later than 
October  1997  instead  of  1  July  1996,  all  measures 
adopted  to  lift  such  restrictions. 
1/161 9.  9.  97  Official  Journal of the  European  CommQnities 
Article J 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  Hellenic  Republic. 
Done  at  Brussels,  18  June  1997. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIBRT 
Member of the Commission 
.. 
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II 
(Acts  whose  publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COUNCIL 
COUNCIL DECISION 
of 28  November  1.9.97 
concerning dte conclusion on behalf of the European Communitj•, ac  regards 
matters within its competence, of the results of the WTO negotiations on basic 
telecommunications services 
(97/838/Bq 
THB  COUNCIL OF THB  BUROPBAN  UNION, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  EuroJiean 
Community, and in particular Articles 57, 66, 90, 99, 100, 
IOOa and 113, in conjunction with Article 228 (2) and the 
first  subparagraph  of  Article  228  (3)  thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1), 
Having  regard  to  the  opinion  of  the  European  Par-
liament (2), 
Whereas  the  Marrakesh  Agreement  establishing  the 
World Trade Organization and its related agreements, the 
Ministerial  Decisions  and  Declarations,  including  the 
Ministerial  Decision on  Negotiations on  Basi~ Telecom-
munications.  as  well  as  the  Annex  on  Telecommunica-
tions and the Annex on  N~gotiations on Basic Telecom-
munications  were  approved  by  Council  Decision 
94/800/BC  of  22  December  1994 (J~ 
Whereas the overall commitments in basic telecommuni-
cations services negotiated by the Commission, on behalf 
of  the  European  Community  and  its  Member  States, 
constitutes  a  satisfactory  and  balanced  outcome; · 
Whereas  on 30  April  1996  the  Council  authorized  the 
Commission  to  approve,  on  behalf  of  the  European 
Community and its  Member States,  the  Decision  of  the 
Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications and the 
a 
0~ c 267,  3. 9.  1997,. p.  80. 
0  C 339,  10.  II.  1997. 
0  L 336,  23.  12.  1994,  p.  I. 
WTO Council for Trade in Services  adop,ting the  Fourth 
Protocol  to  the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
and the Decision of the Coun!=il  for Trade in Services on 
Commitments  in  Basic  Telecommunications; 
Whereas on 14 February 1997 the Council authorized the 
Commission to submit to the wro the final  schedule of 
commitments on behalf of the European Community and 
its  Member  States; 
Whereas the competence of the Community to conclude 
international  agreements  does  not  derive  only  from 
explicit conferral _by  the Treaty but may also  derive from 
other  provisions  of  the  Treaty  and  from  acts  adopted 
pursuant to those provisions by Community institutions; 
Whereas where  Community rules  have  been  adopted  in 
order  to  achieve  the  aims  of  ·the  Treaty,  Member 
States  may  not,  outside  the  framework  of  the  common 
institutions, enter into commitments liable to affect those 
rules  or .  alter  their  scope; 
Whereas  some  commitments  on  basic  telecommunica-
tions services  fall  within the competence of the Commu-
nity  under  Article  113  of  the  Treaty;  whereas,  further-
more,  other commitments on  basic  telecommunications 
services  affect Community rules  adopted  on the  basis  of 
Articles  57,  66,  90,  99,  100  and  100a  and may  therefore 
only  be  entered  into  by  the  Community alone; 
Whereas  the  use  of Article· 100  of  the  TreatY  as  a legal 
. base  for this Decision is justified also by  the fact that the 
aforementioned  commitments  on  basic  telecommunica-
tions  serviees  are  likely  to  affect  Council · Directive 
90/434/BBC of 23  July 1990  on the. common system of 
1/163 '  •.  ~ 
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taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets 
and exchanges of shares concerning companies of differ-
ent Member States(') and Council  Directive 90/435/EEC 
of 23  July  1990  on the common system  Qf  taxation  ap-
plicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries 
of  different  Member  States (l),  which · are  based  on 
Article  I 00  of  the  Treaty; 
Whereas, by  their nature, the Agreement establishing the 
World  Trade  Organization  and  the  Protocols  to  the 
General Agreement on Trade in  Services, are  not suscept-
ible to  being directly invoked  in  Community or Member 
States  courts, 
HAS  DECIDED  AS  FOLLOWS: 
Sole  Article 
1.  The Fourth  Protocol  to  the General Agreement on 
Trade  in  Services  concerning  basic  telecommunications 
services  is  hereby  approved  on  behalf  of  the  European 
Community with  regard  to that portion of it which falls 
within  the  competence  of the  Community. 
( 1)  OJ  L 225,  20.  8.  1990,  p.  I. 
(1)  0 J  L 225,  20.  8.  l 990,  p.  6. 
2.  The text of the  Fourth  Protocol  is  attached  to  this 
Decision,  as  are  also  the  following: 
- the  schedule  of  specific  commitments  of  the  Com-
munity and  the  Member States,  which  is  part of  the 
overall  package of commitments reached at the wro 
on  15  February  1997, 
- the decision  of  the  Council  for  Trade  in  Services on 
commitments  in  basic  telecommunications,  and 
- the report of  15  February 1997 by the Group on Basic 
Telecommunications  to  the  Council  for  Trade  in 
Services. 
3.  The President of the Council is  hereby authorized to 
designate  the  person(s)  empowered  to  sign  the  Fourth 
Protocol  to  the General Agreement on Trade  in  Services 
in  order  to  bind  the  Community  with  regard  to  that 
portion  of  the  Protocol  falling  within  its  competence. 
Don-e  at  Brussels,  28  November  1997. 
For  the  Council 
The  President. 
G.  WOHLPART 
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ANNEX(') 
FOURTH  PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE  IN SERVICES 
Members of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter referred to as  the 'WfO) whose Schedules of Specific 
Commitments and  Lists  of  Exemptions  from  Article  II  of the  General  Agreement on  Trade  in  Services 
concerning  basic  telecommunications  are  annexed  to  this  Protocol  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  'Members 
concerned'), 
Having  carried  out  negotiations  under  the  terms  of  the  Ministerial  Decision  on  Negotiations  on  Basic 
Telecommunications  adopted  at  Marrakesh  on  IS  April  1994, 
Having  regard  to  the  Annex  on  Negotiations  on  Basic  Telecommunications, 
Agree  as  follows: 
I. Upon  the entry into force  of this  Protocol, a schedule of specific commitments and a list of exemptions 
from  Article II concerning basic telecommunications annexed to this Protocol relating to a Member shall, 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  specified  therein,  supplement  or  modify  the  schedule  of  specific 
commitments  and  the  list  of  Article  II  exemptions  of  that  Member. 
2.  This Protocol shall be open for acceptance, by signature or othe.wis~. by the Members concerned until 30 
November  1997. 
3.  The Protocol  shall  enter into  force  on 1 January  1998  provided  it has  been  accepted  by  all  Members 
concerned. If by  1 December 1997 the Protocol has  not been accepted by all  Members concerned, those 
Members which have accepted it by that date may decide, prior to 1 January 1998, on its entry into force. 
4.  This  Protocol shall  be  deposited  with  the  Director-General  of the WI'O. The Director-General  of the 
WfO  shall  promptly  furnish  to  each  Member  of  the  WfO  a  certified  copy  of  this  Protocol  and 
notifications  of  acceptances  thereof. 
S.  This Protocol shall  be  registered  in  accordance with  the provisions of Article  102 of the Charter of the 
United  Nations. 
Done at  Geneva this fifteenth day of April one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven, in a single copy in 
the English,  French  and Spanish  languages, each  text  being authentic, except as  otherwise provided  for  in 
respect  of  the  Schedules  annexed  hereto. 
(1)  The  Annex  is  authentic  in  English,  French  and  Spanish. 
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ADDITIONAL COMMITMENT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER 
STATES 
The following are definitions and principles on the regulatory framework  for  the basic telecommunications 
services  underpinning the  market access  commitments by  the  European  Communities and  their Member 
~- . 
D~linitions 
Users  mean  service  consumer and  service  suppliers. 
Essential faci/itie~ mean  facilities  of a  public  telecommunications  transpo,rt  network  and service  that 
(a)  are  exclusively  or predominantly  provided  by a  single  or limited  number of suppliers;  and 
(b)  cannot feasibly  be  economically or technically substituted  in  order  to  provid~ a  service. 
A  major supplier is  a supplier which  has  the ability to materially affect the terms of participation (having 
regard to price and supply) in the relevant. market for basic telecommunications services as a r~ult of: 
(a)  control  over essential  facilities;  or 
(b)  use  of its  position  in  the  market 
I.  COMPETITIVE  SAFEGUARDS 
·1.1.  Prevention.  Qf  anti-:competitive  praetieea in telecommunications 
Appropriate  measures  shall  be  maintained  for  the  purpose  of · preventing suppliers  who,  alone' or 
together,  are  a  major supplier  from  engaging in or continuing anti-competitive  practices. 
1.2.  Safeguards 
The anti-competitive  practices  referred  to  above  shall  include  in  particular: 
(a)  engagi~g in  anti-competitive  cross-subsidization; 
.(b)  using information  obtained from  competitors with  anti-competitive  results;  and 
(c)  not making available  to other serVices  supplier&  on  a  timely  basis  technical  information  about 
c:ssential  facilities  and commercially relevant information which are necessary for  them to provide 
services. 
2.  INTBRCONNBCI10N 
2.1.  This seCtion applies to linking with suppliers providing public telecommunications transport networks 
or services in order to allow the users of one supplier to communicate with users of another supplier 
and  to access  services  provided  by another supplier. 
2.2  Interconnection to be  ensured 
Within the limits of permitted market access, interconnection with a major supplier will  be ensured at 
any  technically  feasible  point in  the  network.  Such  interconnection  is  provided ('t. 
(a)  under non-discriminatory tenns, conditions (including technical standards and specifications) and 
rates  and of a quality no less  favourable  than  that provided  for  its  own  like services  or for  like 
services  of non-affiliated •ervice suppliers or for  its  subsidiaries  or other affiliates (1); 
(b)  in  a  timely  fuhion, on  terms,  conditions (including technical  standards  and specifications) and 
COlt-oriented  rates  that  are  transparent,  reasonable,  having  regard  to  economic·  feuibility,  and 
sufficiently unbundled so that the •upplier need not pay for network components or facilities .that it 
docs  not require- for  the •ervice  to be  p~ded; and 
(c)  upon request, at points in addition to'  the network  tennination points offered  to  the majority of 
,  ·useil, subject  to  charges  that  reRect  the cost construction of necessary  additional  facilities. 
(') Supplica of servic:a or networks not ·aencmlly available to the Public. auc:h u  closed user~  have prantecd riprs 
to connect with the  public celccommuni<:ationa transport netwotk or servic:a on cenna. cOnditions and rates which ant 
non-cliscrimantory, uanspantnt and cost-oriented. Such "nns. conditions and rates  may,  howewr, wry from  the cenns, 
conditions and tates apPlicable  to  int.en:onnection .  benrreen  public  telecommunications  networb or services. 
(I)  Diffemu terms, condit10111 and ates may be set in the Community for ·operatoa in cliffelent market sepenta. on the 
buia of  non.cfiacriminatory  and transparent  national  Uc:ensi1_11  provisions.  whent  such  cliffeaenc:a  can  be  objectively 
justified  because  thete services  are  not considered 1ib services .  , 
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2.3.  Public availability of the procedures  for  interconnection negotiations 
The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier will be made publicly available. 
2.-4.  Transparency of  interconnection  arrangements 
It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available either its interconnection agreements or 
a  reference  interconnection  offer. 
2.5.  Interconnection: dispute settlement 
A  service  supplier requesting  interconnection  with  a  major supplier will  hav~ recourse,  either: 
(a)  at  any  time;  or 
(b)  after  a  reasonable  period  of time  which  has  been  made  publicly  known 
to an independent domestic body, which may be a regulatory body as  referred to in paragraph S below, 
to  resolve  disputes  regarding  appropriate  terms,  conditions  and  rates  for  interconnecti~n within  a 
reasonable  period  of  time,  to  the  extent that  these  have  not been  established  previously. 
3.  UNIVERSAL  SRRVICE 
Any Member has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes to maintain. Such 
obligations  will  not  be  regarded  as  anti-competitive  per  st,  provided  they  are  administered  in  a 
transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and arc not more burdensome than 
neceuary  for  the  kind  of  universal  service  defined  by  the  Member. 
-4.  PUDI.IC  AVAILABJL11Y  OF  LICHNSING  CRITBRIA 
Where  a  licence  is  required,  the  following  will  be  made  publicly  available: 
(a)  all the licensing criteria and the period of time normally required to reach a decision concerning an 
application  for  a  licence  and 
(b)  the  terms  and conditions of individual  licences. 
The reasons  for  the denial  of a  licence will  be  made  known  to  the applicant upon  request 
S.  INDHPBNDHNT  RHG~LATORS 
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications 
services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall be impartial with respect to all 
market  participants. 
6.  ALLOCATION AND  USB  OP SeARCH  RHSOURCBS 
Any procedures  for  the allocation  and usc  of scarce  resources,  including frequencies,  numbers  and 
rights of way,  will  be carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. 
The  current  state  of  allocated  frequency  bands  will  be  made  publicly  available,  but  detailed 
identification  of frequencies  allocated  for  specific_  government uses  is  not required. 
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DF.CISION ON COMMITMENTS  IN  BASIC  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
TIW COUNCil.  JlOR  TRADE  IN SERVICES, 
HAVING  REGARD  to  the Annex  on  negotiations  on  basic  telecommunications, 
HAVING  REGARD  to  the  results  of  the  negotiations  conducted  under  the  terms  of  the  decision  on 
negotiations  on  basic  telecommunications  adopted  at  Marrakesh  on  I 5  April  1994, 
ACfJNG  upon  the  final  report  of  the  negotiating  group  on  basic  telecommunications, 
DECIDES  as  follows: 
I. To adopt the  text of the 'Fourth  Protocol  to  the General  Agreement on Trade in Services' (hereinafter 
referred  tQ  as  the Protocol) and  to  take  note of the schedules of commitments and  lists  of exemptions 
from  Article  II  listed  in  the  attachment  to  the  final  report  of  the  negotiating  group  on  basic 
telecommunications. 
2.  Commencing immediately and  continuing until  the date of entry into force  of the  Protocol  Members 
conc-.crned  shall, to the fullest  extent consistent with  their existing legislation  and  regulations,  not take 
measures  which  would  be  inconsistent with ·their undertakings  resulting  from  tt'!ese  negotiations. 
3.  During  the  period  from  I 5  January  to  I 5  February  1997,  a  Member  which  has  a  schedule  of 
commitments annexed to the Protocol, may supplement or modify such schedule or its  list of Article  II 
exemptions. Any such Member which has not annexed to the Protocol a list of Article II exemptions may 
submit such  a  list  during  the  same  period. 
4.  A  Group on  basic  telecommunications  reporting  to  the  Council  for  Trade  in  Services  shall  conduct 
consultations on the implementation of paragraph 3  above commencing its work no later than 90  days 
from  the adoption  of the decision. 
S.  The Council for Trade in Services shall monitor the acceptance of the Protocol by Members concerned 
and shall, at the request of a Member, examine any concerns raised regarding the application of paragraph 
2  above. 
6. Members  of  the  World  Trade  Organization  which  have  not  annexed  to  the  Protocol  schedules  of 
commitments or lists of exemptions from Article II may submit, for approval by the Council, schedules of 
commitments and lists  of exemptions  from  Article  II  relating to  basic  telecommunications  prior  to  I 
January  1998. 
18.  12.  97 
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REPORT OF THE GROUP ON BASIC  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
1.  This  report  is  made  in  accordance  with  paragraph  4  of  the  Decision  on  Commitments  in  Basic 
Telecommunication·s,  adopted  by  the  Council  for  Trade  in  Services  on  30  April  1996  (S/L/19).  In 
paragraph  I  of this  Decision,  the  Council  also  adopted  the  text  of  the  Fourth  Protocol  to  the  General 
Agreement on Trade in  Services and took  note of the schedules of commitments and lists of exemptions 
from  Article  II  listed  in  the  attachment  to  the  final  report  of  the  negotiating  group  on  basic 
tclemrnrnunications  (S/NGBT/18). 
2.  The  Decision  on  commitments  on  basic  telecommunications  established  the  Group  on  Basic 
telecommunications  to  'conduct consultations  on  the  implementation of  paragraph  3 of  the  Decision'. 
Paragraph 3 states that 'during the period from  IS January to  IS  February  1997, a Member which  has  a 
schedule of commitments 11nnexed to the Protocol, may supplement or modify such schedule or its  list of 
Article II  exemptions' and that 'any such Member which  has  not annexed to  the Protocol a list of Article 
II  exemptions  may  submit  such  a  list  during  the  same  period'. 
3.  At the Group's first meeting in July 1996, participants suggested that the principal issues  before the GBT 
induded the  desirability of  improving  the  quantity  and  quality  of  schedules  offered,  and  the  need  to 
address  certain  issues  which  had  been  left  unresolved  in  April.  Subsequently,  the  Group  sponsored 
frequent rounds of bilateral negotiations on offers and regularly included discussion of outstanding issues 
in its  meetings. In  November participants began submitting revised draft offers of commitments on basic 
telecommunications  for  consideration.  The  Group's  Report  to  the  Council  on  Trade  in  Services 
(S/GBT/2), which formed part of the Report to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, recommended that 
Ministers 'stress their commitment to bring the negotiations on basic telecommunications to a successful 
conclusion  by  15  February  1997,  urge  all  WTO  Members  to  strive  for  significant,  balanced  and 
non-discriminatory liberalization commitments on basic telecommunications by that date and recognize 
the importance of resolving the principal issues before the GBT. The Declaration adopted by Ministers in 
Singapore  (WT/MIN(96)/DEq  contained  a  commitment  to  'achie~. a  successful  conclusion  to  the 
negotiations on basic telecommunications in February 1997'. Ministers also stated 'We are determined to 
obtain  a  progressively  higher  level  of  liberalization  in  services  on  a  mutually  advantageous  basis  with 
appropriate flexibility for  individual developing country members, as  envisaged  in  the  agreement, in  the 
continuing negotiations and those scheduled to  begin no later than  1 January 2000.  In  this context, we 
look  forward  to  full  MFN  agreements  based  on  improved  m~rket access  commitments  and  national 
treatment'. 
-4.  In  its  discussions  on  outstanding  issues,  the  Group  considered  the  following  matters:  ways  to  ensure 
accurate scheduling of commitments - particularly with  respect to supply of services over satellites and 
to  the  management  of  radio  spectrum;  potential  anti-competitive  distortion  of  trade  in  international 
services; the status of intergovernmental  satellite organizations  in  relation  to GATS  provisions;  and the 
extent  to  which  basic  telecommunications  commitments  include  transport  of  video  and/or  broadcast 
signals  within  their scope . 
.S.  The Chairman  issued  notes  reflecting  his  understanding  of  the  posttton  reached  in  discussion  of the 
scheduling of commitments and management of radio spectrum. The first such note set out a number of 
assumptions  applicable  to  the scheduling of commitments and  was  intended  to  assist  in  ensuring the 
transparency  of  commitments  (S/GBT/W/2/Rev.  1  of  16  January  1997).  The  second  addressed  the 
allocation of radio spectrum, suggesting that the inclusion of references to the availability of spectrum in 
schedules was  unnecessary and that such references should be deleted (S/GBT/W  /3 of 3 February 1997). 
These  notes  are  attached  to  this  Report. 
6.  By  15  February 1997 the total number of schedules submitted had reached 55 (counting as  one the offer 
of the European Communities and their Member States).  Nine governments had submitted lists of Article 
II  Exemptions. 
7.  The Group  noted  that five  countries  had  taken  Article  II  exemptions  in  respect of  the  application  of 
differential  accounting rates  to services  and service suppliers of other Members.  In  the  light of  the fact 
that the accounting rate  system established  under the  International Telecommunications Regulations  is 
the usual  method of terminating international traffic and by  its  nature involves differential  rates, and in 
order to avoid the submission of further such exemptions, it is the understanding of the Group that: 
- the application  of such  accounting  rates  would  not give  rise  to  action  by  Members  under dispute 
settlement  under  the  WTO,  and 
- that this understanding will  be reviewed  not later than the commencement of the further Round of 
negotiations  on  services  commitments due  to  begin  not  later  than  I  January  2000. 
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8.  The Group also recalled paragraph 6 of the Decision of 30 April  1996. which stated that' Memben of the 
World Trade Organization which have  not annexed to the ProtocQI schedules of commitments or lists of 
exemplions from Arcicle  II  may submit, for approval by the Council, schedules of commitments and lists 
of  exemptions  from  Article  II  relating  to  basic  telecommunications  prior  to  I  January  1998.-
9.  At its meeting of I 5 February  1997, the Group adopted this report and the attached list of the Schedules 
of Commitments  and  Lists  of  Article  II  Exemptions,  which,  in  accordance  with  paragraph  3  of  the 
Decision on commitments in basic  telecommunications, will  be attached to the  Pourth  Protocol  to the 
General  Agreement on Trade  in  Services  in  replacement of  those  attached  on  30  April  1996. 
18.  12.  97 
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NOTE  BY  THE CHAIRMAN 
Revision 
It has bttn sug~:tsted by a  number of delegations that it might bt helpful to  product a  brief and simple 
note  on  assumptions applicable  to  tht scheduling· of commitments  in  basic telecoms.  71Je  purpose  of the 
a/lached note is to assist delegations in  ensun'ng the transparency of  their commitments and to promote a 
be/ler undtrstanding of tht meaning of commitments.  71Jis  note  is  not  intended to  have  or acquire any 
binding  legal status. 
NOTES  FOR  SCHEDULING  BASIC  TELECOM  SERVICES  COMMITMENTS 
I.  Unless  otherwise  noted  in  the  sector  column,  any  basic  telecom  service  listed  in  the sector column: 
(a)  encompasses  local,  long  distance  and  international  services  for  public  and  non-public  use; 
(b)  may  be  provided  on· a  facilities-basis  or by .resale;  and 
(c)  may  be  provided  through  any  means  of technology (e.g.,  cable ('),  wireless,  satellites). 
2.  Subsector (g) - private leased  circuit services - involves  the ability of service suppliers to  sell  or lease 
any type of network capacity for the supply of services listed in  any. other basic telecom service subsector 
unless otherwise noted in the sector column. This would include capacity via  cable, satellite and wireless 
network. 
3.  In view of points I and 2 above, it should not be necessary to list cellular or mobile services as  a separate 
subsector. However, a number of Members have done so, and a number of offers have commitments only 
in these subsectors. Therefore, 'in order to avoid extensive changes in schedules, it would seem appropriate 
for  Members  to  maintain  separate  entries  for  these  subsectors. 
(')  Including all  types  of cable. 
L  347/57 
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CHAIRMAN'S  NOTE 
Market access  limitations on spectrum availability 
Many Members have entries in  the market access column of their schedules indicating that commitments arc 
'subject to  availability of spectrum/frequency' or similar wording.  In  light of  the  physical  nature of spt·ctrum 
and  thr- t·onstraints  inherent in  its  usc,  it  is  understandable that  Members  may  have  sou~ht to  rdy on  thc.-sc· 
words  tn  adc.-quntely  protc,·t  lcgitirnatr SJlC'l'lnun  mann~enwnt pnlicic·s.  There·  is,  howC'VC'r,  tlouhl  that  words 
such  as  'suhjrct  to  availability  of  spet:trurn/frequetu:y'  ns  listed  in  thr  market  ll<'t'ess  wlttrnn  of  mnny 
Members'  schedules  achieve  that  objective.  · 
Spectrum/frequency  management  is  not.  ptr st, a  measure  which  needs  to  be  listed  under  Article  XVI. 
Furthermore  under  the  GATS  each  Member  has  the  right  to  exercise  spectrum/frequency  management, 
which  may affect the  number of service suppliers, provided  that this  is  done  in  accordance with  Article  VI 
and other relevant provisions of the GATS. This includes  the ability to  allocate frequency bands  taking into 
account existing and future  needs. Also, Members which  have  made additional commitment in  line with  the 
reference  paper  on  regulatory  principles  are  bound  by  its  paragraph  6. 
Therefore,  words  such  as  'subject  to  availability  of  spectrum/frequency'  are  unnecessary  and  should  be 
deleted  from  Members'  schedules. 
18.  12.  97. 
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Status of voice  communications on Internet under Community law  and, in  particular,  pursuant 
to  Directive  90/  388/EEC 
(9H/C  6/04) 
(Tnt witl.  EEl\  relevance) 
Regulatory  pmition of voice  communications on  Internet 
Directive 90/3HH/LEC on competition in  the markets for 
tdcconununic:ttiom  st·rvin·~  (OJ  L  192,  24.  7.  1990, 
p.  10)  dcfinc.·s  in  detail  the  service  which  the  Member 
States  may  continue  to  reserve  to  their  telccommuni-
catiOns  organisations. 
According  to  Article  I  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  'voice 
telephony  mean.\  the commercial  provision  for the  public 
of  the  direct  transport  and  switching  of  speech  in 
real-time  between  public  switrhcd  network  termination 
points, enabling any  user to usc  equipment connected to 
such  a  network  termination  point  in  order  to 
communicate  with  another  termination  point'. 
On  20  Ocwher  1995  the.·  Commission  published  a 
communication  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  the  stalUs  and  implementation  of  Directive 
901388/EEC on competition in  the markets for telecom-
munications services (95/C 275/02, OJ C  275, p.  2) (the 
communication).  This  set  out  the  Commission's 
approach  on  the  implementation  of  the  definition  in 
Article  t  of  Directive  90/388/EEC.  Since  then  due  to 
the  development  of  specific  software  it  has  become 
possible  to code, compress  and transmit voice  communi-
cations  in  such  a  way that it  has  become viable  to send 
them  via  the  Internet  to other Internet subscribers  using 
the same  or interoperable  software  and  via  gateways  to 
standard  telephones.  This  is  a  new  issue  and  the 
Commission  should  therefore  adopt a  supplement to the 
communication  on  these  services,  often  described  as 
'Internet  telephony'. 
Tht·  presc.·nt  notin·,  which  conrerm  the  two-way 
exchange  of  voin.·  cornmunicatiom  v1a  the 
Internet(') C).  atlre'ises  two  key  regulatory  questions: 
(') Applications  which  allow,  for  example,  stored  data  (such  as 
Web  pages, e-mails or voice  mails), to be  retrieved  in  spoken 
form  are  not  considered  by  this  notice,  as  they  are 
considered  to- be  new  multimedia  services,  notwithstanding 
the voice  element within  the overall service. 
e>  This  notice  does  not  consider  the  situations'  where  the 
Internet is  only used  to dial  up a call-back operator in  order 
to set  up  a  telephone  call  via  the  public  switched  telephone 
network  (PSTN).  The  service  provided  by  the  call-back 
operator  would  however  be  subjected  to  a  serarate 
assessment  under  the  voice  telephony  definition.  I  that 
call-back  operator  also  provided,  in  addition  to  switching, 
direct  transport  of speech  on  own  or  leased  infrastructure, 
then  it  would  fall  within  the  category  of  voice  telephony 
providers. 
firstly,  whether such  services  in  the run  up to the full  . 
liberalisation of voice  telephony services  and  telecom-
munications  infrastructure  from  1998  are  already  in 
the  liberalised  area,  following  an  assessment  under 
the  voice  telephony  definition  m  Directive 
901388/EEC, 
secondly, to what extent should those elements of the 
regulatory  framework  for  t 998 C),  which  arc 
applicable  to  the  prov1s1on  of  voice  telephony 
services,  be  applied  to voice  communications  servict's 
provided over the Internet. 
Categories of Internet  telephony 
In  examining  issues  associated  with  Internet  telephony, 
this_ notice  considers  in  panicular situations  where  users 
are connected to the  Internet via  public  switched  (fixed) 
network  termination  points  in  order to  communicate  as 
opposed to, for example, dedicated  connections or other 
means  not  using  such  termination  points.  Within  this 
focus,  three  distinct  categories  of voice  communications 
making  use  of  Internet  can  be  distinguished  from  the 
point of view of the  user: 
computer to computer voice services: voice communi-
cations  transmitted  via  the  Internet  between  the  PC 
of one user and the  PC of another (both  users  using 
modems,  compatible  software,  loudspeakers  and 
microphones  to communicate), 
computer/phone  voice  scrvin~s:  voice  communi-
cations transmitted  via  the  Internet between  a  PC of 
one  user  (with  modem,  software,  loudspeaker  and 
microphone)  and  another  user  using  a  traditional 
telephone connected to the  public switched  telephone 
network (PSTN), and 
C>  In  addition  to  Direc.tive  90/388/EC (the  Services  Directive) 
as  amended  in  particular  by  Directive  96/ 19/EC  (the  Full 
Competition  Directive),  this  regulatory  framework  is  set out 
in  three  harmonising  measures,  namely,  Directive  97  I 13/EC 
(the  Licensinl?  Directive);  Directive  97  /33/EC  (the  Inter-
connection  Dtrective);  and  Directive  95/62/EC as  amended 
by  Directive 97/  .. ./EC (the  Voice Telephony  Directive) on 
the  application  of open  network  provision  (ONP)  to  voice 
telephony. 
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pluuu- 111  plu,rw  Vc1icc·  \c·rvicn:  voitr  ttlllllllllllic~lliom 
ll.lll'>tllirlt·d  v1.1  rlw  hnr·rrwr,  luu  lwrWf'C'Il  .,.,,.,.,  whc1 
huda  .Ill'  IJ',IIIJ:  rc·lc·l'llllllf''•  c  Cllllln tc·cl  111  dw  public 
.  \wilt lwd  tH'tWcllk.  In  dm t ;t\c',  p.llt  ol  thr rommuni 
cuion  j_,  trammiued  via  pal:kct  means  w.ing  Internet 
protocols  imtead  of  fully  via  the  national  and  intcr-
n:ttional  public switched  networks. 
Assessment  under  the  voice  telephony  definition  in 
Directive  90/  388/EEC 
Undcr  thc  dcfinition  of  voic:t.'  telephony  in  Directive 
90/  JHH/FEC,  voice  communications  via  the  Internet 
could  only  be  comiden~d a' voice  telt·phony  if  each  of 
the  following  ni1eria  are  nu·t: 
s~~th  wmm11111taliou1  .w·  thc·  su/~jt•tl  f?/ ''  mmmc·rci.tl 
o//~·1 
'commercial'  should  be  understood  in  the  common 
sense  of the  word,  i.e.  that  the  transport of voice  is 
provided  as  a  separate  commercial  activity  with  the 
intention  of  making  a  profit.  Consequently,  it  does 
not  cover  the  simple  technical  non-commercial 
provision  of  a  telephone  connection  between  two 
users. 
In  the.·  l·ase  of  the  Imernet,  while  the  provtsron  of 
software  and  browsers  enabling  users  of  such 
software to send  and  receive  voice communications is 
subject  to  commercial  offer  (often  pre-installed  on 
new  PCs),  in  most  cases the commercial  provision of 
the  transport  of voice  is,  at  least  for  the  time  being, 
not  the  principal  aim  of  access  providers e),  and 
lnternc.•t  telephony  is  only  an  additional  feature.· 
offered  by  lntc.·rnet  arn:.\\  which  i.~  chosen  by  the 
customer  for  a  number of reasons,  sich  as  browsing, 
e-mail,  and  downloading  of  files  and  data,  etc.  In 
other cases,  the  necessary software has been acquired 
by  the  user  rather  than  obtained  from  the  access 
provider to which they subscribe. 
Given  that  in  most  cases,  the  facility  for  votcc 
communications  is  only  one  part  of  an  integrated 
Internet  scrvict'  offered  to  the  customer,  where  the 
(')  for  example:  Ar~~t·rica  On-Line,  CompuServe,  Skynet,  Ping, 
Atlas/Global  One.  Certain  ~t"rvil·e  providers  like  Globallink 
do  not  essentially  offer  accc~s  to  Internet,  but  specifically 
offer a product principally  focused  on  voice  communications 
which  facilitates  their  transmission  via  the  Internet  from  a 
telephone  as  well  as  from  a  PC,  and  are  not  to  be 
considered  as  access  providers. 
v•)icr  \t'rvice  J.\  anrill.lr}'  l(l  'Hhcr  t•lc·nu·nr'  ,,f  rfu· 
lnlt'llll'l  \I'I'Vit ,.  (ju\1  ·"  \ id, .  .,  rr·ll'planny  j,  llCII 
c oll\idrrcd  .1\  voin·  rcl('plrntt\'  lr~el.t\ ).  ltiii'I'IH'I  vou 1  • 
will  ;\_,  .1  general  rule  nol  m.11d1  dm  li,-,t  clcrnem  ol 
the  Community voice  trlep~Hlny ddinitinn. 
Only  where  phone-to-phone  Internet  telephony  is 
marketed  in  the  Europe:tn  Union  as  an  alternative 
form  of  voice  telephony  service,  would  the  organi-
sation  concerned  be  considered  to  be  making  a 
commercial  offer. 
Similarly,  in  the  case  of  PC-b.1.sed  voice  communi-
cations,  if  the  provision  of a  dial-out  facility  to  any 
telephone  number  beome  a  derisive  element  rn 
service providers commercial  Mrategies,  they could  be 
ronsidered commercially the trampnrt of voice, 
-- j(,r tht' publi£· 
in  the  qse  of  computer-to-computer  voice  services, 
although  only  users  who  subscribed  to  an  Internet 
service  provider  (ISP)  providing  access  to  the 
Internet  and  who  use  compatible  software  would  be 
able  to  use  the  Internet  for  calling  each  other,  it 
could  be  argued  that  computer-to-computer  Internet 
voice  is  provided  'for  the  public'  since  the  service 
would· be  available  to  all  members  of the  public  on 
the same basis. 
However computer-to-computer and  phone-to-phone 
voice  communications  transmitted  via  the  Internet, 
whereby  any  necessary  conversion  of  the  signal  is 
taken care of by the organisation offering the service, 
would  meet  this  criteria,  since  such  services  arc 
available  to  all  members  of  the  public,  subject  to 
them  entering  into  the  necessary  commercial 
arrangement  with  the  org.111i~ation conrcrnc.·d, 
to  and /rom public switched network termination  points 
'between public  switched  network termination  points 
means that,  to fall  within the  reserved  area  up to the 
dates  set  for  liberalisation,  the  voice  communication 
service  not  only  has  to  be  offered  commercially  and 
to the public,  but also  it  has  to connect two network 
termination  points  on  the  PSTN n  at  the  saml' 
(') The  public  switched  network  is  not  formally  defined  in  the 
Directive.  It  must  be  given  its  common  meaning,  i.e.  the 
public  switched  telephone  network  (PSTN)  which  is  the 
collection  of switching and  transmission  facilities  used  by  the 
telecommunications  organisation  to  provide  the  normal 
telephony  service.  · 
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timr.  TIH·~e  tt·nntn:lllon  point.\  are  thme  defined  by 
~~~b~nihn  numhcr~  from  lit<'  n.uion.d  telephon<~ 
numlwring  pl.1n.  Comcqut·ntly,  il  an·c.\~  to  tlw 
Internet  i~  oht.lirwd  vi.t  k.tscd  rirn1its,  the  service 
nndd  never  lw  comidt·n•d  a~ voice  telephony, even  if 
tlw  clll  tt•rmirt.ll<''  on  tlw  publi,·  switdwd  nt•twork. 
Thi.,  would  Ill'  true  whcthn  roriiH'l"ling  .1  telephone 
or a  COIIlJHHcr. 
If  the  Internet  user  can  only  call  other  Internet 
subscribers  whose  computers  arc  connected  via  a 
modem and  who are  using  compatible software,  then 
this  is  aim  not  'voice  telephony'  because  it  is  not 
't·nabling  any  u.ser  ... to  communicate  with  a~othcr 
termin.uion  point'  in  the  sense  of  'any  user  to  any 
user'.  However, in  the  cases  of computer-to-phone or · 
phoru•-to-phonc·  lntcnwt  voice  thi.,  clement  would  be 
s:ui.,fit·d, 
it  involves  direct  trmuport  and  switchin~ of speech  tn 
realtime 
given  the  technique used  for the  first  voice  communi-
cations  between  Internet  users  and  the  early state of 
development  of  Internet  technology  (mainly 
bandwidth  and  compression  techniques)  Internet 
telephony could  not,  originally be  considered  to take 
place  in  realtime(').  According  to  this  basic 
technique,  the  voice  is  digitally encoded, packed  and 
sent  by  a  user  from  a  termination  point  to  a  server 
and on to the  reception  server which  in  turn sends  it 
to  the  rt'reiver equipment, connected  to a  termination 
point,  whic:h  ~l'l.\t·rnble~  the  packets  to  be  delivered  a~ 
voin·  vi~t  dw  louchpt·ak<:r.  The  time  period  required 
for  pmrcssing and  transrnis~ion from  one termination 
point  to  t~Je other is  generally still  such  that  it  cannot 
be  ronsidcrcd  as  of  the  same  quality  as  a  standard 
real-tim<'  service. 
This would  be  true whether the  voice  communication 
transmitted  via  the  Internet  is  between  two  PCs, 
between a  PC and a  telephone on the public switched 
network or between  two  telephones.  Although  voice 
communications  via  Internet  between  two  telephones 
involve  two  conversion  stages,  these  communications 
can  often  be  subject  to less  delays  than  between  two 
PCs.  However,  given  the  fact  that  part of the  trans-
mission  is  over the  Internet (which  currently has  only 
one  class  of  services),  it  is  subject  to  unpredictable 
(
6
)  Voice  mail  applications  an·c.-~sed  via  the  Internet  would  fall 
outside  tht·  definition  l>ccau\c:  the  nature  of such  services  is 
that  the.- voice  communic::uion  effectively  docs  nOl  occur  in 
realtime.-. 
congcstilll1  risk,  making  it  difficuh  or  impossible  to 
gu.uantt'l'  thl'  same  level  of  reliability  and  spccrh 
quality  as  produced by  dw  PSTN.~. 
In  Ll\c'~  where  oq.~.111is.Hions  nflnin~~  phon<' 
to- phone  lntcnwt  voire  ~trc  guararHt·cing  qua lit\  tll 
speech  by  ban~iwidth  reservation  and  claim  tl~cm­
sclves  that  the  quality  of the  service  is  the· same  a~ 
circuit-switched  PSTN  voice,  this  clement  of  the 
votcc  telephony  definition  will  obviously  already  be 
meL 
In  sumrn:uy  therefore,  the  Commission  considers  that 
the  definition  of  voice  tdephony  in  Dircnivc 
90/388/EEC  taken  together  with  t•xisting  prec.:cdcnt~ 
provides  good  guidance  for  assessing  the  rc:guLHory 
position  of voice  communications services on the  Internet 
in  tlw  pre-libcralisation  situation. 
The~c scrvin·s rannot for  tht·  time  being  he  considered  a., 
voice  telephony  in  the  scmc  of  thi~  Din:nivc  and  the) 
therefore  fall  already  within  the  liheralised  arc.1,  bdnrc 
the  dt>adlines  set  for  the  . implt•mt·nt;nion  of  full 
competition.  There  are  nevcrthc:les.\  alreJdy  new  voice 
communications  services  offered  to  the  public  making 
use  of Internet  technology.  The situation  must  therefore 
be  kept  under  review  in  the  light  of  technological  and 
market  developments. 
Regulatory  consequences 
Current  situation 
-- l.iren..,ing 
Internet  access  providers  now  typically  operate under 
a  data  transmission  or  value-added  service  author-
isation. 
According to Directive  90/388/EC 
the  proviSion  of  telecommunications  services 
other than voice  telephony,  the  establishment  and 
provision  of  public  telecommunications  networks 
and  other telecommunications  networks  involving 
.the  use  of radio  frequencies,  may  be  subjected  to 
only  a  general  authorisation  or  a  declaration 
procedure.  To  the  extent  that  Internet  Voice  is 
considered  not  to  be  a  voice  telephony  service 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Directive,  a 
requirement  for  an  individual  licence  may. 
therefore  not  be  imposed  on  Internet  ac~:ess/ 
service  providers, 
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till'  J~r·rwr.d  ;urdrorl\.11 ion  or  dr·1 l.u ation 
pro1 r·durn  m.ry  orrl;·  lOill.lin  1 ondition.\  which 
;111'  ohjecrivc  (i.e.  linked  to  dw  essential 
re<Jllin·nwnr  involved),  non-di.,niminatory, 
jllOJhllliorr.rll'  .uul  tr.rmp.rn'lll.  Thi.,  i111plil'\  thar 
1111  ·'Jlt'rilir  .1uthori~.uion  ~dtc·nH'  .\hnuld,  in 
prinriple,  he  draftt·d  for  Internet  arrc~s/scrvice 
provider.~  which  is  different  from  the  one 
applicable  to  other data  transmission  providers.  In 
any  case,  where  the  Internet  telephony  service  is 
only  one  part  of  an  integrated  Internet  service 
nfft•rcd  to  the  customer,  where  it  is  ancillary  to 
other  element!>  of  the  Internet  service,  the 
telephony  application  would  be  subsumed  under 
tlw  broader  authorisation  which  covers  the 
Imcrnet  access  provider's  opcr.uion  and  it  would 
he  nmsidered disproportionate to  require  Internet 
.Ieee\.~  providen  to  oht~tin  an  additional  author-
l~auon, 
where  a  Ml·rnht•r  State  want~  10  withdraw  or 
refuse  to  grant  a  general  authorisation  for  the 
supply  of a  non-rcstrrvcd  service,  reasons  must  be 
given  and  there  must  be  a  procedure  for 
appealing  against  such  a  dcci~ion ('), 
the  relevant  authorisation  schemes  must  have 
been  communicated  to the  Commission. 
The Licensing  Dirertivc, which  enters  into  force  on  I 
January  1998  furtht'r details  which  conditions may be 
attached  to  authorisations,  as  well  as  the  principles 
licensing  procedures should  respect. 
- u n i v e r sa I  s e r v  1 c <' 
To the extent th.ll  lmcrnct  Voice  is  nmsidered  not  to 
ht·  a  voice  tclc.·phony  service  within  the  meaning  of 
the  Directive,  no  contribution  can  be  required  from 
Internet access  providers. 
Future  situation 
As  sho,vn  in  the  above  analysis,  the  regulatory  posltlon 
of voice  communications  on  the  Internet  depends  on an 
analysis  of  the  actual  service  provided  as  regards  the 
various  elements  of the  definition  of voice  telephony  in 
Article  I  of Directive  90/388/EEC. 
The  current  pos1uon  of  voice  communications  on 
Internet  under Community  law  may  change  in  the  light 
of  further  technical  and  market  developments.  The 
comments  rcaivcd hy  the Commis!Jion  show  that at  least 
to  a  limiu·d  t•xtent  key  clements  of  the  t·onditions  for 




.\lH h  ~•n  evolution  in  the  Community  Jpproal h arc  close 
to  hcing  met,  namely: 
a1  1<".1.'>1  on<'  gwup  of  lnlerrH·t  wrvit I'  providt'rs  .ll't' 
~t.tning to provide a  snvir<'  whereby  .tn  Internet  mn 
can  connect  to  a  loCJI  Internet  .'lcrvin·,  log  on  with 
his  PC  or other terminal  equipment,  input  the  desti-
nation  telephone  number,  have  the  call  routed  over 
the  Internet  to  any  telephone  number  (including  to 
users  without  a  modem)  at  the  far  end  ag:tinst 
payment; 
and 
the  usc  of  the  Internet  (and  the  lower  const·qut•nt 
tariffs)  arc  a  dt·cisive  driver  for  lnt<'rnl't  ~uhKription 
to  such  a  service  (whether  or  not  tlw  suh~nihn  i~ 
also  taking an  Internet connection  to a  PC  as  part of 
the service allowing use  of his  or her telephone). 
Nevertheless,  additional  elements  of quality  may  rema1n 
to  be  satisfied. 
When  all  the  criteria  of  the  vo1ce  telephony  definition 
are  satisfied,  those  Internet  service  providers  offering  a 
dial-out  service  to  any  telephone  number,  and  only 
those,  could  then  be  considered  providers  of  voice 
telephony  services  under  Community  law.  Thi.~ 
description  is  by  way  of example  and  does  not  exclude 
other  possible  interpretations  of  future  developments. 
This  could  have  significant  regulatory  l'!lll~t·qul'IKe.\  for 
the  relevant  undertakings: 
-Licensing 
According  to Article  3 of Directive  90/388/EEC and 
Article  7(2)  of  the  Licensing  Directive,  Member 
States  could  then  subject  the  operation  in  their  terri-
tories  of  Internet  service  providers'  voice  telephony 
services  to  individual  licensing  procedures  if  they 
deemed  it  necessary.  However, any  licensing  schemes 
must be  notified  to the  Commission. 
In  any  case,  once  some  voice  communications 
services  on  the  Internet  can  he  considered  as  voice 
telephony,  and  service  providers  he  subjcned  by 
certain  Member States  w  individual  licences,  even  in 
this  case,  both  Directive  90/388/EEC  and  the 
Licensing  Directive stress the  need  for  proportionality 
and  non-discrimination  in  lirensing  regimes. 
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hu  duTIIIOII',  any  lircmirtg  .\chernc  must  take  into 
.IC(ount  the  consumer  imere~t  to  be  able  to  choose 
among  a  variety  of  services  and  operators,  notably 
avoiding  disproportionate or discriminatory charges, 
- univenal  service 
If  in  the  future  Internet  vo1ce  IS  considered  voice 
telephony,  then  the  service  providers  concerned 
would  fall  within  the  category  of organisations  that 
could  he  a!>kcd  to  nmtributc  to  universal  service 
funding  .1ftn  m;ukt't\ an· ope•u·d  to full  competition, 
in  .h"cord.lnn·  with  tlw  principle!>  set  out  in 
Community  l.1w  .111d  wi1h  the  guideline.\  on  tht• 
co\tirtg  .uul  fin.uuin~~  of  univenal  !>crvicc  set  out  in 
the  Conulli\!>ion  rommuniration  of  27  November 
I YY6  (COM(Yo)  60H). 
In  ;l  m;tjority  of  Mt·lnhn  Statc.\  thi!>  i!>sue  will  not 
ari!>e,  hut  whcn·  it  doc  .... ,  Community  law (
1
)  provides 
:1  framework  a"crording  to  which  CQntributions  to 
univcnal  service  may  be  required  from  organisations 
providing  publicly  available  telecommunications 
networks  and  publicly  available  voice  telephony 
servrces. 
The  imposition  of  burdens  relating  to  such  an  obli-
gation  would  have  to be  proportionate, non-discrimi-
natory and  transparent.  Proportionality requires that: 
(
1
)  Srr  Direnivc·  'JO/.\HH/EEC  and  Direnive  97/33/EC of the 
1-.uropt';Hl  P.uli.unc-m  anJ of d1t'  Council of 30 June  1997  on 
intnconnrniou  iu  tf'lf'communicniom  wilh  regard  lO 
t'll\llrinJ~  univc-1 '·"  ~"rvirt'  and  inleropc-rahilily  through  the 
applicu ion  of  til('  principl<'\  of  open  network  provision 
. (ONI'), OJ  I.  I'N, 2h.  7.  I'J'J7. 
double  contributiom  to  univer.<,al  service  obli-
gations  a.re  avoided.  Where  a  service  is  provided 
which  relies  on  the  user  having  a  connection  to 
someone  else's  network,  care  will  be  needed  to 
ensure  that  regulators  do  not  collect  two 
contributions:  one  from  the  PSTN  operator  and 
another  from  the  service  provider,  even  if  the 
service  offered  involves  voice  telephony, 
the  cost  and  effort  required.  to  identify  the 
relevant  elements  ncce~sary  for  c.tlculating 
universal  service  contrilnniom  do  not  reprc!>cnt  a 
disproponionatt'  burden  on  tlH'  organi.\atio11 
conct•rnt·d  in  n·lation  to  th(·  imp.u·t  of it\  ;Ktivitin 
on  thl·  provi.\ion  of  univn!>.ll  .\ervin·  in  dw 
Member  State  concerned.  There  could  he  a  real 
risk  of  substantial  harrier-'>  being  created  to  the 
provision  of an  innnvatiV('  service, 
further  obligation\  \lemming  from  the  ONJl 
legislation 
Once. some  voice  communications  services  on  the 
Internet  can  be  considered  as  voice  telephony,  if 
providers  of such  services  were  to  enjoy  significant 
market power as  defined  pursuant to Article  2 of the 
proposed  amendmem  to  the  Article  IOO(a)  Voice 
Telephony  Directive  now  being  discussed  before  the 
European  Parliament  and  Council,  they  would  be 
subject  to  the  relevant  provisions  set  out  in  this 
Directive. 
The need for periodic  review 
The  Commission  will  review  the  scope  of  thi!>  notice 
periodically  and  at  latest  before  I  j.:1nuary  2000 . 
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1.  State of play 
Since 1 January 1998, telecommunications markets have been fully liberalised in most 
of the European Union.  This marks the culmination of a  ten-year process of gradual 
market opening, set in train at European level by the Commission's 1987 Green Paperl 
and based on extensive consultation and a broad measure of  support from consumers and 
th~ industry. The process was given added impetus by the entry into force of the WTO 
agreement on basic telecommunications services on 5 February 1998. 
Telecommunications  are  at  the  heart  of the  Information  Society,  which  promises 
extensive opportunities for European business and a significant contribution to improved 
living  standards  for  the  European  citizen.  The  opening  of EU  telecommunications 
markets~ with a current value of 141  billion ECU and growing annually at 8.2°/o,  is 
clearly of  the greatest importance in terms both of  overall growth and employment within 
the European economy and of  increased international trade. 
The Community telecommunications regulatory package aims at market opening based 
on  the  combined  usc  of  liberalisation  measures  to  break  down  monopolies: 
harmonisation measures providing common rules and procedures in the markets opened 
to competition; the establishment of national regulatory authorities; and the active use 
of  competition rules to ensure fair competitive behaviour. 
Since the liberalisation process began, there have been  continuous improvements in 
levels and quality of  services~ with corresponding falls  in  prices.  Despite significant 
tariff rebalancing in  some Member States in  recent years. prices have in  overall  terms 
declined in some countries of  the Union by up to 40% since 1990. Liberalisation is also 
the driver of~ and driven by~ an unprecedented take-up of new services and technologies. 
Europe has already seen enormous growth in three areas: mobile communications, with 
mtlrc than 45 million users throughout the Union today~ the use of fax, which has grown 
dramatically  during  the  nineties:  and  now  the  Internet,  potentially  the  single  most 
important development in telecommunications for decades and stimulated in particular by 
the rapidly increasing penetration r.ate of personal computers in the EU market. 
In  expectation  of  full  libcralisation  on  1  January  1998,  new  players.  licensed  or 
authorised  under  procedures  established  pursuant  to  the  Community  directives,  have 
undertaken large-scale investment in terms of finance and human resources in most of 
the  Member  States.  A  large  number of providers  of voice  telephony  are  already 
I  Green  Paper  on  the  development  of the  Common  Market  for  telecommunications  services  and 
equipment, COM(87) 290 
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hundreds of players ~tre offering data and Internet services. 
<  iiven  the  itnportance of this  process. the Commission has placed the highest priority 
on  the full  implementation of the telecommunications  regulatory  package by  all 
Member States. 
The Commission· s broad assessment of implementation, as at January 1998, is that: 
•  the  tra~sp_~~~!!~f~~  _01cn_~11r~~ laid down  in  the  regulatory package  ~1re v~ry largely_ in 
phu.·l' in  most  Men~h_er  States~ 
•  t;•~~-p-~•sis will  now  need  to  be  put  on  effective application of the  national  rules  to 
ensure  market  entry  in  all  market  sectors  (in  the  already-liberalised  sectors  in  the 
derogation countries)~ and 
•  economic indicators will  need to be gathered to measure the market effects of the 
new environment. 
This Communication builds on two previous Communications adopted on 29 May and 8 
October  t  9972,  in  which  the  Commission  reported  to  the  Council  and  European 
Parliament  on  progress  by  Member States  in  preparing for  the  1 .January  1998 
deadline, and set out its approach to  carrying forward the implementation exercise after 
full  liheralisation. 
The ( 'ommunication is based on: 
I.  the  tindings which  have already  resulted  in  the  Commission  having  to  take out 
infringement  proceedings  in  respect  of  failure  to  communicate  national 
measures or deficiencies found  in  transposing the directives under the regulatory 
package  or  in  applying  the  national  measures  concerned.  There  are  currently 
thirty-five  proceedings  under  way3;  it  is  likely  that  a  number of these  will  be 
dosed  as  a  result  of the  measures  communicated  recently.  The  Commission 
intends  to  open  a  fresh  round  of infringement  proceedings  before  the  end  of 
March on the basis of  the information gathered during this exercise~ 
II.  a  round  of intensive  bilateral  meetings with  the  Member  States,  begun  on  11 
Decem her 1997, the purpose of  which was 
to examine the state of progress in transposition and the conformity of the 
measures adopted with the Community package, and 
to review the national  auth<~risation schemes implemented: 
Ill.  a questionnaire on the stale of the national telecommunications markets forwarded 
to the national regulators. 
J  I  2 concern the libcralisation and 23  the harmonisation directives 
3 
1/184 2.  Transtu•sifion  -··--- ·~  ··-------
2. I Prin(:iple 
The Commission, in line with the case law of the Court of Justice, distinguishes between 
the  process  of transposition  of the  directives  and  the  effective  application  of the 
transposed  rules.  Transposition  means  the  incorporation  into  national  law  of the 
obligations set out in the directives concerned in order to achieve the objectives pursued. 
The Court has consistently stated 4 in this regard that each Member State must implement 
directives  in  a  manner  which  fully  meets  the  requirement  of legal  certainty  and  must 
consequently  transpose  their  terms  into  national  law  as  binding  provisions:  the 
transposition  or a  directive  into  domestic  law  docs  not  necessarily  require  that  its 
provisions  be  incorporated  f(lrmally  and  verbatim  in  express,  specific  legislation:  a 
general legal context may, depending on  the content of the directive. be adequate f(lr  the 
purpose, provided that  it docs indeed guarantee the  full  application or the  directive  in  a 
sufficiently  clear  and  precise  manner.  The  Commission's  view  as  f~tr  as  the  current 
exercise  is  concerned  is  that  only  correct  transposition  provides  full  certainty  to 
market players, particularly new entrants, as to  their substantive rights and their 
rights of  reco~rse to the regulator. 
The  obligations  set  out  in  the  directives  impinge  on  different  areas of the law  in 
different  Member  States;  although  most  chose  to  adopt  a  framework 
telecommunications law with accompanying secondary provisions, each has  also had  to 
rely  to  a greater or lesser extent on other branches of the  law such as  those  relating  to 
administrative  procedure,  legal  remedies,  contract.  planning  and  local  government. 
consumer protection, and,  in certain cases. the  national constitution.  In  many cases also, 
the directives deliberately offer options which the Member States arc free  to act on. 
National transposition measures must of course incorporate correctly the objectives or the 
directives.  that  is.  they  must  he  in  conf(lrmity  with  them.  In  some  instances.  Member 
Stutes  have  introducL·d  regulation  which  goes  beyond  thnt  providt.•d  for.  The 
Commission will examine such regulation and. where  it  crL·ates harriers to  the realisation 
of  the  Single  MarkL·t  and  accordingly  contradicts  the  objectives  of  the  directi\'L' 
concerned, will  take action on the basis that  it constitutes incorrect transposition. 
Full  transposition  in  conformity with the directives is.  however, not necessarily enough 
to  ensure that the objectives in  view are  actually achieved.  This requires the effective 
application of the measures in question; this is considered in section 3. 
2.2 Assessment of  transposition 
The status and general level of transposition of the directives is as follows: 
a) /,iheral  i.,·c~l ion direcl  il'£'S 
The  liheralisation directives, which  removed  exclusive rights and  most special  rights  in 
the  telecommunications  services  and  equipment  markets.  were  adopted  between  May 
4 Sec, for example. judgement of 2 Decem her  1986, Case 239/85, E( 'R  1986, pp 3645-3661: judgement of 
9Apriii987.Case363/85,ECR 1987p 1740-1745 
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directives was  I July  1997.  In  November 1997, the Commission initiated infringement 
procedures against those Member States which had not notified the relevant transposition 
measures.  Several  Member  States  (Belgium,  Greece,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Portugal) 
have still  not  notified  specific  provisions. despite· the fact  that they are  not,  or are no 
longer.  covered  by  derogations.  However.  even  if  not  fully  transposed,  clear  and 
unconditional provisions of these Directives have direct effect. and certain of  the Membet 
States concerned (Belgium, Ireland) have granted provisional authorisations based on this 
direct effect of Community law.  In order to  understand  the  situation  in  the  various 
Member States it is therefore important to look at the same time both at transposition and 
application. A more detailed assessment is set out in Annex I. 
h)  Harmonisation direclive.\' 
Two major directives. on interconnection and  licensing, were adopted during  1997.  In 
addition.  the  ONP  Framework  and  Leased  Lines  Directives  were  amended.  The 
Terminals I  >irective, as supplemented as regards earth satellite terminal equipment. is  in 
the process both of  consolidation and fundamental revision. Th0 directives on frequencies 
have been in  l~lrc~ for· :.t  number of years. and it  is  not envisaged to amend them ..  For all 
of these directives. the  verification of transposition was carried out on the basis of 
those nrticlcs haying down the essential principles which the respective directives arc 
designed to achieve. As regards the Voice Telephony Directive, whic~ will be amended 
by  a  directive  on  which  conciliation  was  concluded  on  I 0  December  1997,  the 
verification concentrated in particular on those articles setting out principles which 
are carried over into the new directive. 
The  Commission's  broad  assessment  of  th~  state  of  transposition  of  the 
harmonisation directives is as follows: 
' 
The  level  of transposition  is  generally  very  good,  bearing  in  mind  the  fact  that  the 
Licensing  and  Interconnection  Directives  in  particular  were  required  to  be 
transposed for 31  J>ecember 1997. Where legislative delays have occurred, the drafts 
f()rwarded to the <.'om mission show in the majority of  cases that there will be substantial 
transposition once they nrc adopted. There arc few cases giving rise to  major concern 
arising from non-conformity of transposed measures with the directives. 
Framework J)irectivc:  Provisions on national regulatory authorities have been adopted 
in all the Member States. 
Leased lines: Of the four findings of partial transposition, three relate to non-conformity 
wilh various .\pec{fic principles (Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal), while one, the result of 
delay in bringing forward the necessary legislation (Belgium), should be made good by 
the adoption of  two forthcoming decrees. 
Voice telephony:  Only one Member State has not notified measures (Greece). Of the 
four cases of partial  transposition, two arise from  non-cof!formity with  various spec!fic 
principles {Spain.  Portugal),  one  (Luxembourg)  from  leKislative  delays  coupled  with 
concern  over  .\pec{fic  principles,  and  one,  the  result  of delay  in  hringing fhrward 
leKis/ation (Belgium), should be remedied by the adoption of  a forthcoming decree. 
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although  a  derogation  for  certain  principles  has  been  requested;  Spain,  where  the 
forthcoming  Act should transpose  the main provisions; and  Ireland,  where the current 
draft Regulations provide for substantial transposition). Three of the five cases of partial 
transposition are also the result of  delay in bringing forward legislation (Belgium, where 
draft  secondary  legislation  is  at  an  advanced  stage;  Luxembourg,  where  secondary 
legislation remains to be adopted; and The Netherlands, where substantial transposition 
should be achieved  by  the  f()rthcoming  Act).  There is  concern in  one country (Frarice) 
over  a  .\pec~fic  licence  condition  coupled  with  delay  in  introducing  legislation  on 
procedures, although secondary legislation is in preparation to  remedy the latter, and in 
another (Italy) concerning specffic licence conditions.  In one country (Austria) there is 
concern over certain procedural aspects. 
Interconnection:  The two cases of non-transposition are the result of legislative delays 
(Greece,  where 'secondary  legislation  is  under  way;  and  Portugal,  where  secondary 
legislation is due to be adopted shortly). Four cases of  partial transposition are the result 
of  delays in adopting legislation (Spain, where the forthcoming Act should transpose the 
main provisions; Ittly,.where amendment o( the framework is under consideration and 
secondary legislation is at an advanced stage;  The Netherlands; where the forthcoming 
Act  should  bring  substantial  transposition;  and  Sweden,  where  the  forthcoming 
amendment  of the  Act  should  bring  substantial  transposition).  Two  cases  of partial 
transposition  are  the  result  of legislative  delays  coupled  with  concern  over  specific 
principles in two Member States (Belgium, where amendments to the Law and secondary 
legislation  arc  under  consideration;  and  Luxembourg,  where  secondary  legislation 
remains to be adopted). In one (France) there is concern over  ,\1Jec~fic principles. 
Terminals:  The directive is substantially transposed in all Member States. 
Satellite terminals:  The  three  cases of non-transposition  are  the  result of legislative 
delays (Belgium, where a decree is at an advanced stage, Greece, where a presidential 
decree is under draft; and Ireland, where draft regulations are in preparation). 
Frequencies: The directives are substantially transposed in all Member States. 
A more detailed assessment is set out in Annex II. 
The Commission draws attention to the fact that certain Member States had not fulfilled 
by the due date the obligation under the Interconnection Directive to notify the manner in 
which  certain  information  is  to  be  published  and  the  names  of organisations  with 
significant n1arket power under the Directive. The Commission is required to publish this 
inf(lrmation in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
The f(lcus of future communications will shift away from  transposition towards effective 
application  and  fuller  reporting  of the  opening of national  markets,  on  the  basis  of a 
wider  range  of  indicators  and  more  extensive  data  from  the  national  regulatory 
authorities, as indicated below. 
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3.1 Principle 
The major task of the Commission f(lllowing the f(lrmal  transposition of  the I  iberal isation 
and harmonisation directives is to ensure the effective npplication of the national rules 
adollted llursuant to the directives in the package. 
a)  Liheralisation directives 
In  line  with  the  aim  of the  liberalisation  directives,  nearly  all  Member  States  have 
effectively authorised new market entrants in the various telecomm~nications markets. In 
assessing whether the Member States have effectively implemented this objective, it  is 
necessary to  look into a number of concrete indicators of compliance, given that these 
measures have been transposed in different ways in each Member State.  For example, 
licensing conditions vary widely from Member State to Member State, and will affect the 
burden and the time necessary to enter the market. 
h) llarmoni.\·ation directive.tt 
The  deadline  f()r  transposition  of the  two  most  important  harmonisation  directives, 
Licensing  and  Interconnection,  expired  on  31  December  1997,  as  did  that  f(n  the 
amendment to  the  Framework and  Leased  Lines  Directives.  Moreover,  the  new  Voice 
Telephony (Adaptation) Directive has  had  an  impact on the  transposition of the  Voice 
Telephony Directive for which the deadline for transposition was 31  December 1996. In 
these circumstances, a systematic verification of the correct and effective application of 
the  national  measures  adopted  pursuant  to  these  directives  and  reported  on  in  this 
Communication will  be  carried out  in  the  light of their implementation in  the  coming 
months. 
3.2 Assessment of  effective application 
In the light of  the above, it is useful, in assessing effective application, to examine on the 
one  hand  the  Iiberalisation  process  and  on  the  other  the  accompanying  regulatory 
framework. 
Liberalil·ation 
In  the  wake of the  implementation of full  competition  on  I  January  1998  in  the  ten 
Member States without a derogation, all  but one of the ten have granted authorisations to 
new market players for the provision of voice telephony and public telecommunications 
networks.  This was the .last step of phased liberalisation initiated with the adoption of 
Directive 90/388/EEC on 28 June 1990. 
This Directive liberalised the markets for voice and data services, i.e. all services other 
than  voice  telephony,  telex,  provision  of directories,. mobile  and  satellite  services. 
These services are now fully open to competition in the Communii:y.  However, in two 
out of fifteen Member States, certain restrictions continue to be applied on the provision 
of  "call-back" services  (Portugal  and  Greece).  The  Commission  will  address  these 
remaining restrictions as a priority. 
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. 94/46/EC.  The relevant services are  also  widely  open.  Four Member States (France, 
Ocrmany, Netherlands and UK) and Switzerland have entered into an agreement to apply 
a  one-stop  shopping  procedure  f(lr  the  granting  of VSA TS  and  SNG6  authorisations. 
llowever a small number of Member States are still completing the regulatory framework 
necessary in order to allow for the authorisation and operation of satellite services. Two 
Member States (Ireland and  Luxembourg) have already adopted some legal  provisions, 
but must still  set out the  authorisation procedures, including determination of level of 
fees.  One MembeF State (Greece) has notified a draft licensing procedure, which should 
soon  be  adopted.  Furthermore  the  situation remains  unclear in  a  number of Member 
States with regard to the measures taken to allow by-passing of the national signatory of 
international satellite organisations such as Intelsat or Eutelsat. 
In  order to  give  full  effect to  the  liberalisation of services other than voice telephony, 
Commission Directive 95/St/EC required Member States to lift restrictions on the use of 
cable  television  networks  to  provide  such  services,  including  for  example  Internet· 
access.  To date,  all  but two  Member States have taken the  necessary  measures.  This 
Directive has already had dramatic effects in Member States such as the Netherlands and 
Belgium  where  cabie  networks  .  are  used  for  the  commercial  provision  of 
telecommunications services. One Member State (Greece) is drafting legislation to repeal 
the  exclu~ive rights recently granted to the incumbent operator for the provision of CA-
TV netwf)rk  infrastructure. In another Member State (Luxembourg), the measures taken 
do  not  seem  sufficient  to  give  legal  certainty  to  cable  operators  wanting  to  provide 
Iiberalised services.  A factor preventing Directive 95/51/EC from  yielding the intended 
effects  is  the  simultaneous  operation  of telecommunications  and  cable  television 
networks  hy  the  same  undertaking.  In  December  1997,  the  Commission  therefore 
adopted  the  draft  of an  amendment of Directive  95/51 /EC  in  order to  ensure  that  in 
certain circumstances Member States impose legal separation of  these activities. 
Directive  96/19/EC  requires  in  parallel  the  lifting  of restrictions  on  the  use  and 
establishment of other alternative infrastructure.  Although some Member States were 
given deferment periods regarding this obligation, these had expired by  1 October 1997. 
By that date, the Commission found that Portugal, Greece and Luxembourg had not taken 
the  necessary  measures  to  allow  new  entrants  to  use  or  establish  alternative 
infrastructures.  Formal  proceedings  were  initiated  in  November  1997  and  will  be 
continued until  these  measures are  in  place.  Moreover, in  Spain, the current operators 
have  challenged  the  first  ~uch  authorisation  m  Court,  delaying  the  effective 
implementation of  this obligation. 
The  opening  of the  mobile  and  personal  commun,ications  market  is  the  aim  of 
Directive 96/2/EC (Mobile Directive). Portugal and Ireland were granted an additional 
implementation  period  until  I  January  1999  for  the  lifting  of restrictions  on  direct 
interconnection of mobile networks with mobile networks and PSTN in other Member 
States.  Two  Member States  without  any  deferment  period  for  the  lifting  of such 
restrictions (Italy and Greece) have still to implement in practice this right of the mobile 
5 Very Small Aperture Terminal (small earth stations for one- or two~way private communications) 
6 Satellite News Gathering (using transportable earth stations) 
8 
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opened  an  infringement  procedure.  Finally,  five  Member  States  (Belgium,  Spain, 
Ireland, Italy and The Netherlands) are still in the process of granting one or more DCS 
1800 licences, which should have been done by  l  January 1998.  The Commission 
will  initiate  infringement  procedures  if DCS  1800  licences  are  not  granted  within 
reasonable  periods. 
Regulatory  framework 
Member  States  have  implemented  divergent  authorisation  procedures  for  voice 
telephony and public telecommunications networks going  from  light  procedures  in 
certain  Member States (no  authorisation  required  except to  apply  for  numbers  and/or 
frequencies) to full  and more lengthy licensing procedures.  However, to  date in all but 
one of the  Member States  without derogation,  new operators have  been  authorised to 
provide voice telephony or public telecommunications networks in competition with the 
incumbent.  The number of  authorisations granted  v~ries between Member States, which 
is  partly  to  he  explained  hy  the  different  liheralisation  dates  and  the  size  and 
opportunities of each  national  telecommunications market.  As at  1  5 January  1998, the 
lJ K  has «I ready granted more than  30 voice telephony I  icenccs,  whereas Germany has 
granted 13  national voice telephony licences and 6 national public network infrastructure 
authorisations. France has issued 4 public network authorisations and 4 voice telephony 
authorisations,  and  further  applications  are  still  being  processed.  Amongst  the  larger 
Member States, the situation in Italy where no additional operator has been authorised to 
date  gives  cause  for  concern.  It should  be  noted  that Spain,  which  was  granted  an 
additional implementation period, has already granted a second nation-wide licence and 
is in the process of granting a further licence. Of the smaller Member States, Belgium 
and Austria,  which were  late  in  transposing the directives,  have  nevertheless already 
granted a number of public infrastructure and voice telephony licences, although in the 
case of Belgium these are only provisional.  In The Netherlands there are at present two 
national  voice telephony  licences and  two  national  public infrastructure operators with 
rights of way, in  addition to  the incumbent operator.  This situation is  likely to change 
with the projected adoption of  the new Telecommunications Act in  March  1998. 
At this initial stage of liheralisation, all  but two (Italy and France) of the Member States 
without  additional  implementation  periods  do  not  consider  that  the  provision  of 
universal  service  by  the  former  monopoly  constitutes  an  unfair  burden  within  the 
meaning of  the Interconnection Directive, and have not yet activated schemes to share the 
burden  of universal  service  provision.  The  Commission  is  therefore  examining  the 
justifications provided by  these two Member States.  Only one of the  Member States 
without an additional  implementation period (France) has notified a plan to  phase out 
tariff imbalances  and  approved  the  implementation  of access  deficit  charges  by  its 
operator for a transitional  period. Italy has stated that tariffs are still not balanced, but 
has  not  provided  a  precise  timetable.  The  Commission  is  monitoring  whether  other 
operators are implementing hidden access deficit charges and will, where required, take 
action. 
The  incumbent  operators  of all  Member  States  without  derogations  have  published 
standard interconnection  terms and conditions.  The extent of services  provided  as 
well  as  the  level  of charges  vary  from  one operator to  another.  The Commission  has 
adopted a Recommendation on Interconnection Pricing setting out 
4best practice prices' 
9 
1/190 f<lr  interconnection at three different levels.  Annex  Ill  shows the  level of prices in  the 
Member States, together with the percentage deviation from best practice. As at January 
1998,  respectively  five  and  six  Member  States  were  within  the  recommended  price 
ranges depending on the  level  of call  termination considered.  In  two  Member States 
(Austria, Italy), the prices proposed by  the operator are still subject to approval by the 
regulator.  Member  States  with  derogations  must  also  ensure  that  a  reference 
interconnection  offer  is  published  covering  interconnection  for  already  Iiberalised 
services (eg mobile and cross-border interconnection). 
The Commission's first conclusions on the application of the rules in  place in  the 
Member States arc as follows: 
The  state  of Iiberalisation  achieved  in  January  1998  is  encouraging.  Considerable 
progress  has  been  made  since  last  September,  when  the  last  assessment  was  made. 
Although the Commission has already had to deal with a number of informal complaints 
relating  either  to  transposition  measures  or their  application  (such  as  long  delays  in 
granting authorisations, disproportionate burdens imposed, discouraging  licensing fees, 
etc.) or to  the behaviour of incumbent operators (interconnection fees  leading to  anti-
competitive  price  squeezes,· non-publication  or incomplete  publication  of a  reference 
interconnection offer, denial of the right to negotiate interconnection, predatory pricing, 
imposition of unreasonable fees  on customers choosing another operator, etc.), there is 
evidence that the national regulators now established in the Member States are assuming 
their responsibilities for enforcing the provisions of the framework as laid down in the 
directives. 
In order to ensure a level playing field  in  the single market, the Commission will pursue 
its  monitoring  of the  implementation  of the  regulatory  framework  at  national  level. 
relating  inter  alia  to  the  licensing  process,  the  level  of licence  fees,  the  terms  and 
conditions  of interconnection,  the  implementation  of an  appropriate  cost-accounting 
system  as  well  as  the  structure of the  incumbents'  retail  tariffs  structure  in  order  to 
prevent predatory pricing, price squeezes, cross-subsidies, etc. Particular attention will he 
given to the level of  competition in the local loop and to national measures taken to foster 
competition in this market. 
4 .. Monitoring progress in opening national telecommunications markets 
The above assessment is naturally structured around the legislation in question, the focus 
being on the practical outcome of the measures taken by the Member States to transpose 
the Community principles laid down.  It is  also important, however, to  observe the real 
effects of these measures on markets, taking into account that there will  be other factors 
which have a bearing on how they evolve. 
Two meetings of the  lligh  Level  Committee of National  Regulators  were  held  during 
1997,  devoted  principally  to  subjects  relating  to  the  real effects  of the new  national 
frameworks.  In  particular,  the  regulators  were  asked  to  comment  on  a  series  of 
indicators which subsequently formed the basis of a questionnaire which they were asked 
to  complete with  data on  the  state of their respective  national telecommunications 
markets. 
10 
1/191 The data provided by  National Regulatory Authorities is set out in Annex III as a means 
of 
- observing the openness of the market, inter alia  ari~ing from  the impact of the 
liberalisation and harmonisation measures already transposed into national law; 
- establishing a 'base line' by which progress in opening markets as from the date of 
full liberalisation can be judged. 
As far as the impact. of the Community directives is concerned, the data is presented to· 
take account of  the fact that: 
- On the one hand, liberalisation opens markets to competition, the presence of  which 
is indicated by the number of operators, their market shares, the percentage of the 
national territory/population with a choice of operators, the level of tariffs, and so 
on. 
- On the other, the number of operators is influenced by the regulatory framework 
relating  inter alia to  the  licensin~ process,  the  level  of licence fees,  the terms of 
interconnection, and so on. 
This  first  presentation of data is  based on indicators which are  relatively  narrow,  and 
attempts to mobilise data which the National Regulatory Authorities could reasonably be 
expected to have available at this early stage in the opening of  markets. It  is intended to 
supplement these in subsequent communications to take account of .the evolution of 
markets. 
It should be clear in this context that Annex III is not to be read as a comparison between 
Member States whose markets are not comparable by virtue of differences for example 
in the date laid down for full  liberalisation. 
5.  Future reporting 
The Commission will  continue to  monitor closely the status of implementation and the 
evolution of the telecommunications market in  the Community. A further report will  be 
issued in the middle of this year. 
As far  as the  1999 review of Community telecommunications legislation is  concerned, 
the results of  the ongoing monitoring exercise will be used in arriving at proposals for the 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































r/ lg0Method of assessment
The Commission has, in arriving at its directive-by-directive  assessment of transposition
for each Member State, taken account of the key principles  laid down in each directive,
and limited itself to the following three categories:
qssosWmt of the
particularlS{:
"Not transposed"  means that no'hansposition  measunos, havo boen notified to the
Commission, or those notified do not tanspose the principlos of the directive. Draft
measures  are treated as above. The Comnission wi[ bring proceedings  for failure to
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 OVERVIEW OF TRANSPOSITION OF HARMONISATION DIRECTIVES: BELGIUM 
•  The  new  regulatory  framework  for  telecommunications  was  adopted  in  December 
1997  (Law  amending  the  Loi  du  21  Mars  1991  portant  reforme  de  certaines 
entreprises publiques  economiques  I  Wet  betreffende  de  hervorming  van  sommige 
economische  overheidshedr(jven  ).  Secondary  legislation  has  been  passed  in  recent 
months and drafts are in the process of  being adopted to complete the framework. 
•  Framework Directive: The Belgian NRA (lnstitut Beige des services postaux et des 
telecommunications  I  Belgisch  lnstituut  voor  postdiensten  en  telecommunicatie, 
IBPT/BIPT)  has  been  operational  for  some  years.  The  new  Law  has  enhanced  its 
compctcnccs,  while  leaving  licensing  powers  to  the  Minister.  yiven the  fact  that 
responsibility both for the State shareholding in the former incumbent operator and for 
overall management of the regulatory body are vested in one and the same Ministry, 
the Commission will monitor the effective application of  the requirement of  structural 
separation between regulatory functions and activities associated with ownership  and 
control set out by the Directive. 
•  Leased  lines:  General  provisions  are  set  out  by  the  new  Law,  but  substantial 
transposition wiJl only be achieved by forthcoming secondary legislation. Outstanding 
issues relate mainly to cost accounting obligations, procedures to allow restrictions to 
access, and availability of  information. 
•  Voice  telephony:  A  number  of principles  are  transposed  by  the  new  Law,  but 
substantial transposition will only be achieved by forthcoming secondary legislation. 
Outstanding issues are cost accounting obligations and regulation on special access. 
•  Licensing:  The  directive  is  partially  transposed  by the  new  Law,  which  requires 
supplementing  by  secondary  legislation.  Drafts  are  in  preparation  concerning 
conditions and  procedures  for  general  authorisation  and  individual  licences,  and  in 
some cases arc at an advanced stage. Deficiencies in the Law or in the draft legislation 
examined by the Commission relate mainly to conditions and procedural aspects. 
•  Interconnection: The directive is partially transposed by the new Law and secondary 
·  legislation , with gaps concerning the principle of non discrimination, powers of the 
NRA concerning dispute resolution, and provisions on cost accounting.  In  addition, 
excessive obligations are imposed as regards cost orientation. Secondary legislation is 
in preparation to fill  in some of  these gaps, and amendments to the Law are also under 
consideration. 
•  Terminals/ Satellite earth station equipment: The Directive on terminal equipment 
was  substantially  transposed  by  Royal  decree  in  November  1996.  A  draft  decree 
concerning satellite earth station equipment is at an advanced stage and its adoption is 
announced for the first semester of 1998. 
•  Frequencies:  The  three  Directives  have  been  substantially  transposed  by  Royal 
Decrees adopted in 1991  and 1992. 
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OVERVIEW OF TRANSPOSITION OF HARMONISATION DIRECTIVES: DENMARK 
•  The Telecommunications Law (Lov om visseforhold pa telekommunikationsomradet) 
as  amended  in  1996  and  1997,  together with  the  1996  Law  on the obligation  to 
provide  telecommunications  services  (Lov  om  forsyningspligt  og  visse 
forhrugerforhold inden for telesektoren) and other specific hlws and executive orders, 
provide the regulatory framework . 
•  Framework Directive: The independence of the regulatory authority (Telestyrelsen) 
from  the former incumbent is established and its operational powers defined by the 
1996 Laws. 
•  Leased  lines:  The  directive  has  been  substantially  transposed  by  the 
Telecommunications Law and a series of laws and executive orders adopted in 1996 
and 1997. 
•  Voice Telephony: The 1996 Law on the obligation to  provide telecommunications 
services, together with executive orders adopted in 1996 and 1997, in particular that 
on interconnection agreements, substantially transpose the provisions of  this Directive 
•  Licensing: The directive is substantially transposed and a system of class licences is 
laid down, whereby authorisations are required only where frequencies are to be used. 
The  NRA  lays  down  detailed  rules  for  radio  equipment  and  the  use of frequency 
bands. 
•  Interconnection: The directive is  substantially transposed by the specific legislation 
adopted in 1  996  and 1997 on interconnection agreements. 
•  Terminals/ Satellite earth station  equipment:  These  directives  are  substantially 
transposed  by  the  Laws  of  1992  respectively  on  telecommunications  terminal 
equipment  and on  radiocommunications, a  1995  executive order on satellite earth 
station equipment, and a 1997 executive order on the construction and use of certain 
radio stations. 
•  Frequencies:  Current  national  legislation  ensuring  substantial  transposition  is  the 
1997 Law on radiocommunications and assignment of  radio frequencies  and the 1997 
executive order on the construction and use of  certain radio stations. Telestyrelsen has 
also published the Danish Frequency Allocation Table. 
21 
1/202 OVERVIEW OF TRANSPOSITION OF HARMONISATION DIRECTIVES: GERMANY 
..  -
1.  Germany  has  adopted  a  telecommunications  framework  law,  the 
Telekommunikationsgesetz {TKG), which entered int\l force on 1 August 1996. This 
is  supplemented  by  a  series  of enabling  regulations.  In  addition,  more  general 
provisions under the Constitution and under the law of competition, administrative 
procedure and contract apply. 
2.  Framework Directive:  A  Regulatory  Authority  established  under  the  TKG,  the 
functions of  which are separate from those of  the former incumbent, began operation 
on 1 January 1998. 
•  Leased Lines: The Directive has  been substantially transposed  in  particular by the 
TKG and the regulations on consumer protection (Telekommunikations-Kundenschutz-
verordnung),  universal  service  Telekommunikations-Universaldienstleistungsverord-
nung), and tariffs (Telekommunikations-Entgeltregulierungsverordnung). 
•  Voice Telephony: The Directive has been substantially transposed in particular by the 
TKG  and  the  regulations  on  consumer  protection,  network  access  (Netzzugangs-
verordnung), and tariffs. 
•  Licensing: The Directive has been substantially transposed in particular by the TKG 
and the regulations on licence fees  (Telekommunikations-Lizenzgebiihrenverordnung) 
and  frequency fees (Frequenzgebiihrenverordnung,  Frequenznutzungsbeitragsverord-
nung). 
•  Interconnection: The Directive has been substantially transposed in particular by the 
TKG and  the regulations on network  access,  data protection,  universal  service and 
tariffs. 
•  Terminals/  Satellite  earth  station  equipment:  The  Directives  have  been 
substantially transposed in particular by the  T~G  and  the regulation  on approvals 
(Telekommunikations-Zulassungsverordnung). 
•  Frequencies: The Directives on GSM,  ERMES  and DECT have been substantially 
transposed by a regulation on frequency allocation (Frequenzzutei/ungsverordnung). 
22 
1/203 OVERVIEW OF TRANSPOSITION OF HARMONISATION DIRECfiVES: GREECE 
3. 
•  A review of the existing regulatory framework (the Telecommunications Framework 
Lawn.  2246/94) has been .started and the new Framework Law is  expected to be 
adopted before Summer 1998. 
•  Framework  Directive:  An  independent  Regulatory  Authority  (EET  - National 
Telecommunications Commission) was established by the framework law of  1994, 
becoming operational in the following years. 
•  Leased lines: The Directive has been partially transposed by Presidential Decree n. 
40/96. Main outstanding issues are NRA powers, tariff principles and cost-accounting. 
New secondary legislation is being prepared. 
•  Voice telephony: The Greek authorities have not communicated measures transposing 
this Directive. 
•  Licensing: Greece has requested a deferment for implementation pursuant to Article 
24 of  the Directive. The remaining  provisions of  the Directive are not transposed. 
•  Interconnection: The Directive has not been transposed into national law. Concerns 
relate to  the obligation to  publish a reference interconnection offer for mobile and 
cross-border interconnection,  and  essential  obligations  concerning  tariff principles, 
cost-accounting and numbering. Secondary legislation is under way. 
•  Terminals/ Satellite earth station equipment: At present there is no transposition of 
the satellite Directive, although  assurances have been given that secondary legislation 
will be soon adopted by Presidential Decree. In relation to the terminals Directive, this 
has  been  substantially  transposed  by  a  Presidential  Decree  adopted  in  1995  (n. 
424/95). 
•  Frequencies:  The Directives concerning frequencies in the GSM, DECT and ERMES 
bands  are  substantiaJly  transposed  by a  1994  Ministerial  Decision  (n.  5898018-3-
1994). 
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1/204 OVERVIEW OF TRANSPOSITION OF HARMONISATION DIRECTIVES: SPAIN 
•  The Bill for a Ley general de  Telecomunicaciones (Telecommunications Act) is now 
being discussed by the Parliament and is  expected to be adopted before Easter. The 
current  framework  is  based on the  Law of 1987,  which  has  been amended several 
times since 1992, the latest amendments being made by the Decree law (June 1996) 
and subsequent Act (April 1997) on Telecommunications liberalisation. 
•  Framework Directive: The regulatory functions are divided between the Minister for 
Development (Fomento)  and  the  Commission for  the Telecommunications  Market 
(  Comision del Mercado de las  Telecomunicaciones);  the latter has been operational 
since 3 .February 1997. Both are independent from the operators. 
•  Leased lines: This Directive has been substantially transposed by a Royal Decree of 
1995, subject to the need to make good minor deficiencies. 
•  Voice telephony: Although transposition was improved by the adoption in December 
1997  of the  Regulation  on  voice  telephony  and  bearer  services,  there  are  still 
deficiencies concerning a number of principles, including publication and access to 
infonnation, compensation to  users, special network access, provisions on tariffs, and 
publicity and elements of  the cost accounting system. 
•  Licensing: Transposition ofthe main provisions of  this Directive will be ensured once 
the new Act on Telecommunications is passed, although complete incorporation will 
require the adoption of  secondary legislation. 
•  Interconnection: The situation is similar to that relating to the Licensing Directive, 
although  some  provisions  on  interconnection  are  already  in  place  concerning  the 
obligation to provide interconnection, tariff principles and some powers granted to the 
NRA. The national Numbering Plan was adopted in November 1997. 
•  Terminals/ Satellite ea.rth station equipment: A Royal Decree adopted in July 1996 
substantially -transposes both Directives. 
•  Frequencies: Substantial transposition of the  GSM, ERMES  and  DECT Directives 
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•  The  regulatory  framework  is  based  on  the  Loi  de  reg/ementation  des 
telecommunications (Telecommunications Act) of  July 1996, together with secondary 
implementing legislation. 
•  Framework Directive: The  regulatory  functions  are divided between the Minister 
responsible  for  Telecommunications  and  the  Telecommunications  Regulatory 
Authority  (Autorite  de  regulation  des  telecommunications);  the  latter  has  been 
operational since 1 January 1997. Both are independent from the operators. 
•  Leased lines: The Directive was substantially transposed by a Decree of 1993, subject 
to the need to make good minor deficiencies. 
•  Voice telephony: Substantial transposition has been ensured mainly by the latest Act 
and by France Telecom's "cahier des charges" adopted in December 1996. 
•  Licensing: National measures concerning this Directive were laid down in the Act and 
the subsequent Decree on standard clauses, both adopted in 1996. There are, however, 
no provisions in place laying down administrative procedures for granting individual 
licences.  Assurances  have  been  given  that  further  secondary  legislation  will  be 
adopted by May  1998.  As to  conformity with Community law,  the Commission is 
concerned. about the licensing condition requiring financial  contribution to  research 
and training in the telecommunications sector. 
•  Interconnection: The provisions of the Act were supplemented by two Decrees on 
interconnection and universal service fmancing,  which were adopted respectively in 
March and May 1997. In some cases national provisions impose obligations on all 
organisations irrespective of their market power. There is also concern in relation to 
the sufficiency of the NRA'  s powers. Furthennore, the Commission has concerns in 
relation to the contribution to universal service in 1997 and whether the burden on the 
organisation entrusted witl) the provision of  universal service obligations is unfair. 
•  Terminals/ Satellite earth station equipment: Two  Decrees adopted  in  February 
1992 and April 1995 transpose substantially both Directives. 
•  Frequencies: Substantial transposition of the GSM,  ERMES and DECT Directives 
was ensured by the Frequencies National Table adopted in December 1996. 
25 
1/208 OVERVIEW OF TRANSPOSITION OF HARMONISATION DIRECTIVES: IRELAND 
•  The  regulatory  framework  is  laid  down  in  the  Postal  and  Telecommunications 
Services  Act,  1983,  as  amended,  and  the  Telecommunications  (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1996, and a number of  statutory instruments. 
•  Framework  Directive:  An  independent  NRA  (Director  of Telecommunications 
Regulation)  was  created  in  December  1996  under  the  Telecommunications 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, and has been operational since July 1997. 
•  Leased  Lines:  The  Directive  is  substantially  transposed  through  the  European 
Communities (Application of  Open Network Provisions to Leased Lines) Regulations. 
New  secondary  legislation  is  being  prepared  to  complete  minor  aspects  of the 
transposition (draft European Communities (Leased Lines) Regulations). 
•  Voice  Telephony:  The Directive is  substantially transposed  through  the  European 
Communities  (Application  of  Open  Network  Provision  to  Voice  Telephony) 
Regulations, adopted in October 1997. 
•  Licensing: The Directive remains' to be transposed on the basis of  the adoption of  the 
draft European Communities (Telecommunications Licences) Regulations. 
•  Interconnection:  The  Directive  is  substantially  transposed  through  the  European 
Communities  (Interconnection  in  Telecommunications)  Regulations,  adopted  in 
January 1998. 
•  Terminals/  Satellite  earth  station  equipment:  The  Terminal  Directive  is 
substantially  transposed  through  the  European  Communities  (Telecommunications 
Terminal  Equipment)  Regulations.  No  transposition  has  been  carried  out  for  the 
Satellite Directive, although draft regulations are in preparation. 
•  Frequencies:  The  GSM  Directive  is  substantially  transposed  by  the  European 
Communities (Co-ordinated introduction of  public pan-European cellular digital land-
based  mobile  communications- GSM)  Regulations.  The  ERMES  Directive  is 
substantially  transposed  by the  European  Communities  (Pan-European  land-based 
public  radio  paging  service  - ERMES)  Regulations.  The  DECT  Directive  is 
substantially transposed by the European Communities (Digital  European  Cordless 
Telecommunications - DECT) Regulations. 
26  1/201 OVERVIEW OF TRANSPOSITION OF HARMONISATION DIRECfiVES: ITALY 
•  A new regulatory framework has been in place since September 1997 (Regolamento 
per  I 'attuazione  di  direttive  comunitarie  ne/  settore  delle  telecomunicazioni  -
Regulation for the implementation of  Community Directives), the object of  which is to 
transpose  the  main  contents  of the  EC  package.  In  November  1997  a  ministerial 
decree was also adopted setting out licensing procedures (Disposizioni per il rilascio 
delle /icenze individuali nel settore delle telecomunicazioni). · 
•  A number of secondary measures are in preparation on licence fees, universal service 
financing scheme,  interconnection agreements (drafts at  an  advanced stage in some 
cases). 
•  Framework Directive: An independent regulatory authority was established in 1997 
(Autorita per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni), although it is not yet operational. A 
President has been appointed. In the meantime, the Ministry is empowered to continue 
to act as regulator. 
•  Leased  lines:  Substantial  transposition  has  been  achieved  by  national  measures 
adopted in 1994,  supplemented by the new Regulation. Legislative changes are under 
consideration in order to complete minor aspects of  the transposition. 
•  Voice' telephony: Transposition of the Directive has been substantially completed by 
the new Regulation. Minor  inconsistencies identified in the transposition measure will 
be dealt with by forthcoming legislation. 
•  Licensing:  National  measures concerning this  Directive are  laid  down by the new 
Regulation,  as  supplemented  by  the  decree  adopted  in  November  1997.  As  to 
conformity with Community law,  the Commission has concerns relating to licensing 
conditions, in particular requiring financial contribution to research and development 
in the telecommunications sector and a bank bond. A draft decree concerning licences 
fees is in preparation. 
•  Interconnection:  The  Directive  is  partially  transposed  by  the  Regulation.  The 
Commission's concerns  relate  to  the  lack  of implementing  measures  on universal 
service contributions, interconnection and numbering and to the fact that the principle 
of non  discrimination  is  not  imposed  sufficiently  widely.  Amendments  to  the 
Regulation  are  being  considered  to  remove  inconsistencies,  while  draft . secondary 
implementing legislation is at an advanced stage. 
•  Terminals/ Satellite earth station  equipment:  Both  Directives were  substantially 
transposed by legislative decree in November 1996. 
•  Frequencies: The Directives have been substantially transposed by three Ministerial 
Decrees. 
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•  The regulatory framework is set out in the 1997 Telecommunications Act (Loi du 21 
mars 1997 sur les telecommunications). Some secondary legislation has recently been 
adopted; other drafts are in preparation.  · 
•  Framework  Directive:  The  regulator,  the  Institut  Luxembourgeois  des 
Telecommunications  was  created  through  the  Act,  and  became  operational  in ·the 
summer of 1997.  Given the fact  that responsibility for the State shareholding in  the 
former incumbent and control and supervision of IL T are vested in the same Ministry 
i(the  Ministry  of Communications),  the  Commission  will  monitor  the  effective 
application of the requirement of structural separation between regulatory  functions 
and activities associated with ownership and control set out by the Directive. 
•  Leased  Lines:  The  Directive  is  partially  transposed  by  the  Act  and  secondary 
legislation recently adopted (Reglement grand-ducal fzxant les  conditions du  cahier 
des  charges  pour  /'  etablissement  et  I'  exploitation  de  reseaux  fzxes  de 
telecommunications et de services de te/ephonie, and Riglement grand-ducal fzxant /es 
conditions  du  cahier des  charges pour I 'etab/issement et I 'exploitation  de  reseaux 
fzxes de telecommunications). Concern exists mainly in relation to  cost~orientation and 
transparency  of tariffs,  the  appr?priateness  of the  accounting  system,  and  lack  of 
certain powers for ILT. 
•  Voice  telephony:  The  Directive  is  partially transposed  by  the  Act  and  secondary 
legislation adopted  recently (Reglement grand-ducal fzxant les  conditions du  cahier 
des  charges  pour  I 'etablissement  et  I 'exploitation  de  reseaux  fzxes  de 
ttHecommunications  et  de  services  de  telephonie).  Concern  exists  m~inly on  cost-
orientation and transparency of tariffs, the appropriateness of the accounting system, 
and lack of  certain powers for ILT. Some secondary legislation remains to be adopted. 
•  Licensing:  The  Directive  is  partially  transposed  through  the  Act  and  secondary 
. legislation recently adopted. Some secondary legislation remains to be adopted. 
•  Interconnection:  The  Directive  is  partially  transposed  by  the  Act  and  secondary 
legislation adopted recently.  Some of the transposing measures appear not to be in 
conformity with the requirements of the Directive, in particular as regards the powers 
of  the Regulator. Some secondary legislation remains to be adopted. 
•  Terminals/  Satellite  earth  stati()n  equipment:  The  Directives  are  substantially 
transposed through  a Reglement grand-ducal relatif aux equipements  terminaux de 
telecommunications et aux equipements de stations terrestres de communications par 
satellite: incluant Ia reconnaissance mutuel/e de leur conformite. 
•  Frequencies:  The three  Directives  are  substantially transposed  through  Ministerial 
Decisions on allocation of  frequency bands and channels for the respective service. 
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THE NEmERLANDS 
•  In  1996 legislation was passed to liberalise voice telephony as  from  1 July 1997. A 
review of  the existing regulatory framework (Wet op telecommunicatievoorzieningen-
Telecommunications Act 1988, as amended several times) was started in 1997: a new 
Telecommunications Act (Telecommunicatiewet), the object of which is to transpose 
the main contents of the EC  package, has been submitted to the Parliament and  is 
expected to be adopted by March. 
•  Secondary  legislation  is  also  in  the  pipeline,  the  adoption  of which  should  follow 
swiftly the entry into force of  the new Act. 
•  Framework Directive: An  independent Regulatory Authority (  Onajhankelijke post-
en telecommunicatie autoriteit, OPT  A) was created in 1997 and is now operational. 
•  Leased  lines:  The  Directive  has  been  substantially  transposed  by  secondary 
legislation (Besluit algemene richtlijnen telecommunicatie). The latter will be replaced 
by  new  legislation  which  is  being  prepared  for  the  purpose  of completing  minor 
aspects of  the transposition. 
•  Voice  telephony:  Transposition  is  substantially  ensured  by  secondary  legislation 
(Besluit  a/gemene  richtlijnen  telecommunicatie).  Implementation  of  the  cost 
accounting system is expected to be completed by May 1998. Other minor problems 
will be solved by new legislation. 
•  Licensing:  A  framework  for  licensing  is  in  place  under  the  existing 
Telecommunications Act, as amended in 1996, by which the Directive is only partially 
transposed.  Transposition  should  be  substantially  completed  by  the  forthcoming 
Telecommunications Act, in conjunction with other general regulations (Algemene wet 
bestuursrecht). 
•  Interconnection: Some provisions on  interconnection are already in place under the 
current Telecommunications Act. The Directive should be substantially transposed by 
the  new  Telecommunications  Act,  in  conjunction  with  other  general  regulations 
(Algemene wet bestuursrecht). 
•  Terminals/ Satellite earth station equipment: National transposit_ion  measures for 
the two Directives were notified in December 1997. 
•  Frequencies:  The  Directives  have  been  S\lbstantially  transposed  by  Ministerial 
Orders. 
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•  Austria adopted in July 1997 a Telecommunications Law - Telekommunikationsgesetz 
(TKG) which entered into force on 1 August 1997. The Law constitutes a framework 
which has been supplemented by a  number of secondary ordinances,  in particular 
relating to interconnection, tariffs and numbering. 
4.  Framework Directive: An independent Regulatory Authority (Telekom Control) is 
established under the Law and began operations on 1 November 1997. 
5.  Leased lines: The Directive has been substantially transposed by the Law. 
6.  Voice telephony: The Directive has been substantially transposed by the Law and 
secondary legislation,  in  particular the  1996 ordinance on tariffs  (Telekom-Tarif-
gestaltungsverordnung)  and  the  1997  ordinance  on  numbering  (Numerierungs-
verordnung). 
7.  Licensing:  The Directive has  been  partially transposed  into  national  legislation; 
concerns remain in relation to certain procedures for the granting of  licences. 
8.  Interconnection: The Directive is substantially transposed on the basis of the Law 
and the ordinance on interconnection (Zusammenschaltungsverordnung). There are 
some minor concerns regarding number portability, which will be fully achieved in 
a few years, and the NRA power. 
9.  Terminals/ Satellite earth station equipment: In relation to  terminals,  the Law 
and  a  specific  ordinance  ·  (Konformitiitsbewertungsverordnung)  substantially 
transpose the  Directive.  New  secondary  legislation  is  being drafted.  Concerning 
. satellite earth station equipment, the Law extends the key provisions of  the Terminal 
Equipment Directive to these systems. 
10.  Frequencies:  Core  frequencies  have  been  reserved  for  the  GSM,  ERMES  and 




OVERVIEW OF TRANSPOSITION OF HARMONISATION DIRECTIVES: PORTUGAL 
•  The  regulatory  framework  is  set out  in the Lei  que define  as  bases  gerais  a  que 
obedece o estabelecimento.  gestao  e  explora~ao de  redes  de  te/ecomunica~oes e a 
presta~ao de  servi~os de  telecomunica~oes  (Telecommunica~ions Act)  adopted  in 
August 1997, together with se~ondary legislation transposing Community law. 
•  Framework  Directive:  The  independent  Portuguese  NRA  (Instituto  das 
Comunica~oes  de Portugal, ICP) began operation in November 1989. 
•  Leased lines:  National  measures,  laid down mainly in a Decree-law of July  1994, 
transpose this  Directive partially.  Main  gaps  relate  to  information  to  be published, 
NRA  powers  on  refusal,  interruption  or  limitation  of supply,  tariffs  and  cost 
accounting. 
•  Voice telephony: Despite the adoption in September 1997 of  the Decree-law on voice 
telephony, there are still gaps concerning publication of tariffs; verification, publicity 
and aspects of  the cost accounting system; the numbering plan; and NRA powers. 
•  Licensing: This Directive was substantially transposed by a Decree-law of December 
1997, subject to the need to make good minor deficiencies. 
•  Interconnection:  No  legislation  aimed  at  transposing  this  Directive  has  been 
communicated. Assurances have been given that secondary legislation will be soon 
adopted. 
•  Terminals/ Satellite earth station equipment: Two Decree-laws adopted  in  June 
1993 and August 1996 transpose substantially both Directives. 
•  FreQuencies: Substantial transposition of  these Directives was carried out in February 
1994 by a decision ofiCP's Board of  Directors. 
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•  The Telecommunications Act  1987  was revised in  1997  in order to  reflect market 
developments  and  to  adapt  Finnish  legislation  further  to  EU  harmonisation 
requirements. The new law, the Telecommunications Market Act (Telemarkkinalaki-
Telemarknadslagen) was adopted on 30 April 1997 and entered into force on 1 June 
1997. The Act is supplemented by secondary legislation on specific matters. 
•  Framework Directive: The regulatory functions are divided between the Ministry of 
Transport  and  Communications  (Liikenneministerii:J-Trafikministeriet)  and  the 
Telecommunications  Administration  Centre  (T AC)  (Telehallintokeskuksen-
Teleforvaltningscentra/en  ).  Independence of the regulatory function  is enhanced  by 
the revision of the allocation of tasks between the Ministry and the T  AC which· took 
place in 1997, and under formal guidelines from the Ministry. 
•  Leased  Lines:  The  Directive  is  substantially  transposed  through  the 
Telecommunications  Market  Act  and  other primary  legislation,  and  a  complex  of 
secondary legislation. 
•  Voice  Telephony:  The  Directive  is  similarly  substantially  transposed  through  the 
Telecommunications  Market  Act  and  other primary  legislation,  and  a  complex  of 
secondary legislation. 
•  Licensing/Interconnection:  The  Directives  are  substantially  transposed  through  a 
complex of  primary and secondary legislation and the licences issued under the Act. A 
licence is needed only for constructing mobile networks. 
•  Terminals/  Satellite  earth  station  equipme~t:  The  Terminal  Directive  is 
substantially transposed through the Telecommunications Act,  the Radio  Act and a 
regulation issued by the Telecommunications Administration Centre.  The Satellite 
Directive is substantially transposed through the legislation on terminals, together with 
a  regulation  on  the  conformity  assessment  and  markings  of telecommunications 
terminal equipment and satellite earth sta~ion equipment. 
•  Frequencies:  The GSM  Directive  is  substantially  tr~sposed through  the  national 
frequency allocation table, and a decision regarding moving frequencies from NMT to 
GSM.  The  ERMES  and  DECT  Directives  are  substantially transposed  through  the 
national frequency allocation table. 
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1/213 OVERVIEW OI,TRANSPOSmON OFBARMONJSATION,DIRECTIVES: SWEDEN 
•  The Telecommunications Act  1993  (Telelagen)  was  amended  in  1997  to  take  into 
account  experience  of the  liberalised  environment  and  new  EC  hannonisation 
requirements,  and some new secondary legislation was  adop1ed.  The amended Act 
entered into force on 1 July 1997. 
•  Framework  Directive:  The  Swedish  telecommunications  is  supervised  by  an 
independent regulatory authority, the Post- and Telecommunications Agency (Post-
och  Te/estyre/sen)  (PTS).  Ownership of the  former incumbent,  Telia,  was in 1997 
passed  from the Ministry of Communications to the Ministry of Industry, to further 
mark the independence of  the regulatory authority. 
•  Leased lines: The Directive is substantially transposed through a complex of  primary 
and  secondary  legislation,  and  licence  conditions.  Primary  legislation  is  being 
amended to complete minor aspects of.the transposition. 
•  Voice  telephony:  The  Directive  is  substantially  transposed  through  a  complex  of 
primary and secondary  legislation,  licence conditions,  and  other measures  adopted 
under the Act. 
•  Licensing: The Directive is substantially transposed through a complex of primary, 
secondary legislation and licence conditions. 
•  Interconnection: The Directive is partially transposed through a complex of  primary, 
secondary legislation, and licence conditions.  Concern relates mainly to the lack of 
provisions on the publication of the reference interconnection offer and  the NRA 's 
powers  in  relation  thereto.  Outstanding  problems  appear  to  be  dealt  with  by 
forthcoming legislation and licence conditions. 
•  Terminals/  Satellite  earth  station  equipment:  The  Directives  are  substantially 
transposed  by  the  Telecommunications  Terminal  Equipment  Act  1992,  the 
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Order, and Regulations issued by the NRA. 
•  Frequencies: The GSM, ERMES and DECT Directives are substantially transposed 
through  a  complex  of secondary  legislation  and  the  national  frequency  allocation 
table. 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
•  The  telecommunications  regulatory  framework  was  reformed  by  the 
Telecommunications Acts 1981 and 1984. 
•  Three  new  Statutory  Instruments  were  issued  in  December  1997,  to  bring  UK 
legislation into  line  with the requirements of the Framework Directive,  the  Leased 
Lines  Directive,  the  Licensing  Directive  and  the  Interconnection  Directive.  The 
Statutory Instruments amended  in  particular the  1984 Act,  the Wireless Telegraphy 
Act of 1949, and certain licence conditions. 
•  Framework Directive: The regulatory functions are divided between the Departrnent 
of  Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Director General of  Telecommunications (DGT), 
who heads the Office of  Telecommunications (OFTEL), which are independent of  the 
operator. 
•  Leased lines: The Telecommunications (Open Network Provision and Leased Lines) 
Regulations substantially transpose the Directive. 
•  Voice  telephony:  The  Telecommunications  (Voice  Telephony)  Regulations 
substantially transpose the directive. 
•  Licensing:  The  Telecommunications  (Licensing)  Regulations,  together  with  a 
complex of other measures,  substantially transpose  the directive, notwithstanding a 
minor deficiency regarding procedural time-limits. 
•  Interconnection:  The  Telecommunications  (Interconnection)  Regulations 
substantially transpose the directive. 
•  Terminals/  Satellite  earth  station  equipment:  The  Directives  are  substantially 
transposed through the Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Regulations  1992 
and  the  Telecommunications  Terminal  Equipment  (Amendment  and  Extension) 
Regulations 1994. 
•  Frequencies: The GSM Directive, the ERMES Directive and the DECT Directive are 
substantially transposed through the national table of  radio frequency allocation. 
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The following tables present a selection of economic indicators providing a picture of the public 
(fixed and.mobile) voice telephony and public network infrastructure markets in.the Member 
States. 
The following criteria have been used to identify the number of operators in each of the markets 
selected: 
+  in countries where a licensing or declaration regime is  in place, the number of operators is 
shown  according  to  the  number  of general  authorisations  or  individual  licences  granted 
(including  requests  for  blocks of numbers)  or to  the  numbers  of undertakings  subject  t~ 
declaration procedures. In such cases, the figures  rela~e to  the potential competition in each 
sub-market,  rather than  to  the  current  level  of competition,  since  it  does  not  necessarily 
follow that all operators have actually entered the m~ket; 
+  in those countries where no such declaration/licensing system exists, the number of operators 
reflects the totality of  undertakings actually operating in the relevant sub-market. 
Explanatory notes 
Telecoms  services market value:  includes  revenues  for  fixed  and  mobile  telephone  services, 
switched data, leased-line and CATV  services. 
Incumbent:  means  telecommunications  organisations  granted  special  and  exclusive  rights  by 
Member  States  (Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  of 28  June  1990)  or public  operator(s) 
which enjoyed  a de facto monopoly before liberalisation. In the case of mobile telephony, the 
word 'incumbent' may refer to the subsidiary of  the incumbent in the voice telephony market. 
Public (fixed/mobile) voice telephony operators/service providers: operators which manage their 
own/third  party  (wire  or  wireless)  telecommunications  transmission  network  to  provide 
(fixed/mobile) voice telephony services  to the public at large. 
Public  network  operator:  operators  which  manage  their  own  (wire  or  wireless) 
telecommuQication transmission network to provide telecommunications services to the public at 
large (voice and non voice) or to provide network services. Network services (i.e. conveyance of 
calls,  messages  and  signals  over  a  telecommunication  network,  including  any  necessary 
switching)  may  be  network  interconnection  services,  which  are  provided  to  other  network 
operators to enable calls and associated functions to be passed between interconnected networks, 
or basic retail network services which are  provided to  other customers  such as  end users  or 
service providers. 
Market shares for  fixed/mobile  voice  telephony  ar~ indicated  in  term,  respectively,  of retail 
revenue (or operating income) and subscribers. 
Percentage of consumers with choice of operators:  percentage of national territory/population 
covered by two or more network operators/service providers. 
Incumbent's voice telephony prices for  3 or 10  minute local/long-distance calls made at peak 
hours by residential users. Values include value added tax, without taking volume discounts into 
account. 
Incumbent's analogue  leased  line  prices:  connection and  rental  charges  (exclusive  of  value 
added tax) for ordinary-quality national analogue leased lines (M.l 040 CCITT coefficient 1.00). 
Connection charges are for 2-wire circuits and represent the charge for both ends. 
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1/ 211 Incumbent's digital  leased line  prices:  connection and  rental  charges  for  national  high speed 
(2Mbit/s) leased national  lines circuits, exclusive of value added tax. 
Average time for granting individual licences: from the date of  individual  licence application 
Long-distance/international carrier selection in  place:  this  includes both call-by-call  selection 
and carrier pre-selection (default carrier determined by the subscribers and call-by-call override 
selection). 
NRA arbitrations:  number of NRA  interventions  to  resolve  disputes  during  interconnection 
agreement negotiations. 
Interconnection charges per minute (in Ecu/100) for call termination on fixed network, are based 
on a  3  minute call  duration at  peak rate  as  set out in  the  Commission Recommendation on 
Interconnection  in  a  Iiberalised  telecommunications  market.  Deviation  from  "best  current 
practice" interconnection charges (identified by the above-mentioned Recommendation) for call 
termination on fixed network, based on a 3 minute call duration at peak rate: 
- local level: between 0,6 and 1,0 Ecu/1 00 per minute; 
- single transit (metropolitan level): between 0,9 and I ,8 Ecu/1 00; 
-double transit (national level/more than 200 km.): between 1,5 and 2,6 Ecu/1 00. 
Positive deviation is from the upper limit of  the range. 
Exchange rate  to  ECU at  September  1997  is  applied (for consistency  with the  "best current 
practice"). 
Sources: National Regulatory Authorities, except when explicitly indicated. 
Other sources are: 
- European  Economy,  Annual Economic  Report for  1997'',  European  Commission  for  per 
capita  GDP  at  current  market prices  (PPS  (purchasing  power standard):  theoretical  prices 
expressed in equal standard purchasing power for each Member State) 
- "European  Information  Technology  Observatory  1997''  for  telecommunications  services 
market value/growth 
All figures relate to  January 1998, except for market shares; "1997 mobile market share", if not 
explicitly indicated, refers to the third quarter of 1997. 
The following exchange rates to ECU are applied (average at January 1998): 
8:40,78  DK:7,53  D:  1,98  EL:312  E:  167,32  F:6,61  IRL:0.77  I:  1940,65 
L: 40,78  NL: 2,23  A:  13,9  P: 202,23  FIN: 5,99  S: 8,72  UK: 0.67 
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BELGIUM  I 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita 1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  112,3  (EU: 100) 
telecoms services market value ( 1997; MECU)  4080 
per capita telecoms expenditure ( 1997; ECU)  399  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  9,8%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per I 00 inhabitants ( 1997)  9,5  (EU average: 13) 
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants ( 1996)  46,7 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
(according to the licences granted) 
Public fixed  ·local I  • incumbent:  Belgacom S.A.  (50,1% state-owned) 
voice  long distance/  1997 market share:  I 00% 
telephony  international'  • alternative operators:  3 
Public  analogue:  ..  incumbent:  Belgacom Mobile  (75% Belgacom SA) 
mobile voice  • incumbent:  Belgacom Mobile 
telephony  GSM 900  market share:  •1995: 100%  •1996: 85%  •1997: 70% 
• alternative operators:  I (Mobistar)  I 997 market share: 30% 
DCS 1800  no licences granted 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
(according to the licences granted) 
local loop/ trunk I  9 licensee operators + Belgacom 
crossborder connections•  (3 CATV companies; 3  ( +  Belgacom) fiXed voice telephony licensee operators) 
0/o OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERA  TORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony 
carrier selection in place  • long distance: yes  • international: yes 
number portability in place  no 
local/long-distance/ international calls  • territory: 0%  • population: 0% 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: 0%  • population: 0% 
GSM 900  • territory: approx.  100%  • population: approx. I 00% 
INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/100) 
bi-monthly rental  331) 
local calls  • 3 minutes:  14,8  • I  0 minutes:  49,4 
long-distance calls  • 3 minutes:  53,2  • I  0 minutes:  178 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue  • connection: I 146  • monthly rental 50 km: 267  • monthly rental  250 km: 944 







Incumbent's retail prices (cont.) 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue  • connection: 774  • nearest EU: 956  • furthest EU:  1251 
digital  • connection: 2281  • nearest EU:  I 1930  • furthest EU:  24492 
Average time for delivery leased lines.  • national:  I month  • international: 1 month 
(analogue/2Mbit/s) by the incumbent 
LICENCE FEES 
(according to the relevant drafllegislation2) 
Public fixed voice telephony licence fees (ECU) 
services  • up-front: 8582  • annual fees: 7356 
infrastructure (public network)  • up-front:  I 2261  • annual fees: 8852 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees 
analogue  no fees 
GSM 900  • up-front:  220,693 MECU  • annual fees: 245000 ECU 
• annual frequency fees: 24522 ECU per channel 
DCS  1800  196,171  MECU 
Average time for granting individual licences  120 days 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  •pending:  0  • refused:  2 (non valid  files) 
PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  2 
fixed-fixed  2 (some new 1/C agreements are being negotiated) 
mobile-mobile  none 
NRA arbitration in place  none 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  none 
Universal service contribution in  place  none 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
fixed-fixed  local level  1,14  +14,0% 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  2,15  +19,4% 
charges.\  double transit (national)  3,02  +16,1% 
mobile-fixed  local level  1,14  '  +14,0% 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  2,15  +19,4% 
charges  double transit (national)  3,02  +16,1% 
%difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed  Jocal level/single/double transit: none 
1/C charges 
1  The  licence  system  (for both  services  and  infrastructures)  does  not  differentiate  between  local,  national  and 
international licences. 
2 Reproduced by a temporary "Circulaire Ministeriel". 




DENMARK  .  I 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
. 
per capita  1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  115,5  (EU:/00) 
telecoms services market value (1997; MECU)  2625 
per capita telecoms expenditure (1997; ECU)  498  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  8,6%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants (1996)  25 
telephone I  ines per I  00 inhubitnnls ( 1996)  61,6 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERA  TORS/SERVICE PROVID.ERS' 
Public fixed  local
2  • incumbent:  Tete Danmark  (52% state-owned) 
voice  market share:  •1995: 100%  •1996: 100%  •1997: 95% 
telephony  • alternative operators:  5  (I CATV) (2 companies are not operating) 
(according to the  1997 market share: 5% 
interconnect  ion  long distance
3  • incumbent:  Tete Danmark 
agreement.\~  market share:  •1995: 100%  •1996: 99%  •1997: 94% 
• alternative operators:  4  (2 companies are not  operating) 
1997 market share: 6% 
international  incumbent:  Tele Danmark 
market share:  •1995: 100%  •1996: 98%  •1997: 90% 
• alternative operators:  4  (all companies operating) 
1997 total ulternative operators market share:  I  0% 
Public mobile  analogue  incumbent:  Tele Danmark Mobile  (I 00% Tele Danmark subsidiary) 
voice telephony  • incumbent:  Tele Danmark Mobile 
(according to  GSM 900  market share:  •1995:  50%  •1996: 50%  •1997: 50% 
the licences  • alternative operators:  2  Sonofon market share ( 1997):  50% 
granted)  (Debitel is a service provider not yet operating) 
DCS 1800  3 operators+ Tele Danmark Mobile 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS' 
(according to the market situation) 
localloop
4  Tele Danmark + 4 operators  (/ CATV) (2 companies are not operating) 
trunk connections  Tele Danmark + 2 operators 
crossborder connections  Tele Danmark + 3 operators 
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1/221 Ofo OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony 
carrier selection in place  .  •long-distance: yes  • international: yes 
number portability in place  no 
local culls  .  • territory:  100%  • population:  I 00% 
long-distance calls  • territory:  I 00%  •population: 100% 
international calls  • territory:  I 00%  • population:  I  00% 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: 0%  • population: 0% 
GSM900  • territory: I 00%  • population: I  00% 
INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony~ (ECU/1 00) 
bi-monthly rentul  2297 
local calls  •  3 minutes:  15,1  •  10 minutes:  46,6 
long-distance culls  •  3 minutes:  23.5  •  I  0 minutes:  74,6 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kllz)  • connection: 690  • monthly rental 50 km:  175  • monthly rental250 km:  293  · 
digital (2 Mhitls)  • connection: 4143  • monthly rental 50 km:  1940  • monthly rental250 km: 3123 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 863  • nearest EU:  1726  • furthest EU: 5809 
digital (2Mhitls)  • connection: 5178  • nearest EU: 30540  • furthest EU: 88299 
A  ve~age  time for delivery leased lines  • national: 28 days  • international: 90 days 
(analogue/2Mbit/s) by the incumbent
6 
LICENCE FEES 
l•ublic fixed voice •eleJlhony lic.-ence fees (I·:< 'l J) 
services/infrastructure (public network)  up-front/annual fees:  none 
annual numbering fees  0,23 ECU per 8 digit number+ code fee (unknown) 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue  not available 
GSM 900  • annual fees:  752 per duplex channel 
DCS  1800  • annual fees: 488 per duplex channel 
annual numbering fees (GSM900 and DCS 1800)  0,23 ECU per 8 digit number+ code fee (unknown) 
Average time for granting individual licences  0 days 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  • pending: none  • refused: none 
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1/222 PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  3 
fixed-fixed  9 
mobile-mobile  2 
NRA arbitration  3 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  none 
Universal service contribution in place  none 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
ftxed-ftxed  local level  0,98  none 
networks I/C
7  single transit (metropolitan)  1,82  +1,1% 
charges  double transit (national)  2,22  none 
mohil£•-./ixcd  local level  • 0,98  none 
networks 1/('  single transit (metropolitan)  1,82  tl,l% 
charges  double transit (national)  2,22  none 
% diflcrence between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed  local level/single/double transit: none 
1/C charges 
1 Providers of  (fixed) telecommunications networks and services are not required to obtain individual licences, and 
do  not  need  to  notify  or await  any  authorisation  from· the  NRA  before  iaunching  operations.  Public  voice 
telephony operators must apply to the NRA for number allocation; once it is obtained, they can provide local/long 
distance and  international voice telephony services.  For the time being, about 20  operators have been awarded 
numbers,  but only 5 have an  interconnection agreement  in  place (and 2 of them  offer only  international  voice 
telephony). A separate licence is required for establishing and operating public mobile communications networks. 
2 Long distance voice service operators allowed to provide local voice services are included . 
.  l  International voice service operators allowed to provide long distance voice services are included. 
4 Trunk operators allowed to provide local loop are included 
~Tariffs are calculated as an average of  the various local tariffs. 
11  1995 average. 






per capita  1997 GOP at current market prices (PPS)  108,8  (EU:/00) 
telecoms services market value (1997; MECU)  36502 
per capita telecoms expenditure (1997; ECU)  445  (EU average: '376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  5,9%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per I 00 inhabitants ( 1997)  9,9  (EU average: 13) 
telephone lines per I 00 inhabitants ( 1996)  55,1 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
(according to the licences granted) 
Public fixed  local'  • incumbent:  Deutsche Tclckom AG  (74% state-owned) 
voice  1997 market share:  I 00% 
telephony  • alternative operators: 43 
long  • incumbent:  Deutsche Telekom 
distance  1997 market share: I 00% 
• alternative oper~tors:  13 
international  incumbent:  Deutsche Telecom 
1997 market share: 1  00% 
• alternative operators:  13 
Public  analogue  • incumbent:  T -Mobil  (100% Deutsche  Telekom subsidiary) 
mobile voice  GSM 900  • incumbent: T-Mobil 
telephony  market share
2  • 1995: 48%  • 1996:50%  • 1997:52% 




DCS 1800  2  (E-Pius Mobilfunk and E2  Mohilfunk) 
E-Plus Mobil funk  1997 market share: I 00% 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
(according to the licences granted) 
localloop
3  Deutsche Telekom +57 network operators (23 (+D.T.) of which also have local 
voice licences) 
trunk connections  Deutsche Telekom + 6 network operators (4 (+D.T.) of  which also have long 
distance voice licences) 
crossborder connections  Deutsche Telekom + 6 network operators 
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1/224 0/o OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
l,ublic fixed voice telephony 
\:.~·:~~~-~~l_ccl  ~un in plncc  ·-- -------··  ~ 
• lnng-distnncc: yes  • internntinnnl: yes 
number portability in place  yes 
local long-distance/international  • territory:  not available  • population: not available 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: 0%  • population: 0% 
GSM 900/DCS 1800  • territory: approx. 100%  •population: approx. IOOo/o 
INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/100) 
bi-monthly rental  2488 
local calls  •  3 minutes:  12,1  •  I 0 minutes:  42,5 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes:  91  •  10 minutes:  303 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 445  • monthly rental 50 km: 369  • monthly rental  250 km: 546 
digital (2Mbit/s)  • connection: 4047  • monthly rental 50 km: 2590  ..  • monthly rental  250 km: 3991 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 506  • nearest EU:  1260  • furthest EU:  1497 
digital (2Mhitls)  • connection: 1451  • nearest EU:  16066  • furthest E  U: 20 194 
Average time for delivery leased lines  • national analogue: 3 months  • international: not available 
(analogue/lMbit/s)  by the incumbent  • national digital:  6 months 
LICENCE FEES 
Public fixed voice telephony licence fees (ECU) 
services up front fees  •local: 1012  • national:  1517600 
infrastructure (public network) up front fees  •local: 1012  • national: 5362093 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue/GSM 900/ DCS 1800 up-front fees  •7588  • national: 2530000 
Average time for granting individual licences  not available 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  • pending: not available  • refused: not available 
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1/225 PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  3 
fixed-fixed  22 
mobile-mobile  not available 
NRA arbitration  4 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  none 
Universal service contribution  none 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from .. best current practice" 
fiXed-fiXed  local level·  1,00  none 
networks 1/C  single transit  regio50  I ,71  none 
charges
4  regio200  2,16  +20% 
double transit (national)  2,61  +0,4% 
mobile-fiXed networks 1/C charges  local level/ single/double transit  not available 
1 Long distance voice service operators that provide local voice services are included. 
2 Source: Mohi/e Communications guide to west European cellular subscribers, Nov.  1997 and Sept.  /996. 
1 Trunk operators that provide local loop are included. 
4  In  local currency (DM/100): (I) City:  1,97 per min.; (2) Regio50:  3,36 per min.; (3) Regio200: 4,25 per min.; (4) 
National: 5, 14 per min.  · 
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1/228 I 
GREECE  I 
DEROGATIONS GRANTED FOR FULL LIBERALISATION 
•  public fixed voice telephony: 1.1.200 I  I  •  public infrastructure: 1.1.200 I 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  64,6  (EU: 100) 
telecoms services market value ( 1997; MECU)  2243 
per capita telecoms expenditure (1997; ECU)  212  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  8,8%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per I  00 inhabitants ( 1997)  7,3  (EU average:  I 3) 
telephone lines per I  00 inhabitants ( 1996)  57 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
(according to the licences Kranted) 
l,uhlir fixed  local/  •  incumbent:  OTE  (82% state-owned) 
voice  long distance/  1997 market share:  I  00% 
telephony  international  •  alternative operators:  0  (derogation granted) 
analogue  no licences granted 
Public  GSM 900  •  incumbent:  none 
mobile voice  •  alternative operators:  2  o  Panafon 1997 market share: 57% 
telephony  o  Telestet 1997 market share: 43% 
ocs fsoo  Cosmote  (70% OTE) 
I•UDLIC NETWORK OI,ERATORS 
local loop/trunk/ crosshorder connections  I OTE (derogation granted) 
o/o OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERA  TORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony (derogation granted) 
carrier selection in place  •  long-distance:  no  •  international: no 
number portability in place  no 
local/long distance/international calls  territory/population: 0% 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  no licences 
GSM 900  • territory: approx. 70% of road network  • population: approx. 90% 
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1/221 INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/100) 
bi-monthly rental  657 
-
local calls  •  3 minutes: 4,17  •  I  0 minutes:  4,17 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes: not available  •  10 minutes:  not available 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  •  connection: 577  •  monthly rental 50 km: 351  •  monthly rental  250 km: 633 
digital (2Mbit/s)  •  connection: 2385  •  monthly rental 50 km: 3367  •  monthly rental  250 km: 5993 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  •  connection: 641  •  nearest EU:  1474  •  furthest EU:  1474 
digital (2Mbit/s)  •  connection: 1122  •  nearest EU: 28846  · •  furthest EU:  28846 
Average time for delivery leased lines  •  analogue (national/ international): 2-3 months 
(analogue/2Mbit/s) by the incumbent  •  digital (national/international):  I  0 !pOnths 
LICENCE FEES 
J•uhli-.· fiud voi-.~e •eleJ)fumy Ike  nee fees (I  ~('IJ)  -------
servin·s/  annual OTE fees:  IJ,205 MU'II 1 0,025'Yc.(annual turnover-1,602 MECIJ)j 
infrastructure (puhlic network) 
l•uhlic mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue  no licences granted 
GSM 900  •  up-front fees:  116 MECU 
•  annual fees:  [I ,603 MECU + 0,02%(annual turnover-32051 0 ECU)] 
DCS 1800  •  up-front: 45,8 MECU  •  annual fees': 335220 
Average time for granting individual licences  6 months 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  •  pending: none  •  refused: none 
PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  2  (under negotiation) 
fixed-fixed  0 
mobile-mobile  I 
NRA arbitration  I 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  not yet decided 
Universal service contribution in place  not yet decided 
Interconnection charges 
fixed-fixed networks 1/C charges  not yet decided 
mobile-fixed networks 1/C charges  under negotiation 
1 Figure for 1996 subject to annual revision. 
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11228 I 
SPAIN  I 
llEROC;ATIONS (;RANTED FOR FULL LIBERALISATION 
•  public infrastructure l(u voice telephony: 1.12.1998  I  •  public fixed voice telephony:  1.12.1998 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 <  iDP at current market prices (PPS)  76,9  (/~(}: /00) 
telecoms services market value ( 1997; MECU)  10585 
per capita telecoms expenditure ( 1997; ECU)  269  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  8,6%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants (1997)  11  (EU average: 13) 
telephone lines per I 00 inhabitants; ( 1996)  40,75 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
(accordin~ to the licences ~ranted) 
1
1uhlic fixed  lm:al/regiona 1
1  • incumbent:  Telef6nica de Espana S.A. (0.1% state-owned) 
voice  market share ( 1997):  I  00~'0 
telephony  • alternative operators:  10  (Retevision + 9 CATV operators) 
.  (companies not yet operating) 
long distance/  • incumbent:  Telef6nica de Espana S.A 
internal ion a I  1997 market share:  100% 
• alternative operators  10  (Retevision + 9 CATV operators) 
(CATV operators, not yet operating) 
Public  analogue  incumbent:  Telef6nica M6viles  (I 00% Telef6nica de Espana subsidiary) 
mobile voice  • incumbent:  Telef6nica M6viles 
telephony  GSM 900  market share:  •1995:  100%  • 1996:  61%  •1997:  64% 
• alternative operators:  I (Airtel)  1997 market share: 36% 
DCS  1800  no licences granted 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
(according to the licences granted) 
local loop  Telef6nica de Espana+ 9 CATV operators+ Retevision 
(alternative operators not yet operating) 
trunk/ crosshurder  Telef6nica de Espana  1 9 CATV operators -t  Rctevision 








I  ... 









Ofo OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERA  TORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
f•uhUc fixe!l voice telephony 
tnrrier sclctlion in plutc  •long-dishmtc: yes  • internationnl: yes  . 
number portuhility in pluce  no 
local calls/ long-distance/ international calls  territory/population: major Spanish cities 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: O%  • population: 0% 
GSM900  • territory: 65%  • population: 93% 
INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/1 00) 
bi-monthly rental  1722 
local calls
2  •  3 minutes: 7,9  •  I 0 minutes:  19,8 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes:  102,7  •  I 0 m·inutes:  308,2 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kllz)  • connection: 659  • monthly rental 50 km: 471  • monthly rental  250 km: 794 
digital (2Mhil/s)  • connection: 6574  • monthly rental 50 km: 3852  • monthly rental  250 km: 7765 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 448  • nearest EU: 867  • furthest EU: 1256 
digital (2Mbit/s)  • connection: 2988  • nearest EU: 21291  • furthest EU:  27079 
Average time for delivery leased lines  • national:  I 5 days  • international: 40 days 
(analogue/2Mbit/s)  by the incumbent 
LICENCE FEES 
Public fixed voice telephony licence fees 
services/ infrastructure (public network)  I• up-front fees: not available  • annual fees:  I /oo of  annual turnover 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue  • annual frequencies fees:  8,307 MECU  • annual fees:  I  ofoo of  annual turnover 
GSM 900  • annual frequencies fees: 2,636 MECU  • annual fees:  I  ofoo of  annual turnover 
Average time for granting individual licences  2,5 months 
Number of individual licence applications pending/refused  • pending:  5  (sate// ite)  • refused: none 
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1/230 PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  2  (under. negotiation) 
fixed-fixed  1 
mobile-mobile  I 
NRA arbitration  none 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  not yet decided 
Universal service contribution in place  not yet decided 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
fiXed-fiXed  localleveP  I ,51  +51% 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  I ,51  none 
charges
4  double transit (interprovinc.)  4,22  +62% 
mobile-fiXed  local level  not available  -
networks 1/C  single transit (metr_opolitan)  · not available  -
charges5  double transit (interprovinc:)  13,2  +408% 
%difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed 1/C charges  double transit: +213% 
1 Long distance voice service operators allowed to provide local voice services are included. 
2 Interprovincial calls. Lower tariffs are available for provincial calls. 
1 The lowest 1/C charge covers interconnection at a local or a tandem exchange. TpJJs the. "local" rate is the same as 
the "single transit" rate.  . 
4 Reference interconnection offer is not yet approved by the NRA; maximum 1/C tariffs are established by "Orden 
del  Ministerio  de  Fomento"  of 18  March  1997.  No  difference  between  local  level  and  single  transit:  both 
correspond to the denomination of"metropolitan" interconnection charges. 1/C charges in  local currency (Pts): (I) 
local level: not provided; (2) metropolitan: 2,5 per min.; (3) provincial: 4,25 per min; (4) interprovincial: 7 per min. 
Until fullliberalisation on  I December 1998, this offer is only valid for a limited number of authorised operators. 
~ Tariffs are being negotiated. In  local currency (Pts): (I) local level: not provided; (2) metropolitan: not provided.; 
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FRANCE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  105,9  (Ell: 100) 
telecoms services market value ( 1997; MECU)  24093 
per capita telecoms expenditure ( 1997; ECU)  411  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  7,4%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per I  00 inhabitants ( 1997)  10,1  (EU average: 13) 
telephone lines per I  00 inhabitants ( 1996)  57,2 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
(according to the licences granted) 
Public fixed  local'  • incumbent:  France Telecom  (75% state-owned) 
voice  1997 market share: 1  00% 
telephony  • alternative operators:  12 
long  • incumbent:  France Telecom 
distance  1997 market share: 100% 
• alternative operators:  4 
internal ional'  • incumhcnt:  France Telecom 
market share:  ·1996: 100%  • 1997: not available 
• alternative operators:  4 
Public  analogue  • incumbent:  France Telecom Mobile  (I 00% France Telecom subsidiary) 
mobile voice  1997 market share: 36% 
telephony  • alternative operators:  I (Societe Fram;aise de Radiocommunications (SFR)) 
1997 market share: 64% 
GSM 900  • incumbent: France Telecom Mobile (FTM) 
• alternative operators:  o national: 1  (SFR)  o local: 2  (FTM and SRR) 
DCS 1800  •national:  I licence (Bouygues T~lecom) 
•local  2 licences (FTM and  SFR) 
digital mobile market share  • France Telecom Mobile: 53% 
(GSM900+DCS 1800)  •SFR: 38% 
• Bouygues: 9% 
l,lJIILIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
(according to the licences grunted) 
localloop
2  France Telecom +14 (12 ofwhich also have voice telephony licence.\~ 
trunk connections  France Telecom+ 5 (4 of  which  also have voice te/eph~ny licences) 
crossborder connections
2  France Telecom +6 (4 of  which  also have voice telephony licences) 
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1/232 o/o OF CONSUMJ~:RS  WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
l'uhlic fixed voice telephony 
carrier selection in place  •long-distance: yes  • international: yes 
number portability in place  yes 
local calls/ long-distance  • territory:  0%  • households: 0% 
international calls  • territory: not available  • households: not available 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue/ GSM 900  • territory: 85%  • population: 98% 
DCS 1800  • territory: 47%  • population:  82% 
INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
J•ublic fixed voice telephony (ECU/ I  00) 
hi-monthly rental  2056 
local calls  .  3 minutes: 11,2  .  10 minutes:  25,7 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes:  51,7  •  I  0 minutes:  172,4 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kllz)  • connection: 605  • monthly rentaP 50 km: 485  • monthly rental  250 km: 697 
digital (2Mhitls)  • connection: 9072  • monthly rental 50 km: 2283  • monthly rental  250 km: 4702 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 340  • nearest EU: 624  • furthest EU: 760 
digital (2Mbit/s)  • connection: 3629  •nearestEU: 11914  ·furthestEU:  14138 
Average time for delivery leased lines  • national: not available  • international: 3 months 
(analogue/2Mbit/s)  by the incumbent 
LICENCE FEES 
l,ublic fixed/mobile voice telephony licence fees (ECU) 
services  opcr. with significant market power  •local: 30241  • national: 453618 
(annual fees)  other operators  •local: 15120  • national: 2268 J 0 
infrastructure  oper. with significant market power  •local: 30241  • national:  I ,068 MECU 
(annual fees)  other operators  •local: 15120  • national: 529221 
administrative  fixed  SCrVICCS  • local: 7560  • national:  113400 
fees  telephony  infrastructure  • local: 7560  • national: 264610 
mobile  services  • local: not available  • national: not available 
telephony  infrastructure  •local: 15121  • national: 529221 
Average time for granting individual licences  • pending: 24  • refused: not available 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  • not available  • not available 
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1/233 PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile/ fixed-fixed/mobile-mobile  not available 
NRA arbitration  not available 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  • 0,27 ECU/1 00 per min. for fixed operators 
+ universal service contribution in place  • 0.15 ECU/100 per min. for mobile operators 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
fixed-fixed  local level  0,71  none 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  1,73  none 
charges
4  double transit (national)  2,55  none 
mobile-fixed  local level/single/double  0,71  none 
networks 1/C  transit (metropolitan)  1,73  none 
chargess  transit (national)  2,55  none 
%difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed 1/C charges  local /single/ double transit: none 
1 Long distance voice service operators allowed to provide local/international voice services are included. 
2 Four trunk operators allowed to provide local loop arc included. 
1 Tarifl:<; for 250 krn distance from the border. 
4  In  local  currencY.  (FF/1 00):  (I) local  level:  4,69 per min.;  (2)  single transit:  II ,40  per min.;  (3) double transit 
(>200km): 16,77 per min. 
~ Source: Reference interconnection catalogue, France Telecom,  1997. 
53  1/234 IRELAND 
DEROGATIONS GRANTED FOR FULL LIBERALISATION 
•  public infrastructure for voice telephony:  1.1.2000  I  •  public fixed voice telephony:  1.1.2000 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  103,9  (EU:/00) 
telecoms services market value ( 1997~ MECU)  I585 
per capita telecoms expenditure ( 1997; ECU)  438  (EU average: 376) 
tele<.:oms servi<.:es market value growth 1998/97  9,5%  (RU avera}{e: H,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per I  00 inhabitants ( 1997)  11,3  (ElI avera}{('.'  13) 
telephone linl's per I  00 inhabitants ( 1996)  38,4, 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Public fixed  local/  • incumbent:  Telecom Eireann (80% state-owned) 
voice  long distance/  market share:  1997:  100% 
telephony  international  • alternative operators:  none  (derogation granted) 
analogue  incumbent:  Eircell  (100% Telecom Eireann subsidiary) 
Public  • incumbent:  Eircell 
mobile voice  GSM 900  market share:  •I996: 100%  • I997
1
:  72% 
telephony  • alternative operators:  1 (Esat Digifone)  I 997 market share 
1  28% 
DCS I800  no licences granted 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
local loop/ trunk/  Telecom Eireann  (derogation granted) 
crossborder <.:onnections 
•yo  OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony (derogation granted) 
carrier selection in  place  • long-distance:  no  • international: no 
number portability in place  no 
local/long distance/international calls  territory/population: 0% 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  0% 
GSM 900  • territory:  approx.  100%  • population: approx.  I 00% 
INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (EClJ/100) 
bi-monthly rental  2916 
local calls  •  3 minutes:  14,9  .  10 minutes:  45,7 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes:  58,2  . I  0 minutes:  194 
54  1/235 1:'  ,, 
.ncumbent's retail prices (cont.) 
;)  • monthly rental 50 km: 427  • monthly rental  250 km:  772 
J480  • monthly rental 50 km: 3200  • monthly rental  250 km: 5965 
J) 
.10n:  389  • nearest EU: 1685  • furthest EU: 29 I 6 
.;ction: 6480  • nearest EU: 23976  • furthest EU:  28512 
.ry leased lines  • national:  not available  • international: not available 
y the incumbent 
F"'-
LICENCE FEES 
Public fixed "t>ice telephony licence fees 
services/ infrastructure (public network)  r  not yet decided 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue  no fees 
GSM 900  • annual spectrum  fees
2
:  o first two years:  12961  o after the second year: 25920 
DCS 1800  • up  front:  I, 944 MECU  • annual spectrum  fees
2
: 25920 (after the second year) 
• spectrum access charge (up-front): the applicants are free  to  offer any figure up to and 
including an amount of 12,96 MECU 
Average time for granting individual licences  not available 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  • pending: not available  • refused:  not available 
PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  2 
fixed-fixed  none 
mobile-mobile  none  (I 1/C agreement is being  negotiated) 
NRA arbitration  none 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  not yet decided 
Universal service contribution in place  not yet decided 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
fixed-fixed  local level  7  +600% 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  13,3  +638% 
charges
3  double transit (national)  16,6  +537% 
mobile-fixed  local level  7  +600% 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  13,3  +638% 
charges  double transit (national)  .  16,6  +537% 
%difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed 1/C charges  local level/single/double transit: none 
1 Source: Mobile Communications guide to west European cellular subscribers, Nov.  /997. 
2 Per paired 200kHz channel 
1 Charges for cross-border call termination. Tariffs proposed by  the operator, but not yet approved by the national 
regulatory authority. In  local currency (IR£/100): (I) local level: 5,22 per min.; (2) single transit: 9,84 per min.; (3) 
double transit:  12,27 per min. 
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1/236 ITALY  I 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GOP at current market prices (PPS)  103,2  (EU: /00) 
telecoms services market value ( 1997; MECU)  18884 
per capita telecoms expenditure ( 1997; ECU)  329  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth  1998/97  7,1%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per I  00 inhabitants ( 1  997)  16,2  (EU average: 13) 
telephone I  ines per 100 inhabitants ( 1996)  42,68 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
(according to the licences granted) 
1:.u blic fixed  local/  • incumbent:  Telecom ltalia  (9,45% state-owned) 
voice  long distance/  1997 market share:  I  00% 
telephony  international  • alternative operators:  0  (no licences granted) 
Public  analogue  incumbent:  Telecom ltalia Mobile  (60,34% Telecom lta/ia) 
mobile voice  • incumbent:  Telecom ltalia Mobile 
telephony  USM 900  market share:  •1995: 90%  • 1996:  74%  • 1997: 71% 
• alternative operators:  I (Omnitel P.l.)  1997 market share: 29% 
DCS  I MOO  no licences granted 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
(according to the licences granted) 
local loop/trunk/  Telecom Italia + 0 alternative operators  (no licences granted) 
crossborder connections 
0/o OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony 
local/long distance/international  • territory:  0%  • population: 0% 
carrier selection in  place  • national: no  • international: no 
number portability in  place  no 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: 0%  • population: 0% 
GSM 900  • territory:  72%  • population: 96% 
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1/231 INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/100) 
hi-monthly rental  1892 
local calls  •  3 minutes: 7,8  •  I 0 minutes:  23,6 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes:  70,7  •  I 0 minutes:  217,3 
Nationalleased-lines.(ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection:  I 04  • monthly rental 50 km: 475  · • monthly rental  250 km: 667 
digital (2 Mbitls)  • connection: 309  • monthly rental 50 km: 7224  • monthly rental  250 km:  11295 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: I 04  • nearest EU:  1594  · • furthest EU:  1867 
digital (2 Mhitl.\')  • connection: 309  • nearest Ell: 32441  • furthest Ell: 36797 
Average time for delivery leased lines  •national: 89% in 20 days or within the terms accorded with the clients 
(analogue/2Mbit/s)  by the incumbent  • international:  not available 
LICENCE FEES 
(according to the draft legislation) 
Public fixed voice telephony licence fees (ECU) 
...  local  regional  national 
services  up-front  10306  20612  51530 
annual  10306  25766  61835 
infrastructure  up-front  10306  20612  61835 
(public network)  annual  25766  51530  103058 
services -t  up-front  15459  25766  56682 
in frastructurc  annual  10306  25766  61835 
numbering ll.·l·s  • subscriber's  number: 0,0 I ECl J/suh.  • operator's prclix 
1
:  from  I  01058 to 25766 
Public mohile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue  annual fees: 3,5% of annual turnover 
GSM 900  • up-front: not available  • annual fees: 3,5% of  annual turnover 
DCS 1800  same fees as for fixed voice telephony, unless differently stated in the bidding procedures 
Average time for granting individual licences  not available 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  • pending: 5 
• refused: none 
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Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent 
Universal service contribution in place 
Interconnection charges 
fixed-fixed  local leveF 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan) 
charges
1  double transit (national) 
mohi/e-fixed  local level 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan) 
charges
4  double transit (national) 
%difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed 
1/C charges 
1 Depending on the type of  access code. 





not yet decided 
not yet decided  ' 
ECU/1 00 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
1,54  +5~% 
2,52  +40% 
not provided  -
4,12  +312% 
4,12  +129% 
4,12  +58% 
•local level: + 167% 
• single transit: +63% 
3 Source: Reference Interconnection Offer,  Telecom lta/ia,  1997.  Lat.est tariffs proposed by the operator, but not yet 
approved by the national regulatory authority. In  local currency (LIT): (I) local level (only from  1.9.1998): 29,6 
per min.; (2) single transit: 48,4 per min.; (3) double transit: not provided. 
4  In  local currency (LIT): local/single/double transit: 80 per min. 
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1/239 LUXEMBOURG  I 
Jn;RonATIONS (';RANTt~D FOR Ji'ULL LIBERAI~ISATION 
•  public infrastructure for voice telephony:  1. 7.1998  I  •  public fixed voice telephony:  1. 7.1998 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  163,5  (EU:/00) 
telecoms services market value (1997; MECU)  211 
per capita telecoms expenditure ( 1997; ECU)  505  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  9,9%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants ( 1997)  15,1  (EU average: 13) 
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants ( 1996)  58,3 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERA  TORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Public fixed  local/  • incumbent:  Luxembourg  P&T  ( 100% state-owned) 
voiCe  long distance
1
/  1997 market share:  100% 
telephony  international  • alternative operators:  none  (derogation granted) 
Public  analogue  none  (service no longer provided by P& T) 
mobile voice  • incumbent:  Luxembourg  P&T 
telephony  GSM900  1997 market share:  100% 
• alternative operators:  1 (Millicon) 
DCS 1800  Luxembourg  P&T  + Millicon 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
local loop/trunk/  Luxembourg  P&T  (derogation granted) 
crossborder connections 
0/o OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony 
carrier selection in place  no 
number portability in place  no 
local/long distance/international calls  territory/population: 0% 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  service no longer provided  (by P&T) 
GSM 900/DCS 1800  territory/population: 0% (alternative operator not yet operating) 
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1/240 INCUMBENT'S RET  AIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/100) 
bi-monthly rental  2707 
local/long distance calls  •  3 minutes:  12,3  •  10 minutes: 36,9 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3,1 kHz)  • connection: 123  • monthly rental 50 km:  184  • monthly rental 250 km: 184 
digital (2Mbit/s)  •connection:2943  • monthly rental 50 km: 5100  • monthly rental 250 km: 5100 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, 1 kHz)  • connection: 123  • nearest EU: 294  • furthest EU: 846 
digital (2Mbitls)  • connection: 2943  • nearest EU: 9809  • furthest EU:  24521 
Average time for delivery leased lines  • national: 10 (for analogue) 20 (for digital) working days 
(analogue/2Mbit/s)  by the incumbent  • international: 20 (analogue/digital) working days 
LICENCE FEES 
t•ublic fixed voice telephony licence fees 
services/in frastructurc  not yet decided 
t•ublic mobile telephone services licence fees (EClJ). 
GSM 900/ DCS 1800  • up-front: 1,839 MECU  •annual fees: 735644 
• annual spectrum usage: 12261 per channel 
Average time for granting individual licences  not available 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  • pending: none  • refused: none 
PUBLIC NETwORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile/ fixed-fixed/ mobile-mobile  0  ( 1 1/C agreement is being negotiated) 
NRA arbitration  not available 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  not yet decided 
Universal service contribution In place  not yet decided 
Interconnection charges 
jixed-fu:edl mobile -fu:ed networks 1/C charges  under negotiation 
1 Luxembourg does not have a local network. 
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1/241 THE NETHERLANDS 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  I  997 GOP at current market prices (PPS)  104,9  (EU:/00) 
telecoms services market value (I  997~ MECU)  7089 
per capita telecoms expenditure ( 1997; ECU)  454  (EU average: 3 76) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  6,7%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per 1  00 inhabitants ( 1997)  9,9  (EU average: 13) 
telephone lines per I 00 inhabitants ( 1996)  52,3 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
(according to the licences granted) 
Public fixed  local
1  • incumbent:  PIT Telecom (KPN)  (44% state-owned) 
voice  1997 market share: 100% 
telephony  • alternative operators:  3  (not yet operating) + 125 CATV (5 of  which 
have 1/C agreements in place) 
long  • incumbent:  PIT Telecom 
distance  1997 market share: 100% 
• alternative operators:  2 
international  • incumbent:  PIT Telecom 
market share:  •1996:100%  •1997: <100% 
• alternative operators:  2 
Public  analogue  incumbent:  PIT Telecom 
mobile voice  • incumbent:  PTTTelecom 
telephony  GSM 900  1997 market share: 60% 
• alternative operators:  1  (Libertel)  1997 market share: 40% 
DCS 1800  no licences granted 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERA  TORS 
(according to the licences granted) 
local loop
2  PTr Telecom + 3 + 125 CATV (5 of  which have 1/C agreements in place) 
(all the network operators have been granted voice telephony licence~) 
trunk/ crossborder connections  PIT Telecom + 2 (voice telephony licensee operators) 
o/o OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony 
carrier selection in place  •long-distance: yes  • international: yes 
number portability in place  no 
local/long-distance/international calls  • territory: not available  • population: not available 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: 0%  • population: 0% 
GSM900  • territory: approx. 1  00%  • population: approx. 100% 
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1/242 INCUMBENT'S RET AIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/100) 
bi-monthly rental  2442 
local calls  •  3 minutes: 13,2  •  10 minutes:  33,7 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes:  31,4  •  10 minutes:  94,3 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3,1 kHz)  • connection: 1  05  • monthly rental 50 km:  125  • monthly rental  250 km: 283 
digital (2Mbitls)  • connection: 2244  • monthly rental 50 Ian: 2199  • monthly rental  250 km: 3  77  5 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3,1 kHz)  • connection: 105  • nearest EU: 507  • furthest EU: 664 
digital (2Mbitls)  • connection: 2244  • nearest EU: 9170  • furthest EU: 11895 
Average time for delivery leased lines  • national: within 3 months  • international: within 3 months 
(analogue/2Mbit/s)  by the incumbent 
LICENCE FEES 
Public fixed voice telephony licence fees (ECU) 
services  • up-front: 135  • annual fees: 281 
infrastructure  locaVregional  • up-front: 90  • annual fees: 224 
(public network)  long distance  • up-front: 0  • annual fees:  112212 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue  annual fees:  10100 
GSM 900/DCS 1800  annual fees:  112212 
Average time for granting individual licences  less than 6 weeks (90%) 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  • pending: approx. 30  • refused: not available 
PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  3 
fixed-fixed  8 ( 19 1/C agreements in negotiation) 
mobile-mobile  not available 
NRA arbitration  2 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  not yet decided 
Universal service contribution in place  not yet decided 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
fzxed-fzxed  local level  0,95 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  1,27 
charges  double transit (national)  1,63 
mobile-fzxed  locaV single/ double transit  not available 
networks 1/C charges 
1 Long distance voice service operators allowed to provide local voice services are included. 






1/243 AUSTRIA  I 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  110,4  (EU:100) 
telecoms services market value ( 1997; MECU)  3190 
I 
per capita telecoms expenditure (1997; ECU)  393  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  9,5%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants ( 1997)  14,3  (EU average: 13) 
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants ( 1996)  48,5 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS · 
(according to the licences granted) 
local1  • incumbent:  Post und Te1ekom Austria (PTA) AG  (100% state-owned) 
Public fixed  1997 market share: 100% 
voice  • alternative operators:  7  (not yet operating) 
telephony  long distance/  incumbent:  Post und  Telekom Austria (PTA) AG 
international  1997 market share: 100% 
• alternative operators:  5  (not yet operating) 
analogue  incumbent:  MobilKom Austria (75%  PTA)  .. 
Public  • incumbent:  MobilKom Austria 
mobile voice  GSM 900  market share:  •1995: 100%  • 1996: 96,8%  •1997: 75% 
telephony  • alternative operators:  1 (Max.Mobil)  1997 market share: 25% 
DCS 1800  1  (Connect Austria, not yet operating) 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
(according to the licences granted) 
localloop
2  PTA+ 7 licensee operators (not yet operating) 
(5  operators are  I 00% publicly-owned utilities companies.  1 operator has been granted 
only voice telephony licence.  1 operator has been granted only infrastructure licence) 
trunk/cross  border  PTA + 4 licensee operators 
connections 
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1/244 Ofo OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony 
carrier selection in place  • long-distance: no  • international: no 
number portability in place  no 
local/ long-distance/ international calls  territory/ population: 0% 
l,ublic mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: 0%  • population: 0% 
GSM900  •territory:approx.30%  • population: 90% 
INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony' (ECU/1 00) 
bi-monthly rental  6938 
local calls  •  3 minutes: 25  •  1  0 minutes:  83 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes: 96  •  10 minutes: 321 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, 1 kHz)  • connection: 108  • monthly rental 50 Ian: 327  • monthly rental  250 Ian: 578 
digital (2Mbit/s)  • connection: 1438  • monthly rental 50 Ian: 3055  • monthly rental  250 Ian: 5572 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 108  • nearest EU: 899  • furthest EU: 1677 
digital (2Mbit/s)  • connection: 1438  • nearest EU:  11383  • furthest EU:  19770 
Average time for delivery leased lines  • national: 3 to 4 months  • international: not available 
(analogue/2Mbit/s) by the incumbent 
LICENCE FEES 
Public fixed voice telephony licence fees
4 (ECU) 
services/  • up-front:  5033  • annual fees:  0  • numbering fees:  not yet decided 
infrastructure (public network) 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees
4 
analogue  • up-front:  5033 ECU  • annual fees per channel:  71,8 ECU 
GSM 900  •up-front:  287,570 MECU  • annual fees per channel:  575 ECU 
• numbering fees: not yet decided 
DCS 1800  •up-front:  194,110 MECU  • annual fees per channel:  575 ECU 
Average time for granting individual licences  4 weeks 





PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  2  (2 new 1/C agreements are being negotiated) 
fixed-fixed  0  (3 new 1/C agreements are being negotiated) 
mobile-mobile  not available 
NRA arbitration  1 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  not yet decided 
Universal service contribution in place  nones 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
fued-jixed  locallevel
6  3,26 
networks  single transit (metropolitan)  3,26 
1/C charges
7  double transit (national)  3,99 
mobile-fued  local level
6  07 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  8,1 
charges
8  double transit (national)  10,02 
%difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed  •localleveVsingle transit: +  147% 
1/C charges  • double transit: +  151% 
1 Long distance voice service·operators allowed to  provide local voice services are included. 
2 Trunk operators allowed to provide local loop are included. 







4 All the  licensee operators have to  contribute to  the operational cost of the NRA (proportionally to their annual 
turnover and to the total turnover of the national telecommunications market). The amount is not yet decided. 
~ Unless PTA' s market share falls under 80%, it cannot claim financial service funding. 
(>  There arc  no  offer  for  1/C points at  local  level. lbe lowest  J/C charge covers interconnection at a local or a 
tandem exchange. 'lbus the "local" rate is the same as the "single transit" rate. 
7 Proposed tariffs, noy yet approved by the NRA and still under negotiation. In local currency (ATS): (I) local level: 
not provided; (2) single transit: 0,45 per min.; (3) double transit: 0,55 per min. 
R In  local currency (ATS): (I) local level: not provided; (2)  single transit:  1,12 per min.; (3) double transit:  1,39 per 
mm. 
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PORTUGAL  I 
DEROGATIONS GRANTED FOR FULL LmERALISATION 
•  public infrastructure for voice telephony: 1.1.2000  I  •  public fixed voice telephony: 1.1.2000 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  69,4  (EU:/00) 
telecoms services market value (1997; MECU)  2550 
per capita telecoms expenditure (1997; ECU)  258  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  11,1%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per 1  00 inhabitantS ( 1997)  11,5  (EU average: 13) 
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants ( 1996)  37,14 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Public fixed  local/  • incumbent:  Portugal Telecom  (25% state-owned) 
voice  long distance/  1997 market share: 100% 
telephony  international  • alternative operators:  0 (derogation) 
t•uhli,·  analogue  incumbent:  Telecomunica<;oes M6veis Nacionais (TMN) 
mobile voice  ( 100% Portugal Telecom subsidiary) 
telephony  • incumbent:  TMN  . 
GSM 900  market" share 
1
:  • 1995:47%  • 1996:  45%  • 1997:  50% 
• alternative operators:  2  Telecel1997 market share
1
: 50% 
(one licensee company not yet operating) 
DCS 1800  1  (company  not yet operating) 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
local loop/trunk/ crossborder connections  I  Portugal Telecom  (derogation granted) 
o/o OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERA  TORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony (derogation granted) 
carrier selection in place  no 
number portability in place  no 
local/long distance/international calls  territory/population: 0% 
t•ublic mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: 0%  • population: 0% 
GSM 900  • territory:  zpprox. 90%  • population: approx. 99% 
INCUMBENT'S RET  AIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/100) 
bi-monthly rental  2136 
local calls  •  3 minutes: 6,7  •  lOminutes:  26,7 
long-distance calls
2  •  3 minutes:  100  •  10 minutes:  320,4 
66  1/241 Incumbent's retail prices (cont.) 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection
3:208  • monthly rental 50 km: 330  • monthly rental  250 km:  1063 
digital (2Mhit/s)  • connection
3
: 4945  • monthly rental 50 km: 4500  • monthly rental  250 km:  13648 
International leased-lines (ECll) 
analogue (3, I kllz)  • connection: 183  • nearest EU:  1623  • furthest EU: 2363 
digital (2Mbitls)  • connection: 3653  • nearest EU: 23332  • furthest EU:  35177 
Average time for delivery leased lines  • nationaVintemational:  from 4 to 7 days 
(analogue/2Mbit/s)  by the incumbent 
LICENCE FEES 
Public voice telephony licence fees 
services/  infrastructure (public network)  not yet decided 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue  no specific fees in addition to GSM 900 fees (for TMN) 
GSM 900/0CS 1  800  • up-front:  4945  • renewal fees: 2472  • annual fees: 24724 
Average time for granting individual licences  43 working days 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  •pending:  3  • refused:  none 
PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  I (I 1/C agreement is being negotiated) 
fixed-fixed  I (I 1/C agreement is being negotiated) 
mobile-mobile  not avail. 
NRA arbitrations  1 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  included in the overall charges 
Universal service contribution in place  included in the overall charges 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice, 
fued-fued  local level  1,25  +25% 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  2,5  +39% 
chargcs
4  double transit (national)  18,75  +621% 
mobile-fixed  local level  1,25  +25% 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  2,5  +39% 
charges
5  double transit (national)  18,75  +621% 
%difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed  • localleveVsingle/double transit: none 
1/C charges 
1 Source: Mobile Communications guide to west European cellular subscribers, Nov.  1997 and Sept.  1996. 
2 Tariffs for interurban 2"d  grade call. Lower tariffs are available for regional 1
51  grade call, urban a!eas of Lisbon 
~~~  . 
3 National circuit connecting different groups of  networks. 
4 Charges for cross-border call termination not yet approved by the NRA. In local currency {PTE):  (1) local level: 
6,99 per min.; (2) single transit: 15 per min. (regionall
11  grade call, urban areas of  Lisbon and Oporto); (3) double 
transit:  107,15 per min. (interurban 2"d grade call). Values referring to  1997 and are still undergoing discussion 
for 1998. 
5 In local currency (PTE): double transit:  112,5 per min. (interurban 2"d grade call). Values referring to 1997 and 
still undergoing discussion for 1998. 
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1/248 FINLAND  I 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GOP at current market prices (PPS)  94,2  (EU:/00) 
telecoms services market value (1997; MECU)  1795 
per capita telecoms expenditure ( 1997; ECU)  350  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  6,9%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants ( 1997)  40  (EU average: I 3) 
telephone lines per tOO inhabitants (1996)  52,8 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS1 
Public fixed  locaF  • incumbents
3
:  o 46local incumbents (Finnet  Group)  (100% private owned) 
voice  market share:  • 1995: 78%  • 1996: 68%  • 1997: not avail. 
telephony  o Telecom Finland  (100% state-owned) 
(according  market share:  • 1995: 32%  • 1996: 32%  • 1997:  not avail. 
to the  • alternative operators:  15  (almost all companies are operating) 
notification.\)  1996 market share: approx. 0% 
long distance  • incumbent:  Telecom Finland 
market share:  •1995:  41o/q.  •1996: 42%  •1997: not avail. 
• alternative operators: ·  17  (almost all companies are operating) 
1996 total alternative operators market share: 58% 
(Fin net subsidiary: 55%; Telia Finland: 4, 7%) 














market share:  •1995: 75%  • 1996: 69%  •1997: not avail. 
• alternative operators:  15 
incumbent: 
• incumbent: 
1996 total alternative operators market share: 31% 
(Finnet subsidiary: 24%; Telia Finland: 9%) 
Telecom Finland 
Telecom Finland 
market share:  • 1995: 67%  • t  996: 68%  • 1997: 66% 
• alternative operators:  1  (Finnct subsidiary) 
1997 market share: 34% 
25 licences granted  (only 2 companies are yet operating) 
PUBLIC NETWORK OPERATORS 
(according to the notifications 
1
) 
Telecom Finland+ Finnet  Group (46 operators)+ 5 other operators 
(almost all companies are operating) 
Telecom Finland+ 2 Finnet subsidiaries+ 4 other operators 
(almost all companies are operating) 
Telecom Finland+ 1 Finnet subsidiary+ 7 other operators 
(almost all companies are operating) 
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1/249 0/o OF CONSUMERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
Public fixed voice telephony 
carrier selection in place  • long-distance:  yes (.\·ince  /994)  • international:  yes (.\·ince  /994) 
number portability in place  in some areas since June 1997 
local calls  • territory: I 00%  • population: I 00% 
long-distance calls  • territory: 100%  • population: 100% 
international calls  • territory: 1  00%  • population: 1  00% 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: 0%  • population:  0% 
GSM 900  • territory: 100%  • population: 1  00% 
DCS 1800  • territory: Helsinki area  • population: approx. 1  0% 
INCUMBENT'S RET  AIL PRICES (Telecom Finland) 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/100) 
hi-monthly rental  243R 
local calls  •  3 minutes:  li,H  •  I 0 minutes:  20,7 
long-distance calls  •  J minutes:  18,5  •  I 0 minutes:  61,8 
N  a tiona  I lcast.•d-lines ( EClJ) 
analogue (3, I .k/lz)  • connection: 768  • monthly rental 50 km:  I 74  • monthly rental  250 km:  524 
digital (2Mhit/:,)  • connection: 4174  • monthly rental 50 km: 870  • monthly rental  250 km: 2497 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 668  • nearest EU: 523  • furthest EU:  1370 
digital (2Mbit/s)  • connection: 2588  • nearest EU: 8314  • furthest EU:  23433 
Average  time  for  delivery  leased  lines  • national: not available  • international:  6 weeks 
(analoguc/2Mbit/s)  by the incumbent 
LICENCE FEES 
Public fixed voice telephony licence fees (ECU) 
Sei"Vll'CS  • up-front/annual/renewal: none 
• numbering fees:  o for subscriber number
1
': 0,4 ECU/sub. 
o for operator's prefix: from 3673 to 91827 
infrastructure (public network)  none 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue/ GSM 900  • up-front fees:  none  • annual spectrum fees
7
:  1262 (per frequency band/25kHz) 
DCS 1800  • up-front fees: none  • annual spectrum fees
7
: 947 (per frequency band/25kHz) 
Average time for granting individual licences  about 3 months 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  • pending:  none  • refused: none 
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II l:JU PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  2 
lixed-tixcd  approx. 70 
mobile-mobile  1 
NRA arbitration  4/5 times during the negotiation (not for the final agreement) 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  none 
Universal service contribution in place  none 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
fixed-fixed  local level
8  1,81  + 0,81% 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  1,81  + 0,5°/1, 
charges'
1  double transit (national)  4,20  + 61,5% 
mobile-fixed  locallevel
8  1,81  + 0,81% 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  1,81  +0,5% 
charges  double transit (national)  4,20  + 61,5% 
% difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed  localleveVsingle/double transit: none 
1/C charges 
1 According to the national licence regime, a notification is requested for providing fixed voice telephony services 
or network services in a public telecommunications network. Only the provision of telecommunications network 
services  in  a public  mobile  wireless  network  is  subject to  an  individual  licensing  requirement.  The  national 
licence/notification regime does not make any distinction between locaVlong distance and international. 
2 Some long distance voice service operators allowed to provide local voice services are included. 
3  Finnet  group  consists  of 46  regional  privately owned telephone  company and  their subsidiary  and  affiliated 
companies.  The great part of them  are  limited companies or cooperatives,  but there are  also  some economic 
associations and  organisations owned by  cities.  Until  1994  each  local  telephony company had a well-defined 
although limited monopoly within its geographical region and Telecom Finland  functions were to interconnect 
the  local telephone companies, in  order to  provide long-distance and international services, and to provide local 
tck·phony ( where there were no other local telephone companies). 
·•  Three trunk operators allowed to provide local loop arc included. 
~Six trunk/local loop operators allowed to provide crossborder connections are included. 
(>  Depending on the type of access code. 
7  For 6'h  billing year or later and for national spectrum usage. Lower annual spectrum usage fees are requested for 
the first 5 years of activity and for restricted right of  use area. 
8 The lowest. 1/C charge covers interconnection at local or a single exchange. Thus the "local " rate is the same as 
the "single transit". 




SWEDEN  I 
TELECOM.MUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  97,3  (EU:/00) 
telecoms services market value ( 1997; MECU)  4667 
per capita telecoms expenditure (1997; ECU)  523  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  7,4%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants ( 1996)  28 
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants (1996)  70,1 
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS
1 
Public fixed  local
2  • incumbent:  Telia  ( 100% state-owned) 
voice  market share:  •1995: 100%  •1996: 98%  • 1997:  not avail. 
telephony  • alternative operators:  13  licences  + 9 notifications 
(according  1996 total alternative operators
3 market share: 2% 
to the  long  • incumbent:  Telia 
notifications  distance  market share:  •1995: 94%  •1996: 88%  • 1997: not avail. 
or licences  • alternative operators:  13 licences + 9 notifications 
granted)  1996 total alternative operators market share: 12% 
(Tele2:  11%) 
international
2  • incumbent:  Telia 
market share:  •1995: 76%  •1996: 73%  • 1997: not avail. 
• alternative operators:  13 licences + 9 notifications 
1996 total alternative operators market share: 27% 
(Tele2: 22%) 
Public  analogue  incumbent:  Telia Mobitel  (100% Telia 's subsidiary) 
mobile voice  • incumbent:  Telia 
telephony  GSM900  market share  •1995: 46%  •1996: 52%  • 1997: not avail. 
(according  • alternative operators:  2 licences 
to the  1996 market share:  o Comviq: 30% 
licences  o Europolitan 17% 
granted)  DCS  1800  4  (only I company operating) 
PUBI:.IC NETWORK OPERATORS' 
local loop/ trunk/ crossborder connections  7 licensee operators + 24 notifications + Telia 
(according to the notifications or licences  (5  licensee operators (+Telia) and 5 notified operators also offer 
granted)  voice telephony services) 
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1/252 OJ. OF CONSUMERS Wim  CHOICE OF OPERA  TORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
r•ubllc fixed voice telephony 
carrier selection in place  •long-distance: yes  • international: yes 
number portability in place  no 
local calls  •tenntory:approx.O~  • population: approx. 0~ 
long-distance calls  • territory: 100%  • population: 100% 
international calls  • tend tory: 1  00~  • population: 1  00~ 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue  • territory: 0~  • population: 0~ 
GSM 900  • territory: not available  • population: not available 
INCUMBENT'S RETAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/100) 
bi-monthly rental  2410 
local calls  •  3 minutes: 8, 7  •  10 minutes:  27,5 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes:  21,8  •  10 minutes:  61,9 
Nationalleased-lines
4 (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 1860  • monthly rental 50 km: 82  • monthly rental  250 km: 504 
digital (2Mbitls)  • connection: 8136  • monthly rental 50 km:  1220  • monthly rental  250 km: 4446 
International leased-Iines
4 (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 581  • nearest EU: 416  • furthest EU: 1835 
digital (2Mbit/s)  • connection: 581  • nearest EU: 4943  • furthest EU:  i 1342 
Average time for delivery leased lines  • national: 6 weeks  • international: not available 
(analogue/2Mbit/s)  by the incumbent 
LICENCE FEES 
Public fixed voice telephony licence fees (ECU) 
services/  •licences fees:  up-front: 11470  annual fees: 0,9%0 of turnover 
infrastructure (public network)  • notifications:  up-front: none  annual fees
6
:  115 or 573 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue/ GSM 900/  • up-front:  114 70  • annual fees: 0,9%0 of turnover 
DCS 1800  • annual spectrum fees:  17,21 /base station 
Average time for granting individual licences  not available 
Individual licence applications pending/refused  •pending: 1  • refused: none 
7 
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1/253 PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements 
fixed-mobile  15 
fixed-fixed  20 
mobile-mobile  not available 
NRA arbitration  5 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  none 
Universal service contribution in place  none 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
fzxed-fzxed  local level  1,14  +14% 
networks UC  single transit (metropolitan)  1,75  none 
charges
8  double transit (national)  2,38  none 
mobile-fzxed  local level  1,14  +14% 
networks UC  single transit (metropolitan)  1,75  none 
charges  double transit (national)  2,38  none 
%difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed  local level/single/double transit: none 
1/C charges 
1  According  to  the  national  regime,  a  notification  is  requested  for  providing  (within  a  publicly  available 
telecommunications network): fixed telephony, mobile services,  network capacity (including leased lines), or any 
other telecommunications service which requires allocation of capacity from numbering plan for telephony. An 
individual  licences  is  requested  for  providing  fixed  telephony,  mobile  services,  network  capacity (including 
leased  lines)  if  the  activity  is  considered  to  be  of a  "considerable  scope"  ("for  maintaining  efficient 
telecommunications and competition in the  Swedish market") with regard to the area covered, the  number of 
users,  or other comparable  factors.  The  national  licence/notification  regime  does  not  make  any  distinction 
between local/long distance and international. 
2 Long distance voice service operators allowed to provide local/international voice services are included. 
3 The main operators are Tele2, TeleNordia and Europolitan. 
4 Source: Tarifica I 997. 
5 With a minimum of 5735 ECU. 
6 Depending if total turnover is over or under 344000 ECU. 
7 Two licences recalled at companies request. 




UNITED KINGDOM  I 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
per capita  1997 GDP at current market prices (PPS)  99,5  (EU:/00) 
telecoms services market value ( 1997; MECU)  20633 
per capita telecoms expenditure ( 1997; ECU)  350  (EU average: 376) 
telecoms services market value growth 1998/97  7,2%  (EU average: 8,2) 
cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants ( 1997)  14,1  (EU average: 1  3) 







PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY OPERATORS/SERVICE PROVIDERS 





• incumbent:  British Telecom (BT)  (100% private owned)(+ Kingston) 
BT market share:  •1994/5: 94%  •1995/6:  92%  f  •1997:  89% 
• alternative operators: 
o CATV
2
:  140 
o others: 32 licences (9 comp.a_nies operating) 
total alternative operators market share ( 1997): 11% 
• incumbent:  British Telecom 
market share:  •1994/5: 84%  • 1995/6:81%  •1997: 78% 
• alternative operators:  32  licences (9 companies operating) 
1997 market share:  o C&WC (Mercury): 10% 
o others: 12% 
international
3  incumbent:  British Telecom 
market share:  • 1994/5: 71%  • 1995/6:69,6%  • 1997: 58% 
• alternative operators:  63  licences  (about 10 companies operating) 
1997 market share:  o C&WC (Mercury): 14% 
o WorldCom: 9% 
o others: 19% 
analogue  • incumbent:  Cellnet (  60% BT) 
• alternative operators: 1 (Vodafone) 
GSM 900  • incumbent:  Cellnet 
• alternative operators: 1 (Vodafone) 
DCS 1800  2 operators  Orange + one2one (50% C& WC) 
total mobile  o Vodafone  • 1995:  46%  •1996: 43%  • 1997: 38% 
market share






1/255 PUBLIC NETWORK OPERA  TORS 
(according to the licences granted) 
local  loop~  172  licences + BT  (included  I 40 cable franchise licences  which  are divided 
between 8 company operating) 
trunk connections  32 licences + BT (companies operating: BT+9) 
cross  border connections
3  63 licences+ BT (companies operating: BT+about 10) 
Ofo OF CONSUMERS WITHCHOICE OF OPERATORS/CARRIER SELECTION 
,, 
Public fixed voice telephony 
carrier selection in place  •long-distance: yes  • international: yes 
number portability in place  yes 
local calls  • territory:  not available  • households
6
:  46% 
long-distance/international calls  • territory: 100%  • households: 100% 
Public mobile voice telephony 
analogue/ GSM 900  • territory: not available  • population: 98% 
DCS 1800  • territory: not available  • population:  more than 90% 
INCUMBENT'S RE.TAIL PRICES 
Public fixed voice telephony (ECU/1 00) 
bi-monthly rental  2663 
local calls  •  3 minutes: 18  •  10 minutes:  60 
long-distance calls  •  3 minutes:  36  •  10 minutes:  118,6 
National leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3, I kHz)  • connection: 180 1  • monthly rental 50 km: 334  • monthly rental  250 km: 650 
digital (2Mbit/s)  •connection: 13855  • monthly rental 50 km: 1984  • monthly rental  250 km: 5737 
International leased-lines (ECU) 
analogue (3. I kllz)  • connection: 1365  • nearest EU
7 
: not available  • furthest Ell:  1660 
digital (2Mhitl.\)  • connection:  24542  • nearest EU
7 
:  not available  • furthest EU:  not available 
Average time for delivery leased lines  • national: 23,5 working days  • international: 15,3 working days 
(analogue/2Mbit/s)  by the incumbent 
LICENCE FEES 
Public fixed voice telephony licence fees (ECU) 
services I  local/regional  •up-front: 18763  • annual fees:  15011 
infrastructure  long distance  • up-front: 60043  • annual fees 
8
: 30021 
{public network)  international  • up-front: 10507  • annual fees:  12008 
Public mobile telephone services licence fees (ECU) 
analogue/GSM 900/ DCS 1800  • up-front: 55540  • renewal fees:  52537 
Average time for granting individual licences  approx. 6 weeks 





PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
Interconnection agreements
9 
fixed-mobile  24 
fixed-fixed  200 
mobile-mobile  8 
NRA arbitration  7 
Access deficit charge to be paid to the incumbent  none 
Universal service contribution in place  none 
Interconnection charges  ECU/100 per min.  deviation from "best current practice" 
fixed-fixed  local level  0,64  none 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  0,91  none 
charges"'  double transit (national)  1,74  none 
mobile-fixed  local level  0,64  none 
networks 1/C  single transit (metropolitan)  0,91  none 
c~arges  double transit (national)  1,74  none 
%difference between fixed-fixed and mobile-fixed 1/C charges  local /single/ double transit: none 
1 Long distance voice service operators allowed to provide·local voice services are included. 
2 The 140 individual licences are held between 8 Multiple System Operators. 
3 International Facilities Licences. 
4 Total mobile voice telephony market share (analogue, GSM 900, DCS 1800). 
5 Trunk operators allowed to provide local loop are included 
6  lTC broadband homes passed divided by 1991  Census GB household (+2% for Northern Ireland). 
7 Tariffs lo Ireland arc distance dependent. 
K But not more than O,OWX, of turnover. 
11 oncl CStimateS 
111  In  local  currency (£/100):  (I) local  level:  0,434 per  min.~ (2)  single transit:  0,618  per  min.~ (3) double transit 
(>200km): I,  177 per min. 
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Notice  by  the  Commission  concerning  a  draft  Directive  amending  Commission  Directive 
90/388/EEC  in  order  to  ensure  that  telecommunications  networks  and  cable  TV  networks 
owned  by  a  single  operator are separate legal  entities 
(98/C  71/03) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
The Commission  approved  a  draft  Directive  amending Commission  J)irective  90/388/EEC in 
order to ensure  that telecommunications  networks  and  cable 1V networks owned  by a  single 
operator are separate  legal  entities. 
The  Commission  intends  to  adopt  the  Directive  after  having  h.eard  the  comments  of  all 
interested  parties. 
The Commission  invites  interested  parties  to  submit  their observations  on  the  draft  Directive 
published  below. 
Observations must  reach  the Commission not later than two  months  following  the date of this 
publication.  ObserV-ations  may  be  sent  to  the  Commission  by  fax  (No (32-2)  296 98  19),  by 
e-mail  (cable-review@dg4.cec.be) or by  post  to  the  following  address: 
European  Commission 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV) 
Directorate  C 
Office  3/44 
Avenue  de  Conenberg/Kortenberglaan  150 
B-1 040  Brussels 
c 71/J. 
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Commission  communication  concerning  the  review  WJ.der  competition  rules  of  the  joint 
pro.vision  of telecommunications and cable TV networks by  a single  operator and the abolition 
of restrictions  on  the  provision  of cable  TV capacity over telecommunications  networks 
(98/C  71/04) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
SUMMARY 
1.  The  establishment  of  a  framework  of liberalisation 
of  telecommunications  and  cable  networks  in  the 
European  Union  is  scheduled  to  take  place  on 
I  January  1998  in  most  EU Member States('). Key. 
principles  underpinning·  this  liberalisation ' process 
have  been  the  introduction  of competition  into  tele-
communications  marke-ts,  which. increase  the  choice 
available  for  consumers  of  telecommunications 
services.  This  will  result  in  lower  costs  of telecom-
munications  services  and  a  wider  variety of services 
on offer. 
2.  This period of liberalisation  has  also been marked by 
an enormous leap  forward  in  terms of technology in 
telecommunications  and  the  associated  digital  tech-
nologies  of  broadcasting,  interactive  services, 
including  the  Internet,  and  new  data  communi-
cations  such  as  electronic  mail.  These  technologies 
increasingly  overlap  and  merge,  so  that 
C>  The  requirement  to  progressively· open  the  telecommuni-
cations markets in  the  European Union until  1 january 1998 
is  set  out in  Commission  Directive 90/388/EEC of 28  June 
1990  on competition  in  the  markets  for  telecommunications 
services  (OJ  L  192,  24.7.1990,  p.  10,  as  amended  by 
Commission  Directive  94/46/EC  of  13  October  1994, 
satellite  communications,  OJ  L  268,  19.10.1994,  p.  15, 
Commission  Directive  95/51/EC  of  18  October  1995, 
abolition  of  restrictions  on  the  use  of  cable  television 
networks  for  the  provision  of  already  liberalised  teleco~­
munications  services,  OJ  L  256,  26.10.1995,  p.  49,  Corn-
gendum OJ L 308,  29.11.1996,  p.  59,  Commission  Directive 
96/2/EC  of  16  January  1996,  mobile  and  per:so!'al 
communications, OJ L 20,  26.1.1996,  p.  59  and CommiSSIOn 
Directive  96/19/EC of 13  March  1996,  full  competition  in 
telecommunications markets, OJ L 74, 22.3.1996, p.  13. 
The  Commission  granted  additional  transition  peri~s  . to 
five  Member  States  (Ireland:  I  january 2000,  Comm1ss1on 
Decision  97/114/EC  of  27  November  1996,  OJ  L  41, 
12.2.1~97,  p.  8;  Ponugal:  1  january  2000,  Commission 
Decision  97/310/EC  of  12  February  1997,  OJ  L  133, 
24.5.1997,  p.  19;  Luxembourg:  1  July  1998,  Commission 
Decision 97/568/EC of 14  May  1997; OJ L.  2~4, 26.8.1.9?7, 
p.  7;  Spain:  1  December  1998,  Comm1ss1on  .  Dec1s1on 
97/603/EC  of  10  june  1997,  OJ  L  243,  5.9.1997,  p.  48; 
Greece:  31  December  2000,  Commission  Decision 
97/607/EC of 18 June 1997, OJ L 2•U,  9.9.1997, p.  6). 
distinctions  between  previously  different  markets  are 
disappearing ('). 
3.  As  well  as  the  other  benefits  of  lower  costs  and 
greate~ choice  outlined  above,  the  liberalisation  will 
bring  new  and  innovative  telecommunications  and 
multimedia  companies  into  the  market.  They  will 
come  with  many  new  ideas  for  services  and  will 
stimulate the existing operators to respond with their 
own ideas.  This innovation will  benefit consumers in 
Europe, by  providing new  interactive services,  and it· 
will  help  the  European  telecommunications  and 
multimedia  industry  to  compete  more  effectively  on 
. world  markets, so  creating more employment oppor-
tunities  and  increasing  social  welfare.  This  inno-
vatory  development,  however,  will  not  come  about 
unless  the  appropriate  conditions  of  competition 
exist  with  respect  to  telecommunications  and  cable 
networks  in  the  EU,  particularly  in  the  tr~nsition 
· period  to  full  competition  in  the  years  following 
1 January 1998. 
4.  As  part of the  process  which  is  intended  to  ensure 
effective  provision  for  the  transition  towards 
competitive  market  structures,  the  Commission  was 
required  by  Directive  901388/EEC  as  amended  by 
Directive  95/51/EC  (the  Cable  Directive)  and  also 
by  Directive  96/19/EC  (the  Full  Competition 
Directive) to review two particular aspects before the 
full  liberalisation of the market in  1998. These were: 
- the  effects  on  competition  of joint  prov1s1on  of 
telecommunications and  cable 1V networks by a 
single operator, and 
- the  restncuons  on  the  proviSIOn  of · cable  TV 
capacity over telecommunications  networks. 
(') These  issues  are  considered  in:'  Green  Paper  on  the 
convergence  of  the  telecommunications!  ~ed.ia  and 
information  technolOgy  sectOrs,  and  the  1mpl1cauons  for 
regulation,  COM(97) 623  final,  published  on  3  December 
t 997  ('the Convergence Green Paper'). 
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5.  ·rnu  communication  fulfils  the  cOmmission's  obli-
gations  under  that  review.  The  communication  is 
based on two reports established for. the Commission 
which  have  involved  subnantial  research  and  wide-
ranging consultations with sector panicipants  .. 
6.  This communication  addresses these  competition  and 
innovation  issues  only.  In  ·panicular, ·it  shQuld  be 
noted  that with  regard  to  broadcasting· services,  this 
communication  only  considers  the  transmission  of 
signals,  principally  over  cable  and  telecommuni-
cations  networks, and does  not address issues  of the 
content  which  is  transmitted  over  those  networks. 
The Commission  recently published  the Green Paper 
on  the  convergence  of  the  telecommunications, 
media  and  informat:ion  technology  sectors,  and  the 
implications  for  regulation C)  which  covers  this  and 
other  ~sues.  · 
7.  The ·conclusions of the  review  can  be  summarised  as 
follows: 
developments  of  telecommunications  and  multi-
media  markets  depend  on  four  factors:  service 
competition,  infrastructure  competition  and 
infrastructure  upgrade  as  well  as  other types  of 
innovation.  The  joint  provision  of telecommuni-
cations  and  cable  1V  networks  by  former 
monopolies  can  stifle  development  of  telecoms 
and  multi-media  applications, 
in  the  EU,  the  joint  provtston,  inherited  from 
monopoly provision  in  the  past,  of telecommuni-
cations  and  cable  1V  networks  by  a  single 
operat~r  · could  in  cenain  Member  States  allow 
the  former  monopolies  to  delay  emergence  of 
effective  competition.  This  could  lead  to  an 
asymmetric  staning  position  for  dominant  tele-
communications  operators  compared  with  new 
entrants, 
- the  restncuons  on  the  provision  of  cable  TV 
capacity  over  telecommunications  networks  are 
also  significant  as  they can create  an  asymmetric 
C>  See  Footnote 2 ('Conve'lence Green Paper'). 
See  also  the communication from  the  European Commission 
to  the Council, the European  Parliament,  the Economic and 
Social  Committee,  and  the  Committee  of the  Regions  on 
•  Europe  at the  forefront  of the  global  information  society: 
rolling  action  plan',  COM(96)  607  final,  28.11.1996, 
paragraph  114.  Media and content issues  are also  addressed 
1n  the  •Green  Paper  on  audio-visual  and  information 
services:  cultural  matters'  and  in  other  Commission 
initiatives  such  as  the  Green  Paper  on  the  protection  of 
minors  and  of  human  dignity  in  audio-visual  and 
information  services,  COM(96)  483  final,  16.10.1996,  and 
the  MEDIA  II  Programme,  which  aims  at  encouraging, 
among  other  things,  the  -competitiveness  of  the  European 
audio-visual  industry. 
" 
regulatory  environment  which.  again  constrains 
.market  development  over time.  However,  given 
that  technology  allowing  such  rrovision  ~ just 
emerging,  the  constraints are  stil  not felt  heavily 
in  most Member States in  practice, 
- the accounting separation in  the case of the joint 
provision  of  competing  networks  by  dominant 
telecotVmunications  operators  established  by 
Commission  Directive  95/51/EC  ·('the  Cable 
Directive')  has  been  shown  to be  insufficient  to 
facilitate  pro-competitive  development  in  the 
multi-media  sector.  Minimum  step~  should 
.include the .¢ffective separation of thc;se  operators 
from  their cable 1V network companies,  i.e.  the 
operation  of these  activities  in  clearly  separated 
legal  entities.  Further  action  by the  Commission 
will  be  justified  with  regard  to specific  cases  to 
reduce  the  anti-competitive  effect  of,  highly 
dominant  positions  through  the  joint  provision 
inherited  from  previous  legally  protected 
monopoly  positions. 
8.  Finally,  the  principle  underlying  this  review  is  the 
imponance  of competition  for  innovation.  Telecom-
munications  and  multi-media  can  become  vital · 
drivers  of  growth  and  employment  in  the  EU's 
economies.  The  European  Union  must  ensure  that 
the  staning  positions  into  these  new  markets  are 
right  and  pro-competitive  in  _order  to  draw 
maximum  benefit  for  growth  and  creation  of new 
jobs from  the new developments. 
1.  HISTORY AND REASONS  FOR CABLE  REVIEW 
9.  The  programme  to  complete  the  internal  market  in 
telecoms  services  and  equipment  in  Europe  is 
designed  to  increase  innovation  and  the  range  of 
services  available  to  consumers  in  particular through 
the  promotion  of  competition.  The  experience  in 
countries  where  telecommunications  liberalisation 
had  been  carried  out indicated  that both  new  and 
existing  operators  developed . · more  innovative 
services  as a result of the Iiberalisation, to the benefit 
of consumers. 
10.  On  18  October  1995,  the  Commission  adopted  the 
Cable  Directive  which  required  Member  States  to 
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allow the use of. cable 1V networks for the provision 
of all  liberalised  telecommunications services (
4
). 
II. Specifically,  in  relatio~  to  the  cable  review,  the 
Cable  Directive stated : 
'Where a single  operator provides  both  networks or 
both  services . . .  (i.e.  public  telecommunications 
networks  and  cable  TV  networks) ...  ,  the 
Commission  shall,  before  I  January  1998,  carry out 
an  overall  assessment  of  the  impact  of  such  joint 
provision in  relation to the aims of the Directive.' 
12.  On 13  March 1996, the Commission adopted the full 
Competition Directive which  noted  th~t: 
...  !\lf.hile·  Directive  95/51/EC  of  18  October  1995 
lifted  all  restrictions  with  regard  to  the  provision  of 
liberalised  telecommunications  services  over  cable 
television  networks,  some  Member  States  still 
maintain  restrictions  on  the  use  of public  telecom-
munications  networks  for  the  provision  of  cable 
television  capacity.  The  Commission  should  assess 
the  situation  with  regard  to  Sl:lch  restrictions  in  the 
light of the  objectives  of this  directive once the  tele-
communications  markets approach  full  liberalisation.' 
The Directive also stated that: 
'By  1 January  1998,  the  Commission  will  carry out 
an  overall  assessment  of the  situation with  regard  to 
remaining  restrictions  on  the  use  of public  telecom-
munications  networks  for  the  provision  of  cable 
television  capacity.' 
13.  The  review  before  1 January  1998  was  necessary 
because  this  is  the  date  set  for  the  introduction  of 
full  competition  on  the  provision  of  telecommuni-
cations  infrastructures and  services.  Effective  liberali~ 
sation · of telecommunications  infrastructure  is  indis-
pensable  in  this  context  as  acknowledged  by 
Directive  96/19/EC,  to  avoid  new  entrants  being 
limited  in  their  freedom  to  provide  services  and 
being  reliant  on  their  main  competitor  for  ·the 
provision of transmission capacity. 
14.  Given  the  capital  intensive  nature  of  investment  in 
new  networks,·  existing  cable  1V  networks  are  a 
crucial  element  in  the  effective  proVISion  of alter-
native  infrastru~ure,  in  the  local  loop,  and  also 
service  proVISion  for  new  telecommunications· 
operators  in  the  newly  liberalised  markeu  in  the 
Member  Sta~s. This  re~iew  is  therefore  important 
before  the  Implementation  of  full  competition  to 
assess  the effect of joint ownership of such  networks 
and  telecoms  networks.  This  is  because  local  loop 
competition is  an essential  ingredient for  the creation 
of competitive  markets and  the  reduction  of market 
power of the dominant carrier. 
15.  In  order  to  carry  out  the  review  the  Commission 
commissioned  two  reports,  one .  fQCusing'  on  market 
and technological  developments,  the  other providing 
an  analysis  .of  the  legal  context (').  The  market 
repon had ·the following oyerall objective: 
'To  examine  opuons  for  developing  competitioA-in  ...  -
local  telephone  markets,  for  example,  via  caple 
networks  competing  with  existing  local  loop  infra-
structure. 
To understand  the barriers and  drivers  to the  devel-
opment  of  broadband  networks  in  the  European 
Union  Member  States,  thus  encouraging  devel-
opment  of  multimedia  services ·  over  advanced 
networks.' 
16.  The reports focused  on: 
'The  JOint  ownership  of  telecommunications  and 
cable TV networks  by  dominant  telecommunications 
operators (referred  to  as  joint  ownership)  addressed 
in  the cable TV Directive, and 
exasung  restncuons  on  the  prov1saon  of  cable  TV 
capacity  on  public  telecommunications  networks, 
addressed in  the  full  Competition Directive.' 
(') 'Cable  Review  - Study  on  the  competition  implications  in 
telecommunications  and  multimedia  markets  of  (a)  joint 
provision  of  cable  and  telecoms  networks  by  a  single 
dominant  operator  and  (b)  restrictions  on  the  use  of tele-
communications  networks  for  the  provision  of  cable 
television  services,'  Anhur D.  Little  International,  1997,  and 
'Study  on  ~e Scope  of  the  Legal  Instruments  under  EC 
Competition  Law  available  to the  European  Commission  to 
implement  the  Results  of  the  ongoing  review  of  certain 
situations  in  the  telecommunications . and  cable  television 
sectors,'  Coudert,  1997.  The views  presented  in  the  t'epo~ 
are those of the contractors and  do not represent or commat 
the Commission  in  any way. 
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2.  SUMMARY OF THE REPORTS'  FINDINGS  ON THE 
CURRENT SITUATION 
17.  According  to  the  reports  undertaken  for  the 
Commission,  Member  States'  telecommunications 
and  multimedia  markets  are  not  developing  in  an· 
optimal  manner  at  present.  This  is  clear  from 
evidence  gathered  on  the  four  drivers  of  optimal 
development  identified  in  the  market  repon.  On 
each of these  drivers - innovation,  service provision, 
network  competition  and  service  ·competition  -
according to the  repons it  is  clear that nearly  all  of 
the  markets  for  telecommunications  and  multimedia 
arc developing in  a suboptimal  manner. 
2.1.  Market and technology overview 
18.  According  to  the  repons,  the  telecommunications 
and  multimedia  service  offerings  in  most  Member 
States  are  still  limited  compar.ed  with  the  optimal 
development  path.  Most  fundamentally,  telephone 
density  in  Europe  is  generally  still  low  compared 
with  that  in  the  US.  Only  Sweden  has  a  greater 
telephone  density  than  the  US,  the  other  Member 
States are below with  the  EU  average  being  49  lines 
per  100  inhabitants,  compared  with  62  for  the  US. 
This lower penetration  in  telecommunications lines  is 
also  reflected  in  other areas,  such  as  the  number of 
Internet  hosts  per  inhabitant,  where  only  Finland 
exceeds· the  US  figure.  ISDN(') penetration  remains 
also  limited. 
Fewer  than  half  (43 %)  of  European  homes  are 
connected  to  either  cable  or satellite  television  (for 
the  European  cable  TV  networks  in  particular  see 
overview in  Annex  t ). 
19.  Cable competition is  developing in  the USA, Canada 
and  Australia.  Incumbent  cable  companies  in 
America  have  been forced  to respond to competition 
by  cutting  prices  by  50 %  and  in  one  cas~  over . 
90 %,  offer free  pay per view  events  and upgrading 
their  systems.  Other  companies  have  added  more 
programmes  to  their  basic  cable  package.  In 
Australia,  new  competing  cable  operators  are 
planning  to  widen  the  services  they  will  offer  m 
comparison  ·with  the  incumbent  operators  to 
generate  additional  revenue. 
20.  in  the  European  Union,  by  contrast,  the  reports 
suggest  that  as  many  as  59 %  of  cable  customers 
(') Integrated Services  Digital  Network. 
are  served  by a  cable  operator which  is  wholly  or 
panly  owned  by  the  main  telecommunications 
provider.  Far  from  there  being  competition  in  the 
local  loop  in  these  circumstances,  therefore,  ~ne 
company  controls  two  points  of  entry  into  these 
homes.  Effective  local  loop  competition  currently 
only  takes  place  in  three  Member  States:  the  UK, 
Finland  and  Sweden.  In  the  UK,  BT's  market 
position  has  been  retained  at  a  high  level  partly 
because  of its  continuing  strength. in  the  local  loop. 
In  Finland  by  contrast,  a  large  market  share  was 
obtained by the new entrants in  a very shon space of 
time  because  many of the  companies  already  had  a 
presence in  local  telephone  markets. 
21.  Exploitation  of  technological  ad:vanc:es  is  essential 
for  the  development  of  increased  telecommuni-
cations  and  multimedia  services.  Currently  such 
technological  advances  include:  digital  terrestrial 
television,  digital  sa'ellite  DTH (')  television,  cable 
telephony  S(trvices  and  multichannel  television  over 
broadband  cable  television  networks,  ·and,  in  the 
future,  broadband  Internet  provision  over  fixed, 
wireless  and· satellite ne.tworks. 
2.2.  Key  issues 
22.  The four  key  issues  identified  in  the  repons  for  the 
optimal  development of the  new  telecommunications 
and  multi-media  technologies  are: 
- the  range  of services:  upgraded  cable  TV  and 
PSTN (
1
)  access  technologies  have  the  potential 
to  offer  the  widest  range  of telecommunications 
and  multi-media  services,  including  multichannel 
TV,  voice  telephony,  and  high-speed  Internet 
access.  While  telephony services  will  be  available 
from  a  range of alternative wireline. and  wireless 
networks, such as  power lines  and WLL ('), these 
technologies  are  unlikely  in  the  shon to  medium 
term to have  the capacity to deliver the  full  range 
of audio-visual  services.  The lack  of an  inherent 
return  path  will  prevent  other  technologies  that 
are  well  suited  to  the  delivery  of  broadcasting 
multichannel  TV  and  multimedia  services  from 





)  Public  Switched Telephone  Network. 
r>  Wireless  local  loop. 
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- the  level  of service  innovation:  both  cabl~ 1V 
and  telecommunications  networks  have  the 
technical  capabilities  to  foster  the  conception, 
development,  and  realisation  of the  widest  range 
of innovative telecommunications  and  multimedia 
services:  for  example,  switched  video  services, 
broadcast  services,  pointe~ services,  and  high 
speed  data services.  -In  contrast  the  development 
of  innovative  services  over  alternative  access 
technologies  will  be  limited,  owing  to,  for 
example, lack of upstream capacity or bandwidth 
per user, 
- infrastructure  limitations:  every  telecommuni-
cations  infrastructure  has  technological  limi-
tations  on  the  range  of  services  that  can  be 
offered.  Both  cable  1V and  PSTN  access  tech-
nologies  can  be  upgraded  to  overcome  most  of 
these  limitations  and  provide  a  suitable  platform 
for  the  dev~lopment of  the  telecommunications 
and  multi-media  sector.  The  bandwidth  can  be 
upgraded  by  replacing  with  broadband · fibre 
optics.  Bi-directional  amplifiers  and  S"Witching 
fabrics  can  be  installed  to  provide  switching 
capabilities:  Digitalisation  will  greatly  enhance 
the  quality  and  variety  of  services  of  both 
wireline  and  wireless  technologies.  By  contrast, 
the  upgrading  of  many  wireless  technologies, 
such  as  wireless  local  loop  and  om satellite, 
will  be  limited  by  technical  or  environmental 
restraints, 
- infrastructure  compeuuon:  cable  1V and  PSTN 
systems  can  be  equal  competitors  in  the  local 
loop  for  the· provision  of all  telecommunications 
and  multi-media  services.  In  the  medium  term, 
. there  will  be  competition  from  digital  satellite 
and  wireless  local  loop  operators  for  the 
provision  of  television  and  telephony  services 
respectively.  However,  cable  TV  and  PSTN 
syStems  are  in  place  today  and  will  accelerate 
c~mpetition in the local loop substantially. 
23.  In  summary,  the  two  wireline  technologies  - tele-
communications  and  cable  1V networks  - are  at 
this stage  the  only ones  which  can  promote optimal 
development according to all  four criteria: choice of 
services, service  innovation, removal  of infrastructure 
limitations  and  the  encouragement  of infrastructure 
competition.  The  other  wireless  technologies 
currently  available  still  have  limitations  of  one  or 
more  of the  criteria  which  makes  them  less  suitable 
for  dte  optimal  development  of multimedia  serVices. 
Nevenheless, in  most 'Member States, dominant tele-
communications operators own or control  cable 1V 
networks.  · 
2.3.  Options  assessed 
24. -Given  this  situation,  the  rep~rts  assessed  a  broad 
range of actions. As regards joint ownership of cable 
TV  and  telecommunications  network,  the  market 
repon examiped  the following  main options: 
--::  maintain  joi~t ownership without other changes, 
- legal  separation  (creation  of  100%  cable 
subsidiary), 
- no  joint ownership. 
25.  As regards the  restri~ons on  th~ provision  by  tele-
communications operators of cable· TV capacity over 
telecommunications  networks  the  following  options 
were examined: 
- maintain status quo, 
- lift  restncuons  on  specific  PTOs  and/  or  give 
dominant  PTOs  rights  to  provide  cable  TV 
capacity via  telecommunications  infrastructure, 
- lift  restrictions  on  licences  for  cable  TV  infra-. 
structure. 
26.  In  a  graduated approach,  the  repon also  assessed  a 
number of intermediate  and  transitional  options {'
0
). · 
The details  are set out in  Annex  2.  The reports  are 
available on request.  · 
(1
1
)  The Repon also assessed  the following options: 
- maintain  joint  ownership/accelerate  DTH development 
towards digital  multichannel  services, 
- maintain  joint  ownership  but  establish  ONP  on  joint 
owner's cable network, 
- maintain  joint  ownership  but  open  up  spectrum  for 
wireless local loop Jnarrowband),  . 
- legal  separation an  management separation,  . 
- panial JOint  ownership, 
- andependent  trustee, 
- separation of network and services. 
See Annex 2. 
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27.  The  reportS  found  that an·  optimal  result  would  be 
achieved  only  by  a  fu1l-s~le  divestiture,  in  cases 
where  the  dominant  telecommunications  operator 
.also  has  a  determining  ownership  interen  in  the 
cable 1V infrastructure, as  joint ownership acts  as  a 
severe deterrent to  the  emergence of new  and  inno-
vative  services  and  to potential  new  entrants into the 
market,  and  could  undermine  the  effective 
implementation  of  full  liberalisation  by  1  January 
1998. The repons concluded that a divestiture could 
be  required  under  competition  rules  in  certain 
circumstances. 
As  regards  the  restrictions  on  telecommunications 
operators  to  provide  cable  1V capacity  over  tele-
communications  networks  the  reports  conclude  that 
such  restrictions  should  be  lifted,  depending ·on  the 
overall  Impact  of  such  a  measure  as  regards · the 
competitive situation in  the  local  loop. 
3.  MORE  DETAILED ANALYSIS  OF JOINT  PROVISION 
AND OF RESTRICfiONS FOR THE 
PROVISION Of CABLE TV CAPACITY 
28.  In  this  section,  more  details  are  given,  drawing  on 
pans of the reports,  on the  focus  of the  review:  the 
impact  of  joint  provision  and  the  restrictions  on 
providing cable 1V capacity. 
3.1.  Impact of allowing continued joint provision of cable 
TV  capacity  by  telecommunications  organisations, 
when abolishing their exclusive rights 
29.  It  seems  clear  from  the  analysis  that  the  current 
position  with  regard  to  the  innovation  in  the 
European Union  is  not optimal  in  the  telecommuni-
cations and  multi-media  sectors ('
1
). 
30.  Joint  .  ownership  of  both  telecommunications 
networks  and  cable  1V networks  limits  the  devel-
(
11
)  It should  be  noted that problems related to audio-visual and 
cOntent  provision  and  the  position  of public  service  broad-
casters  are  not  dealt  widi  in  this  communication.  More 
general  regulatory  and  audio-visual  matters  are  addressed 
by  the  Commission  in  the  Convergence ·Green  Paper  (see 
fOOtnote  2).  · 
This  communication  addresses  innovation  and  ·market 
structure  issues·  relating to infrastructUre  provision. 
,, 
opment  of  the  telecommunications  and  ~~ltimedia · 
markets  in  the  Member  States  ill'  four  main  ways. 
These are: 
- delaying  the upgrading of cable  networks to have 
bi-directional  capability, 
- blocking  the  development  of  competing  infra-
structures, 
.. 
- limiting service competition,  and 
- constraining  innovation. 
31. Joint  operators  have  no  incentive  to  upgrade  their 
cable  1V  networks  to  full  bi-directional  capacity. 
This  is  because  there  is  no intrinsic  financial  benefit 
in  upgrading  a  cable  1V network  which  will  then 
compete  for  customers  with  the  core  telecommuni-
cations  business  of the  telecommunications  network 
operator.· This  competition  will  take  place .not only 
for  telephony  services,  but  also  for  more  advanced 
multimedia  services  such  as  Internet  access  and  in 
the  future  services  such  as  video  on  demand.· The 
investment  in  the  cable  television  network  is  seen  as 
unlikely to generate a  net  additional  revenue  for  the 
joint owner.  · 
32.  In  addition,  in  many circumstances,  the  joint owner 
is  unlikely  to focus  on the development of the  cable 
television  business  as  it represents  a small  proportion 
of the  total  revenue  of the .telecommunications  and 
cable  businesses  combined.  On  average  across  the 
EU,  less  than  10%  of  revenue  comes  from  cable. 
Therefore a  jointly owned  cable  television  company 
may  not receive  the  management attention  necessary 
to invest in  the development of the system. 
33.  Independent  cable  network  operators,  by  contrast, 
do  not face  the  investment  disadvantage  which  the 
joint  owner  has.  Upgrading  an  existing  cable· 
network  to  provide  bi-directiona-l  capacity  costs  less 
than  building  a  new  telecommunications  network 
from  scratch.  However,  the revenue benefits  for  the 
independent  cable  'television  provider  are  pure 
benefits  .and  do  not·  take  revenue  from  other 
activities ·as  is  the case with the joint owner. Indeed, 
the  development  of  telecom~unications  services  is 
likely  to attract entirely new customers to the inde-
pendent cable teleVision  provider, and  not customers 
transferri~g froin another business. 
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34.  Joint ownership  also  h~ a  profound effect on both' 
infrastructure  and  semce  competition.  This  effect 
takes place in  several ways.  First, the joint ownership 
does  not give  competitors  to the dominant operator 
an  alternative  access  to  the  local · l~op.  This  has 
proyed  vital  in  the  development  of competition  in 
telecommunications  in  the  UK, where  the  arrival  of 
the  cable  companies  led  to  the  reduction  in  the 
dominant  operator's  market  share  far  quicker  than 
the  previous  (primarily  the  service  competitor 
Mercury)  challenger  to  BT had  done.  To  maintain 
joint  ownership  will  deny  consumers  in  other 
markets. the access to alternative service providers for 
broadband  multimedia  services.  Second,  the  absence 
.  of local  .loop  competition  means  that  long  distance 
competition  is  also  cunailed.  Long  distance 
operators  can  op,.erate  by  taking  traffic  from  the 
incumbent  directly  through  the  incumbent's  local 
loop.  However,  long  distance  competition  has  been 
far  stronger  when  customers  can  be  found  from 
other challengers to the dominant operator at a local 
level.  Again, experience  in  the UK demonstrates that 
this  is  the case. Thirdly, joint owenrship can prevent 
or  delay  the  introduction  of  broadband  interactive 
services.  According  to  the  analysis  undenaken, joint 
owners appear to be  reluctant to link the broadband 
cable  network  with  the  PSTN  network  in  order to 
provide  true  interactivity  for  the  development  of 
interactive  services,  such  as  high  speed  Internet 
access.  Finally,  service  providers  face  problems  if 
there  is  not  a choice of infrastructure providers over 
which  to offer  their services  because  of the  reliance 
on a single provider. 
35.  Service  innovation  is  also  hindered  by  joint 
ownership.  Experience  of  cable  operators  from 
several  Member  States  indicates  that  when  those 
operators  wish  to  develop  innovative  services  the 
dominant  telecommunications  operator  often 
restricts  the  development  of the  innovative  services. 
This restriction arises  because of the cable operators' 
dependence for many elements on the dominant tele-
communications operator. Even  if they are willing to 
develop  the  services,  the  costs  which  it  wishes  to 
impose on the other cable operators will  often make 
the  venture  non-viable  for  those  companies.  Where 
the  dominant  telecommunications  operator is  a  joint 
owner  of the  cable  operator,  its  role  in  the  devel-
opment of new  services  is  even  more  imponant for 
the  success  of the  venture.  Without "th~ involvement 
of the joint owner,  the  critical  mass  is  not available 
to kick stan the new services.  · 
·36.  The  result  is  that  joint  ownership  of telecommuni-
cations  and  cable  networks  in  a  situation  of 
dominance  is  likely  to be  the  single  most  imponant 
factor  holding  back  market  development  and  the 
· pro-compeuuve  effects  of  liberalisation,  as  Europe 
moves  into the multi-media age (
12
). 
3.2.  Impact  of  restnctlons  to  provide  cable  TV  trans-
mission  capacity 
37.  Restrictions  on telecoms  companies·  to  provide  cable 
TV  transmission  capacity  may  discourage  the 
building of broadband  networks  in  other ways.  The 
Cable  Directive  ensures  that  all  cable TV networks 
are free  to provide .all  liberalised  telecommunications 
services.  However,  there  is  no  corresponding 
provision  to  ensure  that  telecommunications 
operators  are  allowed  to  offer  cable  TV  capacity 
over  theil:"  public  telecommunications  networks.  The 
ability  of  telecommunications  operators  to  develop 
funher  their  public  telecommunications  networks  in 
this  respect  may  depend  on  national  regulations. 
Even  in  cases  of  joint  ownership  where  telecom-
munications  companies  do  make  available  cable TV 
capacity,  this  can  lead. to  restrictions  on  technical 
progress,  given  that new  technologies for  upgrading 
telecommunications  networks  exist  and  also  given 
the  far  higher  penetration  of  telecommunications 
networks compared with  cable TV networks in  most 
Member States. 
38.  The  technology underpinning  the  different  types  of 
telecommunications  networks  is  steadily  converging. 
For telecommunications  networks,  technologies  such 
as  ADSL (") are  providing  an  opponunity for  tele-
communications  networks to carry broadcast signals. 
Combined  with  compression  techniques,  telecom-
munications  operators  will  be  able  to  transmit  high 
bandwidth  signals  down  the  existing  copper  pair 
telephone  line.  This  could  amount  to  between  one 
and six  television  channels. This will  enable telecom-
munications  companies  to  contemplate  competing 
with cable  companies,  for  the  provision of television 
channels  and,  more  likely  by  offtring  video  on 
demand  services  which  would  compete  with  cable 
television companies pay per view services, as well  as 
high-speed  Internet access. 
C')  Currently  the  public  Telecommunications  Organisations 
have  a  strong  cable  presence  in  ten  Member  States:  they 
·plan  such  presence  in  two  Member  States:  they  are  not 
present at this stage in  three Member States. 
c•>  Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber  line. For details see Arthur 
D. Little study (footnote S  ). 
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39.  The  removal  of such  restrictions  in  the  context  of 
the  liberalisation  of  the  European  telecommuni-
cations  sector  was  therefore  called  for  by  the 
European  Parliament (
14
). 
4.  MEMBER  STATE  REGULATION 
40.  Member States are now in  the process of completing 
the  implementation  of the  Directive  96/19/EC with 
a  view  to introducing full  competition  by  1 January 
1998 (
11
). Except in  one member state, national legis-
lation aiming at the abolition of special and exclusive 
rights  adopted  in  this  framework  contains  no 
measures to address the issue of joint ownership. 
41.  Different  levels  of regulation  continue  to be applied 
to  cable  network  operators.  Most  Member  States 
give  licences  to cable  TV operators  at a  local  level, 
often  under  exclusive  or  special  rights.  The  possi-
bility  for  owning  infrastructure  also  varies  from 
country  to  country  as  do  the  restrictions  on  the 
ability  for  the  dominant  operators  to  provide  cable 
TV services  over telecommunications networks. 
42.  Although  one  member  state  imposes  limitations 
which  affect  the  size  of the  shareholding which  the 
telecommunications  operator  can  hold  in  cable  TV 
company authorised as  a  telecoms network operator, 
the  joint  provision  of telecommunications  and cable 
TV networks by a single  operator remains permitted 
in  all  Member  States C').  A  number  of  Member 
States  rely  on  general  competition  law  to  regulate 
the actions of the joint provider.  · 
(u) EP  Resolution  of  15  JUne  1995  (OJ  C  166,  3.7.1995,  p. 
109)  and  EP  Resolution  of  19  May  1995  (OJ  C  151, 
19.6.1995, p.  479). 
C')  Communication  to  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament, 
the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee of 
the  Regions  on  the  implementation  of  the  telecommuni-
cations regulatory package:  first  update  (COM(97) 504). 
(") In  Spain  the  dominant  operator Telef6nica  is  required  to 
wait  before  beginning  as  a cable 1V network  provader  in  .a 
new franchise  area. This restriction lasu between  16  months 
and  two  years.  IN  the  UK,  BT,  the  dominant  operator. 
Mercury  and  Kingston  Communications  can  operate  cable 
TV networks if they obtain a franchise.  HoweVer, they have 
to  be  run  separately  from  the  main  telecommunications 
business. 
In  a number of other Member StateS  no explicit  restrictions 
are  foreseen  but  the  situation  is  undefined.  It  can  be 
expected  that  problems  will  arise  as· the  new  tcchnol~ics 
arc  applied.  According  to  the  reports,  the  Commissaon 
considers  that  the  situation  in  ten  Member  States  falls  into 
this category. 
43.  As  regards  the  provision  of cable 1V capacity over 
telecommunications  networks,  two  Member  States 
have  imposed  explicit .restrictions  on  their  telecom-
munications  organisations.  Other  Member  States 
have  no  national  restrictions,  but  the  telecommuni-
cations  operator  still  does  not  carry  cable  TV 
capacity for a variety of reasons connected with  the 
local  regulatory environmei1t.  In the longer term, the 
restrictions,  mentioned  in  the  first  sentence,  prevent 
telecommunications  companies  from  offering  cable 
1V capacity, which  is  likely to restrict infrastructure 
competition  and  multimedia  and  therefore·  means 
that  the  development  of  telecommunications  and 
multimedia  markets  in  the  EU  will  proceed  in  a 
sub-optimal  manner (
11
).  These  restrictions  therefore 
should  not  be  regarded  as  a  permanent  fixture  and 
should be  lifted according to a given  and transparent 
timescale  across  the  EU  as  effective  competition 
develops  in  the local  lqop.  That timescale  should  be 
capable  of  some  flexibility,  to  take  account  of 
national  circumstances. 
44.  The finding  therefore is  that, as  market development 
is  still  in  its  infancy  as  regards  the  carriage  of 
television  capacity  via  public  telecommunications 
networks,  the  regulatory  situation  is  largely 
undefined. 
45.  The  restraints  on  further  development  of cable  TV 
capacity  through  the  development  of  new  techno-
logies,  either  by  further  development  of  the  public 
telecommunications networks  (e.g. via  ADSL) or the 
allocation  of  new  licences  for  new  broadband 
wireless  technologies  could  become  a  major  brake 
on  market  development  toward~ multi-media  in  the 
near future. 
5.  ASSESSMENT  AND ACTION  UNDER COMPETITION 
RULES 
46.  The Treaty, and in  particular its  Anicle  90,  entrusts 
the  Commission  with  the  task  of  ensuring  that 
Member  States,  in  the  case  of public  undenakings 
and  undertakings  enjoying  special  or  exclusive 
rights,  comply.  with  their  obligations  under 
Community  law.  Under  Article  90(3)  the 
Commission  can,  on  the  one  hand,  specify  and 
clarify  the obligations arising  from  this  Anicle,  and, 
on·  the.  other  hand,  set  out  obligations  for  the 
Member  States  which  are  necessary  to  allow  the 
Commission  to  perform  effectively  the  duty  of 
surveillance  impose~ upon it by that paragraph. 
(") This  is  refleetcd  in ·  the  UK,  where  the  restrictions  on  BT 
and  the other PTO's are time limited. 
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.fl. ·Ibe Commissio~ must  in  panicular ensure that, even 
while  abolishing  these  rights,  Member  States  1hall 
not  enforce  measures  which  would  not  allow  the 
dominant  posi~on  of  telecommunications  organi-
sations  being  challenged  by  competition  once  the 
liberalisation  of voice  telephony  takes  place,  making 
it  thus  possible  for these  telecommunications organi-
sations  to  maintain  their dominant position  in  voice 
telephony  and_  public·.  telecommunications  network 
markets  and  thereby  strengthening  the  dominant 
position of the incumbent operator. 
5.1.  Horizontal action 
5.1.1.  joint Ownership 
48.  As  regards  joint  ownership;  Directive  95/51/EC 
('the  Cable  Directive')  has  established  the  principle 
of accounting  separation  and  has  indicated  a  pref-
erence  for  structural  separation,  i.e.  operation · of 
telecommunications and cable TV networks by those 
operators in  clearly distinct legal  entities (
11
). 
49.  Anicle  2  of  the  Directive  requires  that  Member 
States: 
- ensure  accounting  transparency  and  prevent 
discriminatory  behaviour,  where  a  telecommuni-
cations  operator  with  an  exclusive  right  to 
provide  public  telecommunications  network 
infrastructure  also  provides  cable  TV  network 
infrastructure, 
- ensure  the  separation  of  financial  accounts  as 
concerns  the  provision  of each  network  and  the 
telecommunications  operator's  acuvaty  as 
provider of telecommunications services,  and 
(
11
)  The Cable  Directive stipulates  in  its  recital  18  in  particular: 
"Where  Member States  grant  to the  same  undertaking  the 
right  to  establish  both  cable  1V and  telecommunications 
networks, the:y  put the undertaking in  a situation whereby it 
has  no incenuve to attract users  to  the  network best SUited 
to  the  provision  of the  relevant  service,  as  long  as  it  has 
spare  capacity  on  the  other  network.  ~n  that  case,  the 
undertaktng  has,  on  the  contrary,  an  mterest  for  over-
char,ing  for  use  of  the  Cable  infrastructure  for  the 
prov1sion  of non-reserved  services,  in  order to increase  the 
traffic  on their .telecommunications  networks .... To allow 
the  monitorin_g  of any  improper  behaviour,  Member States 
should  therefore  at  least  impose  a  clear  separation  of 
financial  records  between  the  two  activities,  though  full 
structural separation is  preferable.' 
- ensure that an operator with an exclusive right to 
provide  cable  TV  network  infrastruaure  in  a  . 
given  area  in  a  Member  State  keeps  separate 
financial  accounts regarding its  activity as  a  tele-
communications  network capacity provider when 
its  turnover exceeds a cenain level.  · 
50.  While  the  Cable  Directive  left  the  decision  on 
accounting  separation  versus· a  full-scale  structural 
separati_on  to  the  Member States,  it  also  stated  that 
the  ·current  review  of  the  impact  of  such  joint 
provision  in  relation  to  the  aims  of  the  Directive 
would  be  made.  The  Directive  stated  that  the 
Commission , would  reconsider  'whether  the  sepa-
ration  of  accounu  is  sufficient  to  avoid  improper 
practices'  and  would  'assess  whether  such  joint 
provision  does  not  result  in  a  limitation  of  the· 
potential  supply  of  transmission  capacity  at  the 
expense of the services providers in  the relevant area, 
or whether  funher  measures  are  warranted'  (recital 
20),  where  in  the  meantime  no  competing  home 
delivery  systems  were  authorised  by  the  relevant 
Member States. 
51.  Even  though  under  Directive  96/19/EC,  the 
majority  of the  Member  States  have  the  legal  obli-
gation  t~  abolish  exclusive  or  special  rights  by  1 
January  1998  on  telecomunications  networks,  in 
none  of· them  will  effective  competition  in  the  local 
loop  be  established  at  a  national  level  before  a 
substantial  transition  period.  As  regards  the  joint 
ownership  of  telecommunications  and  cable 
networks,  only  a  few  Member  States  have  estab-
lished  structural  separa•ion C'). 
52.  While  accounting  separation  and  implementation  of 
appropriate  cost  allocation  methods  can  he_lp 
·  C')  E.g.  the  Netherlands  have  taken  a  number  of  steps  to 
ensure  a  limitation  of cross-ownership  by  the  incumbent 
telecommunications  organisation  over  both  telecommuni-
cations  and  cable lV infrastructure  as  well  as  to  introduce 
a form  of structural separation between  those two activities: 
inter alia, specific obligations were developed  to ensure that 
there  would  be  no  inAuence  by  the  incumbent  telecom-
munications  organisation·  on  the  commercial  behaviour  of 
the cable 1V operator and specific Chinese Walls  needed to 
be  put in  place  in  order to ensure  that there would  be  no 
direct  or  indirect  exchan~e  of  commercially  sensitive 
information  between  the  mcumbent  telecommunications 
organisation  and  the  cable  1V  operator.  In  Germany, 
Deutsche Telekom have  recently  announced that their cable 
1V networks will  be  put into a separate cqmpany from  the 
core  telecommunications  business. 
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in  verifying  and  avoiding  a  number  of. possibly 
abusive  practices  by the dominant undertaking, the 
beneficial effects of such rules remain largely limited 
to princing practices. However, as was anticipated in 
the  Cable  Directive  the  position  of  the  dominant 
undertaking may also give rise  to more fundamental 
concerns which  go back to the essential  'conflict of 
interest' which  is  inherent in  that position due to the 
control over both the telecommunications and cable 
TV infrastructure. 
t 
53.  The  mere  separation  of accounts  will  only  render 
financial flows more transparent, whereas legal sepa-
ration will  lead  to more transparency of assets  and 
costs  and  will  facilitate  monitoring  of the  profit-
ability  and  the  management  of  the  cable  network 
operations.  The  provision  of  telecommunications 
networks  and  cable  TV  networks  are  related 
activities.  Therefore the  position of an operator on 
one ·of these  markets  has  an  impact on its  position 
on the other, and the supervision of its  activities on 
these markets is  more difficult. 
54.  Also,  the  future  financial  prospects  of a  cable TV 
network which  has  not yet been built are uncertain 
for a company that is  not yet already established on 
the telecommunications or pay TV services markets. 
Therefore,  it  is  essential  that  a  dominant  telecom-
munications organisation organises its own cable TV 
network activities in  a way that can be monitored in 
order to exclude that it uses its  resources to abuse its 
position, for example so that it does not discriminate 
against new entrant cable TV networks for intercon-
nection  rates for telephony as  opposed to the rates 
for its own cable TV network. 
55.  In applying the competition rules  to specific facts  it 
is  essential  to  take  due  account  of the  legal  and 
economic  context.  This  implies  that  changes  in 
market circumstances, such as  technological or other 
developments  have  a  direct impact on  the  analysis 
under competition  law.  At the .eve  of convergence 
and  the  emergence  of  new  multi-media  markets, 
cross-ownership  between  telecommunications  and 
cable  networks has  a  much hig.her  potential impact 
as regards market power and potential of abuse. The 
commercial  conduct  of  the  enterprises  concerned 
will  therefore  require  an increased  scrutiny since  a 
•.•9.*4!'? .. :e .. ..  · ...  :-.-.·.--·;-·::.·::::r:  ;~  ... _:·.·.·.·. · ·· 
large potential for abusive conduct and foreclosure 
effects exisu. Accounting separation is an insufficient 
measure in this context. ·  ·  · 
56.  The review of the Commission therefore considers it 
necessary,  as  a  minimum  measure,  that legal  sepa-
ration is  implemented. In order to be able to ensure · 
rapid  technological  progress  and  to  monitor 
effectively  behaviour  which  could  be  abusive,  it 
therefore  will  submit  an  amendment  to  Directive 
90/388/EC which will  establish this  requirement to 
enable  fully  competitive  structures  in  the  telecom-
munications and cable TV network markets. 
57.  In  addition,  Member  States  might  have  to  take 
specific  action to. avoid  that in  the  local  telephony 
markets  the operator of both networks  is  the only 
infrastructure provider for its  competitors (2°)  taking 
·into  a-ccount  the  specific  circumstances  of  the 
relevant  local  telephony  markets  where  duplication 
of infrastructure is slow and expensive. 
5.1.2.  Restriction on the provision of  cable 1V  capacity 
58.  The restriction  on telecommunications  operators  to 
provide cable TV capacity ovet their public telecom-
munications networks can lead to a situation where 
providers  of cable TV services  are  prevented  from 
using ·  the  public  telecommunications  network 
capacity of the telecommunications organisation for 
cable TV services. The exclusion  of the  use  of the 
public  telecommunications  network  increases  the 
scarcity of cable TV transmission available capacity. 
The  restrictions  on  the  available  capacity  have 
particularly severe effects on providers of cable TV 
from  other  Member  States  as  the  allocation  of 
capacity available on cable networks is  based on the 
media laws of t~e Member States which usually give 
or have given preference to national providers. 
I 
(1°)  The  meas~re tO  be taken  in  respect of specific cases  could 
include  the  splitting-up ·of  the  entity  operating  cable  TV 
networks  into several  regional  entities,  the opening of the 
cable  operator to  a  panicipation  of third  panics,  or the 
requirement to fully sell-off this entity. 
For example, a requirement to sell-off wholly or panty it$ 
ownership  in  the  entity  or  entities  operaung  cable  TV 
networks could be implemented through the appointment of 
a trustee with an irrevocable mandate to sell ilie entity and 
to  set  up  a  management  strUcture  for  the  time  period 
required to implement a divestiture. 
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59. The  measures  restncung  the  use  of telecommuni-
cations networks for the provision of cable television 
capacity could therefore be in breach of Anicle 90, 
in conjunction with Anicle 59 of the Treaty. Even. in 
cases ·where restrictions· apply without distinction to 
all  companies  other  than  the  relevant  cable  TV 
network operators, Article 59  might be applicable. It 
is  not necessary for all  the companies of a  Member 
State  to  be  favoured  in  relation  to  the  foreign 
companies.  It  is  sufficient  that  the  preferential 
treatment  should  benefit  cenain  national 
operators C') if these measures prevent telecommuni-
cations organisations from ·upgrading their telecom-
munications networks to full  multimedia capabilities 
· they  could  also  be  in  breach  of  Anicle  90,  in 
conjunction with Article 86(b) of the Treaty. 
60.  Even  though  these  measures  limited  the  techno-
logical  development  of  the  networks  and  impede 
cross-frontier  provision  of  services,  temporary 
restrictions  in  this  area  may  be  justifiable  by  the 
requirement to ensure effective competition· between 
operators competing in the relevant markets, as  long 
as there is  no effective competition in the local loop. 
This could  be  panicularly imponant in  geographic 
areas where cable networks have  not yet been fully 
rolled out. 
61.  In conclusion, as  only two Member States currently 
maintain explicit restrictions, the adoption of a hori-
zontal  measure  at this  stage  may  not  be  justified. 
However, the situation in at least ten Member States 
seems  undefined  and  barriers  to  the  future  devel-
opment of the convergent multi-media markets may 
emerge very rapidly.  For example,  in  Belgium,  the 
telecommunications  operator  is  planning  to  invest 
heavily  in  ADSL  technology  to  offer  high  speed 
Internet connections to customers in response to the 
introduction  of  cable  modems  by  the  cable  TV 
networks.  Accordingly,  the  Commission  will  keep 
the situation under review, in  panicular in respect of 
possible impediments of the development of the EU 
multi-media  markets  (such  as  introduction  of 
broadband Internet services). 
5.1.3.  Allocation  of frequencies  for  broadband  wireless 
local loop 
62.  In the  light of the  effect of the  restrictions  in  the 
allocation  of  radio  frequencies  on  the  overall  of 
( 11)  ECJ  judgment  Mediawet  I,  2S.7.t991,  ECR Vol  I-<f069, 
paragraph 1-4 onwards, especially parag~ph 2S.  . 
cable  TV  capacity,  in  particular  for  new  market 
developments  and  technologies,  the  commercial 
provision of ~ew broadband transmission capacity is 
of  utmost  Importance.  In  the  future,  wireless 
broadband  applications  will  become  technically 
feasible and commercially viable. 
63.  According  to  the  Full  Competition  Directive 
(96/19/EC) Member States  have  an  obligation  not 
to  refuse  to  grant  licences  fo·r  such  wireless 
broadband  application~  where  the  necessary 
frequencies  are  available.  Given  the. importance  of 
this  issue,  the  Commission  will  monitor closely the 
·  granting  of  radio  frequency  licences  by  Membe.r 
States and will take action if necessary. 
It Member States were to delay the grant of licences 
for  such  applications  for  reasons  other  than  the 
non-availability  of  radio  frequencies  these  delays · 
could therefore be incompatible with the Treaty. 
64.  The current restrictions  on  the  allocation  of ·radio 
· frequencies  c~n act as  a  measure  equivalent  to  the 
restriction  of  the  provision  of  cable  TV  capacity 
panicularly for new innovative services. Therefore, it 
is  of  paramount  imponance  that  Member  States 
fulfil  their obligations with  regard  to the  allocation 
of  new  licences,  panicularly  wh~re  ne~ techno-· 
logical  opponunities allow  this.  In  the  near future, 
· wireless broadband cable TV network could become 
such an alternative. 
5.1.4.  Summary 
65.  The  Commission  will  bring  forward  a  measure  to 
structurally  separate  jointly  owned  dominant  tele-
communications operators and cable TV companies. 
In addition, it will  keep under 'review the, restrictions 
. on the provision of cable 1"V capacity over telecom-
munications networks  and  the allocation of licences 
of radio  frequencies  for  the  broadband  local  loop 
with a view to taking action should it be justified. 
5.2.  Case .specific actions 
66.  The  horizontal  approach  outlined  above  will  only 
suffice as a minimum application of the competition 
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rules  of the · EU  to  the  issues  raised  by  the  joint 
ownership  of  telecommunications  and  cable 
television.  Individual  action,  addressed  to  the 
Member States (u) or to undertakings concerned (u) 
will  be  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  optimum 
conditions  for  the  development  of  telecommuni-
cations and multimedia take place. 
The  Commission  will  need  to  examine  individual 
cases on their own merits as they arise. 
67.  Ani  de 86  applies  to individual  undertakings  which 
hold a·  dominant position. In this sector it should be 
applied  a fortiori  to  an  undertaking  which  is  the 
owner  of  both  a  telecommunications  and  a  cable 
ne.twork,  in  particular when  it  is  dominant on both 
markets.  Where  companies  enjoy  a  dominant 
position  on  two  markets,  they  must  take  panicular 
care  not to  allow  their conduct to  impair  genuine 
undistorted  competition.  In  particular,  that 
dominance  cannot  be  leveraged  into  neighbouring 
markets,  impede  the  emergence  of new  services  or 
strengthen  their dominance  through  acquisitions  or 
co-operative  ventures  either  horizontally  or 
vertically. 
Within the framework set out in this communication, 
certain common approaches can be identified, within 
the context of the existing case law under Articles 86 
and 90. 
68.  In  certain  circumstances  it  might  be  that  the  only 
means  which  would  allow  the  creation  of  a 
competitive environment consist in  the divestment of 
the  cable  television  network  by  the  telecommuni-
cations  operator.  Other  solutions  may  also  be 





69.  Under Anicle 90 in  conjunction with Anicle 86,  the 
Commission may, if any abuse of dominance occurs 
as  a  direct  consequence  of  a  state  measure,  in 
addition  to  the  horizontal approach  set out in  5.1, 
take individual action to prevent abuses such as  the 
(
11
)  Through funher action deriving from Article 90. 
( 11)  Through further action under Article 86 or Anicle 85 or the 
Merger Regulation. 
(,.)  See in panicular, section I of the Couden study. 
0.  '-··;·······.~·  .••';'" •• 
unlawful extension of a dominant posicion by taking 
into account ·existing case  law and the evolution of 
market circumstances and regulatory frameworks. 
70.  The  Commission's  options  for  action  under Anicle 
86  include  the  opening  of own  initiative  cases  or 
action  upon  the receipt of a complaint. In addition, 
under Article  85,  and  more lpecifically  Regulation 
17/62,  and  the  Merger  Regulation,  there  is  the 
possibility of the Commission receiving a notification 
of an  operation. The Commission will  assess  such a 
notification  in  the  light  of the  facts  underlying the 
case.  It  can  be  expected  that  an  extension  of .  an 
operator dominant in  both  telecommunications  and 
cable  television  networks  into  related  fields  could 
raise serious competition concerns. 
71.  In summary, as regards case-specific action: 
The Commission will  have  to  examine,  either at its 
own  initiative  or  i~  the  light  of a  notification  or 
complaint,  the  individual  situations  pertaining  in 
Member States  and  take  action  under  the  relevant 
instruments of competition law. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
72.  This  Communication  has  not addressed  media  and 
content  issues.  The  Commission  has  published  on 
these  more  general  issues  ae  'Green  Paper  on  the 
·convergence  of the  telecommunications,  media  and 
information technology sectors, and the implications 
for  reuglation'  ('Convergence  Green  Paper' {
11
). 
From  a  competition  policy  point  of  view, 
convergence  must  build  on  the  development  of a 
broad ba-se  of pro-competitive infrastructures of tele-
communications  and  cable TV networks. Therefore 
this review is central to the success of convergence in 
building  pro-competitive  structures,  and  comple-
mentary to the 'Convergence Green Paper'. 
73.  The Commission recognises  that there  is  a diversity 
of market structures across the EU and that tailored 




)  See point 6. 
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74.  One minimal general principle, however, can- and 
should- now be applied across the EU. This is  that 
investments  in  multimedia  by  dominant  operators 
have  to  be  assessed  against  the  background  of the 
market  structures  in  place.  The  assessment  of any 
attempts by dominant telecommunications operators 
to expand into new multimedia areas will depend on 
the introduction of the necessary structural changes · 
or other adequate safeguards. 
75.  The  starting  posmons  for  moving  into  the 
convergent markets must be  in  conformity with  the 
competition  rules.  Convergence  must  not  lead  to 
new  multi-media  super-monopolies,  but  to  the 
creation of growth-oriented, job-rich new economic 
structures. 
76.  The joint provision of telecommunications and cable 
TV networks  by a  single  operator, which  has  been 
inherited  from  monopoly  provisions  in  the  past, 
creates an  asyJ!lmetric starting position for dominant 
telecommunications  operators  as  compared  to  new 
entrants as the various different multi-media markets 
converge. First,  it will  act as  a significant constraint 
on the optimal development of these markets. It will 
clearly  have  the  effect  of reducing  competition  in 
telecommunications markets as  new entrants will  be 
unable. to access  the  loc~lloop independently of .the 
dominant  operator.  Second,  it  creates  at  least  an 
incentive  and  a  strong  likelihood  that  the  dual 
dominant operator will  act in  a  manner which  will 
stifle  innovation·  and  delay  the  development  of 
multimedia markets in the European Union. 
77.  The  Commission  therefore  will  act  in·  two  ways. 
First, it will submit an Article 90  Directive amending 
Directives  90/388/EEC  and  95/51/EC  requiring 
legal  separation  of  the  cable  television  companies 
from  telecommunications  companies,  i.e.  operating 
cable  TV  networks  and  telecommunications 
netwo.rks  in  separate  .l~gal  entities,  in  particular 
where special or exclusive rights have be.en allocated 
for cable operations. This will  increase transparency 
of assets  and costs  and create a 'walling ofP  effect 
between  the  two  operations.  Most  importantly,  it 
will  allow regulators and the competition authorities 
to supervis~ the operations of cable TV networks in 
their own right. This separation will be the minimum 
step that the Commission intends to take, given that 
the  Review  has  shown  that the  current accounting 
separation is clearly insufficient in those cases. 
78.  Further,  the  Commission  intends  to act  within  the 
scope of Anicle 86, or of Article 85  and the Merger 
R~gulation on  a  ~ase by  case  basis,  where  appro-
pnate,  for  reducang  further  the  anti-competitive 
effects  of  joint  provision  inherited from  previous 
market  positions.  Action  . could  be  at ·  the 
Commission's  own  initiative,  or as  the  result  of a 
complaint based  on Article  86  by an  affected  third 
party.  In  addition,  the  Commission  will  act  as  a 
. result  of notifications  by  a  dominant telecommuni-
cations  and  cable  television  company  of  an 
expansion ·into  new  multimedia  areas,  by  imposing 
further  structural  changes  or  other  effective 
safeguards  where  necessary.  This  will  be  in  the 
·application  of  either  Articles  85  and  86  or  the 
Merger Regulation, as cases require. 
79.  As  regards  restrictions  on  telecommunic~tions 
operators  to  provide  cable  TV capacity  over  their 
public  telecommunications  networks,  the  Com-
mission  will  keep  the  situation  under  review,  in 
particular in  respect of possible  impediments  to  the 
development of EU multi-media markets. 
80.  As  far  as  the  allocation  of  radio  frequencies  is 
concerned,  the  Commission  will  also  keep  under 
review the obligations in Member States contained in 
the Full  Competition Directive (96/19/EC) to grant 
licences  for  radio  frequencies  on  a  non-discrimi-
natory  basis.  The  Commission  will  monitor  this 
process  closely in  the  Member States and  will  take 
action if necessary. 
81.  Where the· Commission intends to adopt horizontal 
measures  based  on  Anicle  90  (Amendment  to  the 
existing  Anicle  90  Directives),  in  accordance  with 
the  conclusions  drawn  in  Chapter 5,  it  will  follow 
transparent  procedures  of consultation.  It  will,  in 
particular, submit such amendments to the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Social and 
Economic  Committee,  and  the  Committee  of 
Regions,  as  well  as  publish  them .  in  the  Official 
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Journal  of  th~  Euro~an  ·Communiti~s  for  a 
two--month  consultation period. 
provi~ini. the Qpponunity for admitting new entrants 
.and  encouraging competition  in  the  local  loop, with 
the  development  of  innovative  new  seiVices  for 
European  consumers,  an?  ~~ possibility  of creating 
a  strong  European  mulumedaa  industry  to  compete 
effectively on world markets. 
82.  The  approach  set  out .  in  this  Communication  will 
promote  competition  in  telecommunications  and 
multimedia,  for  the  benefit  of  consumers,  by 
ANNEX 1 
OVERVIEW OF CABLE 1V NETWORKS IN 'THE EU 
Total TV  households  (in  millions) 
Total cable  subcribers  (in  millions) 
.  Cable  penetration 





Estimations for  1997  based  on projections. Please  note  that cable  penetration varies from  0  to near 100% 
across  Member States. 
ANNEX 2 
Excerpt  from  'Cable  review  Study  on  the  competition  implications  in  telecommunications  and 
multi-media  Markets' (Executive  Summary), Arthur D. Little 
According  to the scope of ·the  study,  the following  options  were considered. 
Options  for joint· ownership 
Broadly,  the  options concerning joint ownership  fall·  intQ  four  categorie~.: 
- maintaining joint ownership, 
- partial  jo~nt ownership, 
- divestiture of the cable TV operation, 
- transition from  j~int ownership to divestiture. 
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1. 
2. 
In the first category, six optioru were examined. They impose different degrees of restrictions on the joint 
owner; the impact  on  the development of infrastructure and services  increases  with  transparency of and 
separation  within  the joint owner's  group of companies. 
The second category, partial joint ownership, covers increasing separation of the cable TV company from 
the joint owner, as additional shareholders take bigger shares. The higher their share, the higher the impact 
on accelerated  development of infrastructure and services  in  the  Member States. 
Divestiture of the joint owner's cable TV network, the third  category, has a  high  il:npact on infrastructure 
and service development,  leading to greater .capacity increase, greater accessibility of residential  customers 
and availability of services,  high innovation and the ability of other service providers to offer their services 
over different infrastructures.  Implementing  this  option  will  offer a  sound  basis  for development of tele-
communicatiQn  and  multimedia  markets in  line  with.  the  European  Union's objectives. 
In  the  fourth  category,  two. options  mentioned  by  many  interviewees  for  the  period  between  joint 
ownership and partial and/or full  divestiture: introducing an independent trustee  and structural separation 
were looked at. These options can be combined.  In  the  Netherlands, for example, KPN has  not only to 
separate  its  cable  operations  legally  from  the  telecommunications  operations  but  also  to set  up  separate 
management and an  independent trustee. The regulator enforced these steps to initiate a -partial  divestiture 
of KPN's cable  operations~ moving  it  towards an  e~entual minority share of less  than  25  per cent. 
Th,e  other options described  above can  also  be  pan of an. overall  transition  from  joint ownership. 
The figure  below summaries the results of the examination of ten  main options within  the four categories 
described. 
Impact  on  infrastructure  Impact  on  services 
Options  for  ownership  Accessibility  Cost  Availability  lncreasinf  Innovation  Comments 
Capacity  choke  o  rate  for .new 
upgrade  Ito  residential perfonnance  of  productS  service  services  and  customers  amprovement  and  services  providers  applications 
Maintain  joint  owner- - No cable upgrade 
ship  without  other 
change  0  0  0  0  0  0 
-Less  innovation 
provision 
In  service 
- Slow  down of content service 
development 
- No  short  or  medium-term 
infrastructure  competition 
- Strong regulator needed 
Maintain  joint owner- - Influence on cable upgrade to 
ship/DTii  develop- remain  competitive 
ment  towards  digital 
multichannel services  0  0  0  •  • 
0 
- lncreasin~ availability  of pro-
ducts  an  services  because  of 
rising  competition 
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Options  for  ownership 
3.  Maintain  joint  owner-
ship  but  establish 
ONP on joint owner's 
cable  network 
-4.  Maintain  joint  owner-
ship  but open up spec-
trum  for wireless  local 
loop  (narrowband) 
s.  Legal  separation 
(creation  of  100% 
subsidiary) 
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lplpaa on infruuucwre 
Capacity  Accessibility  Cost  Avaibbility 
upcrade  ~  residential performance  of/.  rod~~ 
customers  amprovement  an  Jemces 
0  • 
0  • 
•  • 
0  0 
0  0  •  • 
0  •  • •  • • 
Impact on semces 
lncreuinf  Innovation 
choice  o  rate for new 
~en-ice  ~ervices and 
providers  applications 
• 
0 








- Rising  number  of  service 
providers in  the market' 
- No  impact  on  upgrade  to 
bi-directional  services 
- Extended content service com-
petition 
- Strong regulator required 
- Cable  upgrade  investment 
requirements  vary  strongly 
between  countries 
- Potentially medium-term infra-
structure  competition 
- Potential devaluation of cable 
- Joint owner forced  to upJrade 
cable  to remain  compeuuve 
- Increase  of  content-service 
development 
- Digital,  two-way  broadband 
technology  not  yet  available 
at  competitive  price,  wide-
spread  rollout  not  realistic  in 
near future 
- Minimum  condition  for effec-
tive  surveillance  of  competi-
tive  behaviour 
- Transparency  of  assets  and 
costs 
- Clear allocation of profit/loss 
- Allows shareholders and regu-
lators  to  see  profitability  of 
cable 1V 
-As  point 5 
- Separate  man~~ment  needs 
tO  present  a  1evements  to 
shareholders and public 
- Motivation  for  management 
to increase 'number of services 
and network performance 
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Options  for  ownership 
7.  Partial j?int 
ownersh1p 
7  .I.  Incumbent  owns 
>so% 
7  .2.  Incumbent  owns 
<so% 
7.3.  Incumbent  owns 
< 2S%  , 
Official  )oumal of the  European  Communities 
Impact· on  infruuuautc  Impact  on  leiYiccs 
Accessibility  Cost  Availabitit}- lnccho~~of  r!:'r:;u.:, 
Capacity  to residential oerforrnance  of/rodu.cu  ~  ·  d  upgrade  r- semcc.  semccs  an 
customers  mprovement  an  .semccs  providers  applications 
•  • •  •• •  • •  • •  • 
• •  ••  •••  •••  •••  • • 
•••  •••  •••  • • •  •  • • •  •• 
7.3.98 
Commenu 
- Financial  and  management 
details stiU  have to be revealed 
to parent company 
- All of points 5 and 6 
- Majority  of  shares  allows 
joint  owner  to  make  man-
agement  decisions  and  there-
fore  avoid  competition  be-
tween the two infr~structures 
- Specific  contract  with  other 
shareholders  mar  impact 
development  of  infrastructure 
and services 
- Cable  upgrade  achievable 
according to business case 
- HiJher  possibility  for  ad-
diuonal  service  providers  next 
to joint owner 
..:._  Financial  and  management 
decisions  have  to  be  revealed 
to pare·nt company 
- Blocking  vote  of joint  owner 
against  major  competitive 
action, i.e.  in  POTS 
- Since  joint  owner  does  not 
have  'blocking'  minority  vote, 
a  full  ~rvice competitor  can 
be  established  by management 
according to business case 
- Joint owner can  keep  link  to 
cable  TV  network  for  the 
provision of cable TV services 
.....  •  ~l 
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ImpaCt  on  infrastructure  Impaa on  services 
Options  (or  ownership  Accessibility  Cost  Availability  Increuinf  Innovation  Comments  Capacity  choice  o  rate  for  new 
upgrade  Ito  residential performance  of/roducu  service  iervices  and  customers  Improvement  ~n  services  providers  applications 
8.  No joint ownership  •••  •••  •• • •  •••  •••  •••  - Service and infrastructure com-
petition 
- Increased  accessibility  of resi-
dential  customers  .  . 




ble  as  competitive  advantage-
continuous  network operator 
- Increasing · choice  of  service 
providers,  even  of  similar 
services,  because  of additional 
capacity a"'d  competing  infra-
structures 
Additional  op,tions  for transitional  periods 
9.  Independent  trustee  0  ••  •  ••  • • 
0  - Independent  trustee  is  able  to 
opti'mise  cost/perfonnance  of 
networks 
- Independent  trustee  is  likelk 
.  to  receive  funds  for  networ 
upgrade 
-In  The  Netherlands  the 
trustee  optian 
the  transition 
vestiture 
is  used  during 
to  panial  di-
10.  Separation  of network  - Very limited  network upgrade 
and  services  (creation  owing  to  risk  aversion  of 
of  separate  subsidi- network  owner  (cannot  par-
aries  for joint owner)  •  • •  •  •  •  • 
ticipat~ in  upside) 
-Price  increase  since  network 
operation  has  to  be  profitable 
stand alone 
- Strong  . regulator  needed  tO 
control increasing prices 
- If  service  providers  are  a:l-
lowed  to  invest  in  network 
upgrade, 
1shared  ownership  is 
created'. 
0  No  impact  •  Low  impact  •  •  Medium  impact  •  •  •  High  impact 
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Reatrictiou on  the  pro.Uion of cable  TV capacity 
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7.3.98 
'J.'hree  policy  options  for the provision  of cable 1V capacity can  be  considered: 
- Maintaining the status quo· 
- Lifting restrictions on specific PrOs and/or giving dominant PrOs rights to provide cable 1V capacity 
over telecommunications  infrastructure 
- Lifting restrictions on licences for cable 1V infrastructure. 
As  shown in  the  figure,  lifting restrictions that apply specifically to PTOs and giving  them  rights  to provide 
cable 1V capacity over  their  existing  networks  would  have  limited  impact  on the  market,  but  lifting· the 
general  restrictions· on  licence  availability  for  cable 1V infrastructure would  have  a  major  impact  on  the 
long  term  development  of broadband  multi-media  markets. 
Options  for  lifting  restrictions 
on the provision  of cable 1V 
capacity 
I. Maintain status quo 
2.  Lift  restncuons  on 
specific  PrOs  and/  or 
give  dominant  PTOs 
rights  to  provide  cable 
1V  capacity  via  tele-
communications  infra-
structure 
J.  Lift  restncuons  on  li-





infrastructure  •  •  • 
0  No  impact 
Impact  on infrastructure 
Accessibility  Cost  Availability 
o  residential performance  of/rod"!cu 
customers  tmprovement  an  servaces 
•  0  • 
• •  •  • • 
•••  • •  • •• 
Impact  on  services 
Increasing  Innovation 
choice  of  rate  for  new 
service  servi<"es  and 
providers  applications 
0  0 
•  • 
Comments 
- In  seven  Member  States 
restrictions on  new  broadband 
infrastructure  remain 
- Reduced opponunity for com-
petition  and  innovation  in 
multi-media  services 
- Potentially  large  impact  as 
removes  legal  uncertamty and 
explicit  restrictions on  PTOs 
- Potential  competitive  risk 
through  enhanced  position  of 
dominant  PrOs 
- Lifts  specific  restrictions  on 
PTOs  where  they  exist  (UK 
and  Spain) 
- Removes  asymmetry  between 
cable  and telecoms  regulation 
•••  •  · •  •  ·  - Potentially  high  impact  on 
creation  of  new  broadband 
networks  and  multi-media 
services 
•  Low  impact  •  •  Medium  impact  •  •  •  High  impact 
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Draft Commission Directive amending  Directive 90/388/EEC in  order to ensure  that tdecom-
munications  networks  and  cable  TV  netw.orks  owned  by  a  single  operator are  separate  legal 
entities 
(98/C  71/05) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
lHE COMMISSION  OF TiiE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community,  and  in  particular Article  90(3)  thereof, 
Whereas: 
(1)  Pursuant  to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC of 
28  June  1990  on  competition  in  the  markets  for 
telecomm\_lnications  services C),  as  last  amended  by 
Directive  96/19/EC (1),  the  Member  States  were 
required  to  lift  special  and exclusive  rights  for tele-
communications  services  and  infrastructures  by 
1  January  1998,  subject  to  additional  transition 
periods  for  some  Member  States.  In  particular, 
Article  4,  as  amended  by  Commission  Directive 
95/51/EC C),  required  Member  States  to  'abolish 
all  restrictions  on  the  supply  of  transmission 
capacity by  cable 1V networks and  allow the usc  of 
cable  networks  for  the  provision  of  telecommuni-
cations services, other than voice  telephony', and  to 
'ensure  that  interconnection  of cable  TV networks 
with  the  public  telecommunications  network  is 
authorised  for such  purpose,  in  particular intercon-
nection  with  leased  lines,  and  that  the  restrictions 
on the direct interconnection of cable TV networks 
by cable TV operators are abolished'. 
(2)  Directive  95/51/EC  addressed  two  problems 
concerning  undertakings  to  which  Member  States 
have  granted  the  right  to  establish  both  cable  TV 
and  telecommunications  networks.  First,  it  stated 
that  these  undertakings  are  in  a  situation  whereby 
they  have  no  incentive  to  attract  users  to  the 
network best suited  to  the  provision  of the  relevant 
service.  It was  pointed  out that the  introduction  of 
fair  competition will  often  require  specific  measures 
that take  into  account the  specific  circumstances of 
the relevant markets. At the time of the adoption of 
(')  OJ  L 192, 24.7.1990, p.  10. 
(')  OJ  L 74, 22.3.1996, p.  13. 
(I) OJ L 256, 26.10.1995, p.  49. 
Directive  95/51/EC,  the  Commission  concluded 
that,  given  the  disparities  between  Member  States, 
the  national  ·authorities  were  best  able  to  assess 
which  measures  were  most  appropriate,  and  in 
particular  to  judge  whether  a  separation  of  these 
activities  was  indispensable.  Secondly,  the 
Commission  concluded  that  detailed  control  of 
cross-subsidies  and  accounting  transparency  are 
essential  in  the  early stages  of liberalisation  of the 
telecommunications  sector.  Article  2  of  Directive 
95/51/EC  therefore  required  Member  States  to 
ensure  in  particular  that  telecommunications 
ox:ganis.ations  providing  ct~bJe .. TV  infrastructures 
kept  separate  financial  accounts  as  concerns  the 
provision.  of  public  telecommunications  networks 
and  cable TV networks as  well  as  their activities  as 
telecommunications  service  providers.  It  was  also 
stated  that  while  Member  States  should  at  least 
impose  a  clear  separation  of  financial  records 
between two activities,  full  structural separation was 
preferable. 
(3)  At  the same  time  the  Commission  stated  that in  the 
absence  of  the  emergence  of  competing  home-
delivery  systems  it  would  have  to  reconsider 
whether a  separation  of accounts  was  sufficient  to 
avoid  improper  practices  and  would  assess  whether 
such joint provision did  not result  in. a limitation of 
the  potential  supply of transmission  capacity at the 
expense  of  the  service  providers  in  the  relevant 
area, or whether further  measures  were  warranted. 
In  this  context  the  third  paragraph of Anicle  2  of 
Directive  95/51/EC  required  the  Commission  to 
carry  out,  before  1  January  1998,  an  overall 
assessment  of the impact,  in  relation  to  the aims  of 
that  Directive,  of the  joint  provision  of cable  TV 
networks  and  public  telecommunications  networks 
through a single operator. 
( 4)  This  Directive  is  based  on  the  assessment  carried 
out by  the  Commission  as  required  by  Article  2 of 
Directive  95/51/EC.  In  preparing  that  assessment, 
two studies  were  commissioned  on the  competition 
implications  in  telecommunications  and  multimedia 
markets  of,  on  the  one ·hand,  joint  provision  of 
cable  and telecommunications  networks  by a  single 
dominant  operator  and,  on  the  other,  restrictions 
on the use  of telecommunications  networks for the 
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provision  of  cable  1V  aervices.  The  studies 
concluded  in  particular that the  joint ownership  of 
telecommunications  networks  and  cable  . 1V 
networks  by  a  single  enterprise,  without  a  high 
degree  of competition  in  the  local  access  markets, 
slows  down  the  development  towards  a  full 
multimedia  infrastructure  to  the  detriment  of 
consumers,  service  providers  and  the  European 
economy as  a whole. 
(5)  The Commission  has  adopted  a  communication  on 
·the assessment carried out as  required by Directives 
95/51/EC  and  96/19/EC C).  In.  its  review  the 
Commission  found  that  the  optimal  development 
of  telecommunications  and  multimedia  markets 
depends  on four  factors:  service  competition,  infra-
structure  competition,  infrastructure  upgrade,  as 
well  as  other types  of innovation.  It  found  ~hat iu 
the  Community,  the  joint  provision  of  telecom-
munications  and  cable  1V  services  by  a  single 
operator creates an asymmetric starting position  f~r 
dominant  telecommunications  operators  compared 
with  new  entrants.  This  will  act  as  a  significant 
constraint -on  the  optimal  development  of telecom-
munications  markets. 
(6)  The  Treaty,  and  in  particular  Anicle  90  thereof, 
entrustS  the  Commission  with  the  task  of ensuring 
that  Member  States,  in  the  case  of public  under-
takings  and  undertakings  enjoying  special  or 
exclusive  rights,  comply  with  their  obligations 
under  Community  law.  Pursuant  to  Anicle  90(3) 
the  Commission  can  specify  and  clarify  the  obli-
gations  arising  from  that  Article,  and  in  that 
framework,  set  out  the  conditions  which  are 
necessary  _to  allow  the  Commission  to  pedorm 
effectively  the  duty of surveillance  imposed  upon  it 
by that paragraph. 
(7)  Most  European  telecommunications  organisations 
are  still  State-controlled  companies.  In  addition, 
whilst  Community law  provides  for  the  withdrawal 
of special  and  exclusive  rights  for  the  provision  of 
telecommunications  networks  and  services,  tele-
communications  organisations  will  continue  to 
enjoy  special  rights  · as  defined  by  Directive 
90/388/EEC,  as  amended  by  Directive 
(') OJ C ...  , ...  , p  .•.. 
94/46/EC (1),  beyond  the date of full  liberalisation, 
in  "the  area  of  radio  frequencies  used  for  the 
provision  of  telecommunications  networks  and 
· broadcasting  transmission  capacity.  That is  because 
telecommunications  organisations  continue  to  enjoy 
rights  to  use  radio  frequencies  which  they  have 
historically  been  granted  otherwise  than  according 
to  objective,  proportional  and  non-discriminatory 
criteria.  Those  authorisations  are  regulatory 
advantages  that  strengthen  the  position  of  those 
operators  and  continue  to  have  a  substantial  effect 
on  the  ability · of  other  undertaking~  to  compete 
with  the  telecommunications  organisations  in 
the  area  of  telecommunications  infrastructure. 
Therefore  those  telecommunications  operators  are 
undertakings  covered  by  Article  90( 1)  of  the 
Treaty. 
(8)  Most  Member  States  have  adopted  measures 
granting  to  the  telecommunications  organisations 
special  or exclusive  rights  for  the  provision of cable 
teleVision  networks.  The  right.S  can  take  the  form 
either of an  exclusive  licence  or of a  non-exclusive 
licence  where  the  number  of  licences  is  restricted 
otherwise  than  according  to objective,  proponional 
and  non-disc:riminatory  criteria. 
(9)  Article  86  of  the  Treaty  prohibits  one  or  more 
undertakings  holding  a  dominant  position  from 
abusing  that dominant  position  within  the  common 
market or a substantial pan of it. 
(10)  Where  Member  States  have  granted  a  special  or 
exclusive  right  to  build  and  operate · cable  iV 
networks  to  a  telecommunications  organisation 
which  is  dominant on the  market for services  using 
telecommunications  infrastructure,  that  telecom-
munications  organisation  has  no  incentive  to 
upgrade  both  its  public  narrowband  telecommuni-
cations network or itS  broadband cable 1V network 
to  an  integrated  broadband  communications 
network  ('full-service  network')  capable  of 
delivering  voice,  data  and  · images  at  high 
bandwidth. 
In  other words, such  an organisation  is  placed  in  a 
situation where it  has  a conflict of interestS  because 
any  substantial  improvement  in  either  itS  telecom-
munications  network or its  cable 1V network  may 
lead  to  a  loss  of business  for  the  other  network. 
(') OJ L 268,  19.10.1994, p.  15. 
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It  would  be  desirable  in  those  circumstances  to 
separate  the  ownership  of the  two  networks  into 
two  distinct companies since  the  joint own.ership  of 
the  networks leads  those organisations  to delay. the 
emergence  of  new  advanced  communications 
services  and  thus  restricts  technical  progress  at the 
expense  of the  users,  contrary  to  Anicle  90{1)  of 
the  Treaty,  in  conjunction  with  point  (b)  of the 
second paragraph of Anicle 86. 
As  a  minimum,  all  Member States should, however, 
ensure  that telecommunications· organisations  which 
have  special  or exclusive  rights  for  the  provision of 
cable TV networks operate cable .lV networks in  a 
separate legal  entity. 
( 11)  Such  ~ conclusion  is  reinforced  by  the  following 
considerations.  Where  Member  States  grant  to  an 
undertaking  the  special  or  exclusive  right  to 
establish  cable  1V  networks  in  the  same 
geographical  area  where  it  already provides  public 
telecommunications  networks,  different  forms  of 
anti-competitive  behaviour  are  likely  to  occur 
unless  sufficient  transparency  of the  operations  of 
the undertakings  is  ensured. 
Notwithstanding  the  requirements  of  Community 
law  with  regard  to  accounting  separation,  some  of 
which  only  entered  into  force  with  the  implemen-
tation  of the  package  of general  measures  opening 
up  the  Community's telecommunications  marketS  in 
most  Member  States  from  1  January  1998,  in 
situations where serious conflicts  of interest exist as 
a  result of joint  ownership, such  separation has  not 
provided  the  necessary safeguards  against  all  forms 
of anti-competitive  behaviour.  In  addition,  the sep-
aration  of accounts will  only render financial  flows 
more  transparent,  whereas  a  requirement  for 
separate  legal  entities  will  lead  to  more  trans-· 
parency of assets  and costs will  facilitate  monitoring 
of  the  profitability  and  the  management  of  the 
cable  network  operations.  The  provision  of  tele-
communications  networks  and  cable  TV  networks 
are  related  activities.  The  position  of  an  operator 
on  one  of  those  markets  has  an  impact  on  its 
position  on  the  other,  and  the  supervision  of its 
activities  on  those  markets  is.  more  difficult.  In 
addition,  where  a  dominant  telecommunications 
organisation  has  any  cable TV interests,  this  has  a 
discouraging  effect  on  any other company  because 
of the .financial  strength  of the  telecommunications 
operator.  Also,  the  future  financial  prospects  of a 
cable TV network which  has  not yet been built are 
uncenain  for  a  company  that  is  not  yet  already 
.established  on  the  telecommunications  or pay 1V 
services  markets. 
Therefore,  It  1s  essential  that a  dominant  telecom-
munications  organisation  organises  its  cable  1V 
network  activities  in  such  a  way  that  it  can  be 
monitored in  order to ensure· that it does not use  its 
resources  so  as  to  abuse  its  position.  During  the 
crucial  phase  of the  full  opening  of the  sector  to 
competition,  a  legal  separation  between  the 
operation  of  the  public  switched  telecommuni-
cations  network and  the  cable 1V network  of the 
telecommunications  organisations  is  the  minimum 
requirement  in  order . to  ensure  compliance  with 
Article  90.  In  order to  achieve  this  transparency, it 
is  necessary  that  the  ·networks  be  operated  by 
separate  legal  entities  which  may,  however,  in 
principle  be  jointly  owned.  The  requirement  of 
legal  separation  would  therefore  be  complied  with 
if  the  cable TV  operations of a telecommunications 
organisation  were  transferred  to  a  fully-owned 
subsidiary of the telecommunications organisation. 
(12) The  Commission  will  examine  on  a  case-by-case 
basis  whether  it  would  be  compatible  with  the 
principle  of  proportionality  to  require  individual 
Member States to take further measures. 
The  decisions  to  be  taken  in  resp~ct  of  specific 
cases  could  provide  for  measures  including  the 
opening  of  the  cable  operator  to  participation  of 
third  parties,  or  the  requirement  to  sell-off  that 
entity  altogether. 
(13)  The  distribution  of  audio-visual  programmes 
intended  for  the  general  public  via  telecommuni-
cations  networks,  and  the  content  of  such 
programmes,· will  continue  to be  subject  to  specific 
rules  adopted by Member States in  accordance with 
Community  law  and  ·should  not,  therefore,  be 
subject to the provisions of this  Directive. 
(14)  Directive  90/388/EEC  should  therefore  be 
amended  accordingly. 
(15)  Member  States  should  refrain  from  introducing 
new  measures  with  the  purpose  or effect  of jeop-
ardising the aim of this  Directive, 
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HAS  ADOPTED  1HIS DIRECilVE:.  Articlt  2. 
Article  1 
Article 9 of Directive 90/388/EEC is  hereby replaced  by  . 
the  following: 
Member States shall supply to the Commission,  not later 
than  nine  months  after  this  Directive  has  entered  into 
force,  such  information as  Will· allow  the Commission to 
confirm  that  Article  1  of  this  Directive  has  been 
complied  with. 
'Article  9 
Article  J 
Member States shall  ensure  that any telecommunications 
organisation  to  which  t~ey  grant  special  or  exclusive 
rights in  the  ~reas of relevant radio frequencies or which 
ihey control, which, in  a substantial part of the common 
market, has a dominant position and operates a cable TV 
network under special  or exclusive  rights  does not do so 
using  the  same  legal  entity  as  it  uses  for  its  public  tele-
communications  network.' 
This  Directive  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  20th  day 
following  its  publication  in  the  Official  foumal  of the 
European  Communities. 
Article  4 
'Ibis  Directive  is  addressed  to .the  Member States. 
Non-opposition  to  a  notified ·concentration 
(Case  No IV /M.t078 - BP/Hiils) 
(98/C  71/06) 
(Text  with  EEA  relevance) 
On  13  February  1998,  the  Commission decided  not to oppose  the  above  notified  concentration 
and  to· declare it  compatible with  the common  market. 'This  decision  is  based  on Article 6(1)(b) 
of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89.  'I11e  full  text  of the  decision  is  available  only  in 
English and will  be  made  public  after it  is  cleared of any  business secrets it  may  contain. It will 
be  available:  · 
- as  a  paper version  through  the  sales  offices  of the  Office  for  Official  Publicat~ons of the 
European Communities (see  list on the last page), 
- in  electronic form  in  the 'CEN' version of the  CELEX database,  under document number 
398M1078.  CELEX  is  the  computerised  documentation  system  of European  Community 
law; for more information concerning subscriptions please  contact: 
EUR-OP, 
Information, Marketing and  Public  Relations  (OP/4B), 
2,  rue Mercier, 
L-2985  Luxembourg; 
telephone: (352) 2929  4 24 55, fax:  (352) 2929  4 27 63. 
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DIRECfiVE  97/67/EC  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT AND  OF  THE 
COUNCIL 
of 15  Decennber  1997 
on common rules  for  the development of the internal market of Community 
postal services  and the improvement of quality of service 
THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT AND THE  COUNCIL OF 
THE  EUROPEAN  UNION, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, and in  particular Articles 57 (2),  66 and 1  OOa 
thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from  the Commission (1), 
Having regard to  the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee (t 
Having  regard  to  the  opinion  of  the  Committee  of  the 
Regions (1), 
Having  regard  to  the  resolution  of  the  European  Par-
liament of 22 January 1993  concerning the green paper 
on  the  development of the single  market for  postal  ser-
vices e>. 
Having  regard  to  the  Council  resolution  of  7  February 
1994  on  the  development  of  Community  postal  ser-
vices(~. 
Acting  in  acconhmcc  with  the  procedure  laid  down  in 
Article  189b  of  the Treaty,  in  the  light  of  the joint  text 




Whereas measures should be adopted with the aim 
of  establishing  the  internal  market  in  accordance 
with  Article  7a  of  the Treaty; whereas  this  market 
comprises  an  area  without  internal  frontiers  in 
which  the  free  movement  of  goods,  persons, 
seiVices  and  capital  is  ensured; 
Whereas  the  establishment of  the internal  market 
in the postal sector is of proven importance for the 
economic and social  cohesion  of the Community, 
(I}  OJ  C  322,  2.  12.  1995,  p.  22,  and 
OJ C  300,  10.  10.  1996,  p.  22. 
(2)  OJ  C  174,  17.  6.  1996,  p.  41. 
(')  OJ C  337,  II.  11.  1996,  p.  28. 
(
4
)  OJ  C  42,  15.  2.  1993,  p.  240. 
(, OJ C  48,  16.  2.  1994,  p.  3. 
(')  Opinion of the  European  Parliament of  9  May  1996 (0  J  C 
152, 27. 5.  1996, p. 20), Council Common Position of 29 April 
1997 (0  J  C  188,  19. 6.  1997, p.  9}  and Decision of the Euro-
pean  Parliament  of  16  September  1997  (0  J  C  304,  6.  I 0. 
1997,  p.  34);  Decision  of  the  European  Parliament  of  19 









in that postal seiVices are an essential instrument of 
communication  and  trade; 
Whereas  on  ll  June  1992  . the  Commission 
presented  a  Green  Paper  on  the _development  of 
the single market for postal seiVices and, on 2 June 
1993,  a  Communication on  the guidelines for  the 
development  of  Community  postal  seiVices; 
Whereas  the  Commission  has  conducted  wide-
ranging  public  consultation  on  those  aspects  of 
postal  seiVices  that  are  of  interest  to  the  Com-
munity  and  the  interested  parties  in  the  postal 
sector have communicated their obseiVations to the 
Commission; 
Whereas  the current extent of  the universal  postal 
seiVice  and the  conditions governing its  provision 
vary  significantly  from  one  Member  State  to 
another,  whereas,  in  particular,  performance  in 
terms of quality of seiVices is very unequal amongst 
Member States; 
Whereas  cross-border  postal  links  do  not  always 
meet  the  expectations  of  users  and  European 
citizens,  and  performance,  in  terms  of  quality  of 
service  with  regard  to  Community  cross-border 
postal  services,  is  at  the  moment  unsatisfactory; 
Whereas  the  disparities  obseiVed  in  the  postal 
sector  have  considerable  implications  for  those 
sectors  of activity  which  rely  especially  on  postal 
seiVices  and  effectively  impede  the  progress 
towards  internal Community cohesion, in  that the 
regions  deprived  of  postal  seiVices  of  sufficiently 
high  quality  find  themselves  at  a  disadvantage  as 
regards both their letter seiVice and the distribution 
of goods; 
Whereas  measures  seeking  to  ensure  the  gradual 
and controlled  Iiberalisation  of the market and  to 
secure  a  proper balance  in  the application  thereof 
are necessary in order to guarantee, throughout the 
Community,  and  subject  to  the  obligations  and 
rights  of  the  universal  seiVice  providers,  the  free 
provision  of seiVices  in  the  postal  sector  itself; 
Whereas  action  at  Community  level  to  ensure 
greater harmonisation of the conditions governing 
the  postal  sector  is  therefore  necessary  and  steps 
must consequently be  taken  to  establish  common 
rules; 
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(I 0)  Whereas,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity,  a  set  of general  principles  should  be 
adopted  at  Community level,  whilst  the choice of 
the  exact  procedures  should  he  a  matter  for  the 
Member States, which should he  ~ree to choose the 








Whereas it  is  essential  to guarantee at Community 
level  a  universal  postal  service  encompassing  a 
minimum  range  of services  of  specified  quality  to 
be  provided  in  all  Member States  at  an  affordable 
price  for  the  benefit  of  all  users,  irrespective  of 
their geographical  lu<..:ation  in  the  Community; 
Whereas the aim of the universal services is  to offer 
all  users  easy access  to  the  postal  network through 
the  provision,  in  particular, of a sufficient number 
of access points and by ensuring satisfactory condi-
tions  with  regard  to  the  frequency  of  collections 
and  deliveries;  whereas  the  provision  of  the 
universal  service  must meet the fundamental  need 
to  ensure  continuity  of  operation,  whilst  at  the 
same  time  remaining  adaptable  to  the  needs  of 
users as  well as guaranteeing them fair and non-dis-
criminatory  treatment; 
Whereas  universal  service  must  cover  national 
services  as  well  as  cross-border  services; 
Whereas  users  of  the  universal  service  must  be 
given adequate information on the range of services 
offered,  the conditions governing their supply and 
usc,  the  quality  of  the  services  provided,  and  the 
tariffs; 
Whereas the provisions of this Directive relating to 
universal service  provision are  without prejudice to 
the right of universal service operators to  negotiate 
contracts  with  customers  individually; 
Whereas  the  maintenance  of  a  range  of  those 
services  that  may  be  reserved,  in  compliance with 
the rules of the Treaty and without prejudice to the 
application  of  the  rules  on  competition,  appears 
justified on the grounds of  ensuring the operation 
of the  universal  service  under financially  balanced 
conditions;  whereas  the  process  of  liberalisation 
should not curtail the continuing supply of certain 
free  services for  blind and partially sighted persons 
introduced  by  the  Member States; 
Whereas  items  of  correspondence  weighing  350 
grammes and over represent less  than 2 % of letter 
volume  and  less  than 3% of  the  receipts  of  the 





times the basic tariff) will  better permit the distinc-
tion  between  the  reserved  service  and  the express 
service,  which  is  liberalised; 
Wher:eas,  in  view  of  the  fa<..:t  that  the essenLial  dif-
ference  between  express  mail  and  universal  postal 
services  lies  in  the  value  added  (whatever  form  it 
takes)  provided  by  express  services  and  perceived 
by  customers,  the  most  effective  way  of  deter-
mining the extra value  perceived is  to consider the 
extra  price  that  customers  are  prepared  to  pay, 
without prejudice, however, to the price limit of the 
reserved  area  which  must  be  respected; 
Whereas  it  is  reasonable  to  allow,  on  an  interim 
basis,  for  direct  mail  and  cross-border  mail  to 
continue  to  be  capable  of  reservation  within  the 
price  and  weight  limits  provided;  whereas,  as  a 
further step towards the completion of the internal 
market of  postal  services, a decision on the further 
gradual  controlled  liberalisation  of  the  postal 
market,  in  particular with  a  view  to  the  liberalisa-
tion of cross-border and direct mail as  well  as  on a 
further  review  of  the  price  and  weight  limits, 
should  be  taken  by  the  European  Parliament  and 
the  Council  not  later  than  I  January  2000,  on  a 
proposal  from  the  Commission  following  a  review 
of  the  sector; 
Whereas,  for  reasons  of  public  order  and  public 
security,  Member  States  may  have  a  legitimate 
interest  in  conferring  on  one  or  more  entities 
designated by them the right to site on the public 
highway letter-boxes intended  for  the reception  of 
postal items; whereas, for the same reasons, they are 
entitled to appoint the entity or entities responsible 
for  issuing  postage  stamps identifying the country 
of  origin  and  those  responsible  for  providing  the 
registered mail service used in the course of judicial 
or  administrative  procedures  in  accordance  with 
their  national  legislation;  whereas  they  may  also 
indicate  membership  of  the  European  Union  by 
integrating  the  12-star symbol; 
Whereas new services (services  quite distinct from 
conventional  services)  and  document exchange do 
not  form  part  of  the  universal  service  and  con-
sequently  there  is  no  justification  for  their  being 
reserved  to the universal  service  providers; whereas 
this  applies  equally  to  self-provision  (provision  of 
postal services by the natural or legal  person who is 
the originator of the mail, or collection and routing 
of  these  items  by  a  third  party  acting  solely  on 
behalf of  that  person),  which  does  not fall  within 
the  category  of  services; 
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Whereas Member States should be  able to regulate, 
by  appropriate  authorization  procedures,  on  their 
territory, the  provision  of  postal  services  which are 
not  reserved  to  the  universal  service  providers~ 
whereas  those  procedures  must  be  transparent, 
non-discriminatory,  proportionate  and  based  on 
objective  criteria; 
Whereas the Member States should have the option 
of  making the grant of licenq!s subject to universal 
scrvi<.:c  obligations or contributions to a compensa-
tion  fund  intended  to  compensate  the  universal 
scrvin.~ provider for  the provision  of sc.;rviccs  repre-
senting  an  unfair  fin:mcial  burden;  whereas 
Member  States  should  be  able  to  include  in  the 
uuthorisations  an  obligation  that  the  authorised 
activities must not infringe the exclusive or special 
rights granted to  the universal service  providers for 
the  reserved  services;  whereas  an  identification 
system  for  direct  mail  may  be  introduced  for  the 
purposes of supervision where direct  mail  is  liber-
alised; 
Whereas measures necessary for  the harmonisation 
of  authorisation  procedures  laid  down  by  the 
Member States governing the commercial provision 
to  the  public of  non-reserved  services  will  have  to 
be  adopted~ 
Whereas,  should  thi:-.  prove  necessary,  measures 
shall  be  adopted  to  ensure  the  transparency  and 
non-discriminatory  nature  of  conditions governing 
access  to  the  public  postal  network  in  Member 
Stat~s; 
Whereas, in order to ensure sound management of 
the  universal  service  and  to  avoid  distortions  of 
competition,  the  tariffs  applied  to  the  unive~al 
service  should  be  objective,  transparent,  non-dis-
criminatory and  geared  to  costs; 
Whereas the remuneration for the provision of  the 
intra-Community cross-border mail service, without 
prejudice  to  the  minimum  set  of  obligations 
derived  from  Universal  Postal  Union  acts,  should 
be geared to cover the costs of delivery incurred by 
the  universal  service  provider  in  the  country  of 
destination; whereas  this remuneration  should also 
provide  an  incentive  to  improve  or  maintain  the 
quality of the cross-border service  through  the use 
of  quality-of-service  targets;  whereas  this  wo~ld 
justify suitable systems providing for an appropnate 
coverage  of  costs  and  related  specifically  to  the 
quality  of service  ac~ieved; 
Whereas  separate  accounts  for  the  different 






necessary  in  order  to  introduce  transparency into 
the actual costs of the various services and in order 
to  ensure  that  cross-subsidies  from  the  reserved 
sector to  the  non-reserved  sector do not adversely 
affect  the  competitive  conditions  in  the  latter, 
Whereas, in  order to  ensure the application of the 
principles  set  out  in  the  previous  three  recitals, 
universal  service  providers  should  implement, 
within  a  reasonable  time  limit,  cost  accounting 
systems,  which  can  be  independently  verified,  by 
which  costs  can  be  allocated  to  services  as  accur-
ately  as  possible  on  the  basis  of  transparent  pro-
cedures;  whereas  such  requirements  can  be 
fulfilled,  for  example,  by  implementation  of  the 
principle of  fully  distributed costing; whereas such 
cost· accounting  systems  may  not  be  required  in 
circumstances  where  genuine  conditions  of  open 
competition  exist; 
Whereas  consideration  should  be  given  to  the 
interests of users,  who are  entitled to  services  of a 
high quality;  whereas,  therefore,  every  effort  must 
be  made  to  improve  and  enhance  the  quality  of 
services  provided  at  Community  level;  whereas 
such  improvements  in  quality  require  Member 
States  to  lay  down  standards,  to  be  attained  or 
surpassed  by  the  universal  service  providers,  in 
respect of the services forming part of the univerS<II 
service; 
Whereas  the  quality  of  service  expected  by  users 
constitutes  an  essential  aspect  of  the  sevices 
provided; whereas  the  evalua~ion standards for  this 
quality of service and the levels of quality achieved 
must be published in the interests of users; whereas 
it is  necessary to have· available harmonised quality-
of-service  standards  and  a  common  methodology 
for measurement in order to be able to evaluate the 
convergence  of  the  quality  of  service  throughout 
the  Community; 
Whereas national quality standards consistent with 
Community  standards  must  be  determined  by 
Member  States;  whereas,  in  the  case  of  intra-
Community  cross-border  services  requiring  the 
combined  efforts  of  at  least  two  universal  service 
providers from  two different Member States, quality 
standards  must  be  defined  at  Community  level; 
Whereas compliance with  these standards must be 
independently verified at regular intervals and on a 
harmonised  basis;  whereas  users  must  have  the 
right to  be informed of the results of  this verifica-
tion  and  Member  States  should  ensure  that 
corrective  action  is  taken  where  those  results 
demonstrate that the standards are not being met; 
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(34)  Whereas Council  Directive  93/13/EEC of  5 April 
f 993  on  unfair  terms  in  consumer  contracts(') 
applies  to  postal  operators; 
(]~)  WhcrcltS  thl'  tll•ed  for  improvement  of  quality  of 
scrvi<:e  means  that  disputes  have  to  he  settled 
quickly and efficiently; whereas,  in  addition  to  the 
forms  of legal  redress available  under national and 
Community  law,  a  procedure  dealing  with 
complaints  should  be  provided,  which  should  be 
transparent,  simple  and  inexpensive  and  should 
enable  all  relevant  parties  to  participate; 
(36)  Whereas progress  in  the interconnection of  postal 
networks  and  the  interests  of  users  require  that 
technical  standardisation  be  encouraged;  whereas 
technical  standardisation  is  indispensable  for  the 
promotion  of  interoperability  between  national 
networks and for  an efficient Community universal 
service; 
(37)  Whereas  guidelines  on  European  harmonisation 
provide  for  specialised  technical  standardisation 
activities  to  he  entrusted  to  the  European 
Committee  for  Standardisation; 
(38)  Whereas  a  committee · should  be  established  to 
assist the Commission with the implementation of 
this Directive, particularly in relation  to the future 
work on  the  development of measures  relating to 
the quality of Community cross-border service and 
technical  standardisation; 
(39)  Whereas, in order to ensure the proper functioning 
of  the  universal  service  and  to  ensure  undistorted 
competition  in  the  non-reserved  sector,  it  is  im-
portant  to separate  the  functions  of  the  regulator, 
on  the one  hand,  and  the  operator, on  the other; 
whereas no postal operator may be  both judge and 
interested party; whereas it is  for  the Member State 
to define the statute of one or more national regu-
latory  authorities,  which  may  be  chosen  from 
public  authorities  or  independent  entities 
appointed  for  that  purpose; 
(40)  Whereas  the effects  of  the  harmonised conditions 
on the functioning of the internal market in postal 
services  will  need  to  be  the  subject  of  an  assess-
ment;  whereas,  therefore,  the  Commission  will 
present  a  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and 
the  Council  on  the  application  of  this  Directive, 
including the appropriate information on develop-
ments  in  the  sector,  particularly  concerning 
economic,  social,  employment  and  technological 
aspects, as  well as  on quality of service, three years 
following the date of its entry into force, and in any 
event  no  later  than  31  December _2000; 
(') OJ  L  95,  21.  4.  1993,  p.  29. 
(41)  Whereas this  Directive docs not affect the applica-
tion of the rules of  the Treaty, and in  particular its 
rules  on  competition  and  the  freedom  to  provide 
services; 
(4l)  Whereas  nothin~ shall  prevent Member States from 
maintaining  in  force  or  introducing  measures  for 
the postal sector whkh are more liberal than those 
provided  for  by  this  Directive,  nor,  should  this 
Directive lapse, from maintaining in  force  measures 
which they have  introduced in  order to implement 
it,  provided  in  each  case  that  such  measures  are 
compatible  with  the  Treaty; 
(43}  Whereas it is  appropriate that this Directive should 
apply  until  31  December  2004  unless  otherwise 
decided  by  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  the  basis  of  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission; 
(44)  .  Whereas this  Directive  docs  not  apply  to  any  ac-
tivity which  falls  outside  the  scope of Community 
law,  such as  those provided  for  by Titles V and VI 
of the Treaty on European  Union, and in  any case 
to  activities  concerning  public  security,  defence, 
State  security  (including  the  economic  well-bein.g 
of  the State  when  the  activities  relate  to  State  se-
curity  matters)  and  the  activities  of  the  State  in 
areas  of  criminal  law; 
(45)  Whereas  this  Directive  does  not,  in  the  case  of 
undertakings  which  are  not  established  in  the 
Community,  prevent  the  adoption  of measures  in 
accordance with both Community law and existing 
international  obligations  designed  to  ensure  that 
nationals of the Member States enjoy similar treat-
ment  in  third  countries;  whereas  Community 
undertakings should benefit in third countries from 
treatment and effective access that is comparable to 
the  treatment  and  access  to  the  market  which  is 
conferred  on  nationals of  t~e countries concerned 
within  the  Community  context, 
HAVE  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECfiVE: 
CHAPTER  I 
Objective and scope 
Article  1 
This  Directive  establishes  common  rules  concerning: 
- the provision of a  universal  postal  service  within  the 
Community, 
- the  criteria  defining  the  services  which  may  be 
reserved for  universal service providers and the condi-
tions governing the provision of non-reserved services, 
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tariff  principles  and  transparency  of  accounts  for 
universal  service  provision, 
the  setting  of  quality  standards  for  universal  service 
provision  and  the  setting-up  of  a  system  to  ensure 
compliance  with  those  standards, 
the  harmonisation  of  technical  standards, 
the  creation  of  independent  national  regulatory  au-
thorities. 
Article  2 
For  the  purposes of this  Directive,  the  following  defini-
tions  shall  apply: 
I. f'OJtal  Jervias:  services  involving  the  clearance, 
sorting,  transport  ~nd 'delivery  of  postal  items; 
2.  pub/it jm.1tal m·twork: the system of organisation and 
resources  of  all  kiuds  used  by  the  universal  service 
provid<.·J~s)  lor  the  purposes  in  particular  of: 
the  clearance  of  postal  items  covered  by  a 
universal  service  obligation  from  access  points 
throughout  the  territory, 
the routing and handling of those items from  the 
postal  network  access  point  to  the  distribution 
centre, 
- distribution  to  the  addresses  shown  on  items; 
3.  acceJJ points: physical facilities, including letter boxes 
provided for  the public either on the public highway 
or at  the  premises  of  the  universal  service  provider, 
where postal  items may be deposited with the public 
postal  network  by  customers; 
4.  dtaram:e:  the  operation  of  collecting  postal  items 
deposited  at  access  points; 
S.  d iJtrilmt  ior1: the  process from  sorting at the distribu-
tion centre to delivery of postal items to their addres-
sees; 
6.  postal item: an  item  addressed  in  the  final  form  in 
which  it  is  to  be  carried  by  the  universal  service 
provider.  In  addition  to  items  of  correspondence, 
such  items  also  include  for  instance  books,  cata-
logues,  newspapers,  periodicals  and  postal  packages 
containing merchandise with or without commercial 
value; 
7.  item  of correspondence: a  communication  in  written 
form on any kind of physical medium to be conveyed 
and delivered  at the address  indicated  by the sender 
on  the  item  itself  or on  its  wrapping.  Books,  cata-
logues,  newspapers  and  periodicals  shall  not  be 
regarded  as  items of correspondence; 
8.  direct  mail:  a  communication  cons1stmg  solely  of 
advertising,  marketing  or  publicity  material  and 
comprising  an  identical  message,  except  for  the 
addressee's name, address and identifying number as 
well  as  other  modifications  which  do  not  alter  the 
nature of the message,  which  is  sent to a significant 
number of addressees,  to  be conveyed and delivered 
at  the  address  indicated  by  the  sender on  the  item 
itself  or  on  its  wrapping.  The  national  regulatory 
authority shall interpret the term 'significant number 
of  addressees'  within  each  Member  State  and  shall 
publish  an  appropriate  defintion.  Bills,  invoices, 
financial statements and other non-identical messages 
shall  not be  regarded  as  direct  mail.  A  communica-
tion  combining direct  mail  with  other items within 
the  same  wrapping shall  not  be  regarded  as  direct 
mail. Direct mail shall include cross-border as  well as 
domestic  direct  mail; 
9.  registered  item:  a  service  providing  a flat-rate 
guarantee  against  risks  of  loss,  theft  or damage  and 
supplying  the  sender,  where  appropriate  upon 
request,  with  proof  of  the  handing  in  of  the  postal 
item  and/or of  its  delivery  to  the  addressee; 
I 0.  in.rured item: a service insuring the postal  item up to 
the value declared by the sender in the event of loss, 
theft or damage; 
11.  cross-border  mail: mail  from  or to  another Member 
State  or from  or  to  a  third  country; 
12.  document  exchange:  provision  of  means,  including 
the supply of ad  hoc premises as  well  as  transporta-
tion by a third party, allowing self-delivery by mutual 
exchange of postal items between users subscribing to 
this  service; 
13.  universal .rervice provider: the public or private entity 
providing a  universal  postal  service  or parts  thereof 
within  a  Member  State,  the  identity  of  which  has 
been notified to the Commission in  accordance with 
Article  4; 
14.  authorisations:  means  any  perm1ss1on  setting  out 
rights and obligations specific to the postal sector and 
allowing undertakings to  provide  postal  services and, 
where  applicable,  to  establish  and/or operate  postal 
networks  for  the  provision  of  such  services,  in  the 
form  'of  a  'general  authorisation'  or  'individual 
licence'  as  defined. below: 
- 'general  authorisation'  means  an  authorisation, 
regardless  of  whether  it  is  regulated  by  a  'class 
licence'  or  under  general  law  and  regardless  of 
whether  such  regulation  requires  registration  or 
declaration  procedures,  which  does  not  require 
the  undertaking concerned  to  obtain  an  explicit 
decision  by  the  national  regulatory  authority 
before  exercising  the  rights  stemming from  the 
authorisation, 
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'individual licence' means an  authorisation which 
is  granted  by  a  national  regulatory  authority and 
which  gives  an  undertaking  specific  rights,  or 
which  subjects  that  undertaking's  operations  to 
specific  ohli~ations  supplemenlin~  the  general 
:HJthorisation  where  applicahle,  wht'fl'  tht·  undc.-r-
takinJ~  is  not  entitled  to  cxercice  the  ri~hts 
concerned  until  it  has  received  the  decision  by 
the  national  regulatory  authority; 
I 5.  terminal dtu•J:  the  remuneration  of  universal  service 
providers  for  the  distribution  of  incoming  cross-
border  mail  comprising  postal  items  from  another 
Member State  or  from  a  third  country; 
I 6.  sender: a  natural  or legal  person  responsible  for  ori-
ginating  postal  items; 
17.  users:  any  natural  or  legal  person  benefiting  from 
universal  service  provision  as  a  sender  or  an 
addressee; 
18.  national rt'J!,Uiatory  authori~y: the body or bodies, in 
each  Member  State,  to  which  the  Member  St41tc 
entrusts,  i11tt'1'  alia,  thl·  reguh1tory  functions  falling 
within  the  scope  of  this  Directive; 
19.  eJSential requiremmt.1: general non-economic reasons 
which  can  induce a  Member State  to  impose condi-
tions on  the supply of postal  services. These  reasons 
are  the confidentiality of correspondence, security of 
the  network  as  regards  the  transport  of  dangerous 
goods  and,  where  justified,  data  protection,  environ-
mental  protection  and  regional  planning. 
Data protection may include personal data protection, 
the  confidentiality  of  information  transmitted  or 
stored  and  protection  of  privacy. 
CHAPTER  2 
Universal  service 
Article 3 
1.  Member States shall ensure that users enjoy the right 
to  a  universal  service  involving the  permanent provision 
of a postal service of specified quality at all  points in their 
territory  at  affordable  prices  for  all  users. 
2.  To this end, Member States shall take steps to ensure 
that the density of the points of contact and of the access 
points  takes  account of  the  needs  of  users. 
3.  They  shall  take  steps  to  ensure  that  the  universal 
service  provider(s) guarantee(s) every working day and not 
less  than  five  days  a  week,  save  in  circumstances  or 
geographical  conditions  deemed  exceptional  by  the 
national  regulatory  authorities,  as  a  miminum: 
one  clearance, 
one delivery to the home or premises of every natural 
or legal  person or, by way  of derogation, under condi-
tions  at  the  disnetion  of  the  national'  regulatory 
authority,  one  dclivt·ry  to  appropriall'  installations. 
Any exception or derogation granted by  a national regula-
tory authority in  accordance with  this  paragraph  must be 
communicated  to  the  Commission  and  to  all  national 
regulatory  authorities. 
4.  Each  Member State shall  adopt the measures neces-
sary to ensure that the universal  service  includes the fol-
lowing  minimum  facilities: 
the  clearance,  sorting,  transport  and  distribution  of 
postal  items  up  to  two  kilograms, 
the  clearance,  sorting,  transport  and  distribution  of 
postal  packages  up  to  10  kilograms, 
services  for  registered  items  and  insured  items. 
S.  The national  regulatory authorities may  increase tht' 
wci~ht limit of  universal St'IVin·  <.:overa~e for  postal  pack 
ages  to any  weight  not  exceeding 20  kilograms and  may 
lay  down  special  arrangements  for  the  door-to-door  de-
livery  of  such  packages. 
Notwithstanding  the  weight  limit  of  universal  service 
coverage  for  postal  packages  established  by  a  given 
Member  State,  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  postal 
packages  received  from  other  Member  States  and 
weighing  up  to  20  kilograms  are  delivered  within  their 
territories. 
6.  The  minimum  and  maximum  dimensions  for  the 
postal  items in question shall  be  those laid  down  in  the 
Convention and the Agreement concerning Postal Parcels 
adopted  by  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 
7.  The universal service as  defined in this Article shall 
cover  both  national  and  cross-border  services. 
Artidl' 4 
Each  Member State shall ensure that the provision of  the 
universal  service  is  guaranteed  and  shall  notify  the 
Commission of the steps it  has taken to fulfil  this obliga-
tion and, in particular, the identity of its universal service 
provider(s).  Ea!:h  Member  State  shall  determine  in  ac-
cordance with Community law  the obligations and rights 
assigned  to  the  universal  service  provider(s)  and  shall 
publish  them. 
Article  5 
1.  Each  Member State  shall  take  steps  to  ensure  that 
universal  service  provision  meets  the  foll~wing require-
ments: 
- it shall  offer a  service  guaranteeing compliance  with 
the  essential  rerquirements, 
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-- it  shall  offer  an  identical  service  to  user!,  under 
comparable  conditions, 
it  shall  be  made  available  without  any  form  of  dis-
crimination whatsoever, especially without discrimina-
tion  arising  from  political,  religious  or  ideological 
considerations, 
- it shall not be  interrupted or stopped except in  cases 
of  force  majeure, 
it shall evolve  in  response  to  the technical, economic 
and  social  environment and  to  the  needs  of  users. 
2.  The  provisions  of  paragraph  I  shall  not  preclude 
measures  which  the  Member  States  take  in  accordance 
with  requirements  relating  to  public  interest  recognized 
by  the  Treaty,  in  particular  Articles  36  and  56  thereof, 
concerning,  inter alia,  public  morality,  public  security, 
including  criminal  invesigations,  and  public  policy. 
Article 6 
Member States  shall  take  steps  to  ensure  that  users  are 
regularly given  sufficiently detailed  and up-to-date  infor-
mation  by  the universal  service  provider(s)  regarding  the 
particular  features  of  the  universal  services  offered,  with 
special  reference  to  the  general  conditions  of  access  to 
these  services  as  well  as  to  prices  and  quality  standard 
levels.  This information shall  be  published  in  an  appro-
priate  manner. 
Member  States  shall  notify  the  Commission,  within  12 
months of  the date  of  entry into  force  of  this  Directive, 
how the  information to  be  published in  accordance with 
the  first  subparagraph  is  being  made  available.  Any 
subsequent  modifications  shall  be  notified  to  the 
Commission  at  the  earliest  opportunity. 
CHAPTER  3 
Harmonization  of  the  services  which  may  be 
reserved 
Article  7 
1.  To the extent necessary to  ensure  the  maintenance 
of universal service, the services which may be reserved by 
each  Member  State  for  the  universal  service  provider(s) 
shall  be  the clearance,  sorting, transport and delivery  of 
items of domestic correspondence, whether by accelerated 
delivery or not, the price of which  is  less  than  five  times 
the public tariff for an item of correspondence in  the first 
weight  step  of  the  fastest  standard  category  where  such 
category  exists,  provided  that  they weigh  less  than  350 
grams. In the case of the free  postal service for  blind and 
partially  sighted  persons,  exceptions  to  the  weight  and 
price  restrictions  may  be  permitted. 
2.  To the extent necessary  to  ensure the maintenance 
of universal service, cross-border mail and direct mail may 
continue to be reserved within the price and weight l_imits 
laid  down  in  paragraph  I. 
3.  As  a  further  step  towards  the  completion  of  the 
internal  market  of  postal  services,  the  ·European  Par-
liament  and  the  Council  shall  decide  not  later  than  1 
January 2000 and without prejudice to the competence of 
the  Commission,  on  the  further  gradual  and  controlled 
liberalisation  of  the  postal  market,  in  particular  with  a 
view  to  the liberalisation of cross-border and direct mail 
as  well  as  on  a  further  review  of  the  price  and  weigh~ 
limits,  with  effect  from  1  January  2003,  taking  into 
account the developments, in  particular economic, social 
and  technological  developments,  that  have  occurred  by 
that date, and also taking into account the financial equi-
librium of the universal service provider(s), with a view to 
further  pursuing  the  goa~s of  this  Directive. 
Such  decisions shall  be  based  upon a  proposal  from  the 
Commission  to  be  tabled  before  the  end  of  1998,  fol-
lowing  a  review  of  the  sector.  Upon  request  by  the 
Commission,  Member" States  shall  provide  all  the  infor-
mation  necessary  for  completion  of  the  review. 
4.  Document exchange  may  not  be  reserved. 
Article  8 
The provisions of Article 7 shall  be without prejudice to 
Member States' right to organise the siting of letter boxes 
on  the  public  highway,  the  issue  of  postage  stamps and 
the registered mail service used in the course of judicial or 
administrative  procedures  in  accordance  with  their 
national  legislation. 
CHAPTER  4 
Conditions governing the provision of non-reserved 
services and access  to  the network 
Article  9 
1.  For  non-reserved  services  which  are  outside  the 
scope  of  the  universal  service  as  define<;!  in  Article  3, 
Member  States  may  introduce  general  authorisations  to 
the  extent  necessary  in  order  to  guarantee  compliance 
with  the  essential  requirements. 
2.  For non-reserved services which are within the scope 
of  the  universal  service  as  defined  in Article  3,  Member 
States  may introduce authorisation  procedures,  including 
individual  licences,  to  the  extent  necessary  in  order  to 
guarantee compliance with the essential requirements and 
to  safeguard  the  universal  service. 
The granting of  authorisations  may: 
- where  appropriate,  be  made  subject  to  universal 
service  obligations, 
- if  necessary,  impose  requirements  concerning  the 
quality,  availability  and
1  performance  of  the  relevant 
services, 
1/288 21.  I. 98  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  L  15/21 
be  made subject to  the obligation  not to  infringe the 
exclusive  or  special  rights  granted  to  the  universal 
service  provider(s)  for  the  reserved  postal  services 
undt•r  Article  7(1)  and  (2). 
J.  The  prut·cdures  described  in  paragraphs  I  and  2 
shall  be  transparent,  non-discriminatory,  proportionate 
and  based  on  objective  criteria.  Member  States  must 
ensure  that  the  reasons  for  refusing  an  authorisation  in 
whole or in  part arc  communicated to  the applicant and 
must  establish  an  appeal  procedure. 
4.  In  order to  ensure that the universal  service  is  safe-
guarded,  where  a  Member  State  determines  that  the 
universal  service  obligations,  as  provided  for  by  this 
Directive,  represent  an  unfair  financial  burden  for  the 
universal  service  provider,  it  may  establish  a  compensa-
tion  fund  administered  for  this  purpose  by  a  body  inde-
pendent of the beneficiary or beneficiaries. In  this case, it 
may  make  the  granting  of  authorisation  subject  to  an 
obligation  to  make a  financial  contribution  to  that fund. 
The  Member  State  must  ensure  that  the  principles  of 
transparenq,  non-discrimin;Jtion  and  proportionality  arc 
respected  in  establishing  the  compensation  fund  and 
when fixing the level  of the financial contributions. Only 
those services set out in Article 3 may be financed in this 
way. 
5.  Member  States  may  provide  for  an  identification 
system  for  direct  mail,  allowing  the  supervision  of  such 
services  where  they  are  liberalised. 
Artide 10 
I.  The  Emopce~n  Parliament  e~nd  tht•  Council,  ;Kling 
on  a  pruposnl  from  the  Commission  e~nd on  the  basis  of 
Articles  .57(2),  66 and  I OOa  of the Treaty, shall  adopt the 
measures  necessary  for  the  harmonisation  of  the  pro-
cedures referred to in  Article 9 governing the commercial 
provision  to  the  public  of  non-reserved  postal  services. 
2.  The  harmonisation  measures  referred  to  in  para-
graph  1  shall  concern,  in  particular,  the  criteria  to  be 
observed and the procedures to be followed by the postal 
operator, the manner of publication of those criteria and 
procedures,  as  well  as  the  appeal  procedures  to  be 
followed. 
Article  11 
1be European  Parli:m1ent  and  the  Council,  acting on  a 
proposal  from  the  Commission  and  on  the  basis  of 
Articles 57(2), 66 and  I  OOa  of the Treaty, shall adopt such 
harmonisation  measures  as  are  necessary  to  ensure  that 
users and  the  universal  service  provider(s)  have  access  to 
the  public  postal  network  under  conditions  which  are 
transparent  and  non-discriminatory. 
Tariff principles and  transparency  of accounts 
Article  12 
Member States  shall  take  steps  to  ensure  that  the  tariffs 
for  each of the services  forming  part of  the  provision  of 
the  universal  service  comply  with  the  following  prin-
ciples: 
prices  must  be  affordable  and  must  he  such  that  all 
users  have  access  to  the  scrvit:es  provided, 
prices  must  be  geared  to  costs;  Member  States  may 
decide  that  a  uniform  tariff  should  be  applied 
throughout  their  national  territory, 
the  application  of  a  uniform  tariff  docs  not  exclude 
the  right  of  the  universal  service  providcr(s)  to 
conclude  individual  agreements  on  prices  with  cus-
tomers, 
tariffs  must  be  transparent  and  non-discriminatory. 
Article  13 
1.  In order to ensure the cross-border provision  of the 
universal  service,  Member  States  shall  encourage  their 
universal  service  providers  to  arrange  that  in  their agree-
ments  on  terminal  dues  for  intra-Community  cross-
border  mail,  the  following  principles  arc  respected: 
tt.'rmin:tl  dues shnll  be  tixt·d  in  rchllion  to  the co:.ts  of 
processing and delivering inc.:oming cross-border  me~il, 
levels  of remuneration shall  be  related  to  the quality 
of  service  achieved, 
- terminal  dues  shall  be  transparent  and  non-discrim-
inatory. 
2.  The implementation of these principles may include 
transitional arrangements designed to avoid undue disrup-
tion  on  postal  markets  or unfavourable  implications  for 
economic operators provided there  is  agreement between 
the  operators  of  origin  and  receipt;  such  arrangements 
shall, however, be  restricted to  the minimum required to 
achieve  these  objectives. 
Article  14 
I.  Member States shall  take  the  measures  necessary  to 
ensure, within two years of the date of entry into force  of 
this Directive, that the accounting of the universal service 
providers is  conducted in  accordance with  the provisions 
of  this  Article. 
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2.  The  universal  scrviu·  providers shall  keep scrparate 
accounts within their internal accounting systems at least 
for each of the services within the reserved sector on the 
one haqd and for the non-reserved services on the other. 
The accounts for the non-reserved services should clearly 
distinguish  between  services  which  are  part  of  the 
universal service and services which are not. Such internal 
accounting  systems  shall  operate  on  the  basis  of  con-
sistently  applied  and  objectively  justifiable  cost  ac-
counting  principles. 
].  The  accounting sysll'lllS  referred  to  in  paragraph  2 
sh:tll,  without· prejudice  to  p:1ragraph  4,  allocate  costs  to 
each  of  the  reserved  :md  to  the  n<m-rest.·rvcd  services 
respectively  in  the  following  m<mncr: 
(a)  costs  which  can  be  directly  assigned  to  a  particular 
service  shall  be  so  assigned; 
(b)  common costs,  that is  costs  which cannot be directly 
assigned  to  a  particular service,  shall  be  allocated  as 
follows: 
(i)  whenever  possible,  common  costs  shall  be  al-· 
located on the basis of direct analysis of the origin 
of the  costs  themselves; 
(ii)  when direct analysis is  not possible, common cost 
categories  shall  be  allocated  on  the  basis  of  an 
indirect linkage to another cost category or group 
of cost categories for which a direct assignment or 
alloottion is  possible; the indirect linkage shall he 
based  on  comparable  cost  structures; 
(iii)  when  neither direct nor indirect measures of cost 
allocation can be found, the cost category shall be 
allocated  on  the  basis  of  a  general  allocator 
computed  by  using  the  ratio  of  all  expenses 
directly or indirectly assigned or allocated, on the 
one hand, to each of the reserved services and, on 
the  other  hand,  to  the  other services. 
4.  Other cost accounting systems may be applied only 
if  they are  compatible with  paragraph  2  and  have  been 
approved  by  the  national  regulatory  authority.  The 
Commission shall be informed prior to their application. 
5.  National  regulatory  authorities  shall  ensure  that 
compliance  with  one  of  the  cost  accounting  systems 
described in  paragraphs 3 or 4  is verified by a competent 
body  which  is  independent  of  the  universal  service 
provider.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  a  statement 
concerning  compliance  is  published  periodically. 
6.  The  national  regulatory  authority  shall  keep  avail-
able,  to  an  adequate  level  of detail,  information  on  the 
cost  accounting  systems  applied  by  a  universal  service 
provider,  and  shall  submit  such  information  to  the 
Commission  on  request. 
--------------------------------
7.  On  request, detailed  accounting information ansmg 
from  these systems shall be  made available  in  confidence 
to  the national  regulatory authority and to  the Commis-
sion. 
8.  Where a given Member State has not reserved any of 
the  services  reservable  under  Article  7  and  as  not  es-
tablished a compensation fund for universal service provi-
sion,  as  permitted  under  Article  9(4),  and  where  the 
national  regulatory authority is  satisfied  that  none of the 
designated  universal  service  providers  in  that  Member 
State  is  in  receipt  of  St<ttc  subvention,  hidden  or other-
wise,  the  national regulatory authority  may dc<:idc  nul  to 
apply the requirements of pan1graphs 2,  J,  4,  S,  6 and 7 ot 
this Article. The  n:Jtion<~l rcguh1tory flllthority shall inform 
the  Commission  of  all  such  decisions. 
Article  15 
The  financial  accounts  of all  universal  service  providers 
shall be drawn up, submitted to audit by an  independent 
auditor  and  published  in  accordance  with  the  relevant 
Community  and  national  legislation  to  commercial 
undertakings. 
CHAJYrER  6 
Quality  of services 
Article  16 
Member  States  shall  ensure  that  quality-of-service 
standards  are  set  and  published  in  relation  to  universal 
service  in  order  to  guarantee  a  postal  service  of  good 
quality. 
Quality  standards  shall  focus,  in  particular,  on  routing 
times  and on  the  regularity  and  reliability  of  services. 
These  standards  shall  be  set  by: 
the  Member States  in  the  case  of  national  services, 
the European Parliament and the Council in the case 
of intra-Community cross-border services (see Annex). 
Future  adjustment  of  these  standards  to  technical 
progress  or  market  developments  shall  be  made  in 
accordance  with  the  procedure  laid  down  in  Article 
21. 
Independent performance monitoring shall be carried out 
at  least  once  a  year  by  external  bodies  having  no  links 
with  the  universal  service  providers  under  standardised 
conditions  to  be  specified  in  accordance  with  the  pro-
cedure laid down in Article 21  and shall be the subject of 
reports  published  at  least  once  a  year. 
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Article  17 
Mcmht·r  Stales  shall  day  down  quality  standards  for 
national  mllil  and  shall  ensure  that  they  arc  compatible 
with  those  laid  down  for  intra-Community cross-border 
services. 
Member  States  shall  notify  their  quality  standards  for 
national  services  to  the  Commission,  who  will  publish 
them  in  the  same  manner  as  the  standards  for  inlrll-
Communily noss hordcr scrvic(•s rcfcrrt·d to in  Art ide  I~-
National  regulatory  authorities  shall  ensure  that  inde-
pendent  performance  monitoring  is  carried  out  in  ac-
cordance with the fourth subparagraph of Article  16, that 
the results are justified, and that corrective action is taken 
where  necessary. 
Article  18 
I.  In  accordance  with  Article  16,  quality standards for 
intra-Community  c.:ross-hordcr  services  arc  laid  down  in 
the  Annex. 
2.  Where  exceptional  situations  relating  to  infrastruc-
ture  or  geography  so  require,  the  national  regulatory 
authorities  may  determine  exemptions  from  the  quality 
standards  provided  for  in  the  Annex.  Where  national 
regulatory  authorities  determine  exemptions  in  this 
manner, they shall notify the Commission forthwith. The 
Commission shall submit an  annual  report of the notifi-
cations  received  during  the  previous  12  months  to  the 
Committee established  under Article  21  for  its  informa-
tion. 
3.  The  Commission  shall  publish  in  the  Official 
journal of the  European  Communities any adjustments 
made to the quality standards for intra-Community cross-
border services and shall  take steps to ensure the regular 
independent  monitoring  and  the  publication  of  per-
formance  levels  certifying  compliance  with  these  stan-
dards and the progress accomplished. National regulatory 
authorities  shall  ensure  that  corrective  action  is  taken 
where  JJCCeSSilry. 
Article  19 
Member States  shall  ensure  that transparent, simple and 
inexpensive  procedures  are  drawn  up  for  dealing  with 
users'  complaints,  particularly  in  cases  involving  loss, 
theft,  damage  or  non-compliance  with  service  quality 
standards. 
Member States shall adopt measures to  ensure that those 
procedures  enable  disputes  to  be  settled  fairly  and 
promptly with provision, where warranted, for a system of 
reimbursement  and/or compensation. 
Without prejudice  to  other possibilities  of appeal  under 
national and Community legislation, Member States shall 
ensure that users, acting individually or, where  permitted 
by  national  law,  jointly  with  organisations  representing 
the interests of users and/or consumers, may bring before 
the  competent  national  authority  cases  where  users 
complaints to the universal service provider have  not been 
satisfactory  resolved. 
In  accordance with Article  16, Member States shall  ensu~e 
that the universal service  providers  publish, together with 
the annual report on the monitoring of their performance, 
information  on  the  number  of  complaints  and  the 
manQer  in  which  they  have  been  dealt  with. 
CHAPTER  7 
Harmonisation of technical standards 
Article  20 
The  harmonisation  of  technical  standards  shall  be  con-
tinued,  taking into account in  particular the  interests of 
users. 
The  European  Committee  for  Standardisation  shall  he 
entrusted with  drawing up technical  standards applicable 
in the postal sector on the basis of remits to it  pursuant to 
the principles set out in Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 
28 March  1983 laying down a procedure for the provision 
of  information  in  the  field  of  technical  standards  and 
regulations ('). 
This  work  shall  take  account  of  the  harmonisation 
measures adopted at  international  level  and  in  particular 
those  decided  upon  within  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 
The standards applicable  shall  be  published  in  the  Offi-
cial journal of  the European Communities once a year. 
Member  States  shall  ensure  that  universal  service  pro-
viders  refer  to  the  standards  published  in  the  Official 
Journal where  necessary in  the  interests  of users  and  in 
particular when they supply the information referred to in 
Article  6. 
The Committee provided  for  in  Article  21  shall  be  kept 
informed  of  the  discussions  within  the  European 
Committee for Standardisation and the progress achieved 
in  this  area  by  that  body. 
CHAPTER  8 
The committee 
Article  21 
The  Commission  shall  be  assisted  by  a  committee 
composed of the representatives of the Member States and 
chaired  by  .. a  representative  of  the  Commission.  The 
committee  shall  establish  its  own  rules  of  procedure. 
(!)  OJ  L  109,  26.  4.  1983,  p.  8.  Directive  as  last  amended  by 
Commission  Decision  96/139/EC (0  J  I.  32,  I 0.  2.  1996,  p. 
31). 
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The representative of the Commission shall submit to the 
committee  a  draft  of  the  measures  to  be  taken.  The 
committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a 
time limit which  the Chairman may lay down according 
to  the  urgency  of  the  matter. The opinion  shall  be  de-
livered by the majority laid  down in ,Article  148(2) of the 
Treaty  in  the  case  of  decisions  which  the  Council  is 
required  to  adopt on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission. 
The  votes  of  the  representatives  of  the  Member  States 
within the committee shall be weighted in the manner set 
out  in  that  Article.  The  Chairman  shall  not vote. 
The  Commission  shall  adopt  the  measures  envisaged  if 
they  are  in  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the 
committee. 
If the measures envisaged are  not in  accordance with  the 
opinion of the committee, or if  no opinion  is  delivered, 
the  Commission  shall,  without  delay,  submit  to  the 
Council a proposal relating to the measures to be taken. 
The  Council  shall  act  by  a  qualified  majority. 
If, upon the expiry of  a  period of three months from  the 
date of  referral to the Council, the Council has not acted, 
the  proposed measures shall be adopted by the Commis-
sion. 
CHAPTER  9 
The  national  regulatory authority 
Article  22 
Each  Member State shall designate one or more national 
regulatory authorities for  the postal sector that are  legally 
separate from and operationally independent of the postal 
operators. 
Member  States  shall  inform  the  Commission  which 
national  regulatory  authorities  they  have  designated  to 
carry  out  the  tasks  arising  from  this  Directive. 
The  national  regulatory  authorities  shall  have  as  a  par-
ticular  task  ensuring  compliance  with  the  obligations 
arising  from  this  Directive.  They  may  also  be  charged 
with  ensuring compliance with  competition rules  in  the 
postal  sector. 
CHAPTER  10 
Final  provisions 
Article  23 
Without  prejudice  to  Article  7(3),  three  years  after  the 
date of entry into force of this Directive, and in any event 
no later than  31  December 2000,  the Commission shall 
submit  a  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on . the .applicati.on  of  this  Directive,  including 
the  appropnate  mformat10n  about  developments  in  the 
sector, particularly  ~oncerning economic, social, employ-
ment and technologacal aspects, as well as about quality of 
service. 
The  report  shall  be  accompanied  where  appropriate  by 
proposals to the European Parliament and the Council. 
Article  24 
Member States shall bring into force the laws,  regulations 
and  administrative  provisions  necessary  to  comply with 
this  Directive  not later than  J 2  months after the date of 
its  entry  into  force.  They  shall  forthwith  inform  the 
Commission  thereof. 
When  Member  States  adopt  these  measures,  they  shall 
contain a  reference  to  this  Directive or be accompanied 
by such  reference  on  the  occasion  of their official  pub-
lication. 
Article  25 
This  Directive  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  20th  day 
following that of its publication in the Official Journal of 
the"  European  Communities. 
Article  26 
1.  This Directive  shall  not prevent any Member State 
from  maintaining  or  introducing  measures  which  are 
more  liberal  than  those  provided  for  by  this  Directive. 
Such  measures  must  be  compatible  with  the  Treaty. 
2.  Should  this  Directive  lapse,  the  measures  taken  by 
the Member States to implement it may be maintained, to 
the  extent  that  they  are  compatible  with  the  Treaty. 
Article  27 
The  provas1ons  of  this  Directive,  with  the  exception  of 
Article  26,  shall  apply  until  31  December  2004  unless 
otherwise  decided  in  accordance  with  Article  7(3). 
Article  28 
This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  15  December  1997. 
For  the  European  Parliament 
The  President 
J. M.  GIL-ROBLES 
For  the  Council 
The  President 
J.-C.  JUNCKER 
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ANNI:"X 
Quality standards for  intra-Community cross-border mail 
The quality standards for intra-Community cross-border mail in each country are to be established in 
relation  to  the  time  limit for  routing  measured  from  end  to  end n for  postal  items  of  the  fastest 
standard category according to the formula formula 0  + n, where 0  represents the date of deposit("") 
and n  the number of working days which elapse between that date and that delivery to the addressee. 
Quality  standanls  for  intra-Communiry  cross-border  mail 
Time  limit  Objective 
0+3  85%  of  items 
0+5  97%  of  items 
The standards must be achieved not only for the entirety of intra-Community traffic but also for each 
of  the  bilateral  flows  between  two  Member States. 
(')  End-to-end routing is measured from the access point to the network to the point of delivery to the addressee. 
(")  The date of deposit to be taken into account shall be the same day as that on which the item is deposited, provi-
ded that deposit occurs before the last collection time notified from  the •ccess point to the network in question. 
When deposit takes flace after this time limit, the date of deposit to be  taken into consideration will  be  that of 
the  following  day o  collection. 
L  15/25 
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Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector and 
on  the assessment  of certain  State measures  relating  to postal  services 
(98/C  39/02) 
(Text  with  EEA  relevance) 
PREFACE 
Subsequent  to  the  submission  by  the  Commission  of a 
Green Paper on the development pf the single  market for 
postal  services C)  and  of  a  communication  to  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  setting  out  the 
results  of the  consultations  on  the  Green  Paper and  the 
measures  advocated  by ·the  Commission C),  a  substantial 
discussion  has  taken  place  on  the  future  regulatory 
environment  for  the  postal  sector  in  the  Community.  By 
Resolution  of  7  1:cbruary  1994  on  the  development  of 
Comml,Jnity  postal  services C),  the  Council  invited  the 
Commission  to  propose  measures  defining  a  harmonised 
universal  service  and  the  postal  services  which  could  be 
reserved.  In  July  1995,  the  Commission  proposed  a 
package  of  measures  concerning  postal  services  which 
consisted  of a  proposal  for  a  Directive  of the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council  on  common. rules  for  the 
development  of  Community  postal  services  and  the 
improvement of quality  of service e)  and  a  draft of the 




This  notice,  which  complements  the  harmonisation 
measures  proposed  by  the  Commission,  builds  on  the 
results  of those  discussions  in  accordance  with  the  prin-
ciples  established  in  the  Resolution  of 7  February  1994. 
It  takes  account  of  the  comments  received  during  the 
public  consultation  on  the  draft of this  notice  published 
in  December  1995,  of  the  European  Parliament's 
resolution (')  on  this  draft  adopted  on  12  December 
1996,  as  well  as  of  the  discussions  on  the  proposed 
Directive  in  the  European  Parliament  and  in  Council. 
The  Commission  considers  that  because  they  are  an 
essential  vehicle  of  communication  and  trade,  postal 
services  are  vital  for  all  economic  and  social  activities. 
New postal services are emerging and  market certainty is 
needed  to  favour  investment  and  the  creation  of  new 
employment in  the sector. As  recogni~ed by the Court of 
C)  COM(9t) 476  final. 
e>  'Guidelines  for  the  development  of  Community  pos~l 
services' (COM(93) 247 of 2 June  1993). 
e>  OJ c 48,  t6.2.1994,  P·  3. 
(
4
)  OJ C 322, 2.12.1995,  p.  22. 
(') OJ C 3p, 2.12.1995, p.  3. 
(
6
)  OJ C 20,  20.1.1997, p.  159. 
Justice  of the  European  Communities,  Community  law, 
and in  particular the competition rules of the EC Treaty, 
apply to the post sector {'). The Court stated that 'in the 
case  of  public  undertakings  to  which  Member  States 
grant special  or exclusive  rights, they are neither to enact 
nor  to  maintain  in  force  any  measure  contrary  to  the 
rules  contained in  the Tteaty with  regard to competition' 
and · that  those  rules  'must  be  read  in  conjunction  with 
Article  90(2)  which  provides  that undertakings  entrusted 
with  the  operation  of  services  of  general  economic 
interest  arc  to be  subject  to  the  rules  on competition  in 
so  far  as  the  application  of such  rules  docs  not obstruct 
the performance, in  law or in  fact,  of the particular tasks 
assigned  to them.'  Questions are  therefore frequently  pur 
to  the  Commission on the attitude it  intends to  take,  for 
purposes  of the  implementation  of the  competition  rules 
contained  in  the Treaty, with  regard  to the behaviour of 
postal  operators  and  with  regard  to  State  measures 
relating  to  public  undertakings  and  undertakings  to 
which the Member States grant special or exclusive rights 
in  the  postal  sector. 
This ·notice  sets  out  the  Commission's  interpretation  of 
the  relevant Treaty provisions  and  the guiding  principles 
according to which  the Commission  intends to apply the 
competition  rules  of the  Treaty  to  the  postal  sector  in 
individual  cases,  while  maintaining  the  necessary 
safeguards  for  the  provision  of a  universal  service,  and 
gives  to  enterprises  and  Member  States  clear  guidelines 
so  as  to avoid  infringements of the Treaty. This Notice is 
without  prejudice  to  any  interpretation  to  be  given  by 
the  Coun of Justice  of the  Eutopean  Communities. 
Furthermore,  this  Notice  sets  out  the  approach  the 
Commission  intends  to  take  when  applying  the 
competition  rules  to  the  behaviour  of  postal  operators 
and  when  assessing  the  compatibility  of State  measures 
restricting  the  freedom  to  provide  service  and/  or  to 
compete in  the postal markets with tne competition rules 
and  other rules  of the  Treaty.  In  addition,  it  addresses 
the  issue  of  non-discriminatory  access  to  the  postal 
network  and  the  safeguards  required  to  ensure  fair 
competition  in  the  sector. 
(')  In  particular  in  Joined  Cases  C-48/90  and  C-66/90, 
Netherlands  and Koninlelijlee  PIT Nederland  and PIT Post 
BV v.  Commission  [1992]  ECR.  1-565  ~nd Case  C-320/91 
Procureur Ju  Roi v.  Paul Corbeau [1993]  ECR 1-2533. 
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Especially  on  account of the  development  of new  postal 
services  hy  private  and  public  operators, certain  Member 
States  have  revised,  or  arc  revising,  their  postal  legis-
lation  in  order  to  restrict  the  monopoly  of their  postal 
organisations  to  what  is  considered  necessary  for  the 
realisation  of the  public-interest  objective.  At  the  same 
time,  the Commission  is  faced with a growing number of 
complaints  and  cases  under competition  law  on which  it 
must take position. At this stage,  a notice  is  therefore the 
appropriate  instrument  to  provide  guidance  to  Member 
States  and  postal  operators,  including  those  enjoying 
special  or exclusive  rights,  to  ensure  correct  implemen-
tation  of the  competition  rules.  This  Notice,  although  it 
cannot  be  exhaustive,  aims  to  provide  the  necessary 
guidance  for  the  correct  interpretation,  in  particular,  of 
Articles  59, 85, 86, 90, and 92  of the Treaty in  individual 
cases.  By  issuing  the  present  notice,  the  Commission  is 
taking  steps  to  bring  transparency  and  to  facilitate 
investment  decisions  of  all  postal  operators,  in  the 
interest  of the  users  of postal  services  in  the  European 
Union. 
As  the  Commission  explained  in  its  communication  of 
11  September  19~6  on  'Services  of  general  interest  in 
Europe' (
1
),  solidarity  and  equal  treatment  within  a 
market economy are  fundamental  Community objectives. 
Those  objectives  are  furthered  by  services  of  general 
interest.  Europeans  have  come  to  expect  high-quality 
services  at  affordable  prices,  and  many  of  them  even 
view  services  of general  interest  as  social  rights. 
As  regards,  in  particular, the postal sector, consumers are 
becoming  increasingly  assertive  in  exercising  their  rights 
and wishes.  Worldwide· competition  is  forcing  companies 
using  such  services  to  seek  out  better  price  deals 
comparable  to those  enjoyed  by  their competitors.  New 
technologies,  such  as  fax  or electronic  mail,  are  putting 
enormous  pressures  on  the  traditional  postal  services. 
Those developments  have  given  rise  to worries about the 
future  of those  services  accompanied  by  concerns  over 
employment  and  economic  and  social  cohesion.  The 
economic  importance  of  those  services  is  considerable. 
Hence  the  importance  of  modernising  and  developing 
services  of  general  interest,  since  they  contribute  so 
much  to  European  competitiveness,  social  solidarity  and 
quality  of life. 
The Community's  aim  is  to  support  the  competitiveness 
of the  European economy  in  an  increasingly competitive 
world and to gi"ie  consumers  more choice,  better quality 
(') COM(96) 443  final. 
and  lower  prices,  while  at  the  same  time  helping, 
through  its  policies,  to  strengthen  economic  and  social 
cohesion  between  the  Member  States  and  to  reduce 
certain  inequalities.  Postal  services  have  a  key  role  to 
play  here.  The  Community  is  committed  to  promoting 
their functions  of general  economic  interest,  as  solemnly 
confirmed  in  the  new  Article  7d,  introduced  by  the 
Amsterdam  Treaty,  while  improving  their  efficiency. 
Market  forces  produce  a  better  allocation  of resources 
and  greater  effectiveness  in  the  supply  of services,  the 
principal  benficiary  being  the  consumer,  who  gets  better 
quality  at  a  lower  price.  However,  those  mechanisms 
sometimes  have  their  limits;  as·  a  result  the  potential 
benefits  might  not  extend  to  the  entire  population  and 
the  objective of promoting social  and  territorial cohesion 
in  the  Union  may not be  attained.  The public  authority 
must  then  ensure  that the  general  interest  is  taken  into 
account." 
The  traditional  structures  of  some  services  of  general 
economic  interest,  which  are  organised  on  the  basis  of 
national  monopolies,  constitute  a challenge  for European 
economic  integration.  This  includes  postal  monopolies, 
even  where  they  are  justified,  which  may  obstruct  the 
smooth  functioning  of  the  market,  in  particular  by 
sealing. off a  particular market sector. 
The real  challenge  is  to ensure smooth interplay between 
the  requirements  of the  single  market  in  terms  of free 
movement,  economic  performance  and  dynamism,  free 
competition,  and  the  general  interest  objectives.  This 
interplay must  benefit individual  citizens  and society as  a 
whole.  This  is  a  difficult  balancing  act,  since  t~e 
goalposts  are  constantly  moving:  the  single  market  is 
continuing to expand and public services,  far  from  being 
fixed,  are  having  to  adapt to  new  requirements. 
The basic  concept of universal  service,  which  was  orig-
inated  by  the  Commission ('),  is  to  ensure  the  provision 
of high-quality service  to  all  prices  everyone  can  afford. 
. Universal  service  is  defined  in  terms  of  principles: 
equality,  universality,  continuity  and  adaptability;  and  in 
terms  of  sound  practices:  openness  in  management, 
price-setting  and  funding  a:nd  scrutiny  by  bodies  inde-
pendent  of those  operating  the  services.  Those  criteria 
are  not always  all  met  at national  level,  but where  they 
have  been  introduced  using  the  concept  of  European 
universal  service,  there  have  been  positive  effects  for  the 
development  of  general  interest  services.  Universal 
service  is  t~e expression  in  Europe  of the  requirements 
(') See footnote  8. 
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and  special  features  of the  European  model of society  in 
a  policy  which  combines  a  dynamic  market,  cohesion 
and  solidarity. 
High-quality  universal  postal  services  arc  of  great 
importance  for  private  and  business  customers  alike.  In 
view  of  the  development  of  electronic  commerce  their 
importance  will  even  increase  in  the  very  near  future. 
Postal  services  have  a  valuable  role  to play  here. 
As  regards  the  postal  sector,  Directive  97/67/EC  has 
been  adopted  by  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  (hereinafter  refferred  to  as  'the  Postal 
Directive').  It  aims  to  introduce  common  rules  for 
developing  the postal  sector and improving the quality of 
service,  as  well  as  gradually opening up  the  markets  in  a 
controlled  way. 
The aim  of the Postal  Directive is  to safeguard the postal 
service  as  a  universal  service  in  the long term.  It imposes 
on  Member  States  a  minimum  harmonised  standard  of 
universal  services  including  a  high-quality  service 
countrywide  with  regular guaranteed  deliveries  at prices 
everyone  can  afford.  This  involves  the  collection, 
transport,  sorting and delivery of letters as  well  as  cata-
logues and parcels within certain price and weight limits. 
It  also  covers  registered  and  insured  (valeur  declaree) 
items  and  applies  to  both  domestic  and  cross-border 
deliveries.  Due  regard  is  given  to  considerations  of 
continuity,  confidentiality,  impartiality  and  equal 
treatment  as  well  as  adaptability. 
To  guarantee  the  funding  of  the  universal  service,  a 
sector may  be  reserved  for the operators of this  universal 
service.  The  scope  of  the  reserved  sector  has  been 
harmonised  in  the  Postal  Directive  According  to  the 
Postal  Directive,  Member States can only grant exclusive 
rights  for  the  provision  of postal  services  to  the  extent 
that this  is  necessary to guarantee the  maintenance of the 
universal  service.  Moreover,  the  Postal  Directive  estab-
lishes  the  maximum  scope  that  Member  States  may 
reserve  in  order to  achieve  this  objective. Any additional 
funding  which  may  be  required  for  the  universal  service 
may  be  found  by  writing  certain  obligations  into 
commercial  operator's franchises;  for example,  they may 
be  required  to make financial  contributions to a  compe-
sation  fund  administered  for  this  purpose  by  a  body 
independent  of  the  beneficiary  or  beneficaries,  as 
foreseen  in  Article  9  of the  Postal  Directive. 
The  Postal  Directive  lays  down  a  mm1mum  common 
standard  of  universal  services  and  establishes  common 
rules  concerning the  reserved  area. It therefore  increases 
legal  certainty  as  regards  the  legality  of some  exclusive 
and  special  rights  in  the  postal  sector.  There  are, 
however State measures  that are  not dealt with in  it  and 
that can  be  in  conflict with the Treaty rules  addressed to 
Member States. The autonomous behaviour of the  postal 
operators also  remains subject to the  competition  rules  in 
the  Treaty. 
Article  90(2)  of  the  Treaty  provides  that  suppliers  of 
services  of general  interest  may  be  exempted  from  the 
rules  in  the Treaty, to the  extent  that the  application  of 
those  rules  would  obstruct  the  performance  of  the 
general  interest  tasks  for  which  they  are  responsible. 
That exemption  from  the Treaty rules  is  however subject 
to  the  priciple  ·of  proportionality.  That  principle  is 
designed  to  ensure  the  best  match  between  the  duty  to 
provide  general  interest  services  and  the  way  in  which 
the services are actually provided, so  that the  means  used 
are  in  proportion  to  the  ends  pursued.  The  principle  is 
formulated  to  allow  for  a  flexible  and  context-sensitive 
balance  that  takes  account  of  the  technical  and 
budgetary  constraints  that  may  vary  from  one sector to 
another.  It also  makes  for  the  best  possible  interaction 
between  market  efficiency  and  general  interest 
requirements,  by  ensuring  that the  means  used  to  satisfy 
the  requirements  do  not  unduly  interfere  with  the 
smooth  running  of the  single  European  market  and  do 
not affect  trade  to  an  extent  that would  be  contrary to 
the  Community  interest ('
0
). 
The  application  of  the  Treaty  rules,  including  the 
possible  application  of  the  Article  90(2)  exemption,  as 
regards  both  behaviour  of  undertakings  and  State 
measures  can  only  be  done  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  It 
seems,  however,  highly  desirable,  in  order  to  increase 
legal  certainty  as  regards  measures  not  covered  by  the 
Postal  Directive,  to  explain  the  Commission's  interpre-
tation  of  the  Treaty  and  the  approach  that  it  aims  to 
follow  in  its  future  application  of  those  rules.  In 
particular,  the  Commission  considers  that, subject  to  the 
provisions of Article  90(2)  in  relation  to the  provision  of 
the  universal  service,  the  application  of the  Treaty rules 
would  promote  the  competitiveness  of 'the  undertakings 
active  in  the  postal  sector,  benefit  consumers  and 
contribute  in  a  positive  way  to  the  objectives  of general 
interest. 
The postal sector in  the  European Union  is  characterised 
by areas which  Member States  have  reserved  in  order to 
guarantee  universal  service  and  which  are  now  being 
C
0
)  See  judgment  of  23  October  1997  in  Cases  C-157 /94  to 
C-160/94  'Member  State  Obligations  - Electricity' 
Commission  v.  Nttherlands  (157/94),  Italy  (158/94).  France 
(154/94), Spain  (160/94). 
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harmonised  by  the  Postal  Directive  in  order  to  limit 
distortive  effects  between  Member  States.  The 
Commission  must,  according  to the  Treaty, ensure  that 
postal  monopolies  comply  with  the  rules  of the  Treaty, 
anc.l  in  pat'licular  the  competition  rules,  in  onler  to 
ensure- maximum  h~ndit and  limit  any  distortivC'  t'ffects 
for  the consumers.  In  pursuing  this objective  by  applying 
the  competition  rules  to  thf  sector  on  a  case-by-case-
basis,  the  Commission  will  ensure  that  monopoly  power 
is  not used  for  extending  a  protected  dominant position 
into  liberalised  activities  or for  unjustified  discrimination 
in  favour of big  accounts  at the  expense  of small  users. 
The Commission  will  also  ensure  that postal  monopolies 
granted in  the area of cross-border services are not used 
for  creating  or  maintaining  illicit  price  cartels  harming 
the interest of companies and consumers in the European 
Union. 
This  notice  explains  to  the  players  on  the  market  the 
practical  consequences  of  the  applicability  of  the 
competition  rules  to  the  postal  sector,  and  the  possible 
derogations  from  the  principles.  It sets  out  the  position 
the  Commission  would  adopt,  in  the  context set  by  the 
continuing  existence  of  special  and  exclusive  rights 
as  harmonised  by  the  Postal  Directive,  in  assessing 
individual  cases  or  before  the  Court  of  Justice  in 
cases  referred  to  the  Court  by  national  courts  under 
Article  177  of the Treaty. 
1.  DEFINITIONS 
In  the  context  of  this  notice,  the  following  defi-
nitions shall  apply C'): 
'postal  services:'  services  involving  the  clearance, 
sorting, transport and delivery of postal items; 
'public postal nework': the system of organisation and 
resources  of all  kinds  used  by  the  universal  service 
provider(s) for the purposes in  particular of: 
the  clearance  of  postal  items  covered  by  a 
universal  service  obligation  from  access  points 
throughout the territory, 
- the routing and handling of those items from the 
postal  network  access  point  to  the  distribution 
centre, 
- distribution to the  addres~es shown on items; 
(
11
)  The definitions will  be  interpreted  in  the light of the Postal 
Directive  and  any  changes  resulting  from  review  of  that 
Directive. 
~ccess  points':  physical  facilities,  including  letter 
boxes  provided  for  the  public  either  on  the  public 
highway or at  the  premises  of the  universal  service 
provider,  where  postal  items  may  be  deposited  with 
the publir postal  network by  rustnmc·Ts; 
'clearance':  the  operation  of  collecting  postal  items 
deposited at access points; 
'distribution':  the  process  from  sorting  at  the 
distribution centre to delivery of postal items to their 
addresses; 
'postal  item': an  item  addressed  in  the  final  form  in 
which  it  is  to  be  carried  by  the  universal  service 
provider.  In  addition  to  items  of  correspondence, 
such  items  also  include  for  instance  books,  cata-
logues,  newspapers,  periodicals  and  postal  packages 
containing  merchandise  with  or without commercial 
value; 
'item  of co"esondance':  a  communication  in  written 
form  on  any  kind  of  physical  medium  to  be 
conveyed  and  delivered  at the  address  indicated  by 
the  sender  on  the  item  itself  or  on  its  wrapping. 
Books,  catalogues,  newspapers  and  periodicals  shall 
not be regarded as items of correspondence; 
'direct  mail':  a  communication  cons1stmg  solely  of 
advertising,  marketing  or  publicity  material  and 
comprising  an  identical  message,  except  for  the 
addressee's name, address and  identifying number as 
well  as  other  modifications  which  do  not  alter  the 
nature of the  message,  which  is  sent to a  significant 
number  of addresses,  to  be  conveyed  and  delivered 
at  the  address  indicated  by  the  sender on the  item 
itself  or on  its  wrapping.  The  National  Regulatory 
Authority  should  interpret  the  term  'significant 
number  of  addressees'  within  each  Member  State 
and publish  an appropriate definition.  Bills,  invoices, 
financial  statements  and  other  non-identical 
messages  should  not  be  regarded  as  direct  mail.  A 
communication  combining  direct  mail  with  other 
items  within  the  same  wrapping  should  not  be 
regarded  as  direct  mail.  Direct  mail  includes  cross-
border as well as  domestic direct mail; 
'document  exchange':  provision  cf  means,  including 
the  supply  of ad  hoc  premises  as  well  as  transpor-
tation  by  a  third  party,  allowing  self-delivery  by 
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mutual  exchange  of  postal  items  between  users 
subscribing to  this service; 
'express  mail service':  a  service  featuring,  in  addition 
to  greater  speed  and  reliability  in  the  collection, 
distribution, and delivery of items,  all  or some of the 
following  supplementary  facilities:  guarantee  of 
delivery  by  a  fixed  date;  collection  from  point  of 
origin;  personal  delivery  to  addressee;  possibility  of 
t·hanging  LIH·  destination  and  addrcsse  in  transit; 
confirmation  to  sender  of  receipt  of  the  item 
dispatched;  monitoring  and  tracking  of  items 
dispatched;  personalised  service  for  customers  and 
provision  of , an  a la  carte  service,  as  and  when 
required.  Customers are  in  principle  prepared to pay 
a higher price for this service; 
'universal  service  provider':  the  public  or  private 
entity  providing  a  universal  postal  service  or  parts 
thereof within a Member State, the identity of which 
has  been notified  to the  Commission; 
'exclusive  rights':  rights  granted  by a  Member  State 
which  rest'rve  the  provision  of postal  services  to one 
undertaking  through  any  legislative,  regulatory  or 
administrative  instrument  and  reserve  to  it  the  right 
to  provide  a  postal  service,  or  to  undertake  an 
activity, within  a given  geographical area; 
'special  rights':  rights granted by a  Member State to a 
limited  number ·of  undertakings  through  any  legis-
lative,  regulatory or administrative  instrument which, 
within  a given  geographical area: 
- limits,  on a  discretionary  basis,  to two  or more 
the  number  of  such  undertakings  authorised  to 
'terminal dues': the  remuneration  of universal  service 
providers  for  the  distribution  of  incoming  cross-
border  mail  comprising  postal  items  from  another 
Member State or from a third country; 
'intermediary':  any  economical  operator  who  acts 
between  the  sender  and  the  universal  service 
provider,  by  clearing,  routing  and/or  pre-sorting 
postal  items,  before channelling  them  into  the  public 
postal  network of the same or of another country; 
'national  regulatory  authority': the body or bodies,  in 
each  Member  State,  to  which  the  Member  State 
entrusts,  inter  alia,  the  regulatory  functions  falling 
within the scope of the  Postal  Directive; 
'essential  requirements':  general  non-economic 
reasons which cna induce a Member State to impose 
conditions on the supply of postal services C
2
). These 
reasons  are:  the  confidentiality  of  correspondence, 
security  of the  network  as  regards  the  transport of 
dangerous  goods  and,  where  justified,  data 
protection,  environmental  protection  and  regional 
planning. 
Data  protection  may  include  personal  data 
protection,  the  confidentiality  of  information  trans-
mitted or stored and  protection of privacy. 
2.  MARKED  DEFINITION  AND  POSITION  ON  THE 
POSTAL MARKET 
provide  a  service  or  undertake  an  activity,  a)  Geographical and product market definition 
otherwise  than  according  to  objective, 
proportional and non-discriminatory criteria, or 
designates,  otherwise  than  according  to  such 
criteria,  several  competing  undertakings  as 
undertakings  authorised  to  provide  a  service  or 
undertake an acitivity, or 
- confers  on  any  undertaking  or  undertakings, 
otherwise  than  according  to  such  criteria,  legal 
or  regulatory  advantages  which  substantially 
affect  the  ability  of  any  other  undertaking  to 
provide  the  same  service  or undertake  the  same 
activity  in  d~e  same  geographical  area  under 
substantially  comparable  conditions; 
2.1. Articles  85  and  86  of the Treaty prohibit as  incom-
patible with the common market any conduct by one 
or  more  undertakings  that  may  negatively  affect 
trade  between  Member  States . which  involves  the 
prevention,  re~triction,  or  distortion  of competition 
and/  or an  abuse  of a  dominant  position  within  the 
common market or a substantial part of it. The terri-
tories  of  the  Member  States  constitute  separate 
geographical  markets with  regard  to the  delivery  of 
domestic  mail  and  also  with  regard  to  the  domestit~ 
delivery  of  inward  cross-border  mail,  owing 
primarily  to  the  exclusive  rights  of  the  operators 
(
11
)  The  meaning  of  this  important  phrase  in  the  context  of 
Community competition law  is  explained  in  paragraph 5.3. 
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referred  to  in  point  4.2  and  to  the  restncuons 
imposed  on  the  provision  of postal  services.  Each  of 
the  geo~raphical  markets  constitutes  a  substantial 
part  of the  common  market.  1:or  the  determination 
of 'relevant  market', tlw  country of origin  of inward 
c:mss-bordcr  mail  is  immatt'rial. 
2.2. As  regards  the  product  markets,  the  differences  in 
practice  bet  ween  Member  States  demonstrate  that 
recognition  of several  distinct markets  is  necessary in 
some  cases.  Separation  of different  product-markets 
is  relevant,  among,  other  things,  to  special  or 
exclusive  rights  granted.  In  its  assessment  of  indi-
vidual cases on  the basis  of the different market and 
regulatory  situations  in  the  Member  States  and  on 
the  basis  of  a  harmonised  framework  provided  by 
the  Postal  Directive,  the  Commission  will  in 
principle  consider  that a  number of distinct  product 
markets  exist,  like  the  clearance,  sorting,  transport 
and  delivery  of mail,  and  for  example  direct  mail, 
and  cross-border  mail.  The  Commission  will  take 
into  account  the  fact  that  these  markets  are  wholly 
or partly  liberalised  in  a  number  of Member States. 
'Ibe Commission  will  consider the  following  markets 
when assessing  individual  cases. 
2.3. The  general  letter  service  concerns  the  delivery  of 
items  of correspondence  to the  addresses  shown  on 
the  items. 
It  does  not  induce  self-provision,  that  is  the 
provision  of  postal  services  by  the  natural  or  legal 
person  (including  a  sister or subsidiary  organisation) 
who is  the originator of the mail. 
Also  excluded,  in  accordance  with  pratice  in  many 
Member  States,  are  such  postal  items  as  are  not 
considered  items ·  of  correspondence,  since  they 
consist  of  identical  copies  of  the  same  written 
communication  and  have  not  been  altered  by 
additions,  deletions  or  indications  other  than  the 
name  of the  addressee  and  his  address.  Such  items 
are  magazines,  newspapers,  printed  periodicals  cata-
logues,  as  well  as  goods  or  documents  accom-
panying and relating to such items. 
Direct mail  is  co~ered by  the  definition  of items  of 
correspondence.  However,  direct  mail  items  do  not 
contain perso'nalised  messages.  Direct mail  addresses 
the  needs  of  specific  ·operators  for  commercial 
communications services,  as  a  complement to adver-
tising  in  the  media.  Morevover,  the senders of direct 
mail  do  not  necessarily  require  the  same  short 
delivery  times,  priced  at  first-class  letter  tariffs, 
asked  for  by  customers  requesting  services  on  the 
market  as  referred  to  above.  'Ibc  fact  that  both 
services  arc  not  always  directly  interchangeable 
indicates the possibility of distinct markets. 
2.4. Other  distinct  markets  in~lude,  for  example,  the 
express  mail  market, the document exchange market, 
as  well  as  the market for new  services  (services  quite 
distinct  from  conventinal  services).  Activities 
combining  the  new  telecommunications  technologies 
and some elements of the postal services may be, but 
are  not necessarily,  new  services  within  the  meaning 
of the  Postal Directive.  Indeed,  they  may  reflect the 
adaptability of traditional services. 
A  document  exchange  differs  from  the  market 
referred to in  point 2.3  since  it does  not include the 
collection  and  the  delivery  to  the  addressee  of the 
postal  items  transported.  It  involves  only  means, 
including  the  supply  of  ad  hoc  pr.;::rHises  as  well  OlS 
transportation by a third party, allowing self-delivery 
by  mutual  exchange  of postal  items  between  users 
subscribing  to this  service.  The users  of a  document 
exchange are members of a closed user group. 
The express mail service also  differs from  the market 
referred to in  point 2.3  owing to the value  added by 
comparison  with  the  basic  postal  service (u).  In 
addition to faster and more  reliable collection, trans-
portation and delivery of the· postal items, an express 
mail service  is  characterised by the provision of some 
or  all  of  the  following  supplementary  services: 
guarantee  of  delivery  by  a  given  date;  collection 
from  the  sender's  address;  delivery  to the  addressee 
in  person; possibility  of a  change  of destination  and 
addressee  in  transit;  conformation  to  the  sender  of 
delivery;  tracking  and  tracing;  personalised 
treatment for  customers  and  the  offer of a .  range of 
services  according to requirements.  Customers are in 
principle  prepared  to  pay  a  higher  price  for  this 
service.  The  reservable  services  as  defined  in  the 
Postal  Directive  may  include  accelerated  delivery  of 
items  of domestic  correspondence  falling  within  the 
prescribed price and weight limits. 
(u) Commission  Decisions  90/16/EEC  ,OJ  L  10,  12.1.1990, 
p.  47) and 90/456/EEC (OJ  !..  233, 28.8.1990, p.  19). 
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2.5. Without  prejudice  to  the  definition  of  reservable 
services  given  in  the  Postal  Directive,  different 
activities  can  be  recognised,  within  the general  letter 
service,  which  meet  distinct  needs  and  should  in 
principle  be  considered  as  different  markets;  the 
ma~kets  for  the  clearance  and  for  the  sorting  of 
~ad,  the  market  for  the  transport  of  mail  and, 
fmally,  the  delivery  of  mail  (domestic  or  inward 
cross-border).  Different  categories  of  customers 
must  be  distinguished  in  this  respect.  Private 
customers  demand  the  distinct  products  or  services 
as  one  integrated  service.  However,  business 
customers,  which  represent  most of the  revenues  of 
the operators referred to in  point 4.2, actively pursue 
the  possibilities  of  substituting  for  distinct 
components of the  final  service  alternative  solutions 
(with  regard to quality of service  levels and/  or costs 
incurred)  which  are  in  some  cases  provided  by,  or 
sub-contracted  to,  different  operators.  Business 
customers want to balance the advantages and disad-
vantages  of  self-provision  versus  provision  by  the 
postal  operator.  The  existing  monopolies  limit  the 
external supply of those  individual  services,  but they 
would  otherwise  limit  the  external  supply  of  those 
individual  according  to  market  conditions.  That 
market  reality  supports  the  opinion  that  clearance  .  , 
sonmg,  transport  and  delivery  of  postal  items 
constitute  different.  markets ('
4
).  From  a 
competition-law  point  of  view,  the  distinction 
between the four markets may be relevant. 
That  is  the  case  for  cross-border  mail  where  the 
clearence  and  transport  will  be  done  by  a  postal 
operator  other  than  the  one  providing  the 
distribution. This is  also the case as  regards domestic 
mail,  since  most  postal  operators  permit  major 
customers  to  undertake  sorting  of  bulk  traffic  io 
return  for  discounts,  based  on  their  public  tariffs. 
The  deposit  and  collection  of  mail  and  method  of 
payment  also  vary  in  these  circumstances.  Mail 
rooms  of larger companies  are  now  often  operated 
by  intermediaries,  which  prepare  and  pre-son  mail 
before  handing  it  over  to  the  postal  operator  for 
final  distribution.  Moreover,  all  postal  operators 
allow  some  kind  of  downstream  access  to 
distribution.  Moreover,  all  postal  operators  allow 
some  kind  of  downstream  access  to  their  postal 
network,  for  instance  by  · allowing  or  even 
demanding  (sorted)  mail  to  be  deposited  at  an 
expediting  or  sorting  centre.  This  permits  in  many 
cases  .a  higher  reliability  (quality  of  service)  by 
bypassmg  any  sources  of  failure  in  the  postal 
network upstream. 
('~)  See  Commission  Notice  on  the  definition  of the  relevant 
market. ~or the  pu~se of the  application  of Community 
compettuon law (OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, p.  5).  · 
(b)  Dominant  position 
2.6. Since  in  most  Member States  the  operator  referred 
to  in  point  4.2  is,  by virtue  of the  exclusive  rights 
granted  to  him,  the  only  operator  controlling  a 
public postal network covering the whole territory of 
the Member State, such an operator has a  dominant 
position  within  the  meaning  of  Article  8.6  of  the 
Treaty on the  n~tional market for the distribution of 
items  of correspondence.  Distribution  is  the  service 
to the user which allows for important economies of 
scale,  and  the  operator  providing  this  seJ~~Vice  is  in 
most  cases  also  dominant  on  the  markets  for  th. 
clearance, sorting and transport of mail.  In  addi1ivn, 
the  enterprise  which  provides  distribution 
particula~ly 'if  it  also  operates  post  office  premises: 
has  the  amportant  advantage  of  being  regarded  by 
the users as the principal  postal enterprise, because it 
is  the  most  conspicuous  one,  and  is  therefore  the 
natural  first  choice.  Moreover,  this  dominant 
posi~ion  also  includes,  in  most  Member  State$, 
servaces  such  as  registered  n;tail  or  special  delivery 
services, and/  or some sectors of the parcels market. 
(c)  Duties of dominant postal operators 
2.7. According  to  point  (b)  of the  second  paragraph  of 
Article  86  of the  Treaty,  an  abuse  may  consist  in 
limiting  the  performance  of  the  relevant  service  to 
the  prejudice  of  its  consumers.  Where  a  Member 
State grants exclusive  rights  to  an  operator  referred 
to  in  point 4.2  for services  which  it  does not offer 
or  offers  in  conditions  not  satisfying  the  needs  of 
customers  in  the  same  way  as  the  services  which 
competitive economic operators would  have  offered, 
the  Member  ~tate  induces  those  operators,  by  the 
simple exercise of the exclusive  right which has  been 
conferred  on  them,  to  limit  the  supply  of  the 
relevant  service,  as  the  effective  exercise  of  those 
activities  by  private  companies  is,  in  this  case, 
impossible.  This  is  particularly  the  case  where 
measures  adopted  to  protect  the  postal  service 
restrict  the  provision  of  other  distinct  services  on 
distinct or neighbouring markets such  as  the express 
mail  market. The Commission  has  requested  several 
Member States to  abolish  restrictions  resulting  from 
exclusive  rights  regarding  the  provision  of  express 
mail  services by international couriers (u). 
(") See  footnote  1  3. 
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Anodu~r type  of  possible  ahuse  involves  providing  a 
seriously  inefficient  servi<:e  and  failing  to  take 
adV'antage  of  technical  developments.  This  harms 
customers who are prevented from  choosing between 
alternative  suppliers.  For instance,  a  repon prepared 
for  the  Commission C')  in  1994  showed  that,  where 
they have not been subject to competition, the public 
postal  operators  in  the  Member  States  have  not 
made any significant progress since  1990  in  the stan-
dardisation  of  dimensions  and  weights.  The  repon 
also  showed  that  some  postal  operators  practised 
hidden  cross-subsidies  between  reserved  and 
non-reserved  services  (see  points  3.1  and  3.4  ),  which 
explained, according to that study,  most of the  price 
disparities  between  Member  States  in  1994, 
especially  penalising  residential  users  who  do  not 
qualify  for  any  discounts  schemes,  since  they  make 
use  of  reserved  services  that  are  priced  at a  higher 
level  than  ~ccessary. 
The  examples  given  illustrate  the  possibility  that, 
where  they  are  granted  special  or  exclusive  rights, 
postal  operators  may  let  the  quality  of  the  service 
decline (
11
)  and  omit  to  take  necessary  steps  to 
improve  service  quality.  In  such  cases,  the 
Commission  may  be  induced  to  act  taking  account 
of the conditions explained  in  point 8.3. 
As  regards  cross-border  postal  services,  the  study 
referred  to  above  showed  that  the  quality  of those 
services  needed  to be  improved  significantly in  order 
to meet the  needs of customers, and in  panicular of 
residential  customers  who  cannot  afford  to  use  the 
services  of  courier  companies  or  facsimile  trans-
mission  instead.  Independent  measurements  carried 
out  in  1995  and  1996  show  an  improvement  of 
quality  of  service  since  1994.  However,  those 
{'
6
)  UFC  - Que  Choisir,  Postal  services  m  the  European 
Union, Apra  1994. 
(") In  many Member States  users could, some decades ago, still 
rely  on  this  service  to .receive  in  the  afternoon,  standard 
letters  posted  in  the  morning.  Since  t.hen,  a  continuous 
decline  in  the quality  of the service  has  been  observed,  and 
in  ~articular of the  number of daily  rounds of the postmen, 
whach  were  reduced from  five  to one (or two in  some cities 
of the  European  Union). The exclusive  rights  of the  postal 
organisations favoured a fall  in  quality, since they prevented 
other  companies  from  entering  the  market.  As  a  conse-
quence  the  postal  organisations  failed  to  compensate  for 
wage  increases  and  reduction  of  the  working  hours  by 
introducing modern technology,  as  was  done by enterprises 
in  industries open to competition. 
measurements  only concerne  first  class  mail,  and the 
most  recent  measurements  show  that the  qJJality  has 
gone down slightly again. 
The majority  of Community  public  postal  operators 
have  notified  an  agreement  on  terminal  dues  to  the 
Commission  for  assessment  under  the  competition 
rules  of  the  Treaty.  The  panics  to  the  agreement 
have  explained  that  their  aim  is  to  establish  fair 
compensation  for  the  delivery  of cross-border  mail 
reflecting  more closely  the  real  costs incurred and to 
improve the quality of cross-border mail  services. 
2.8. Unjustified  refusal  to  supply  is  also  an  abuse 
prohibited  by  Anicle  86  of  the  Treaty.  Such 
behaviour  would  lead  to  a  limitation  of  services 
within  the meaning of Anicle 86,  second paragraph, 
(b)  and,  if  applied  only  to  some  users,  result  in 
discrimination  contrary  to  Artide  86,  second 
paragraph,  (c),  which  requires  that  no  dissimilar 
conditions  be  applied  to  equivalent  transactions.  In 
most of the Member States, the operators referred to 
in  point 4.2 provide access at various access points of 
their  postal  networks  to  intermediaries.  Conditions 
of  access,  and  in  panicular  the  tuiffs  applied,  arc 
however,  often  l:onfidential  and  may  fadlitatc  thr 
application  of  discriminatory  conditions,  Member 
States should  ensure that their postal  legislation  does 
not encourage postal operators to differentiate injus-
tifiably  as  regards  the  conditions  applied  or  to 
exclude  certain companies. 
2.9. While  a  dominant  firm  is  entitled  to  defend  its 
position  by  competing  with  rivals,  it  has  a  special 
responsibility  not  to  funher  diminish  the  degree  of 
competition  remaining  on  the  market.  Exclusionary 
practices  may  be  directed  against  existing 
competitors  on  the  market  or  intended  to  impede 
market  access  by  new  entrants.  Examples  of  such 
illegal  behaviour  include:  refusal  to deal  as  a  means 
of eliminating  a  competitor  by  a  firm  which  is  the 
sole  or dominant  source  of supply  of a  product  or 
controls  access  to  an  essential  t.or::·:.::qnology  or infra-
structure;  predatory  pricing  and  selective  price 
cutting  (see  section  3  );  exclusi·.~.lar  dealing 
agreements; discrimination as pan of a w·  ;r pattern 
of  monopolizing  conduct  d,..,.;gned  to  exclude 
competitors; and exclusionary  rebate schemes. 
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3.  CROSS-SUBSIDISA  TION 
(a)  Ha\ic  principles 
3.1. Cross-subsidisation  means  that an  undertaking  bears 
or allocates  all  or part of the  costs  of its  activity  in 
one geographical or product market to its  activity in 
another  geographical  or  product  market.  Under 
certain  circumstances,  cross-subsidisation  in  the 
postal  sector,  where  nearly  all  operators  provide 
reserved  and  non-reserved  services,  can  distort 
competition and lead  to competitors being beaten by 
offers  which  are  made  possible  not  by  efficiency 
(including economies of scope)  and  performance but 
by  cross-subsidies.  Avoiding  cross-subsidisation 
leading  to unfair competition  is  crucial  for  the devel-
opment of the postal sector. 
3.2. Cross-suhsidisation  docs  not  distort  competition 
when  the  costs  of  reserved  activities  are  subsidised 
by  the  revenue  generated  by  other reserved  services 
since  there  is  no  competition  possible  as  to  these 
services.  This  form  of subsidisation  may  sometimes 
be  necessary,  to enable  the  operators  referred  to  in 
point  4.2  to  perform  their  obligation  to  provide  a 
service  universally,  and  on  the  same  conditions  to 
everybody {
11
).  For  instance,  unprofitable  mail 
delivery  in  rural areas  is  subsidised  through revenues 
from  profitable  mail  delivery  in  urban  areas.  The 
same  could  be  said  of subsidising  the  provision  of 
reserved  services  through  revenues  generated  by 
activities  open  to  competition.  Moreover,  cross-
subsidisation  between  non-reserved  activities  is  not 
in  itself abusive. 
3.3. By  contrast,  subsidising  acuv1t1es  open  to 
competition  by  allocating  their  costs  to  reserved 
services  is  likely  to  distort  competition  in  breach  of 
Article 86. It could amount to an  abuse  by an under-
taking  holding  a  dominant  position  within  the 
Community. Moreover, users  of activities  covered  by 
a  monopoly  would  have  to  bear  costs  which  are 
unrelated  to  the  provision  of  those  activities. 
Nonetheless,  dominant  companies  too  many 
compete  on  price,  or  improve  their  cash  flow  and 
obtain  only  partial  contribution  to  their  fixed 
(overhead)  costs,  unless  the  prices  are  predatory or 
go  against  relevant  national  or  Community  regu-
lations. 
C')  See  these  Postal  Directive,  recitals  16  ana  28,  and 
Chapter 5. 
(b)  Consequences 
3.4. A  reference  to cross-subsidisation  was  made  in  point 
2.7;  duties  of  dominant  postal  operators.  The 
operators referred to in  point 4.2  should  not use  the 
income  from  the  reserved  area  to  cross-subsidise 
activities  in  areas  open  to  competition.  Such  a 
practice could prevent,  restrict or distort competition 
in  the  non-reserved  area.  However, in  some  justified 
cases,  'subject  t~  the  provisions  of  Article  90(2), 
cross-subsidisation  can  be  regarded  as  lawful,  for 
example for cultural mail C'),  as  long as  it  is  applied 
in  a  non  discriminatory  manner,  or  for  particular 
services  to  the  socially,  medically  and  econom~cally 
disadvantaged.  When  necessary,  the  Commission 
will  indicate  what  other  exemptions  the  Treaty 
would  allow  to  be  made.  In  all  other cases,  taking 
into  account  the  indications  given  in  p()int  3.3,  the 
price of competitive services  offered  by  the  operator 
referred  to  in  point  4.2  should,  because  of  the 
difficulty of allocating common  costs,  in  principle  be 
at least  equal  to the  average  total  costs  of provision. 
This  means  covering  the  direct  costs  plus  an  appro-
priate proportion of the common and  overhead costs 
of the  operator.  Objective  criteria,  such  as  volumes, 
time  (labour) usage,  or intensity of usage,  should  be 
used  to determine the  appropriate proportion. When 
using the turnover generated by the services involved 
as  a  criterion  in  a  case  of  cross-subsidisation, 
allowance should be  made for the fact that in  such a 
scenario the turnover of the relevant activity  is  being 
kept  artificially  low.  Demand-infl~enced  factors, 
such  as  revenues  or  profits,  are  themselves 
influenced  by  predation.  If  services  were  offered 
systematically  and  selectively  at  a  price  below 
average  total  cost,  the  Commission  would,  on  a 
case-by-case  basis,  investigate  the  matter  undC'r 
Article  86, or under Article  86  and  Article  90( 1)  or 
under Article 92. 
4.  PUBLIC  UNDERTAKINGS  AND  SPECIAL  OR 
EXCLUSIVE  RIGHTS 
4  .1. The treaty obliges  the  Member  State~, in  respect of 
public  undertakings and  undertakings  to which  they 
grant special or exclusive  rights,  neither. to enact nor 
maintain  in  force  any  measures  contrary  to  the 
c•)  Referred  to  by  UPU  as  'work  of  the  mind',  comprising 
books,  newspapers, periodicals and journals. 
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Treaty  rules  (Anicle  90( 1  )).  The expression  'under-
taking'  includes  every  person  or  legal  entity  exer-
cising  an  economic  activity,  irrespective  of the  legal 
status  of  the  entity  and  the  way  in  which  it  is 
financed.  The clearance,  soning,  transportation  and 
distribution  of  postal  items  constitute  economic 
activities,  and  these  services  arc  normally  supplie<l 
for reward. 
The term  'public  undertaking'  includes  every  under-
taking over which the public authorities may exercise 
directly or indirectly  a  dominant influence  by  virtue 
of ownership  of it,  their  financial  participation  in  it 
or  the  rules  which  govern  it e
0
).  A  dominant 
influence on the part of the public authorities may in 
particular  be  presumed  when  the  public  authorities 
hold,  directly  or  indirectly,  the  majority  of  the 
subscribed  capital  of  the  undertaking,  control  the 
majority  of  the  voting  rights  attach'!d  to  shares 
issued  by  the undertaking or can  appoint more  than 
half  of  the  members  of  the  administrative,  mana-
gerial  or supervisory body.  Bodies  which  are part of 
the  Member  State's  administration  and  which 
provide  in  an  organised  manner  postal  services  for 
third parties against remuneration are to be  regarded 
as  such  undertakings.  Undertakings  to which  special 
or  exclusive  rights  are  granted  can,  according  to 
Article 90( 1  ),  be public as  well  as  private. 
4.2. National  regulations  concerning  postal  operators  to 
which  the  Member  States  have  granted  special  or 
exclusive  rights  to  provide  certain postal  services  are 
'measures' within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the 
Treaty  and  must  be  assessed  under  the  Treaty 
provisions to which that Article refers. 
In  addition  to  Member  States'  obligations  under 
Article  90( 1  ),  public  undertakings  and  undertakings 
that have been granted special or exclusive  rights  are 
subject to Articles 85  and 86. 
4.3. In  most  Member States,  special  and exclusive  rights 
apply·  to  services  such  as  the  clearance,  transpor-
tation  and  distribution  of  certain  postal  items,  as 
well  as  the way in  which those services are provided, 
such as the exclusive right to place letter boxes along 
the  public  highway  or  to  issue  stamps  bearing  the 
name of the country in  question. 
( 10)  Commission  Directive  80/723/EEC on  the  transparency  of 
financial  relations  between  Member  States  and  public 
undertakings, OJ L 195,  29.7.1980, p.  35. 
5.  FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES 
(a)  Basic  principles 
5.1, The granting of special or exclusive  rights to one or 
more operators referred  to in  point 4.2  to carry out 
the  clearance,  including  public  collection,  transport 
and  distribution  of certain  categories  of postal  items 
inevitably  restricts  the  provision  of  such  services, 
both  by  companies . established  in  other  Member . 
States  and  by  undertakings  established  in  the 
Member  State  concerned.  This  restriction  has  a 
transborder  character  when  the  addresses  or  the 
senders of the  postal  items  handled  by  those  under-
takings  are  established  in  other  Member  States.  In 
practice,  restrictions  on  the  provision  of  postal 
services,  within  the  meaning  of  Article  59  of  the 
Treaty e•),  comprise  prohibiting  the  conveyance  of 
certain  categories  of postal  items  to  other  Member 
States  including  by  intermediaries,  as  well  as  the 
prohibition  on  distributing  gross-border  mail.  The 
Postal  Directive  lays  down  the  justified  restrictions 
on the provision of postal services. 
5.2. Article  66,  read  in  conjunction wi,(l  Artuicle  55  and 
56 of the Treaty, sets out exceptions from Article  59. 
Since they are exceptions to a fundamental  principle, 
they  must  be  interpreted  restrictively.  As  regards 
postal  services,  the  exception  under  Article  55  only 
applies  to  the  conveyance  and  distribution  of  a 
special  kind  of  mail,  that  is  mail  generated  in  the 
curse  of  judicial  or  administrative  procedures, 
connected,  even  occasionally,  with  the  exercise  of· 
official  authority,  in  particular  notifications  in 
pursuance  of  any  judicial  or  administrative 
procedures. The conveyance and distribution  of such 
items  on  a  Member  State's  territory  may  therefore 
be  subjected  ot  a  licensing  requirement  (see  point 
5.5)  in  order  to  protect  the  public  interest.  The 
conditions of the other derogations  from  the Treaty 
listed  in  those  provisions  will  not  normally  be 
fulfilled· in  relation  to  postal  services.  Such  services 
cannot,  in  themselves,  threaten  public  policy  and 
cannot affect public health. 
5.3. The  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  allows,  in 
principle,  further  derogations  on  the  basis  of 
mandatory  requirements,  provided  that  they  fulfil 
non-economic  essential  requirements  in  the  general 
interest,  are  applied  without discrimination,  and art. 
appropriate  and  proportionate  to  the  objective  to 
(
21
)  For  a  general  explanation  of  the  principles  .:riving  from 
Article  59,  see  Commission  intemretative  communication 
concerning  the  free  movement  ot  services  across  frontiers 
(OJ C 334, 9.12.1993, p.  3). 
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be  achieved.  As  regards  postal  services,  the  essential 
requirements  which  the  Commission  would  consider 
as  justifying  restrictions  on  the  freedom  to  provide 
postal  services  are  data  protection  subject  to 
approximation  measures  taken  in  this  field,  the 
confidentiality  of  correspondence,  security  of  the 
network  as  regards  the  transport  of  dangerous 
goods,  as  well  as,  where  justified  under  the 
provisions  of  the  Treaty,  environmental  protection 
and  regional  planning.  Conversely,  t.he  Commission 
would  not consider it justified  to  impose  restrictions 
on the freedom to provide postal services  for reasons 
of  consumer  protection  since  this  general  interest 
requirement can be  met by the general legislation on 
fair  trade  practices  and  consumer  protection. 
Benefits  to  consumers  are  enhanced  by  the  freedom 
to  provide  postal  services,  provided  that  universal 
service  obligations  are  well  defined  on  the  basis  of 
the  Postal  Directive and can be  fulfilled. 
5.4. The  Commission  therefore  considers  that  the  main-
tenance of any special or exclusive  right which limits 
cross-border provision  of postal  services  needs  to  be 
justified  in  the  light  of  Articles  90  and  59  of  the 
Treaty.  At  present,  the  special  or  exclusive  rights 
whose  scope  does  not  go  beyond  the  reserved 
services  as  defined  in  the  Postal  Directive  are prima 
focie  justified  under  Article  90(2).  Outward  cross-
border mail  is  de jure or de focto  liberalised  in  some 
Member States,  such  as  Denmark,  the  Netherlands, 
Finland, Sweden, and the United  Kingdom. 
(b)  Consequences 
5.5. The  adoption  of  the  measures  contained  in  the 
Postal  Directive  requires  Member States  to  regulate 
postal  services.  Where Member States  restrict  postal 
_services  to  ensure  the  achievement  of  universal 
service  and  essential  requirements,  the  content  of 
such  regulation  must  correspo-nd  to  the  objective 
pursued.  Obligations  should,  as  a  general  rule,  be 
enforced within  the framework of class  licences  and 
declaration  procedures  by  which  operators of postal 
services  supply  their  name,  legal  form,  title  and 
address as  well  as  a  short description of the services 
they  offer  to  the  public.  Individual  licensing  should 
only  be  applied  for  specific  postal  services,  where  it 
is  demonstrated  that  less  restrictive  procedures 
cannot  ensure  those  objectives.  Member States  may 
be  invited,  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  to  notify  the 
measures  they adopt to the Commission  to enable  it 
to assess  their proportionality. 
6.  MEASURES ADOPTED BY MEMBER STATES 
(a)  Basic  principles 
6.1. Member States have  the freedom  to define what arc 
general  interest  services,  to  grant  the  special  or 
exclusive  rights  that  are  necessary  fbr  providing 
them,  to  regulate  their  management  and,  where 
appropriate,  to  fund  them.  However,  under  Article 
90(1) of the Treaty, Member States must,  in  the case 
of  public  undertakings  and  undertakings  to  which 
they  have  granted special  or exclusive  rights,  neither 
enact nor maintain in  force  any measure contrary to 
the  Treaty  rules,  and  in  particular  its  competition 
rules. 
(b)  Consequences 
6.2. The  operation  of  a  universal  clearance  and 
distribution  network  confers  significant  advantages 
on  the  operator referred  to in  point 4.2  in  offering 
not only reserved or liberalised services falling  within 
the  definition  of  universal  service,  but  also  other 
(non-universal  postal)  services.  The  prohibition 
under  Articles  90(1 ),  read  in  conjunction  with 
Article  86(b),  applies  to  the  use,  without  objectiv(" 
justification,  of a  dominant  position  on  one  market 
to obtain  market  power on  related  or neighbouring 
markets  which  are  distinct  from  the  former,  at  the 
risk  of eliminating competition on those  markets.  In 
countries  where  local  delivery  of  items  of  corre-
spondence  is  liberalised,  Sl,lch  as  Spain,  and  the 
monopoly  is  limited  to  inter-city  transport  and 
delivery,  the  use  of a  dominant  position  to  extend 
the monopoly from  the  latter  market to the'  former 
would  therefore  be  incompatible  with  the  Treaty 
provisions,  in  the  absence  of specific  justification,  if 
the  functioning  of services  in  the  general  economic 
interest  was 
1  not  previously  endangered.  .  The 
Commission  considers  that  it  would  be  appropriate 
for Member States to inform the Commission of any 
extension  of special  or exclusive  rights  and  of the 
justification  therefor. 
6.3. There  is  a  potential  effect  on  the  trade  between 
Member States  from  restrictions  on the  provision  of 
postal  services,  since  the  postal  services  offered  by 
operators  other  than  the  operators  referred  to  in 
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point  4.2  can  cover  mailings  to  or  from  other 
Member  States,  and  restrictions  may  impede  cross-
border ativities of operators in other  ~ember States. 
6.4. As  explained  in  point  8(b)(vii),  Member  States  must 
monitor acn·ss conditions and  the  exercise of special 
and  exclusive  rights.  They  need  not  necessarily  set 
up  new  bodies to do this  but they should  not give  to 
. their operator (u) as  referred  to in  point 4.2,  or to a 
body  which  is  related  (legally,  administratively  and 
structurally)  to  that  operator,  the  power  .of  super-
vision  of  the  exclusive  rights  granted  and  of  the 
activities  of postal  operators generally.  An  enterprise 
in  a dominant, position  must  not be  allowed  to  have 
such  a  power  over  its  competitors.  The  inde-
pendence,  both  in  theory  and  in  practice,  of  the 
supervisory  authority  from  all  the  enterprise . 
supervised  is  essential.  The  system  of  undistorted 
competition  required  by  the  Treaty  can  only  be 
ensured  if  equal  opportunities  for  the  different 
economic  operators,  including  confidentiality  of 
sensitive  business  information,  are  guaranteed.  To 
allow  an  operator  to  check  the  declarations  of  its 
competitors  or  to  assign  to  an  undertaking  the 
power to supervise  the activities of its  competitors or 
to  be  associated  in  the  granting  of  licences  means 
that  such  undertaking  is  given  commercial 
information  about  its  competitors  and  thus  has  the 
opportunity  to  influence  the  activity  of  those 
competitors. 
7.  POSTAL OPERATORS AND STATE AID 
(a)  Principles 
While  a  few  operators  re.ferred  to  m  point  4.2  are 
highly  profitable,  . the  maJonty  appear  to  be 
operating  either  in  financial  deficit  or  at  close  to 
break.-even  in  postal  operations,  although 
information  on  underlying  financial  performance  is 
limited,  as  relatively  few  operators  publish  relevant 
information  of  an  auditable  standard  on  a  regular 
basis.  However,  direct  financial  support  in  the  form 
of  subsidies  or  indirect  support  such  as  tax 
exemptions  is  being  given  to  fund  some  postal 
services,  even  if  the  actual  amounts  are  often  not 
transparent. 
The  Treaty  makes  the  Commission  responsible  for 
enfo'rcing  Article  92,  which  declares  State  aid  that 
affects  trade  between  Member  States  of  the 
Community  to  be  inrompatible  with  the  common 
market  e:x:cept  in  certain  circumstances  where  an 
e')  See in  panicular, Case  C-18/88 RTTv GB-Inno-BM [1991] 
ECR 1-5981, paragraphs 25  to 28. 
exemption  is,  or may be,  granted. Without prejudice 
to Article 90(2), ArQcles  92  and 93  are applicable  to. 
postal  setvices (u). 
Pursuant  to  Article  93(3),  Member  States  arc 
required  to  notify  to  the  Commission  for  approval 
all  plans  to  grant  aid  or  to  alter  existing  aid' 
arrangements.  Moreover,  the  Commission  is 
required to monitor aid which  it  has  previously  auth-
orised  or  which  dates  from  before  the  entry  into 
force  of the  Treaty  or before  the  accession  of the 
Member State concerned. 
All  universal  service  providers  currently  fall  within 
the scope  of Commission  Directive  80/723/EEC of 
25  June  1980  on  the  transparency  of  financial 
relations  between  Member  Stares  and public  under-· 
takings (
24
),  as  last  amended  by  Directive 
93/84/EEC e').  In  addition  to  the  general  trans-
parency  requirement  for  the  accounts  of  operators 
referred to in  point 4.2  as  discussed  in  point 8(b)(vi}, 
Member  States  must  therefore  ensure  that  financial 
relations  between  them  and  those  operators  are 
transparent  as  required  by  the  Directive,  so  that  the 
following  are clearly shown: 
(a)  public  funds  made  available  directly,  including 
tax exemptions or reductions; 
(h)· public funds  made available  through other public 
undertakings  or financial  institutions; 
(c)  the  use  to which  those  public funds  are actually 
put  .. 
The  Commission  regards,  in  particular,  the 
following  as  making available  public funds: 
(a)  the setting-off of operating losses; 
(b)  the provision of capital; 
('') Case C-387/92  Banco  de Credito  Industrial v.  A  :Jtamiento 
Valencia [1994]  ECR 1-877. 
(") OJ L 195, 29.7.1980, p.  35. 
e')  OJ L 254,  12.10.1993, p.  16. 
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(c)  non-refundable  grants  or  loans  ,on  privileged 
terms; 
(d)  the  granting of financial  advantages  by  forgoing 
profits or the recovery of sums due; 
(e)  the  forgoing  of a  normal  return  on  public  funds 
used; 
(f)  compensation  for  financial  burdens  imposed  by 
the  public  authorities. 
(b)  Application of Articles 90 and 92 
The Commission qas  been  called  upon  to  examine  a 
number  of  tax  advantages  granted  to  a  postal 
operator  on  the  basis  of Article  92  in  connection 
with  Article  90  of  the. Treaty.  The  Commission 
sought  to  check  whether  that  privileged  tax 
treatment  could  be  used  to  cross-subsidize  that 
operator's operations in  sectors  open  to competition. 
At  that  time,  the  postal  operator  did  not  have  an 
analytical  cost-accounting  system  serving  to  enable 
the  Commission  to  distinguish  between  the  reserved 
activities  and  the  competitive  ones.  Accordingly,  the 
Commission,  on  the  basis  of the  findings  of studies 
carried out in  that area, assessed  the  additional costs 
due  to  universal-service  obligations  borne  by  that 
postal  operator  and  compared  those  costs  with  the 
tax  advantages.  The Commission  concluded  that the 
costs  exceeded  those  advantages  and  therefore 
decided that the tax system  under examination could 
not  lead  to  cross-subsidization  of  that  operator's 
operations in  the competitive areas C'). 
It  is  worth  noting  that  in  its  decision  the 
Commission  invited  the  Member State  concerned  to 
make  sure  that  the  postal  operator  adopted  an 
analytical  cost-accounting  system  and  requested  an 
annual  report which  would  allow  the  monitoring  of 
compliance with Community law. 
The  Court  of  First  Instance  ha  endorsed  the 
Commission's  decision  and  has  stated  that  the  tax 
advantages  to  that  postal  operator  are  State  aid 
e')  Case NN 135/92, OJ C 262,  7.10.1995,  p.  11. 
which  benefit  from  an  exemption  from  the 
prohibition  set  out  in  Article  92( 1)  on  the  basis  of 
Article  90(2) (2'). 
8.  SERVICE OF GENERAL ECONOMIC INTEREST 
(a)  Basic  principles 
8.1. Article  90(2) of the Treaty allows  an  exception  frorn 
the  application  of  the  Treaty  rules  where  the 
application of those  rules  obstructs, in  law or in  fact, 
the  performance  of the  particular  task  assigned  to 
the  operators  referred  to  in  point  4.2  for  the 
provision  of a  service  of general  economic  interest. 
Without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  the  Member 
States to define particular requirements of services of 
general  interest,  that  task  consists  primarily  in  the 
provision  and  the  maintenance  of a  universal  public 
postal  service,  guaranteeing  at  affordable,  cost-
effective  and transparent tariffs  nationwide  access  to 
the  public  postal  network  within  a  reasonable 
'  distance  and  during  adequate  opening  hours, 
including  the  clearance  of  postal  items  from 
accessible  postal  boxes  or  collection  points 
throughout  the  territory  and  the  timely  delivery  of 
such  items  to  the  address  indicated,  as  well  as 
associated  services  entrusted  by  measures  of a  regu-
latory  nature  to  those  operators  for  universal 
delivery  at  a  specified  quality.  The universal  service 
is  to evolve  in  response to the social, economical and 
technical environment and  to the demands of users. 
The general  interest involved  requires the availability 
in  the  Community  of a  genuinely  integrated  public 
postal  network,  allowing  efficient  circulation  of 
information and thereby fostering,  on the one  hand, 
the  competitivenes  of  European  industry  and  the 
development  of trade  and  greater cohesion  between 
the  regions  and  Member  States,  and  on  the  other, 
the  improvement  of  social  contacts  between  the 
citizens of the  Union. The definition of the reserved 
~rea has  to take into account the financial  resources 
necessary  for  the  provision  of the service  of general 
economic  interest. 
8.2. The  financial  resources  for  the  maintenance  and 
improvement  of  that  public  network  still  derive 
mainly  from  the  activities  referred  to  in  point  2.3. 
e')  Case T-106/95  FFSA v. Commission [1997]  ECR 11-229. 
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Currently,  and  in  the  absence  of harmonisation  at 
Community  level,  most  Member  States  have  fixed 
the  limits  of  the  monopoly  by  reference  to  the 
weight  of  the  item.  Some  Member  States  apply  a 
combined  weight  and  price  limit  whereas  one 
Member State applies  a  price  limit  only.  Information 
collected  by  the  Commission  on  the  revenues 
obtained  from  mail  flows  in  the  Member  States 
seems to indicate that the maintencance of special or 
exclusive  rights  with  regard  to  this  market could,  in 
the  absence  of  exceptional  circumstances,  be 
sufficient  to  guarantee  the  improvement  an  mam-
tenance of the public postal network. 
The  service  for  which  Member  States  can  reserve 
exclusive or special  rights, to the extent necessary to 
ensure  the  mainr.enance  of  the  universal  service,  is 
harmonised in  the Postal Directive. To the extent to 
which  Member  States  grant  special  or  exclusive 
rights  for this  service,  the service  is  to be considered 
a  separate product-market in  the assessment of indi-
vidual  cases  in  particular with  regard  to direct mail, 
the  distribution  of  inward  cross-border  mail, 
outward cross-border mail,  as  well  as with  regard to 
the  collection,  sorting  and  transport  of  mail.  The 
Commission  will  take  account of the  fact  that those 
markets are wholly or partly liberalised  in  a  number  1 
of Member States. 
8.3. When  applying  the  competition  rules  and  other 
relevant  Treaty  rules  to  the  postal  sector,  the 
Commission,  acting  upon  a  complaint  or  upon  its 
own  initiative,  will  take  account of the  harmonized 
definition set out in  the Postal  Directive in  assessing 
whether  the  scope  of  the  reserved  area  can  be 
justified  under Article 90(2). The point of departure 
will  be  a  presumption  that,  to  the  extent  that  they 
fall  within  the limits  of the  reserved  area as  defined 
in  the  Postal  Directive,  the special  or exclusive  rithts 
will  be. prima facie  justified under Article 90(2). That 
presumption can, however, be rebutted if the facts  in 
a  case  show  that  a  restriction  does  not  fulfil  the 
conditions of Article 90(2) C'). 
8.4. The  direct  mail  market  is  still  developing  at  a 
different pace from  one Member State to the other, 
e•)  In  relation  to the  limits  on the application of the exception 
set out in  Anicle 90(2), see  the position taken by the Coun 
of  Justice  in  the  following  cases:  Case  C-179/90  Merci 
convenzionali  porto  di  Gtnow  v.  Siderurgica  Gabrielli 
[1991)  ECR 1-1979;  Case  C--41190  Klaus  Ho/ner  and Fritz 
Elser v.  Macroton  (1991)  ECR 1-5889. 
which  makes it  difficult for the  Commission,  at this 
stage,  to specify  in  a  general  way the obligations of 
the  Member States  regarding  that service.  The two 
principal  issues  in  relation  to  direct  mail  are 
potential  abuse  by  customers  of its  tariffication  and 
of its  liberalisation  (reserved  items being delivered  by 
an alternative operators as  if  they were non-reserved 
direct  mail  items)  so  as  to  circumvent  the  reserved 
services  referred  to  in  point  8.2.  Evidence  from  the 
Member  States  which  do  not  restrict  direct  mail 
services,  such  as  Spain,  Italy,  the  Netherlands, 
Austria, Sweden and Finland, is  still  inconclusive and 
does not yet allow a  definitive general assessment. In 
view of that uncertainty, it is  considered appropriate 
to  proceed  temporarily  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  If 
particular  circumstances  make  it  necessary,  and 
without prejudice  to  point  8.3,  Member States  may 
maintain  certain  existing  restrictions. on  direct  mail 
services  or  introduce  licensing  in  order  to  avoid 
artificial  traffic  distortions  and  substantial  destabil-
ization of revenues. 
8.5. As  regards  the  distribution  of  inward  corss-border 
mail,  the  system  of  terminal  dues  received  by  the 
postal  operator of the  Member State  of delivery  of 
cross-border mail  from  the  operator of the  Member 
State  of origin  is  currently  under  revision  to  adapt 
terminal  dues,  which  are  in  many cases  too low,  to 
actual costs of delivery. 
Without prejudice  to point 8.3,  Member States  may 
maintain  certain  existing  restrictions  on  the 
distribution of inward cross-border mail C'),  so as to 
avoid  artificial  diversion  of  traffic,  which  would 
inflate  the share of cross-border mail  in  Community 
traffic.  Such  restrictions  may  only  concern  items 
falling  under  the  reservable  area  of  services.  In 
assessing  the  situation  in  the  framework  of  indi-
vidual  cases,  the  Commission  will  take  into account 
the  relevant,  specific  circumstances  in  the  Member 
States. 
8.6. The clearance,  sorting and transport of postal  items 
has been or is  currently increasingly being opened up 
to  third  parties  by  postal  operators  in  a  number 
e') This  may  in  panicular concern  mail  from  one  State  which 
has  been  conveyed  by  commercial  c~  ... panies  to  another 
State  to  be  introduced  in  the  rublic  postal  network  via  a 
postal operator of that other State. 
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of Member States.  Given  that the  revenue  effects  of 
such opening up  may vary according to the situation 
in  the  different  Member  States,  certain  ,Member 
States  may,  if  particular  circumstances  make  it 
necessary,  and  without  prejudice  to  point  8.3, 
maintain  certain  existing  restrictions  on  the 
clearance,  sorting  and  transport  of  postal  items  by 
intermediaries C
0
),  so  as  to  allow  for  the  necessary 
restructuring of the  operator referred  to  in  point  4.2 
However,  such  restrictions  should  in  principle  he 
applird  only  to  postal  item~ roven·d  by  the  cxiMing 
monopolies,  shoulc.l  not  limit  what  i.'i  already 
accepted  in  the  Member  State  concerned,  and 
should  be  compatible  with  the  principle  of 
non-discriminatory  access  to  the  postal  network  as 
set out in  point 8(b )(vii). 
(h)  Conditions for the application of Article  90(2) to 
the postal sector 
The  following  conditions  should  apply  with  regard 
to the exception under Article 90(2): 
(i)  l.ibaalisatim• (l  otbt•r posl(ll  sc·roiu5 
Except  for  those  services  for  which  reservation  is 
necessary,  and  which  the  Postal  Directive  allows  to 
be  reserved,  Member  States  should  withdraw  all 
special  or exclusive  rights  for  the  supply  of postal 
services  to  the  extent  that  the  performance  of  the 
particular task  assigned  to  the  operators  referred  to 
in  point  4.2  for  the  provision  of  a  service  of  a 
general economic interest is  not obstructed in  law or 
in  fact,  with  the exception  of mail  ·connected  to the 
exercise  of official  authority,  and  they  should  take 
all  necessary  measures  to  guarantee  the  right  of all 
economic operators to supply postal services. 
This  docs  not  prevent  Member States  from  making, 
where  necessary,  the  supply  of such  services  subject 
to declaration procedures or class  licences  and, when 
necessary,  to  individual  licensing  procedures  aimed 
at the  enforcement  of essential  requirements  and  at 
safeguarding  the  universal  service.  Member  States 
C
0
)  Even  in  a  monopoly  situation,  senders  will  have  the 
freedorr.  to make  use  of particular services  provided  by an 
intermediary,  such  as  (pre-)sorting  before  deposit  with  the 
postal  operator.  · 
should,  in  that event,  ensure  that the  conditions  set 
out  in  those  procedures  are  transparent,  objective, 
and  without discriminatory  effect,  and  that  there  is 
an  efficient  procedure  of  appealing  to  the  courts 
against any refusal. 
(ii)  Absence  of less  restnctiVe  means  to  ensure  the 
st•rvin·s ;, tht• xem:rttl t•cmrmnic  itrtert•st 
Exclusive  rights  may  be  granted or maintained  dn!y 
where  they  are  indispensable  for  ensuring  the  func-
tioning  of the  tasks  of general  economic  interest.  In 
many  areas  the  entry  of  new  companies  into  the 
market could, on the basis  of their specific skills  and 
expertise, contribute to the  realisation of the services 
of general economic interest. 
If the  operator  referred  to  in  point  4.2  fails  to 
provide  satisfactorily  all  of  the  elements  of  the 
universal  service  required  by  the  Postal  Directive 
(such  as  the  possibility  of  every  citizen  in  the 
Member  State  concerned,  and  in  particular  those 
living  in  remote areas,  to  have  access  to newspapers, 
maga:t.ines  and  hooks),  even  with  th("  henefit  of  a 
universal  postal  network  and  of special  or exclusive 
rights,  the  Member  State  concerned  must  take 
action (,. ).  Instead  of  extending  the  rights  already 
granted, Member States  should  create the possibility 
that services are provided by competitors and for this 
purpose  may  impose  obligations  on  those 
competitors in  addition  to  essential  requirements.  All 
of  those  obligations.  should  be  objective, 
non-discriminatory and  transparent. 
(iii)  Proportionality 
Member  States  should  moreover  ensure  that  the 
scope  of any  special  and  exclusive  rights  granted  is 
in  proportion to the general ·economic  interest which 
is  pursued . through  those  rights.  Prohibiting  self-
delivery,  that  is  the  provision  of. postal  services  by 
the  natural  or  legal  person  (including  a  sister  or 
subsidiary organisation) who  i~ the originator of the 
mail,  or collection  and  transport of such  items  by a 
third  party  acting  solely  on  its  behalf,  would  for 
(u) According  to  Article  3  of  the  Postal  Directive,  Member 
Sta,tes  are to ensure that users enjoy the right .to a universal 
service. 
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example  not  be  proponionate  to  the  objective  of 
guaranteeing  adequate  resources  for  the  public 
postal  network.  Member States  must  also  adjust  the 
scope  of those  special  or exclusive  rights,  according 
to  changes  in  the  needs  and  the  conditions  under 
which  postal  services  are  provided  and  taking 
account  of any  State  aid  granted  to  the  operator 
referred to in  point 4.2. 
(iv)  Monitoring  by an  independent  regulatory body 
The  monitoring  of  the  performance  of the  public-
service  tasks  of the operators referred  to in  point 4.2 
and  of open access  to the public postal  networ~ and, 
where applicable,  the gram of licences or the control  • 
of  declarations  as  well  as  the  observance  by 
economic operators of the special  or exclusive  rights 
of  operators  referred  to  in  point  4.2  should  be 
ensured  by  a  body  or  bodies  independent  of  the 
latter (u). 
That body should in  particular ensure: that contracts 
for  the  provision  of reserved services  are  made  fully 
transparent,  are  separately  invoiced  and  distin-
guished  from  non-reserved services,  such  as  printing, 
labelling  and  enveloping;  that  terms  and  conditions 
for  services  which  are  in  pan reserved  and  in  pan 
liberalised  are  · separate;  and  that  the  reserved 
element  is  open  to  all  postal  users,  irrespective  of 
whether  or  not  the  non-reserved  component  is 
purchased. 
(v)  Effictive monitoring of  reserved services 
The  tasks  excluded  from  the  scope  of  competition 
should be  effectively monitored by the Member State 
according  to  published  service  targets  and 
performance  levels  and  there  should  be  regular  and 
public  reponing on their fulfilment. 
(vi)  Transparency o/  accounting 
Each  operator referred  to in  point  4.2  uses  a  single 
postal  network  to  compete  in  a  variety  of markets. 
(u) See  in  particular Articles 9 and 22 of the Postal Directive. 
Price  and  service  discrimination  between  or within 
classes  of  customers  can  easily  be  practised  by 
operators  running  a  universal  postal  network,  given 
the  significant  overheads  which  cannot  be  fully  and 
precisely assigned  to  any one service  in  particular. It 
is  therefore  extremely  difficult  to  determine·  cross-
subsidies  within  them;  both  between  the  different 
stages  of the  handling  of postal  items  in  the  public 
postal  network  and  between  the  reserved  services 
and  the  services  provided  under  conditions  of 
competition.  Moreover,  a  number of operators offer 
preferential tariffs for  cult~ral items which  dearly do 
not cover the  average  total  costs.  Member States  are 
obliged  by  Anicle  5  and  90  to  ensure  that 
Community  law  is  fully  complied  with.  The 
Commission  considers that the most appropriate way 
of  fulfilling  that  obligation  would  be  for  Member 
States to require operators referred  to in  point 4.2  to 
keep  separate  financial  records,  identifying  sepa-
rately,  inter alia,  costs  and  revenues  associated  with 
the  provision  of  the  services  supplied  under  their 
exclusive  rights  and  those  provided  under 
competitive  conditions,  and  making  it  possible  to 
assess  fully  the  conditions  applied  at  the  various 
access  points  of the  public  postal  network.  Services 
made  up  of elements  falling  within  the reserved  and 
competitive  services  should  also  distinguish  between 
the  costs  of  each  element.  Internal  accounting 
systems  should  operate  on  the  be ::j'  of consistently 
applied  and  objectively  justified  cost-accounting 
principles.  The  financial  accounts  should  be  drawn 
up,  audited  by  an  independent  auditor,  which  may 
be  appointed  by  the  National  Regulatory Authority, 
and  be  publsihed  in  accordance  with  the  relelvant 
Community  and  national  legislation  applying  to 
commercial  organisations. 
(vii)  Non-discriminatory  access  to  the postal network 
Operators should provide the  universal  postal service 
by affording  non-discriminatory  access  to  customers 
or  intermediaries  at  appropriate  public  points  of 
access,  in  accordance with  the  needs  of those  users. 
Access  conditions including  contracts (when  offered) 
should  be  transparent,  published  in  an  appropriate 
manner and offered on a non-discriminatory basis. 
Preferential  tariffs  appear  to  be  offer~d  J.!  some 
operators  to  particular  groups  of  custor  rs  in  a 
non-transparent  fashion.  Member  States  should 
monitor the access  conditions  to  the  network with  a 
view  to  ensuring  that  there  is  no  discrimination 
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either  in  the  conditions  of  use  or  in  the  charges 
payable. It should  in  particular be ensured that inter-
mediaries,  including  operators  from  other  Member 
States,  can  choose  from  amongst  available  access 
points to the public postal  network and obtain access 
within  a  reasonable  period  at price conditions based 
on costs,  that  take  into  account  the  actual  services 
required. 
The obligation  to  provide  non-discriminatory  access 
to  the  public  postal  network  does  not  mean  that 
Member States ar.  required to ensure access for items 
of  correspondence  from  its  territory,  which  were 
conveyed by commercial companies to another State, 
in  breach of a  postal  monopoly, to be  introduced in 
the  public  postal· network  via  a  postal  operator of 
that  other  State,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  taking 
advantage  of  lower  postal  tariffs.  Other  economic 
reasons,  such  as  production  costs  and  facilities, 
added values  or the  level  of service  offered  in  other 
Member States  are  not regarded  as  improper.  Fraud 
can be  made subject to penalties  by the  independent 
regulatory body. 
At present cross-border access  to postal  networks  is 
occasionally  rejected,  or  only  allowed  subject  to 
conditions,  for  postal  items  whose  production 
process  includes  cross-border  data  transmission 
before  those  postal  items  were  given  physical  form. 
Those  cases  are  usually  called  non-physical  remail. 
In  the present circumstances there may indeed  be  an 
economic  problem  for  the  postal  operator  that 
delivers  the . mail,  due  to  the  level  of terminal  dues 
applied  between postal operators. The operators seek 
to  resolve  this  problem  by  the  introduction  of  an 
appropriate terminal dues system. 
The  Commission  may  request  Member  States,  in 
accordance  with  the  first  paragraph  of Article  5  of 
the  Treaty,  to  inform  the  Commission  of  the 
conditions  of access  applied  and  of the  reasons  for 
them. The Commission  is  not to disclose  information 
acquired  as  a  result  of such  requests  to  the  extent 
that  it is  covered  by  the  obligation  of professional 
secrecy. 
9.  REVIEW 
This  notice  is  adopted  at  Community  level  to 
facilitate  the  assessment  of  certain  behaviour  of 
undertakings  and  certain  State  measures  relating  to 
postal  services.  It is  appropriate  that  after  a  certain 
period  of  development,  possibly  by  the  year  2000, 
the  Commission .should  carry  out  an  evaluation  of 
the  postal  sector with  regard to  the Treaty rules,  to 
establish  whether modifications  of the views  set  out 
in  this  notice  are  required  on  the  basis  of  social, 
economic or technological considerations and  on the 
basis of experience with cases in  the postal sector.  In 
due  time  the  Commission  will  carry  out  a  global 
evaluation of the situation in  the postal sector in  the 
light of the aims of this notice. 
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Notice  pu~t  to Article  19  (l) of Council  Regulation  No  17 (') concerning  a  request for 
negatiVe  clearance or an  exemption p~t  to Article· 85  (l) of the EC Treaty 
.  (Case No IV  /35~296 - ~t-P)  .. 
(95/C  304/06) 
(Text with  EJ:;A ,relevance) 
I.  INTROJ?UCUON 
On  11  November  1994  the  International  Maritime 
Satellite  Organization,  which,  in·  December  1994~ 
changed  its  name  to  the  International  Mobile  Satellite 
Organization (lnmarsat),  notified  to the Commission  the 
creation  of  an  affiliate,  I-CO  Global  Communications 
Ltd  (ICO),  to  finance,  construct  and  operate  the 
Inmarsat-P  world-wide  mobile  satellite-based  telecom-
munications system.  ICO was  actually incorporated as  a 
UK company with limited liability on 16  December 1994 
after an extraordinary meeting of the Inmarsat Assembly 
decided to go ahead  with  it.  The Inmarsat assembly  also 
decided  that  signatories  of lnmarsat  would  be  free  to 
deci~e wh~ther or not to invest  in  ICO. A large number 
of stgnatones subsequently expressed  an  interest in  doing 
so,  ~nd, finally,  38  of them  decided  to  i~vest during  a 
m~eung held  on  17  to  20  January  1995  providing  ICO · 
wtth  more  than  the  financial  suppon  initially  expected. 
In  June  1995,  ICO was  restructu.red;  it  consists  now of 
three  entities,  a  holding  company  ·and  an  operating 
company  registered  in  the  Cayman  Islands  and  a 
management  services  company  registered  in  the  United 
Kingdom. 
ICO  and  the  lnmarsat-P syStem  are  at a  early stage .of 
development. The first satellite of the system will  only be 
launche~ on 31  July  1999  and the  fu~ operability of the 
system  IS  foreseen for 31  December 2000. In addition  no 
radio  frequencies  have  yet  been  aijocated  to  Inmars~t-P 
and  some of the required technologies still  remain under 
development  or  have  not·  yet  been  applied  in  systems 
directly  analogous  to  Inmarsat-P. 
II.  PARTIES 
/.  1.  Inmarsat  is  an  international  inter-governmental 
organization  which  provides  mobile  satellite  communi-
cations  world-wide.  Established  in  1979  to  serve  the 
maritime  community,  lnmarsat  has  since  envolved  into 
the  major  provider  of  mobile  satellite  communications 
for  cOmmercial  and  distress  and  safety  applications  at 
sea,  in  the air and on land. 
lnmarsat ·'space  segment'  consists  of four  geostationary 
second generation  ~atellites lacated two over the Atlantic 
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Ocean,  one  over· the  Pacific  Ocean  and  one  over  the 
In?ian O~ean. A  ~ird generation of satellites is  currently 
bemg  bu1lt  and  1ts  expected  to  become  operational  in 
1996. 
The  services . offered  by  I~marsat  include  direct-dial 
telephone,  telex,  facsimile,  electronic  mail  and  data 
connections  for  maritime  applications,  flight-deck  voice 
a?d  da~, automatic  position  and  status  reponing .  and 
d1rect-dtal  passenger  telephone  :fp·r  aircraft,  two-way 
data  exchange,  position  reponing,  electronic  mail  and 
fleet  ma_nagement  to land transpon. Inmarsat is  also  used  \J 
for  emergency  communications  at  times  of  human 
disaster  and  natural  catastrophe.  In  addition,  lnmarsat 
offers several  different mobile communication· systems:  in 
1991  Inmarsat  launched  its  lnmarsai-C  low-data  rate 
text  and  data  s~.r::vices  and  in  1993  its  Inmarsat-M 
ponable satellite  phone.  By  the  end  of 1993  there  were 
3 790  lnmarsat-C and 333  Inmarsat-M  terminals  in  use. 
lnmarsat  had  been  developing  the  lnmarsat-P  concept 
for the last few  years..- . 
Any country in  the world  is  entitled  to be  an  Inmarsat 
member.  At  the  third  quarter· of 1994,  there  were  75 
member  countries.  Member  countries  designate  a 
nat~onal  entity  to  be. its.  signatory;  usually  the  (inter-
nataonal)  telecommumcataons  operator  or  the  satellite 
service provider. Signatories have  an "investment share  in  t 
Inm_arsat  which  is  proportional to the use  they make  of 
the  system.  This  principle  has  been  abandoned  for ·the 
setting-up  of ICO. 
Inmarsat  has  invested  $ 150  million  in  ICO  corre-
sponding  to  a  10,7 96 . of  the  ordinary ·shares  of  the 
co~p.any and entitling  i~ to 15 96  of the voting  rights~ In 
addataon,  Inmarsat  has  received  700 000 B  shares  in 
exchanges  for  its  in-kind  contribution (
2
}.  .  In-kind 
contributions  by  lnmarsat  to  ICO  have  been  paid 
e>  In-kind  ~n~butions  refer  to  expenditures  made  by 
lnmaC$at  aun~utable to the development of Inmarsat-P and 
to  compc;nsauons  to  Inmarsat  for · benefiting  from  its 
experience- in  the  satellites  communications  market  for  the 
use  of  lnmarsat's  logo  and  trademarks  and  'for  the 
compromise . by  Jnmarsat  not .  to  procure  a  separate  space 
segment  destgned  for  the  purpose  of providing  hand  held 
serv~ces other than from ICO.  ·  · 
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for  in  shares  in  accordance  with  an  independent 
valuator.  The B shares will  be  imm~diately. convertible 
into ordinary shares, provided that if Inmarsat does so 
prior to  1 January 2002,  it cannot exceed  15 °/o  of the 
voting rights for more than 90 days. 
2.  37  sigaatories  (or  subsidiaries  of  signatories)  of 
Inmarsat,  all  of  · them  telecommunications  and/  or 
satellite(s)  operators,  freely  decided  to  join  ICO  and 
have signed subscription agreements with ICO. None of 
them controls more than 6,7 °/o of the ordinary shares of 
ICO. ICO's shares  are split the following  way:  38,7 °/o 
of  the  shares  are  in  the  hands  of Asian  signatories, 
12,2 °/o  are in the hands of Arabic signatories, 9,4 °/o  are 
in  the hands of Latin-American signatories, 6,7 °/o  are in 
the hands of the US.signatory, 3,9 °/o  are in the hands of 
non-EU European signatories e), 1,7 °/o  are in the hanas 
of African  signatories arid  0,1  %  belong to. Australia.  ~ 
EU  companies  account  for  16,9 °/o  of  the  ordinary 
shares.  Of  the  six  companies  so  involved,  five  are 
incumbent telecommunications operators: Telef6nica de 
Espana  (Spain,  2,2 Ofo),  Telecom  Finland  (Finland, 
0,1  °/o), OTE (Greece, 3,9 °/o), CPRM (Portugal, 1,8  O/o)' 
and  P1T Telecoms c·>  (the  Netherland~,  2,2 °/o);  the 
sixth  is  Detemobil,  the  mobile  subsidiary  of  Deuts~he 
Telekom (6,7 O/o). 
This  reparuuon  of the  shares  clearly  differs  from  the 
current structure of Inmarsat itself;  where 75 °/o  of the 
shares are  controlled by European and North-American 
signatories. 
This structure could be modified in the near future, .as it 
is  foreseen that ICO's board may issue additional equity 
of up to US $ 600 million that will be offered to strategic· 
.investors,  including companies other than Inmarsat and 
its  signatories,  i.e.  tJte  spacecraft suppliers .and  handset 
.  manufacturers (5).  ·  · 
(l) Swiss  Telecom  (2,2 %),  Cyprus  Telecomms  (0,1 %), 
Telemalta (0,1 %), Polish Telecom  (1,-4 %) and  Morsvias-
putnik of  R~ssia (0,1 %).  .  · 
e> ·It  is  wonb  noting  that  three  out  of  four  members  of 
Unisource  are  involved1  together  accounting  for  $ 9-4 
million, or 6,7 % of the snares. 
.(')  As  regards  the former,  ICO has  fmally  chosen· H.:_.ghes  as 
the m.anufacturer of the satellites. Hughes will·also become a 
strategic partner of ICO; whereas ABB, Ericsson and Nokia 
·  ~ong  the latter have maintained contacts with Inm'arsat. 
Investors in ICO will be granted rights and opponunities 
to operate elements of the Inmarsat-P ground segment 
and  to  act  as  wholesalers  and/  or  retailers  fQr  the 
distribution. of the services  to be  provided  through  the-
system. 
3.  ·ICO 
ICO hasd been established for the provision of an Inter-
mediate Circular Orbit space  segment (i.e.  the satellites 
over which the service will  be  provided)  and  associated 
grpund  infrastructure  for  the  delivery  of  lnmarsat-P 
.hand-held  and  other  ancillary  telecommunications 
services.  ICO  will  then  be  offering  what .is  called  a 
world  .. wide  satellite-personal  communications  system 
(S-PCS) (').  ICO  will  mainly  be  a  network  provider. 
However,  it  can  require  wholesalers  to  provide  a 
minimum set of services of a stao,dard guality in order to 
ensure global interconnectivity.  ;;  · 
ICO  is  obliged  to  follows  a  number  of  principles 
included in  the memorandum of association: 
(i)  it shall serve all  areas where there is  a need for the 
services; 
(ii)  it shall act exclusive~y for  pe~ceful purposes, and 
(iii)  it shall not discriminate  in  service  provision  on the 
basis  of nationality, provided that geographic price 
·differentiation should  be  permitted based  on costs, 
competition or similar conside~;ati~ns. 
ICO will  be  managed 'by  a  Board of Directors  (BOD) 
made of 13  members  (including  the  CEO). Ten of its 
members  are  elected  by  cumulative  voting.  The  first 
BOD has  been elected for a two-year term. Thereafter 
BOD  members  (other  than  the  CEO  and  the  two 
directors appointed by Inmarsat) will serve for one-year 
terms. After the initial meeting of shareholders held  on 
24 January 1995, three directors belonging to EU share-· 
holders have  been elected to the  BOD. The BOD will 
delegate certain executive  authority to the management 
team· of the company,. which will be led ·by the CEO, to 
be  elected  by  the  BOD.  The  management  will  be 
responsible  for  carrying  out  the  directions  of  the 
(') The term 'S-PCS system' is synonymous With the terms "Big 
LEO/MEO' or 'Mobile Satellite S~ms  (MSS)' commonly 
seen in the press and~  by ITU. s.:.PCS has been the term 
used ·by the ColllJJlission  in  the 'Communication from  the 
COmnussion  and  proposal  for  a' Council  resolution  on 
satellite personal communications', COM(93) 171,  27  April 
-1993.  . 
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BOD  and  for.  informing  them  of  progress  m  the 
company's  development  and  business. 
Decisions  by  .the  BOD  will  be  adop.ted  by  simple 
majority, although some important matters will  require a 
two-thirds  majority (i.e.  nomination  and dismissal  of the 
chairman of the BOD and of the CEO). In view of the 
above, and given that the powers of the general assembly 
do  not seem  to be  very  substaittial,  it would . seem  that 
the  company will  be  controlled by the  BOD. 
III.  TilE INMARSAT-P  SYSTEM 
1.  The network 
The  system  will  consist  of the  following  elements:  the 
space  segment,  including  .  satellites  and  tracking, 
telemetry  and  control  stations  (IT  & C)(');  several 
network control stations (NCS) (
1
)  directed by a network 
control  centre  (NCC); the  user  handheld  terminals;  the 
P-net  of  interconnected  satellite  access  nodes  (SAN); 
and  the  gateways  connected to the  P-net. 
A  majour  feature  of  the  system  is  its  integration  of 
mobile  satellite  communications  capability  with  public 
land  mobile  networks  and  public  switched.  telephone 
networks.  So,  the  system  will  route  calls  from  land 
networks  through  ·sANs  which  will  select  a  satellite 
through which  the  call will  be  connected  to a  handheld 
terminal  (and vice  versa). 
The  space  segment  will  consist  of a  constellation  of 10 
satellites  to  be  deployed  in  intermedi.ate  circular; orbit 
(10 335 km  above  the Eanh's surface). The satellites will 
be  arranged  in  two  planes  of five  satellites  each.  The 
system  wiU  also  include  two spare  satellites  in  the  same 
orbit,  bringing  the  total number of satellites  to 12.  This 
configuration  has  been  designed  to ·provide  optimal 
coverage of the entire  surface  of the Earth  at all  times, 
so  ~t more  than  one  satellite  will  neacly .  always  be 
avatl~ble  . .at  the  same  ~e  to any  user,  which  increases 
the  likelihood  of succesSful  and  uninterrupted  calls. 
('). Tr  & C .  stations  will  uack the ·movements  of ~e  ·satelliteS 
and  adjust  .their  orbits  to  maintain  the  constellation.  In 
addition  they  will  monitor  the  general  conditions  of  the 
satelliteS. There would be fiv.e Tf  &: Cs. 
(') The NCSs, acting .through 'IT.&  Cs  and SANs, will CC:,nuol 
the  ~der  linkages  between  the  feeder  and  service 
antennas on  che satellites.  . 
The system  will·use  a frequency  in  the  range of-1,9/2,2 
GHz (') for user ·links (that is  links between  the  s~tellites 
and  the  user  terminals).  · 
The  satellites  will  be  linked  to  a  ground  backbone 
network  (the  P-net)  consisting  of  12  -interconnected 
SANs located throughout the world. SANs will  comprise 
eanh stations with  multiple  antennas  for  communicating 
with  satellites  and  associated  switching  equipment  and 
databases.  They will  be  the  primary  interface  with  the 
satellites  for  coordinating  and  routing  traffic  and  main-
taining  certain  subscriber  data.  SANs  will  be  owned  by 
ICO  but  installed  , and  ·.operated  . by  'qualified 
operators' (1°).  The P-net will  be  managed  by  the  NCC. 
In  order  to  provide  global  roaming,  the  P-net  will 
include a system for management of user mobility which 
will be based upon existing digital caftular standards such 
as  GSM. 
Ga.teways  are  switches  which  will  serve  as  the  link 
between  the  SANs  and  the  public  terrestrial  networks. 
The  most  likely  gateway  implementation  is  an·  incre-
mental  hardware  and- software  modification  to  existing 
switches.  They will  be  owned  by  third  party  operators 
which  will  be  responsible  for  the  implementation  and 
maintenance  of these  facilities  in  conformity  with  ICO's 
technical  and  operational  requirements.  It  is  expected 
that, in reality, most gateway owners will  be wholesalers, 
retailers  and/or  signatori~  of  Inmarsat  and/or  ICO 
shareholders. In this  respect,  the panies have  stated that 
the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  wholesaler  and/  or 
retailer  au~orizations· will  not  include  any  form  of 
provision binding them  not to compete with  competitors 
of  ICO  or  giving  it  preferred  market  access. 
F~ermore, existing  or plan·ned  EC  regulation  will  be 
applicable .  to the  operation of gateways,  in  particular  as 
regards  access.  ·  -
The total system's  implementation  costs  are  estimated  at 
nearly  US $ 3 billion. 
Finally,  hand  se~ will  be  produced  by  major  manu-
facwrers  of  equipment,  benefitting  fro.m  terrestrial 
r>  This  frequency  is  different.  from  those  reserved  by  the 
W  ARC-92  conf~nce for . user  links  in  S-PCS  systems 
{1 61o-t 626,5/2 483,5-2 500 MHz)  and  allocated  an  . the 
United  States by the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
·  (FCq of the US to five U5-based 5-PCS systems, including 
Iridium, Globalstar and Odyssey, on 31 january 1995. 
·  ( 10)  ICO  will ·  select  sAN. operators  on  commercial  grounds. 
However,  it  will . give  consider:iuon  to  favouring  ~~rect 
· U,vestors in ICO with preferenti~ rights to operate SANs. 
II  A/ 
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cellular  technologies·.  Most  hand  sets  will  be capable of 
dual-mode  operation  with  both  satemte  and  terrestrial 
cellular  (including  GSM  systems),  so  that  they  will  be 
able  to select, either automatically or under user control, 
satellite  or terrestrial  modes  of operation. 
2.  Distribution of the services 
The  available  information  concerning  the  future 
distribution  of the  ICO services  is  limited  to  the  broad 
principles  contained  mainly  in  the  information 
memorandum  included  in  the  notification  and  detailed 
below.  This  is  not supported  by the relevant agreements 
that, according to the parties,  hav~ not· been drafted yet. 
Although  nothing  prevents  ICO from  supplying  services, 
it  is  essentially to be considered as  a network provider. It 
will,  nevertheless,  prescribe  a  minimum  set  of  services 
and/  or features  to be  offered in  all  territories in  order to 
ensure  global  interconnectivity.  In  addition,  ICO  could 
adopt  guidelines  for  retailers.  According  to  the  parties, 
such  guidelines,  if  adopted,  will  not  cover  pricing  or 
other  competitive  conditions. 
The  actual  telecommunication  services  will  be  provided 
to  end-users  through  a  network  of  wholesalers  and 
retailers,  responsible  over one or _ptore  national markets, 
which  will  provide  the  services  at  their  own  risk  and 
according  to  terms  agreed  independently  between  them. 
Such  retail  agreements  do not exist  yet. 
A.  Wholesalers 
Any  investor  which  has  invested  at least $ 20  million  in 
ICO has  an option to become a  service wholesaler in its 
nation.  In  case  that  it  accepts  to become wholesaler,  it 
shall  agree to meet specific performance requirements to 
be  defined  by  ICO. 
Appointment  of  wholesalers  for  territories  where  no 
investor  has  exercised  its  option  or where  there  is  no : 
investor  will  be  awarded  the  biggest  bid  in  an  auction. 
Each  investor  will  receive  a  voucher  for  every  s·t  of 
investment.  Vouchers  are  the  currenc;y  used  in  the 
auction  to  obtain  wholesaler  rights  over different  terri-
tories.  At the discretion of ICO's board, these territories 
can  be  awarded on  ~ national  o~ regional basis. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  board  is  entitled  to  nominate 
more than one wholesaler in one territory if necessary to 
·meet  strategic  requirements,  if the  .original  wholesaler 
fails  to  achieve  its  performance  requirements  or  if 
required  by  applicable  .qational  laws  or  regulatory 
authority. 
-
In  many  cases,  .  wholesalers  will  own  and  operate 
gateways  and  possibly  they  will  also  be  the  SAN 
operators. 
As  indicated  abo~e, where  no  wholesaler  is  authorized, 
Inmarsat  itself  will  be entitled  to act as  a  non-exclusive 
wholesaler. 
The  terms  and  conditions  of  d»:- wholesalers  auth-
orizations  are  to be  developed  by  the  management  and 
Board of reo. 
The  number  of  wholesalers  and  their  respective  terri-
tories  are not known yet. 
Wholesalers  will  arrange for  all  aspects ·of the  provision 
of  the  services  within  their  territor(y)(ies).  They  will 
purchase  'Inmarsat-P  services  from  reo  (basically  air 
time)  and  resell  it  to  retailers.  They will  be  responsible 
for arranging installation and operation of gateways, for 
links  between the P-net and the gateways,  for  intercon-
neCtion  to  the  public  networks  and  for  establishing 
$atellite-cellular  integration  within  their  countries.  In 
addition, they, together with retailers, will  be  responsible 
for  the  provision  of  value  added  and  supplementary 
services  (voice  messaging,  call  waiting  and  forwarding 
and  so  on)  on  top  of  the  mobile  voice  service  the 
Inmarsat-P system is ·designed for.  In summary, they will 
perform within their territories a role similar to that of a 
cellular  network operator. 
B.  Retailers 
Retailers will be responsible for marketing and retail sale 
of  the  services  and  terminals  and  will  have  primary 
contact .with. end-risers  within  one  country.  They  will 
also  be  responsible  for  all  aspects  of  accQunt 
management  and  customer  care  including  customer 
credit,  billing,  accounting and  related  administration. 
Retailers will be appointed by wholesalers consistent with 
guidelines- provided by ICO. They will  purchase services 
only from  authorized wholesalers. 
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All  Inmarsat  signatories  have  the · right  to  become 
non-exclusive  retailers. Apan from  that, the nomination 
of retailers will  be  at the discretion of wholesalers.  · 
It is  envisaged that retailers will  be  free  to sub-contract 
some or all  of their services to resellers, distributors and 
dealers. 
Retailers will perform a role similar to that of an air-time 
reseller in  cellular terrestrial mobile  services. 
C.  Tariff structure 
ICO will  set the structure and level  of prices for services 
provided to the national services wholesalers. The latter, 
in  turn, are  expe~ted to have  discretion in  the level and 
structure of prices charged to retailers. Retailers for their 
part  will  also  have  price  discretion  in  chargil;lg 
end-customers. In respect of any customer, ICO (
11
)  will 
bill  wholesalers,  which  then  will  bill  retailers,  which  in 
their  turn  would  finally  bill  resellers  or end-customers. 
End-customers  will  have  to  pay  a  connection  fee,  a 
monthly  fee  and  a tariff per voice  minute traffic. 
It is  expected  that end-customers will,  in principle,  be 
registered  in  one  out  of  two  categories:  global 
customers,  usually  highly  mobile  international  business 
travellers,  will  be  charged  higher tariffs,  as  their use of 
the  system  is  likely  to entail  more  extensive  use  of the 
system's  elements.  National  customers  will  be  charged 
lower tariffs,. but ~hey will only have access to the SANs 
covering  their  home  country.  Customers  will  have  the 
option of changing  from  one category·  to the  other as 
desired  and subject to commercial considerations. 
3.  Relationships  between  lnmarsat  and  ICO  will  be 
governed  by  a  services  conuact  and  the  subscription 
agreement entered into by the two parties. Pur5uant to 
the  services  contract  Inmarsat  will  provide  ~CO· the 
services that the latter needs to put in place and operate 
the  Inmarsat-P syswtem.  The services  Contract will  last 
until  30  April  t 998,  although  it can be  renewed  for a · 
funher three year period. Pursuant to ~at  agreement, all 
contracts  relating  to  equipment,  facilities,  services  and 
other common activities  provided  by  Inmarsat to  ICO 
will  be  negotiated  at- arm's  length  and paid  on a  fully 
allocated  costs  basis  plus  a  reasonable  fee  of  6,5 Ofo 
(") SAN  o~rators will  bill  ICO for their activity on the basis 
agreed m their operating contractS. · 
of the actual total costs  in~rre4 by lnmarsat in fulfilling 
the specific task (Articles  1.17 and 4.l respectively). 
Also  as  pan of the  services  contract both  panies  have 
agreed that ICO will  buy a  minimum  level  of services 
from  Inmarsat  during  the  operational  life  of  the 
agreement (Articles 4.3  and 4.4). 
In addition to its  involvement with  ICO, Inmarsat will 
continue  to  provide  its  existing  geostationary  orbit · 
(GEO)  satellite-based  mobile  satellite  communications 
and  allied  services,  although  it  has  agreed,  subject  to 
cenain  conditions,  not  to  procure  a  separate  space 
segment  designated  for  the  purpose  of  providing 
handheld  services  other  than  through.  reo  (point  2, 
schedule  2  of  the  Inmarsat  slfare  subscription. 
agreement). 
In exchange for lnmarsat's ownership of a 10,7 Ofo  of the 
ordinary shares of ICO, Inmarsat will  have  the right to 
appoint two  members  of the  ICO's board  of directors. 
These directors  are  required to act in  the 'best interest' 
of [ICO]. 
Also,  as  pan of its  investor benefits,  lnmarsat will  have 
the  right to act globally as  an  exclusive  wholesaler for 
maritime  and  aeronautical  services  provided  to 
non-hand-held  term~nals so  long  as  Inmarsat maintains 
15 °/o  of the  voting  rights  in  ICP  and,  in  addition, 
Inmarsat  shall  have  the  right  to  be  appointed 
non-exclusive wholesaler in any country or region where 
no investor is _interest  in  becoming wholesaler. 
Finally,  a  consultation  mechanism  will  be  established  • 
between Inmarsat and  ICO in  respect of the  ham)on-
ization  and  evolutiol)  of  their  respective  range  of 
services,  and  in  respect of the  use  or sharing  of each 
other seivices or facilities (point 4, schedule 2, Inmarsat's 
share subscription agreement). According to the panies, 
it aims at reinfo~:cing the cenaintythat Inmarsat's public 
service duties will not be jeopardized by the launching of 
Inmarsat-P. The precise form of this mechanism has not 
been formulated yet. 
IV.  RELEVANT MARKET 
1.  Product market 
The term 5-PCS  is  used  to denote a  network used  to 
provide  satellite  personal  communications  services, 
_usually  on  a  worldwide  basis.  At  least  some  of  the 
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relevant  technologies  were  developed  in  the framework 
of R & D  military  programs  in  the US. AS-PCS system 
encompasses  a  constellation  of  LEO  (low  eanh -orbit), 
MEO (medium earth orbit) or GEO (geostationary earth 
orbit)  satellites C
2
),  their  control  earth  stations  and  a 
number of gateway  earth  stations  through  which  access 
will  be  provided  to  terrestrial fixed  or mobile  networks. 
Such  a  configuration  will  support full  user mobility and 
identification by a single  number anywhere in the world, 
t  using · 'intelligent'  features,  similar  to  those  of  digital 
terrestrial  cellular  systems  (such  as  GSM),  that  will  be 
located  either in  earth stations  or in  the satellites  them-
selves.  Substantial  effortS  are  being  devoted  by 
equipment  manufacturers  to  develop  light  hand-held 
portable  terminals  capable  of either  satellite-only  or of 
dual  coverage  (terrestrial  when  within  cellular terrestrial 
coverage,  and  satellite  when  outside  it).  It  is  expected 
that  voice  service  will  be  the  primary  application  for 
these  networks,  but  other  significant  segments  will 
involve  low  rate  data  transmission,  positioning,  tracking 
and  paging. 
S-PCS  reprc~cm  the  ability  to  maximize  mobility  of 
users,  by  providing  global  seamless  coverage,  in 
particular  in  remote  areas  where  terrestrial  services  may 
be  uneconomic.  'Global  seamless  coverage'  means  not 
only that the  user can  move  anywhere, but also  that the 
communications svstem  can 'move' to serve new fixed  or 
'stationary'  users;  the  system  is  never  out  of  range. · 
S-PCS  is  expected  to  act  as  complement  and/  or 
substitute  for  wireless  terrestrial  mobile  technologies 
(including GSM ('})  and digital  cordl_ess  telephony within 
a fixed  radius  - DECT).  In  this  r¢spect,  it  will  be 
offered  by  terrestrial  cellular  mobile  network  operators 
(such  as  GSM  in  the  European Union) 3$  an additional 
feature  priced  at  a  premium  rate.  In  addition,  it  is 
expected  to  act  as  a  complement  and  even  a  substitute 
for  the  public  switched  fixed  telephone  network, 
enhancing service coverage in  remote ar<:as  of low popu-
lation  density  and/or where the  terrestrial  infrastructure 
is  very poor. Another important use of S-PCS will be as 
a  substitute  for cellular  mobile  telephony in areas where 
the  cellular  network  has  failed  to  penetrate  (i.e.  rural 
('z)  LEO  salellites  are  located  ar~\lnd 900 km  over  the  Eanh. 
Full  coverage  of  lhe  Earth's  suda~e  would  require  a 
minimum  of 48  LEO satellites. 
MEO  satellites  are  located  around  10 000  km  over  the 
Earth.  Full'  coverage of the  E~nh's $Ud~ce would reguire a 
minimum  of  I  0  MEO  satelli~. The Intermediate  C1rcular 
Orbil (ICO) lobe used  by •co belongs to this category. 
GEO salellites are located at 36 000 k.m  over the Eanh. Full 
coverage  of  the  Earth's  ~l\rfacc  vould  require  only  three 
GEO salelliles.  · 
('') It  is  expected  that  the  p(icc  differential  for  dual-mode 
(satellite  and  GSM). versus, ~!ngl~.,.mode (GSM only) will  be 
as  low  as  10 %.  ' 
parts of the developed world and both urban  and  rural 
·parts of lower income  countries). 
In  this  respect,  Commission  studies (
14
)  predict  that  the 
greatest potential by far in  the S-PCS market in terms of 
numbers  of subscribers  will  be  for  communities  in  less 
developed  regions of the world as a  substitute for 'fixed 
service'  where· fixed  networks· have  yet to be  rolled  out 
or are very poor. Central and Eastern Europe represent 
an important customer base  in  this  context, which  could 
.be  accessed  from  gateways within the EU. 
In  any event,  major  users  of S-PCS in  the  EU  will  be 
international business  travellers  using their dual terminals 
in the terrestrial mode where within a given network and 
switching to  satelli~e in  ar~as outside terrestriar coverage 
or with  incompatible  networks.  :;:;· 
A  feature  of  these  S-PCS  systems  is  that  they  pose  .1 
number of unresolved  regulatory  issues  in  particular  for 
the  EU: 
contrary to what the situation is  in  the us, where the 
Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC) granted 
frequencies  to  five  S-PCS  in  January  1995,  the  EC 
has  not  yet  adopted  a  coordinated  approach  to  the 
licensing of these systems C
5
). 
S-PCS  regulation  requires  solving  a  number  of 
additional  questions;  first,  the  criteria  (technical  and 
above  all  financial)  to  select  S-PCS  providers,  and 
second, the.licensing (on a  national or supra-national 
basis) of gateway operators. 
2.  Geographical market 
As  to  the  geographic  market,  notwithstanding  the 
particular  CQmmercial  arrangements  that.  could  be 
offered  in  the  future  to  precise  categories  of potential 
customers, the Iqmarsat-P system to be managed by ICO 
is  aiming  at  a  global  coverage,  and  so  the  relevant 
C
4
)  See  'Satellite  Personal  Commun_ications  and  their  conse-
quences  for  ~uropean  Telecommunications,  Trade  and 
Industry'.  ~P9¥l ~o the  European  Commission  (DG  XIII) 
by KPM.G Pc;at M.;a.rwick,  March 1994. 
(
11
)  In  addii.Jon,  the  lptcmational  Telecommunications  Union's 
. (ITIJ)  1995.  W~rld  Radiocommunication  Conference 
(WRC.,-95)  h~ld  il) ·October  1995  focussed  on  frequency 
issues  relating to  s~~llite communications. 
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geographical  market  to  be  considered  is  worldwide  in 
scope. 
3.  Competition in the future worldwide S-PCS market 
A number of alternative projects are known to be trying 
to  o~fer  hand-held  telecommunication  services  through 
satelhte,  s_o~e of them  (the  so-called  'little  LEOs'} have 
a  more  hmtted  product  (usually  they  will  not  provide 
voice services) and/or geographical coverage, others (the 
so-called  'big  LEOs')  are  aiming  at  the  same  relevant 
market as  ICO. Generally speaking, with the only major 
exception of ICO itself,  most planned S-PCS systems are 
US-led  initiatives.  As  of now,  there  is  no prospect of a 
European-led  world-wide  S-PCS  syStem.  However, 
many  European  companies  are  substantially  involved  in 
several  of the  announced  S-PCSs.  The  most  important 
competitors  of  IC_O ('  .. ) will  be: 
- Iridium 
Motorola,  a  major  US  telecommunications  .equip-
ment  manufacturer,  plays  the  leading  role  in  the 
Iridium  consortium  for  a  LEO  S-PCS  system.  A 
number  of  European  companies  are  participating  by 
way  of  partnership  agreements  and/or  investment. 
These  include  STET  (the  Italian  state  holding 
company,  majority  owner  of  Telecom  Italia)  and 
Vebacom  (subsidiary  of  the  major  German 
conglomerate VEBA  AG). 
Motoro'a  Satellite  Communications  is  in  charge  of 
spacecraft construction but Iridium itelf will  own and 
operate  the  system  once  in  place.  Lockl!ee.d  Corp. 
(USA)  is  contracted  to  build  125  LEO satellites  for 
Iridium  by  the  year  2003.  Other  panners/inveStors 
include  Krunichev  Enterprise  (Russia)  which  will 
launch  the  satellites  with  Proton  rockeu,  Scientific 
Atlanta  Inc  (USA)  which  will  develop  and  manu-
facture  the  hand-held  units  as  well  as  the  satellite 
earth  terminals,  and  S.,-rint,  the  third  United  States 
long-distance  telecommunication  carrier.  The  total 
cost of the system is  estimated at US$ 3.8  billion. 
Iridium plans to be operational with a limited number 
of satellites by 1997  to 1998,  and expects  1,5  million 
subscribers  by  the  year  2000.  It  will  offer  voice, 
paging and data services. 
e·>  The_· Commission  has  commenced  investigations  at itS  own 
initiative  on  Iridium  and  Globalstar  (see  lP/95/549  of 7 
June  1995). 
Globalstar 
Globalstar  intends  to  put  in  place  a  S-PCS  system 
using 48  LEO satellites. The Globalstar consortium is· 
led  and  sponsored  by  the  Loral  Corporation,  a 
leading  United  States  defence  eleetronics  and  space 
company.  Partners/  contractors  include  the  European 
aerospace  companies  Alcatel  (France),  Aeorospatiale 
(F),  Alenia  (1),  Deutsehe Aerospace  (D) and Tesam, 
a  joint  venture  created  by  Alcatel  and  France 
T~l~com. The total cost of the syStem  is  estimated  at 
US $ 2  billion. 
Globalstar  expects  to  be  operational  in  the  US 
around 1999  to 2000  and globally,  around  five  years 
later. Globalstar will_ also be  offeri!B voice  and data. 
as  well as  tracking services. 
-Odyssey 
The Odyssey  S-PCS  system  is  supported  by  the  US 
aerospace company TRW and the Canadian telecom-
munications  operator  T eleglobe  Inc.  Odyssey  will 
consist  of 12  MEO satellites  and  will  be  operational 
by 1999. 
S-PCS  systems  offering  global  mobile  communications 
using  hand-held  terminals  represent  a  market  which ·is 
expected  to result  in  revenues  of ECU  10  to  20  billion 
during  the  next  decade.  Due  to  the  scarcity  of 
frequencies,  the  very  heavy  financial  , implications 
involved in  launching and operating the large  number of 
satellites  needed  for  such  systems,  and  the  high  level  of 
market  uncertainty,  however,  it  appears  to  be  unlikely 
that there will be more· than a few  major players, at least  • 
at the world-wide. level.  · 
V. 1HE NOTIFIED  AGREEMENTS 
At the  time  of the  notification,  only  the  memorandum · 
and  article~  of  association  of ICO  had  been. drafted. 
They were included in  the notification together with the 
information  memorandum  that  was  made  available  -to 
potential investors in ICO. Later orr,  as  part of the reply 
to a formal request for information, the parties submitted 
on .6  March  1995  copies  of  (i)  the  standard  share 
subscription  agreement  signed  by  all  investors;  (ii)  the 
(non-exclusive,  irrevocable,  non-r,ransferable,  wo.rldwide) 
intellectual property  righ~ licence  between  Inmarsat ;lnd 
ICO  and  (iii)  the  (non-exclusive)  servia  mark  licence 
be~ecn Imnarsat and ICO; together with  an addendum 
to. the  information  memorandum. ·Finally,  on  26  April 
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1995, the parties submitted the services  contract between 
lnmarsat  and  ICO.  With  these  agreements, ·information 
regarding  the  implementation  and  operation  of ICO  is 
now  complete. 
However, a number of agreements and relevant pieces· of 
information  are  still  missing  concerning  the  distribution 
of  IC<?'s  services  once  the  system  is  operational. ·These 
at least  include  the  nomination of wholesalers  and terri-
tories  granted  to them,  the  terms  and conditions  of the 
wholesaler  authorizations,  the  guidelines  to · be  adopted 
by ICO for  the appointment of retailers, the terms of the 
retailer  authorizations  as  agreed  with  wholesalers  and 
the  agreements  to  be  signed  with  cellular  terrestrial 
operators  for  the  joint  offering  of  terrestrial/satellite 
services  (and  terminals) to customers.  In their absence,  it 
is· not yet possible  to take  a  final  position  in  respect of 
the  aspects  of ICO affected  by  the  missing  information. 
The  Commission  intends  to  take  a  favourable  view 
pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of 
the  EEA  Agreement  towards  the  creation  of ICO  and 
the  relationship  between  Inmarsat and ICO as  described 
in  the  prese11t  notice.  Before  doing  so,  it  invites 
interested  third  parties  to send  their observations  within 
one  month  of  the  publication  of  this  notice  to  the 
following  address,  quoting  the  reference  'IV  /35.296  -
lnmarsat-P': 
Commission  of the  European  Union, 
Directarate-~eneral for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate  C, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/Wetstraat 200, 
B-1 049  Brussels. 
Recapitulation  of current tenders, published in the  Supplement  to  the  Offidal journal of the 
European  Communities,  fmaoced  by  the  European  Community  under  the  European  Devel-
. opment  Fund  (EDF)  or the  European  Communities  budget 
(week:  7  to  1-1  November _1995) 
(95/C  304/07) 
Invitation  to  Number and date  Final  date 
tender  No  of 'S' journal  Country  Subject  for  submission 
l,f  bids 
-' 
4079  s 212,  7.  11.  199~  Niger  NE-Niamey:  vehicles,  motorcycles  6.  2.  1996 
4066  s 214,  9.  11., 199!i  Zimbabwe  ZW  -Harare: vehicles  and  tractors  2.  1.  1996 
4079  S 214,  9.  11.  199S  Niger  NE-Niamey:  vehicles,  motorcycles  6.  2.  1996 
(additional  in/orm4tion) 
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Notice pu'rsuant to.,Article  19  (3) of Council Regul:uion No 17 (')and Article 3 of flrotocol  21 
"f the European Economic Area Agreement concerning a  request  for. negative clearance  o~ an 
exemption  pursuant  to  Article  85  (J)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and  Artacle  S3  (3)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement 
Ca\r No  IV/J5.JJ7 - Atlas 
('J5/C  337/02) 
(Ttxl with  EF.A  rdevance, 
INTRODUCTION 
I.  Atlas  was  notified  to  tht·  Commi~tc;iun  on  16 
Dcrc:mbc.-r  I  994.  This  transaction  bring~  about  a  joint 
\'rntun· ownl.'d  SO % by  France.- Tclec:om  ( FT)  and  50 % 
by  Deutsche Tdekom (D"I).  Atla~ is  also  the  instrumea\.t 
of  DT and  PT\ participation  in  a  st·l·ond  transanion, 
named  f>hoc·nix,  with  Sprint  Corporation(').  In  tbt• 
course of the pr(redure before the Commission, IT ar.d 
DT agreed  ·.o  modify  buth  tht·  Atlas  and  the  Phoenix 
agreements.  The  latter,  notific.·c.l  on  29  June  1995,  are 
described  in  a separate:  notin· pursuant to Artide  19  (3) 
of  Rc.-gubtiun  No  17,  published  in  thi~  edition  of  the 
0/ficic~/ joumal of  the  Europe.'""  Cotmmmities. 
2.  The Atlas venture will  be structured :u two levels. A 
holding  company  established  in  Brussels,  Atlas  SA,  will 
be.- incorporated  as  a  societe  auonyme  unc.fer  the  laws  of 
Belgium.  Atlas  SA  will  have  three operating subsidiaries. 
namely  one in  France  (Atlas  franct').  one  in  Germ3ny 
(Atlas  Germ:\ny),  and  one for  the  rest  of Europe.  Atl3s 
France and Ada.\ Germany' will  initially prO\·idc.- technical 
and  sales  support  to  r:-r  and  DT.  i.e.  th(•  frc.·nrh  and 
German  da~tributors  of  Atlas  and  Phoenix  products. 
After  full  liberJ:ization of the.·  tdecommunit·ations infra-
!ltructure  anll  services  markets  in  France  ami  Germanv, 
scheduled  to  occur by  I J:lnuary  199N,  DT's subsidiary 
for  the  prcvisil'-n  of  standardized  low-le\'el  packet-
switched  X.!S  data  communications,  Datex-P,  will  be 
merged with :\;tl:u Germany whilt>  ~:·r·s subsidiary for the 
provision  oi 
1 standardiud  low-lt•vel  packet-switcht'd 
X .2S  data  c-ommunicatiom,  Transpac  France,  will  be 
IYlf'r~cd  with  Atlas  hann·. 
A.  THE I,AitTIES 
3.  Deut\chr Tdtknm AG  (DT)  and) ham·t· Tde<.'Clm 
(J='r)  arc.- the  puhlic  TO in  Germany  ami  Francr.  Both 
'tupply  tdephonc  exchange  lint's  tu  luHtH'\  ami  hu~i­
n«'\~e~; local. trunk and international ronununiraliom to 
anc.f  from  thrir  rr~pet·tive  homr  roumry.  Wnrld-
t'l  OJ Nn 1.\, 21  ~.  1%2, p.  204111.! 
1'1  Nutifi<·:uwn annnuru:t'd in OJ No C  1114,  Ill. 7.  l'Jtl;, p.  II 
witll'  turnnn·r  in  IIJ94  w:l\  ECU  .\ 1,1'  hillitm,  a  4,.\% 
innt·a~t·  (l\'l.'r  I  'J'JJ,  fnr  I>T  aut!  FCl J  11,7  hilliuu,  a 
I ,K  %  innt':Ht' m'l'r  I 'J'J.\.  for  thl·  FT  •:roup. 
8.  TilE RELEVANT MARKET 
1.  Product markets 
4.  Atlas  wiil  adtlrc·,c;  thl·  markl't\ for  the.- pw"i'i'"' of 
\'alue-added  tderommunic.-:uions  n•r\'in·s  to  rorrur:ut· 
cc;ers  hoth  Europe-witle and  nationally.  Atl:u  will  tar~et 
two  sc.·paratc:  produt·t  markeu for  \'aluc.·-addec.f  \t'r\'ice~. 
namely: 
5.  71Je  market for advancrcltrltcommmricdtimu stroictl  to 
corporate lllt"rs 
This  market  c:omprisc.-s  moc;tly  t'U\tomii't'd  c.-omhin:uionc; 
of  a  range  of  existing  telecommunil'ations  St'l"\'iC:f'S, 
mainlv  data  communications  and  lihcrali:r.rd  ,.c.,il"C' 
sel"\.;  ··s  indudino  \'Oice  c:ommunic::uion  bC"twc.·en 
nu·moers  of  a  cl~sc.·d  gro.ap  of  users  (\·inual  pri\'ate 
network  (VPN)  sel"\·ices),  high-,peed  data  sel"\·ict's  and 
outsourced  telecommunic::nions  solutions  spt•c.·iall~· 
designed  for  individual  customt•r  rc.·quirement'i.  The:' 
market  for  ad.,.anced  telecomrnunicationc;  ~c:n·irr~  w 
corporaH·  ust•rs,  t•nhanrrtl  hr  ft·.uun•\  \U\'h  :\\  t.lil,,rt'd 
op:lcity  :llloc:ation,  hill in~~.  Hh/  Nh  tt•t·hnic\l  \t'r"i~·c.·, 
t'h.:.,  is  t.:urrc.·ntly  rhan~ing and  t'\'OI\'in~ rapidly.  \'(IJwthrr 
t.•adt  uf  thrst•  '''1"\'it·t•s  \'Omtitutl''  a  ''"rar:ttt•  prutfur1 
market  t·an  he.·  left  open  for  the.·  purpoc;t•  of  thi~ l'a\t',  a~ 
Atlas  anc.l  its  t.·ompt•tiwr-.  usuall~·  tlfft•r  nastnmizt•d 
p:u:kages of such  sel"\·ires  in  rombinati,m with  individual 
enh:lnrec.l  fe:lturc.·s. 
Thl'Sl'  sc.•r\'il't'\  an·  pnl\'idc.·d  m·c.·r  hi~h-spt·c.·c.l  largt'· 
rap:u:it}'  lt·:m·d  lint'\  linkin~ \Uphi,tic.::ut•d  rctuipnwnt  nn 
ru\tumt·r  J'rt•mi\t'~ w  the.·  'it·rvin.·  provitlt·r\  node.·~. :\ltt'r-
n:Hi\'rl\',  othc:'r  means  of  transmis~inn,  e.g.  'i:\tellitt'  l>r 
mnhilc.-.  radio  rapacity,  ran  he.- uo;c.•c.l  to  t•nsun·  tlw 
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geographic.:  t:uveragc  dt•rn:mde<l  from  time.·  to  time.·.  Sud1. 
scrvires employ  advanc:c.·J  'itatc-uf-thc.··.:lrt  \t.uHI.mh,  data 
comprcs\ion  tcchniquc.·s,  c.·quipment  Jnd  ~oftw,\rt:.  In  thi~ 
market,  Atla~ is  cxpertcd  to  ufft·r  a  portfolio  of  ~c.·rvin·~ 
induding  the  following: 
data  services:  high  speed  pad.ct-~witdwd Jnd  Frame 
Relay  services;  prc.·-pnwisioucJ,  nunaged  ami  l·ircuit-
switc.·hcci  bandwidth, 
value-added  application  sc.·rvin·~:  valu<·-addc.·d 
messaging  and  vidcu-cnnfcn·m:ing  \crvtc.'t.''• 
voice  VPN ;;crvices, 
intelligent  network  services, 
integrated  .  very  small  apcnurc  satclliu~  (VSAT) 
network services,  and 
outsQurcing:  customer!;  art.•  offt.·rcd  to  tr;msfcr 
responsibility  and  ownership  of  tlu·ir  network~  to 
Atlas.  In  this  connection,  Atl~~ may  intt•gr.lte  into  iu 
own  offerings  third-party  prw,J~t;ts alrc:;uly  owned  by 
customers  who  wish  to ·keep  such  offering),  as  the 
case  may  be. 
6.  Due  to  the  high  cost  of building  a:td  upc.·rating  the 
networks  needed  to provide  advanced  rorporatt.·  services, 
such  services can  be  commercially viable  only  if  provided 
to  large  businesses  and  other  l~rge  telc.·communicati, 
users  who  ger.c:rate  contintJcd  high  traffit:  volumc.~s C). 
Customers  for  advancc.·d  services  target<:d  hy  Atlas  arc 
multinational  corporations,  cx~endcd  c.·•m·rpri\l·~.  and 
ot ... er  intensive  users  of tclef:ommunications  and  notably 
the  largest  :among  these  cuupmers.  Many  of  these 
potential  CU!>'.Otners  h~vt:  huge  tclcc.·ommunit.·ation  need• 
and  have  often  acquired  ~xpl.'nise  in  man;tging  own 
internal  networks; they  are  om  likely  to  ~witch to service 
providers  such  as  Atlas  unless  doing  this  proves  to  be 
cost-effective.  Finally,  given  their  knowledge.·  of  the 
market these customers arc  in  a position  w  request  offers 
from  different  competitOfS. 
7.  1h~ market  /or- fl(mdllrdilt•d  ,'ow-lt'Vt'l  p,,fkL"I-switd!r,/ 
data  comm11nic~tiam «<•rvices 
Atl;~ will  al~o be:  0\C,:{ivt:  on  ;a  J.c•pnratt·  m;ukc:t  for  p;u:k(.·t~ 
switched  data  co@m~nic:uion!l 1<iVrvil'e\.  Tlw  ComnliUi(m 
Ctmsiders  data  CQrnplunic;uiortli  !lt.•rvicc~  ;l  di\lilld  WJC: .. 
communications  JnqcJuct  m~rkct,  without  pr~·judire  t~., 
the  existence  of  oarro,...c;r  markca (•).  Onv.  narrowc:r 
C>  Sre  Cornmiuion  de4=isit~n i" C;uc  Nu  IV/H.K!\7  (UT-MCl) 
of  27 July  1'194  (OJ  No I. 223,  27.  H.  I'J'H). 
(•)  Commission'i  Guidc:~ines  un  the  :applir.atinn  uf  EC 
competition  rules  in  tht"  u•lecummunic:attum  ~t·t"tur  l OJ  Nn 
C 233, 6.  9.  1991, p.  2,  p:ar~graph 27). 
market  ,.,  that  for  pat.·ket- and  cirt.·uit-switched 
\crviet·!l (' ).  Packet  !~Witching  is  a  me am  to  improve 
m·twork  capacity  utilization  a'ld  con!li!lt!l  of :r.plitting  data 
~cquenrc~  into  'packets',  feeding  these  and  other 
'packets'  into  the  network  optimizing  utili7.ation  of 
availahlc  capacity,  switl'hing  the  'packet~' to  tht:  dc!lirc.-d 
destination  and  rearranging  the  'parkets'  to  ohtain  the· 
data  se,Juenccs  sent.  The  most  common  !ltandard  u!teJ 
for  the  provi~ion of packet-switched  data  sc.·rvircs  is  the 
'X.25'  ~tamlard. 
Packet-switched  dat:a  communications  ~crvin·s constitute 
a distinct  product m:arket  because  they  are  provided  ovrr 
basic  wrrestrial  network  infrastructure  and  based  on 
more  m\Uure  tt.•chnology.  These  services  arc  rrovided  to 
different  customer  segments  within  the  same  product 
m:l rket,  namely: 
I.  On  the  one  hand,  cu~tomers  who  generate  mostly 
erratic  and  geographically  widesrread  traffic.  These 
features  are due either to the specific  type of use  (e.g. 
h;mks  operating  cash  machines  nationwide,  networks 
of  points-of-sale  in  shops)  or  to  the  si1.e  of  such 
customers,  i.:.  sm:all  and  medium-si1.ed  enterprises 
{SMEs).  Such  services  are  billed  according  to 
published  tariffs  that  are  proponional  to  the ·actual 
time of use  of the network. 
All  incumbent  Member  State  TCs including  DT and 
t-•r  operate  dense  rublic  data  networks  with 
nationwide  cover;tge  providing  racket-switched  data 
communic:ations  services  to  this  customer  segment.  In 
each  Member  ~tate  there  is  only  one  public  data 
network  buil~ by  the  respective  incumbent  TO under 
a  public  service  obligation  before  market  liberal-
ization. 
2.  On  the  other  hand,  larger  corporate  customers  and 
uther  extended  u~ers  generate  more  subuanti:al  and-
regular  traffic.  The rcquiremrnts  of thc.·sc  m~rs justify 
that  either  third-p:any  ~ervic~  providers  or  the 
potential  Cl4~torner  itself  :assume  the  high  cost  of 
qeating  cusuu1)i7.e~ leased  tines  circuits  to  meet  indi-
vidual  service  dcman~..  Packet-switched  dat:l 
communications  s.ervices  to  such  users  arc  billed 
according  to  ncgotia~rd  rat~s that  take  accou~t of the 
individual  demand  features  of a panicular customer. 
(')  As  defined  in  Article  I  (I),  9th  indent  of  Commission 
Directivt  90/388/EEC  of  28  June  1990  on  competition  in 
the  m:arkeu  for  tt"lrcommunic:ations  services  (OJ  No  l  191. 
74.  7.  1990,  p.  10), (the 'Service; Directive•). 
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!C.  Vinually  all  companies  active  in  each  imlivic.lu:tl 
Memht·r  State  of  tht•  European  Union  arc  potential  if 
nut  .ll'lual  <.·ustomcrs  for  national  standardized  low-level 
packet-switched  data  communications  ~erviccs.  The'lc 
\crvin·s  are  also  required  by  SMEs,  albeit  in  smaller 
volumes  and  possibly  less  regularly  than  by  larger  uscn. 
Seldom  will  such  volumes  justify  that  service  providers 
invest  in  leased  lines  with  the  specific  purpme  of 
reaching  the~c  SMEs,  which  arc  therdurc  in  a  wt·ak 
negotiating  position  and  hardly  capable  to  date  of 
switching  from  the  current  proviticr,  typic:ally  the 
in<.umbent  TO, to  a  competitor. 
9.  Standardized  low-level  p:Kket-swiu:hcd  data 
communic:nions  may  al~o  be  offered  as  one  service 
combined  with  advam:cd  corporate  serviet·  oHcrings. 
However,  even  as  pan  of  such  t·ombincd  offerings 
packct-~witchcd  data  communicatiom  sc:rvit·es  .trc 
providc'd  over  standard  terrestrial  infr:mructurc.  At  the 
national  level,  ,·hoicc' from  a  wider  range  of  offerings 
than  merely  standardi1.cd  low-level  packet-switched  data 
communications  services  may  also  be  available  to  larger 
customers  that  are  not  using  the  TO's  public  data 
networks  but  arc  served  over  customiud  leased-line 
circuits.  However,  mmt  existing  customers  for  stand-
ardized  low-level  pa<.·ket-switched  data  t·ommunications 
currently  generate  annu:al  turnovrr  of  far  hdow  ECU 
10 000  each  and  are  not  therefore  potential  users  of 
advanced  corporate  ne~work \Cndces.  Therefore,  packet-
switched  dat:a  communications  offered  by  Atlas 
constitute  :a  product  market  separ:ate  from  the  advanced 
network  services  market  equally  targeted  by  Atlas. 
2.  Geot~traphic  markru 
·nw  markrls  for  aJvancrJ  lelrcommmrications  services  to 
corporalr  usrrs 
10.  Given  that  price  differences  :are  quite  substantial, 
demand  for  these  services  cxius  in  at  le:ast  three  distinct 
geographic  markt!U,  namely  at  a  global,  a  cross-border 
regional  and  a national level.  Atlas  will  provide  advanced 
telec'nmmunic:nions  services  to  corporate  users 
Europe-wide  and  nationally.  Through  Phoenix, 
advann·d  telecommunications  service\  offered  by  Atla.\ 
will  aiso  have  global  'connectivity',  i.e.  the  technical 
opuon  to extend  a given  service  offering  beyond  Europe 
by  linking  a  customer's  premises  worldwide  over  the 
Phoenix  'Global  B:lckbonc  Network'. 
1  I.  Given  the  considerable  costs  involo,ed  advanced 
sc~iccs  arc  today  mainly  demanded  by  large  multi-
nauonal  corporation\,  extended  t·ntcrpri~cs,  as  well  as 
major  national  and  otber intc.•nsive  users  of telecommur•i-
cati~ms. The  rcquin·mcnt'>  of \udr  U\t·r~.  that  cxu·nd  to 
all  prodUCl'>  or  t·nrporate  ~crviccs  provided  by  Atl:a\, 
were  discussed  in  det:ail  in  the  BT-MCI  dc.·cision (•). 
Essentially,  customers  demand  a  customized  package  of 
sophisticatc.·d  telecommunications  and  information 
services  offered  by  one  ~ingle provider.  This  provider  is 
expected  to  take  full  responsibility  for  all  services 
contained  in  the package from  'end to end'. Accordingly, 
DT and  FT intend  to offer such  customers through Atlas 
what  existing  technology  allows  to  offer  from  time  to 
time  within  the  applicable  regul:atnry  framework.  In  this 
regard,  the  panics  have  indicated  -that  Atl:.s  will 
eventually  extend  to international  voice  traffic  an~ other 
basic  services,  regulation  permitting. 
12.  Due  to  the  cost  ~tructure of advanced  corporate 
sc:rvin·s,  notably  the:  rust  of  leasing  the  rc<1uirc:d  infra-
structure,  prices  of  such  services  arc  rd:ated  to 
geographic coverage, as  is  the cost  of additional  features 
(e.g.  one-stop-billing,  .. elp-desk  and  technical  assistance 
:around  the  clock, customized billing). There is  indication 
that  increasing  availability  of  trans-European  networks 
will  ultimately  blur  the  distinction  between  national  and 
cross-border  or  ultimately  Europe-wide  :adv:anced 
corporate  services.  However,  certain  n:uion:al  sophis-
ticated  value-added  services  (e.g.  national  voice  VPN 
services  :as  well  as  data communications serYices based on 
Asynchronous  Tr:ansfer  Mode  (ATM)  or  equivalent 
switching  technology)  currently  3Vailable  from  DT and 
Fr in  Germany and  France respectively  will  not ~  inte-
gr:ated  into  the  Atlas  offerings.  This  circumstance  illus-
trates  that  a  distinction  between  national  and  cross-
border advanced  network  services  remains valid  to date. 
Thr  mark~ts  for  Jlandardiud  low-/n;e/  packtt-switcMd 
data  commmaications  srrvicts 
13.  Price  differences  may  be  less  acute  th:m  for 
advanced  corpor01tc  services.  However, a  nation:al.  cross-
border  regional  and  glob:al  geographic  level  can  be 
distinguished  for  st:andardi1.ed  low-level  p3cket-switched 
data  rommunications  scrvicc.·s.  In  tt·rms  of  tr:lffi<.' 
volume·~, supply  and  dcm:md  of  standardized  low-level 
packet-switched  data communications  service~ an·  mmlly 
national.  for  imtance,  in  Germany  DT•s  existing 
Datex-P  packet-switched  data  t'ommunic:uions  ~ervict·s 
division  hardly  ever  provides  surh  services  across  the 
border  while  1-·rs  German  subsidiary  Info  AG,  in  spite 
of  appenaining  to  l~l  .. s  st·amless  t·ros\-bordcr  Transpac 
(') Srt'  runuwtt 3 ;thuvt. 
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network,  only  provic..lt•\  uJ'rifth of  it\  p:irkc.·t·\witda·d 
data  nunmunic.·atiun~  ~  .. rvic:c.·~  al'ro\\  the.·  honlcr.  Thi' 
aues\mc.·nt  walt  t·onfirrnc:d  hy  interc.·~tt·d  third  putit·\ who 
!luhmih··d  ohu·rvatimn  funhc.·r  to  the  Cornmi,,ion\ 
nntic.·c·  on  riiC'  /ula'  " 1tifiratinn ('). 
14.  At  a  global  and  Eurupc.·-widc  level,  low-lc:vd  datJ 
service~  and  advanced  network  ~crvice!l  may  he.·  panl~· 
converging  to  the  extent  that  large:  c.·u\lomc.·f\  of  tlw 
latter  do  not  rt'CJUirc.·  scp:>ratc  provi,ion  nl  !ttanc..lardizcd 
low-level  packet-switched  data  communicatiom  \crvirc:' 
once such  services  arc avoailable  .as  pan of st·rvin·  romhi-
nations  offered  over  adv:anccd  network~.  Ae<:ordinJ;Iy, 
13rge  Europeoan  tclccommunictations  users  c..lc.·mand 
service!!  with  glohal  'connectivity',  i.e.  that  may  he.· 
extended beyond  Europe if so required.  DT and  VI'  have.· 
moved  to  meet  this  demoand  in  entering  the  Phoc.:nix 
.agreements  with  Sprint.  Along  with  incrt·ascd  availability 
of  advanced  cross-border  network  infr~mrunun·,  thr 
market  is  generally  exrected  to  ovc.·rcnme  di,tinc.·tiom 
along  ntational  borders  in  the  medium  term.  Howt·ver, 
separate  national  geographic  markets  subsi\t  w  daw  for 
stand.udized  low-i~el  packeL-switc.·hcd  d:ua  communi-
cations  services  and  advanced  nl"twork  servin:' 
respectively. 
C.  MARKET SHARES  OF ATLAS 
The  markets  /or  advanced  corporatr  ttltcomm,nicatiQru 
s~roice 
IS.  The parties  ~stimate the  Europe.· an  c.·orroratc.·  tdc.·-
communication!.  services  market\  kxdu'.i\·c.·  of  d.lta 
communico.tions  services)  to  l>c.·  worth  approxirnatrly 
ECU  SOS  million  (I'J93  figure~).  Of  thi\  tnt;ll, 
end-to-r.nd  services  accounted  r  lr  apprnximau·ly  1-:Ct J 
15, I  million,  VPN services  for approximately  ECU  220.6 
million,  VSAT  services  for  approximately  ECU  173,2 
million  and  outsourcing  services  for  approximatdy  ECU 
96,4  million.  According  to the  notification  DT and  I·T\ 
aggregate  market  ~hares (1993  figures)  in  the.·  Europ<.'illl 
llnion  were  25 %  in  the  end-to-end  service.·'  market, 
27%  in  the  VPN  !lcrvices  market  and  2.3%  in  tlw 
outsourcing  servicC"s  market.  Markc.·t  \h:trl's  for  VSAT 
services  are  difficult  to  calculate  givc.·n  th:n  'J'(),  mmtl~· 
use  VSAT terminals e-ither  as  back-up  facilitic~  fnr  nthn 
services  or  to  extend  the  geographic  \Cope.·  of  \l'rvin·' 
despite  terrestrial  infra!ltructure  shortcomings;  hnwt•vcr 
DT  and  fT  t:ikcn  together  operated  I  0 907  VS:\T 
terminals  by  June  1994,  C(Juivalcnt  to  29%  nf  the  Ultal 
installed  base  of  interactive,  data  onc-w:w  or  hu .. inc.·~' 
televi~ion  VSAT  terminals  in  the  Eumpc.an  h·,mornir 
Area. 
(')  Nmific::uiun  nf  a  juint  vc:niUrt'  fCJ\t'  Nu  IV/.\~  ..  l.\i'  -
Ada~) tOj Nn C .177,  31.  12.  1'1'14,  Jl·  ..,, 
:\\  to  differc·nt  \c.·gruc.·nt\  ';,(  till'  atlvann·<l  corpur:nc· 
'c:rvicn  rnarkc.·t  ,11  tilt'  national  lnd,  UT  ;ond  IT\ 
.tggrq.~att·  mJrkc.·t  ,!J.uc·'  in  Fr.wn·  ;and  (,nmany 
rc  .. !\pc.·rtivdy  .uc:  CJ3  =r..  in  the.·  Frenrh  VP:--.:  m.ukc:t  (v. hc.·rc.· 
Iff' h:t'  1111  pn:,c.;nn·)  .l~~aimt  C :,:  in  tlw  Cc·rrn:an  VPN 
m:trk«:t.  and  IJO  ~ in  tlw  hc.·nth  m.trk«:t  for  eml-tch·ntl 
't·rvilt'\  a~~:lill\t  .\5  ';':,  in  thl'  t·ctuiv;tlc.·ni  (;nman  market. 
DT and  FT\  out\ourt:in~  joint  vc::tture,  Eunetrom  BV, 
at·hit·vc.·d  36  ~'  of  total  out,ourring  turnover  gcnc.·ratt·d 
in  hann·  :~nd  2lJ :n  nf  unal  out\ourrin~  rurnovt"r 
gt·m·ratt·d  in  Germany.  A'  for  VSAT  \c.·rvit·c,,  LJT  ha' 
imtallt'~  approxim:udy  25 %  of  all  VSAT  terminal\  in 
Germany;  thi'  Mc.·mhc:r  Statr  a(:t·ount\  for  I K%  of the 
tntal  in,tallc.·d  ha~c.·  of  ~urh terminal'  in  the.·  Eb\. 
'/1x•  mciT~'t'l for stmu/,mliud low·lt"t'C'I  ~~f~'t'I·JUJIId'c.·tl d,u,, 
,·mnmu11iwtimu  St'rt'iu·s 
16.  DT  and  J!l'  c:\tim.ttt·  till'  Europt•an  markc.·t  fnr 
data  c.·ommunicatiom  \t·rvirc!l  to lw  worth  approximately 
ECU  2,M  billion  (1'.1':13  figurc.·'l).  Acrording  to the  notifj. 
cation  DT and  I·T\ aggregate  !lharc'i  ( 1'1'13  figure:\)  of 
this  market  wc.·rc  35 %.  Among  nation:tl  markt't'i,  Atla\ 
will  have  a  panicularl)·  strong  pmitiun  in  i=r;ancc:  and 
Germany.  DT and  FT's  aggregate  market  !.hare:  for  all 
d:ua  communications  services  is  79 %  in  Germanv  and 
77 %  in  France,  of  which  approximatd)·  half  al·~ounl'i 
for  services  provided  h)·  Drs Datcx-P divi\ion  and  Vl .. s 
Transpac  Frant·e  subc.idiary.  both  of  which  remain 
ot:~tside  the  scope  of Atlas  until  the  French  and  German 
telecommunications  infril'itructure  and  scrvict's  markru 
arc  fully  lihc.·rali7.cd  a\  c.chc.·c.lult·c.l  for  I J.lnuary  J<J<JH. 
D.  MAIN  COMPETITORS  01:  ATI.AS 
'/ 1Jt:  m&Zrkrts  lor  ,,,ft.,wu·d  c  orl'"'''tc.·  tt•lt•t """'"""ctlttrm  • 
H'rt•i, c•s 
17.  Sinn·  the.·  C.:nrurni\\ion\  B'J'.~1CI  dc:ri,ion  many 
pla)·c.·r~.  :tcting  .tlonc·  or  jointly  wi1 h  partm·n,  havt" 
entrrt.'c.l  or  an·  tntt·ring  the  m.trkt·i  ft,r  intnn.Hion.ll 
valuc.·-adc.lt•d  \~·rvin·\. Among  the.·  Jntl\t  important ol  thc.•\t' 
playc.·n.  albeit  wuh  di,paratr  ~c.·n.,;r;tphi(  'ropr and  tar~c.·t 
c.·u~tnrner\,  arc·:  AT&T  WorltiP;trtnc.·n,  Conc.·c.·n, 
IRM.Strt.  lntc.·rn.uion:tl  Priv.Hc·  Sau·llitc·  P.trtnt'f\, 
Uni,ourt·c  or  Uniwurld.  Sorm·  of  tlw  ahcwc.·  an·  mc.·rc.· 
prnjc.-rl'i  nf  stratc.·gic.·  allianrcs  lwtwc.·t·n  TO\,  ollwr\  :arc· 
awaiting  rc.·gulatnry  approval.  llowc.•vc•r,  all  of  tlw  .1lu•vc· 
!~hare.·  thr aim  to  pmition  tlw  n·,pc.·l'tiv'·  p.utnc.·f\  in  vic.·w 
nf  the.·  full  lilwr:tli7alion  to  c:omc.·. 
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The  markrt/or stanJarJiuJ lnw-ln'f'l packt:l·switcht•d tl.lla 
communications  services 
18.  The:  markc.·t  for  standardized  low-lc.·vd  pac. kc.·t-
switc:hed  X.l5  Jac:.  l·ornmunic.·aciom.  ~t·rvin·'  fc.·Jturt"'>  J 
substantially  larger  number  of  playcn  than  that  for 
cuswmized  offerings  compri~ing  advann·d  l"orpnrate 
servicc.·s.  Among  the global  piJycn in  thi\  market  arc  the: 
alliances  mentioncc.l  at  paragraph  17  above.·  t·umpeting 
with  prr  ider.;  such.  as  EDS,  FNA,  lnfom·t,  SITA  or 
SWIFT  and  operating  suh~idiaric:~  of  large  · glohal 
companies  such  a~  AT&T  hu·l,  C:ahlc  &  Wirelc.",s 
Businc.·ss  Network\,  DEC's  Easynt·t,  or GElS. 
In  addition, a large  number of smaller piJycrs  Lompc:tc  at 
a cross-border r'!.'gional  or national  lcvc:l  in  •.he  EE.A.  For 
innance,  PT's  indirect  German  subsidiar;  Info  AG,  that 
provides  most  of its  data  comm:.anicat!\)ns  services  within 
Germany,  is  DT's  second-largc.·•t  competitor  in  the 
German  national  market  ft .. :·  standardi1.ed  low-level 
packet-switched  data  communications  services.  None  of 
these  smaller  piJ v,.-::,  can  compare  with  large  alliances  in 
term\  of  rcadt,  access  to  transmission  capacity  and 
financial  backin~;. 
E.  TI-lE TRANSACTION 
19.  The  Atlas  tran·action  notified  to  the  Commission 
comprises  a  set  of agreements  whme  main  features  arc 
described  below. 
I.  Agreements u  originally notifted 
(a) lne  Atlas  joint  Venturt  Agrrrmt,l  <JV 
Agreemrnt)  is  the  main  agrcrmcnt  providing  for 
the establishment of thr  Atla~ joint  venture. 
(b) The  lntdltcll~al  anJ  lndmtrial  Proper(Y  Trans.for 
and l.ictnu Agrttmtnls will  be  concluded  by  each 
of  1:-r  :and  DT  with  Atla~  SA.  Under  these 
agreements  F'T  and  DT make  avail3hle  to  Atlas 
SA  the  inu:llectual  p10pt"rty  rights  OPRs)  necdrd 
to operate ''•e Atlas  hu\inl'\\. 
(c)  The  Srrr.•iu.>s  Agrc·rmrnts  will  be  framework 
agreements  \ettinJ~  fonh  thr  ba\ic  term~  and 
conditions  with  rt\pcct  to  the.·  supply  by  DT and 
VI"  of cc:nain  services  tu Atla\  SA  and  the  \upply 
by  Atlas SA  of cc:nain  st-rvicrs to I·T and  IYI'. 
(d) 'Inc:  Distribution  Agrrtmtnls:  twu  \ubstantially 
similar  dis1ribution  agreements  with  I·T  and  I  >T 
rc!lpectivdy  wil:  lay  out,  for  the  home  countries 
(france :ancl  Germany respectively),  the  n1arketing 
and  salt of Atlas  products. 
(c.·)  '11w  Af.&'my  Agrc•t•mt:nts  under  which  each  parc:nl 
appoit~l\ 1\tlas  S:\  non-exdu\ive  worldwide  agent 
for  •ilc:  !l.llc  of  DT and  FT'\  intc.·rnatinnal  le:ned 
lin.:\  (half-c.·irt:uits)  with  the  territorial  exception 
t,f Gc.·rmany  as  reJ;:mh  DT\ half-circ:uit\. 
"  Contractual  provi\ion\ 
20.  In  panil-ular,  tht·  ahovc.·  Jgrc.·c.·rncnt\  provide  for 
the:  following: 
I.  Stntclllrt o/thr Atlas t•tnlllrr 
Atla11  SA  will  he  neatcd as  a joint \'t'nturc:  ~twc.-cn 1:-r 
and  DT,  each  owning  h;alf  the  \han·  capital.  The 
m:magement  structun· nf Atla\  ~A will  ~  .t\ follow\: 
(a)  Sharthfi/Jrrs · mc•rting:  Prior .1ppru\'al  of the:- \hare-
holders'  mectin~ is  n<·tcuary  for  mancn \uch  .u 
the  amendment  of  the.·  anicles  of  ;usociation,-
modification  of  capital,  inu.1n  .. c:  of  sh.tres, 
merger~,  sale  of  all  or a  subst:anti.tl  pan  of  the 
as~cu, and  liquidation. 
(h)  Strategic  /lnarJ:  It  is  envisaged  that  th•·  Strategic 
Board  of Atlas  SA  will  have  two co-chairmen and 
eight  members,  one  half  .:arpoint!d  by  each 
parent,  ·who  m.t)'  he  frcdy  removtd  and  shall 
mcc.-t  at  least  twin·  :a  yr.tr.  The  Strate~ic  Board 
has  .1  «JUorum  of  a  majority  of  its  mc.·mhc:rs, 
including  :at  lea\t  two  memben .tppointcd  by  each 
p.tny; the co-chairmf'n do nut  have  .1  tie-breaking 
vote.  Prior  arprov:al  by  the  Stra.tcgic.  Bo.trd  is 
required  for  matters such  as  the  entry into a joint 
venturr  or  other  str.tte~ic  alliance  with  a  third 
pany, any  significant  modification  of the  scope  or 
Atl.t•.'\  bu~iness  and  \Ul"h  m.1ttt-"  as  m.1y  from 
timr  to  time  be  submitted  to  it  bv  .1  vote  of onc 
half  of  the  members  of  thr  8oa~d of  Directors. 
'lne Strategic  Bo;m.l  \hall  .tl~n  revirw  all  \tratrRK 
plans of Atlas  SA. 
(l')  'lnr  /Jo.~rJ n.f /Jirt•cttm:  It  i\  c.·nvi~ag('d  that  Atlu 
SA\  Board  of  Dirt·c:tur\  will  ha\'t'  nine  nl<'mhc.·rs, 
four  d<"ctcd  hy  ral·h  nf  OT .1nd  FT and  one  by 
Sprint.  Prim approval  h~· tht- Bnard  of  Dirrctor~ is 
required  for  a number nf  important decisions such 
as  the  approval  of  business  plans  and  annual 
budgets  and  changes  in  the  scope  nf  Atlas,  the 
conclusion  of  imponant  contracts,  etc.  Decisions 
on  change\  in  the  Atl.t!l  bu .. inc.•ss,  m;nagement 
appointment\,  and  the  approval  nf  the  hu!linc:u 
plan,  tht•  annual  operating  plan,  and  the  budget 
rectuire  that  at  least  two  directors  nominated  by 
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t·ach  pany  vme  with  tht·  maJoratv.  Mattt:r\  on 
whirh  the:  Board  of  t;;rcnon  fail\  to  rt·J.ch 
agreement  .. t.:all  be  brought  before  the  Strategic 
Bo;ard. 
1•.1)  Chief E:tec11tive  Officers  (CEOs):  It  i\  t•nvi~:tgcd 
that Atlas  SA  will  havt~ twn CEO\, one nnmin:ued 
hy  VI'  :tmnng  it~  rc:pre~c:mJtive\  in  tlw  Board  of 
Direc:tors,  the  other  by  DT Jmong  it\  reprt'\l'll· 
tJtives  in  the  Board  of Directors. The CEO\ \hall 
be  jointly  resp·.msible  for  day-to-day  operation\ 
:~nd the  management of the bu\ines\ and  affain of 
Atla\.  Approval  of both  l'o-CEOs  i~  rettuirc.·d  for 
all  impun:un  decisions  including  tht'  hiring  or 
di\mi\sal nf l'c:y  employee\. 
'llu:  panit·~  will  contribute  to  Atla!l  their  l'Xt\tmg 
Eumpe:m  aueu outside  !=ranee  and  Gc·rmanr  (a\ well 
;o\  \orne  :u!leU  in  France  and  Germany)  U\t•d  for  tht· 
provi\ion of service\ coming within  the  o,copc:  of  Atla~. 
2.  1'111pnse and activities  fJ/ Atlas 
lbe Atla\  venture  is  to providt•  seamle\s  natior:-al  and 
international  end-to-end  \ervices  to  corpor:nc 
cu\tomen  (i.e.  to  multinational  companies  (MNCs) 
and  SMEs  alike:).  ·Inc  portfolio  of  Atlas  \ervices 
c·omprise\  data  network  services,  international 
end-to-end  services  (managed  link~).  voice  VPN 
'>crvires,  CU\tnmer-dc:fined  nt>twork\,  out\ourring  .1nd 
VSAT  serviet·~. 'lbesc:  \crvicr.\  arc  fully  liberalizd  in 
the  Europt•3n  Union  and  arc  widely  liberalized 
worldwide.  Ada\  will  have  the  rc'lponsibility  for  the 
\t'rvice\  portfolio  mentioned  above  outside  of  France 
;tnd  Germany. 
In  Fram·e  and  German)',  Atla\  will  he  providing  ~tales 
~upport  tn  f:."'('  and  DT's  sales  force\  as  regards  311 
\crvices  m('ntioned  in  the  Atla\  ponfolio,  with  the 
exception  of  public  X.25  packet-switched  network 
\ervices  within  France  3nd  Germany,  whid•  will  be 
provided  by  J:."''(''s  Trampac  Francc.o  \ub~tidiary  and 
DT's  Datcx-P  subsidiary  respcc:ti\·dy  until  the  tele-
communic:ation\  infra\tructun·  :md  ~crvic.·r\  m:arkcu 
are  fullv  liberalize,J  in  •=ranee  and  Germ;uw,  :as 
\chedulcd  for  I January  19'JH.  · 
Each  1ctinJ~  as  an  exdu~ive di\trihutor,  DT  will  sell 
Atla\  \crvic:es  in  Germanv,  while  FT  will  \ell  Atlas 
\trvicc~  in  Franc:c.  Atlas'  product\  will  be  sold  in 
Franl·e  and  Germany  undt·r  the  common  globally 
U\t"d  Atla,/Phoc.·nix  br:ands.  Pa\si\'t'  \.lll'\  o(  Atl.u 
'>ervicc~ by  DT in  trance, hy  VI'  in  Gt'rmany  and  hy 
any  Atl;u  operating entity  in  huth  Member State\  will 
he  allowed.  Ouuide  hance  and  Germany,  Atl:n 
producu will  be  sold  by  thc  Atl3~ operating en•ity  for 
th~ rest  of Eurore. 
It i!l  planned that  there  will  he  a halam:int;  pa~·ment by 
DT  at  each  clming  to  l'cJ!..llilt'  tht·  rt·\pt·..:tin· 
contribution  value\  uf  tht:  two  p;utit:\.  It  1\  further 
cnvi\af~ed  that  ccnain  Jtlju,trnl'nt  paymc.·rtt\  will  ht· 
made  on  thl'  re!!pectin·  m·t  worth  of  the  entitie\ 
concerned  at  the  time  of  rontrihution  lO  t\tla\.  A 
scpar3te  adju\tment  payment  may  he  made  ht"tween 
VI'  and  DT  if  the  actual  pcrfnrmarKc·  of  t  ht·  I·T 
romrilnued  hu .. inew~'  in  Frlncc  or  clw  IJT 
rontriuull'c.l  hu\inc\\t'!l  in  rJcrn1anv  fall\  ,iguifit"amly 
~hurt uf projcctiom in  I 'l'JS  (and  p~)\\ihly  I  'J'JfJ ). 
~tutual  \c.·rviu·  pro  .. -i,ion  hl·twc.·c.·n  t\ll.n  anc.l  IT/DT 
will  ht•  the  nhjl·c.·t  uf  two  Sc.·n·in·\  AJ•rt•crnrnt~ 
pur!IUJrtt  to whirh  dl"alinJ~' ht•twt·rn  I·TlDT and  t\tla~t 
\hall  he.·  tr:amparc:nt, 'nnn-disuimin:atnry  and  .n  lrrn'\ 
length. 
A!!  for  ~c:rvicc~  gc:ncrall)·  offcn·c.l  hy  DT nr  FT.  thr 
price\  and  othrr  term\  which  UT  or  f:'('  gcnerall~· 
apply  from  time  to  time  to  their  ~ustomen  shall 
cqu:~lly apply  for  Atlas.  A\  for  services  nOl  gt'nually 
offt>rcd  by  f:."'f  or DT.  m:arket  prkt'!l  and  term\  shall 
lpply  01nd  be  negotiated  bctWl"t'n  tht'  l,anit>\  in  good 
f:aith  3t  arm's  length.  Conscc1uently,  Atlas  will 
purcha\c  such  services  from  DT or  f:."'J'  at  the  sarnt' 
price\  and  conditions  th3t  any  third  pany  r,cnt'rally 
offering  such  services  would  apply  un~cr thc  \amc 
circumc.tances.  If  inform.ninn  on  rclev;mt  mukct 
prit·es  i\  not  a\'ailahle,  thc  pric.-c\  applicahlr  for  :\tl:as 
'hall  he  dctcrmincd  on  the  bac.i\  of  :a  cal..ul.uiCln 
mc,deJ  that  i\  U\Cc.l,  within  VI',  tn  m.1ke  offt'r\  tO 
CU\tomcrs  with  \pccial  rc<Juesu  ami,  within  DT,  to 
calcul.1te  intr3·group  trJn\fer  prict>\.  Prices  rt."sulting 
from  \uch  calculation  c.hall  l·ovc·r,  for  the·  rdf'vant 
period, all  co~t~ 3S  well  3\ a rca\nn3hlt· profit  mar~in. 
4.  Non-wmp('te  prrwi1irms 
Punuant  tn  t\rtidc.·  XIII  ni  the.·  :\tl.l\ JV  AJ~rt·t·mrnt, 
1:1'  :tn\1  DT  will  not  l'n~.l~t·  ,\n~·wht·n·  in  tht• 
proc.luc:tinn  of  \crviH"\  that  .Ht'  \Uh,t;mtiall)·  tlw  \:Ifill' 
or compt'tc  dirC"ctly  with  the  Atla.,  \rrvirt>.,,  and  will 
nnt  t•ngage  outsidt'  of  hanrc  and  Gl·rman~·  in  tht' 
nHlrketing,  sale  or  di\trihution  uf  \ervic.·r\  that  arc· 
\ubst.tntiall)'  the  \Jmt.'  or  t:nmpt•tt•  dirc·l'tly  with  tht• 
"''"~  \ei'Vil'C'\.  Furtht•rmnrt•,  vr  will  llCII  m.ulu·t  tlf 
diurihute  Atl3\  ~t'rvil·c~  in  Gl•rman)'  Jnc.l  DT will  nnt 
markr.t  and  di\trihute  Atl:a'  \t'n·in·\  in  Fr:arKt';  pa\\ivt· 
sales  uc htlwevcr  pcrmittt·d  lty  IT nunidc.·  <·f  hanc.·r., 
b)·  DT  out\idc · of  German)'  and  by  Atla\  in  bnd1 
i=ranc'!  and  Germany. 
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S.  Provisions  rtlatms:  to  it~ttllrctual and industrial property 
l:rt'  and  DT will  each  condudc  an  Intellectual  and 
Industrial  Property  Tran~fcr and  Licence  Agreement 
with  Ada~ SA  under  which  the  panics  make  available 
to  Atlas  SA  the  intellectual  property  rights  ('IJ>Rs') 
which  are  needed  to  operate  the  Atlas  business  in 
accordance with  the  following  principles: 
(a)  IPRs owned by, or licensed  to, the parties that are 
used  exclusively  for  the  Atlas  business  shall  be  . 
transferred to Atlas SA; 
(b)  IPR.s owned by, or licensed  to, the panics that arc 
used  pu<lominandy  for  the  Atlas  business  shall 
al10  be  transferred  to Atlas  SA,  and  a sub-licence 
shall  ·be  granted  to  the  parties  (Grant  Back 
Licence  sub-licence); and 
(c)  IPRs owned by, or licensed  to, the panics that are 
used  predominantly  for  the  panics'  businc~s  arc 
(sub-)licensed  to Atlas  SA. 
F.  CHANGES  MADE  AND  UNDERTAKINGS  GIVEN 
FURniER  TO  THE  COMMISSION'S  INTERVENTION 
21.  Cenain  features  of  the  Atlas  transaction  as 
notified  appeared  to  be  incompatible  with  Community 
competition  rules.  Consequently,  the  Commission  by 
letter  of  23  May  199S  bformed  the  panics  of  its 
concerns.  In  the  course  of the  notification  procedure the 
panics  have  amended  the  original  agreements  and  givc:n 
unden:akings  to  the  Commi\sion. 
1.  Contractual  changes 
22.  Non-appornlmtnt  of At/a)  SA  as  an  agtnt for  inttr-
Mtional  ha/f-cir(uits.  f=unher  tn  the  Commi~\i(tn'\ letter 
of  23  May  1'195,  DT  and  rr abolisht'd  the  Agency 
Aarremr•ns  :and  amended  the  original  Servi't 
Alrtcments  tn  takt'  account  nf  the  non-3ppointment  of 
'•  Atlas  SA  as  :1  non-exclusive  :agent  for  IJT ,'IIUl  vrs half-
circuits. 
2).  Non-l'flltgration  of Frtnch  and Gtrma"  public  data 
nt1VJorlt1  brfort  full  fll,tralization  of tht  ttltcommuni-
calions  in/raJtructurt  and  ltT'"ViCtl  marlttti.  Atlas  SA  \hall 
i•"'  acquire  ltgal  ownership  or  control  within  the 
meanil'g  of  Anicle  3 of Council  kegulation  4064/M9 (') 
of the  hench and  Gtrman  puhlic  X.25  pack.r-t-switchrd 
data  networks,  Tr:ansp;u:  Fr:ancr  and  Datex-P 
respccti,·ely,  hdorr  the  telccommunicaticm'>  infra· 
(')OJ No I. 3fiS,  ,0.  12.  19119,  p.  1. 
\tructurc  :md  services  markets  arc  fully  libc.·r:ali~t:c.l  in 
France  and  Germany,  as  is  sc.:ht'dulc:d  I'>  rwrur  hy 
I January  1998.  L'ntil  then,  it  is  cnvi\agc.·d  tll:at: 
I. Transpac  SA  will  be  split  imo  'lhn~p:ac  Fr:ann·  and 
Transpac  Europe; 
2.  Transpac Europe  will  be contributed tn  Ada~; 
3.  Transpac France  will  be  a wholly owned  sub!tidiuy of 
1-T; 
4.  DT's D:nex-P services  division  will  be  incorpor:ued  n 
a separate company under German law  and  become.- a 
wholly owned subsidiary of DT; 
5.  DT  and  I-Ts  outsourcing  joint  venture.-.  f..unctcom 
BV, will  be  fully contributed to Atlas SA; and 
6.  Atlas  SA  will  create  :a  subsidiary  in  France  and 
Germany  (Atlas  Fr:mce  :and  Atl:as  Germany 
rt-spectively)  to provide  the  following  services: 
(i)  sales  iuppon  regarding  Atlas  producu  to 
distributors in  France and Germany; and 
(ii)  services  within  the scope of Atlas other than  X.2S 
packet-switched  data  network services  including: 
- VSAT  services, 
- international  end-to-end  services, 
- voice  V  PN  services, 
- customer-defined  solutiom  (excluding 
national  X.25  dat:a  communication\  \ervicc.-\  in 
France  and  Germany), and 
- ouuourdng  ~erviccs. 
Provided  the  tclt•communications  infra\tnlctun·  ami 
\el"\·ices  market\  arc  fully  liber:alil.ed  in  t=r.lnft'  .tnd 
Grrman)'  on  I  Janu:af')'  1'19R,  Tran~rac  hanc;e  .tnc.l 
O.;ntx·P will  bt'  contributed to  Atla~ on  thar  date  in  ~uch 
a  way  that  Atlas  hancc  and  Atl.u  Gtrmany  v.·ill  he 
mrrgtd  with  Transpac:  France  and  Datcx-P  rt\f't'C:tivel)·. 
24.  Tnhnical  COOJHration.  Ahead  of  full  hheraliution 
of  the  ttlecommunic:nions  infrastructurc  .tnd  \t'I'Vice~ 
markets  in  France  and  Germany,  schc.-dulrd  to  (l\"CUr  h~· 
I January  1998, DT and  1:-r  will  coopcratr in  the  d  .. ·vd-
opment  of  common  tcchninl  network  dc.-ment\.  Thi' 
cooperation  will  comprise  only  the  following  :area\: 
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\\!,,,,,.  \w.11!qa.trfrr'  lfc·  ••'lf'itlc·  ,,,·,:aurr.  lJlJ,  he·  !r .  .rt' 
lt-r11d:  •  \d." 
.'"  I J I  .Ill•!  !"I  IJ  r\,'  ,.!\,  :..;1\1'11  rhi  .td.litl"ll..l  1111.!•·• 
1.1 1-.~tl::'  .!,· '' r  clsn!  l•c·l• t\\ _ 
I .  I  •c·  '" I  J I  .w.l Ff'• f'llblit  d.a.,  ud;;.  ,,,~·· 
l.hil  "'  Fl  .tlld  tn·  will  ·''  •• ,  I  J.liiU.tr~·  I'1'JIJ 
nt  .• hli'h  JnJ tlwn·Jitc·r  nt.'lifll.llll  thiul·p.Ht~  ,1\lt'''  111 
tltt'''  puhlic·  w.·ih lwei  cl.at.t  m·t··•"rk'  iu  h  HH:c·  .wd 
f  ,c·mt.lll~  rnp•·cr;·,·c:h.  '\,.n.di"·rirniu;uur\.  upt·n  .111d 
tr.•u,p.•rt·nt  .anc•  .•  '-'ill  he·  ;.~r.rutc·d  111  .111  cl.ll.l  \t'r\rc·,., 
pr ..  \rdc·•,  tll.u  utf.-r  X.2f,  p.lc·kt·t·\Witdwd  dJI.l 
,·.,mmuni~·.ltrurr'l  , •. r\r~c.·'·  T"  c'fl\lHc·  llllll·dr,c·rimi· 
11.1t11n·  .11 n·''  ,  ..  tlrt·ir  n.Hi"''·''  puhli~.- '\ 25  p.tdil'l-
~"' it~·tiC.'cl  dJt.l  uc·tworJ..,,  I·T .Inti  Iii' \h.11·;. 
1.1 t  c.·'ltJhli .. h  :111d  mJu,I.Hn  ,t.md.mJi,t·cl  X.7S 
rntt•rlJ~.·c,  to  J(H'"  tlll'ir  rl.ltionJI  pulrlit  .:\.2; 
p.u.lo.t:t-'lwitrhc.·tl  J.lt.l  m·t "''  •rk';  1 hi'  imc.·r(on· 
nc:('tiun  j, \Uit.lt.k  f,lr  the  provj,j,,n of cnJ·to-cnd 
wr\iu·\ iJHc:d  ur,  X  .  .25  'Pl'l'iiic.·lticm\  ic•r  ~rui·U'IC:r 
ll'Cl''' \pt·c.·ch  up  to 1,~ kbp'l; JnJ 
lh  1  nft'c:r  \Uc:h  JtTC\\  on  nun-di  .. criminatnrv·  tcrmr,, 
ir:duJin,.;  priu:.  l\'Jibbility  oi  volunw  ;.r  other 
Jj,~·nuut'  lnd  tht:  ttU.llit~·  uf  intc.·rnmnc:c:tion 
prm idc.·J. 
I' I'  .mJ  (  J J'  'itJII  iurtlcc:r  c:murl'  lllln-di'" rimin.llor\' 
llU'\'1 h\  llt,lkl!t~ puhlidy  ,IV,lil.tl.lt·  tht•  \l.llld.Ucl  IC'rlll.\ 
... ncl  '"uclitinit'\  fur  '1\Kh  X_.7~  in•nf.llc'  \t,llld.uth, 
iudycl.n~. it  .tny,  volume.•  lnJ utl1t·r  c.li,c.·uuul\,  .1\  ol  I 
l.ttlU:trv  1
11'11 •.  IT  .1ncl  1../1'  \\ill  rn.akc·  :av.lil:~hlc·  fur 
'•'1\c'' ,·  .. ,. h~·  the·  Cummi,  .. iun  .1m  .1)-;rt't'IIIC'Ill\  rr·l.llin~ 
'uc.i.  X.7;  intt·d:au·,,  mc.ludinJ.;  .lll  'P''tifir.llly 
.',rc-c·cl  tc·rm'  t .'111il  \Udt  tintl'  ~"  Tr.ln,p;.a~  hann· .111J 
'·'It"\ -I'  .1 n·  uctt·~t.llc.·d  intn  \tl.h,  nt·it llt'r  Tra  "'Jl·h' 
.  r llatt·  uor  IJ.I!n;-1'  ,Ju!l  tli,dn,c·  111  :\tl.l\  ;Ill\'  \Uth 
p<:•  ific..11l~  .l~·.rc·nl  wrrm th.t!  .an·  itlc.·mific·d  Jrul.  rn.1in· 
.1inc:d  J\ I.'Ofliitlcrlli;'IJ  h~·  the.•  r;ut\' oftt,lil\111!-;  inlt'flllfl• 
..,., tiun  throul•lt  \Ut'h  X.i;  inr•·rf.H'l'\.  Hrr:sllv  tlu: 
,J,,,,.,.  ohli~:at  10~" 'llllll  lilo.t•\1. io,t•  .tppl~·  111  .my  ~t·r;t'l .Ill~· 
,  ... d  CJ:J'IT.,tanJaulitt·tl  llltnc.onnt•t.lhlll  prnt•,rol 
·h:1t  mJ~·  mt•dify.  rr:pbn·  or  nl·t'\1\t  ;!'.  J  \t.tnd.lnl 
·d:..tc·d  to  the.·  X.7;  \t.md.1rd  Jllll  j,  U\t·d  hv  VI'  .11td 
. IT.  , 
:  'ruprit•t,•r~  intnf:rl't'\  rn,l\  lw  n·t.tirwd 
••u•m~:  Tr.tll\p.ll  haruc·,  J).lln-P  .lie·: 
:ct•·tf.Ht''  ;111'  ,f,·luwd  f,,  d.,.  p.•llt•lll.ll 
...  !.,~:~ I  "·'"'  .... ,II t  .Hid  '"',"'.It,.  I h ' 
· 'lll'r.ltlll  U\1'\  to  Jllll\lclc·  ;HI\ .11111'\f  • 
,.,t:.hJi,hnl 
\ "·":  \lid  I 
i''' nl  lt.'L'h· 
•  IWI v. nrk 
I  \j\tllll\1/('\1 
'11'1'\IU'\.  :\tl.l\  \l.rll  ht·  Jllo\lonlt" ·'''''" tl,,.  'Jr  .• n,p.u· 
h.llhl'  Jncl  lhtn-P  puhltl  p.H kc·t·"-'· itd1nl  d.lll 
r•c·t·,r.ork'  tltrt~u~h  tht·":  prupril'tlr~  iutt·rbll'\,  Jh" 
,, or  tlu:  pro\'i,ion  nl'  X.:?!)  d:tt.l  llllll111li111LIIlllll\ 
,,·n·it n,  pru\'idt·d  .lll t'"  ~r;uunl  to  \tl.l'l  tltrouJ,;h 
'Ut h  intt•rtJl'l'\  j,  t'l Hflllffljl'.lfh  t'tJUi\·;.aft·nt  lo 
ti,ard-p.ut~  Jl'l't'"  to  du- TrJn'Jl:lt  h.mu·  .lllli 
I J.ut·\-P nc·t\\od"'· 
1.  (  .'rr.ss-wbsiJiza~ltmr 
I rr  and  VI'  ,h.1ll  not  t·n,;.~~t·  in  nt~\\·  ,uJ.,iliit.ll ion 
\\ ithin  the.·  mc.·:~nin~  uf  the  Cnmrnl\\iun\ (etlll(\\'titicm 
~uidc.·:inc.·,  fnr  the:  tc:lc.·l·omrnunicJtinm  ,e,•rtor (
11
)  tn 
c.onnc:c:tion  with  the :\tl:l\ \'c:nturc.·.  Tn J\'oic.l  thJt :\tiJ\ 
hc.·ndit\  from  l'rH\\-,uh,idic.·,  \tc:mmir~g  frnrn  tht· 
Ppt:r.uinn  nf  puhlic.·  tdet:ommunit'.ltion\  infrJ\truc.·turc: 
,,nd  of  n·,cr•c.·d  'c.·n·ice\  h\·  c.-ithc.·r  DT  nr  VI',  .1ll 
cntitit•\  fnrmc.·,l  pur,uant  tu ·the:  :\tb\ vc.·nturr  will  bt-
t'\tJbli\hc:d  ol\  tli\tinl't  cntitic.•'  •c:p:arlte  from  DT .lnd 
FT. 
:\tla\ SA,  DJtcx-P and  Tr.1nsp.:ac  Fr:tnl·c  \hJII  ubt.1i:-. 
their  own  d~ht  financing  on  tt:dr  own  cr~dit. 
prm·ided that rT and DT: 
(3)  m.1y  make  c.:apital  contribution~ or  ~ommerci:ally 
r~a\onable  loam  to  \uch  entities  as  requirrd  to 
enable A.tla.\  SA,  Date~-P :tnd Tr.1nsp:ac  Fr:mcr to 
c.·on~uct their  re~pective bu\iness; 
1  o)  m:ay  plcdJ,tt'  their  vc.·nturc:  intercm.  in  ~;u,·h c.·ntitic:\, 
in  ~onnc:ction  with  non-rerour)t'  fin:anc.:ing  for 
\Ul'h  c.•ntitic.•~;;  :md 
ll')  mJy  guarJntc:c  Jny  inJdnc:dnc:\\  of  \Uc:h  c.·nullc:,. 
pnwided  that  1~1'  ~nd  OT  mly  only  m.1kc.· 
p.lyment\  puf\U.lnt  tn  an~·  \uc.·:a  ~u.nJillt·c.· 
following  l  dcfJuh  by  \Ufh c.·ntitit"\  in  rt'\pt'c.·t  nf 
\uc.·h  inddltc:Jnc:\'1. 
:\tl:n  S:\,  D:nc:x-P  .1nd  Trampl'-'  hanct•  'hJII  not 
.:alln!0'.1tt.·  c.lirrctl~·  or  indirc.·c.:tly  any  p:an  uf  tlwir 
op<•rJting  cxpemcs,  c.·mt\,  dl·prc.·c:i:atinn,  or  othl·r 
cxpc.•me\  of their hu\inc.·ss  to Jny  part' of FT nr ()T\ 
hmint'\\  unit\  (induding  without  limitation  dw 
1•rupnrtinnatc.·  l'O\h )ll\c.·d  on  work  anu.llly  pc.·rformc.·c.l 
tlllt  are  Jttrihutahlc  to  ~hJrcd t·mployt·c'  ur  \Jit•'  m 
m:trkctin,; or  Atla~ pmdut:t\ ;md  scn·icl'\ hy  DT nr VI' 
c:mrluycl•.,),  provided  hu\\'('\'c.·r  th.tt  nuthing  'hall 
(
111 c.uiJc·lim·,  Clll  tilt'  ."lj'J'h\.ltinn  .,f I.LC  ( 11tti(Wtith•l1  Kul ....  Ill 
1hr Tt'lt·,·nmmum,·."lllnn'  ~~·,·tor  Hll  Sn f  1\\, h  ''  1'•'•1. 
J'U.l~r.lJ't.  IC! ,.,  Wtf.)  . 
II  AI  16 15.  1.2.  <JS  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Commur.itic\  :--.;,, c .>37/ll 
I.  FT  and  trr  will  ruopc.•ratc  in  the.·  dc.·wloprnc.·nt  nf 
umun,,n  prnJun'  and  nmunon  tc.·d111ic..tl  nt·twurJ.. 
dc.·nwnt'>  (i.e.·.  'ud1  produ\.'t\  and  c.·lcrm·nto,  that  \ll.lrt: 
the  \Jrne  fc.·aturc.,,  ~·c:t  \epar.udy  built  Jnd  owm·d); 
\Udt  rnopc:r:ttinn  will  extend  tu  thc  Frc:nrh  :tnd 
German  puhlic.·  X.15  p;u:kc.·t·w•itdu·d  data  c.ommuni-
ratinn~ network  ...  Only the following  func.·tiom  will  he· 
m.anagc.·d  hy  :\tla.,  SA  for  Tran.,p:tc  hann·  :tml 
Dau·x-P  n·,pc.·nivd,t': 
( J I  prnduc.t  rnan.lJ;rmc:nt  and  dr.,·cloprncnt,  l"rovidrc.l 
ttut  product  hr.1nding  .1nc.l  l"ricing  J\  wc.·ll  .1\ 
l"roc.lun  implemc.·ntation  in  the.·  network  will  he: 
managc.·J  h~·  Traml"ac.·  france.·  anc.l  D~tcx-P 
rc.·o,pe<:tin·ly; 
(r  I  informJtion  'Y\tc:m\,  provided  that  n·ntral 
infnnn.niun  'Y'" rn  huKtion\  (t·  .  .,;.  hillinJ; 
inforrn.uion  .uul  \t,ui,tin)  will  lw  opc.·r.ttt·c.l  hy 
Tr.III'J'·"  h.tn• c•  .uul  DJtc·x-P  rc''l'''''tivc·l~·. 
J'lu·  .tlttt\'1'  .tll'.l't  ttl  tttttlll'l,lltllll  \lt.tll  Ill  1111  1 ,1\f'  '"' 
'"''' '"'''''"' '" .•  ,,,.,,,,,,, '"'''V.'"''"'' ,,f  ,,,,.  ,.,,  ... ,It"'"' 
(  ll'flfl,tll I"'''"'  \Will h•·tl  tl.tt,t  Jti'IWIII~.'t,  wJ.H lt  Wtll  ,,. 
Cflltltllllr·tl  l.y  IWII  \f'll.tl.tll'  ltf'IWIIJ~,  trl.tii.J)~I'IIIf'llt 
''""'''!'"'"  ... t! 
.2.  :\til\ m:ly  \ulx.ontr;an 'cni&in  (lptr.:ntoual  func. taom  LO 
Tran\p:lc.·  France and  Oatex-P re\l"t'c:tively. 
z;.  .\'rm-mtt·xratirm  of autts  fl/ fT1  inJirect  Gc.•nnaPI 
mbtiJi.J')'.  Tlw  J\U't\ uf'  J·T\ German rorporJte tt:lrcum-
muniotiom  \C.'f'\'tc.'C:\  pnwidrr lnfu r\G  'ihJII  not  be  intc-
gr.:nc:<~  imn  :\til\  \l\'C:  3\  indic.·atcd  at  plragrJph  27 
hdow.  ~~Of('O\'Cr, rr  ~hall  divc:~t  Info  ,\G. 
.2.  Non-di\crimin:ation 
Zb.  In  ordc.·r  '",  prn\'ide  the  \cn•in·o,  dc\,rihc.·d  under 
p:lragrlph 5 Jh()VO,  Atl:a\  nr  .ln~· other  !~ervin.· pro\'idcr i\ 
dtl"rndent  on  the  l"uhlic.·  \witched  telccmnmunic:atinn\ 
nrtwork (PST:") ar1d  rc:\crved  \ervicco,(•).  In  l·rancc  and 
Germany,  only  I·T  :anc.l  DT provide  hnth  acce\\  tn  the 
PST~ and  rt\erved  u·rvicc\.  Given  that rr anc.l  DT arc 
indirc.·ct  'lharchold.er\  of Atla\  it  i\  cs\cntial  fnr  the  \Jfc-
J;UJrding  of  fair  c.·ompc:titiun  hctwcc:n  Atla'  and  other 
c:xi\tin•~  ur  future  tdl'c.·ommuniutinm  \ervic.·c\  l"rn"·idc:r., 
to  diminJtc  thr  ri\k  th:u  the  former  arc  granted  mnrc 
fav(lurahlc:  treatment  rcg:1r~ing  access  and  u\e  c~f  thr 
French  and  Gc:rm:tn  PSTN  and  rc,en·cd  \c:rvicc~. 
(')  Rr\t"l'\'rd  \t'rvit't'\  Jrt  \Crvict'\  which  .ur  prcwidtd  (lUr\U.lnl 
111  \!ll'l't.ll  ur  udu\ivt"  riJ~I'I'  •~r;uncd  hy  thr  H:  ~tc  .. rnhrr 
..,tllt"\ tn thc-ar  tC'\f't'ltivc.- TO\ in  t·nmplio~tu·r with  H. l;a'IAI·. 
--------------·------------
'11u·  Commi.,o,inr.  \t't out  in  it 'I  nntin on  tht·  lniorwl  i• •lltl 
Vt·ntun· ( •·~)  how  prohihiti(tn  to  di'l nnunJu·  lllll\1  lot· 
unc.lc:r.,tnod  in  Jc.·tail.  .  ·  ...  ·c.·ordin~ly, w  t•murc.·  till'  Jhwmt· 
of  di\criminati()n,  the  Commi\\ion imcnd\  to Jn·idc th.u 
DT, I·T and  Atla\  \hall  comply  'lA. tth  tht·  follow in~: 
I.  Tenns  am/  conJitimu:  The  tcrnh  .1nJ  condition\ 
apl"tit"d  hy  DT  anc.l  fJ'  to  t\tla'  for  ac.:n·'"  to  dtt· 
PST~ .1nd  fur  the:  prnvi\inn ,,f  n·u•n·c.·d  'tt'f'\ ic.c·.,  h·  .  ._;. 
pro.,·i\ion  of  1'-J\c:c!  lintsl  in  c.·nnncc.·tion  with,  tht· 
.\c:n•i(C\  c.lc\c:rihc:d  under  !"3r.1gr:aph  5  .1hm·c:  \h,lll  Itt· 
'timibr  to  the:  \c:rm~  and  c.·nnc.lition\  :tpl"lic.·d  tn  utllt'r 
provider\  of  \irnilar  \ervicc\.  ·n,i\ rc•tuirt·mrnt  c.·m·cr\ 
av:~ilabilit~· !"rice,  <tuality  of service,  U\.lgc.· conc.litium, 
dcl:1y\  for  imotall:nion  of  rc:quc.•\tt"d  fac.·ilitie\,  and 
rep:tir  and  maintenance  ~c:rvicc\ .1mong othc:r  \crvicc\. 
2.  .'),-,,,,.  of u•rt·iu•s  at·,,i/aMt.  :\tl.:n  -.hall  not  ht·  gr.lntt"tl 
term'  ~mel  c:umlitinm,  nr  hr  c.·xc·mpt  fnm•  .111y  U\.l~t· 
re\tric.·tion\  rc.·~ .  .udin~ the:  P~TN and rt"\c:rvrtl  \l'f'\'in·,, 
whit It  wnultf  rnahlc•  it  tc•  nffrr  \f'f\'in''  whi, h 
rotttpt'tll•t\ tu·ewi,lt•t·\  tHt' I'H'\'t'"''''' ftnm nlh•ttnR 
\.  /'rrlmlt••l  '"''''"'''''"":  lfl'  .an•l  1'1'  ,ft,elt  '"'' 
•li\c rirninalr  lt~•IWI'I'It  At I.e\  ,wei  ·"'V  otlu·r  .,,.tlttt ,. 
y"''-"~''!,'  ,.rr.~r;t.w;  1iflfh  '.tit-:.  ir.  tt.rt('o.""•'•'rl  .....  , ... 
~.t:.";~  ;,  ~.~._,~,~  -.;,  ~..,.,~.#.·.~.  ,..~.  .. ,  ~.....:..~.  .,,  ... ,. ,, •·· 
an~rla\.~\  fur  the  a(\.c:-\\  to  r~~.-~~4  '!ot'n~c..c:-\  "'"  tht' 
disclo\ure  of an\'  other technical  infmm.1tion  relating 
tel  th~ Ollera•ion ·of !he  PST~. 
4.  Comrr.trdal  in/nnnatiarr.  DT  and  rr  \hlll  nut 
di!>criminate  between  Atbs  :-nd  other  llrll'iidc.·r'  of 
services  as  described  under  p.a:·agr.1ph  5  lhove  3\ 
rcg:1rd~  the  disdo~urc:  ('If  ccn.:1in  c.:ommc:rc:ial 
information.  Thi\  mean~ that  rrr anti  1~· !h.lll  not 
provide  Atlas  with  ~ync:mi7.l·d  and  organi1.ed 
customer  information  dcri\'cd  exdu.,ivc:h·  fmm  the: 
O!"eration  of the  PST~ or  the  pnwi\iun' or  rt\t"f'\'rd 
\c:rvit·c:\  if  \Ul'h  inform;uion  woulc.l  t.·onft.·r  .:l  \Ul'l\tlnti.ll 
competiti\·c:  ad  ..  ·ant:lgc  :md  j, nut  rt:.:lc.lily  .1ml  t•ctuJII\· 
:~vailablc  c.-1\ewhc:re  by  scn·in·  l"rtwitlc.·r'  t"UIU!"t'ting 
with  Atl.l\. 
3.  Undrrtaking\ givtn by  tht p:artir\ 
27.  /Jit•tstrturt  rl lrr/n  AG.  1-T  \hJII  tlin·\t  of  it\ 
interest  in  Info  r\G.  Tn  thr  c~tc:nt  \t'l",u;ahlt·  frnrn  the: 
( 10)  Nucin·  J'Uf\~.lnl "' :\rtidc.·  ,,, I'  I ,,f  c,nuu  al  Rc··~uhttolll  ~,. 
17  t"nnctrnu•g CJ\r :":u  1\'t\.\  .. h,l  ...  :  lnlullt'l, tUI '"  C  :', 
II. I.  l'J'I~. p.  \, Jl  plroa~rJph 'II 
II  AI  17 ,;, 12.  'J;  Oifilial  Journai  uf  tht·  European  Communitic.·\  ~;.,CB7/tl 
prt·\c:nt  :\til\ S:\,  D.ucx-P and  Trampac  hance irom 
billing  DT m  IT fur  produn~ and  \rrvic.·c~  pr<widcd 
to DT or FT  lJ~·  \uch entities on  the  bJ~is of the  ~arne 
price  dllrged talird  pJrtic~ (in  the  ca\c of prodUl'\S  nr 
\t·n.·icc~ \old  to third  panies in  commercial  quantities) 
or  full  nm  reimbuncmen~  or  other  arm's  length 
pril·ing  method  (in  the  case  of  product'l  and  ~ervicc:o, 
not  \oid  to third panics in  commercial  <JU:lntitic~). 
.-\tb~  S:\,  Datex-J>  and  Transpac  rrJn(.t>  .,hat  ~ccp 
o,cpuatt·  acc:ounting  records  that  identify  oaymcnt.~ lU 
tr.tmfcn w  or frum  DT Jnd rr.  Morec>'t'er,  Al~·n SA, 
Datcx-P  Jnd  Trample  frJncc  shall  not  receive  an~· 
material  -.ub.,id)·  (induding  forgiveneo,s  of  debt) 
directh.·  ,,r  indirenlv  from  DT  or  VI',  or  am· 
invc:\U~cm or  pJymc~t from  DT or  FT  that  i~  nc;t 
recorded  in  the:  hooks  of  \uch  entitic\  J~  Jn 
im·c:.,tmcm  in  debt ur equity. 
DT,  Fl' Jnd  Atl.t\  !~hall  comply  with  the  Jhovc  until 
the:  tc:lct.ommunicJtions  infrastructure  and  service\ 
markets  in  fran~e Jnd Germany  Jre fully  libt·ralized, 
JS  is  scheduled to ot:cur by  I January  199M. 
3.  Auditing 
Atlas  SA  Cwhic:h  includes  iu  consolidated  subsi-
diaries), Tr:anspac  Franc  Jnd  Datex-J>  shall  be  audited 
on a regular and customary basis, and  such  audit shall 
cunfirm  from  an  accounting  viewpoint  that  the  trans-
actions  between  the\e  entities,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
1-T and  DT. on the other hand, have  been  conducted 
Jt arm\ length.  This  obligation  o,hall  remain  in  force · 
until  the  telr.c:ommunications  infrastructure  and 
servin·s  mJrkct.·.  in  France  and  Germ:my  are  fully 
liberaliud,  as  "  srheduled  to  occur  by  l  January 
19~H. 
4.  Recording  and rtpnrting 
To allow  the Commission to monitor compliance with 
the  undertakings  the  panics  have  Jgreed  the 
following: 
• 
(a)  Recording  obligations.  DT,  1~r  and  Atlas  each 
undenJke to keep  records and  ~ocuments suitable 
to prove  compliance  with  the  terms  of the  above 
undertaking~  ready  for  inspection  by  the 
Commission. 
(b)  lmpection  of records.  For  the  p11rpnse  of  ascer-
taining  and  ensuring  compliance  by  DT.  Ff or 
Atlas  with  the  above  undenakings,  DT,  l:rt'  m 
Atlas  shall,  on  reasonable  notice.  during  offin· 
houn, anc.l  without  a need  for  tht'  Commission  to 
invoke  the  powers  of  inspt'ction  punuant  w 
Regulation  No  i7,  give  the  C.:>mmission's  Direr-
torate-General  for  Competition  :access  to  DT,  VI' 
or Atb\'\ businc\\  prcmi\C:S  tu impcn rn·ord\ and 
document\  ccwc:red  b~·  the  ahove  rclordinJ.!  obl:-
gatiom  and  to  rccc:i\:C:  oral  c:.xp!Jnatiom  n:bting 
to such  documt:nt\. 
Cc)  Reporting  obligations.  o·r,  1-T  and  Atlls  al\o 
undcr.akc  to  provide  the  Commi~o,ion\  Direc-
torate-General  for  Competition,  for  the  pu1pmc: 
of ascertJining whether DT, FT and  Atlas  comply 
with  the  requiremtnts  of the  above  undcnJkings, 
with: 
.1ny  records  .tnc.l  c.locumrnh  ;n  thr  pm\c\\inn 
or control  of  DT,  1-·r  or .1\tb\  nrcc:s\Jry  fur 
that determination, and 
- oral or written complemrnt:ary  up13nations. 
These  recording  Jnd  reponing obligJtions  will  remJin 
in  force  until  the  telecommunications  infrastructure 
and services  markets in  France :md  Germany are fully 
liberalized,  as  is  scheduled  to  occur  by  I  January 
1998. 
29.  In  so  far  :u  related  to existing  obli~ations under 
national  or  Community  law.  the  above  is  intended  to 
ensure  the  parties'  firm  commitment to comply  with  the 
applicable  legal  framework. 
G.  THE REGULA TORY SITUATION 
)0.  In  letters  sent  to  the  Commission,  the  Fr~nch Jnd 
Gennan  Governments  have  undertaken  to  take  the 
nece~sary steps  to liberalize  ah~rnative infrastructure  for 
the  provision  of  liberalized  telecommunication~ services 
bv  I  July  1996  and  to  liberalize  the  voice  telephony 
-.rvicc 3nd lll telecommunications  infrntructurc ruay by 
1 January  1998.  Th~ availability  of  alternative  telecom-
munications  infrastructure  in  Germany  and  fr.tnc:c 
render competitors of Atlas  independent of DT .tnd  1:-r·~ 
infrastructure for the  purposes of creating trunk network 
infrastructure  to  provide  liberalized  services. 
Early  altcrn:uive  infrastructurt·  libc:rJiiutiun  in  hancr 
:anc.l · Germ.tny  .tdds  to  3  regulatory  framt•work  in  the 
home  countries  of the  Atl.ts  p.tnners  th:at  i\  dc:~igntc.l  tu 
ensure  a  level  piJying  fit'lc.l  in  the  tel~communicatinns 
m..rkeu. 
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I.  Franct 
Punuant  tn hc.·rll'h  law,  the.·  muH\tc.·r  lor  tt·lt·ut~n­
rnuni<:atinm  .,hall  c.·nsurr  thJt  rc.·~ul:uinn  of  tlw 
tde<:ommunir:niom  market~  i.,  undertakc.·n  \c.·par-
atdy  u{  :"-ervin·  provi~ion  in  thc.·sc.·  m.1rkc.·t\.  A 
~re-cific  national  regulatory  authority  (NRA),  the 
Uirec.:tion  Gef\erale  des  Po'ltes  et  Tell-romrnuni-
c.·atiom  (DGJYI"),  is  competent  for  lic.:cming 
providen  of  telecommunications  network!l  and 
servicrs  m  France  based  on  objective  and  tran\-
par~nt  criteria.  ·n,e  DGJYr  shall  'lurvc~·  IT's 
m:uket  bc.·haviour  Jnd  approve  l~l  .. s  tariffs  fnr  (i) 
reserved  ~c.·rvic.·c\  and  lc.~:ued  linc.·'i  and  (ii)  \uch 
liberaliud sc.·rvi(C!i  that are  not  in  f.aC.:l  pruvidc:c.f  hy 
a third part)' active  in  the  trench market. 
2.  Nmr-Jisc:rirnin"lfJry  "cceu 
further  w  ~~~c  adoption  of  the  Cornrnis\iun's 
Services  Directive  and  the  ONP  hamcwork 
Directivet") Article  L.  32-l-4° of the  t=rr-nch  Law 
of  29  December  1990 grants  all  users  equal  acceu 
to the public  network on objective, transparent and 
non-discriminatory conditions. Ff is  under an obli-
gation  to  effectively  grant  such  access  and  must 
publish  information  on  the  network  (e.g.  technical 
features.  tariffs  and  usage  conditions)  and  on 
leased  lin:.- offerings.  The  DGJYr  may  verify  FTs 
compliance  with  these  obligatiom  and  in\'estigatc 
complaims  filt'd  against  1~r  for  non-cornplianct' 
with  these  obligations.  The  DGJYr  !.hall  further 
cn~ure  compliance  with  1-T'.,  oblig:llion  to  ~harr 
availalle  transmission  capacit)'  for  liberaliud 
services  \\·ith  competitors  and  !.hall  publi\h  annual 
uatin:~al  reporu  on  FT's  complrance  with  these 
obligztior.  s. 
3.  Prrotntimr  of mm-subsidirs 
To  allow  ·.he.·  DGJYr  to  'upc.·r  ... i!tt'  I·T\  m.•rkrt 
bchaviou:,  J' r i'i  unc.Jcr  the  Jt>gal  obJi~ation IP  kc.•c.•p 
an  analytical  accounting system  that rl'latt.'\  rom to 
each  individual  I·T  servic.·e.  Wher::- ~n  offering 
comprise~  the  provi~ion  of  hoth  rc.·,cn·c..·d  and 
liberalized  services,  1~· must  separate  each  kim!  of 
'iervice  in  the:  contrart  anc.l  m  the- mvmcr. 
(
11
)  Council  Dirrcti\·.- of  2K  Junr  1'190  un  1h<'  r\uhli~lunrm nf 
the  i~ltf'rnal  markrt for  tt·ln·nmmunicuiom  \Nvin~\ tluou,;h 
the  implf'mrntatiun  uf  uprn  nrt  work  pro\'i\lon  (O.J  Nu  I. 
1"12,  14. i. J'I'JO,  Jl.  I). 
In  thi'  l'tllllll'llltlll,  I·T',  ,tu.t  1111HI1HIIIit.tlinm 
\t'I"VIl'l''  an·  .1 ln·ad~·  prn,·iJt'd  h\'  .1  wp.ll.ltt'  It·~··! 
entity. 
~.  Gtrmany 
Pursuant  to  the  German  141M'J  Pmt~truktur~c.'\C.'t1, 
the  14194  Po\tnc.·unn.lnun~!'t~c.·~c.·t1  ami  the.·  l  'J'J-1 
Pmt·  und  Tclckornmunik:nion  Rc~ulic.·run~'~c.·,c.·t1, 
rc~;ubtory  c.-ornpctcncic~ arc  J!'t!'tignc.·d  tn  3  h·dcr:tl 
:t~enc.·~·  crc.·att·d  umlc.·r  ilw  Fc:c.lt·ral  Mini.'  r~ of  Po\t 
and  Telecomnluniratiun\  (BMPT)  whtlc.·  tdt·rmn-
munic.·ation~  operation\  are  unc.lertakc.·n  hy  DT,  a 
fully  Statc-owncJ  joint  \tock  l"Orpuration.  Rc.·~u­
bturv  obli~atiom  of  DT  arc  pulin·d  by  indc:· 
pend.cnt  hodic.·\,  \n-rallc.·c.l  rc.·Kulawry  c:harnbt·r~. 
2.  Non-disaimir~atory accrss 
Under  the:  current  and  future  German  regulatory 
framework.  DT  shall  provide:  third  pJnic.·s  with 
both  access  to  monopoly  infrastructure.- and 
reserved  or mandatorv  sel"\·iccs  on a  non-discrimi-
natory and  tr:anspare~t basis  according to obj•:ctiw 
criteria.  Upon  appt=ration,  DT  ~hall  ~upply  sutc.·-
of-the-an  leased  linrs  ovt-r  ~crvic.·c-m·utral  ac.·cc.·'s 
points  without  delay.  With  the  only  re!ltril"tion  of 
voice  telephony  sen·icc.·  provision,  lca\t"c.l  lines  may 
be  frcelv  interconnt'cted  and  used  for  anv  ~c.·rvic.c. 
Leased  'tines  must  meet  market  dc.•mJnd . :mJ  DT 
rnust  publi!!h  data  con<:crning  avail.tbility  and 
quality of such  lines. 
3.  Prt"t't'nliorr  of fTOH·mbsitlirs 
Tht·  BMPT (i)  ,(tJII  .tppro,·t·  hudt  t;nif£~ .tml  uthc.·r 
pricc.·-scnsitin·  contranual  tc.·rm'  for  UT\ fl'\cr.·c.·d  ' 
\en·icc.·s  and  (ii)  m:t••  <'hjcrt  w  DT\  l.lrifh  fur 
manJatorv  st'n·ire!l.  ··nu·  BMPT  m:t.\'  ;tl'o  'c.·i~t· 
DTs profits  !tternmin~ from  tariff!~  in  ~\ft'\!1 uf the 
approved  amount  and  take  any  mc.':t\Urt'  m·c.·c.·\\Jry 
tu  rc.·cstahlid•  a  fair  nl!npc.·titivc·  c·nvirunnwm  jc.·op· 
ardin·d  hy  unlawful  nms-\uh\ic.lil.llion.  l\tun·m•t•t, 
DT!I  subsidiaries  and  affiliate.·.,  ""·'"  u~c.·  rc.·sen·c.·c.l 
scrvicrc;  for  tht'  prm i'ion  nf  rompc.·titi\'l·  'lc.·n·in·' 
undt'r  the.·  \:tmc.·  H·rm!l  ;1\  DT\ ru,tonwr' and  mu't 
use  ~uch te-rm\  to acc:ouin  intnn.t! ,,.1"\.'in·'  tramlc.·r 
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THE COMMISSION'S  INTEIVTIONS 
31.  On  the.·  basi~  of  the  forrgoing,  t  ht·  Cc.muni!.~ion 
intends  to  takr  a  favourable  pmitinn  on  the  notific.·d 
tramanions  under  tlw  competit~,m  rules  of  the  EC 
Treaty  and  under Article  SJ of the  EEA  Agrcl!lllC'lt  and 
to  grant  Atlas  an  individual  exemption  pursuant  tn 
Anicle  KS  (3) of tht.•  EC Treaty and  Anidc.·  53  (3) of tlw 
EEA  Ay,recment.  Before  doing  so,  the  Comrni~\ion 
invites  interested  third  parties  tc.'  send  thc.·ir  obsc.·rvatiom 
within  six  wc.·c.·k.\  from  thl'  puhliratiun  of  thi\  notit:c  to 
the  following  addrt:'l\,  ·~uoting the  rdrn.·nn·  'IV /35.337 
- Atlas': 
European  Conunis~ion. 
Directorate-General  for  Compc.·tition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate  for  Information,  Conunu.tiration  and 
Multimedia, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/Wctstraat  200, 
B-1 04 9  Bru!iscls. 
Fax:  (32-2)  296 98 19. 
Notice punuant to Article  19  (J) of Council Regulation  No 17 (')and Article  J  of t•rotocol  21 
of the  Euro~an !!conomic Area Agreement concerning a  request  for  negative  clearance or .an 
~xemprion  pursuant  to  Article  8S  (J)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  SJ  (J)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement 
C~ne No  IV/JS.617  - PhMnix 
(95/C  337/03) 
(Tut with  EEA  reltvanc:c) 
INTRODUCilON 
I.  The  Phoenix  transanion  was  no~ificd  to  the 
Commission  on  29  June  1995.  The  Photmi)(  transaction 
is  linked  to  :1  sep:1r:1te  tr:tnsaction  bringing  ~bout :1  joint 
venture,  Atl:ts,  owned  50%  by  France  Tc:lccnrn  (FT) 
and  SO % by  Deutsche  Telekom  (DT).  given  th;u  Atlas 
is  :1  p:trent  to  the  joint  venture  entities  ere:ued  pursu:lnt 
to  the  Phoenix  :tgreements.  The  Atl~s  agreements, 
notified  on  16  December  1994,  :1re  described  in  a 
separ:tte  notice  published  in  this  Offida/ jfJumal  of thr 
Europtan  Communities. 
2.  The  Phoen;x  agreements  comprise  two  m.1in  trotns-
actions  invo!·.-ing  \W()  F.u.rope:tn  Union  telecommuni-
c:ttions  org:tniz:ttions  (TO)  and  one  US  •elecummuni-
cations  operator: 
(i)  e:tch  of  FT :tnd  DT is  to  acquire  an  equity  stake  of 
approxim:ttely  10%  in  Sprint  worth  US$  4,2  billion. 
Both  FT  :1nd  DT  will  obt:tin  proponion:ttc:  bf':tn.l 
representation  :tnd  investor  protecti<>n  as  minority 
shueholders  in  Sprint;  as  det:tilcd  below,  prnvi$inns 
h:tve  been  ir.cluded  in  the  lnvf'stment  Agrccm4.'nt  to 
prevent  DT and/or  VI',  either  sc.·p:tratcly  or  juintly, 
from  c,>ntrolling or influencing  Sprint; and 
C')  OJ NoD, 21.  2.  I'J62, r.  204/t»2. 
~.  I  •  ..t  ~~ 
(ii)  Atl:ts  .md  Sprint  are  to  create  a  joint  venture, 
Phoenix,  for  the  provision  of  enh:tnccd  and 
value-:tdded  glob:tl  telecommunications  services  and 
other telccommunic:ttions  services  to corporate users, 
c:trriers  :and  consumers.  ll1e  Phoenix  joint  venture 
will  be  structured  into  several  oper:ttion:tl  entities 
under  the  nrottegic  supervision  of  :1  Glob:tl  Vertture 
Boud  (coll~ctively  referred  to  as  the  'Phoenix 
entities').  One  such  entity  will  provide  Phoenix 
services  worldwide except  in  Europe  and  the  United 
States  (the 'Rest  of World  (ROW) entity'), a second 
entity  will  provide  Phoenix  services  in  Europe excrpt 
in  fr"nce and Germ:tny  (the 'Rest of Europe  (ROE) 
entity')  :tnd  a  third  entity  will  oper:lte  the  global 
b:td.hone network of Phoenix  (the 'Global  Backbone 
Network (GBN)  entity'). The Global  Venture  Boud 
shall  t:tke  dc~isions on  matters  of  policv  only  :t.nd 
will  not  cng~&r  in  the  m:magrmrnt  of  individual 
operational  entities  cre:tted  pursuant  to  thf'  Phoenix 
:tgrecmenu. 
A.  TilE PARTIES 
3.  IJcutschc:  Td,kom  AG  (DT)  and  hann· Tdc.·rum 
(r:T)  arc  tlw  G~rrnan :tnJ  Frenl·h  puhlir TO rr!>pt·c.·tivdy. 
DT  is  the  world's  second-lar,;est  and  VI'  llu·  world's 
fourth-l:trgest  ~~~~communications  carrier  in  term~  of 
revenue.  Det4ils of both  undertaking~ arc  provided  in  the 
notice  on  the  1\~las venture  puhlished  in  this  isslie  of the 
Official  Journal. 
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4.  ::print  ( :orpc ll';llion  I  ~print I  i'  .1  he 1ldlll~~  l'lltnp.lll\' 
:n  the·  l !nitt·d  ~t.llt''· The·  ~print  J~tPup of llllllp.lllic·'  "  .1 
cli\'t'r\ilit·cl  tdt·c·c llflfllllniLH inti\  gn  lllp  pt c  w1d i111~  ~lnh,t  I 
\'Pin·.  ciJt.t  .111cl  \'idt·o-nmfnc·m in~  ,,.n·il (''  .11ul  n·l.11c·d 
produt t\  Sprint\  main  ~uh,idi.Hit'\  ptovidc·  loc·.tl  (lIS) 
t'Xdtatlgt·,  u·llul.tr  win•lt·~' ;t\  v..:c·ll  a' tlnmc·,tic·  (!I\  I  .11ttl 
inu·rn.ttional  long-di'lt.Hil't'  tt'lc·n •mnnutir.uiclll'  ,,  ... ,.,, ,.,. 
( )tlwr  \print  'uh,itliaric·'  t'll~~.tgc·  111  \\ hnln.tlc-
cli,trilllll ion  nf  tdt·rommunir.ll io11'  ptntlul·t'  .111cl  1  he· 
puhli,hing  and  m;trk.c·tin~  of  whitt·  ;wd  yt'llo\\  p.t~c· 
tt·kplumc·  din·noric·'·  Wnrldwidt·  turnovc·r  for  "ipnrtt  in 
PJ'J.4  w.n  FC:ll  JO,'J  !Jillion;  Sprint  i'  tlw  v. ..  tld\  tldt 
l.tq;t'''  H'lt.'c·ornmunir.llium  ctrrin  in  lt'nt"  111  n·,·c·mu·'· 
II. Tilt ltEI.EVANT MAitKET 
I. Crution of  thr  Phornix  rntitirc, 
S.  'llH.'  l'hoc·ni\  t.'lltttit·'  will  .ttldn·~'  \t'\'c·t.tl  ptndth 1 
.111d  gc.·ographic:  111.1 rk.u '·  nJnwl~·  (  i)  dw  m.trk.c·t'  lor 
v  .lluc·-adtlt:tl  tt:lt.'rnl1trnunit·atio"'  nc·t work.  "'~'' H ,.,  111 
l  orpur:~u·  U\t'f\  hodt  glohally  .uul  n·~~ion.tllv,  Iii I  t ht· 
marke-t  for  travdlc·r  \t•n·in·c,  .lllcl  (iii)  the·  111.11 k.c·t  for 
\tH.:allc·J  l'.urit•r\  rarric.·r  !\t.'rvin·'· 
I.  Product  market\ 
'/7l('  markrts  for  n•/ur-,,clc/c•cl  lt•lt•cmnmll"h'''imu  m·tu·urA• 
l('ri.'i(('J 
f,.  The  Pltoc.•nix  c.·ntitit·c.  will  he.·  .tniv~·  011  tlw  c..mn· 
mark.rt\  for  hc,th  atlvaJtt:t·d  tdc·c·cunmuniratioll\  \t'rvin·' 
tn  l'nrporatc.·  U\t.'r\  and  .\tancbrclitrd  low-lc·,·c.·l  p:u·k.c·t-
c.witdwtl  d:u.1  nmmtunil'Jtiom  \t't'\'in·'  dc·,rrilwd  in  tlw 
\t.'paratc.·  notirc  on  tlw  Atla\  n·attun·  puhti,ht·cl  in  thi' 
i\\Ut.'  of  tlw  Olfic·i.ll  Journal. 
7.  "l11e  market  fur  tr:l\'dlc.·r  tdc.·(.'omrnunir.ttiom 
~orrvice'l  comprisc.·'i  offeringc.  that  met·t  the  tlc.·mancl  of 
inJiviJual~o  who  arr  away  from  tht·ir  ll\lrnt:~l  lol'ation. 
c.·itlu·r  at  home.•  or  .lt  work.  AmnnJ~ tlw  me"'  rt•lt·v:mt  of 
llww  offc.·riu•~'  arc·  1  hmt·  olft•rc·cl  h\·  till'  l'hcwni x c'lll it it•\, 
nanwly  railing r:mlc.  (i.e·.  prt·p.ticl  r.ml' with  or without  .1 
rotlr and  pmtpJid t::trde.),  indudmg thmt· in  nunhin;uiun 
with  ne<lit  card,  and  other  hrandc.·d  \t'rvin  c  .~rd' 
C':tffinity  card\'). 
K.  ( :u\tollll.'l\  foa  tr  ~tvdlc·r  \CTVtl'l'\  t~~rlutlc.·  hot h 
hminc·\c.  travdln,  ;wd  otltt·a  tr.l\'t•llc·a '·  In  tlu·  r.ml 
hu~oine\\ targt.'tc·d  hy  1'h·l('nix,  thl'  fmmc.·r  .trc.·  h~·  far  tltc.· 
largt'\t  group of huyc.·n.  Bm11H'"  1r  .1\'t'llc.·r'  .trt'  ~t·nn  a ltv 
intcmivt.'  rani  U\erc,,  the  main  inrl'ntivt.'  for  Ltnl  m.tg~· 
ht."ing  the  pm,ihilit)'  tu  avoid  payinJ~  ltotd  tdc·phont· 
surdt:~rge~o. 
IS.  12.  'J=, 
'J  Thl'  nt.l rkt't  h •r  l.HIIt·r \  l .trnc.·r  't·rvirn  n unprt\t'\ 
tltt·  lc·.t\t'  ol  tr:tmmi"iun  c·.ap.h.;t~·  .uul  tilt'  provi'lion  of 
rd.llc·d  \l'r\"llt''  111  thinl-p.HI\'  tt'lc·cnmrnuniratiom  traffit· 
\'.11 rit·f\.  :\long  with  liht'l.tlit.ll ion  .uul  ~~loh.tlii.H ion  of 
tl'lnnrtllllllllll .II ion'  m.trk.t·t'>,  clf'm.uul  fur  t·ffit·it·nt,  high-
qu.tlitv  tr.tiiH·  tr.tmport.uion  r.tp.arity  lt."  ric,c.·n  ;among 
11ld  .11HI  rH'\\  rarrwn.  In  tlu' l"nnm·nion.  tlw  tratliti'lllll 
llllltlc-,1  .,f  \t'(l.Hatt·  a rr  .HlJ~c·ntt·llt'  with  otht·r  individu.tl 
c  .IITit'l' i'  inrrt".l\lrt~ly  t h.tlll'rtgc·d  h~·  pl.tyt•r'  with  ~lnlt.al 
m·twork.  infra\lrlltturc.·  that  nlft•r  ctrric·r'  311  .trray  of 
wrvicn.  Tht'  IIHI\1  rdt'\',11\1  ol  \uch  \t'l"\'in·'  an·: 
1.1 I  '"' itdtt·cl  tr.all\it,  it'. tr.lll'l''"''  ol  u.dlic·  11\TI' hil.llt'l,ll 
f.uiliait·'  hc·t\\t't'll  the.·  ori~inating  ~.urin, tht·  trJrt\ll 
l.l  rric·r  .uul  tlw  tt·rrninattrt~  l'  a rrin; awitlwr  the.·  11rig-
in at 111~  l' .an it'f  nc11  1  he·  tt"rrnin.ll in~  r.1 rrit•r  nt•t•tl 
hil.ltc·r.tl  IJt alitrt'\  hc·twc.·c·n  tllt'rmc.ln·'·  hut  on!y  with 
tlw  t r.ul\it  l .11 ric·r; 
II•)  dc·dtt".llnl  tr.1n,it.  'c.·.  u.tn,pnn  ,,r  tnffit·  ovt·r 
pc·rm.IIH'Ill,  dc.·tli\·atnl  LKilitic.·\  thrnu~h tht•  tlume,tit· 
••c.·twork.  of  tilt'  tr.amit  c·.lrrit·r;  f.ll·ilitit·-,  U\C:tl  fur  thi\ 
puqlo\t'  ma~· indutlc.·  di,, n·tt·  \'oin· ort"uiu ur a high-
h:mtlv. ichh  digit.1l  l irnait  that  l';tn  ht·  U\t'c.l  fc,r  huth 
voin· and tl:na  \t'l"\'ict·~; .mtl 
(r)  tl'.lffir  huhhing  ,,ffning,,  whnt•  tht·  pnwidt·r  take\ 
l'.Ht'  of  .til  or part of intc.·rnaticmal  l'tlllllt'niun\; thr\t' 
nfft·nng'  art'  wpil·all~·  c.lt',ignt.'d  fur  c.·rm·rging 
curit·r~.  who  art'  intt.'rl'nnru·nt·d  with  thr  provitlt'r 
on·r hil.ut·r.11  f.u:ilitic.·'  Jntl  whmc·  intt·rn.ltitm.al  tr.tffil' 
j, nlt'rgc.·d  with  ndwr tr.tffit·  nn  the.·  pnwidc·r·  ..  glnhal 
nt·twnrk.. 
:\'  intt·rn.ltitulal  tdcnlllununil'.ltium  m.uk.t.'t!\  art.' 
dl'rt'gulatc.·d,  tll'm;tml  for  ~·arric.·r\  rarric.·r  't•rvin·~  ic. 
inc.:rt·a,ingly  driven  by  .lltcrn.uivc carrier' c.·Pnn·rnc.·d  with 
c.·ntru!ltin~  the:  im·umhent  TO  with  t~tt·i•  intc.•rnationJI 
trJ  Hie.·,  ftlr  rc.·ae.om  sudt  a'  tn·hnit·JI  tkpt·ntlt•nt·y  ami 
c.·ommt•rri.ll  \t'll'.itivil\'  of  ruc,tomc.·r  infnrm:uion 
I  0.  PurdtJ"t"r'  nf  cnric.·r\  t'.Hrit·r  \t'I'VIl'l'\  induc.lt• 
t'\Uhli,ht•tl  and  t•rnc.·r~ing t·.trril'r  ...  Bntla  ~roup' of  dil'nt\ 
h.tvt·  'uh!>t.lntial  hargainin~  pclwt·r  .md  an·  hi~hly 
nuupt·tition-\t'll\itivt.'.  :\mnn~ tlw  bttc.·r  grnUJl,  cHit'  may 
di,tingui'h  l'arilitic·,.h,l\l'-1  r.u ric·"  that  pmvitlc·  tt•lc·n,m-
munit.lliclll\  \t't'Vin'"  ovc·r  .tltc·rat.lli\'C'  inft.I\HUrtuu·  or 
r.thlc·  u·lc·vi,ion  nt•twork,  \C'C'k.in•~  J~rt·Jtc·r c·Hiric·tK\'  in  tht· 
tr.tmpmt  of  intt·rnatinn;ll  du·nt  1r.11fir,  while·  nt\1\ 
f.trilitit·\-ha.,cd  l'.Hrit'r!\  \t.·c.·k.  10  P"''t'l'\'1'  a  nunpt'llll\'t' 
.ulvant.l~t·  h~·  .wuitlint;  tlt•pt·ntlc.·tll'C'  on  a  tool  TO  r~lr 
intnnation.tl  dit·nt  tr.tfiic. 
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l.  G~ographic  rnarkth  ·,. 
II.  t\long  tlw  lim·\  of  tlw  Cornmi.\\ion\  finding\  in  it\ 
BT- rv1CI  tft·l i'ion ('),  the  gt·ographic  ~ropt·  of  n·n;ai:l 
rnarkt't\  targt·tcd  hy  tht•  Phoenix  t•ntitic:\  a\  wdl  a\  tlw 
markt·t  that  rnu'it  he  considcre,:d  in  respt·t·t  of  t ht' 
invemnc.·nt  of DT and  FT  in  Sprint  i~  international  and 
t'Vcn  glohal.  Although  national  borders  ~ubsist  for  many 
~crvit:c~,  ~trau:gic  allian<:cs  like  Phoenix  arc  huih  flllt 
onl>·  in  anticipation  of a  market  unaffected  by  national 
boundaries  but  even  with  the  express  purpo\t'  to  offer 
brge  global  telecommunications  users  'icarnlt•ss 
t·nd-to-end  services  anywhere  by  overcoming  the  diHi-
cultit'~  inhcrt·nt  in  the  current  market  structure  split 
along  national  hor dcrs.  l-lowevc.-r,  the  !iervice  offerings of 
thro  Phoenix  entitit•s  will  be  rclt·vant  to  different  existin~ 
geographic  mark«'l'i. 
J1,r  m,zrkt/1  /or  t.'alut•-addrd  trlt•mmmunicatiom  network 
ffrt'l(ff 
11.  As  dcscrilwd  in  the separate  Atlas  notice,  demand 
by  corporate users  for  advanced services  exists  in  at  least 
three  di~tinct geographic  markets,  namely  at  a  global,  a 
cross-border  regional  and  a  national  level.  Phoenix 
services  will  have  global  reach  given  that  each  of  DT, 
· FT, Sprint and  the  ROE and ROW entities will  be  inter-
ronm·ned over the  Phoenix global backbone network.  In 
dat'  glohal  market  for  advanced  telecommunications 
'>crvin:s  to  corporate  users,  the  Phoenix  venture  will 
therefore  create  competition  for  instance  for  BT  and 
MCI's  existing  Concert venture.  In  the  European  Union, 
the  ROE entity will  cooperJte with  DT, fr  and  A"I1.AS 
to  provide  advanet•d  telecommunications  services  to 
wrporate  u~ers at  the  cross-border  regional  level;  these 
services  will  have  'global  connectivity',  i.e.  allow  for  an 
extemion  beyond  thr  European  Uniori  if  a  customer  so 
requ1re<t. 
13.  Standardized  low-levd  p:wket-w•itrlwd  d.H:t 
communicatiom  ~ervices  in  t':arh  l~t·ogr;tphil:  m:u kt·t 
mentioned  in  the  previous  paragraph  are  a  pan  of  the 
Phoenix  offering~ portfolio.  However,  ~uch  ~crvicc:~  will 
be  provided  at  the  national  level  only  if  so  decided  uy 
the  regional  Phoenix  operating  entity.  Therefore,  the 
ROE  entity  will  provide  Europe-wide  packet-switched 
data  tommunications  services,  that  will  initially  be  b;m·d 
on  dar  exiHing  Transpac  and  Sprint  networks.  The 
extent  to  which  the  ROE  entity  will  providt·  such 
~ervin·\ in  national  market~ within  the  EEA  will  tlept·nd 
(
1
)  CortiiTii\,1011  d~·riwm of 27  July  I'J'J.I  (0,1  No I.  21.',  27.  II. 
I'J'H, p.  ,ll,). 
on  dll'  t·otmlinati(lh  ht·twt;t·n  Atl.i'  .md  tlw  IH >1.  t·nut:. 
:t\  tht·  rompt•tt·nt  J>hot•nix  l'llllt~·  in  1h.1t  rq~inn. 
14.  Alon~ with  the  ~luhalintion of  tlw  t•t·muHny  tht· 
markt·t  for  t ravellt•r  ~ervires  .lppt·ar'  to  lw  innt·.l\int-;ly 
~loh:tl;  worldwide  travdlt·r~  dt·rnaml  off~·rin~\  whirh 
include  a  sin~le  hill  and  intc:~ratc.·d  funcuom  \uch  a!> 
voin•  mt·ssagin~, voi<:e  respomt•  and  information  'Y'It'J~\. 
G-:ographic  limitations  of  t·urrer~t  tr;wcllt-r  .  ~t·rvll"t' 
offe.-ings  arc  ~ent·rally due  to tt·chnKal  \hortr~munt-;~  '~·t 
to he  overcome in  the ncar future,  .,ud1  a\ tht·  anrnrnpall-
bilit~· of rnohile  communit·atinm wMern\  or tliHt·n·nn•\  in 
prepaid  cards  without  an  individ~al uwr t·odt·.  A'  il~u!o­
trated  at  p:tragraph  7  above,  mmt•  of  tht·  \t'rvll'l'\ 
targeted  hy  the  Phoenix  entitie~  j,  a_flt•t'tt•tl  hy  tht'\l' 
shortcomings;  however,  the  geo~raphar  \l'opc  of  the 
traveller  !iervicc:~ offered  hv  Phot•ntx  can  ht·  lc·h  open  for 
the  purpose!~  of  this  t·a~~.  a\  tht·  finding  of  narrow 
gt·ographic  markets  would  not  afft•t·t  tht·  a\\l'\\OU.'nt  of 
the  panics'  competitive  pmitinn. 
'/be  market for  carrier$  carritr  Jt'rr..·icrJ 
15.  Both  supply  of  and  demand  for  c:trm·r ~  carrier 
services  are  by  nature  international.  Geographic 
proximity  between  purcha$er  and  supplier  of  swiu·hed 
u ansit  capacity  is  hardly  reJc,·  - for  switchrd  transit 
which  carriers  use  either  as  a  ~  'titute  for  operating 
own  international  lines  or  to  deal  with  peak  tr:tffir  on 
su1.:h  lines.  Likewise,  dcdicatt•d  tr.m~it  \tn·an·~  offrr 
cable- or  s:uellite-based  routing  t·apal'ity  Jcro'!l  third 
countries.  Finallv,  using  hubbing  ser-..·ires  is  an  ahrrnativr 
to  entering  int~  an  undetermined  numher  ,,f  hil.ttt•rai 
.agreem('nts  with  individual  c;lrricrs. 
2.  DT and  FTs innstment  in  Sprint 
I(,.  '111l'  ll'<jlll~lllOn  hy  DT  .Hid  FT  ,,f  llt'W  l'll\lll~ 
l'ttuivalt·nt  tu an  lpproximatt·  20%  \t.lkt•  in  s,mnt  airm 
;n  Lonsolidating  a  strategic  alliann·  tn  t•nter  tht•  glohal 
telecommunications  markets,  whirh  ~t·rvt'\  tlw  panie' 
ben  interest  to  improvr  and  t'Xtt•ntl  \ervin·  in  m·w 
market  segments.  Telecpnununicatiom  markt·t'  an· 
developing  quickly  and  there  i~  unn·rtaint)'  ahout  what 
thry will  look  likt•  in  a  few  yt·an.'  tinw:  tin·  prmpt·n  of 
full  libt•rali7.ation  is  pushing  TO'~ to  takt·  pmition\,  in 
(lrder  to  he  in  the  bt•M  pmsihlt·  'lituatinn  whrn  full 
liberalization  come~. A'!i  shown  b~·  tilt'  BT-MCI  alliJrKt', 
invemnrnt  in  a  US  rarril'r  nfft•n  nnt·  dfirit•nt  way  tn 
atldreH  muhinational  nunp.mit·'·  i.e·.  tlu·  l.u~n1  t;IIJ~c·t 
&:U!itomt•r  group  for  t-;lobal  \'aluc·-.tddt•tl  tdc•ulllllll\1111-
l'atiom.  nrtwork  st·rvirrs,  nmahl~·  in  tlw  l lnitt·d  Stall'!.. 
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C.  MARKET  SIIAitES 01:  PIIOENIX 
11•c·  m"rkt•lf  for  "'lt•,mn•J  ft•lc•mmmumcatimu  st·rvict'l  to 
o ••1f'01"f('  IIJf'rJ 
17.  (i/ob.ll  markrt.  ·n,e  par::-nt~  (.'!ltimatt'  tht•  ~lobal 
vJiut.·-added  lcll'l"Omn·.mic:uiom  network  !lcr.·•ccs 
m.ukct  addre!l!lrd  hy  Phocni::  (exdu,ive  of  d:na 
nlnununintiom  \l'rvin•!~)  Hl  he  wonh  approximately 
ECU  4,tc  billion  ( I'J9J). Of this  total, end-to-end !lcrviccs 
.1u:ountc:d  for  approximately  ECU  37,6  million,  VPN 
\crvin·r,  for  approximately  ECU  2,M  billion,  VSAT 
\f"n.'i<:c\  for  .tpproximatcly  ECU  1,4  billion  and 
ouuourcing services  for  approximately  ECU  527  million. 
In  I'J'J3,  the aggrt-gate turnover of DT, FT and Sprint  in 
tht- different  rnarkt•t  segment~  amounted  to 
approximately  ECU  ),K  million  for  ('nd-w-end  services, 
approximately  ECU  576  million  for  VPN  service!~  and 
:approxir:latcl)·  1-:cu  b  million  fnr  ouuC'urcing  !lervice!l, 
giving  Phoenix  a  tht•ort"tical  market  share  of  II,K %  in 
the- global  market.  for  :advann·d  tdt•cornmunications 
servit.·es  to  corporate  users. 
18.  Cross-border  regional  market.  Services  in  the 
Eurnpean  Uniun  (exclusive  of  data  communications 
servi~es) accounted  for  approximately  ECU  ~05 million 
in  1993.  According  to  the  notification  the  Phoenix 
parents'  aggregate  market shares  in  the  European  Union 
in  1993  were  [ ...  ] % C>  in  the  end-t~-cnd  services 
market,  [ ...  ] % (•)  ;n  the  VPN  st"rvices  market 
[ ...  ) % C')  in  the  outsourcing  services  market  and 
( ...  J % (') in  tht•  VSAT market.  However,  market  ~hares 
for  VSAT  servtces  are  diHicult  to  calculate  given  that 
TO~ mostly  use  VSAT terminals  as  hack-up  facilitie~ for 
othl"r  ~ervices  or  to  extend  the  geographic  scope  of 
\ervices  despitt"  terrestrial  infraMru<.·turc  shortcomings. 
I'J.  National  m"rkets.  National  markets  for  advan<.·cd 
ttlr-communication~  ~t·r vi<.·es  to corporatt.·  users  within  the 
EEA  are  discmscd  in  th~  notice  nn  1ht·  Atlas  venture, 
published  in  thi.\  i\~ue  nf  ~ht·  Official  Journal.  In  this 
rt"gard,  Sprint  ha\ a  ~ignifi<.·ant  'hart• of total  nut~ourcing 
turnover  grnc:ratt·d  in  Mcmbt.·r  Statt·\  \Ul"h  a!t  the 
Netherlands  ( ...  ] % (')  Jnd  tht·  Unitt"d  Kingdom 
(  ...  J% ('),  where  DT  and  vr·..  OUt\OUrcing  joint 
vt"nturc,  Euneu:om  BV,  has  a  le\scr  prc!lt•ncc  (5 %  of 
total turnover in  both  Member State\). A  ..  fur  hanl·e and 
Grrmany, adding  Sprint  to  DT and  FT hrings  Ph(l('nix's 
fictional  aggregate  share  of  total  turnm·t·r  gt•nerated  hy 
( 
1
)  Bu,int\\ \t'Htt  Ot'\\  1han  30  ~h 
(')  Bu\inr\s stnrt (It'\\ than  .\0 %). 
(')  Dusinrn  srcret  (ltn than  S %). 
(')  Uu\inr\\  \C't'n't  Clr\\ than  H  %). 
(')  Uu\ints\  \C't'tC"I  llt·n  th.1n  10 %). 
(
1
)  UusintH  ~crrt flf'\\  th.ln  10 %). 
outsourcing  services  to  [- - .J % n  in  hann·  Jnd  to 
( ...  ) % ('
0
)  in  Germany,  compared  with  31  o/::  in  france 
and  33%  in  Germany  for  the  \ct:ond-large!tt  provider, 
Conccn's  Syncordia,  in  both  thc\c  national  markets. 
"/be  market for standardized low-lfVfl packet-switched data 
com m  11n ications  serviu.•s 
20.  ·ntc  global  market  for  standardized  low-level 
packet-switched  d:ua  services  was  wonh  approximately 
ECU  5,3  billion  in  1?'J3,  while  DT,  Vr  and  Sprint's 
aggregate  sales  were  [ ...  ] (
11
)  or [ ...  ] % \
11
)  worldwide. 
The  European  market  for  data  communications  sen•ices 
is  discussed  in  the  separate  notit-c:  on  the  Atlas  trans-
action,  published  in  this  issue  of  the  Official  Journ:al. 
Sprint's  turnover  for  standardized  low-level  p:acket-
switched  data  !tervices  was  ( ...  ]  in  1993,  bringing  DT. 
VI'  and  Sprint's  aggregate  shares  of  that  market  to 
[ ...  ) % (").  A!l  for  national  markeu,  Sprint  achieved  its 
highest  turnov~r  in  France,  Germany,  Italy  and  the 
United  Kingdom.  Neither DT nor 1-·r  have  a  signifinnt 
market  presence  in  the  latter two  Member  States,  where 
Sprint  has  [ ...  ] % (
14
)  and  ( ...  ] % (")  market  share 
respectively.  In  turn,  Sprint's  turnover  in  France  (ECU 
[ ...  ] ("})  and  Germ:any  (ECU  [ ...  ) (''))  equals  market 
shares  in  these  Member  States  of  only  [ ...  ] %  and 
[ ...  ] %  respectively (
11
). 
7be  market /or traveller  services 
21.  Total calling card  revenue  in  the  European Union 
was  approximately  ECU  120,5  million  in  1994,  most  of 
which  generated  by  national  dialling.  In  1993,  DT had 
issued  200 000  cards  (lll  of  which  in  Germ:any), 
equivalent  to  2,1  % of the  total  card  subscriber  bast"  in 
the  European Union; n· had  issued  1,5  million  cards (all 
of  which  in  France),  etJuivalent  to  I  5,7 %  of  the  card 
subscriber  base  in  the  European  Union;  and  Sprint  had 
issued  12  million  cards  wurldwidC',  of  which  500 000 
(equivalent  to  a  5,2 %  market  sharr)  in  the  Europc-;an 
Union.  The  aggregate  m:arkl't  shart'll  of  tht'  plrents 
would  therdore  makr  Phoenix  lltl'  largt'st  ralling·l'3rd 
\crv!ces  provider  in  the  Eurupcan  Union  (H %  m~lrkt"t 
share)  in  terms  of subscriber  nunlbcrs,  ahead  nf  AT~T 
and  BT  with  21  and  17,8%  market  shart'  re!~prctively. 
(')  8usinru srcrrt  Orn than  45 %). 
c••)  Businru  srcrrt  0f'n than  40 %). 
(")  Bu~inrS\  srcrrt. 
(")  Dusir:tn  ~rrrr1  flt'n  1han  2S %). 
(")  Bu,inr\\ srntl (lrn than  40 %) 
(")  Dusinrn  srcrr1  (lr~~ than  5 %). 
(")  Bu~inrn srnrt (lru than  5 %). 
(
10
)  Bu\int\\  \tnt't. 
(")  Bu\inrn  St'l.."rC't. 
(,.)  Businr~s srcrtt  fie\\  th:an  5%  rf'\flC'l·ti\'d\') 
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In  terms  of  calling  card·  traffic  withiR  the  European 
Union,  the  aggregate  market  shares  of  FT  (2 I %)  and 
DT (3 %)  are  equal  to  BT's  market  share  of  24 %. 
Tnt  market for  carrier's  carrier  services 
22.  The  market  for  glob::al  switched  transit  services  is 
C!ltimatcJ  robe worth  approximately  ECU  301,1  million, 
equivalent  to  I 500  million  minutes  of  internation. d 
traffic  or approximately  3 %  of the  world's  international 
telephony  traffic.  Of  this  total,  approximately  ECU 
165,6  million  are  services  provided  by  European  carriers, 
of  which  approximately  ECU  30, I  million  to  other 
European  carriers.  Within  the  global  switched  transit 
market  (1994),  with  5-6%  annual  growth,  DT  had  a 
turnover  of  ECU  [ ...  ] ("),  FT  of  ECU  [ ...  ] {'
0
)  and 
Sprint  of ECU [ ...  ) (
11
). The aggregate  market shares  of 
DT, IT and  Sp·int make  Phoenix the third  largest global 
switched  transit  provider  behind  AT&T and  BT  (20,2% 
each). 
D.  MAIN  COMPETITORS OF THE PHOENIX ENTITIES 
n,e  market  /or  vallle-added  telecomm•mications  network 
services 
23.  The  situation  in  these  markets  is  discussed  in  the 
separate  notice  on  the  Atlas  venture  published  in  this 
issue  of  the  Official  Journal. 
Tbe  market for  traveller  services 
24.  More  than  one  third  of  cailing  cards  in  Europe 
are issued  by  US operators. AT&T is  estimated  to have  2 
million  postpaid  card  customers  in  Europe, equivalent  to 
21  % of all  cards  issued  there.  These  customers  generate 
59 %  of  calling  card  traffic  initiated  in  Europe  on  tlw 
US  route.  MCI  i~  e~timated  to  have  I  million  poupaid 
card  customers  in  Europe  ( 10,5 %),  which  generate 
27%  of  calling  card  traffic  initiated  in  Europe  on  the 
US  route.  Exrcutive  Tclecard  International  (ETI) 
markets calling cards  in  Europe through  agreement~ with 
local  oprrator~ or  c.-red it  c.·:ud  c:ompanic~; ETI's  markrt 
position  is  !limilar  to  that  ot  MCI. 
(")  Ousinrn  ~rcrrt (rn.:lrkrt  ,!Jur It"\\  th;ln  10 %). 
(
10
)  Bu~inrn secrrt  (markrt sh.:1rr  It\\ than  15 %). 
(
11
)  Busineu  srcrrt (mukrt sh.:1re  lr\s than  5 %). 
.11w  m~rket for carrit•r's  carrier  servict•s 
25.  Major  playcn  in  the  market  for  l·arrier's  carrier 
services  and  notably  global  switched  tramit  ~ervices 
competing  in  the  EEA  include  AT&T,  BT (each  holding 
approximately  one  fifth  of  the  market),  Cable & 
Wireless,  MCI  and  Teleglobe  Canada.  Along  with  the 
incrcasinc  proliferation  of  new  carriers  that  seck  to  be 
independent. of the  incumbent TO for  their  international 
traffic,  new  supplier~  of  suc.·h  service~.  some  with 
substantial  infrastructure  resources,  arc  emerging  in  the 
market,  e.g.  Hermes  Europe  Raihel. 
E.  TilE TRANSACTION 
26.  The  transaction  notified  to  the  Commission 
comprises  a  set  of  agreements  whme  mam  features  :arc 
described  below. 
1.  Agreements as  originally notified 
I.  Agreements  regarding  the  Phoe11ix joint  wnta~re 
The  panics  have  to  date:  submitted  one  final 
agreement:  the  Phoenix  joint  Venture  Agrremenl 
(the  'JV  Agreement'),  that  sets  out  the  panics' 
essential  commitments  and  businc~s  objectives. 
Attached  as  ann~xes  to  the  JV  Agreement  arc 
detailed  term  sheets  for  all  agreements  desnibed 
below,  which  will  be  submitted  upon  dosin~ of tltc 
Phoenix  transactipn.  'llu~se  term  sheets  detJil  the 
agreed content of the  foUowing  agreements: 
(a)  the  Traniftr  Agrtfments  will  provide  for  the 
transfer  by  Sprint,  Ff,  DT,  and  Atlas 
(collectively  referred  to  as  the  'p:arents')  of 
certain  basic  aod  related  businesses  to  the 
relevant RO£, ROW, and GBN entities. 
(b) 'lllc lntt•llt•rW4/  /7opt•r(Y ,,.J Trcltlt•m,rrk  /.in•PICt' 
AgrtemtPI(s  will  ~onn.·rn  the  t;rant  hy  ti•r 
rarcnts  and  c:c:rtain  affiliatt·!i  tu  the:  Phol·nix 
t•ntities  .,(  •wn-~.xc.:lusivc.·,  IHln-tramfc.·rahlc 
lircmccs  to  u!:c  t'efltlin  of the  p.uc.•nt!i'  tcc.:lmil·al 
information  otnd  tr~~cmark\. 
(c)  "11te  Sc.·rviCt's  A~  rec.•mt•u ts  will  .-.pccify  the  tcrm!i 
:md  conditinm  of  tr.ul;ng  relatiumhip~ among 
Sprint,  Atlall,  and  the  ROE and  ROW  entitil'~, 
inducting  tht•  supply  and  !lupport  ~t'rviccll 
needed  to provide  Phoenix  \l'rvkc.·ll  worldwid(. 
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2.  Agrttm£'nts  ·regarding  Fr ami  IJT's  int'£'st~nent  m 
Sprint 
(a)  The  l11n•stmtnt  Agrerment  will  provide  for  the 
purchase  by  each  uf  FT  and  DT  of 
approximately  10%  of  the  common  stork  of 
Sprint. 
(b)  The  Standstill Agretment will  bind  FT lnd DT 
for  a  period  of  15  years  not  to  ac<Juirc 
additional  shares  in  Sprint  which  would 
increase  d.~ir combined  aggregate  vming  rights 
to  more  than  20 %. 
(c)  The  Registration  Rights  Agreement  is  required 
in  order  for  coach  pant  to  consummate  the 
troansactions  contemplated  by  the  Investment 
Agreement. 
2.  Main Contractual  Provisions 
I. Concemi11g  tht Phoenix  Entities 
(a)  Structure of  the  Phoenix venture 
The JV Agreement provides  for  the  creation of 
the  following  operating  entitie$:  Phoenix  Rest 
of Europe  (ROE)~ Phoenix  Rest  of the  World 
(ROW)  end  Global  Backbone  Network 
(GBN).  The  ROE  entity  will  conduct  the 
Phoenix  business  within  the  'rest  of  Europe' 
region  (i.e.  outside  '.lf  France  and  Germany), 
while  the  ROW  entity  will  cor.duct  the 
Phoenix  business  within  the  'rest of the  world' 
region  (i.e.  outside  Europe  and  the  United 
States). The GBN  entity  will  own  and  operate 
a  global  transmission  network  over  which 
Photnix  services  and  other  traffic  will  be 
routed. 
1-·r  and  DT  will  each  be  the  exclusive 
distributor  of  Phoenix  services  in  France  and 
Germany  respectively;  however,  IT  and  DT 
will  meet  unsolicited  customer  requests  for 
4ic:rvices  regardless  of  the  customer's  location. 
Moreover,  the  I;rench  and  German subsidiaries 
of Atlas  will  provide  ..  ,.  and  DT with  (i)  sales 
suppon services  regarding  Phoenix  products  to 
distributors  in  France  :-.nd  Germany;  and  (ii) 
services  within  the scope of Phoenix other than 
X.25  packet-switched  data  network  services. 
A new,  wholly-owned  subsidiary  of Sprint  (the 
'Sprint Subsidiary') and  Atlas  will  each  initially 
own  50 % of the  outstanding  voting  equity  of 
each  of the  parent  entities  of the  ROW entity 
and  the GBN entity. lbe Sprint Subsidiary and 
Atlas  will  initially  own  33'h  and  662/)%, 
re~pectively, of the  voting  equity ·~r ;he parent 
entity of the  ROE entity. 
A Global  Venture  Board  will  be  :\tabli~hcd to 
set  global  policies  and  monitor  · ompbnce of 
the  operating  groups  with  their  •usiness  plam. 
Any  initiative of the  Global  Vent Jre  Board  will 
generally  require a unanimous vctc. 
Day-to-day  operations  will  l•c  the  responsi-
bility  of  the  chief  executive:  officers  of  the 
operating  entities~  who  are  under  the  surrr-
vision  of  the  governing  board  of  the  relcvant 
parent  entity  of  either  the  ROE,  ROW,.  or 
GBN  entity.  Most  decisions  of each  governing 
board  will  be  adoapted  by  simple  majority  vote 
of the  members  present.  Unanimous  consent  is 
however  required  for  a  number  of  imponant 
decisions  including  final  approv:al  of  busincss 
pb.ns,  cenain changes  in  structure  :and  c~pital­
ization,  and  cenain  decisions  on  technology 
and  investments. 
(b)  Purposes  anJ aditJitits of  Ph«nix tntitits 
The  business  of the  joint  venture  will  initially 
consist  of  the  provision  of  (i)  global  inter-
national  data~  voice,  and  video  business 
services  for  multinational  companies  and 
business  customers;  (ii)  international  services 
for  consumers,  initially  b~sed on  card  services 
for  travellers,  and  (iii)  carrier  services 
providing  cenain  transpon  services  for  the 
parents  and  other  carriea"S.  1ne  Phoenix 
entities  may  also  offer  telecommunications 
equipment and  invest  in  national oper:uions. 
To  market  these  services  the  Phoenix  joint 
venture  will  be  responsible  for  the  planning 
and  management  functions  of  operations,  as 
well  as  marketing  and  customer  suppon. 
including  the  following: 
(i)  central  coordination  of  product  dcvC'I-
opment  and  management  to  ensure 
seamless  global  · services;  the  Phoenix 
entities  shall  notably  define  functionality, 
technical  standards,  and  service  level 
requiremems  for  Phoenix  servicrs; 
(ii)  implementation  of  a  common  global 
network and  information systems  platform 
rationalizing  and  imegroating  the  currently 
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\Cfl.lf.!lt'  .imt·rnltinn.d  d.ll.l,  vio1u·.  .a11d 
0\'t·rb  ~·  fH.'t work\ of till'  p.Ht'llt';  l ht·  ( ,fr" 
will  link  ovl·rbv  and  h.ltkht•m·  uetwl•rk' 
in  c.trh  opc:r:u.iu~  aa·.1  (ix.  ROI-.  .IIlli 
ROW)  while.·  propril't.try  imnl.ttn  will 
;tllov.  provi~iun  of  \t'.lllllt·"  \t·rvic n; 
witluu  it\  fir\t  ft·w  ~·t·.ar\  of  IIJlt'r.uing, 
l'hotnix  will  hq~iu  to  tkplo~·  tht'  JH'\1 
~c.·nc.·r.ttion  of  :\\ynrhroiHlll\  Tr.llt\ln 
Mod  c.·  (.1\TM)  tc:dmolo~y, rompri,irag  .1m 
and  all  of  tr;ln'>mi\\ioll,  \\Vitrhing. 
'>i~nalling,  nt'twork  intelligt·rKc.·.  .1nd 
~avin·  rnana~enwm elernc.·m'; 
(iii)  imc.·gr:ttiun  and  dcvcloprnt'nt  of 
information  w~tcm'>  for  l'Oordin:~tcd 
billing,  c:u~toml:r  ~uppon, :tnd  othl'r  h:tck-
offil'e  function!~,  ~upponing  n;uion;tl 
di'ltrihutors;  and 
(iv)  dcvdop!lll'llt  of  .l  \Jin  prncnn·  in  tlw 
RCF:  and  ROW  tc.·rritorit·'  t·itlll'r  dirt.·nh 
or  through  di\trihutioll  arr.lllgt'lllt'lll\ 
u'ling  a  <.'omrnon  'm:~o,terhra11d'.  i11 
particular,  n:~tion:tl  o,ervirc  operatiom  will 
he  e~tabli~hcd  or  romolidated  in  c.·at"h 
major wuntry, and  will  be.·  rc~ponsiblt- for 
di~tributing  Phm·nix  ~ervicc\  wi~hin  that 
country;  in  addition,  region a I  \lit•\  ofiin:\ 
will  he  established  to  provide.·  tn·hnic•l 
and  !>ales  'lUpport,  induding  idc.·ntifil':ttion 
of  potenti:tl  customc:n  and  :l'>'i~ting  111 
preraration of cu\tnrnt·r prnpm:tk 
(c)  Provisio11J  :rmcenr111g  dt·lllinJ.:s  u·rll~lb)'  /
1hrH·,zix 
entitit·s 
J>unu;ull  to  the  JV  A~rt.Tmt.·nt,  tr:ln\.lttilln\ 
arnon~ dw  PilllC.'Ilix  t·ntitit'\,  on  dw  nnt·  h.utd, 
and  I·T  1>'1',  ;and  Atl.l\,  on  dH·  "tlu·•,  ·.~·ill 
gcnc.·rally  he.·  nmdunt·d  Oil  the  rnmt  l.tvour.ahlc· 
tc·rnn  :tllll  ronditiom  th.u  :liT  ••llcrt'd  tn  third 
p;trtre~.  lf  produt.t\,  \t'r\'lll'\,  "'  f.11  diun 
relevant  to  thnl'  tr.lll\.1Cii1HI\  :\It'  r111t 
(  omrnt·rci:~llv  .avaibhk,  \uds  ~l.lfl\,lltiom  ,Ja,tll 
bc·  conclutt;·d  in  .tnord;uHc  \\id •.  111  .11111\ 
length  pri<..in~  method,  ming  tull-ln\t  11'1111· 
hur\t·rnt·nt  or  \urh  odll'r  .Hill\  lc·rlJ~th  1Hilln~: 
method  a'l  m:ty  bt·  agrc.·nl  on  h~  dtt·  p.trtlt''· 
The plrt'nt'l \hall  hJ\'C  thc  fir\t  right  to oftn ttl 
'lupply  n·rt:~in  produl't\,  't·r·virl'\,  and  f.Kilitin 
til  tht·  l'luH'nix  (.'ntitit·'l.  Notwith'~.lndin~~· e.ah 
Phocni).  elllit~·  may  purdt:l\t'  trurn  .1  third 
p.trty  which,  I'll  other wi\t·  t o•up:u .1hlt·  tt'rrll\ 
.uul  t 1  •lid i1 i1 oil\,  1  olin\ l11wn  prit n, t·itln·r  •  I Ill t· 
tltt·  p; nit'\  h,t\'1'  ht·t·n  ~~iH:n  tht·  upponu:11ty  tn 
rn;ttda  ,udt  tnrm  ;ual  ro11dirium  or  if  a 
t U\tunu·r  'n rt·qurn·'· 
L.1da  of  tilt'  Phot·llix  c·nutic·\  .md  tllt'ir  p.arntt\ 
h.tvc·  the  fir\t  riglu  to ollt·r  to pc.·rfmm  111  dtt·ir 
rt'\pt·ctivi·  taritory  .all~'  l.at ilitic·'  or  ,,.,.\'lit'\ 
rt·quirc:d  h~·  anotht·r  party  to  the.·  Phot·flix 
:l~~n·c·mt'lll \.  'out h  \t·n·iu·'  rn;l ~·  lw  oht.tinnl 
from  a  third  p.•n~·  :lt  J  lown  prin·  undn 
comparable.·  tC:rlll\  :tml  t"onditiom,  or  whnt•  a 
t'U\\tlllll'r  \tl  n·quirn.  In  an·onl.uKt'  with  thi' 
print"iplt·,  tlw  ROE  ami  ROW  c:ntitit·\  will  he.· 
rc.·quirc·d  to  pun:ha\t'  tdt·t'onununicHiom 
rwtwork  tr.1mrni\\ion  rJparity  from  the.·  GBN 
t•ntit~·  to tht·  c.·xtt·m  :~vailahle. 
(d)  1\'o, -rompt•/t'  prot.·Hiom;  diJtTIImtimr 
PUI \11.1111  tu  thl'  JV  :\gn·t·mrnt  ,1\  t'l·~~m.lll~· 
notified,  .1lhcit  \llhtn:t  to  v.Hit'll'  nn-ptitlll\, 
no party or affil1ate  of  .1  pMty  may  Ji,tributc.· 
.uw  intt·rn:~tional  tclt•t:ommum<.'atitm~  \t·n.·it'c:\ 
wl;id1  art·  either  provided  by  the  Phoenix 
t•ntitic'l  or  \Uh'ititutahlc  lor  \urh  ~ervin·\. 
l.ikc.·wi~c.·,  no  p;trty  or affiliatt·  of  J  pany  may 
invc~t  in  arw  ('ntitv  that  offer\  \Ut:h  sen.·in·'l. 
Moreover,  n~l plrt): or any of it' affili:tH.''i  may 
offer  national  long-distanl·c  scrviu~'  in 
n>mpc.·titinn  with  c.·ithcr  :1  n  .  .uional  opt·ration of 
Phoenix  ur  a  puhlir  tdt·phonc  operator 
affiliated  with  Phoenix  (q~.  :l  nation:ll 
di~trihutor of Phoenix).  Nor  m.:~~·  .:~ny  party ''r 
:ln\'  of  it\  Jffili.m·~  nuke  inn·,tmc.·nt~  in  .1m 
l'll;it~·  offc.•ril'~  'ud1  rompc.·tin~  n.uit,n.tl  1\lll~ 
di~tllll't'  \t'r\'il'c\  or  in  any  n.lti\ln.tl  ''pt'r.Hi\'ll 
aliied  \Vith  .1  rn.tjor t'tlfllJll'titor of  Phot·ni\. 
\. lUt\idt  tltt'  p.llt'llt\'  h·.lllll'  llllllllllt'\ t'\llll\1\"ll\ 
will  he·  gr.tntt·d  hl  di,tl ihuwr'  on  .1  l ,\\t' 
hy-ct\t'  h,,,i,.  1 1.t\\iH'  ,,dt·'  In  llllt'  di,tllhutor 
to  l'll\llllllt'r'  in  tlw  rnpt't"tivt'  ,,,In tnstllll\' nt 
:ua~·  uthn  di,trihuh:•  will  ht·  .tll,•wnl  i11  tlw 
IT:\. 
(d  /.iltiiU'S  to  /'c  gr.lii/C',/tu  /'/•ontl\  1'11/1/lc') 
Undc:r  tltt·  lntt'lll·rtu.tl  Prupr1 ty  Ar.n·t'lllt'lll', 
t'.lt.'h  p.Ht·nt  will  ~r.tllt  t'.tdt  t\f  tlw  Phnt·ni' 
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c:ntitic:s  non-exclusive,  non-transfc:rablc  fict·ncc:!l 
to  usc  certain  technical  information  of  that 
parent  in  the  respective  territories  of  \UCh 
enuues  to  conduct  the  Phoenix  business.  Each 
Ph~nix  entity  shall  have  the  right  to 
sub-licc:me  lhe  rights  granted  to  any  other 
Ph()("nix  entity  or  any  affiliated  national 
operation  or local  partner,  to  the  extent  5Juch 
sub-licence  is  necessary  to conduct the  Phoenix 
business.  Likewise,  each  Phoenix  entity  shall 
on  request  also  sub-license  such  rights  to  any 
parent or affiliate of such  parent,lto the  extent 
such  sub-licence  is  necessary  to  con.duct  the 
Phoenix  business. 
Royahit•s  shall  be  payable  as  cu~wmary in  the 
market  and  m:J~otiatc:d  by  the  panics  on  an 
arm's-length  basis.  Licence:  rights  ~ranted w  a 
party  under  the  Intellectual  Property 
Agreements  will  continue  in  the  event of either 
termination  of the  Phoenix  venture  or tramfcr 
of such  pany's interest  in  the  Phoenix  venture. 
Similarly,  pursuant  to  the  Trademark  Licence 
Agreement  each  parent  grams  each  oi  the 
Phoenix  entities  non-exclusive,  non-trans-
fcrabl!  rights  to usc  certain  trademarks owned 
by  or  licensed  to  such  parent  in  <:onnecticn 
with  the  marketing  or  sale  of  certain  auth-
orized  products  and  services  in  the  respective 
territories of such  entity. 
2.  CpnCfming  Fr  a1zd  IJT'J  it~vt·stment in  .~prirzt 
(a)  Reurictions  on  transfor  of sharti  lry  IT or  /)'{' 
and ltmitis  on  increases  of thrir  sh,zrelmldit~g  in 
Sprint 
Pursuant  to  the  Investment  Agret:rnem,  rt·ither 
f·T or OT may  dispme  or  it' !!hare\  in  Sprint 
for  five  years  after the  dosing date.  Thereafter 
restrictions  apply  to  large  transfers,  which 
would  in  most  circumstanct•s  ~ivc  Sprim  the 
rights  of firn  refusal. 
Punuant  to  the  St~tml~till  A~n·cmc:nt, FT  and 
[..fJ'  5JI1JJI  each  havt·  the  ri~l11  to  ;u·,tuirc: 
additional  Sprint  ~hart'\ to  n·arh  .md  maint.:tin 
a  10  ~~  !.harcholdin~, hut  !~hall  not  for  IS  yt·an 
.:tftrr  tlw  dming d:uc  ;u:'luin·  ;lddition.:tl  !!h;lrt:!l 
that  would  incrcau·  their  a,;gu.·g.:tte  vmin~ 
rights  to  more  tl~an  20 %.  Once  thi~  initial 
·~tandstill' period  Ius expired,  I·T and  DT may 
acquire  additional  share.,,  hut  may  not  increast.· 
their  aggre~atc  voting  rights  above  30 %  nor 
conduct  cenain  activitie\  intended  at  taking 
(.'Ontrol  of Sprint. 
(b) Consent  rights  and  board  representation  of Fr 
and DT 
I·T and  DT have  the  right  to elect  directors to 
the  Sprint  board  in  proportion  to  their  share· 
holding,  provided  that  each  has  the  right  to 
elect  at  least  one  director.  Neither  FT or  DT 
may  have  access  to  confidential,  competitive 
information  on  Sprint's  ~u:tiv-itit·s  in  thr  EEA 
throu~h their  reprc.·lic.'ntJtion  on  Sprint\. huanl. 
Nor  may  tln·se  repre!lentJtives  providt"  Sprint 
with  confidential  informJtion  that  FT  or  DT 
may  have  obtained  from  US  t"urnprtitur\ 
throu~h corrc:5Jpondent  n:btiomhip\. 
As  the  sole  holden of Sprint's cla!ls  :\ common 
5Jtock,  I-T  and  DT  have  been  ~rante-d 
substantial  nmsensu.tl  right~  with  rt~'ipt'ct  to 
cenain  corporate  actions  of  Sprint,  which 
nevertheless  fall  considerably  short  of  control. 
These  actions  include  major  equity  issuances, 
disapproval  of  investments  in  Sprint  by  major 
competitors,  participation  rights  in  transactions 
involving  change of control, and  other bilateral 
corporate  transactions.  fT  and  DT  have  a 
right of first  offer with  respect  to long-distancr 
assets of Sprint for a fixe-d  period of time. 
F.  CHANGES  MADE  AND  UNDERTAKINGS  GIVEN 
FURTHER  TO  THE  COMMISSION'S  INTERVENTION 
27.  Some  feature~  of  the  .l~rt.·t·mt'nt'  a~  notifit'ti 
appeared  to  be  in,;ompatiblc  with  the  Cummunity 
competition  rules.  In  the  wur~c  ol  the  notific.nion 
procedure  the  panics  have  amended  cc:nain  dJu\cs  in 
their  agrt'cmcnt.\  and  gavcn  un<lcrtakin~\  to  the 
Commission. 
I.  Contractual  chang~' 
lH.  Non·appoi111m''"l  of f'J,,,cnix  .u ,,  ••.~c·r•t /or mt,·r· 
PMtirmal  ha/fcinllilf.  f=ollowin~  ;m  .tnnounn·nwm  madt· 
in  the  Phot'nix  notifir;uiun,  whirh  di,l  not  Vt't  rdlrn tlat• 
p:trtit.'\  nmunitments  rt•gardin~  t\ttl\  fu.nhn  to  thr 
Cmnmi'l~ion's  intcrvc.·ntion,  DT,  rr.  Atla\  .w,l  Sprint 
havt.'  ddt.'ted  IT :tnd  DT' 'intt.·rnation:tl  privatt·  line·\', 
i.t.·.  IT and  DT\ inu·rn:ttional  la.llf·firnlll\,  from  tl•c·  ll\t 
uf  pmdut't!l  th.:tt  Ptuwnix  wulald  tli\tributr  .l\  .l~t·nt. 
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2'!·  .  .\'rm·u~mpt·tc·  pmtouimu.  Tht'  panic\  h.we  not  yt:l" 
~ou~lu  .111  t'Xt'lllption  pur\uant  to  :\nidn  XS  (3)  of  the 
LC  Trc·.11~·  .tnd  5.'  (J'  of tlw  FFA  A~rc·t·mc.·rH  for  Jr•>· 
'Ill"' i  f1l  ·'l~rt·c·IIH'fll'  r  c.·~:.mling  11.11 inuJ I  I  on~·  di\t.lllft' 
\t'f\'ll t''  Tht'  non-e umpc·tc·  d.tmc·  in  tltc·  nriJ;in.d  JV 
:\grt't'lllt'lll  lt.l\  lflrtt·lofl'  ht'('fl  ,IIJII'rtdccf·  drc·  JUrliC:\  ,IJC' 
11ow  ohligt·d  10  rdr.tin  onl}·  from  t'itht'r  li)  rornpc·trrt~ 
with  111  (li)  ill\'t'\1111);  in  .1  n•mpc·titor of c·mitit'\  provid111~ 
long-di,t.mn:  ~t'rvll"e\  provided  \Ut·h  t'ntlttt·~  .1rc 
nmtrollc·d  hy  Photnix. 
2.  Non-di\cnmination 
)C.  Ju\t  a\  DT  .:md  FT  ~hall  he  prohibited  from 
di,niminatin,; in  favour of the  joint ,·enture, as  de!lcrihed 
in  the·  \cparate  notice  on  the  Ada\  tramanion,  the 
Commi\\ion  intend,.  likcwi\c:  to  prohibit  DT  and  I·T 
from  Ji\rriminatin~  in  favnur  of  the  Phoenix  entities. 




J.  Undertaking\ given  by  the  pO&rtie\ 
.'\I.  Cdrrlt'r's  Cd"in  st'n..'irn  Nc.·ithtr  Atlac;,  Phoenix, 
IJT,  IT,  S,print  or  any  affili.:ttt'  of  the~e  cntitic~  ~hall 
m.1ke  .:t  particubr  telecommunications  o;>erator's  ability 
to  U\t:  Phoenix  international  carrier  service~  conditional 
upon  u\e  or  di'>tribution  by  that  telecommunications 
oper.:ttor  of '>ervicc'>  provided  by  Atla!l,  Phoenix,  F'T,  DT 
Pr  Sprint.  :'-Jeither  ~hall  Atlas,  Phoenix,  DT,  f-T,  Sprint 
or  any  affiliate  of  these  entities  make  its  commercial 
dealings  (i.e.  terms, conditions, price, discounts) with  any 
telenlmmunication\  operator  conditional  upon  use  or 
di~tril~ution  hy  that  tclerommuniration's  operator  of 
\t·r•it:c\  providc·d  by  AtLn,  PhOl·nix, Tl', DT or  Sprint. 
32.  OT,  !-T .:tnd  Sprint  have  al\o  ~ivcn funher under-
lakin~\ that  mirror  the  undertaking'  givc.·n  in  connection 
with  the  Atla~  notification;  rdt»rence  i'  therefore  m.:tdc 
to  the  ~eparare notil:e  on  the  Atl.:ts  transaction  publi'lhed 
in  thi ..  i\\ue  of  tht Official  Journal. 
I.  Cmu-wbwli1atirm 
:\\ in  the t:omext  of tht:  Atlas  transaction,  IJT :tnd  FT 
~hall  not  eng.:tgc  in  ere .~~-\UlHidization  within  the 
rne.:tning  of  tht•  Comm;~!tio11'~  competition  ~uidelint·s 
for  tht·  wlcrommunications  !tenor {'
1
)  in  ronnenion 
(" 1  ~t'c  notKc punuant to Aniclr  I~ (3) of Council  RcguiJtion 
r-.:o  17  conccrnin1~  Ca~r  No  IV /33.361  - lnfunc:t  (Oj 
No  C  7,  II.  I.  1~'12, p.  3, .lt  par.1~~raph ~). 
( ''  1 (  ,uuldinr.~ on  thc  applicuiun of  1.1-.(.  Competition  Hulr\  in 
thr TdrnunmunilJtiom Srnor 101  No C  1.\.\,  6.  'J.  I'J'JI, 
p.  ), p.1r.1grJpb  102  rl srq.J.  · 
:\o C  337/21 
with  the  Phoenix  veruurc.  To  :avoid  th.:tt·a.he  Phoenix 
t·ntitie~  or  their  di\tributor!t  benefit  from  cros\-
,uh  .. idic\  \lemming  from  the  oper.:t~ion  of  both  puhlic 
tdc:t:ornmunicuiom  infrastrunurc  .lllJ  reH·n·cd 
\l:rvit'e'>  hv  t"ither  OT  or  FT,  all  el'titit'\  forrnttl 
pur\U,lnt  ~~,  the  Phoenix  venture  will  be  e~tabli~hcd J\ 
di.,tinn  c.·r~titic!l  \eparate from  DT .:tnd  IT. 
The:  ROE  and  ROW  entitie~  will  obtain  their  own 
debt  financing  on  their  own  credit,  provided  that 
Sprint, f-T and DT: 
(a)  may  make  capital  contribu•ions  nr  commercially 
rea!lonablc  loans  to  such  entitie~  .:ts  required  to 
enable  the  ROE and ROW entities to conduct the 
Phoen;x  business; 
(b)  may  pledge  their  venture  interestS  in  such  enm•cs 
in  connection  with  non-recourse  financing  for 
such  entities; and 
(c)  may  guarantee  any  indebtedness  of such  enuues, 
provided  that Sprint, IT and  DT may  only  make 
paymentS  pursuant  to  any  such  guarantee 
following  a  default  by  such  entities  in  respect  of 
such  indebtedness. 
The  ROE  and  ROW  entitie~  shall  11ot  .1lloratc 
directly  or  indirectly  any  part  of  their  oper.1ting 
expcmes,  costs,  depreciation,  or  other  npenses  l,f 
their  businesses  to  an}'  parts  of  DT of  1-·r!l  busine!l~ 
units  (including  without  limitation  the  proponionlte 
costs  based  on  work  actually  performt'd  that  are 
attributable to !th.:tred  emplt,yces or salt's  or  marketin~ 
of  Phoenix  products  and  sen·ices  h~·  DT  llr  I·T 
t'mployees).  Howe  .. ·er,  nothing  \h.:tll  pren·nt  \Ul'h 
Photnix  entities  from  billin~  DT or rr ftlr  p~·ldul·t, 
and  services  provided to DT llr l-T h~·  \Uc.. h t'ntll it'\ on 
the  ha!li\  of tht'  \arne  prirt'!l  d1~1r;;ed  to  third  putic., 
(in  tht'  case  of  products  or  H·rvin·'  ~old  to  third 
panics  in  commercial  qu.lntitic·\)  or  full  c..o\t  rt'im-
burscment  or  other  arm's  length  pricing  mcthod  (in 
the  case  of  product~  and  'icrvil'e~  11ot  \old  to  thirJ 
partic..·:~  in  commercial  quantitie'>). 
The  ROE  and  ROW  entntc~  \hall  krt•p  \t'plratr 
JL-rounting  rerord\ that  identif>·  paynu.·nt\  <lr  lr.lmfen 
to or from  DT anJ IT. The.·  ROE  and  ROW cntitit·' 
~hall  nm  rt'L'el\'e  Jny  m.nrrial  'uh.,idy  (  induding 
II  A/  28 No C  .\371'!.2  IJ·~- l  Olftll.tl Journ.d  nf  lhl'  I ur••Jll'.lll  (.omlltllllllll'\  J=,  1..'  ··:., 
----------------------------------- .. ·--. 
fur~in·nn~ of  dd1t)  dirt·nl~· or  irulirntl~·  lrum  UT or 
Fr. or  .1ny  m..-e,tment  or  p.1ymt·nt  from  Ul' or  Fl" 
dtJt  ic,  not  rnordcd in  the  hook\ of  \Ul'h  t·ntitit·' ·" .111 
inn·\tmrnt in  t.lcbt  or t·quity. 
l.  Rt•wrd"'K .mJ rt•p()rtmx 
"llu·  !.arm·  undertaking\  apply  J\  dnoiht:d  u1  tiH' 
nnti'-=t'  on  the  AtJ,..,  tr  .1nunion  puhli~hcd in  tim  j,,ue 
of the Official Journal. 
.\3.  In  \O  far  a~  rc:"tut·d  to  t'XI\lln•~  ..  hltg:.ti'l'l\  undt·r 
n.uional  or  Cummunit\'  law,  the:  ahm·t·  1\  inu·ndnl  10 
rmure the  plrtlc\' firm'  <:ommitmt·nt  to  comply  with  the 
applicable  lc:gal  framt·work. 
G.  TJIE  REGuLATORY SITUATION 
34.  The rt"gul.uory  ~ituation in  Fram·e  and  German~· j., 
de\nibed  in  thr  noticr  on  the  Atla~ tramaction.  As  for 
the  United  Statr~. pursuant  to the  I  '1 34  Communicatiom 
:\n,  Sprint  shall  public,h  tariff  c,chc:dult•s  and  nmtr  JL'ts 
drscribing  iu  nt"twork  arrangc:rnc:nt\  and  \t"rvtl<"~. 
Furthermort",  the  I'J.\4  Communicatiom  Act,  t·nfnrced 
by  the  Frderal  c,,rnmunic:.niom  Commi.,c,ion  (FCC), 
p:-ohibits  ~print  from  providing  c,crvict"s  that  unjuc,tly  ur 
unrc-ac,onably  di~criminate against  Sprint'\  competitor~ or 
foreign  corre~pfJndents,  which  may  lodgt·  a  formal 
complaint bdorr- the fCC if  Sprint  doe\ nm  compl)·  with 
thr~  obligatiom. 
_\)  Wlult·  tht·  Luropc:Jn  Ctllllllii\'>HJII  '-'·I'  .l\\1'\\lll~~  dw 
l'hPt'lll'  tlllufication  unJer  Commurut\  Ia..-..  dw  I;'-, 
I kpJrtment of  Ju~ti<:e h.l\'t'  nmdudt'd  :t  prnu-.hut· u.Hkr 
I'\ .lflli-tru\t  l.1w  b~·  <'ntering  .1  l'OII\l'llt  tin rn  Tim 
• nmt·nt  dent•t·  ~pt·ll\ out undc:r1Jking'>  hy  the  pJrw·' dt.tt 
l.trgely  rc'>t·mble  thme de\nihed  in  thi ..  notiu· 
TilE COMMISSION'S  INTENTION' 
.'\6.  On  the  ha~i~  of  the  foregoing,  tht·  Cornmi\\ion 
intend~  to  take  a  favour;ahlc  pmition  on  tht·  notifit·d 
tramanion under thc- competition  n1ks of the  EC  Tn·at\' 
.wd undrr t\rtidc- S3  of the  EEA  Agreement ami to gram 
Phoenix  an  individual  exemption  puf\uant  to  Anidr  KS 
(J)  of  thc- EC  Treaty  and  Aniclt·  SJ  (  3)  nf  tht"  I·.EA 
Agrc-cmc-nt.  Bdore  doing  so,  the  Conunic,c,inn  invitl''> 
intc-n·~tcd  third  panic~ to  ~end their  oh\cn·atium  within 
">ix  week~  from  the  publication  of  this  notit·c  to  the 
following  address,  quoting  the  reference  'IV  13S.617  -
Phoenix': 
European  Commis~ion, 
OircciOrau:-General  for  Compt•tition  (DG  IV), 
Oirc:norate  for  lnformltion,  Communication 
and  Multimedia, 
Ruc- de  Ia  Loi/Wrtstraat  200, 
B-1049  Bru~sels. 
Fax:  (32 2)  296 98 19. 
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Notice pursuant to. Article 19  (  3)  of Council Regulation No 17 (1)  and Article  3 of Protocol 21 
of the EEA Agreement concerning a request for negative clearance or an exemption pursuant to 
Article 85  (3)  of the EC Treaty and Article  53  (3)  of the  EEA Agreement 
(Case  No IV/35.738 - Uniworld) 
(97 IC  44104) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
A.  INTRODUcnON 
On  29  September  1995  the  Commission  received  a 
notification  of a  joint venture  pursuant  to  Article  4  of 
Council  Regulation  No  17"  formed  by  Unisource 
Pan-European  Services  BV,  a  subsidiary  of  Unisource 
NV,  and  AT&T  Pan-European  Services,  Inc. e),  a 
subsidiary  of AT&T Corp.  under the  name  'Uniworld'. 
As  funher  described  below,  Uniworld  (now  AT&T -
Unisource  Communication  Services)  has  been  created  to 
provide  pan-European  telecommunications  services  with 
global  connectivity  to the  European  business  market. 
The  present  case  is  inextricably linked  to  the  Unisource 
- Telef6nica  case  (Case  No IV/35.830). An  Anicle  19 
(3)  notice  in  that case  has· been  published  in  this  same 
issue of the Official journal of  the  European Communities. 
B.  TI-lE  PARENT COMPANIES 
1.  Unisource  NV  is  a  joint  venture  company  the 
shareholders  of which. are Telia  AB,  PIT Telecom  BV, 
Swiss  Telecom and Telef6nica de  Espana SA. .Unisource 
NV (hereinafter, Unisource) is  a holding company active 
in  the  telecommunications  sector that incorporates  seven 
operating  subsidiaries.  Total  turnover  of  the  group  in 
1994  was  Fl  933  million  (ECU 443  million).  Net result 
_...  was  losses  of Fl  41-,072  million  (ECU  20  million).  The 
activities  of the  Unisource  Group  can  be  split  in  three 
main  areas:  business  services,  personal  services  and 
network  services.  A  detailed  description  of  the  services 
currently  provided  by  Unisource  through  its  subsidiaries 
can  be  found  in  the  An.icle  19  (3)  notice  in  the 
Unisource  - Telef6nica  case  (IV  /35.830). 
C>  OJ No 13, 21. 2.  1962, p. 204/62. 
(') Unisource  Pan-European Services  and AT&T Pan-European 
Services  have  been created as  special subsidiaries to hold  the 
respective · interests  of. the  parent  companies  in  Uniworld 
VOF. 
2.  AT&T  is  a  telecommunications  operator  in  the 
United  States  providing a  broad  range of US  and  inter-
national  telecommunications  services  and  infrastructures 
to  and  from  the  US.  AT&T  announced  in  September 
· 1995  a  restructure  pursuant  to  which  its  services, 
equipment  and  computer  business  will,  by  the  end  of 
1996,  become  wholly  separated  businesses  with  no 
common  management.  AT&T  Corp.  retains  the 
communications  and  information  services  business.  Its 
turnover in  1995  was  US $  47  billion. 
On  9  May  1996,  the  Federal  Communications 
Commission  (FCC)  of  the  US  adopted  an  order 
declaring  AT&T  a  non-dominant  carrier  for  inter-
national  voice  services C). 
Direct revenues  in  1995  of AT&T in  the  EEA and  Swit-
zerland  were  as  follows:  AT&T  Easylink  (messaging) 
[ ...  ]; AT&T lstel  (corporate services)  [ ...  ] and  Business 
Communications  Europe  (hereinafter,  BCS-E)  [  ...  ]. 
C.  CONTRIBUTIONS  BY  PARENT  COMPMlES  TO 
UNIWORLD 
Unisource  will  contribute  to  Uniworld  the  following 
companies  or  the  relevant  international  assets  thereof: 
·certain  of  the  Unisource  Bwiness  Networks  (UBN) 
companies,  Unisource  Voice  Services  (UVS),  Unisource 
France  SA,  Unisource  USA  Inc,  Unisource  Business 
Services  Inc.  and  Unisource  WPC Inc. 
AT&T will· contribute the relevant assets of the following 
entities:  AT&T  Europe  SA,  most  of AT&T  lstel  Ltd, 
BCS-E and the AT&T companies in  the  Member States. 
After  the  Uniworld  transaction,  AT&T will  still  provide 
in  the  EEA  and  Switzerland,  under  its  own  name, 
the  following  services:  new  high  value-added 
(')  By  order released  on 23  October 1995, the FCC  reclassified 
A  T&.T  as  a  non-dominant  carrier  in  the  market  for 
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applications  (such  as  AT&T  network  notes),  consumer 
cards  and  calling  cards  services,  outSourcing  (AT&T 
solutions)  and  the  full  range  of voice  telephony services 
to  business  and  consumer  customers  in  the  UK - by 
means  of  AT&T  Communications  UK's  operating 
licence,  which  permitS  also  international  simple  resale  to 
the  US. 
D.  THE JOINT VENTURE: UNIWORLD 
1.  Structure of Uniworld 
Uniworld consistS  of two companies: Uniworld VOF and 
Uniworld  NV. 
(a)  Uniworld  VOF is  a general partnership  under Dutch 
law.  Unisource,  through  Unisource  Pan-European 
Services,  has  a  59,94%  shareholding  interest  in  it, 
AT&T,  through  AT&T  Pan-European  Services,  a 
39,96%,  and  Uniworld  NV  the  remaining  0,1 %. 
Uniworld VOF is  not a separate legal  person distinct 
from  itS  owners.  In  addition  it  is  tax  transparent so 
the  income  flows  through  directly  to  the  parentS. 
Uniworld  VOF  will  actually  provide  the  telecom-
munications  services  within  the  business  scope  of 
Uniworld. 
The Uniworld NV's supervisory board and CEO will 
be  directly responsible for the partnership. 
(b)  Uniworld  NV has  been  created to supervise  and act 
as  general partner of Uniworld VOF. Thus it  is  the 
only  partner  that  governs  and  can  bind  the  part-
nership  and  has  legal  title  to  all  tangible  and 
intangible  assets  which it will  hold  for the benefit of 
Uniworld VOF. It also  has  the  authority to manage 
the  day-to-day  operation  and  affairs  of  the  part-
nership  and  has  all  of  the  resources  necessary  to 
manage  and  operate  the  business  activities  of 
Uniworld  VOF.  Unisour~e,  through  Unisource 
Pan-European  Services,  has  a  60 %  shareholding 
_...  interest  in  Uniworld  NV,  whereas  AT&T,  through 
AT&T  Pan-European  Services,  owns.  the  other 
- 40%.  According  to  the  Parties,  Uniworld  NV, 
although jointly owned is  not a joint venture in  itself 
. as  it  will  not  conduct  any  business  for  its  'own 
account.  Uniworld  NV  will  earn  an  . annual 
management  fee  for  its  activities  as  general  partner 
of the  partnership. 
Uniworld  NV is  governed  by  a  management  board 
of  one  chief  executive  officer  nominated  by 
Unisource  (AT&T  nominates  the  chief  operating 
officer),  responsible  for  managing  the  company,  and 
a  supervisory  board  of  five  directors,  three 
nominated  by  Unisource  and  two  by  AT&T.  The 
supervisory  board  approves  the  budget  and  business 
plan  by  supermajority  (i.e.  unanimity  of  directors 
present  or  represented).  AT&T  has  been  granted 
veto rights in  respect of all  signifi~ant matters. 
2.  Strategic  advisory  boards 
Upon  its  incorporation,  Uniworld  will  create  three 
strategic  advisory  boards  to  deal  with  the  following 
matters: 
(a)  service  portfolio development and pfferings; 
(b)  marketing  and  sales  {the  international  sales  board 
responsible  for  the  global  account  management 
plan); and 
(c)  architecture  and  technology. 
All  participants  to  the  Uniworld  transaction,  including 
representatives  of  the  Unisource  shareholders  will  be 
represented  in  the  boards. 
The  boards  are  resources  for  achieving  consistency  in 
approach  to  an  issue,  as  well  as  working  committees  to 
help  make  decision-making  processes  efficient.  They are 
also  a  forum  to  solve  disputes  between  the  parents  that 
might  have  an  impact  on  Uniworld.  Uniworld  can  use 
them  to  forge  a  consensus  for  Uniworld's  initiatives  in 
advance  of  supervisory  board  consideration.  Originally, 
recommendations  were  binding  on  all  participants. 
However,  after  the  Commission  objected  to  that,  the 
Parties  modified  that provision  so  that recommendations 
shall  not  be  binding  on  the  participants  and  their 
pertinent  affiliated  companies  (see  later). 
Information  to  be  exchanged  by  participants  to  the 
boards  will  neither  include  actual  retail  prices  of 
Uniworld  end-user  services,  nor  information  relating  to 
commercial  conoitions  of. products  and  services  outside 
the  business  scope  of Uniworld  as  notified.  In  addition, 
market trends in pricing will  only be  discussed  in  general 
terms  without  disclosing  sensitive  customer  pricing 
information.  · 
3.  Business  scope 
The scope of Uniworld's business will  be the provision of 
seamless e>  multilateral C>  pan-European  telecommuni-
cations services  with global connectivity to the  European 
(')  Seamlessness  is  defined  as  a  cohesive  and  homogenous 
approach  to  the  service  from  a  user's  perspective.  So,  the 
customer  does  not  see  the  underlying  complexities  of 
providing the service. 
(') The  term  'multilateral'  encompasses  foreign-to-foreign  as 
well  as  home-to/from-foreign  traffic.  Bilateral  services  are 
not able  to encompass  foreign-to-foreign  traffic. 
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business  market. The  Panies have  identified  ( ...  ]  global 
and  European  multinationals  with  international .telecom-
munications  expenditure  greater than  ( ...  ]  a  year as  the 
target market for Uniworld. Of these, it will  focus on the 
( ...  ] biggest corporations having at least an office  in  the 
EEA  plus  Switzerland  (such  focus  does  not preclude the 
offering of Uniworld services  to any other customer with 
similar  needs). 
Global  connectivity outside  the  EEA  and  Switzerland (') 
will  be  mainly achieved  through Uniworld's panicipation 
in  the  WorldPanners  Company  and  Association (').  In 
this  respect,  Unisource  will  transfer  to  Uniworld  its 
rights  in  the  WorldPanners  Company  and  Association 
and  AT&T UK wiJI  do the  same  with  its  rights  in  the 
WorldPartners  Association.  As  a  result  Uniworld  will 
become  the  exclusive  distributor  in  the  EEA  plus  Swit-
zerland  of  the  telecommunication  services  bearing  the 
WorldSource  trade  mark (
1
). 
In  accordance  with  the  initial  business  plan  for 
Uniworld, revenues would amount to [ ...  ] in  1996. They 
are  expected  to  grow  to  [ ...  ]  by  2005.  Break-even  1s 
expected  to be  achieved  by  1999  (1998  for data). 
The Parties  aim  at Uniworld achieving  market shares  of 
[ ...  ] in  voice IVPN and [ ...  ] in  data services. by 2005, in 
the  EEA  plus  Switzerland. 
(')  In  areas  outside  Europe  or the  WorldPanners Association, 
the  bilateral  agreements  of the  Unisource  shareholders,  of 
Unisource  and/or  AT&T  will  be  used  to  extend  global 
connectivity.  In  the  future,  Uniworld  could  have  its  own 
bilateral  arrangementS.  In  addition,  Unisource  has  recently 
announced  a non-exclusive agreement with Infonet (which  is 
56%  controlled  by  the  Unisource  shareholders)  regarding 
the  provision  by  Infonet  of  X.25  connectivity  outSide 
Europe.  X.25  is  not  offered  within  the  WorldPanners 
framework. 
(') WorldPanners  is  a  limited  partnership  promoted  by  AT&T 
.·  basically to set  performance standards, agreed and respected · 
by  the  members  of the  pannership, in  respect of given  tele-
communications  services.  Such  standards  are  a  way  to 
extend  connectivity for  those services  outSide  the  borders of 
each  of  its  members.  Members  of  the  WorldPanners 
Company  have  invested  in  it  and  panicipate,  among  other. 
things,  in  the  definition  of 'the  standards.  Members  of the 
WorldPanners Association  are distributors of the services  in 
given  territories.  The  agreementS  regarding  Unisource  and 
AT&T UK's  entry into WorldPanners have  been separately 
notified  to the  Commission  (Case  No IV  /35.490 - World-
Fanners). 
(') The  WorldPanners  ponfolio  of  WorldSource  services  is 
limited  to  the  offering  of  vinual· network  services  (VNS), 
frame  relay  and _private  lines.  For each of thes.e,  a common 
denominator  of  features  is  defined.  Such  common 
denominator  would  be  provided.  by  each  WorldPartner's 
member  or associate.  Services  complying  with  the  common 
denominator can  bear the WorldSource trademark. 
Uniworld  1s  expected  to  have  around  [ ...  ]  employees. 
·Although  Uniworld · is  responsible  for  its  own  product 
developmer:u,  it  will  not  conduct its  own  basic  research 
activities.  It  will  have  access  to  research  capabilities  of 
AT&T,  Unisource  and  the  Unisource  shareholders  via 
intellectual propeny arrangements to be  agreed, the prin-
ciples  of which  have  been  notified. 
Uniworld  will  own  and/or  manage  all  frame  relay, 
messaging,  X.25  international  backbone,  X.25  domestic 
switches  with  exclusive  or  predominantly  international 
usage,  non-home  country  X.25  networks  and  managed 
bandwidth  assets.  Asset  selection  will  be  made according 
to a set of rules agreed upon by the panies in  accordance 
with  the  given  principles  for  asset  seleCtion. 
In  addition,  the  ex1stmg  backbone  data  network  -
Unidata  - that  links  together  the  domestic  data 
networks  of the  shareholders  of Unisotirce  will  also  be 
assigned  to  Uniworld. 
4.  Telecommunications  services  to  be  provided  by 
Uniworld 
Uniworld's  services  are  based  on end-to-end  control  by 
Uniworld  of  the  services  to  customers  including  the 
national  extensions  of such  services.  However, Uniworld 
will  not offer purely  domestic  services ('). 
The  services  will  initially  include  international  vinual 
private  network  (IVPN) voice  services,  packet-switched, 
frame  relay  and  other  data  networks  and  services, 
messaging  and  network  related  outsourcing.  The· home 
countries,  France,  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom, 
Belgium  and  Italy.  represent  primary  target countries. 
- As  regards  voice  IVPN  services,  an  IVPN  service 
(Uniworld  VNS),  made  of  different  packages  with 
different  features,  will  be  offered  to  customers  to 
cover  their  intra-European  needs C
0
).  The  backbone 
network (basic  transmission  capacity) to be  used  will 
(')  In  this  respect,  according  to  the  ranies,  a  customer 
receiving  international  and  nationa  services  from  a 
distributor  of  Uniworld,  will  clearly  perceive  that  he  is 
receiving  two different kinds of services. 
('
0
)  Such  service  is  basically  the  same  Phase  II  service  jointly 
developed  by  Unisource  and  AT~T  -in  the  framework  of 
the  EVUA bid. 
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be  that  of  UCS  and,  in  some  cases,  that  of 
third-party suppliers.  The Uniworld  VNS (") service 
is  defined as  'multilateral', as  opposed  to the existing 
IVPN services of the Unisource shareholders that are 
available  abroad  depending  on  bilateral  agreements 
concluded  by  each  telecommunications  operator 
(T~), 
- as  regards  data  networks,  during  1996  to  1997, 
Uniworld will integrate the existing international data 
networks assigned by the parents. These networks are 
not  currently  interworkable  as  they  are  based  on 
different  equipment  (mainly  Nonel  for  X.25  and 
frame  relay  in  the  case  of Unisource  and  Stratacom 
for  frame  relay  in  the  case  of BCS-E).  As  a  first 
stage, a network to network interconnection - to be 
developed  by  manufacturers  of  the  equipment 
inStalled - will  improve seamlessness. A  TM will  then 
gradually be  introduced - together with UCS - so 
that  an  integrated  voice-data  platform  will  be 
available  by  the  year  2000.  Pan of  the  integration 
will  involve  the  standardization of delivery  platforms 
for  each  service.  The  combined  network  will  be 
expanded  by  the  setting  up  of  additional  points  of 
presence  (POPs);  in  particular,  in  key  markets  like 
Germany  and  Italy,  where  current  coverage  is  very 
poor.  Integrated  traffic  will  make  feasible  the instal-
lation  of POPs  in  countires  where  it  would  not  be 
economical to do so for a single type of traffic, 
- as  regards  data  services  the  Uniworld  services  will 
initially  be  based  on  the  current  pan-European 
offerings of Unisource  and AT&T's BCS-E,  but they 
will  offer  a  better geographical  cov~rage than  these 
existing  offerings,  given  the  different  POPs  of  the 
existing data networks of the parents. 
In addition, Uniworld will  roll out new  data services 
like  high  speed  LAN (
12
)  interconnect, .  high  speed 
bandwidth services,  interworking and  Internet access 
to big  business  users  (offering  improved  quality  and 
·security).· Most of these will be introduced by the end 
_...of  1996 and will generally be available in  1997. 
Alongside  these,  other  services  to  be  launched  (in 
early  1997)  are  integrated  (voice  and  data) 
(
11
)  It  also  offen  more  features  (than  the  minimum  common 
denominator)  but  less  geographical  coverage  (limited  to 
Europe), than the WorldSource VNS service that Unisource 
and  AT&T  UK are  beginnin~ to  distribute  in  continental 
Europe and the UK respectively. 
(
11
)  Local area network. 
services (u)  like  video-conferencing,  flXed-mobile 
integration,  teleworking,  bandwidth  on  demand  and 
call  centres  including  automatic  re-routing  on  real 
time ("),  and  remote  network  management  for 
customer's data networks, 
- the domestic data services  and networks in  the home 
countries  and  the  UK  will  not  be  contributed  to 
Uniworld  but  will  remain  in  Unisource  and  AT&T 
UK  respectively.  The  respective  Unisource  share-
holder will  act  as  distributor  of Unisource  for  these 
domestic produets in  each home country, 
- messaging  covers  electronic  mail  and  EDI  (electronic 
data  interchange).  Current  plans  foresee  the  use  by 
Uniworld  of AT&Ts messaging  platform  (Easylink), 
instead  of Unisource's existing  one  (  400Net). 
All  of  the  above  services  are  divided  between 
exclusive C')  (vinual  network  services  - VNS/IVPN/ 
closed  user  group  voice  services,  X.25  bearer  service, 
frame  relay  service,  SNA  service ("),  managed 
bandwidth.  service  and  X.400  bearer  service)  and 
non-exclusive  services  (call  centre  services,  1AN  inter-
connect  services,  messaging  services,  VSAT  satellite 
services,  network-related  outSourcing,  network  facilities 
management,  private  network  provis_ioning,  Internet 
access  services  ana data VPN services). 
5.  Uniworld's  operating  functions:  sales,  marketing  and 
services 
(a)  Sales 
Uniworld  will  be  responsible  for  negotiating  distribution 
agreements  and  third-party commercial sales  agreements. 
In  addition,  it  will  work  closely  with  distributors  to 
(u) The  ~VUA  has  issued  in  1996 a  new  tender for  integrated 
voice/  data services. 
('•)  Service  applications  will  include  reservation  centres, 
customers  service  support  centres  and  maintenance  and 
warranty  sup~on  centres.  These  services  require 
European-wide free  phone numbers  (0 800). 
(
11
)  See  below under point E (2) (c). 
(") SNA  is  an  extension  of the  frame  relay  service  that offers 
nework access  interfaces  suitable  to  meet  the  requestS  of 
customers working within  an  IBM  environment. 
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ensure  that  offers  to  customers  respond  to  their 
expressed  needs  and  will  provide  sales  training  for 
Uniworld employees  and distributors. Uniworld will  also 
support  the  development  of  a  single  integrated  sales 
process  incorporating  technical  support,  bid 
management,  contract support and service  ordering. 
In  respect  of complex  bids,  Uniworld  will  assist  in  or 
assume  direct  leadership  responsibility. 
(b)  Marketing 
Uniworld  will  be  responsible  for  developing  the  service 
portfolio  marketing strategy including  the  overall  pricing 
strategy  (retail  pricing  will  however  be  the  responsibility 
of  distributors).  It  will  also  conduct  competitive 
assessment  and  customer  analysis  and . assist  product 
managers  in  developing  individual  service  strategies. 
Uniworld  will  develop  marketing  communications 
products  including  advertising.  It will  also  support  bid 
management  to  non-standard  ·requests  for  proposals 
requiring  the  integration  of multiple  services. 
(c)  Services 
Uniworld  will  define,  control and own service  definition 
and  define  and  control  service  platforms  (i.e.  the 
sof~ware  installed  in  the  equipment  that  controls  the 
voice  and data traffic over the  backbone network),  and 
c:unomer care elementS. It will also be  responsible for the 
hfe  cycle  management of all  services  in  its  portfolio.  In 
addition,  it  will  determine  the  overall  architecture/tech-
nology/platform evolution that enables the services  to be 
competitive  and  efficient  in  terms  of  features,  func-
tionality,  customer  service·  attributes  and  cost.  In  so 
doing, it will  seek to accommodate the reasonable· needs 
of  its  affiliated  and  other  key  non-affili~ted  suppliers. 
The resulting  plans will  be approved  by the supervisory 
board  by supermajority. 
E.  TiiE NOTIFIED  AGREEMENTS 
1.  Agreements 
The  original  notification  comprised  the  Joint  Venture 
and  Shareholders  Agreement  and  the  following 
agreements  and  other documents  annexed  to  it: 
- the articles of association of Uniworld NV, 
- the  limited  partnership  agreement  of Uniworld  CV 
(now Uniworld VOF), 
- the  by-laws  of  Uniworld  NV  and  Uniworld  CV 
(idem), 
- the  pa~ental support agreement, 
- principles for asset seleaion, 
- the supply agreement between Uniworld and UCS, 
- the  master distribution  agreement, 
- principles  for IPR negotiations, and 
- the network evolution  plan. 
2.  Contractual  provisions 
(a)  Supply  agreement  with  Unisource  Carrier  Services 
. (UCS) 
Uniworld  will  be  a  service  provider  and  thus  will  not 
develop  or  operate  itS  own  basic  switching  and  trans-
mission  systems,  but will  purchase these capabilities from 
suppliers.  The  preferred  supplier  will  be  UCS,  a 
subsidiary  of  Unisource  NV  responsible  for  managing 
the  international  networks  of the  Unisource  NV share-
holders  ('preferred'  means  that Uniworld will  be free  to 
contract  with  other suppliers  if  the  demanded  services 
are outside the scope of UCS or in case UCS does not or 
cannot compete with  the  terms  and  conditions  of other 
suppliers). 
Under  the  supply  agreement,  UCS  will  deliver  basic 
switching  and transmission ·  elements,  including  the  main 
switching  elements  and  .the  international  switching 
centres of the Unisource shareholders, and will  route the 
traffic  to  the  agreed  destination  or  point  of  intercon-
nection  as  determined  by  the  service  database  admin-
istered by Uniworld. In this respect, UCS will  provide to 
Uniworld  interconnection  and transmission  capacity that 
will  include  international,  national and local  leased  lines 
and  international  and  national  PSTN terminations. 
UCS  will  have  a  contractual  requirement to provide  the 
capacity necessary to meet Uniworld's traffic forecasts  at 
agreed performance levels.  The price for UCS' services  is 
guaranteed  for  5  years.  The  average  minute/price 
charged by UCS will  be reduced provided that Uniworld 
delivers  the  agreed  total  volume  of international  traffic 
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and uses  the agreed  capacity of international bandwidth. 
Should that not be  the case, prices  charged by UCS will 
be  adjusted  accordingly. 
The Parties  have  indicated  that similar  price  guarantees 
will  be  provided to third-pany customers  that commit to 
deliver  similar volumes  of international  traffic. 
In  addition,  the  intention  of  the  parties  is  to  use  the 
UCS'  pan-European  network  for  all  internodal 
bandwidth  needs  of the  Uniworld  services. 
Uniworld  will  collect  customer  care  information  for 
billing,  account  inquiry,  etc.  In  addition,  Uniworld  will 
also own the service  control points that maintain the real 
time  definition  and  realization  of the  Uniworld services. 
Such  points  will  be  connected  to  the. UCS  network. 
Uniworld's  CEO  will  attend  UCS'  board  meetings 
without the right to cast any vote - concerning network 
planning  and  other  matters  concerning  the  supply 
agreement. 
(b)  Rebltionship between  Uniworld and its parents 
Under  Article  10  of  the  Joint  Venture  Agreement,. 
Uniworld: 
~  shall  purchase  supplies  on  a  best  available  basis  in 
accordance  with  rules,  regulations  and  guidelines  of 
the  European  Commission  and  the  relevant  national 
regulatory  agencies.  'Best  available'  refers  to  price, 
quality,  features  and  functions,  capacity  and 
geographical  coverage  purchased  from  affiliated 
parties offered  (or not) by them to third parties, · 
- shall  be  provided  access  to networks  and  underlying 
facilities  of  any  company  involved  directly  or 
indirectly  in  Uniworld  at  non-discriminatory 
competitive  prices.  Such  prices  charged  to Uniworld 
shall  .be  competitive  in  view  of  prices  charged  for 
similar  seFVices  by  competitors  of  the  affiliated 
companies  and  shall  be  consistent  with  applicable 
national  and  European  law,  including  obligations  of 
non-discrimination  and  prohibitions  of  cross-subsi-
dizations.  Neither  must  they  be  more  advantageous 
than the prices  charged for similar services  in  similar 
circumstances  to  other  customers  of  such · afl'iliated 
companies, 
- shall  have  a 'privileged subsidiary' status, with regard 
to  terms  and  conditions  for  transactions  between 
Panies  for  resources  and  services  from  . these 
companies. In this respect, it will be treated as though 
it were a subsidiary of Unisource,  its  shareholders or 
AT&T in  respect of services,  to the extent that there 
are  no  contractual  restrictions  with  third  parties 
prohibiting  it, · 
- will  have  a  'most  favoured  customer  status'  from 
Unisource,  its  shareholders  and  its  affiliated 
companies  and  AT&T  for  the  provision  of  other 
related  commercial  services,  such  as  the  purchase  of 
capacity.  Uniworld  will  be  offered  'best  customer' 
·prices  for  services  which  are  in  principle  available 
both  to  Uniworld  and  to  non-related  customers  in 
the  marketplace. 
(c)  Non-competition 
Under Article  12  of the  Joint  Venture  Agreement,  the 
parents  agree  with  Uniworld  VOF  that  they  shall  not 
incorporate  a  business  or engage  in  exclusive  Uniworld 
services  (as  described  above)  or participate  in  any  joint 
venture or other cooperative arrangement engaged in  the 
provision  of exclusive  Uniworld  services. 
The  following  activities  are  excluded  from  the 
non-compete  provisions: 
- the  development  and  offering  to  customers  of  a 
parent's  national  services  and  international  services 
based on bilateral arrangements, 
- services  that  compete  with  non-exclusive  Uniworld 
services,  and 
- competing  offers  of third  parties  (basically  Infonet's 
services,  but  also  Concert's  or  Atlas's)  who  have 
decided  to  market  their  services  through  the 
Unisource  shareholders. 
The  non-compete  obligation  shall  not  affect  the  access 
by third  parti~ to any reserved and basic  netw~rk of the 
Panics  and  their affiliated  companies,  nor shall  it  affect 
·any  parent  obligation  to  make  available  reserved  and 
basic  services. 
All  non-competition  obligations  of the  parents  and  their 
affiliated  companies would  be  valid  until  the  termination 
of the  joint Venture  Agreement.  After  termination  no 
participant  shall  during  the  original  duration  of  a 
customer  contract  solicit  those  existing  CUStomers  with 
respect to which the other Party has been  assigned  under 
the  termination  rules  the  right  to  provide  Uniworld 
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services  (Anicle  16  (3)  (1)  (F)  of  the  Joint  Venture 
Agreement).  Finally,  Article  16  (3)  (2)  (B)  (ii). of the 
Joint  Venture  Agreement  provides  that . a  company 
exiting  (from  Uniworld)  shall,  under  the  non-permitted 
exit (
17
)  provision  as  from  the date of the  non-permitted 
exit and for a period of 12 months continue to be subject 
to  Article  1'2  of the Joint Venture Agreement. 
(d)  Distribution 
(1)  Distribution of services 
Uniworld  will  distribute  its  services  through  local 
distributors.  Uniworld  intends,  wherever  appropriate,  to 
own  or  control  them.  Distributors  are  responsible  for 
managing  (and  can  own)  local/national  networks. 
However,  Uniworld  will  approve  the  delivery  platforms 
to  be  used  by  distributors  in  delivering  Uniworld 
services,  the  overall  architecture  of  the  combined 
distributor/Uniworld  network  and  the  location  and 
capacity  of  the  gateways  to  be  used  to  interface  the 
distributor's ·and  Uniworld's  networks. 
In  the  home  countries,  the  respeCtive  Unisource  share-
holder  will  be  the  exclusive  distributor.  AT&T UK will 
be the exclusive distributor in the UK and AT&T will act 
as  the  exclusive  distributor  in  the  US  of  Uniworld's 
services  to  be  delivered  in  Europe.  In  addition,  AT&T 
could  sell  Uniworld  services  to  a  European-head-
quartered  fum  which  vested  its  European  and/  or 
worldwide  telecommunications  deciSions  with  its  US 
subsidiaries  or locations. 
In  other·  countries  where  Unisource,  AT&T,  the 
Unisource  shareholders  or  any  of  their  affiliated 
companies have selected a national partner, the latter will 
be  the  preferred  distributor. 
Distributors will  pay to Uniworld the  established transfer 
price  for  any  given  service.  Uniworld  will  provide 
distributors  with  lists  of  recommended  retail  prices. 
Distributors,  however,  are  free  to  set  their  own  retail 
C')  Under  Article  16  (3)  (1)  neither  parent  company  of 
Uniworld  may  terminate  the  agreement  before  1 January 
2000.  Most  terminations  before  that  date,  in  particular  in 
case  of  material  breach  of  the  agreement,  non-permitted 
transfers of shares or withdrawal, bankruptcy or suspension 
of  payments  by  a  pany,  are  deemed  to  be  non-permitted 
exit. 
prices.  Originally  such  prices  have  to be  communicated 
to Uniworld. That was required in  order for Uniworld to 
provide  billing  services  to  distributors  and  final 
customers  (using· AT&T's  proprietary  billing ·platform). 
However,  the  Commission  objected  to  that  on grounds 
that  Uniworld  could  use  such  information  to  influence 
resale  price  by  distributors.  On  that  basis,  the  Panies 
modified  such  provision  so  that  the  obligatioal  to 
communica.te  retail  prices  to  Uniworld  has  been  elim-
inated.  In  addition,  the  Parties  have  ensured  that 
Uniworld will  not use  information  regarding  retail  prices 
received  from  a distributor for fixing or attempting to  fix 
resale  prices. 
An  initial  distribution  of  potential  customers  has  been 
made  based  on  the  location  of the  decision  making  units 
(D.MU)  of the  top  target  customers.  However,  the  final 
assignment  of a customer to a distributor depends on the 
choice  of the  customer.  In  any  event,  it  is  expected  that 
most  sales  will  involve  a  lead  distributor,  one or several 
support  distributors  and  Uniworld.  Support  distributors 
will  receive  from  U niworld  a  distributor  fee  of  4 % of 
the  transfer  price. 
In  addition,  Uniworld  plans  to  create  a·  'Uniworld 
Associati~n'  after  the  model  of  the  WorldParmers 
Association.  It  will  have  a  light  strUCture  made  of  a 
permanent secretariat and an  executive forum  chaired by 
the  CEO  of  Uniworld.  The  Uniworld  Association  will 
serve  as  a platform for discussion  between Uniworld and 
its  distributors,  so  that  the  latter  will  be  provided  an 
opportunity  to  influence  Uniworld's  services  devel-
opment, processes and technology  (i.e.  the growth of the 
network).  The  Association  will  aet  as  a  central  coor-
dinator  between  distributors  for  ensuring  that  the 
EurQpean  requirements of customers are met in  the most 
efficient  manner. 
The Panies have  indicated that no aetual retail prices (or 
related conditions) of Uniworld  end-user services  will  be 
discussed  in  the  Association  and  that  market  trends  in 
pricing  will  only  be  discussed  in  general  terms  without 
disclosing  sensitive  customer  pricing  information. 
The  distribution  licences  extend  to  the  Uniworld  and 
WorldSource  services  in  the  territory granted. 
The  exclusivity  prov1s1ons  oblige  Uniworld  and  the 
distributor not to  aCtively  seek customers for Uniworld's 
exclusive  services  in  the distributor's territory, as  regards 
Uniworld,  and  outside  it,  as  regards  the  distributor, 
respectively. 
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(})  Existing customer contracts  · 
ExiSting customer contracts that fall  within the scope and 
the  territory  entrusted  to  Uniworld,  concluded  by 
Unisource or AT&T prior to the setting up of Uniworld, 
will  be  assigned  to: 
(a)  Uniworld,  as  regards  the  right  to  provide  services 
which  it shall  deliver at transfer prices  to  the specific 
distributor;  and 
(b)  the  Uniworld  distributor,  as  regards  the  customer 
relations  and  distributions  rights. 
These  customers  will  serve  as  a  customer  base  for 
Uniworld.  Such  customer  base  is  not  negligible  in  .. view 
of the  number of contracts already signed  by  its  parents. 
The following  rules  will  apply  in  the assignment  of these 
existing  contractS: 
(i)  the  respective  parent  distributor  will  assume 
CUStOmer  contracts  (and  the  associated  financial 
obligations)  for  cunomers  whose  decision-making 
unit  (DMU)  is  in  any  of the  home  countries,  the 
UK or the US;  · 
(ii)  for  existing  customer  contracts  where  the  DMU is 
outside  the  abovementioned  countries,  the  contraCt 
will  be  assigned  to  the  new  distributor  in  that 
country.  The  actual  conditions  of  the  assignment 
will  be  a  matter of negotiation  between  the  owner 
of the contract and the new distributor;· 
(iii)  in  countries where no Uniworld distributor has  been 
nominated  yet,  Uniworld  will  manage  the 
distribution  activities. 
The  priority  considerations  are  the  maintenance  of 
customer  satisfaction  and  customer  preference. 
(3)  Global account management programme 
Uniworld  will  organize  an  international  support  organ-
ization  which  will  support a global  account  management 
programme  created  to  enhance  business  relationships 
with multinational customers. It will  focus  on prospective 
customers  which  beeause  of  size  and/  or  strategic 
imponance  will  be  selected  by  Uniworld's  international 
sales  board.  Instead  of  being  attributed  to  a  given 
distributor  in ·accordance with  the  normal  procedures,  a 
global  account  team  will  be  formed  for  each  of  these 
customers  comprising  a  global  account  team  leader  and 
at least  one  regional  or national  acCount  manager.  The 
global  account  team  will  report  to  Uniworld's  multi-
national  accounts  group. 
The global account team  will  coordinate and involve  the 
worldwide  resources  of  Uniworld,  AT&T  Business 
solutions,· WorldPartners, Unisource  and  its  shareholders 
as  required  in  order to  better serve  the  global  needs  of 
that category of top customers  on am  one-stop-shopping 
basis.  In  this  respect,  the  global  account  group  will 
request  support  from  any  affiliated  or related  company 
through  a  defined  worldwide  sales  support  process  that 
will  allow  for  a  simple,  low-cost  sales  support  coordi-
nation  process. 
According  to  the  Parties,  the  global  account 
management programme will  be  a very large determinant 
of the  relative  success  in  the  marketplace. 
F.  RELEV ANf MARKET 
1.  Product  market 
Services  within  the  business  scope  of  Uniworld  fall 
within  the  customized  package  of  corporate  telecom-
munications services  and packet switched  data communi-
cations  product  markets  as  described  in  the  Atlas  and 
Global  One  Decisions (
11
). 
Services  within  those  two  categories  are  mainly 
demanded  by  large  multinational .  corporations, extended 
enterprises,  as  well  as  major national  and  other intensive 
users  of telecommunications,  often  as  an  alternative  to 
self-provision.  The  requirements  of  such  users,  that 
extend  to all  'products or corporate services  provided  by 
Uniworld,  were  discussed  in  detail  in  the  BT-MCI {") 
Decision.  Providers  of such  services  are expected  tO  take 
full  responsibility  for  all  services  provided  from  'end to 
end'. 
Very  large  companies  demand  that  locations 
geographically  dispersed  across  different  territories  be 
C')  Commission  Decisions  of  17  July  1996  relating  to 
proceedings  under Anicle  85  of the  EC  Treaty and  Anicle 
53  of the  EEA  Agreement  (Case  Nos  IV  /35.337 - Atlas, 
and IV /35.617- Global One). OJ No L 239, 19. 9  ..  1996. 
(") Commission Decision of 27 July  1994,  OJ No L 223,  27.  8. 
1994. 
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linked.  The  services  required  in  this  connection  (i.e. 
provision  of sufficient  delivery  capacity  and  in-country 
support) must be  supranational in  nature and respond to 
a  very  particular set  of features  including  the  provision 
of services  across  multiple  borders  at  consistent  service 
levels,  the  availability  of  delivery  schedules;  the  irrel-
evance  of  time  zones,  languages  and  currencies;  and 
making  customers  assume  service  is  local  regardless  of 
where  such  service  is  provided  from.  Truly  global 
services  (i.e.  connecting  locations  of  companies  in 
countries  or territories  located  outside  the  main  indus-
trialized  areas of the world)  are an extreme case. 
The  provtsaon  of  such  services  would  appear  to 
customers to be  seamless.  However, the provision of real 
seamless services  is  now only at a very rudimentary stage 
in  particular as  regards  customer care  and global  billing 
features,  and  the  establishment  of infrastructure  abroad, 
the  latter  in  view  of differences  in  regulatory  regimes 
between  countries. 
2.  Geographic  market 
Due to the· cost structure of advanced corporate services, 
notably  the  cost  of leasing  the  required  infraStructure, 
prices  of  such  services  are  related  to  geographic 
coverage,  as  is  the  cost  of  additional  features  (e.g. 
one-stOp-billing,  help-desk  and  technical  assistance 
around  the  clock,  custOmized  billing).  In  that  respect, 
and  following  the  reasoning  applied  in  the  Atlas  ~d 
Global  One cases,  demand  for these services  exists  in  at 
least three distinct geographic markets, namely at glo~al, 
cross-border  regional  and  national  levels. 
Uniworld will  be active in  the cross-border regional layer 
of the  geographical  market, that in  this  case  will  be  the 
provision  of  such  services  on  a · pan-European  basis 
(including  national  extensions  of the  latter). 
Given  the  links  between  Uniworld,  Unisource  and  its 
shareholders, and given  the  inextricable links  between  all 
notified  cases  involving  Unisource,  Uniworld  is  thought 
tO  have  also  an impact at least on the domestic markets 
of the  European  home  countries,  where  each  Unisource · 
shareholder  enjoys  a  dominant  position. 
3.  Competition in the markets 
(a)  Cross-bordtr  regional  m4rket:  the  m4rket  for 
non-reserwd  corporate  telecommunications  services  in 
Europe 
According  to  AT&T,  the  European  market  place 
currently  will  resemble  the  US  market  that  existed 
between  1983  _and  1993,  during  which  period  essential 
restructuring  of  the  telecommunications  industry 
occurred as  a result of market competition, new services, 
pricing structures, marketing sales  and services  strategies. 
The  result  was  a  very  big  shift  in  market  dynamics, 
significant  entry and  unparalleled  growth. 
According  to  the  Panies,  the  addressable  size  of  the 
European  market  will  grow  from  US$  1,9  billion  in 
1995  to  US $  4,2  billion  in  2005  for  IVPN  and  from 
US$ 2,9  billion  in  1995  to  US$  4  biilion  in  2005  for 
data  services. 
BT-MCI's  Concert  and  Atlas/Global  One are  expected 
to become  major players  on that market. To those  it  is 
necessary  to  add  some  other  significant  players  like 
Info~et, Sita  or IPSP. 
(b)  National m4rkets in  Europe 
Each of the shareholders of Unisource face  a number of 
competitOrs  in  their  respective  domestic  market  for 
packet  switChed  data  communication  services.  So,  such 
services  are completely liberalized  in  Sweden,  there  are 
at least five  licences  granted in  the Netherlands, eight in 
Spain  and  several  in  Switzerland.  Some  of  those 
companies  (such  as  Spain's  BT Tel  or Sweden's  Tele-
nordia)  are  also  the  domestic  extensions  of the  global 
alliances  (BT in  those  two cases). 
4.  Market shares  of the  parties 
(a)  Cross-bordtr  region4/.market 
Market  shares  figures  for  the  cross-border  regional 
market  are  highly  unreliable.  Their  emerging  and 
evolving  nature  and  the  large  traffic  volume  of  big 
corporate  ~stomers are  explanatory arguments for such 
unreliability. 
Current combined  market  share  in  the  EEA  and  Swit-
zerland of the panics is  less  than  10 % for data services 
and  10 %  for  messaging.  No  data  are  available  for 
IVPN  voice  services  and  network  related  outsourcing. 
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(b)  National markets 
As  regards  domestic  packet  switched  data  communi-
cation services,  in  1995, Telia had 78  °/o  in  Sweden (2°), 
PTf  Telecom  and  Telef6nica  over  95%  in  the 
Netherlands. and Spain and Swiss Telecom nearly 100% 
in  Switzerland.  Market  figu~es in  respect of the overall 
tlomestic  telecommunications  services  were  91 %  for 
Telia,  near  100 °/o  for P1T Telecom, 95,7 °/o  for Tele-
fonica  and near 100 °/o  for Swiss Telecom. 
G.  CHANGES  MADE  AND  UNDERTAKINGS  GIVEN 
FURTHER  TO  THE  COMMISSION'S  INTER-
VENTION 
Certain  features  of the  notified  transaction  appeared  to 
he:  incompatible  with  Community  competition  rules. 
Consequently, the Commission  by letter of 7 May 1996 
informed the Parties of its concerns. In the course of the 
notification  procedure  the  Parties  have  amended  the 
,,rigina~  agreements  and  given  undertakings  to  the 
Commission. 
I. Contractual changes 
As described before, the Parties committed to amend the 
following  provisions  in  the notified agreements: 
(:1)  the communication of  retail prices to  Uniworld 
The  Parties  agreed  to  remove  the  stipulation  that 
distributors  are  obligated  to  communicate  price 
information  to  Uniworl~  regarding  specific 
customers (11). 
(b)  strategic advisory boards 
The parties agree to amend the notified agreement in 
respect  of the  strategic advisory  boards  to .stipulate 
that: 
- recommendations  by  the  strategic  advisory 
boards  shall  not  be  binding  on  the  participants 
and their pertinent affiliated companies, and 
- no  information relating to prices and commercial 
conditions  of  products  and  services  outside  the 
(")  In  all  cases  through  the  respective  UBN  domestic 
subsidiary. 
(") Where a distributor chooses  not to communicate iu retail 
prices to Uniworld, then clearly that diStributor's customers 
would  not  be  able  to  benefit  fully  from  Uniworld's 
centralized billing capacity, as described above. 
business scope of l.Jniwocld will  be exchanged in 
the strategic advisory boards. 
2.  "£.!ndertakin.gs. given  ~y the parties 
In  addition,  the  Parties  have  provided  the  following 
behavioural  undertakings: 
(a)  Undertakings  by  Unisource  NV and all of its  share-
holders 
(1)  Unisource  and  every  one  of  its  shareholders 
undertakes  that  it  or its  subsidiaries  wiH  not  offer 
terms  and  conditions  to  Uniworld  in  respect  of 
access  to  basic  switched  transmission  capacity  and 
leased  lines  as  well  as  interconnection to PSTN and 
PSDN  networks  in  the  home  countries  of  the 
Unisource  shareholders  which  are  discriminatory  in 
favour of Uniworld. 
(2)  Unisource  and  e\•ery  one  of  its  shareholders 
undertakes  not  to  misuse  confidential  information 
obtained  from  third  parties  to  the  benefit  of 
Uniworld  and  will  in  relation  to  Uniworld  ensure 
and facilitate the respect of the undertakings related 
to  misuse  of confidential  information  given  in  the 
context of the  Unisource·- Telef6nica case  (Case 
No IV  /35.830). 
(b)  Undertakings by all Unisource shareholders 
(3)  Every shareholder undertakes not to grant any cross-
subsidies  to  any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the 
Uniworld  agreements  funded  out  of  income 
generated  by  any  business  which  they  operate 
pursuant to any exclusive right. 
(4)  Every shareholder undertakes  that it will  not tie  in 
the  sale  of any  service  provided  by  Uniworld  with 
any  service  provided  by  each  of them.  Each  will 
moreover,  for  as  long  as  it has  exclusive  or special 
rights to provide telecommunications services and/  or 
·infrastructures,  only  make  combined  offerings  of 
Uniworld  and  its  own  services  in  a  way  that  the 
customer can identify in  the contract forms the price 
charged as well as the other terms and conditions for 
these  services  and  it  will  ensure  that each  of these 
components  is  separately  available  at  equivalent 
conditions. 
(5)  Every  shareholder  undertakes  not  to  bundle  the 
provision  of Uniworld  (international)  services  with 
the provision  of domestic  services  outside the scope 
of Uniworld. 
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3.  Position of AT&T 
During  the  assessment  of  the  case,  AT&T  made  a 
detailed  description  of its  obligations  under  US  regu-
lations  in  respect  of  its  international  facilities  and 
services,  in  particular  regarding  interconnection  to  its 
networks. AT&T further confirmed its intention to abide 
by all  relevant US  legislation and FCC rules to which it 
is subject from time to time in  resp.ect of its international 
facilities  and services. 
In  addition,  AT&T  offered  to  the  Commission  the 
following: 
(a)  AT&T undertakes to advise DG IV promptly of any 
complaint filed  with the FCC regarding access  to or 
interconnection with AT&T's international facilities, 
including  any  complaint  filed  with  the  FCC 
regarding  bilateral  correspondent  arrangements,  by 
telecommunications  operators  or  service  providers 
from  the  EEA  or  Switzerland.  AT&T  further 
undertakes  to  inform  DG  IV  of any  final  decision 
taken by the FCC in regard to any such complaint; 
(b)  with  respect to operators with  international  facilities 
licences  in  the  EEA  and  Switzerland  with  whom 
AT&T today has an accounting rate agreement, and 
for traffic sent in  the context of the bilateral corre-
spondent  regime,  AT&T  undertakes  to  offer 
cost-based accounting rates that, in  all  cases,  would 
be  no ·higher than the lowest accounting rate estab-
lished  between  AT&T ·and  any  Unisource  share-
holder; 
(c)  wiili  respect to operators with international facilities 
licences  in  the  EEA  and  Switzerland  with  whom 
AT&T- may in the future establish an accounting rate 
agreement,  AT&T  undertakes  to  offer  cost-based 
accounting  rates  that,  in  a,ll  cases,  would  be  no 
higher than the lowest accounting rate then in effect 
between AT&T and any Unisource shareholder. 
H.  THE COMMISSION'S INTENTIONS 
On the  basis  of the foregoing,  the Commission  intends 
to take  a favourable  view  pursuant to Article  85  of the 
EC Treaty and Article 53  of the EEA Agreement and  to 
grant to Uniworld  an  individual  exemption  pursuant  to 
Article  85  (3)  of the EC Treaty and Article 53  (3)  of the 
EEA  Agreement.  Before  doing  so,  it  invites  interested. 
third parties to send their observations within one month 
of the publication of this notice to the following address, 
quoting the reference  'IV  /35.738 - Uniworld'. 
European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG  IV), 
Directorate C, 
Rue de Ia  Loi/Wetstraat 200, 
B-1049  Brussels; 
Fax:  (32 2)  296 98  19. 
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Notice pursuant to Article 19  (3) of Council Regulation No·t7 (I) and ~ide  3 of Protocol 21 
of the EEA Agreement concerning a request for negative clearance or an exemption pursuant to 
Article 85  (3)  of the EC Treaty and Article  53  (3)  of the EEA Agreement 
(Case  No IV/35.830·- Uni$ource- Telefonica) 
(97/C 44/05) 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
On  4  March  1996,  Unisource  NV  (hereinafter 
'Unisource') and Telef6nica filed  a  modified  agreement 
providing  for  the  incorporation  of  T elef6nica  to 
l.!nisource  as  a fourth  equal shareholder. 
Unisource  NV was  established  on 24  April  1992, was  a 
50-50  joint  venture  between  PTf  Telecom  BV,  the 
Dutch  telecom  operator,  and  Swedish  Telecom  Inter-
national,  a subsidiary  of T eleverket,  the  predecessor of 
Telia AB, a Swedish telecom operator, for the purpose of 
concentrating the international value  added  networks of 
the  two  Parties.  The  Panics  effectively  transferred  the 
corresponding  networks as  from  1 January 1993. 
The joint venture  was  first  expanded  by  an  entry  into 
Unisource  Satellite  Services  BV  of  Swiss  PTf  on 
4 November  1992  and  later by its  entry into Unisource 
NV on ·1  July  1993. During 1994, Unisource and Tele-
f6nica  staned negotiations  aimed  at the  entry of T ele-
f6nica  into Unisource  as  a founh sh.areholder. A result 
of  these  negotiations  were  the  original  agreements 
notified  to  the  Commission  under  the  merger  control 
regulation on 29  September 1995. 
On 6 November  1995, the Commission decided that the 
notified  transaction  was  not a  concentration.  Following 
the  Commission's  decision,  and  at  the  request  of the 
?arties the notification was  convened into a notification 
Jnder Regulation  17. 
Almost at the same  time,  following further negotiations, 
an  agreement  was  reached  by  the  parties  on  22 
November  1995  as  to  the  value  of Telef6nica's  packet 
switched data n'etworks  (PSDN). As  a consequence, the 
Panics modified the structure of the transaction, so that, 
Telef6nica  will  contribute  to  Unisource  itS  subsidiaries 
Telef6nica  Transmisi6n  de  Datos  SA  (owner  of  the 
lberpac and  Red  Uno networks)  and  Telef6nica VSAT 
SA in exchange for a 25 °/o  participation in  the capital of 
Unisource. 
(')  OJ No 13, 21.  2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
B.  TELEFONICA AND THE EXISTING SHAREHOLDERS 
OF UNISOURCE 
- Telef6nica  SA  is  the  incumbent  telecom  operator in 
Spain,  where  it  provides  national  and  international 
telecommunications services and infrastructures. 
T elef6nica  is  a  private  company  listed  in  the  stock 
exchange.  However,  the  Spanish  State  has  in  all  a 
21,16 %  shareholding  and  has  substantial  powers  to 
control the  company.  In  particular,  it  nominates  th(" 
chairman of the board and 5 of the board's members 
(out  of  23).  In  addition,  the  State  is  further  and 
directly  represented  by  a delegate e>  which  is  also  a 
member  without  voting  power  of  the  board.  The 
delegate  is  at the  same  time  the  director general  of 
the  Direcci6n  General  de  T elecommunicaciones 
(DGTEL, the existing regulator). 
The remaining shares 'of T elef6nica are in  the hands 
of two  big  Spanish  banks  and  the  biggest  s~vings 
bank  (around  11  °/o),  American  pension  funds  and 
other  non-Spanish  shareholders  (25 Ofo).  Around 
300 000 small private investors account for the rest. 
The consolidated turnover of the T elef6nica group in 
1995 was Pta 1 740 557 million (around ECU 10 927 
million)  of which  the  Telef6nica  mother  company 
accounted  for  Pta  1 372 674  million  (ECU  8 617 
million). 
Telef6nica  undertook  a  change  of  its  corporate 
structure  in  1994.  As  a  result,  some  of iu activities 
(data  transmission,  mobile  telephony,  international 
businesses,  multimedia,  payphones  and  publicity) 
have  been  transferred to separated  subsidiaries. The 
basic  telephony  business  (including  infrastructure, 
leased  lines  and  int~rnational  communications) 
remains with the corporate core. 
T elef6nica  is  the  only  European  telecom  operator 
operating  voice  telephony  in  the  US  through Tele-
f6nica  Larga  Distancia  de  Puerto  Rico ·(TLD).  In 
1995,  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
(FCC)  of the US  classified 'TLD as  a  non-dominant 
(')  Under the terms of a Royal Decree Law recently adopted by 
the  Spanish  Parliament,  the post of delegate will  disappear 
as Of I January 1998. 
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carrier for  international traffic  (except for  routes to 
Spain,  Argentina,  Chile  and  Peru)  and  also  auth-
orized TLD to originate and terminate long-distance 
domestic US traffic from all of the US territory. 
Telef6nica~s was  Europe•s  first  PSDN.  Based  on  a 
proprietary standard, the networks began operations 
in  1973  with migration to an X.25 service by the end 
of  the  1970s.  A  domestic  frame  relay  service  was 
introduced. in 1995, 
- PTf Telecom  BV  is  the  telecom  operator  in  the 
Netherlands,  where  it  provides  national  and  inter-
national  telecommunications  services  and  infra-
structure. 
Royal PTT Netherlands NV (KPN), a public limited 
liability company, owns 100% of the shares in  PTT 
Telecom.  Currently  the  Dutch  State  holds 
approximately  44  Ofo  of  the  outstanding  ordinary 
shares  of  KPN  (which  is  also  the  owner  of  PIT 
Post). 
KPN's turnover in  1994 was  Fl  18 592  million  (ECU 
8 769 million), of which Fl  12 686  (some ECU 6 000 
million) corresponded to PTT Telecom. 
By  the  end  of June  1996,  a  consortium  formed  by 
PIT Telecom and Telia was selected as  the  ~trategic 
partner  for  a  stake  of  up  to  35 °/o  in  Telecom 
Eireann,  Ireland's  State-owned  telecommunications 
company, 
- Schweizerische  PTT-Betriebe  (Swiss  PTf)  is  an 
incorporated  public-law  institution  which  is  pan of 
the Swiss  federal administration. It encompasses post 
and · telecommunications.  Total  turnover  of  Swiss 
PTT  in  1994  was  Sfr  13 838  million  (ECU  8 989 
million)  of which  telecommunications  (services  and 
infrastructures) accounted for Sfr 9 256 million (ECU 
6 0 1  0 million). 
Swiss  P'TT's  future  is  under  discussion,  and  it  is 
planned  to divide  it up  into Post and Telecom AG, 
the  latter being  a  joint stock company with  limited 
liability  in  which  the· State  will  keep  a  majority 
participation (51  Ofo), 
- Telia  AB  is  a  telecom  operator providing  domestic 
and  international  telecommunications  services  and 
infrastructure  in  Sweden.  It  is  ·a  limited  liability 
company incorporated under Swedish Ia!'· All  shares 
are owned by the Swedish State. 
Telia's  turnover  in  1995  was  Skr  41  066  million 
(ECU 4 729 million). 
T eli a is  currently in  the middle of a substantial reor-
ganization that will  completely change  its  structure. 
As a result, the provision of services will be separated 
from  the provision of networks. Thus Telia Network 
Services  will  support  all  the  other Telia's  business 
areas. 
C.  THE JOINT VENTURE: UNISOURCE NV 
Unisource  NV is  a holding  company active  in  the tele-
communications sector that incorporates seven  operating 
subsidiaries.  Total  turnover  of the  group  in  1994  was 
Fl  933  million (ECU 443  million).  Net result were losses 
of Fl  41,072  million  (ECU 20  million). 
1.  Current structure of Unisource NV 
Unisource  is  governed  by  a  management  board  and  a 
supervisory board. 
The  management  board,  which  is  entrusted  with  the 
day-to-day  business  of  Unisource C),  is  composed  of 
three  members  appointed  by  the  general  meeting  of 
shareholders  by  unanimity.  The three  members  are  the 
president and chief executive  officer, the executive vice-
president  and  chief  financial  officer  and  the  executive 
vice-president  and  director  of  Business  Services.  All 
decisions  by  the  management  board  are  adopted  by  a 
majority of the votes. 
The supervisory board will  exercise supervision over the 
management  board  conduct  of  affairs  and  over  the 
general  course  of  business  in  Unisource  an~  the 
operating  companies.  The  supervisory  board  shall  be 
composed , of four  members  appointed  by  the  general 
meeting  of  shareholders.  Each  shareholder  nominates 
one of them. There would  be  a  chairman. The position 
of chairman will  rotate every two years. 
Most resolutions of the .supervisory board (including the 
annual  budget  and  business  plan)  shall  be  adopted  by 
unanimity of the votes cast e). 
Finally, every operational subsidiary has its own board of 
directors  or  management  team  entitled  with  the 
day-to-day business of the subsidiary. 
(>)  Some decisions will  nevertheless require the approval of the 
supervisory  board,  including  among  others,  acquisitions, 
entering into agreements and invesunents. 
(•)  Absolute majority will be  required for resolution of disputes 
arising  out of transactions  between  Unisource  and  any of 
the shareholders. 
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The  supervisory  board  has  to  repon  to  the  general 
assembly  of  shareholders  which,  for  instance,  has  to 
approve  the  annual  accounts. 
2.  The Unisource aruance: the one telecom country 
According  to  the  Unisource's  'Organization  and 
Governance' document, one of the aims  of the  alliance  is 
'to  improve  time  to  market  and  cost  effectiveness  by 
merging  or  coordinating  activities  of  the  parents  and 
creating  service  transparency  between  mother  countries'. 
This  is  the  definition  of  what  the  Panies  call  'the  one 
telecom  country'.  In  practical  terms  the  concept 
translates  into  a  structure,  which  is  still  independent 
from  the  structure of Unisource  NV as  described  below, 
made  of  the  following  alliance  boards: 
- network board (NB).  Its  mission will  be  the  adoption 
of  strategic  decisions  concerning  network  questions 
to  establish  one  transparent ,network  and  to  use  all 
opponunities  to  reduce  costs  and .the  harmonization 
and  integration  of  national  netWorks  and  archi-
tectures  of the  shareholders  between  them  and  with 
Unisource  Carrier  Services  (see.  below).  Membership 
will  include the presidents of the companies involved; 
- service  and  distribution  board  (S&DB).  Its  DUSstons 
will  be  the  adoption of strategic decisions concerning 
the  joint  service  ponfolio  and  its  coordinati~n, the 
harmonizat.ion  and  ~ntegration of national services  of 
the  parents between themselves  and with the relevant 
Unisource  services; 
- R&D board. It will be responsible for the adoption of 
strategic  decisions  regarding  annual  joint  research 
and  development  of ponfolios  and  regarding  R&D 
optimization. It will also suppon the NB and S&DB; 
- purchasing  board  (PB).  It will  be  mainly  responsible 
for  creating  common  opinions  and  making  decisions 
about  areas  wonh  common  purchasing  and  for 
harmonizing  the  process  of purchasing  and  logistics 
both  in  suppon  systems  and  in  approach  to  the 
supplier  market; 
- IT board.  It  will  be  responsible  for  the  adoption  of 
strategic  decisions  concerning  planning,  provisioning 
and  implementation  of  IT  across  the  Alliance 
members,  the  harmonization  and  integration  of 
national  IT  systems  between  the  parent  companies 
and with  the  IT systems of Unisource. 
3.  Scope of activities of Unisource· NV 
The Unisource  product ponfolio  is  developed .'~long the 
lines  of  liberalization  of ·  the  EU  telecommunications 
market  and  follows  customer  demand.  According  to 
Unisource,  the  activities  of the  group  can  be  split  into 
three  main  areas:  business  services,  personal services  and 
network  services.  The  following  subsidiaries  operate  in 
each  of these  areas: 
(a)  Business  services 
Unisource  Business  Networks  (UBN)  is  responsible  for 
the  provision  of  pan-European,  seamless,  end-to-end 
data  network  services,  managed  bandwidth·  services, 
messaging  and  outsourcing.  UBN  has  subsidiaries  in 
Sweden,  the  Netherlands,.  Switzerland,  Spain,  Germany, 
the·· United  Kingdom,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Norway, 
Denmark,  Finland  and  Italy. 
In  addition, the respective domestic packet switehed data 
networks  (PSDN) of the  Unisource  initial  parents  were 
contributed  in  1993  to  the  respective  domestic  UBN 
subsidiaries. 
At  the  moment the  situation  regarding  the integration of 
the  above  networks  is  as  described  below;  each  network 
is  based on ·the same technology (Nonel (')) and they are 
interfaced  through a  common  backbone  network owned 
by  Unisource  (Unidata ('))  using  proprietary interfaces 
(with  the  ex~ption of the  Netherlands,  see  below): 
- the  Netherlands:  the  domestic  X.25  data  network 
(Datanet  1)  is  owned  by  UBN  Netherlands.  It  is 
interfaced  to Unidata  by  a X.75  interface.  Domestic 
only  data  services  in  the  ~etherlands are offered  by 
PIT  Telecom  as  exclusive  distributor  of  UBN 
Netherlands, 
- Sweden:  the  domestic  X.25  data  network  (Unidata 
Data  Pack)  is  owned  by  UBN  Sweden.  It is  fully 
integrated  with  Unidata  using  Nonel's  proprietary 
internal  network protocol (INP). Domestic only data 
services  in  Sweden  are  offered  by Telia  as  exclusive 
distributor of UBN Sweden, 
- Switzerland:  the  domestic  X.25  data  network 
(felepac)  is  owned  by  UBN  Switzerland.  It  is  fully 
integrated  with  Unidata  using  Nonel's  proprietary 
INP.  Domestic  only  ~ata  services  in  Switzerland 
e>  Nonel- Nonhern Telecom- is  a Canadian manufacturer 
of communications  equipment. 
(') N  for  Tclef6nica's  PSDN,  lberpac  is  interfaced  with 
Unidata  through  a  X.75  interface  and  Red  Uno  was  inte-
grated with Unidata in  1995. 
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are offered  by  Swiss  PTr as  exclusive  distributor of 
UBN Switzerland. 
The  respective  UBN  subsidiaries  own  and  operate  the 
data  nodes,  the  associated  databases  and  the  network 
control  centres.  Basic  services  (leased  circuits)  are 
provided to the UBN domestic subsidiary by  the relevant 
Unisource  shareholder.  The  latter  resells  the  Unisource 
services  to  its  local  customer  base.  The  networks  are 
used  to  suppon  the  offering  of  pan-European  serv1ces 
and  purely  domestic  services.  The  country  specific 
domestic  services  are  branded  Unisource. 
The  three  networks  are  being  upgraded  to  offer  also 
frame  relay,  again  using  Nonel  switches.  That  None! 
network  is  being  interconnected  to  another  frame  relay 
network of Unisource that uses  Stratacom {')  technology 
by using  network-to-network interconnections specificaJly 
developed by Nonel and Stratacom. 
The  three  PSDN and  Unidata  share  their  international 
X.75  gateways.  Finally,  the  respective  PSDN  services 
available  in  each  country  are  being  aligned  with  the 
Unisource's  Unidata  PSDN  service  to  create  a  basic 
PSDN service  with  a  wider reach. 
U nisource Voice Service  (UVS)  is  in  fact  a business  unit 
of Unisource offering pan-European voice IVPN services 
and  other closed  user group  services. 
Unisource  Satellite  Services  (USS)  offers  international 
value-added, voice,  video,  text and  data communications 
using  fixed  and VSAT satellite terminals.  It allows UBN 
services  to be extended to remote areas outside terrestrial 
coverage. 
(b)  Personal  services 
,··unisource  Card  Services  (UC)  offers  personal  and 
corporate  post-paid  calling  cards. 
Unisource  Mobile  (UM)  is  a  provider  of pan-European 
GSM  mobile  services.  It · also  applies  for  licences  for 
mobile  networks  operators  in  Europe, outside  the home 
·countries. 
(') Stratacom  is  an  US  manufacturer  of  communications 
equipment.  It  has  a  substantial  presence  in  frame  relay 
switches. 
UM has  three subsidiaries,  GEAB  AB  in  Sweden, GEAB 
Norge  AS  in  Norway  and  TMG  GmbH  in  Germany 
which  act  as  distributors  and  retail  outlets  for  the 
national mobile services in  these countries. So  GEAB  acts 
in  Norway as distributor of Telenor Mobile and Netcom 
and  in  Germany,  where  TMG  is  a  service  provider  for 
the  German  D 1,  D2 and E  Plus  networks. 
UM  is  currently developing  a  vinual  mobile  network  to 
provide  seamless  pan-European  mobile  telephony 
services  based  on  GSM  technology  at  a  significant 
discount  to. standard  roaming  tariffs. 
(c)  Network  services 
Unisource  Carrier  Services  (UCS)  is  currently 
responsible  for  managing  the  international  networks (') 
of  the  shareholders  of U nisource.  It is  organized  as  a 
management  company'  given  that  the  Unisource  share-· 
holders  are  not  permitted  to  assign  their  international 
networks  and  licences  to  UCS.  As  UCS  is  not  an 
lTV-recognized  telecom  operator,  nor  is  it  allowed  to 
negotiate  with  other telecom  operators in  its  own  name 
for  transit  traffic. 
UCS  is  a crucial  element  for  Unisource.  In  the  future  it 
will  provide  carri~r services  to  other services  providers. 
In  this  connection it is  building a pan-European network 
(PEN)  with  global  connectivity  based  on SOH(') tech-
nology  in  those  countries  where  legally  permissible. 
The  PEN. will  be  an  integrated,  centrally  managed 
network  that  will  provide  seamless  teleco~ services  in 
Europe.  It will  take  advantage  of its  presence  in  many 
European  countries  to  provide  an  advantage  to  the 
current  system  of bilateral  settlements. 
The  PEN  will  be  deployed  in  two  phases.  The  first 
phase,  aimed  to  be  completed  in  the  third  quaner  of 
1996,  will  be  a  managed  high  capacity network  between 
the  four  home  countries  with  centralized  management 
(') The  international  networks  include  the  international 
switching  cenues  in  the  three  countries,  the  international 
transmission  maintenance  centres,  the  international  network 
management  centres,  satellite  earth  stations,  sea  cables  and 
other  international  transit  capacity,  the  ATM- and 
SOH-cross connects  and  the  international  signalling  uansfer 
points  of the  said  companies  in  the  said  countries  and  any 
other cross-border facilaties  of the Unisource shareholders in 
the  countries involved. 
(') Acronym  for synchronous digital  hierarchy; an  international 
standardized  transmission  technique  which  enables  greater 
capacity  in  exining  fibre-optics  networks,  better  remote 
control and automatic rerouting in  the case of faults. 
11/1144 12. 2. 97  Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities  No C 44/19 
and  customer support. The second phase  is  aimed  to  be 
completed  on  1  January  1998.  By  then  it  will  be 
extended  to  non~shareholder countries  and  enhanced  in 
order  to  provide  signalling  and  intelligent  network 
services  to  customers. 
The services  provi4ed  on the PEN will  include switched 
transit  services,  switched  hubbing  services,  managed 
bandwidth  services,  delivery  of PSTN and  ISDN traffic 
and  signalling  services.· 
At  present  UCS  only offers  services  to  the  shareholders 
of Unisource  and  Uniworld.  However,  in  1997  it  will 
start  providing  network  services  to  third  parties  in  its 
own  name  on  the  basis  of  network  services  purchased 
from  the  Unisource  shareholders  (~nd other  operators) 
and  resold  in  an  integrated  manner to service  providers. 
The terms  and  conditions  for  the  provision  of network 
services  will  be  laid  down  in  supply  agreements  between 
each  Unisource  shareholder  and  UCS ('
0
). 
Outside  that structure  there  is  another subsidiary,  ltema 
(to be  renamed Unisource Information Services) active  in 
the  information  technology field.  It provides  information 
services  (IS)  and information  technology  (IT) services  to 
the  Unisource  group  and  to  identified  common  projects 
in  the Unisource Alliance.  It also  plays  a  leading  role  in 
the  harmonization process  between  the  IS/IT services  of 
the  Unisource  shareholders.  · 
A management agreement has been signed to subcontract 
the management, coordination and supervision  of certain 
projeCts  and  programmes to Itema.  It receives  a  general 
management  fee  for  its  activities. 
D.  THE  NOTIFIED AGREEMENTS 
1.  Agreements 
The  parties  have  notified  the  following  agreements 
rega~~ing Unisource: · 
- the  Joint Venture  and  Shareholders  Agreement  and 
its  Appendices, 
- the Contribution Agreement, 
- the  articles of association, 
(
10
)  One of these  agreements  has  been  concluded  between  UCS 
and Uniworld  (see  Case No IV  135.738  Uniworld). 
- the  by~laws, 
- the share issuance deed, and 
- the  Non-Compete  Agreements  for  · UBN,  USS, 
Unisource Cards and Unisource Mobile. 
2.  Contractual  provisions  , 
(a)  The  non-compete  provisions 
In  accordance  with  Article  19  of the  Joint Venture  and 
Shareholders  Agreements,  the  Parties  are  free  to 
conduct,  outside  Unisource  and  independently  of  each 
other  all  activities  whether  or  not  within  the  areas  of 
cooperation.  Nevertheless,  at such  time  as  they  agree  to 
develop  or  acquire  or  participate  in  an  operating 
company,  they  shall  negotiate  and  agree  to  a 
non-competition  agreement  specifically  geared  to  the 
business  activities  to  be  conducted  by  that  operating 
company. 
As  of  now,  for  such  non-compeuuon  agreements  have 
,been concluded  in  respect of the  activities  of UBN, USS, 
'UC and  Unisource  Mobile: 
- under  the  Non-Competition  Agreement  for  UBN's 
activities,  the  four  panies decide  to concentrate their 
international  value  added  data  network  services  in 
UBN.  Thus,  and  except  with  regard  to  Infonet 
services,  none  of  the  four  will  offer  comparative 
services  in  parallel  to  the  UBN  portfolio.  Each  of 
them  will  offer  to  their  respective  national  markets 
the UBN product portfolio as  an agent or distributor 
of UBN, 
- under  the  Non-Competition  Agreement  for 
Unisource  Satellite  Services,  none  of  the  four  will 
offer  comparative  VSAT  ~services  in  parallel  to  the 
USS  portfolio.  Each  of them will  distribute  the USS 
product portfolio to their respective  national  markets 
as an agent or distributor of USS, 
- under  the  non:-competition  provision  for  Unisource 
Cards,  the  panies  have  decided  to  concenuate  on 
UC  the  ownership  and  operation  of  the  technical 
platform  for  non~payphone calling  card  services  and 
product  development.  Consequently,  none  of  them 
will  offer  comparative  services  in  parallel  to  the  UC 
pan-European  product  portfolio.,  Nonetheless,  each 
of  them  will  continue  to  market  their  own 
non-payphone  calling  cards  within  their  respective 
national  markets,  and  UC will  market  and  distribute 
its  cards on a real  pan-European scale, 
- finally,  the  non-competition  provision  for  Unisource 
Mobile  (GSM  and  DCS  1800)  services  requires  the 
Unisource  shareholders  not  to  act  as  pan-European 
mobile  service  providers  outside  their  territories  in 
parallel  to  the UM product ponfolio.  However, each 
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of them  will  continue  offering  their GSM services  at 
home  and  abroad  through  the  relevant  roaming 
agreements  concluded  under  the  framework  of the 
GSM MoU. 
(b)  Distrib~ttion of services 
The  services  of  UBN (
11
),  UVS  and  USS  will  be 
distributed  through  exclusive  distributors.  Each  of  the 
Unisource shareholders  is  the  exclusive  distributor for  its 
own  country  (Telia  is  also  the  exclusive  distributor  for 
Norway  and  Denmark).  Exclusive  distributors  shall  not 
actively  seek  customers  outside  its  territory  and  are 
bound  by  non-competition  provisions.  (see  above).  The 
non-competition  provision  regarding  UBN  permits 
nevertheless  the  distribution  to  the  territory of Infonet's 
(global)  data  services.  Thus,  as  in  all  other  European 
countries,  the  reseller  in  the  Unisource  countries  is  a 
business  unit  to  the  country's  telecom  operator.  Such 
business  unit  is  not  transferred  to  Unisource C
2
). 
E.  RELEVANT  MARKETS 
The  relevant  markets  involved  are  basically  the same  as 
described  in  the  Atlas  and  Global  One Decisions (u). 
1.  Product  markets 
(a)  Tbe  markets  for  non-reserved  corporate  telecommuni-
cations  services 
Unisource,  through  UBN,  UVS  and  USS  targets  the 
markets for both customized  packages of corporate tele-
communications  services  and  packet-switched  data 
communications  services,  jointly  referred  to  as 
'non-reserved  corporate  telecommunications  services'. 
The  services  to  be  provided  fall  within  the  following 
categories: 
-:-:-- corporate  voice  services:  global  vinual  private 
··  network  (VPN),  international  toll  free,  selected  card 
and simple  resale services  and switched  digital, 
(1
1
)  After  the  Uniworld  transaction,  the  UBN  distribution 
agreement will  relate  to national data services  and to inter-




)  In  these  countries,  Infonet  claims  a  market  ~hare of  less 
than  1 %. 
(u) Commission  Decisions  of  17  July  1996  relating  to 
proceedings  under Anicle  85  of the  EC Treaty and Anicle 
53  of  the  EEA  Agreement  (Cases  IV  /35.337 - Atlas· and 
IV/35.617  .;.._  Global  One). OJ No L 239  of 19  September 
1996, points 4 to 15 and 5 to 16, respectively. 
- data  communications  services  using,  inter  alia,  the 
X.25, Frame Relay and Internet protocols (IP), 
- dedicated  transmiSSIOn  for  voice  and  data  services: 
managed bandwidth and VSAT, 
- custom  network  solutions:  systems/equipment 
procu.rement,  tailored  and  managed  services  and 
outsourcing, 
- platform-based  enhanced  services:  messaging 
including  access  to  telex,  local  area  network  (LAN) 
interconnection,  electronic  document  interchange 
(EDI),  videoconferencing  and  audioconferencing. 
(b)  Tbe  market /or traveller services 
The  market  for  traveller  telecommunications  services 
comprises  offerings  that  meet  the  demand  of individuals 
who are away from  their normal location, either at home 
or at work. Among  the  most  relevant  of these  offerings 
are  calling  card  services  (i.e.  pre-paid  cards  with  or 
without  a  code and  post-paid  cards),  including  those  in 
combination with credit cards  and  other branded service 
cards  ('affinity  cards'), 
Customers  for  traveller  services  include  both  business 
travellers  and  other  travellers.  In  the  card  business 
targeted  by  Unisource  through  UC,  the  former  are  by 
far  the  largest  group  of  buyers.  Business  travellers  are 
generally  intensive  card  users,  the  main  incentive  for 
card  usage  being  the  possibility  to  avoid  paying  hotel 
telephone  surcharges. 
The  pan-European  GSM  mobile  services  being 
developed  by UM are  also  mainly  intended  to  serve  the 
needs  of  traveller  services  and  for  that  reason  are 
included  here  as  well.  However,  they  are also  seen  as  a 
GSM  mobile  extension  to  corporate  customers'  fixed 
private or virtual  private  (VPN) networks,  it  can  not be 
excluded  now  that they will  have  to be  included  in  the 
previous  market in  the  future. 
(c)  The  market /or carrier services 
The  market  for  carrier  services  comprises  the  lease  of 
transmission  capacity  and  the  provision  of  related 
services  to third-party telecommunications  traffic carriers 
and  service  providers.  Along  with  liberalization  and 
globalization  of  telecommunications  markets,  demand 
for  efficient,  high-quality  traffic  transponation  capacity 
has  risen  among old and new carriers. In this connection, 
the  traditional  model  of  separate  arrangements  with 
other  individual  carriers  is  increasingly  challenged  by 
players  with  global  network  infrastructure  that  offer  an 
array of services.  The most relevant of such  services  are: 
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(1)  switched transit, i.e.  transpon of traffic over bilateral 
facilities  between  the  originating  carrier,  ~the  transit 
carrier and the  terminating carrier; neither the orig-
inating  carrier  nor  the  terminating  carrier  need 
bilateral  facilities  between  themselves,  but only with 
the transit carrier; 
(2)  dedicated  transit,  i.e.  leased  line  offerings  for  the 
transport of traffic through the domestic network of 
the  transit  carrier;  leased  line  facilities  used  for  this 
purpose may include discrete voice circuits or a high-
bandwidth  digital  circuit  that  can  be  used  for  both 
voice  and  data services; 
(3)  traffic  hubbing  offerings,  where  the  provider  takes 
care of all  or pan of international connections; these 
offerings  are  typicaJJy  designed  for  emerging, 
carriers,  who  are  interconnected  with  the  provider 
over bilateral facilities  and whose international traffic 
is  merged with  other traffic on the  provider's  global 
network; and 
(  4)  reseller  services  for  service  providers  without  inter-
national  telecommunications facilities  of their own. 
Demand  for  carrier  services  is  increasingly  driven  by 
alternative  carriers  concerned  with  entrusting  the 
incumbent  TO  with  their  international  traffic,  for 
reasons  such  as  technical  dependency  and  commercial 
sensitivity  of customer  information. 
Purchasers  of  carrier  services  include  established  and 
emerging  carriers.  Both  groups  of . clients  are  sophis-
ticated  purchasers.  Among  the  emerging  carriers,  one 
may distinguish  facilities-based  carriers that provide tele-
communications  services  over  alternative  infrastructure 
or cable  television  networks seeking greater. efficiency in 
the  transport  of  international  client  traffic,  while 
non4acilities-based  carriers  and  services  providers  seek 
to  preserve  a  competitive,  advantage  by  avoiding 
dependence on a local TO for international client traffic. 
2.  Geographic  markets 
Along  the  lines  of  the  Commission's  findings  in  its 
BT-MCI (  ..  ),  Atlas  and  Phoenix  decisions,  the 
geographic  scope  of  certain  markets  targeted  by 
Unisource  is  cross-border  regional  and  pan~European if 
not  global.  Although  national  'borders  subsist  for  many 
services,  strategic  alliances  like  Unisource  are  built  not 
('•)  Commission  Decision  of  27  July  1994  in  Case  No 
IV  134.857 - BT-MCI, OJ No L 223/36, 27.  8.  1994. 
only  in  anttcapation  of a  market  unaffected  by  national 
boundaries but even with the ·express purpose of offering 
large  global  telecommunications  users  seamless 
end-to-end  services  ·aniwhere  by  overcoming  the  diffi-
culties  inherent  in  the  current  market  Structure  split 
along national  borders. However, the service offerings of 
Unisource  through  its  subsidiaries  reach  different 
existing  geographic  markets. 
(a)  Tbe  markets  for  non-reserved  corporate  telecommuni-
cations  services 
As  described  in  the Atlas decision, demand by  large users 
for  customized  packages  of  corporate  telecommuni-
cations services  exists  in  at least  three distinct geographic 
markets,  namely  at  a  global,  cross-border  regional  and 
national  level.  Unisource  services  have  pan-European 
reach. 
Packet-switched  data  communications  services  are 
offered  by  Unisource,  through  UBN (and  the  domestic 
subsidiaries  thereof)  at  a  cross-border  regional  and 
national  level ·  in  the  different  Member  States  involved. 
(b)  Tbe  market for traveller services 
Along  with  the  globalization  of the economy the  market 
for  traveller  services  appears  to  be  increasingly  global; 
travellers  demand  offerings  which  include  a  single  bill 
and  integrated  functions  such  as  voice  messaging,  voice 
response  and  information  systems  everywhere. 
Geographic  limitations  of  current  tra.veller  service 
offerings  are  generally due to technical  shortcomings set 
to be overcome in the near future, such as the incompati-
bility. of mobile  Communications systems or differences in 
pre-paid  cards  without  an  individual  \lSer  code. 
(c)  Tbe  market for carrier services 
Both  supply  of and  demand  for  carrier services  are  by 
nature  cross-border  regional.  Geographic  proximity 
between  purchaser  and  supplier  of  switched  transit 
capacity  is  hardly  relevant  for  switched  transit  which 
carriers use  either as  a substitute for operating own inter-
national  lines  or to  deal  with  peak  traffic  on such  lines. 
Likewise,  dedicated  transit  services  offer  cable- or 
satellite-based  routing  capacity ' across  third  countries. 
Finally,  using  hubbing  services  is  an  alternative  to 
entering  into  an  undetermined  number  of  bilateral 
agreements  with  individual  carriers. 
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3.  Competition  in  the  markets 
(a)  Cross-border  regional or global markets 
Many players, acting alone or jointly with  partners, have 
entered  or are  entering  the  above  defined  cross-border 
regional  or global  markets: 
( 1)  the  m~rket for non-reserved  corporate telecommuni-
cations  services:  BT-MCI's  Concert  and  Atlas/ 
Global  One  are  expected  to  become  major  players 
on  a  global  basis.  To  those  it  is  necessary  to  add 
some  other significative  players  like  Infonet,  Sita  or 
IPSP; 
(2)  the market for traveller services: many companies are 
actively  marketing  calling  cards,  US  firms  like 
AT&T,  MCI  and  Sprint  and  alliances  like  Global 
One.  In  addition,  most  European  telecommunication 
operators and some new entrantS are lauching direct-
to-home  or  collect-call  services  in  order  to  follow 
their customers abroad; 
(3)  the  market  for  carrier  services:  all  telecommuni-
cations  operators  compete  with  each  other  in  the 
provision  of  transit  and  hubbing  services.  A  few 
companies are entering the market on a cross-border 
regio'nal  or  global  basis,  Global  One  and  Hermes 
are, in  principle, the most important ones. 
(b)  National  markets 
Each of the shareholders of Unisource face  a  number of 
competitors  in  their  respective  domestic  market  for 
packet  switched  data  communication  services.  So  such 
services  are  compietely  liberalized  in  Sweden,  there  are 
at least  five  licences granted in  the  Netherlands, eight in 
Spain  and  several  in  Switzerland.  Some  of  those 
companies  (such  as  Spain's  BT Tel  or Swedish's  Tele-
nordia)  are  also  the  domestic  extensions  'of  the  global 
--··alliances  (BT in  those  two cases). 
4.  Market shares  of the parties 
(a)  Cross-border  regional  markets 
Market shares  figures  for those cross-border regional or 
global  marketS  are highly unreliable. Their emerging and 
evolving nature and the high volume  of traffic generated 
by  large  corporate customers  are  explanatory arguments 
for  such  unreliability.  · 
Unisource's  estimates of its  own  market shares  for  1994 
were slightly  above  5 % in  the  EEA  plus  Switzerland  in 
respect  .of  value  adde.d  services  to  corporations 
(encompassing  most  of  the  services  within  the  three . 
markets  above)  and  slightly  over  15%  for  VSAT 
services. 
(b)  National  markets 
As  regards  domestic  packet  switched  data  communi-
cation  services,  in  1995,  Telia  had  78% in  Sweden ('s), 
PIT  Telecom  and  Telef6nica  over  95%  in  the 
Netherlands  and  Spain  and  Swiss  Telecom  nearly  100% 
in  Switzerland.  Market figures  in  respect  of the  overall 
domestic  telcommunications  services  were  91  %  for 
Telia,  near  100%  for  P1T Telecom,  95,7%  for  Tele-
fonica  and  near  100 %  for  Swiss  Telecom. 
F.  CHANGES  MADE  AND  UNDERTAKINGS  GIVE:\ 
FURTIIER TO TI:IE  COMMISSION'S INTERVENTION 
Certain  features  of the  notified  transaction  appeared  to 
be  incompatible  with  Community  competition  rules. 
Consequently,  the  Commission  by letter of 7  May  1996 
informed the Parties of its  concerns. In the course of the 
notification  procedure  the  Panies  have  amended  ·the 
original  agreementS  and  given  undertakings  to . the 
Commission. 
In  addition,  the  Commission  wrote  to  the  four 
Governments  involved  enquiring  about  the  existing 
framework  and  the  intended  evolution  theredf.  Letters, 
where  required,  also  requested  changes  to  that 
framework  necessary  in  the Commission's view  in  order 
to create a level  playing field.  The results of such  action 
are summarized  under 3  below. 
1.  Contractual  changes 
The  following  undertakings  reflect  changes  m  the 
notified  agreements: 
(a)  Spanish  data  networks 
From  the  date  of  completion  of  the  transactions 
envisaged  in  the  notified  agreement  until  full  and 
effective  liberalization  of  telecommunication  infra-
structures  and  services  in  Spain,  scheduled  for  30 
November  1998,  Unisource  NV undertakes  to maintain 
the  Spanish  public  data  network  and  business  as  a 
separate legal  entity under Unisource  NV. The network 
will  during  that  period  not  be.  integrated  in  the 
(u)  In  all  cases  through  the  respective  UBN  domestic 
subsidiary. 
II/A48 12. 2. 97  Official journal of the  European  Communities  No C 44/23 
domestic  UBN  subsidiary  in  Spain  or  its  successor, 
Uniworld  Spain.  It will  keep  separate  accounts  and will 
be  audited  as  such.  The  Commission  will  receive 
annually a copy of the auditors report. A register shall be 
kept of all  contracts  betWeen  this  entity  and  any  other 
Unisource subsidiary.  Such transactions will  comply with 
normal  market  Conditions.  The  Commission  will  be 
entitled  to consult  this  register  pursuant  to  this  under-
taking,  without  the  need  to  invoke  its  powers  under 
Council .  Regula~ion  17/62. 
(b)  Agency  arrangements 
Unisource  NV undertakes  that  neither  it  nor any  of its 
subsidiaries  will  act  as  an  exclusive  agent  for  P1T 
Telecom or Telia in  respect of basic services  and will  not 
be  involved  with  the  provision  of leased  lines  on  behalf 
of  itS  shareholders  (other  than  Telia)  until  1  january 
1998  except  as  purchaser  of  leased  lines  from  share-
holders for  its  own use  or for  resale. It will  terminate as 
from  the  date  of the  granting  of  an.  exemption  under 
Article  85  (3) of the EC Treaty and Article 53  (3) of the 
EEA  Agreement  the  exclusive  agency  agreem.ent  with 
PTf Telecom as  far  as  it  is  concerned with leased  lines. 
Unisource NV undertakes  that neither  it  nor any  of itS 
susidiaries will  act as  an exclusive agent for the provision 
of  leased . lines  on  behalf  of  Swiss  P1T  or T elef6nica 
until  1 January  1998  except  as  purchaser of leased  line 
from each of therm  for  its  own use  or for resale. 
(c)  Transit  negotiations 
Unisource  NV undertakes  that neither it  nor any of its 
subsidiaries,  in  particular  .UCS,  will  act  as  the  sole 
representative  in  any ·capacity  for  any of the  Unisource 
shareholders  in  respect  of  the  negotiations  of  transit 
tariffs  in/through  the  Unisource  shareholders  countries 
on behalf of the shareholders with licensed operators and 
that  it  will  not  be  involved  in  these  negotiations  on 
behalf of the  shareholders  until  1 january 1998. 
2.  1)ndertakings given  by  the parties 
(a)  Prevention  of  discri~ination 
Article  86  of  the  EC  Treaty  prohibits  the  abuse  of 
dominant positions.  Each of the  parentS  of Unisource  is 
in  a  dominant position  in  its  respective  domestic  market 
at least  for  the  provision  of infrastructures  required  by 
competitors  of  Unisource  in  those  domestic  markets. 
Accordingly,  to ensure the absence of discrimination, the 
Commission  intends  to ask Unisource  and/  or its  parent 
companies  to comply with  the following: 
- all  shareholders undertake  that all  dealings with  any 
entity organized under the Unisource agreements will 
be  on non-discriminatory terms  with  regard to those 
terms  offered  to  third  panics  and  at  arm's  length 
basis,  in  connection  with  reserved  facilities  and 
services  and  with  such  facilities  and  services  which 
remain  an  essential  facility  after  full  and  effective 
liberalization  of  telecommunications  infrastructure 
and services in each of their respec.tive  countries. 
(1)  Leased  lines 
- all  shareholders  undertake  that,  to  the  extent  that 
such  would  not  yet  be  the  case,  the  provision  of 
leased  lines  will  be  a  separated  service  for  which 
separate  accounts  will  be  kept  pursuant to  the  prin-
ciples,  rules  and  practices  currently  in  use  under 
national or community law, 
- all  shareholders  undertake  to  publish  the  standard 
terms and conditions for the leasing of lines  (national 
and  international).  The  terms  will  refer  to  the 
technical  specifications  of the  lines,  the  provisioning 
time, repair time,  tariffs and discounts, 
- all shareholders undertake that all types of lines made 
available  to  any  of its  subsidiaries  or to  Unisource 
will  also  be  available  under  the  same  terms  and 
conditions for third parties, 
'  . 
- P1T Telecom has  no clause  in  its  general conditions 
containing any obligation on customers to reveal  the 
use  they intend to make of leased  lines  and does  not 
request  such  information  from  (potential)  customers 
before  or  after  entering  into  contracts  for  leased 
lines.  P1T T.elecom  will  delete  any  clause  form  its 
general conditions containing  references to the use  of 
leased  lines  (i.e.  clause  1  1.10)  and  international  half 
circuits  in 'any way which  would  not be  justified  by 
technical  considerations or mandatory provisions  and 
undertakes  not  to  introduce  such  clawe  or  inter-
ference. 
(2)  Interconnection 
- Unisource  and  its  affiliates,  in  particular  UBN, 
undertakes  to  establish  and  maintain,  third  party 
access  to public data networks (X.75 or any 'standard 
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that  might  replace  it)  of  domestic  UBN's  on 
non-discriminat6i-y  cost-oriented  ~erms  including 
price,  availability  of volume  and other discounts  and 
the  quality  of interconneaion  provided  as  from  the 
granting  of an  exemption  pursuant  to  Article  85  (3) 
of  the  EC  Treaty  and  Anicle  (3)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement.  These  terms  wiJI  be  publicly . available. 
The  price  shall  be  based  on  costs  -defined  and 
attributed using an analytical accounting system. This 
undertaking shall  remain  valid  for the  period  of the 
validity  of  the  exemption  subject  to  review  upon 
request  of the  panies  of the  need  to  maintain  this 
undertaking  by  the Commission, 
- Telef6nica  will  provide  no  later than  on  the  date  of 
the  granting of an  exemption under Anicle 85  (3) of 
the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  53  (3)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement  a  draft  standard  interconnection 
agreement to the Commission in  respect of the PSTN 
and ISDN networks which will  be in  accordance with 
relevant  EU and  national regulations. This agreement 
will  provide  for  timely  interconnection  and  will 
include  terms  and  conditions  (including  technical 
standards  and  specifications) which  are  non-discrimi-
natory  and  cost-oriented  on  a  service-by-service 
basis. 
Interconnection  will  be  available  at  a  reasonable 
range of termination points, in  accordance with inter-
national  technical  standards,  to  ensure  adequate  and 
efficient  interconnections  to  the  extent  necessary  to 
ensure  interoperability of services.  There would  be  a 
number  of regional  points  of interconnection  where 
international  standardized  interfaces  and  signalling 
systems  are  available  and  where  it.  is  economically 
feasible, 
- Telef6nica  undertakes  th~t it  will.  continue  to  grant 
access  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  to  customer 
databases  necessary  for  the  provision  of  directory 
services  at  a  cost-oriented  pricing  and  in  compliance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Public  Act  on  Personal 
Data Handling (LORTAD), 
- P1T Telecom  will  provide no later thap  on  the  date 
of the  granting of an  exemption  under Article  85  (3) 
of the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  53  (3)  pf  the  EEA 
Agreement  a  standard  interconnection  agreement  to 
the  Commission  in  respect  of the  PSTN and  ISDN 
networks  which  will  provide  for  timely  intercon-
nection  and  will  include  terms  and  conditions 
{including  technical  standards  and  specifications) 
which  are  non-discriminatory and  cost-oriented  on  a 
service-by-service  basis. 
Interconnection  will  be  available  at  a  reasonable 
range of termination points in  accordance with  inter-
national  technical  standards  to  ensure  adequate  and 
efficient  interconnections  to  the  extent  necessary  to 
ensure interoperability of services.  There would  be  a 
number  of regional  points  of interconnection  where 
international  standardized  interfaces  and  signalling 
systems  are  available  and  where  it  is  economicaUy 
feasible, 
- PIT Telecom  undertakes  that  it  will  continue  to 
grant  access  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  to 
customer  databases  necessary  for  the  provision  of 
directory services at a cost-oriented pricing, 
- Swiss  P1T will  provide  no later than  on  the  date  of 
the  granting of an  exemption  under Article  85  (3)  of 
the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  53  (3)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement  a  standard  interconnection  agreement  to 
the  Commission  in  respect  of the  PSTN  and  ISD='1 
networks  which  will  be  in  accordance  with  relevant 
Swiss  regulations.  This  agreement  will  provide  for 
timely  interconnection  and  will  include  terms  and 
conditions  (including  technical  standards and specifi-
cations)  which  are  non-discriminatory  and  cost-
oriented on a service-by-service basis. 
Interconnection  wiU  be  available  at  a  reasonable 
range of termination points  in  accordance with  inter-
national  technical  standards  to  ensure  adequate  and 
efficient  interconnections  to  the  extent  necessary  to 
ensure  interoperability of services.  There would  be  a 
number  of regional  points  of interconnection  where 
international  standardized  interfaces  and  signalling 
systems  are  available  and  where  it  is  economically 
feasible, 
- Swiss  PIT undertakes  that it wiU  continue to grant, 
in  accordance  to  the  relevant  Swiss  regulations, 
access  on  a  non-disajminatory  basis  to  customer 
databases  necessary  for  the  provision  of  directory 
services  at a cost-oriented pricing, 
- T elia  undenakes that interconnection charges  will  be 
non-discrimintory,  cost-oriented  and  transparent  in 
compliance with  relevant Swedish  regulations. 
(b)  No  misuse of  confidential information 
- Unisource  NV undertakes  that  UCS  will  not  make 
available  to  any  other  of  its  st,absidiaries  or share-
holders  confidential  information  in  respect  of 
reserved  services e.g.  in  respect of customer contract-
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related data such  as  prices  received  in  its  capacity as 
agent of the Unisouice shareholders, 
- Unisource NV will  require that the Unisource share-
holders  will  not  use  confidential  customer 
information  acquired  by  Unisource  in  the  provision 
of Unisource  data  services  within  business  units  of 
the Unisource  shareholde~ selling  competing services 
or products. 
The above undenakings are also given  by  Unisource NV 
in  respect  of the subsidiary which  will  own  and  operate 
the  Spanish  public  data network and  business, 
- all  shareholdt:rs  undertake  that  they  will  not  misuse 
confidential  information  in  respect  of  customer 
contract  related  data  such  as  prices  received ·in  its 
capacity  as  shareholders  in  Unisource  NV.,  because 
of its  representation  on  any  board  or committee  in 
any  entity  eStablished  pursuant  to  the  U nisource 
agreements,  or  as  distributor  for  any  Unisource 
services, 
- all  shareholders  will  furthermore  ensure  that · 
Unisource  NV or its  subsidiaries will  not have access 
to  confidential  information  in  respect  of  customer 
contract-related  data  such  as  prices  acquired  by 
providing  reserved  services  (for  instance  intercon-
nection agreements or the provision of basic  capacity 
to competitors of Unisource). 
(c)  Prevention  of  CTOss-subsidies 
The parties shall  not engage in  cross-subsidization within 
the  meaning  of the  Commission's  competition  guidelines 
for  the  telecommunications  sector C'): 
- all  shareholders  undertake  not  to  grant  any  cross-
subsidies  to  any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the 
Unisource  agreements  funded  out  of  income 
generated  by  any  business  which  they  operate 
pursuant to any exclusive right or in  respect of which 
they  hold  a  dominant  position  in  the  meaning  of 
Anicle 86 of the EC Treaty, 
- all  shareholders  further undenake; (i)  to provide  any 
entity  created  pursuant to the  Unisource ·agreementS 
with  their  own  debt  financing;  (ii)  not 
(") Guidelines  on  the  application  of EEC  competition  rules  in 
the  telecommunications  sector.  OJ  No C  233,  6.  9.  1991. 
Point 102  et  seq. 
to allocate  operating  expenses  of these entities  to  the 
shareholders; and  (iii)  to  charge the shareholders the 
same  price  as  they  charge  third  parties  for  the 
provision of services, 
- all  shareholders will  ensure  transparency  by  ensuring 
compliance  with  the  accounting  rules,  principles  and 
practices  currently  in  use  under  national  or 
community  law.  Such  rules,  principles  and  practices 
include  the  cost  standard  used,  the  accounting 
conventions  used  for the  treatement of costs  and  the 
attribution method chosen. PaymentS .  and .transfers to 
Unisource and Unisource companies can be  identified 
on  the  basis  of  accounting  reports  that  are  period-
ically  available, 
- T elef6nica  undertakes  and  confirms  that  it  will 
continue to keep  the analytical  accounts  according to 
the  rules,  principles  and  practices  already  in  use  and 
to  the  extent  that  it  is  not  the  case  yet,  T elef6nica 
will  fully  implement  such  analytical  accounting 
system.  T elef6nica  refers  specifically  to  the  Spanish 
Royal  Decree  1558/1995  (whiches  gives  implemen-
tation to Council Directive 92/44/EEC for the estab-
lishment  of  the  open  network  provision  for  leased 
circuits)  and  to  the  resolution  of  the  Directorate-
General  for  Telecommunications  (DGTEL)  of  21 
February  1996  approving  the  contract-type  for  the 
provision  of  the  national  and  international  circuit 
leasing  carrier  service  that  was  already  sent· to  the 
Commission on April 26. 
(d)  Prevention of  bundling 
- T elef6nica  undertakes  that it  will  not tie  in  the  sale 
of  any  service  provided  by  Unisource  with  any 
service  provided  by T elef6nica.  It will  moreover  for 
as  long as  it has  exclusive or special  rightS  to provide 
telecommunications  services  and/  or  infrastructures 
only  make  combined  offerings  of Unisource  and  itS 
own services in  a way that the customer can identify 
in  the contract forms the price charged as  well  as  the 
order terms  and  conditions  for  these  services  and  it 
will  ensure  that  each  of these  componentS  is  sepa-
rately available  at equivalent conditions, 
- P1T Telecom  undertakes  that it  will  not  tie  in  the 
sale  of any  service  provided  by  Unisource  with  any 
service  provided  by  P1T Telecom.  It will  moreover, 
for as  long  as  it  has  the exclusive  or special  rightS  to 
provide  telecommunication  services  and/or  infra-
structures,  only  make  combined  offerings  of 
Unisource  and  its  own  services  in  a  way  that  the 
customer can  identifiy in  the contract forms  the price 
charged as  well  as  the other terms and conditions for 
these  services  and  it  will  ensure  that  each  of these 
components  is  separately  available  · at  equivalent 
conditions, 
11/151 No C 44/26  Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities  12.  2.  97 
- Swiss  PTf undenakes that it will  not tie  in  the  sale 
of  any  service  provided  by  Unisource  with  any 
service  provided  by  Swiss .PTf. It will  moreover, for 
as  long as  it  has  exclusive or special rights to provide 
telecommunications  services  and/  or  infrastructures; 
only  make  combined  offerings  of Unisource  and  its 
own services  in  a way that the customer can identify 
in  the contract forms  the price charged as  well  as  the 
other  terms  and  conditiom  for  these  services  and  it 
will  ensure  that  each  of these  components  is  sepa-
rately available at equivalent conditions. 
All  the  above  undenakings will  be  valid  as  from  date of 
the  exemption  for  the  period  of  validity  of  such 
exemption. 
3.  Changes to the  regulatory framework in  the  countries 
involved in Unisource 
The  Commission  discussed  with  the  governmentS 
involved  the  degree  of  liberalization  of  each  national 
market  directly involved  and  the  existence  of regulatory 
mechanisms  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  in  these  tele-
communications  markets.  Such  discussions  took the  form 
of an  exchange  of letters  between  the  Commission  and 
each  government  which  began on 10  April  1996. 
Sweden 
There  is  already full  liberalizati?n  in  Sweden. 
By  letter  of  25  April  1995,  ~e Swedish  Minister  for 
Telecommunications  added  that  the  current  Telecom-
munications Act of 1 July 1993  will  be reformed in  1997. 
The  most  imponant changes  will  regard  the  powers  of 
the  regulator  (the  National  Post and  Telecom  Agency), 
which  will  be  extended  as  a  consequence  of  the  EU 
Interconnection  Directive  to  be  adopted. 
The Netherlands 
The  Commission  sought  confirmation  that  the 
Netherlands  wiiJ  respect  the  dates  for  .the  liberalization 
of alternative  infrastructure  and  for  the  introduction  of 
fuJI  competition  respectively,  and  that  an  independent 
regulatory agency  was  in  place. 
In her reply of 25 June 1996,  the Minister for T ranspon 
and Waterways of the Netherlands indicated  that as  of 1 
of January  1996,  it  is  possible  to  use  cable  television 
networks  for  liberalized  telecommunications  services  and 
as  leased  lines.  Funhermore, under new  legislation  being 
adopted  by  the  Parliament,  full  liberalization  will  take 
place  on  1 July  1997.  Two more national  licences  (apan 
from  KPN's  concession)  without  territorial  limitation 
and  a  large  number  of regional  licences  with  territorial 
limitations  will  be  granted  to  install,  maintain  and 
operate  fiXed  infrastructure.  All  these· new  infrastructure 
licences  ~ill have  the  right and  (aher an interim  period) 
the  obligation  to  supply  leased  Jines.  All  of them  will 
have  rights  of way. 
Further 'fixed  networks  can  be  installed  by  any  person 
without a licence.  Such  networks will  be  used  to provide 
leased  lines  or telecommunication  services  (except  voice 
telephony).  However,  they  will  not  have  rights  of way. 
Finally,  an  independent  regulator  will  be  established  by 
I  January  1997. 
Spain 
The  liberalization  of alternative  infrastructure  by  I  July 
1996,  the setting  up  of an  independent regulatory agency 
and  the  formal  relinquishment  by  Spain  of the  right  to 
request a temporary derogation  in  respect  of the. date of 
liberalization  of  voice  telephony  and  infrastructure 
granted  to  Spain  by  Directive  96/19/EC  of  13  March 
1996,  amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with  regard  to 
the  implementation  of full  competition  in  telecommuni-
cations  markets,  constituted  the  subject  matter  of  an 
exchange  of  letters  between  the  Commission  and  the 
Spanish  Government. 
In his  initial  reply of 25  June  1996,  the Spanish  Minister 
for Public Works and Telecommunications indicated that 
the  Royal  Decree-Law  6/96  of 7  June  on  the  liberal-
ization  of  telecommunications  proposed  by  the  new 
Spanish  Government  and  adopted  by  the  Spanish 
Parliament C
7
}  provides,  among  other  things,  for  the 
immediate  liberalization  of alternative  infrastructure  (as 
of now,  Retevisi6n  and Correos- the post office- are 
already  authorized  to  provide  capacity  to  third  parties) 
and  for  the  creation  of  a  new  independent  regul:at")r 
(Comisi6n  del  Mercado  de  las  T elecommunicati(.)lles ), 
the  members  of which  have  already been  nominated  and 
which  will  be  operational  be  the  end .of  1996. 
The  Spanish  telecommunications  market  will  be  fully 
liberalized  before  30  November  1998.  By  that  date, 
funher  licences  for  voice  telephony  services  and  public 
infrastructure  win  be  granted,  in  addition  to  those 
granted  that date  (as  funher described  below). 
C')  The  Spanish  Parliament  decided  at  the  same  time  to  pass 
the  Royal  Decree-Law  as  a  law,  which  would  delay  by  a 
few  months the entry into force of the new legislation. 
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The  abovementioned  Royal  Decree-Law  established  a 
second operator - Retevisi6n - for the entire range of 
telecommunications  services  and  infrastructures.  The 
second  operator  will  be  privatized  by  tender  to  be 
awarded during the first quaner of 1997.  A third licence 
for  the  provision  of voice  telephony  and  public  infra-
structures  with  nationwide  coverage  will  be  granted  by 
the  beginning  of January  1998.  By  the  same  date,  cable 
television  operators  which  so  request  will  stan offering 
voice  telephony  and  public  infrastructures  within  their 
respective  areas.  On  that  basis, . the  Commission  has 
considered  that  the  degree  of actual  competition  in  the 
Spanish  telecommunications  market  by  the  beginning  of 
1998  will  be  comparable  to that of most  Member States 
which  will  abide  by  the  liberalization  date of 1 January 
1998. 
Switzerland 
The  Commission  requested  the  acceptance  by  Swit-
zerland  of the  1 July  1996  and  1 January  1998  dates  for 
the  liberalization  of alternative  infrastructure and  for  the 
introduction  of  full  competition  respectively  and  the 
confirmation  that  an  independent regulatory agency  was 
in  place. 
By  letters  of  2  July  and  13  September  1996,  the  Swiss 
Minister  for  T ranspon,  Communications  and  Energy 
stated  that  telecommunications  in  Switzerland  will  be 
fully  liberalized  by  1 January  1998  in  parallel  with  the 
EU.  A  new_  law  will  be  enacted  in  the  new  future  elim-
inating  remaining  restrictions. 
As  regards  alternative  infrastructure  liberalization,  the 
Minister  indicated  that  since  1  May  1995  15  pilot 
licences  have  been  granted  (the  majority  to  cable  tv 
operators).  Such  pilot  licences  allow  the  provision  of 
some  telecommunications  services  to  subscribers 
(Internet  access,  data  transmission,  multimedia  and 
telephony  within  closed  users  groups).  The contents  of 
such licences will  be  extended before  the end of 1996  to 
offer  the  possibility  to  owners  of  alternative  infra-
structures  in  Switzerland  to  carry  out  commercial 
activities,  in  panicular  for  the  provision  over  them  of 
corporate  telecommunications  services.  Competitors  to 
Swiss  P1T for  the  provision  of such  corporate  telecom-
munications  services  will  be  allowed  to  use  such  alter-
native  infrastructures. 
As  regards  the regulator,  the  existing  regulator (Ofcom) 
will  be  supplemented  by  a  communications  commission 
independent  from  the  Swiss  federal  administration.  The 
new  commission  will  be  particularly  responsible  for 
decisions  in  respect of which  a conflict of interests could 
exist  between  Ofcom as  regulator and the Confederation 
as  owner of Swiss  PTf, 
G.  THE  COMMISSION'S  INTENTIONS 
On  the  basis  of the  foregoing,  the  Commission  intends 
to  take  a  favourable  view  pursuant  to Anicle  85  of the 
EC Treaty and  Anicle 53  of the  EEA  Agreement and  to 
grant  to  Unisource  and  to  the  incorporation  of  Tele-
f6nica  to  Unisource  an  individual  exemption  pursuant  w 
Article  85  (3) of the  EC Treaty and Article  53  (3) of the 
EEA  Agreement.  Before  doing  so,  it  invites  interested 
third  panies to send their observations within one month 
of the publication of this  notice to the· following  address. 
quoting  the  reference  IV  /35.830 - Unisource  - Tele-
f6nica. 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (GD IV), 
Directorate  C, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi!Wetstraat 200, 
B-1049  Brussels, 
Fax:  (32-2)  296 98  19. 
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Notice relating to Case  Nos  IV/35.337 -Atlas and IV/35.617 - Phoenix/Global One 
(97 IC 47 /08) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
On  17 July 1996  the Commission adopted individual exemption decisions  pursuant to Article 
85  (3)  of the  EC Treaty and Article 53  (3)  of the EEA Agreement in  Case Nos IV  /35.337 -
Atlas (I) and IV/35.617- Phoenix/Global One C). Pursuant to Article 6 (1) of Council Regu-
lation  No  17 C),  the  Commission specified  that the exemptions would become effective  from 
the  date  on  which  two  or more  licences  for  the  construction or ownership  and  control  of 
alternative infrastructure for the provision of liberalized telecommunications services take effect 
in  both Germany and France. 
On 15  October 1996, the Federal Republic of Germany granted three alternative infrastructure 
licences  pursuant to the German telecommunications  law,  one with  nationwide coverage  and 
two with .broad coverage of major urban  areas.  By  22  November, seven  funher licences,  one 
allowing  for  nationwide  coverage,  had  been  granted  and  awards  of  several  more  were 
announced  before  the  end of 1996.  In  France,  the  first  alternative  infrastructure  licence  was 
granted  under  the  French  telecommunications  law  on  21  November  1996  and  the  second, 
allowing for nationwide coverage, on 29  November 1996.  Two further licences were awarded 
in  December  1996,  whereby all  outstanding requests  for  licences  had  been dealt  with  by  the 
competent French authorities. In both countries, these licences entitle the respective licensees to 
provide  all  telecommunications  services  to  the  public  except  public  voice  telephone  sen·ices 
between  fixed  points. This  means  that there are  no  longer any regulatory constraints on  the 
licensees  in  question  to  provide such  telecommunications services,  including infrastructure.  to 
telecommunications sen·ices  providers  competing  with  the  Atlas  and  Global  One companies. 
Furthermore,  the  granting  of  the  licences  referred  to  above  indicates  that  the  licensing 
procedures established  under the  respective  national telecommunications  legislation  in  France 
and Germany are working satisfactorily and that competition in  the provision of infrastructure 
can be expected to increase; it  is  expected that there will  be  requests for and awards of further 
licences  in  both countries. 
Pursuant to Article  1 of the Atlas  and Phoenix/Global One decisions,  the exemptions granted 
by  the Commission were stated to take effect once two alternative infrastructure licences  have 
become effective  in  both France and Germany. The alternative infrastructure licences  granted 
by  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  in  October  and  November  1996  became  effective 
immediately upon  being issued  to  the  licensees. The alternative  infrastructure licences  granted 
by the French Republic on 21  November and 29  November 1996  became effective upon publi-
cation  in  the Journal  Officiel  de Ia  Republique  Fran~aise, on 23  November and  1 December 
1996 respectively. Therefore, the conditions referred to which were required by Article  I of the 
Atlas  decision  and Article  1 of the  Phoenix/Global One decision  have  been  fulfilled  and  the 
exemptions  granted on  17  July 1996  have  taken effect on  1 December 1996. 
C)  OJ No L 239,  19.  9.  1996, p.  23. 
C)  OJ No L 239,  19. 9.  1996, p.  57. 
e>  OJ No 13, 21. 2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
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Notification of a  joint venture 
(Case  No IV  /36.308  ~  BT  /News International - Springboard) 
(97 IC  6510"61" 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
1.  On 6  December  1996,  the  Commission  received  notification of an agreement pursuant to 
Anicle  4 of Council Regulation  No  17 (') signed  between  British Telecommunications  plc  and 
News International  plc.  The Panies have  formed  a  joint venture to be  known as  Springboard 
Internet Services  Limited, with the principal services  provided by the joint venture to be  known 
as  LineOne. The mass  market service will  be aimed at UK and non-UK consumers. The panies 
state  that  BT's  technical  expenise  and  News  International's  extensive  content  and  editorial 
skills  are  necessary  for  the  joint venture.  Springboard will  provide: 
- an integrated consumer oriented Internet access and content service to UK customers, 
- a consumer-oriented Internet content-only service to EU and worldwide customers, 
- a third pany Web site creation service for business customers. 
Content  will  be  sourced  from  the  joint  venture  parents  and  third  panies,  and  will  also  be 
developed  by  Springboard  itself.  Content  rights  will  be  acq-uirec ' Oil  an  exclusive  and  a 
non-exclusive  basis. 
2.  On  preliminary  exal}lination,  the  Commission  finds  that  the  notified  agreement  falls 
within  the  scope  of Regulation  No  17. 
3.  The  Commission  invites  interested  third  panies  to  submit  any  observations  on  the 
proposed agreements  to  the  Commission. Third panies submitting observations should  indicate 
clearly  any  business  secrets  which  should  be  kept confidential. 
Observations must reach the Commission to later than  10  days following the date of this  publi-
cation. Observations may be  sent to the Commission by fax  (No (32-2) 296 70 81)  or by  mail, 
stating  the  reference  IV  /36.308,  to  the  following  address:  · 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate  C,  · 
Avenue  de  Conenberg/Konenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
(') OJ. No 13, 21.  2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
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Application  for  negative clearance  and notification  for· a~ exemption 
.  . 
(~ase No IV/36.386  ~  Belgacom's  tariffs) 
(97/C  t 10/03) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
I.  On 4 February 1997, the Commission received an applicati()n  for negative clearance and a 
notification for an exemption, pursuant to Article 2 of Council. Regulation  No 17 ('), regarding 
two ·new  tariffs  Belgacom  will  offer;  to its  business  customers.  · 
The first  tanff targets business  customc;rs  having  a  large volume of telecommunications  traffic  .. 
It ·offers discounts on voice  telephony,  lnmarsat telephony and  telex~ calculated on  t~e volume 
of t·raffic  for each of these categories. The .voice  te,ephony option offers a discount on national 
voice  telephony traffic an_d  a discount on international voice telephony traffic depending on the 
volume  of voice  telephony  traffic  for  ~ach.  of these· categories. 
A  second  tariff  targets  business  customer$  having  a  smaller  volume  of  telecommunications 
traffic.  Subject  to the payment of an annual  fee  it offers  a  discount on national  traffic  and a 
· discount op intern·ational traffic.  In addition, it offers extensive guarantees in· respect of se..Vices 
(installation  of lines,  availability  and  maintenance  of the. customer'S' installation). 
Further details  regarding  those  tariffs  can  be  obtained  directly  from  Belgacom  upon  request. 
2.  Upon  pr.eliminary  examination,  the  Comm!ssion  took  the  view··  that  certain  aspects  of 
those  tariffs  could  fall  within  the scope· of Regulation  No  17. 
3.  The Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  tO  ~ub:mii thei~ possible .·obse~ations on 
those  new  tariffs  to the  Comm.ission. 
Observations.  must  reach  the  Commissi~n not  later  th.an  20  days  following  the  date  of this 
publication.  Observations ·may  be sent to·  the Commission by fax  (fax  No. (32 2) 296 _70 81) or 
by  mail, ·stating ·the  reference_ number IV  /36.386, to the  following  address:  · 
European  Commission,  , 
Dire~torate-General for  Cdmpetition (?G -IV), 
Directorate.  C,  . 
Averiue  de  Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan  150, ·, 
B-·1 040  Brussels. 
(') OJ No. ll, 21.  2  ..  1962, p  .. 204/62. 
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Nodfiadoa of. aa aare=eat 
.  . 
(Case ~  IV/36.442 -- ~t)  . .  '  .  . 
, 
(97/C  137/0S) 
(Text with  EEA ~e) 
1·.  On 14  March' 1997,  the Commission received  a notification of ~n agreement pursuant to 
Article  4 of Council Regulation  No 17 ('). It. concerns the  restrUcturing  of.Inmarsat, the inter-
governmental satellite ·organization, i.nto  a. commercial entity.  lnmarsat currently offers satellite 
services  which  are · primarily  used  for  maritime  purposes,  but  also  for  aeronautical  and  land 
·mobile  communk;ations.  lnmarsat  is ·the  sole ·provider  of satellite  servic;es  which  suppon  the 
·International  Maritime  Organization's  global  maritime  distress  and  safety  system  (GMDSS). 
The. new company will conduct all Inmarsat's future and existing business. A residual  intergov-
ernmental organization will  remain,  the sole  purpose of which  will  be  to oversee  and  enforce 
the company's provision of GMDSS services  and  th~ fulfilment of its  other public service obli-
gations ..  Currently,  land  earth  Station  operators  (LESOs)  are  represented  on  the  Council  of 
Inmarsat but following  the  restructuring 'the  relations~ip will  become  more 'arm's length'  and 
contractual.  · 
The notification concerns the restructuri:ng process and in particular the. draft LESO agreement 
that the company. will enter into with each  e~.~!l:l ~0  apd will  use as  a template for similar 
agreements  with  other,  newly  authorized LESOs  in  the  future.  . 
2.  On preliminary  examination,  the  Co~mission finds  that  the  notified'  agr~ement  falls 
within  the  scope  of· Regulation  No 17. 
3.  The  Commission  invites  interested  third  panics  to  submit  any  observations  on  the 
proposed agreements. Third parties· submitting observations should indicate clearly af!y  business 
5ec~ts which  should .be  kept confidential. 
Observations. must  reach  the  .Comn:tission  not  later  than  10  days  following  the  date'  of this 
publication.  Observations  may  be  sent-~by fax  ((32-2) 296 70 81  or  296 98  l9)  or  by  post, 
quoting  the  reference  number· IV  /36.442, to  the  following  address: 
. European · Commission,  . 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
DireCtorate  C, 
Office  3/49, 
Avenue  de  Conenberg/Konenberglaan  158, 
B-1040  BruS$els.  · 
(') OJ No 13, 21.  2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
No C 137/5 
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II/  A5J No C 168/6  0£6cial  J~al  of. the  European  Communities  · 
Notification  of ~lrcem"eats 
· (Case. No IV/l,.474,- mMISTET) 
(97(C  168/06)·· 
(Text wkh  EEA. ~) 
1.  On  10  April  1997, the  Commission  received  notificati<?il  pursuant  to Articles  2  and  4 of 
. Council  Regulation  No.' 17 (
1
)  of cenain agreements  between  the  IB~ group  and  the  STET 
group for  the. marketing and· disuibution of value-added network services ('V  .ANS') and digital 
video  broadcasdn:g  ('DVB') .systems.  The VANS  include  cusio~ized data  services· using  imtr 
II!U.  the  X~25, frame  relay,  ATM. -and  TCJ?/IP  Internet  protoeols;  messaging  (including  EDI, 
E-mail  and  transaction  routing  services);  outsourcing  seivices;  VSAT  services;  and  liberalized· 
voice  services  (within  .. closed  U.er  groups).  The  agreements  do  -no~ concern  the  provision  and  · 
distribution  of  standard  p~ket-switched ·.data  communication• . services.  Pursuant · to  these 
· agrcerne"u~ International Businea  Machines  Corperation ('IBM') appoints Teleeom  Italia SpA 
.  ('Tl'),  a.' iublidia,ry  of STET-Societl  Pinanziaria  Telefonica-pa  (
1~).  as  a  loCal  service 
proVider  ('LSP')  en  a  noa.:exclusive  basis  to ·actively  market  IBM. Global  N:etwork  ('IGN') 
services· in  Italy  and  to provide  services. both  co  customers· located. in  Italy  and  to  custom~ 
elsewhere  requirins  IGN services  in  Italy.  TI will  ·be ·the  Preferred  Provider in  Italy of IGN 
services  for·.IBM and otJaer LSPs. In c:OMeaion -with the appoinunent of  11 u  an  LSP, TI ·will 
acquire control of Incesa, whicli is a joint venture between  IBM Semea SpA and ~  T SpA for 
m.e  provision of VANS  ll)d which  is. currently IGN's LSP  in  Italy.  IBM  funher _appoints TI's 
subsidiary,  TMI Telemedia  International  Ltd  ('TMI'),  as  an  International  Remarketer  on  a 
non-exclusive,  h~is .to market.  IGN 'services  internationally.  TMI  also  authorizes  m~  on  a 
non-exclusive  bl$is . to  qw-ket  internationally  the  VANS  ·currendy  provided  by  TMI.  In 
addition, the STET Cl'Qup and  the  IBM. group  have 'ntered  int~ an agreemebt which sets out . 
the  rules  for' the. patties and  their subsidiaries  for  the 'development of b\\Siness opportUnities ·in 
the  DVB  leCtor.··  ·  .  ·  .  .  ·  .  . ··.  .  · 
. 2..  On  preliminaty  exami~tion,. the·  Co~ission finds  th.at·  the  notified  agreements  &II 
within  the.:scoPe  of Regulation  No  .·17. 
3.  .  The r Collllllilsion  invites  interested  third . patties  to  submit  their  observations  on  the 
riotified  arraligem~nts. 
Ob~ervations must  reach  the  Commission  not  later  than  21  days  following  ~e date  of this · 
pt.\blication.  Observations,. quoting  reference  IV  /36.47  4  (IBM/srE'I),  may  be  sent  to  the 
~mmission  ~y fax  (No (32-2) 296 70 81) or by post to  th~ following  address: 
~  CoiiUiiiuion, 
Directora~.·  for  Competition, 
DirCccorate ,C, 
·Office  3/82,  , 
Avenue.· de ·  Coneiaberg/Kortenberglaan  150, 
B;. t  040  Bnassel1, · ·  , 
~mail: chriatopbe  daulinerie0d84.cec.be 
(') 0) No u. 21.  ~  1962, p  •. 204/62. 
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EC,  EEA  countries,  EFf  A  countries,  Czech  Republic,  Slovak 
Republic,  Slovenia,  Romania,  Hungary 
(
1
)  EEA: Decision No 71/96 of the Joint Committee of 22  November 1996  (entry into force:  1.  1.  1997), 
published in OJ L 21, 23.  1.  1997; 
(I) EFTA  (entry  into  force:  t.  1.  1997):  EC-NO:  Decision  No  t/96 of the  Joint  Committee  of 20 
December  1996; £C-IS:  Decision  No t/96 of the Joint Committee  of 19  December  1996;  EC-CH: 
Decision No 1196 of the Joint Committee of 19 December 1996; published in OJ L 195, 23. 7.  199?; 
(') Interim Acreement EU-Slovenia  (entry  into force:  1.  1.  1997);  published  in  OJ L 344,  31.  12.  1996 
(DeciliOil Of the Council and the Commislion of 25  November 1996); 
e>  Decision  No 3/96 of the  Association  Council  of 29  November  1996  (entry  into  force:  1.  t.  1997), 
published in OJ L 343, 31.  12. 1996; 
('}  Decision  No  2/97  of the  Association  Council  of 9  January  1997  (entry  into  force:  t.  t.  1997); 
published in OJ L 212, 5.  8.  1997;  . 
(')  Decision  No l/97 of the Association Council of 6 May  1997  (entry into force:  1.  1.  1997),  published 
in OJ L 134, 24. 5. 1997; 
(') Decisioa  No 1197  of the Aaociation Commiuee of 31  January 1997  (elltry into force:  31.  1.  1997), 
publishecl in OJ L 54, 24.  2.  1997;  · 
(')  Dec:isioft No 1197 of the Joint Committee of 6 March  1997 (entry into force:  1.  4.  1997), published in 
OJ L ttl, 28. 4.  1997; 
r>  Decision  No l/97 of the Joint Committee of 20  March  1997  (entry into force:  t. 4.  1997), published 
in OJ L ttl, 28. 4.  1997; 
("') 'Oeewoo' No  l/97  of the  Joint  Committee  on  25  February  1997  (entry  into  force:  1.  4.  1997}, 
published in OJ L 136, 27. s. 1997; 
(") Decision  No 3/96 of the  Association  Council  of 28  December  1996  (entry into force:  1.  7.  1997), 
published in OJ L 92, 7. 4.  1997. 
("} Decilioo No t/97 of the Association Council of 30 June 1997 {entry into fofc:e:  1.  7.  1997), published 
in OJ L 221, 11. 8.  1997. 
The  current publication  replaces  the  publication  in OJ  C  84  of  15  March  1997. 
Cac No  IV/36.516- British  Diaital  Broadcudaa (BDB) 
(97/C  291/07) 
(Tat with  EEA releftacc) 
c 291111 
t.  On 16 July  1997, the Commission received a notifi-
cation  pursuant  to Anicle  4  of Council  Regulation  No 
17 f) of agreements  between  Carlton  Communications 
plc  ('Carlton'),  Granada  Group  plc  ('Granada')  and 
British  Sky  Broadcasting  Group  pic  ('BSkyB')  consti-
tuting  a  joint  venture  agreement  for  the  ~ation of  a 
company,  BristiJh  Difital  Broadcucing  Holdings 
Umited,  jointly  owned  by  Carlton  and  Granada  and 
through  which  they  joindy  own,  British  Digital  Broad-
,c:ateing plc ('BOB').  BSkyB  is  no  longer a shareholder in 
BOB.  BOB wu formed  to bid  for  and  operate  3 digital 
terrestrial  multiplexes  under  a  12-year  licence.  The 
paniel  estimate  a  launch  date  for  these  services  of 
Sep&ember  1998.  Each  multiplex  will  carry  five  or  more 
telmtion  channell  and,  potentially,  digital  interactive 
.mcea.  BOB  wiU  retail  these  services  u  aubacription 
celeUon  serrices  to  viewers  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  panies  will  establish  BOB  as  an  inclepenclently 
managed  business.  The  notified  agreements  inducle  a 
programme  supply  agreement  with  British  Sky  Broad-
casting  Limited  (BSkyB)  which  has  been  concluded  for 
the  supply  of  at  least  dlree  of  BSkyB's  premium  tier 
channels  and  one  of BSkyB  basic  channels  for  a period 
of seven  yean  from  launch. 
(') OJ  13,  21.  12.  1962,  p.  204/62  {Special  Edition  1959-62, 
•· 87). 
2.  According  to  the  panies,  BOB's  business  as  the 
operator of a cfiaital  platform  will  involve  the  following. 
Pint,  the  acquisition  of  retail  distribution  rights  for 
television  chaMels  and  additional  services.  BOB  will 
initially  carry  16  television  channels.  Carlton  and 
Granada  will  each supply at  leut four  channels to  BOB . 
BSkyB  will  aupply  at  least  four  channels  to  BOB. 
BBC/Flextedl  wiU  aupply  four  channels  to  BOB. 
Secondly,  the  establishment  of  the  teehnical  distribution 
and  transmission  arrangements  for  the  television 
channels  and any other services.  Thirdly,  the  acquisition 
of  the  necessary  teclmology  and  related  services  to c 291/12  Official Journal of the  European Communities  25.9.97 
operate  pay-television · services.  BOB  is  considering 
licensing  a  conditional  access  system from  News  Digital 
Systems  Limited,  although  no finn  decision  has,  as  yet, 
been  taken.  BOB  plans  ~ own  and  operate  its  own 
SWld-alone  customer  management  system,  subscriber 
card  management  system  and· subscriber  authorization 
system.  In  order  to  enable  "BOB  to  provide  its  own 
customer management system,  for a period. of five  years 
from  the  launch  date,  BOB  will  obtain  certain  facilities 
and  services  from  Sky  Subscriber  Services  Limited,  a 
subsidiary  of  BSkyB.  Fourthly,  arrangements  with 
set-top-box  and  television  receiver  manufacturers  and 
retailers  to  promote  t:Jte  manufacture  and  sale  of 
set-top-boxes.  BOB  will  specify  its  own  set-top-boxes, 
and  to  the  extent  technically  practicable,  'side-car' 
auachments  to  enable  reception . of  its  broadcasts  by 
viewers  using  digital  satellite  Direct-to-Home 
set-top-boxes.  BOB  intends  to  provide  subsidies  to 
recailen  of  Jet-top-boxes  and  of  digital  terrestrial 
side-car  attachments to enable boxes  and attachments to 
be  retailed at a price  attracti~e ttl ·the  consumer.  Fifthly, 
the  retail  distribution  of iu television  and other services 
to  the  consumer.  BOB  intends  to  market  channels  in 
basic and premium  tiers. 
3.  The  following  agreements  have  been  notified  to 
give  effect to the  above-described  operation: 
Joint Venture Agreement dated 3 January 1997 between 
~ton,  Granada and BSkyB for the form•tion of BOB; 
Supplemental Joint Venture Agreement dated 31  January 
1997  between  BOB  Holdings,  BOB,  Carlton,  Granada 
ud BSkyB  (BSkyB  will  cease  to  be  a  party  to  these 
agreements); 
Letter dated 3 January 1997 from BSkyB to Carlton and 
Granada  regarding  the  ~pply of premium  channeb  by 
BSkyB  to BOB; 
Letter dated 20 June 1997 from BSkyB  to Carlton, BOB 
Holdings,  BOB  and  Granada regarding the sale  of half 
of BSkyB's  shares  to Carlton and half to Granada, and 
the supply of programming to BOB; 
Letter  dated  20  June  1997  from  Carlton  to  BSkyB 
regarding  the  supply  to  BSkyB  of  those  television 
channels  which  Garlton supplies  to BOB; 
Letter  dated  io  June  1997  from  Carlton  to  BSkyB 
regarding the provision  of advertising  time  on Carlton's 
I1V licences; 
Letter  dated  20  June  1997  from  Granada  to  BSkyB 
regarding  the  supply  to  BSkyB  of  those  television 
channels  which  Granada supplies  to  BOB; 
Letter  dated  20  June  1997  from  Granada  to  BSkyB 
regarding  the provision of advertising time on Granada's . 
I1V licences. 
4.  On preliminary examination,  the Commission  finds 
that  the  arrangements  which  have  been  notified  could 
fall  within  the  scope  of  Regulation  No  ·17.  The 
Commission  invites  interested third parties to submit any 
observations  that  they  may  have  reprding  these 
arrangements  to  the  Commission.  In  aa:ordance  with 
Article  20  of Regulation  17,  such  observations  will  be 
protected  by . professional  seaec:y.  Obsenations  must 
reach  the  Commission  not later than  2p  days  following 
the  date  of this  publication.  They  niay  be  sent  to  the 
Commission  by  fax  (No  (32 2)  296.98 04)  or by  post 
under  reference  IV  /36.586  - British  Digital  Broad-
casting  (BOB)  to the  following  address: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG IV), 
Directorate  C, 
Office  C  150  3/114, 
Avenue  de  Cortenbeq/Kortenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
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Nod&cadoa of two joiat Yeatura · 
(a- No IV  /.J6.511 - TD aad IV  /56M2 - C6pte1) 
(97 /C 298/04) 
(Tat with EEA releftDc:e) 
1.  On  9 July  1997, · the  Commission  received  notifi-
cation  pursuant  to Articles  2  and  4  of CoUD:Cil  Regu-
lation  No  17  of various  agreements  co.nceming Telecom 
Developpement (fD) tltat were  signed on  11  April  1997 
and  (the 1D Ap-eements  between  Soci~ nationale  des 
c:bem.inJ  de  fer  ~  (SNCF)  and  apcel  (TD 
panies). 
On  18  July  1997, ·  cbe  Commission  received  a  funher 
aoti.fication of variout apeemeats elated  14 May 1997 by 
which  Compapie &Wrale  da eaux  SA  (CGE),  Jritilh 
Telecommuaications  plc.  (BT),·  Mannesmann  AG 
(Mannemwm)  and  SBC  International  Inc.  (SBCI) 
(collectively  the  C6a&el· ·parties)· have  agreed. on  their 
tapeetive.  contriburiolll,  iaUerests  and  commercial 
alationsbip  in  COJIIIeCiion  with  C6ptel  (the.  Qa6tel 
Agreements).  .  · 
These  two  uamaaioas  are  part  of  a  transaction 
iDvolviDg  the  aeuina  up of die  second  full~servic:e .cele-
communieadons  operacor  in  Prance, 
CGE  initiaUy  held  100 96  of aptel. AJ  a result  of the 
apce1 Apeements, CGE,  BT,  Mannesmann  and  SBCI 
crrm  clirecdy  or  iDclirecdy  the  following  interest~  in 







15  96 
15 96. 
.  3.  n.e partlle1'lhip ia TD 
SNCF initially held  100 96  of TO.  AJ  a result of cbe TD 
Apreemenu,  apcel will  prop-eaively  acquire  40 96  of 
TD'a ahare capital &Dd may apply for &be acquiaition of a 
·  6uther  10 96  of  'I'D'~ ~  capital. 
TO's  share  capital will  ultimately  be  the  foUowina: 
- SNCF: between aliahdy  more than  50 96  and  60 96 
- C6ptel: between ·40 96  and  aJiahdy  lea· chan  50 96 
- 11Urd party (if  any):  10 96. 
4.  Dacripdoa of the  C6a6tel Aareemeats 
1\e objecdye  Of  apcel il co  become  me  aeconcl  full-
.mce ~  operator  in  Pruce,  by 
offering  a  full  range  of  telecomm~tions services  as 
early  as  the ~  regulatory framework  allows. 
C6c&el  will  be  ac;:tive  in  France  (iDdudil)s  overseas 
departmentS and territories) and will aCfclress  aU segments 
. of  the  french  telecommunications  markeL  It  will, 
directly  or throllgh  existing  or newly-created  specializ.ed 
s\absidiaries  market and  distn"bute  to end  UlefS  (both  to 
the  residential  market and  to businesses) various  service~ 
such  as  wiiecl  ancl wireless  basic voice  ancl  data semcea 
as  weD  as  enhanced  and  value-added  voice  and  data 
services. 
·It  will  offer  Internet  acCess  as  well  as  Internet  and 
Intranet· .tvices, it will make  available  outiOUl'CiDa  tele-
communications  products  and  services  and  fac:ilities 
management semc:es. C6ptel will further clevelop mobile 
activities  in  France,  which  were  lauDc:bed  in  1989 
(analogue  services)  and  ift  1993  (GSM  services)  and 
which  are  currently carried  out by SociW  franpise  du 
radiot616phone  (SFll). 
C6ptel will  intereOIUleCt  its  'VOice  and  data  traffic  with 
other  ·  intemational  carriers,  notably  •  B'rs  and/or 
Mannesm&DD's  imcllor SBCI's  netW'OI'ka  on  a ptefened 
supplier  basis. 
In connection with their contemplated scope of business, 
·  C6pte1  and  TD  Win  apply  Jor  any. authorizalioft.  or 
licence·  required  under  Pn:tach  lepl  and  replatory 
p.rorisions  to carry out their proposed accmdes . 
C6pcel  wiD  apply  for  a  public·  fixed  national  infra. 
structure  licence  and  a  public  telecommunicacioDI 
aervices  licence (pumaant to, nspeccively. Aniclel U3-t 
and  L.3-4-1 .of the  Preftch  ('Code des  pOiteS et t61ecom-
municadona').  ·  · 
All  C6pte1  parties  will  concentrate .  their  telec:ommwii-
cadona aamt.ies in France in C6ptel. Accordinaly, CGE 
withdrew  at the end  of 1996  from  Siria,  a joint venture 
set. up in  1995 with Unisoun:e. ·ag6tel has  acquired  the 
aiatiq corporate  telecommunications  business  (only  to 
the  extent of supplyins  telecommunications  aervices  and 
related equipment to the Preach. ~)  of B'ra alfiliate 
in Prance· (BT Prance).  cepcel_ will furthermore  become 
the  excluliYe  cliiCributor .  in  Prance  of  concert .me. 
prc.wideel  br.: BT MC Corporat.ioD  Inc. 
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5.  DacriptioD of the TD Apeeaeats 
ag&el has  entered  into  vari~ agreements  ~th SNCF 
in order to joindy build, develop  and operate a network 
allowing  the  nationwide  dUtribution  of  its  services,  as 
soon  as  1 January  1998. 
TD will  be  }oindy .  contrOlled  by  SNCF  and  Qg&el. A 
shareholder  committee  will  have  ihe  duty  to  determine 
the common  position  of the TO panies on a number of 
strategic  issues. 
TO will develop the netWork that has  been brought to ·it 
by SNCF and will  operate a long-distance telecommuni-
catiODJ  netWork  interconneccecl  with  ocher  international 
networks  (open  to  the  public). 
In  order to  develop  as  smoothly and  quickly  as  possible 
its  telecommunications  network,  SNCF  has  contributed 
to TO the  rights  over  its  existing  optical  fibres  installed 
alone railway lines,  and TD has  been granted a priority 
daht to  access  to SNCFs land  guaranteed  by  a penalty 
clause  applicable  during  a limited  period  of three ·and  a 
half years  with  a view  to  permit  the  implementation  of 
an  ambitious,  pluriannual  plan  of deployment  of a tele-
comniunications  network  which· will  permit  C6g~tel and 
1D to compete  efficiently with  France Telecom. 
TD,  which  already  holds  a  long  distance  operator's 
licence open to the public (on the basis of Article L33-1 
of  the  Code  des  Posta  et  T~l6communications),  has 
obtained  the  appropriate  autho~ approval  for  the 
chanae  in  its  share  capital  following  C6getel's  entry 
&herein. 
TD will  make  available  any  excess  long~ce  trans-
mission  capacity.  to  telecommunications  operators  auth-
orized ·pursuant to a  licence  of network  operators open . 
to public  and  will provide  long-distance  interconnec;tion 
services. 
1D  will  offer  a  long-distance  voice-telephony  ·service 
only in  its  capacity as  exclusive provider of long-distance 
capacity  to TOS  and  Qg&el Entreprises  (joil\t ventures 
in  which  C6g&el  is  the  majority  shareholder). 
For  its  part,  C6g~  will  be  supplied  exclusively  by TD 
for  its  long-distance  traffic on  a preferred supplier basis. 
6.  On preliminary examination,  the  Commission  finds 
that .  the  notified  agreements  faU  within  the  scope  of 
Regulation  No 17. 
7.  The  Commission  il!~~. in~  third  parties  to 
submit  any  observations· on  the  prOposed  agreements. 
Third  parties  submitting  observations  should  indicate 
clearly  any b\lliness  secrets  which  should  be  kept confi-
dential.  . 
Observations  must  reach  the  Commission  not later  than 
20  days  followiq  the  date  of  this  publication.  Obser-
vations  may be sent by fax  ((32-2) 296 7081) or by post, 
quoting  reference  IV  /36.581/36.592,  to: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG IV), 
Directorate  C 
Office  3/96 
150  Avenue  de  Cortenberg/Konenberalaan. 
B-1 o•o  Brussels. 
CJarificadoa· of the Comnrission rccoaimcadations  011 the applic:atioa qf the coqtetitioa rala to 
new  transport io.frutructure  projects 
(97/C  298/05) 
(Text  wit1a  EEA  relevu.ce) 
t.  Accelerating  the  implementation  of  the  tranl  .. 
European  traDipOrt  netWork  it  one  of  the 
Community's  objec:tivea  for  developina  comped  .. 
wenen and  growth  in Europe. The high-levelsroup 
on  public-private  pannmhip  financing  of  tranl• 
European network tranaport projecu hu stressed the 
need  to  create  a  lepl environment  that  facilitates 
public-private  partne.nhip1.  · 
2.  Application  of the competition rules  is  often seen  as 
· a factor  of uncertainty  that. impedes  lhe  investment 
of  private  capiw  into  trans-European  network 
tran~port projecu at an  early aap. This  is  because, 
in  applyins  the  competition  rulea.  the  specific 
features  of  each  project  have  to  be  taken  into 
con~ideration  and  .a  cue-by-cue  analylia  carried 
out, in  particular 'llhere individual  exemption~ are to 
be sranted within dte  meani~ of Article 85  (3 ). 
3.  So  as  to · ensure  that  all  the  parties  .involved  in 
creatins such infrutructUrea  are better infonned •. the 
Commission  hu already  presented  to  &he  Council 
and  the  European  Parliament  recommendations  on 
the  application  of the competition  rules  co  traDJpOrt 
11/112 
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Noti&catioa of a joint venture 
(Case No IV/36.645- STET/Bouypes) 
{97/C 324/03) 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
1.  On 12  September 1997  the Commission received  a. notification pursuant to Article 4 of 
Council Regulation No 17 that a joint venture company to be known as 'BS' was to be formed 
by  Bouygues  SA· and  STET  International  Netherlands  NV,  a  company  belonging  to  the 
Telecom Italia.(TI) group. 
2.  The parties have concluded a  shareholders~ agreement which establishes the principle that 
Bouygues SA of France and Telecom Italia SpA of Italy are to work in  partnership in  France 
through' the  joint venture  BS,  the  shares in  which  are  to be .held  by Bouygues,  STET Inter-
national Netherlands NV, and STET France, which likewise belongs to the TI group. BS  is  a 
holding compally which is  to acquire  sta~s in companies operating in the telecommunications 
industry, with the aim of becoming the principal shareholder in those companies. The form of 
partnership  which  is  to  operate  through  BS  will  cover  telecommunications  networks  and 
'  servi~ in France, with the exception of audiovisual media services and the supply of telecom-
mu.lli~yons.  e~uipment. 
3.  The  parties  have  also  agreed  that  as  pan of this  alliance  TI will  acquire  a  minority 
holding of 19,61  °/o  in  BOT, the holding company controls Bouygues  T~l~com. 
4.  On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified joint venture may fall 
within the scope of Regulation No 17. 
5.  The Commission invites interested third panics to submit observations on the tranSaCtion. 
6.  Obsezvations  must  reach  the Commission  no  later than  20  days  following  the  date of 
publication  of this  notice.  Obsezvations  can  be  sent  by  fax  ({32-2)  296 70 81)  or by  post, 
quoting the reference IV/36.645- STET/Bouygues to: 
European Commission, 
Directorate-general  fo~ Competition (DG IV), 
Directorate C, 
Office 3/96, 
Avenue de Conenberg/Kortenberglaan 150, 
B-1040 Brusrels . 
25.10.97 
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The  Commission  would  remind  your authorities  of .the 
suspensory effect of Aryicle  93 (3)  of the  EC Treaty and 
would  draw  their  attention  to  the ·  communication 
published  in  the  0 /ficial  Journal  of  the  European 
Communities  C 318  of 24  November  1983,  whereby aid 
which  was  granted  improperly  - · i.e.  without  prior 
notification  or before  the  Commission  has  taken  a  final 
decision  under  the  procedure  provided  for  by  Article 
93 (2)  of the  EC Treaty - must  where  appropriate  be 
repaid  by  the  recipient  undertaking. 
The  Commission  will,  by  publication  in  the  Official 
Journal  of the  European  Communities,  in,ite  the  o:he~ 
Member 'States  and  other  panies  concerned  to  submit 
their  comments.' 
The  Commission  hereby  gives  the  other  l\lemDe~ St..ltes 
and  other  panies  concerned  notice  to  su:-mi1  L=-teir 
comments on the  measures in  question  within  0:1e  m0nth 
of the  date  of publication  of this  notice  to: 
European  Commission, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/Wetstraat 200, 
B-1 049  Brussels.  In  addition,  the  Commission  requests  the  German  auth-
orities  to  inform  the  recipient  undertaking  immediately 
of the  initiation  of the  procedure  and  of the  fact  that, 
where appropriate, it  must repay unlawfully received  aid. 
The  comments  will  be  commutJicated  to  tht  GcM.zn 
authorities. 
Notification  of co-operation  agreements 
(Case  No  IV/.36.754 - Telef6nica/Portugal Telecom) 
(97/C  385/17) 
(Text  with  EEA  relevance) 
1.  On  31  December  1997  the  Commission  received  notification  pursuant  to  Article 4  of 
Council  Regulation  No  17  of  agreements  signed  between  Telef6nica  de  Espana,  S.oo\  and 
Ponugal Telecom,  SA.  The main  purpose of the  agreements  is  to develop  a  joint  strategy  for 
investments  and  expansion  into  telecommunications  markets  outside  the  EU,  in  particular  in 
South America and in  the Maghreb countries. Under the  agreements, the parties also  intend  h."'~ 
cooperate  regarding:  (i)  ·the  exchange  of  technology,  (ii)  exchange  and  development  of 
know-how  on  marketing,  sales,  human  resources  and  network  operations  and  (iii)  exchange 
and  development  of know-how  of subsidiary  companies  in  fields  such  as  cable  TV, satellite 
services  or mobile  telephony. 
2.  Upon  preliminary  examination,  the  Commission  finds  that  the  notified  cooperation 
agreements  could  fall  within  the scope  of Regulation  No  17. 
3.  The Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  to  submit  their  possible  observations  on 
the  proposed  operation. 
4.  Observations must reach  the Commission  not later than 20  days following  the date of this 
publication.  Observations can  be  sent by fax .(No (32-2)  296 70 81) or by  post under reference 
IV  /36.754  - Telef6nica/Ponugal  Teleeom  to  the  following  address: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate  C, 
Office  3/90, 
Avenue  de  Conenberg/Kortenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
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Notice  published  punuant  to  Article  19(3)  of Council  Replatioa  No 17. (
1
)  conc:emillc  an 
application for neptive clearance or an individual- decision to-cnat an exemption punuant to 
Article 85(3)  of the EC Treaty  · 
(Case  No IV  /36.327 ~  TPS) 
. (98/C 65/03) 
/ 
(Tat with  EEA ·relevance) 
Introduction 
On i  1  October  1996,  the  Commission  receiv.ed  notifi-
cation and an application for  ~egative clearance pursuant 
to Article  85(1-)  or,  failing  that,  an  exemption  pursuant 
to  Article  85(3)  of  the  EC  Treaty  concerning  the 
agreements  cre~ting  a  company - with  the  name 
'T~Imsion Par Satellite' (TPS) with a view  to launching 
a  digital  platform  for  the  distribution  in  France  of 
programmes  and audio-visual services  for payment. The 
Stated  object of the company permits  its  activities  to be 
extended to other French-speaking areas, although this is 
not envisaged  for the  time  being. 
TPS  was set up in the form of a partnership  ('soci~~ en 
nom  collectif)  governed  by  French  law,  the  capital  of 
which  is  held  by five  companies,  each  active  to varying 
degrees  in  the  audio-visual  and  telecommunications 
sector, with  the following  breakdown: 
TF1  ~eloppement: 25 % 
France  T~levision  Entreprises:  25 % 
M6  Num~rique: 20% 
Soci~ pour le  Numerique  Fran~ise: 20% 
Lyonnaise  Satellite:  10 % 
TFl  Developpement  is  wholly  owned  by  TFl.  The 
capital  of  France  Television  Entreprises  is  divided 
between  France  ~eleco~ (66 %)  and  France· Television 
(34 %  ),  themselves  owned  in  equal  proportions  by  the 
public  television  companies  France  2  and France  3.  M6 
Num~rique and  Lyonnaise  Satellite  are  wholly  owned 
subsidiaries  of  M6  and  Suez  Lyonnaise  des  Eaux 
respectively. 
I.  The Parties  concemed 
1.  TFI 
T~levision  Fran~ise  1  (fFl)  operates  the  first  French 
television  channel  broadcast  over  the  radio-relay 
network.  It  has  a  broadcasting  licence  which  was 
renewed  in  1996.  TFl  is  also  distributed  by  cable  in 
Belgium. 
With  a  holding  of  39. %,  the  Bouygues ' Group,  which 
operates  mainly  in  the  construction  and  property 
promotion sectors,  has  Jt facto  control of TFt. 
(') OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p.  204/62. 
L 
TFl  's  m~n actlVlty  is  the ·. unencoded  b~adcasting of 
general-interest television  programmes. TFl is  also  active 
via  its •  subsidiaries  in  the  advertising,  production  and 
services  sectors,  audio-visual  and  film  production,  the 
marketing of audio-visual rights, the broadcasting of t~o 
thematic channels and a  'pay-per-view' channel, and the 
production and distribution  of derived  products. 
In  1996,  the  Bouygu~ Group  realised  a  turnover  of 
ECU 11180,5 million,  while TF1's turnover iri  the same 
period was  ECU 1 475,8  million. 
2.  France  TIJI.uision 
France Television is  made up of France 2 and France 3, 
two limited companies owned by the French State which 
operate the second  and third  French  television  channels 
broadcast  over  the  radio-relay  network.  In  so  doing, 
they  are  required  to  comply  with  the  conditions  and 
public service mission· laid down by the law defining their 
activities.  France  2  and  France  3  are  broadcast 
unencoded  and  are  financed  by  television  licence 
revenues  and  advertising. 
France  2  and  France  3  broadcast  general-interest 
prog,rammes nationally. France 3 also broadcasts regional 
and local programmes. Both channels are also diStributed 
by cable in  Belgium. 
In  addition  to  their  general-interest  broadcasting 
activities,  the two channels are also  involved, via various 
shareholdipgs  and  subsi_diaries,  in  the  following  audio-
. visual  activities:  advertising  production, audio-visual  and 
film  production, marketing of audio-visual  rights, broad-
casting  of thematic  channels  (cultural  and  educational), 
and the production and diStribution  of derived  products 
and  services. 
In  1996,  France  2  realised  a  turnover  of  ECU  760,3 
milli~n, while that of France 3 was  ECU 784,7  million. 
3.  France  Tlllcom 
France  T~lecom is  the long-standing telecommunications 
operator in  France.  It was  partially  privatised  in  1997, 
with  25 % of its ·capital  now being  held  by members  of 
the  public,  institutional  investors  and  iu  staff.  France 
11/185 ., 
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There.  are  at present  1;1  million  subscribers  to  satel.lite 
pay-'IV. There are ·~e·  operators,  including TPS. 
Pay-TV services  broadcast  via  the  radio-relay  network 
are currendy the  most  widely used  in  France~ with  4,3 
million  subscribers  at the present  time. 
2.  Thematic  channels 
Thematic  channels  are  essentially  a  collection  of 
television  programmes  and  services  grouped  together· as 
one  chan~el.  Given  that  they  are  at  present  rare  in 
. relation  to  the  potential  capacity  resulting· from  digital 
compression,  which  is  accentuated  by  the  existence  of 
exclusivity  contracts  between  channels  and·  digital 
platforms, TPS has  found  itself having  to produce some 
of the  thematic  cha11nels  its  distributes.  · 
3.  The acquisition of  sports and film  rights 
This essentially  involves  the  purchase  of a  share  in  the 
rights  to films,  TV films  and television  series  and  rights 
to broadcast sports events.  For. satellite or cable pay-1V, 
these  rights  may  be  divided  into  pay-TV,  pay-per-view, 
near-video-on-demand  and  video-on-demand  rights. 
Acquiring sports and film  rights  is  particularly important 
for  pay-TV  since  these  types  of  progra~mes  are 
auractive  to potential  subscribers. 
III.  The notified  agreements 
Four agreements have  been  notified. The basic principle,s 
governing  the  operation  of TPS  are  contained  in  the 
agreement  of  11  and  18  April  1996,  subsequendy 
expressed  in  more  concrete  and structured  terms  in  the 
Associates" Pact, signed on 19 June 1996, and in the TPS 
and TPSG Articles of Association  of the  same  date. 
These  agreements  and  the  contract  terms  referred  to 
below  are valid  for  10  years. 
1.  Administration of  TPS 
TPS's  management  is  entrusted  to· a  second  company, 
TPS Gestion  (I'PSG), which  has  exactly· the same share-
holder structure as  TPS; 
TPSG  is  governed  by  a  board  of  directors  and  two 
committees:  a  Programming  Committee  and  an 
Executive  Committee,  both c;.f  which provide  advice  and 
assistance.  · 
The  board  of  directors,  on  which  12  directors  sit, 
decides  by  simple  majority  on  any  matters . relating  to 
TPS"s  co~ercial activity. 
2.  TPS's  actitJities 
Under  the  .notified  agreements,  TPS's  object  is  to 
conceive,  develop  and  operate  a  range  of programmes 
and services  aimed at French-speaking television  viewers, 
for which the latter are required to pay. This service will 
be  broadcast  in  digital  mdde  by satellite  to be  received 
directly  by  satellite  dishes  and  cable  networks.  The 
company's  object  covers  all  operations  which  might  be 
linked  to this  activity,  including: 
:__  the purcltase, sale,. marketing,  advertising  and broad-
casting of television  programmes and services, 
- the  purchase,  hiring  and supply of technical,  servi~ 
necessary for routing and access to the digital service, 
- the  development,  marketing, purchase and sale  of all 
access-control  systems,  and  the  management  and 
marketing of subsCription  systems, 
- the  negouauon  of  agreements  concerning  the 
production,  co-production  and  creation  of television 
progra~mes and services intended for TPS. 
3.  Contract  te~s 
(i)  Non-competition  clause 
The  panics  have  agreed  not  to  become  in  any  way 
involved,  even  indirectly,  in  companies  having  similar 
activities  or a similar object  as  TPS as  long as  they are 
TPS  shareholders. 
(ii)  Clause concerning TPS's programmes' and services 
In order to supply TPS with  the programmes it  requires, 
the  panies  have  agreed  to  give  TPS  first ·option  to the 
programmes  or  services  they  themselves  operate  or . 
produce.  TPS  is  also  entitled  to  final  refusal  or 
acceptance  on  the  best  terms  proposed  by  competitors 
with  regard  to  any  programmes  or  services  which  its 
shareholders  offer  to  third  panies.  If  it  accepts  them, 
whether exclusively or not, TPS will  apply financial .  and 
contractual  terms  which  are  ~t least  equivalent  to those 




.c 65/6  Official Journal of the  European  Communities  •  28.2.98 
T~l~~m operates  voice  telephony  (fixed  and  mobile) 
services,  public  networks,  tenninals  (telephones  and  fax 
machines,  telep_hone  switchboards),  cable  netWorks  and 
telematic  and  multimedia  services. 
It  owns  the  'Viaccess'  conditional-access  technology 
U$ed  by TPS and its  rival ·platform AB-Sat. 
In the cable distribution seaor, France  T~l~com CAble,  a 
subsidiary  of  France  T~l~m, operates  a  netWork  of 
more  than  1  ,2"  million  connections,  which  represents  a 
penetration  rate  of  23 %. 
In 1996,  the  France  T~l~m group  realiSed  a  turnover 
of ECU  23 049,13  million. 
4.  CLT-UFA 
CLT-UFA is  a company operating in the media sector. It 
is  the  principal  company  in  the  CLT-UFA  group,  the 
main  activity  of which  is  television  and  ra~io  broad-
casti~g.  It  has  activities  and  shareholdings  in  radio/ 
television  bro~dcasters  in  Luxembourg,  Belgium, 
Germany,  France,  the  United  Kingdom,  Ireland,  · 
Sweden, Poland and Hungary and on the Dutch market. 
It  is  also  active  in  production,  the  acquisition  and 
granting  of  audio-visual  programme  licences  and  the 
supply of related services (in particular technical services) 
to the  media. 
It also  has  an  interest  in  the  pay-TV sector through  its 
holding  in  the  German  Premiere channel. 
Its  wmover in  1996  was  ECU 2 314,6  million. 
5.  M6 
M~tropole T~lmsion (M6)  is  a  company  governed  by 
French  law  which  received  a broadcasting licence  on 26 
February  1987  to operate  a  national  terrestrial  channel. 
Its  main  shareholders  are  CL  T  and  Suez  Lyonnaise  des 
£aux.  Its  licence  was  renewed  in  1996. 
M6  is  also  active  in  various  audio-visual  sectors, 
including  advertising  production,  cinema  and  audio-
visual production, the marketing of rights to audio-visual 
programmes  and  films,  the  operation  of  thematic 
channels,  record,  magazine  and  videogram  production, 
and  telepurchasing. 
In  1996,  M6 realised  a· turnover of ECU 315,93  million. 
6.  Suez Lyonnaise des &ux 
The  capital·  of  Suez  Lyonnaise  des  Eaux  is  divided 
bet-ween  the  following  shareholders  (as  of  October 
1997):  Ele~fina  (GBL)  (10 %),  Credit  Agricole 
(7,6 %),  AXA-UAP  (6,2 %),  CDC  (4,5 %),  Saint-
Gobain  (4 %),  Cogema  (3 %),  staff  (1,1 %),  the  rest 
(63,6 %)  being  in  the  hands  of the  general  public. 
Suez  Lyonnaise  des  Eaux  is  4eveloping  iis  acuvltles  in 
th~  areas  of  water  distribution,  purification,  energy, 
public  works,  infr~cwre concessions  and  financial 
services.  It is  also  present  in  the  communications  sector, 
principally  via  M6,  of  which  it  holds  34,45%  of  the 
cap~tal,  and  its"  subsidiary· Lyonnaise  Communications, 
·which ·operates  a  cable  network  in  France  with  more 
than 1,5  million  connections, equivalent .  to a penetration 
rate  of  18,8 %. 
In  1996, ~its  consolidated  pro  fo~a turnover  was  ECU 
26 394,52  million  (the  merger  having  taken  place  on  19 
June  1997). 
II. The  services' in question 
1.  Pay-1V seroic:es 
TPS  distributes  its  pay-1V  services  via  the  Eutelsat 
satellite.  There  are  various  means  by  which  pay-TV 
programmes  can  be  supplied:  via  the  radio-relay 
network,  by  cable  and  by  satellite.  The  differences 
between  them  are  mainly  linked  to  equipment  and 
financial  conditions,  particularly  since  it  is  necessary  to 
buy  a  satellite  dish  to  receive  satellite  pay-TV services. 
Cable  television,  which· is  not well  developed  in  France, 
is  concentrated in  Paris, the  Paris Region  and the  major 
urban  areas  elsewhere  in  France.  Where  cable  television 
is  · available,  satellite  television  is  poorly·  developed, 
mainly because of co-ownership and town-planning  rules 
and  the  cost of buying  a  satellite  dish.  Consumers  who 
have  a choice between cable  and satellite  television  seem 
to  be  limited  essentially  to  those  living  in  detached 
houses on the outskirts of cabled urban areas or in urban 
areas  adjoining  the  national  frontier,  where  satellite 
dishes  are  used  to receive  foreign  channels. 
There  are  at  present  slightly  more  than  1  ,5  million 
homes  connected  to  a cable  network.  The  market  is 
made  up  of  three  main  operators  and  a  number  of 
smaller. ones.  The national  penetration  rate  is  23 %.  No 
geographical  expansion  of cable  networks  is  planned  at 
the present time,  and the  only  development  which  cable 
is  likely  to  experience  is  an  increase  in  distribution 
capacity as  a result of digitalisation, the state of progress 
of which varies  from  one  network to another. 
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A  provision  specific  to  the  general-interest  channels 
(fF1,  France  2,  Fr~ce 3  and  M6)  already lays  down 
that they  will  be  e~lusively ·distributed  by TPS,  which 
. will  meet  the  technical  costs of transporting  and. broad-
curing them.  · 
(iii)  Clause  concerning cable 
the cable operators which hold shares in TPS undertake 
to give priority to including the programmes and services 
supplied  by  TPS  on  their  networks,  in  particular  its 
pay-per-view services,  and to consult with each other ori 
coordinating  these  programmes  and  services  with  those 
already on cable. 
IV.  The Commission's  intended  position 
Since  the  creation  of  TIS  has  a  positive  effect  on 
competition  in  that it  giv~ .  rife .  to  a  new  operator,  the 
CQmmission.  propose$  t.O  adopt ' a  favourable  auitude 
towards  the  notified  agreements.  As  for  the  provision 
concerning ·  exclusive  distribution  of  ge~eral-interest 
channels  on TPS,  it intends  to grant an exemption  for 
three years with  the possibility  of extension  in  the event 
that the scope of the exclusivity is  reduced by the French 
legislator.  Before  doing  so,  the  Co~mission  invites 
interested third parties to submit any observations within 
one  mo~th of  the  date  of  publication · of  this·  notice, 
quoting  the  reference  IV /C2/36.237  TPS,  to  the 
- following  address: 
European  Commission 
Directprate-General  fot:  Competition  (DG  IV) 
Directorate  C:  Information,  communication 
and  multimedia  · 
.Rue  de la  Loi/Wetstraat 200 
B-1049  Brussels 
Notice of initiation of an anti-clumping proceeding concemiq imports of polypropylene  binder 
or baler twine  originating in  the Czech  Rep~blic, Hunpry and  Saudi Arabia 
(98/C 65/04) 
The  Commission  has  received  a  complaint  pursuant  to 
Article  5  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  384/96 C) 
(hereafter referred  to as  'the basic  Regulation'),  alleging 
that imports of polypropylene binder  ~r baler twine orig-
inating  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungacy  and  Saudi 
Arabia  are  being  dumped  and  are  thereby  causing 
material  injury to the Community industry. · 
1.  Complaint 
The complaint  was  lodged  on  14  January  1998  by  the 
Liaison  Committee of European  Union Twine,  Cordage 
and  Netting  Industries  (Eurocard)  on  behalf  of 
producers  representing  a  major  proportion  of the  total 
Community  polypropylene  binder  or  baler  twine 
production. 
2.  Product 
The  product  allegedly  being  dumped  is  polypropylene 
binder  or baler  twine,  usually  called .  agricultural  twine. 
(
1
)  OJ L 56,  6.3.1996,  p.  1.  Regulation  as  amended  by  Regu-
lation (EC) No 2331/96 (OJl. 317, 6.12.1996, p.  1).  · 
These twines  are  used  in  the  agricultural sector.  notably 
for  binding bundles  to be  picked  up  by automatic balers 
or similar  machines.  The product concerned  is  currently 
classifiable within ex CN code 5607 41 00. This CN code 
is  only given  for  information. 
3.  Allegation  of dumping 
The allegation  of dumping  is  based on a  comparison of 
normal value  established  on the basis  of domestic  prices 
in  the Czech  Republic,  Hungary and  Saudi Arabia  with 
the  respective  expon prices of the  product concerned to 
the  Community.  On  this  basis  the  dumping  margins 
calculated  are  significant  for  all  three  exponing 
countries. 
4.  Allepdon of injury 
The complainant alleges  and  has  provided  evidence  that 
imports  from  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and  Saudi 
Arabia have increased significantly in· absolute terms and 
in  terms of market share. 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 17 July 1996 
relating to a proceeding under Article  85  of the EC Treaty and Article  53  of the EEA 
Agreement 
'  (Case No IV/35.337- Atlas) 
(Oitly tbe English, French and German texts are authentic) 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
(96/546/EC) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  on  the  European . 
Economic Area, 
Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  No  17  of  6 
February 1962, First Regulation implementing Anicles 85 
and  86  of the  Treaty (  1  ), as  last  amended  by  the  Act  of 
Accession  of  Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden,  and  in 
panicular Articles 2, 6, and 8 thereof, 
Having  regard  to the  application  for  negative  clearance 
and  the  notification  for  exemption submitted,  pursuant 
to  Articles  2  and  4  of  Regulation  No  17,  on 
16 December  1994, 
Having  regard  to  the  summary  of the  application  and 
notification  published  pursuant  to  Article  19 (  3)  of 
Regulation No 17 and to Article 3 of Protocol 21  of the 
EEA Agreement (2),  · 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Com~ttee for 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, 
•  Whereas: 
I.  THE FACTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
(  1)  The Atlas  venture was notified to the Commission 
on  16  December  1994.  This  transaction  brings 
about a joint venture owned as to 50% by  France 
Telecom (FT) and as to SO%  by DeutSche Telekom 
AG  (DT).  The  notification  of Atlas  replaces  the 
notification on·  3 June  1993 (3)  of a  joint venture 
formed  by  FT  and  DT  (at  the  time  Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom) under the name of Eunetcom 
to which  this  Decision  extends.  Atlas  is  also  the 
instrument  of  DT  and  FT's  participation  in  a 
(
1
)  OJ No 13, 21. 2.  1962, p. 204/62. 
(1)  OJ No C 337, 15.  12.  1995, p.  2. 
(l)  OJ  ~o  C 175, 26. 6.  1993, p.  11. 
second  transaction,  notified  under  the  name  of 
Phoenix,  with  Sprint  Corporation _ (Sprint) (4). 
Phoenix, since renamed as GlobalOne, is  the object 
of a separate Decision pursuant to Article 85 (3)  of 
the EC Treaty (5). 
(2)  Atlas  is  structured  at  two  levels.  A  holding 
company  established  in  Brussels,  Atlas  SA, 
incorporated  as  a  societe  anonyme  under  the 
laws  of Belgium,  has  three  operating subsidiaries, 
namely  Atlas  Telecommunications  SA  (Atlas 
France)  in  France,  Telekom  lnternationale 
Telekommunikationsdienste  GmbH  (Atlas 
Germany)  in  Germany,  and  one  for  the  rest  of 
Europe.  Atlas  France  and  Atlas  Germany  will 
initially  provide  technical  and sales support to Ff 
and DT, being the French and German distributors 
of Atlas  and  GlobalOne  products.  After  full  and 
effective  liberalization  of  the  telecommunications 
infrastructure  and  services  markets  in . France  and 
Germany,  scheduled  to occur  by. 1 January 1998, 
DT's  subsidiary  for  the  provision  of  X.2S 
packet-switched  data  communications,  T -Data 
Gesellschaft  fiir  Datenkommunikation ·  mbH 
(T-Data)(6),  will  be  merged  with  Atlas  Germany 
while  Ff's  subsidiary  for  the  provision  of  X.25 
packet-switched  data  communications,  Transpac 
France, will be  merged with Atlas France. 
B.  TilE PARTIES 
(3)  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  (DT)  and  France  Telecom 
(F't)  are  the  public  telecommunications 
organizations (TOs)  in  Germany and France.  Both 
(4)  OJ No C 184, 18. 7.  1995, p.  11. 
(5)  See  p. 57 of this Official Journal. 
(6)  The parties have submitted that T-Data is  the new  name of 
DT's  former  Datex-P  division  for  the  provision  of  X.25 
packet-switched  data communications services,  incorporated 
after  publication  of  the  Commission  notice  pursuant  to 
Article 19 (3) of CounCil  Regulation No 17 and Article 3 of 
Protocol  21  of the  European Economic  Area  Agreement  in 
this case;  OJ No C 337, 15. 12. 1995, p.  2 (hereinafter the 
'Article 19 (3)  notice'). 
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supply  telephone  exchange  lines  to  homes  and 
businesses;  local,  trunk  and  international 
communications to and from their respective home 
country.  Worldwide  turnover  in  1994  was  ECU 
31,8  billion,  a  4,3%  increase  over  1993,  for  DT 
and ECU 21,7 billion, a  1,8% increase over 1993, 
for  the FT group. 
C.  THE RELEVANT MARKET 
1.  Product markets 
(  4)  Atlas  will  address the markets for  the provision of 
non-reserved  telecommunications  services  to 
corporate  users  both  Europe-wide  and  nationally. 
Atlas  will  target two separate product markets for 
non-reserved services, namely: 
(5)  The  market for  customized packages  of corporate 
telecommunications services 
This  market  comprises  mostly  customized 
combinations  of  a  range  of  ex1stmg 
telecommunications  services,  mainly  liberalized 
voice  services  including  voice  communication 
between  members  of  a  closed  group  of  users 
(virtual private network (VPN) services), high-speed 
data  services  and  outsourced  telecommunications 
solutions specially designed for individual customer 
requirements. The market for customized packages 
of corporate telecommunications services, enhanced 
by  features  such  as  tailored  capacity  allocation, 
billing, a 24-hour technical service, etc., is currently 
changing and evolving rapidly.  Customers demand 
such· packages of sophisticated telecommunications 
and  information  services  offered  by  one  single 
provider.  That  provider  is  expected  to  take 
full  responsibility  for  all  services  contained in  the 
package  from  'end  to  end'.  Accordingly,  DT and 
FT  intend  to  offer  such  customers  through  Atlas 
whatever  services  existing  technology  allows  them 
to  offer  from  time  to  time  within  the  applicable 
regulatory  framework.  In  this  regard,  the  parties 
have  indicated that Atlas will eventually extend to 
international voice  traffic and other basic  services, 
regulations permitting. 
These  services  are  provided  over  high-speed, 
large-capacity  leased  lines  linking  sophisticated 
equipment  on  customer  premises  to  the  service 
provider's  nodes.  Alternatively,  other  means  of 
transmission,  such  as  satellite  or  mobile  radio 
capacity,  can  be  used  to  ensure  the  geographic 
coverage  demanded  from  time  to  time.  Such 
services employ advanced state-of-the-art protocols, 
data  compression  techniques,  equipment  and 
software.  In  this  market, Atlas  is  expected to offer 
a  portfolio  of  services  including  the  following 
(the 'Atlas services'): 
- data  services:  high- and  low-speed 
packet-switched, Frame Relay, Internet Protocol 
(IP)  services, 
- value-added  application  services:  value-added 
messaging,  video-cohferencing  and  electronic 
document interchange (EDI)  services, 
voice  VPN services, 
- value-added  leased  lines  offerings: 
pre-provisioned,  managed  and  circuit-switched 
bandwidth, 
very  small  aperture  satellite  (VSA T)  network  A 
services,  and  ·  w 
outsourcing:  customers  are  invited  to  transfer 
responsibility  and ownership of their  networks 
to Atlas. If they agree,· Atlas may integrate into 
its  own  offerings  any  third-party  products 
already. owned  by  customers who wish to keep  . 
such offerings, as  the case may be. 
Of the  above,  some  services  will  remain  with  DT 
and FT and therefore  not be  Atlas  services.  These 
services  are:  (i)  those  national  receive-only  VSAT 
services  in  France  which  provide  a  single  channel 
per  carrier  ('receive-only  SCPC');  (ii)  national 
messaging and EDI  services  in  Germany;  (iii)  data 
network  services  using  Asynchronous  Transfer 
Mode  (ATM)  technology in  France, Germany and 
any third country; and (iv) national VPN services in 
France and Germany. The integration into Atlas of 
any such  service  and/or its  underlying  network as 
well  as  of any  broadband  transmission  capacity  8 
operated  by  DT  and/or  Ff necessitates  separate ¥ 
notification to the Commissio!). 
(6)  Due to the high cost of building and operating the 
networks  needed  to  provide  customized  packages 
of  corporate  telecommunications  services,  such 
services can be commercially viable only if provided 
. to multinational corporations, extended enterprises, 
and  other  intensive  users  of  telecommunications 
and in particular the largest among those customers 
generating  continuous  high  traffic  volumes (7). 
· Many of those  potential  customers  have  complex 
and  specific  needs  and  have  often  · acquired 
expertise  in  managing  own  internal  networks. 
Whether  each  of  the  services  listed  above 
constitutes  a  separate  product  market can  be  left 
open for present purposes, since a separate analysis 
would not affect the Commission's conclusions. 
(1)  See Commission Decision 94/579/EC of 27 July 1994 in  Case 
No  IV/34.857  - BT-MCI;  OJ  No  L  223,  27.  8.  1994, 
p.  36. 
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(7)  However, this Decision relates only to Atlas'  range 
of products and its business scope as  notified. Any 
substantial  change  of products  or business  scope, 
and  in  particular  (i) · the  integration  into  Atlas 
of  broadband  transmission  capacity  (such  as 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networks) in 
France and Germany and· (ii)  the offering by  Atlas 
of public basic telecommunications services (such as 
voice  telephony  services(8))  w1ll  require  a  new 
notification. 
(8)  The market for  packet-switched data 
communications services 
Atlas  will  also  be  active  on a  separate market for 
packet-switched data communications services. The 
Commission  considers  data  communications 
services  to  be  a  distinct  telecommunications 
product market, without prejudice to the existence 
of narrower  markets (9).  One  narrower  market  is 
that  for  packet-switched  data  communications 
services(l0). Packet switching is a means to improve 
network  capacity  utilization  and  consists  of 
splitting data sequences into 'packets', feeding these 
and  other  packets  into  the  network  optimizing 
utilization  of  available  capacity,  switching  the 
packets to the desired destination  and rearranging 
the  packets  to obtain the  original data sequences. 
One  standard  used  for  the  prov1s1on  of 
packet-switched  data  communications  services  is 
the  X.25  protocol.  Packet-switched  data  services 
using  this  protocol  (the  'X.25  data  services')  are 
slower  than packet-switched data communications 
services  using  protocols  such  as  Frame  Relay, 
Asynchronous  Transfer  Mode  (A TM)  or  Internet 
Protocol (IP), given that X.25  data services rely on 
smaller  packets  and  require  switches  which  allow 
charging per packet. 
(9)  Packet-switched  data communications services  can 
be divided into different customer segments within 
the same product .market. 
1.  On  the  one  hand,  some  customers  generate 
mostly  erratic  and  geographically  widespread 
demand  for·  low-speed,.  low-volume 
applications.  These  features  are  due  either  to 
.the specific type of use (such as banks operating 
cash  machines  · nationwide,  networks  of 
(1)  Defined  in  the  seventh  indent of Article  1 of Commission 
Directive  90/388/EEC  of 2~ june 1990  on competition  in 
the markets for  telecommunications services; 0 J No L 192, 
24.  7.  1990,  p.  10,  hereinafter  'Services  Directive',  as  last 
amended  by Directive 96/19/EC; OJ  No L 74, 22.  3. 1996, 
p.  13. 
(')  Commission's Guidelines on the  application of Community 
competition rules  in  the  telecommunications sector,  OJ  No 
C 233, 6.  9.  1991, p.  2, at paragraph 27. 
(10)  Defined  as  'packet- and  circuit-switched  services'  in  the 
ninth indent of Article  1 (1)  of the Services Directive- see 
.  footnote  8. 
(10) 
points-of-sale  in  shops)  or to the size  of such 
customers,  as  with  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises  (SMEs).  Such  services  are  billed  by 
volume  sent, according to published tariffs. All 
incumbent  Member  State  TOs  including  DT 
and  FT  operate  dense  public  networks  with 
nationwide  coverage  providing  X.25  data 
services  to  this  customer  segment  (the  'public 
packet-switched data networks'). There  is  only 
one  public  packet-switched  network  in  each 
Member  State,  built  by  the  incumbent  TO 
under  a  public  service  obligation  before 
market liberalization. 
2.  On the  other hand,  larger corporate customers 
and  other  extended  users  generate  more 
substantial  and  regular  traffic·.  Often  the 
requirements of these  users make it  worthwhile 
for  either  third-party  service  providers  or  the 
, potential customer itself to assume the high cost 
of creating customized  leased  lines circuits  (for 
example,  to  set  up  VPNs)  to  meet  individual 
service  demand.  This  demand  is  therefore 
increasingly  met  either  by  packet-switched 
services  using  protocols  other  than  X.25, 
notably  Frame  Relay  and  ATM  (for  VPN 
applications) and IP  (for  both public and VPN 
applications)  or  by  switched  services  (PSTN 
or  ISDN  services).  Packet-switched  data 
communications services to such users are billed 
according to negotiated rates that take account 
of  the  individual  demand  features  of  a 
particular customer. 
Virtually  all  companies  active  in  each  individual 
Member  State  of  the  European  Community  are 
potential  if  not  actual  customers  for  national 
packet-switched  data  communications  services. 
Such  services  are also  required  by SMEs,  albeit  in 
smaller volumes and possibly less regularly than by 
larger  users.  Seldom  will  such  volumes  make  it 
worthwhile for service providers to invest in  leased 
lines  with  the  specific  purpose  of reaching  these 
SMEs,  which  are  therefore  in  a  weak  negotiating 
pos.ition  and  hardly  capable  to date  ol switching 
from the current provider, typically the incumbent 
TO, to a competitor. 
(  i 1)  Packet-switched data communications may  also  be 
offered as one  service  in  a customized package of 
corporate  services.  However,  even  as  part  of 
such  an  arrangement,  packet-switched  data 
communications  services  are  based  on  mature 
internationally  standardized  technology  and 
provided over standard terrestrial infrastructure. At 
the  national  level,  choice  from  a  wider 'range  of 
packet-switched  data  communications  offerings 
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(12) 
(13) 
than merely X.25 data services is available to lat:ger 
customers that are not served over the TO's public 
packet-switched data networks but over customized 
leased-line  circuits.  However,  most  existing 
customers  for  packet-switched  data 
communications currently generate annual turnover 
of  far  below  ECU  10 000  each  and  are  not 
therefore potential users of customized packages of 
corporate  telecommunications  services.  Therefore, 
packet-switched  data  communications  services 
offered  by  Atlas  constitute  a  product  market 
separate from  the  market for  customized packages 
of  corporate  telecommunications  services  equally 
targeted by Atlas. 
2.  Geographic markets 
The  markets for  customized packages of corporate 
telecommunications services 
Given  that  cost  and  price  differences  are  quite 
substantial,  demand  for  customized  packages  of 
corporate  telecommunications  services  exists  in  at 
least three distinct geographic markets, namely at a 
global, at a cross-border regional and at a national 
level.  Atlas  will  provide  such  packages  to  large 
users  Europe-wide  and  nationally.  Through 
GlobalOne,  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications  services  offered  by  Atlas  will 
also  have  global  'connectivity'  - the  technical 
option of extending a given service offering beyond 
Europe by linking a customer''S premises worldwide 
over  Phoenix  'Global  .Backbone  Network' (11 ). 
Given  the  considerable  costs  involved,  customized 
packages  of corporate telecommunications services 
are today. mainly demanded by  large multinational 
corporations, extended enterprises, as well as major 
national  and  other  intensive  users  of 
telecommunications. The Commission has discussed 
the  requirements  of  such  users  in  its 
Decision 94/579/EC (BT-MCI) (1 2). 
Due  to the  cost  st~ucture of providing customized 
packages of corporate telecommunications services, 
notably  the  cost  of  leasing  the  required 
infrastructure, prices of such services are related to 
geographic  coverage,  as  is  the  cost  of additional 
features  (for  example,  one-stop-billing,  help-desk 
and  technical  assistance  around  the  clock, 
customized  billing).  There  is  evidence  that 
increasing  availability  of trans-European  networks 
will ultimately blur the distinction between national 
and  cross-border  or  ultimately  Europe-wide 
prov1s1on  of  non-reserved  telecommunications 
services.  However,  certain  sophisticated  national 
(1 1)  See  Phoenix Decision  in  Case  No 'IV/35.617, at recital 27. 
(  u)  See  footnote  7. 
(14) 
(15) 
non-reserved  services  currently  available  from  DT 
and  Ff in  Germany  and  France  respectively  will 
not  be  At!as  services,  including  DT  and  Ff's 
national data  network services  based  on ATM  or 
equivalent  packet-switching  technology  (Datex-M 
and Transrel respectively)  and the national services 
mentioned ·at  recital  5.  This  demonstrates  that  a 
distinction  between  national  and  "cross-border 
provision  of  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications services remai9s valid to date. 
The  markets  for  packet-switched  data 
communications services 
PriCe  differences  for  these  services  may  be  less 
than  for  · customized  packages  of  corporate t 
telecommunications  services.  However,  a  national, 
cross-border  regional  and  global  geographic  level 
can  be  distinguished  for  packet-switched  data 
communications  services.  In  terms  of  traffic 
volumes,  supply  and  demand  of  packet-switched 
data communications  services  are  mostly  national. 
For  instance,  in  Germany  DT's  existing  T-Data 
packet-switched  data  communications  services 
division  hardly  ever  provides  such  services  across 
the border while Ff's German subsidiary  Info  AG, 
in  spite  of  appertaining  to  FT's  seamless 
cross-border Transpac  network, only  provides one 
fihh  of its  packet-switched  data  communications 
services  across  the  border.  This  assessment  was 
confirmed by interested third parties further to the 
Commission's notice on the Atlas notification( 13). 
At  a  global  and  Europe-wide  level,  X.25  data 
services  and  customized  packages  of  corporate 6  telecommunications  services  may  be  partly W. 
converging  to  the  extent  that  large  customers 
of the  latter  do not require  separate  provision  of 
X.25 data services once such services are available 
as  part  of  service  combinations  offered  over 
advanced  networks..  Accordingly,  large  European 
. telecommunications  users  demand  services  with 
global  'connectivity',  meaning  that  they  may  be 
extended beyond Europe if so required. DT and FT 
have  moved  to  meet  this  demand  in  entering  the 
GlobalOne  agreements  with  Sprint.  Along  with 
increased  availability · of  advanced,  cross-border 
network  infrastructure,  the  market  is  generally 
expected  to  overcome  distinctions  along  national 
borders  in  the  medh,1m  term.  However,  separate 
national  geographic  markets  subsist  to  date  for 
packet-switched  data communications services  and 
for  the  provision · of  customized  packages  of 
corporate  teleco~munications services  respecti\"ely. 
(ll)  Notification  of  a  joint  venture  (Case  No  IV/35.337  -
Atlas),  OJ  No C  ~77, 31.  12.  1994, p.  9 and  the  Article 
19  (3)  notice  (see  footnote 6 and  recitals et seq.). 
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D.  MARKET SHARES OF ATI.AS 
The  market for  customized packages of corporate 
telecommunications services 
(16}  The  parties  estimate  the  European  markets  for 
non-reserved corporate telecommunieations services 
(exclusive  of data communications  services)  to be 
worth  approximately  ECU  505  million  (1993 
figures}.  Of  this  total,  end-to-end  services 
accounted  for  approximately  ECU  15,1  million,  . 
VPN  services  for  approximately  ECU 
220,6  million,  VSAT  services  for  approximately 
ECU  173,2  million  and  outsourcing  services  for 
approximately ECU 96,4 million. According to the 
notification  DT and FT's aggregate  market shares 
(1993  figures}  in  the  European  Community  were 
25% in the end-to-end services market, 27% in the 
VPN services market and 2,3 %  in the outsourcing 
services  market.  Market shares  for  VSAT  services 
are difficult to calcu.late given that TOs mostly use 
VSAT  terminals  either  as  back-up  facilities  for 
other  services  or to extend  the  geographic  scope 
of  services  despite  terrestrial  infrastructure 
shortcomings; however, DT and Ff taken together 
operated  10 907  VSAT  terminals  by  june  1994, 
equivalent  to  29 %  of the ' total  installed  base  of 
interactive,  data  one-way  or  business  television 
VSAT terminals in the European Economic. Area. 
As  to the national market for customized packages 
of corporate telecommunications services in France 
and Germany respectiveiy, DT and FT's aggregate 
market shares· for individual non-reserved corporate 
telecommunications services are 93 % in the French 
VPN  market  (where  DT has no presence)  against 
0% in the German VPN market, and 60% in .  the 
French market for end-to-end services against 35% 
in·  the  equivalent  German  market.  DT and Fr's  · 
outsourcing joint venture, Eunetcom B.V., achieved 
36%  of total  outsourcing  turnover  generated 'in 
France  and  29%  of  total  outsourcing  turnover 
generated in  Germany.  As  for  VSAT  services,  DT 
has  installed . approximately  25 %  of  all  VSAT 
ter~inals in Germany; this  Member State accounts 
for  18 %  of  the  total  installed  base  of  such 
terminals in the EEA. 
In  third-country  national  markets,  including  all 
EEA member countries, DT and FT's presence is to 
· date negligible or non-existent. 
The  market  for  packet-switched  data 
communications services 
(  17)  DT and FT estimate the European market for data 
communications  services  to  be  worth 
approximately  ECU  2,8  billion  (1993  fi~ures). 
According  to  the  _notification  DT  and  FT's 
· aggregate shares (1993 figures)· of this market were 
35 %.  Among national markets,  Atlas will  have a 
particularly  strong  pos1non  in  France  and 
Germany. DT and ~s  aggregate market share for 
all  data  communications  sei:Vices  is  79 %  in 
Germany  and  .  77%  in  France,  of  which 
approximately half. relates  to services  provided by 
DT's  X.25  data  services  subsidiary  (now 
incorporated as T-Data}  and FT's Transpac France 
subsidiary. Both subsidiaries will remain outside the 
scope  of  Atlas  until  the  French  and  German 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  services 
markets  are  fully  and  effectively  liberalized,  as  is 
scheduled for  1 january 1998 (see  recital 24). 
E.  MAIN COMPETITORS OF ATLAS 
The markets for  customized packages of corporate 
telecommunications services 
(18)  Since  the  BT-MCI  Decision  several  players,  acting 
alone or jointly with partners, have entered or are 
entering  the  international  markets  providing 
non-reserved  corporate  telecommunications 
services. The most important of these players, albeit 
with  disparate  geographic  scope  and  target 
customers, include: AT&T WorldPartners, Concert, 
IBM-Stet,  International  Private  Satellite 
Partners(14),  Unisource(15)  or  Uniworld(16}.  Some 
of these strategic alliances are merely projects while 
others are awaiting regulatory approval. However, 
all  of the  above ·  share the  aim of positioning the 
respective  partners  in  anticipation  of  the  full 
liberalization. 
The  market  for  packet-switched  data 
communications services 
(  19)  The  market  for  packet-switched  data 
communications  services  features  a  substantially 
larger number of players than that for customized 
packages of corporate telecommunications services. 
Among  the  global  players  in  this  market  are  the 
·alliances  mentioned  at  recital  18  competing  with 
providers  such · as  EDS,  FNA,  lnfonet,  SIT  A  or 
Swift  and  operating  subsidiaries  of  large  global 
companies such .as  AT&T Istel, ·Cable &  Wireless 
Business  Networks,  DEC's  Easynet,  or  GElS.  In 
addition,  a  large  number  of  smaller  players 
competes  at  a  cross-border  regional  or  national 
(14)  See  Commission Decision 94/895/EC of 15 December 1994 
(Case  No  IY/34.768  - lnterna~ional  Private  Satellite 
Partners); OJ No L 354, 31. 12. 1994, p. 15 • . 
(15)  Notification  of  a  joint  venture  (Case  No  IV/35  .. 830  -
Unisourcc/Telef6nica); OJ No C 94, 30. 3. 1996, p. 5. 
(16)  Notification  of  a  joint  venture  (Case  No  IV/35.738 
Uniworld); OJ No C 276, 21.  10.  1995, p.  9. 
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level  in  the  EEA.  For  instance,  Ff's  .  indirect 
German subsidiary Info AG,  ~hich provides  most 
of  its  data  communications  services  within 
Germany,  is  DT's second-largest competitor in the 
German  national  market for  packe~-switched data 
communications  services.  None  of  these  smaller 
players can compare· .to  large  alliances in terms of 
reach, access to transmission capacity and financial 
backing. 
F.  THE TRANSACTION 
(20)  The  Atlas  transaction  notified  to the  Commission 
comprises a set of ag~eements whose main features 
are described below. 
1.  Agreements as  originally notified 
(a)  The  Atlas  Joint  Venture  Agreement  UV 
Agreement) is  the main agreement providing for 
the establishment of the Atlas joint venture. 
(b)  The  Intellectual  and  Industrial  Property 
Transfer  and  Licence  Agreements  were 
concluded  by  Ff and  DT  respectively,  with 
Atlas  SA;  under  these  agreements  FT and  DT 
make  available  to  Atla:s  SA  the  intellectual 
property rights (the IPRs)  needed to operate the 
Atlas business. 
(c)  The  Framework  Services  Agreements  are 
framework  agreements  setting  forth  the  basic 
terms and conditions with respect to the supply 
by  DT and Ff of certain services  to Atlas  SA 
and the  supply  by Atlas  SA  of certain services 
to Ff and DT. 
(d)  The  Distribution  Agreements  are  two 
substantially  similar  distribution  agreements 
between Atlas SA and Ff and DT respectively, 
reg~rding  the  marketing  and  sale  of Atlas 
products in France and Germany respectively. 
(e)  The  Agenq  Agreements  under  ~hich  each 
parent  appojnts  Atlas  SA  a~  non-exclusive 
worldwide  agent  for  t~e sale  of DT and  FT's 
international leased lines '(half-circuits), with the 
territorial  exception  of  Germany  as  regards 
DT's half-circuits. · 
2.  Contractual Provisions 
. (21)  In particular, the above agreements provide for  the 
following: 
1.  Structure of the Atlas venture 
Atlas  SA  is  created as  a  joint venture  between 
FT and DT, each owning half the share capital. 
The  management  structure  of Atlas  SA  is  as 
follows: 
(a)  Shareholders'  meeting:  Prior  approval  by 
the  shareholders'  meeting  is  necessary  for 
matters  such  as  the .. amendment  of  the 
articles  of association,  changes  of capital, 
issuance of shares, mergers, sale of all or a 
substantial  part  of  the  assets,  and 
liquidation. 
(b)  The board of directors: Atlas SA's board of 
directors  has  eleven  members,  fi-ve  apiece 
being  elected  by  DT and  FT and one  by 
Sprint.  Prior  approval  by  the  board  oi 
directors  is  required  for  a  number  oi 
important decisions such as the approval of 
business  plans  and  annual  budgets  and 
changes  in  the  scope  of  Atlas,  the 
conclusion  of  important  contracts,  etc. 
· Decisions on changes in the Atlas business. 
management  appointments,  and  the 
approval  of the  business  plan,  the  annual f 
operating plan, and the budget require tha[ 
at  least  two  directors  nominated  by  each 
party vote with the majority(17). 
(c)  Chief  executive  officers  (CEOs):  It  is 
envisaged  that  Atlas  SA  will  have 
two  CEOs,  one  nominated  by  FT  from 
among  its  representatives  in  the  board  of 
directors, the other by DT from among its 
representatives  in ',the  board  of  directors. 
The  CEOs  shall  be  jointly  responsible  for 
day-to-day operations and the managemem 
of  the  business  and  affairs  of  Atlas. 
Approval  of both co-CEOs  is  required  for 
all ·important decisions including the hiring 
or· dismissal of key employees. 
The  parties  will  contribute  to Atlas  their 
existing  European  assets  outside  France 
and  Germany  (as  well  as  some  assets  in 
France  and  Germany)  used  for  the 
provision  of  services  coming  within  the f 
scope of Atlas. 
2.  Purpose and activities of  Atlas · 
The  Atlas  venture  is  to  provide  seamless 
national and international non-reserved services 
to corporate customers .(that is, to multinational 
companies  (MNCs)  and  SMEs  alike).  The 
portfolio  of  Atlas  services  comprises  data 
network  services,  international  end-to-end 
services  (managed  links),  voice  VPN  services, 
customer-defined  networks,  outsourcing  and 
VSA T  services.  These  services  are  fully 
liberalized in the European Community and are 
widely  liberalized  worldwide.  Atlas  will  have 
the  responsibility  for  the  services  portfolio 




)  The  originally  envisaged  S[rategic  Board  of  Atlas  SA, 
described  in  the  Article  19  (3)  notice  (footnote  6)  at 
paragraph  20  (b),  was  deleted  from  the  final  Atlas 
Agreements. 
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In France and Germany, Atlas will provide sales 
support to FT and DT's sales forces  as  regards 
all  services  mentioned  in  the  Atlas  portfolio, 
with  the  exception  of public  packet-switched 
data  network  services  within  France  and 
Germany,  which  will  be  provided  by  FT's 
Transpac  France  subsidiary  and  DT's  T-Data 
subsidiary  respectively  until  the  tele-
communications  infrastructure  and  services 
markets  are  fully  and  effectively  liberalized  in 
France  and  Germany,  as  scheduled  for  1 
January 1998. 
Each acting as an exclusive distributor, DT will 
sell Atlas services in Germany, while FT will sell 
Atlas  services  in  France.  Atlas products will  be 
sold in France and Germany under the common 
globally  used  Adas/GlobalOne  brands.  Passive 
sales  of Atlas services  by  DT in  France,  by  Ff 
in  Germany  and  by  any  Atlas  operating entity 
in both Member States will be allowed. Outside 
France  and  Germany,  Atlas  products  will  be 
sold by the Atlas operating entity for  the rest of 
Europe. 
Pursuant  to  the  JV  Agreement,  a  balancing 
payment was made by DT at closing to equalize 
the  respective  contribution  values  of the  two 
parties. DT or FT will make a further balancing 
payment  upon  contribution  of  T -Data  and 
Transpac to Atlas to offset any difference in the 
valuation ofT-Data and Transpac respectively. 
3.  Provisions concerning dealings with/by Atlas 
· Mutual  service  prov1s1on  between  Atlas  and 
Ff/DT  is  the  subject  of  two  Framework 
Services Agreements  p~rsuant to which dealings 
between Fr/DT and Atlas· must be  transparent, 
non-discriminatory ·and  at arm's length. 
As  for  services  generally offered  by  DT or FT, 
.  the  prices  and  other  terms  which  DT  or  Fl' 
generally  apply  from  time  to  time  to  their 
customers are to apply equally for Atlas. As for 
services  not  generally  offered  by  Fr ·Or  DT, 
market  prices  and  terms  apply  and  are 
negotiated  betWeen  the  Parties  in  good  faith 
and  at arm's  length.  Consequently,  Atlas  will 
purchase such services from DT or FT at similar 
prices  and on  similar  conditions  to  those  that 
any  third  party generally offering such  services 
under equivalc;nt circumstances would allow. If 
information  on  relevant  market  prices  is  not 
available, the  prices  applicable for  Atlas are to 
be  determined  on  the  basis  of  a  calculation 
model that is used, within FT, tQ make offers to 
customers with special requests and, within DT, 
to  calculate  intra-group  transfer  prices.  Price~ 
resulting  from  such  calculation  will  cover,  for 
the  relevant  period,  all  costs  as  well  as  a 
reasonable profit margin. 
4.  Anti-competitiorz provisions 
Pursuant  to  Article  XIII  of  the  Atlas  JV 
Agreement,  FT  and  DT  will  not  engage 
anywhere in  the production of services that are 
substantially the same or compete directly with 
the  Atlas  services,  and  will  not engage  outside 
France  and Germany  in  the  marketing,  sale  or 
distribution of services that are substantially the 
same  or  compete  directly  with  the  Atlas 
services.  Furthermore,  FT  will  not  market  or 
distribute  Atlas  services  in  Germany  and  DT 
will  not market and distribute Atlas  services  in 
France; passive sales are, however, permitted by 
FT outside France, by DT outside Germany and 
by  Atlas  in  both France and Germany. 
·  5.  Provisions relating to intellectual and industrial 
property 
The parents each concluded an Intellectual and 
Industrial  Property  T  rapsfer  and  Licence 
Agreement with Atlas SA under which DT, FT, 
T-Data and Transpac France (the 'IPR holders') 
are  to ·make  available  to  Atlas  SA  the  IPRs 
which are needed to operate the Atlas  business 
in  accordance with the following principles: 
(a)  IPRs  ·owned  by,  or  licensed  to,  the  IPR 
holders  that  are  used  exclusively  for  the 
Atlas  business  will  be  transferred  to .Atlas 
SA; 
(b)  IPRs  owned  by,  or  licensed  to,  the  IPR 
holders that are used predominantly for the 
Atlas  business shall  be  tranuerred to Atlas 
SA, and a sub-licence will be granted to the 
Parties  (Grant-Back  Licence  sub-licence); 
and 
(c)  IPRs  owned  by,  or  licensed  to,  the  IPR 
holders that are used predominantly for the 
IPR  holders'  business  are  (sub-)licensed  to 
Atlas SA. 
G.  CHANGES MADE FURTHER TO THE 
COMMISSION'S INTERVENTION AND 
CONDIDONS ATTACHED TO THIS DECISION 
(22)  Certain features of the Atlas transaction as notified 
appeared  to  be  incompatible  with  Community 
competition  rules.  Consequently,  the  Commission 
by  letter of 23  May  1995  informed the  Parties of 
its  concerns.  In  the  course  of  the  notification 
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procedur~ the  Parties  have  amended  the  original 
Agreements.  and  given  undertakings  to  the 
Commission. 
1.  Contractual changes 
(23)  Non-appointment  of  Atlas  SA  as  an  agent  for 
international half-circuits 
Further  to  the  Commission's  letter  of  23  May 
199 5, DT and FT abolished the Agency Agreements 
and  amended  the  original  Service  Agreements  to 
take  account  of the  non-appointment of Atlas  SA 
as  a  non-exclusive  ~gent  for  DT  and  FT's 
half-circuits. 
(24)  Non-integration  of  French  and  German  public 
packet-switched  data  networks.  before  full  and 
effective  liberalization  of  the  telecommunications 
infrastructure and services markets 
Atlas  SA  will  not  acquire  legal  ownership  or 
control within the meaning of Article 3 of Council 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89 (18)  of  the  French 
and German public packet-switched data networks, 
Transpac  France  and  T-Data  respectively,  before 
the  telecommunications  infrastructure  and  services 
markets  are· fully  and  effectively  liberalized  in 
France  and Germany,  as  is  scheduled to occur  by 
1 January 1998. Meanwhile: 
1.  FT has  split Transpac SA into Transpac France 
apd Transpac Europe; 
· 2.  FT has yielded Transpac Europe to Atlas; 
3.  FT  will  keep  Transpac- France  as  a  wholly 
owned subsidiary; 
4.  DT has  incorporated  DT's  X.25  data services 
division  as  a separate company under  German 
law and a wholly owned subsidiary of .DT; 
5.  DT  and  FT  hav~  fully  contributed  their 
outsourcing  joint  venture,  Eunetcom  B.V.,  to 
Atlas SA;  and 
6.  Atlas SA has created a subsidiary in .France and 
Germany  (Atlas  France  and  Atlas  Germany 
respectively)  to provide  t~e following services: 
(i)  sales  support  regarding  Atlas  products  to 
distributors in France and Germany; and 
(11)  OJ  No L 395, 30.  12. 1989, p.  1 (corrected  version  in  OJ 
No L 257, 21.  9.  1990, p.  13); as  amended  by  the  Act  of 
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.  · 
(ii)  services  within  the  scope  of  Atlas  other 
than packet-switched data network services 
including: 
- VSAT services, 
- international end-to-end services, 
- voice VPN services, 
- customer-defined  solutions  (excluding 
national  X.25  data  services  in  France 
and Germany), and 
- outsourcing services, 
and excluding the services described  in  the 
last paragraph of recital  5. 
Once  the  telecommunications  infrastructure  and 
services markets are fully  and effectively  liberalized 
in  France  and  Germany,  Transpac  France  and 
T  -Oata will  be  contributed to Atlas  in  such a way t 
that  Atlas  France  and  Atlas  Germany  will  be 
merged  with  Transpac  France  and  T-Data 
respectively.  For the purposes of such contribution, 
Transpac  France  and  T-Data  shall  be  read  as 
comprising  only  the  public  packet-switched  data 
networks for the provision. of packet-switched data 
communications  services  based  on·  the  X.25,  IP, 
SNA and Frame Relay protocols respectively. 
(25)  Technical cooperation 
Ahead  of  full  and  effective  liberalization  of  the 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  services 
markets  in  France  and  Germany,  DT and  FT  will 
cooperate in the development of common technical 
network  elements.  This  Decision  is  subject  to  the 
condition  that  DT  and  FT's  cooperation  in  this 
field  will,  until the date set in  Article  2, comprise 
the following areas only: 
1.  FT  and  DT will  cooperate in the development 
of  common  products  and  common  technical f 
netWork  elements  (namely  such  products  and  · 
elements · as  share  the  same  features,  whilst 
being  separately  built  and  owned);  such 
cooperation  will  extend  to  the  French  and 
German public packet-switched data networks. 
Only the  following  functions  will  be  managed 
by  Atlas  SA  for  Transpac  France  and T-Data 
respectively: 
(a)  product  management  and  development, 
namely: (i)  product definition (definition of 
inter alia  speed,  terms  and availability  of 
interconnection  and  other  technical  and 
commercial  features),  (ii)  product 
marketing,  (iii)  product  life  cycle 
management,  (iv)  specification  of product 
requirements,  (v)  technical  specifications  · 
and developments of the products and (vi) 
technical  development · of  the  products 
(hardware  and  software),  provided  that 
product  branding  and  pricing  as  well  as 
product  implementation  in  the  network  is 
managed "by  Transpac  France  and  T-Data 
respectively; 
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•  ··" 
(b)  certain  network  planning  functions, 
namely:  (i) central network engineering and 
optimization  of the  common  transmission 
network  so  as  to  avoid  an  unreasonable 
duplication  of  resour~es,  (ii)  engineering 
and optimization  of the.· networks  for  the 
various  service  platforms  so  as  to  ensure 
seamless  services  and  (iii)  central  planning 
regarding  the  implementation  of  new 
network nodes  (such as timing); and 
(c)  information  sy,stems,  namely:  (i)  definition 
of the information system architecture  (for 
example,  development  of  common 
technical  features  for  future  information 
systems),  (ii)  specification  of  information 
system  requirements  and  applications,  (iii) 
technical  development  of  hardware  and 
software  for  information  systems  and  (iv) 
central  implementation  planning  of 
hardware  and  software,  provided  that 
central  information  system  functions  (for 
example,  billing information and statistics) 
will  be  operated  by  Transpac  France  and 
T-Data respectively. 
The  above  areas  of  cooperation  are  on  no 
account  to  be  tantamount  t~  a  de  facto 
integration  of the  French  and  German  public 
packet~switched data  networks,  which  will  be 
controlled  by  two  .  separate  network 
management centres. The restriction of DT and 
FT's  technical  cooperation  to the  elements  set 
out  above  is  attached  to  this  Decision  as  a 
condition within the meaning of Article 8 (  1) of 
Regulation No 17. 
2.  Atlas  may  subcontract  certain  operational 
functions  to  Transpac  France  and  T-Data 
respectively. 
•  (26)  Non-integration of assets  of FT's  indirect German 
·subsidiary 
The  assets.  of  FT's  German  corporate 
telecommunications services provider Info AG shall 
not be integrated into Atlas save as indicated in the 
following undertaking: 
'To  meet  the  requirement  of  "the  European 
Commission  that competition  is  not eliminated 
on  the  German  telecommunications  services 
market, France Telecom  (FT)  undertakes that it 
will  irrevocably  make  available  for  sale,  as  a 
going  business,  Transpac's  German  subsidiary 
Info  AG,  or execute  alternative remedies  if  such 
sale should not occur. 
Scope of the divestiture 
FT will divest of all assets as well as contracts of 
Info  AG.  Multinational  clients  whose · 
headquarters are outside Germany to whom Info 
AG  to date  provides  advanced  network  services 
as  part  of  the  Transpac  netWork  may  be 
transferred  to Atlas,  to the  extent to which  the 
Commission  is  satisfied  that  such  services  are 
separable from the German activities of Info AG 
("Info  AG's  business")  without  significantly 
lessening the value of those activities. 
The two parts of Info AG's  business (i.e. Disaster 
Recovery  Services  (DRS)  and  Network  Services 
(NWS))  will  be  sold  separately  if  no  purchaser 
can be  found  for  Info AG's  business as  a whole. 
For the purposes of this  undertaking, the sale of 
Info  AG  will  be  considered  as  the  sale  of both 
the  DRS  and  the  NWS  parts  of  Info  AG's 
business. 
Obligations of France  Telecom 
1.  With regard to Info AG's present operations 
in  respect of customers whose headquarters 
are  located  outside  Germany,  FT  will, 
before  the  sale  of  Transpac's  shares  in 
Info AG to the party purchasing such shares 
(the  'purchaser'),  try  to  bring  about  a 
service  agreement  between  Info  AG  and 
Transpac.  Pursuant  to  such  agreement, 
Transpac  will  continue  providing  for  Info 
AG  such  services  as  Transpac  is  currently 
providing to Info AG. 
2.  The  services  covered  by  the  agreement 
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall 
be  provided  so as  not to impair Info  AG's 
remaining  business  as  presently  conducted. 
Conclusion  of  such  agreement  with  the 
purchaser is  not a condition and cannot be 
required  by  FT  for  the  purposes  of 
complying with this undertaking  . 
3.  FT  also  agrees  to  provide  the  purchaser 
with  any  assistance  (e.g.  licences  and 
know-how) relating to the provision of Info 
AG's  services  to  the  extent possible  under 
existing contractual obligations, as the case 
~y  be.  FT  may  charge  the  purchaser  a 
market-based  fee  for  any  such  licence  and 
know-how.  The  market-based  fee  shall  be 
that normally  obtainable on the  market at 
the  time  that  any  licence  or  know-how 
is  provided. 
4.  FT  recognizes  the  COmmission's  objectives 
to  (i)  maintain  the  viability,  marketability 
and  competitiveness  of  Info  AG's  current 
business  and  (ii)  to  provide  sufficient 
management  and  other  resources  for  this 
purpose.  To  achieve  these  objectives, 
FT  undertakes the following: 
(a)  to ensure that (i)  Info AG's  business  is 
legally  kept  separate  from  both 
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Transpac  ~nd T-Data  and  maintained 
as  a  distinct and  saleable  business;  (ii) 
the value of Info AG's assets and of its 
business  in every respect is  maintained, 
pursuant to good  business  practice,  at 
their  current level,  unless  a  change  in 
·the assets is necessary, in which case Ff 
shall  110t  make  any  significant  change 
without  prior  consultation  with  and 
approval of the European Commission; 
and  (iii)  all  agreements  necessary  to 
maintain Info AG's business are entered 
into  or  continued  according  to  their 
terms, consistent with past practice and 
the  ordinary  course  of  business;  this 
notably  includes  all  agreements  and 
arrangements  related  to  leased  line 
capacity  and  iJ;tterconnection  with 
T-Data and/or Deutsche Telekom; 
(b)  to  keep  all  administrative  and 
management  functions  relating  to  Info 
AG  which  have  been  carried out at all 
levels  within  Ff and/or  Transpac  to 
maintain  the  viability,  marketability 
and  competitiveness  of Info  AG  until 
divestiture  is  completed  or · until  the 
nustee advises  Ff that such  functions 
are  no . longer  necessary,  whichever 
occurs earlier; 
(c)  as soon as is practical and in any event 
no  later  than  by  10  July  1996,  to 
appoint a trustee (the 'trustee'), such as 
an investment bank, subject to approval 
by the Commission (such approval shall 
not  be  withheld  without"good  cause), 
provided  that;  ~ubject to approval  by 
the  Commission  (such  approval  shall 
not  be  withheld  without good  cause), 
FT  may  (i)  terminate  the  trustee 
agreement should FI' decide at any time 
after  the  appointment  that .  the  trustee 
does  not  perform  its  duties  properly, 
and  (ii)  replace  the  previously 
appointed  trustee  by  another  trustee 
also appro_ved  by the Commission; 
(d)  to  give  such  trustee  an  irrevocable 
mandate  to  sell  Info  AG,  on  best 
possible  terms  and  conditions,  to  an 
available  purchaser  ·making  an  offer 
before [  ...  ] (19); and 
(")  Business  secret; 
(e)  to  establish  and  facilitate  the 
management  structure  agreed  with  the 
trustee  in  the  framework  of  the 
divestiture negotiations. 
5.  When  the  trustee  is  appointed  to  sell  Info 
AG,  FT shall comply with the requirements 
of the trustee to maintain the value of Info 
AG's  . assets,  to  the  extent  legally 
permissible,  unless  a change in  the assets is 
necessary,  in  which case Ff shall  not make 
any  significant  change  without  prior 
consultation  with  and  approval  of  the 
European  Commission.  fT  shall  in 
particular  ensure  that  all  services  provided 
by  FT  or  any  of FT's  subsidiaries  to  Info 
AG  continue  to  be  provided  efficiently and 
satisfactorily and that no increase is made in  f 
the charge (if any) made to Info AG for any 
service.  FT  shall  not,  except  with  the 
consent  of  the  trustee,  employ  or  offer 
employment  to  any employee  or officer  of 
Info AG  until  after the sale of Info AG. 
Obligations of  the trustee 
6.  Pursuant to the agreement between fT and 
the  trustee  appointed  with  the 
Commission's consent, the trustee shall: 
(a)  advise  fT  and  Transpac  on  the  best 
management  structure  to  ensure  the 
continued  viability,  marketability  and  f 
competitiveness  of Info  AG's  business. 
The trustee shall notably give advice on 
how  to. undertake  any restructuring of 
Info AG  in a way that guarantees Info 
AG's  viability,  marketability  and 
competitiveness; 
(b)  advise  FT and Transpac with regard to 
the  satisfactory  operation  and 
management  of Info  AG  to ensure the 
continued  viability,  marketability  and 
competitiveness  of Info  AG's  business 
as  well  as  supervise,  monitor  and 
control  the  implementation  of  the 
advice  by Info AG.  For the purposes of 
and  to  the  extent  necessary  for  such 
monitoring,  the  trustee  shall  have 
complete access  to Info AG's personnel 
and  facilities  as  well  as  to documents, 
books  and  records  of  both  FT · and 
Transpac,  including  such  personnel, 
facilities,  books  and  records  which,. 
even  if not directly related to Info AG, 
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may  have  an impact on the conduct of 
Info AG's operations; 
(c)  act  as  FT's  investment  banker  in 
conducting good faith negotiations with 
interested  third parties  with  a  view  to 
selling  Info  AG  within  [  ...  ] (20)  of the 
first  closing  · date  · of  the  Atlas 
transaction  as  defined  therein,  i.e. 
before [  ...  ] (21)  (the 'target date'). In the 
event that the trustee at any time  prior 
to  the  target  date  but  at  least  two 
months  before  that  date  determines 
together with the Commission that it is 
not  possible  to  identify  an  acceptable 
purchaser for  Info  AG  exclusive  of the 
customers  whose  headquarters  are 
located outside of Germany, the trustee, 
IT  and  the  Commission  will  discuss 
appropriate alternatives to the proposed 
divestiture  of  Info  AG,  notably  an 
extended divestiture; 
(d)  provide  a  written  report  before  a 
binding  contract  is  signed  and  in  any 
event every  month on all  developments 
in  its  negotiations  with  third  parties 
interested  in  purchasing  Info  AG; 
such  reports,  with  supporting 
documentation,  shall , be  furnished  to 
the Commission with copy to FT; 
(e)  provide  the  Commission,  with copy  to 
FT,  with  a  written  report  every  two 
months  concerning  the  monitoring  of 
the  operations  and  management  of 
Info AG; 
(f)  at  any  other  time  upon  the 
CommiSsion's  request  provide  the 
Commission  with  a  written  or  oral 
report on any aspect. of the duties and 
activities  of the  trustee  in  relation  to 
Info AG and its possible purchasers. Ff 
shall  receive  a  copy  of  such  written 
reports  and  shall  be  informed  of the 
content of oral reports; and 
(g)  cease  to  perform  its  duties  as · trustee 
for  the  purpose  of  this  undertaking 
when  the  sale  of  Info  AG  or  any 
alternative  remedy  within  the  meaning 
of  paragraph  6  (c)  above  becomes 
effective. 
7.  The trustee shall be "remunerated by FT. The 
trustee's  remuneration  . shall  provide 
incentives  for  a  prompt divestiture,  so  that 
the trustee uses  its  best efforts  in  arranging 
a prompt and value-maximizing sale of Info 
AG. 
(10)  Business secret. 
(21)  Business secret. 
a.  FT  undertakes  to  give  all  reasonable 
assistance  requested  by  the  trustee  to  sell 
Infp  AG  by  the  target  date.  Ff shall  be 
deemed .to have complied with its divestiture 
undertaking  if by  such  date· it  has  entered 
in~o a binding  letter of intent or a  binding 
contract  for  the  sale  of  Info  AG  to  a 
purchaser  agreed  by  the  Commission, 
provided that such sale  is  completed within 
a reasonable time  limit, after the signing of 
such  binding  letter  of  intent  or  binding 
contract, agreed  by  the Commission. 
9.  The  Commission  may,  upon  FT's  request 
and good cause provided, extend the period 
granted to FT for divestiture of Info AG  by 
an  additional  six  months  after  the  target 
date (the  'extended target date'). 
10.  The  reports  referred  to  in  subparagraphs 
(6)  (d)  and  (f)  above shall  indicate whether 
a  proposed  purchaser  would  be  able  to 
ensure  that Info  AG  remains  a competitive 
participant  in  the  German  tele-
communications  market  and  whether 
negotiations  with  such  proposed  purchaser 
should continue. If within  10 working days 
of the  receipt  of such  indications from  the 
trustee  the  Commission  does  not formally 
disagree  · with  the  trustee's  favourable 
assessment  of  a  proposed  purchaser, 
negotiations  with  such  proposed  purchaser 
may proceed. The Commission may disagree 
with the trustee's assessment of a proposed 
purchaser if the proposed purchaser ~ere in 
the  Commission's view  unlikely to compete 
effectively with T-Data, Atlas Germany and 
Global  One respectively. 
11.  The  [  ...  ] (22)  period  up  to the  target  date 
and  the  six-month  period  up  to  the 
extended target date, as the case may be, are 
suspended ·  in cases  where  the  sale  of Info 
AG  is  suspended due to ·a  notification to a 
competition. authority  until  such  authority 
adopts its  final  decision  with regard to the 
sale of Info AG.  · 
12.  Any  dispute.  between  Ff  and  the 
purchaser(s) of Info AG with respec_t toFT's 
undertaking  to  divest  of  the  Info  AG 
business 'will be subject to arbitration by an 
independent  third  party.  During  such 
arbitration,  the.  [ ...  ] (23)  period  up  to  the 
target date will  be  suspended. 
13.  If  the  sale  of  Info  AG's  business  does  not 
seem  likely  to  occur  by  the  date  stated  in 
paragraph  (4)  (d),  FT  shall,  at  least  two 
(11)  Business secret. 
(13)  Business secret. 
II/ A  Jl No L239/34  Official Journal of the European Communities  .19.  9. 96. 
months  before that date, submit alternative 
remedies  sufficiently  satisfactory  to 
· safeguard  actual  competition  in  the 
German  market. These alternative remedies 
must  be  executed  by  the  date  stated  in 
paragraph (4)  (d).' 
The  Commission  makes  this  l;>ecision  conditional 
on  FT's  compliance  with  the  terms  of the' above 
undertaking.  Where  they  are  separable  from  the 
product  divisions  of  Info  AG  that  are  to  be 
divested,  multinational  clients  to  whom  Info . AG 
now  provides·  network  services  as  part  of  the 
Transpac  network  and  whose  headquarters  are 
located  outside  Germany  may  be  transferred  to 
Atlas. 
(27)  FT,  DT, Atlas  and  GlobalOne have given  separate 
undertakings not to compete, for one year after the 
closing  date  of  the  sale  of  Info  AG,  with  the 
purchaser  for  the  provision  of telecommunications 
services  to  customers  of  Info  AG  whose 
headquarters  are  located  within  Germany  (the 
'transferred  customers')  at  the  specific  locations 
which  Info  AG  served,  except  where  such 
transferred customers decline  in good faith  to deal 
with  the  purchaser  of Info  AG.  The  Commission 
makes  this  Decision  conditional on compliance  by 
FT,  DT,  Atlas  and  GlobalOne  comply  With  the 
requirements of this undertaking. 
(28) 
2.  Non-discrimination condition 
In  order  to  provide  the  services  described  under 
recital  5,  Atlas  or  any  other  service  provider  is 
dependent  on  access  to  the  . public  s,witched 
telecommunications network (PSTN), the integrated 
services  digital  network ·(ISDN)  and  to·  other 
· essential facilities, and also on reserved services (24). 
Until  there  is  full  and  effective  liberalization  of 
infrastructure and services in France and Germany, 
as  is  scheduled  to occur  by  1 January  1998, only 
Fr and  DT  provide  access  to  the  PSTN  and  the 
ISDN  as  well  as  reserved  services.  However,  even 
when  all  telecommunications  facilities  and services  · 
are  non-reserved,  FT  and  DT  will  at least  for  a 
number of years  remain  indispensable suppliers of 
building  blocks  for  the  relevant services  in  France 
and  Germany.  Given  that  FT  and  DT  are 
shareholders  of  Atlas  it  is  essential  for  the 
safeguarding of fair competition between Atlas and 
other existing or future telecommunications services 
providers  to  eliminate  the  risk  that  the  former 
(24)  Reserved  services  are services  which  are provided  pursuant 
to  special  or exclusive  rights  granted  by  the  EU  Member 
States  to their respective TOs. 
might  be  granted  more  favourable  treatment 
regarding  the  following  facilities-related  tele-
communications services provided by FT and DT to 
Atlas in France and Germany respectively, pursuant 
to  the  Framework  Services •  Agreements:  (i)  leased 
lines services, in particular international leased lines 
(half-circuits)  and domestic  leased  lines,  including 
any  discounts,  as  the  case  may  be;  and  (ii) 
PSlNIISDN services  including  both access  to such 
networks  (namely  analogue  access;  basic  ISDN 
access;  ISDN  access  to  the. public  packet-switched 
data  networks;  special  access  from  the  public 
packet-switched  data  networks  to  ISDN  (X.75 
interface);  and  national  and  international  voice 
VPN  and  VPN  interconnection services)  and traffic 
over  such  networks.  Likewise,  Atlas  is  not  to  be 
granted  more  favourable  treatment  than  thi~d 
parties  in  connection  with  other reserved  facilities 
and  services  and  with  such  facilities  and  services 
which  remain  an  essential  facility  after  full  and f 
effective  liberalization  of  telecommunications  · 
infrastructure and services  in  France and Germany. 
Thus: 
1.  Terms and conditions 
The  terms  and  conditions  applied  by  DT  and 
FT  to  Atlas  for  the  abovementioned  services 
covered by the Framework Services Agreements 
and  for  the  provision of other reserved  and/or 
essential  services  (for  example,  provision  of 
leased  lines,  allocation  of numbers,  addresses 
and  names)  in  connection  with  the  services 
described under recital 5 shall be similar to the 
terms and conditions applied to other providers 
of similar services. This requirement covers inter 
alia  availability,  price,"  quality  of  service, 
functionality,  usage  conditions,  timetable  for 
installation of requested facilities, connection of 
apparatus, or repair an.d  maintenance services.  f. 
· 2.  Scope of services available 
Atlas is  not to be granted terms and conditions, 
or to be  exempted  from  any  usage  restrictions 
r~garding the  abovementioned  services  covered 
by  the  Framework  Services  Agreemeius  and 
other  reserved  and/or  essential  services,  which 
would  enable  it  to  offer  services  which 
competing  providers  are  prevented  from 
offering. 
3.  Technical information 
DT and Fr is  not 'to discriminate between Atlas 
and any other service  provider competing with 
Atlas  in  connection  with  either  a  decision  to 
substantially modify  technical  interfaces for  the 
access  to  reserved  and/or  essential  facilities  or 
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(29) 
information  relating  to  the  operation  of the 
PSlNIISDN.  Competitors  will,  in  particular, 
have  access  to technical  information to which 
they can adapt lest their quality of services  be 
reduced, such as signalling software information 
for the provision of voice services. 
4.  Commercial information 
DT and Fr is not to disCriminate between Atlas 
and  other  providers  of  services  as  described 
under  recital  5  as  regards  the  disclosure  of 
certain  commercial  information  (for  example, 
systemized and organized customer information 
derived  exclusively  from  the  operation  the 
PSTNIISDN or the provision of reserved and/or 
essential  services)  if  such  information  would 
confer a substantial competitive advantage and 
is not readily and equally available elsewhere by 
service providers competing with Atlas. 
To ensure the absence of third-party discrimination, 
this Decision in application of Article 85  (3} of the 
EC Treaty and Article 53 (3) of the EEA Agreement 
is  to be  valid  only  on condition that. DT, Ff and 
Atlas  comply  with  the  following  additional 
conditions. 
3.  Other conditions attached to this Decision 
DT  and  fT  have  also  entered  into  certain 
additional commitments. Where these commitments 
are too general or insufficient, the Commission has 
specified  and  supplemented  the  behavioural 
constraints  imposed  on  the  parents.  Compliance 
with  the  constraints  described  below  will  be  a 
condition  for  the  validity  of this  Decision  within 
the meaning of Articie 8 (  1) of Regulation No 17. 
1.  Access  to DT and FT's public packet-switched 
data networks  · 
DT  and  FT ·  have .  given  the  following 
. undertaking: 
'Each  of FT  and  DT will  as  of  1  January 
1996  establish  and  thereafter  maintain 
third-party  access  to  their  public  switched 
data  networks · in  France  and  Germany · 
respectively.  Non-discriminatory,  open  and 
transparent access will  be granted to all data 
services  providers  that  offer  X.25 
packet-switched  data  communications 
services. To ensure non-discriminatory access 
to .their national public X.25 packet-switched 
data networks, FT and DT shall: 
(a)  establish  and  maintain  standardized 
X. 7  5  interfaces  to access  their  national 
public  X.25  packet-switched  data 
networks; this interconnection is suitable 
for  the  provision  of end-to-end  services 
based on X.25 specifications for end-user 
access speeds up to 64 kbps; and 
(b)  offer  such  access  on non-discriminatory 
terms,  including  price,  availability  of 
volume  or  .  other  discounts  and  the 
quality of interconnection provided. 
FT  and  DT  shall  further  ensure 
non-discriminatory access by  making publicly 
available  the  standard  terms  and conditions 
for  such  X.75  interface standards, including. 
if any,  volume  and  other discounts,  as  of 1 
January  1996.  FT  and  DT  will  make 
available  for  inspection  by  the  Commission 
,  any  agreements  relating  to  such  X. 7  5 
interfaces,  including  all  specifically  agreed 
terms.  Until  such  time  as  Transpac  Fran~e 
and T-Data are integrated into Atlas, neither 
Transpac France nor T-Data shall disclose to 
Atlas any such specifically agreed terms that 
are identified and maintained as confidential 
by  the  party  obtaining  interconnection 
through  such  X. 7  S ·interfaces.  Finally,  the 
above obligations shall likewise apply to any 
generally  used  CCITT-standardized 
interconnection  protocol  that  may  modify, 
replace  or co-exist  as  a  standard related  to 
the  X. 7  S  standard  and  is  used  by  fT and 
DT. 
Proprietary  interfaces  may  be  retained  or 
established  among Transpac France,  T-Data 
and Adas; such interfaces are defined by  the 
particular type of technology, hardware and 
softw~re  that  a  network  operator  uses  to 
provide  advanced  or  customized  services. 
Atlas will  be  allowed to access  the Transpac 
France  and  T  -Data  public  packet-switched 
data  networks  ·through·  these  proprietary 
interfaces,  also  . fo1  the  provision  of 
packet-switched  data  communications 
services,  provided  access  granted  to  Atlas 
through  such  interfaces  is  economically 
equivalent  to  third-party  access  to  the 
Transpac France and T-Data networks.' 
The Commission makes this Decision subject to 
the condition that Transpac France, T-Data and 
eventually Atlas grant third-party access  to the 
French . and  German  public  packet-switched 
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data  networks  on  non-discriminatory 
transparent terms and conditions which must be 
economically  · equiv-lent  to  the  terms  and 
conditions of Atlas' access to such networks. 
2.  Access  to  DT  and  FT's  other  networks  and 
facilities 
This  Decision  is  conditional  on DT's and FT's · 
granting  to  any  third  party  that  operates  a 
telecommunications  facility  ('telecommuni-
cations  operator')  and  applies  for  the 
interconnection  of  such  facility  or  systems 
facilities  with  DT  or  FT's  networks,  such  as 
PSTN,  ISDN  Gr  ATM  networks  and  related 
broadband capacity,  as  the  case  may  be,  such 
interconnection  on  non-discriminatory  terms 
vis-a-vis  Atlas.  Such  terms  must  enable  the 
telecommunications  operator  to  provide 
telecommunications  services  or  provide  its 
telecommunications  facilities  without limitation 
in any respect within the reasonable capabilit.ies 
of the  telecommunications operator concerned. 
3.  Cross-subsidization 
DT and  FT  have  undertaken  not to engage  in 
cross-subsidization in connection with the Atlas 
venture. To prevent Atlas from  benefiting from 
cross-subsidies stemming from the operation of 
public telecommunications infrastructure and of 
reserved services by either DT or FT, all entities 
formed  pursuant  to  the  Atlas  venture  will  be 
established as d:istinct entities separate from DT 
and FT. 
Atlas  SA,  T-Data  and  Transpac  France  shall 
obtain their  own debt  financing  on  their own 
credit, provided that FT and DT: 
(a)  may  make  capital  contributions  or· 
commercially  reasonable  loans  . to  such 
entities as are required to enable Atlas SA, 
T-Data  and  Transpac  France  to  conduct 
their respeqive businesses; 
(b)  may  pledge  their  venture  interests  in  such 
entities,  in  connection  with  non-recourse 
financing for such entities, and 
(c)  may  guaratntee  any  indebtednes~ of 'Such 
entities, provided that FT and DT may only 
make  payments  pursuant  to  any  such 
guarantee  following  a  default  by  such 
entities in  respect of such indebtedness. 
Compliance  with  the  above  undertaking  is  a 
condition  for  the  validity  of  this  Decision 
under  Article  8 (1)  of Regulation  No  17.  The 
Commission  extends  the  following  conditions 
as  to  conduct  to  cover  all  entities  created 
pursuant  to  the  Atlas  agreement,  T-Data  and 
Transpac  France.  Such  enttnes  are  not  to 
allocate directly or indirectly any part of their 
operating expenses, costs, depreciation, or other 
expenses  of  their  business  to  any  parts  of 
FT  or DT's  business  units  (including  without 
limitation  the  proportionate  costs  based  on 
work actually performed that are attributable to 
shared employees or sales or tnarketing of Atlas 
products and services  by  DT or FT employees); 
however, nothing is to prevent Atlas SA, T-Data 
and Transpac France from billing DT or FT for 
products and services provided to DT or FT by 
such  entities  on  the  basis  of the  same  price 
charged third parties (in the case of products or 
services  sold  to  third  parties  in  commercial 
quantities)  or full  cost reimbursement  or other 
arm's  length  pricing  method  (in  the  case  of 
products  and  services  not  sold  to  third  parties 
in commercial quantities). 
4.  Accounting 
The  Commission  imposes  a  condition  on 
T-Data,  Transpac  France  (including  all  sub-
sidiaries) and all entities created pursuant to the 
Atlas  agreements  which  operate in  the  EEA  to 
keep  separate  accounting  records  (including 
profit  and  loss  account  and  balance  sheet 
or  statement  of  capital  employed)  using 
international  accounting  standards  for  each 
service they provide in any country. 
• 
These  acc~unting records  will  notably  identify( 
all services provided to such entities by DT and 
FT  and  payments  or transfers  to or from  DT 
and  FT;  moreover,  no  entity created  pursuant 
to  .  the  A~las  Agreement,  nor  T -Data  or 
Transpac  France  will  receive  any  material 
subsidy  (including  forgiveness  of debt)  directly 
or indirectly from  DT or FT, or any investment 
or payment from DT or FT that is not recorded 
in the books of such entities as an investment in 
debt or equity. 
The  Commission  also  imposes  a  condition  on 
DT and  FT  (including  all  subsidiaries)  to keep  · 
separate  accounting  records  of  all  services 
provided  to  any  entity created  pursuant to the 
Atlas Agreements operating in the EEA. To that 
end,  DT and  FT  are  to  implement  within one 
year  from  the  date of the  exemption  pursuant 
to  Article ' 1  of  this  Decision  an  accounting 
system which identifies detailed cost accounting 
data for any such service. 
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(30) 
The  records  mentioned.  in  the· previous  two 
subparagraphs will detail the following: 
(a)  the cost ,tandard used; 
(b)  the  accounting  conventions  used  for· the 
treatment of costs; 
(c)  the  full  allocation  and  attribution  of 
expenses  or  costs,  revenues,  assets  and 
liabilities shared between such entities and 
their parents; and  · 
(d)  the attribution method chosen. 
5.  Bundling. 
The  Commission  imposes  a  condition  on  DT 
and Ff to sell  DT and Ff services  respectively 
under contracts separate from the contracts for 
the  sale  of  Atlas  services  concluded  as 
distributors  of Atlas  in  Germany  and  France 
respectively.  Each separate contract will set out 
the  terms  and  conditions  of  each  individual 
service  sold  thereunder  and  notably  attribute 
any quantity or other discounts to a  particular 
service, as the case may be. 
4.  Obligations attached to this Decision 
The Commission attaches the following obligations 
within the  meaning of Article 8  (  1)  of Regulation 
No 17 to this Decision, pursuant to Article 85  (3) 
of the  EC Treaty  and Article  53  (3)  of the  EEA 
Agreement.  These  obligations will  remain  in  force 
for  the .duration  of the  exemption.  In  so  far  as 
related  to  existing  obligations  under  national  or 
Community  law,  t~e obligations  described  below 
are  intended  to  ensure  the  Parties'  firm 
commitment  to comply  with  the  applieable  legal 
framework.  Pursuant  to  Article  8  (3)  (b)  of 
Regulation  No  17~  the  Commission  may  revoke. 
this  Decision  where  the  parties  breach  any  such 
obligation. 
1.  Auditing 
Atlas  SA  (which  includes  its  consolidated 
subsidiaries),  Transpac France  and T-Data 'are 
to  be  aujlited  every  year;  such  audit  will 
confirm from an accounting viewpoint that: 
(a)  the  transactions  between these entities, on 
the one hand, and FT and DT, on the other 
hand,  have  been  conducted  at·  arm's 
length; 
(b)  these  entities  have  adhered  to  the 
accounting  procedures  chosen  within  the 
framework  set  out  under  recital  29  (4); 
and 
(c)  the calculation numbers are accurate. 
The  first  auditing  reports,  covering  the 
12-month period starting on the date on which 
this  Decision  comes  into  force,  will  be 
submitted to the Commission within 15 months 
of  that  date.  This  obligation  will  remain  in 
force for the duration of this Decision. 
2.  Recording obligations 
DT, Ff and all entities created pursuant to the 
Atlas  Agreements  will  each  keep  records  and 
documents  suitable  to  prove  compliance  with 
the  terms  of the  above  conditions  ready· for 
inspection by  the Commission. 
3.  Inspection of records 
For  the  purpose  of ascertaining  and  ensuring 
compliance by  DT, Ff or Atlas with the above 
,conditions,  DT,  FT  and  all  entities  created 
pursuant  to  the  Atlas  Agreements  will,  on 
reasonable  notice,  duri"ng  office  hours,  and 
without a  need  for  the  Commission  to invoke 
the  powers  of  inspection  pursuant  to 
Regulation No 17, give-the Commission access 
to  DT,  FT  or  Atlas's  business  premises  to 
inspect  records  and documents covered  by  the 
above recording obligations and to receive oral 
explanations relating to such documents. 
4.  Reporting obligations 
T-Data,  Transpac  France,  DT,  Ff  and  all 
entitles  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreements  will  provide  the  Commission,  for 
the  purpose  of ascertaining  whether  DT,  Ff 
·and  Atlas  comply  with  the above  obligations, 
with: 
(a)  any  records  and  documents  in  the 
possession  or  control  of DT,  FT  or  an 
entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
agreements  necessary  for  that  determi-
nation;  in  particular,  every  six  months, 
starting  one  year  after  the  date  of  the 
exemption  pursuant  to  Anicle  1  of  this 
Decision with unaudited accounting data as 
specified in recital 29 (4); and 
(b)  oral  or  written  complementary  explana-
tions. 
H.  THE  REGULATORY SITUATION 
(31)  In  letters  sent to the ·Commission, the French  and 
German Governments have undertaken to take the 
necessary  steps  to  effectively  allow  the  use  of 
alternative  infrastructure  for  the  provision  of 
liberalized  teleCommunications  services  by  1  July 
1996 and to liberalize  the voice  telephony service 
and all telecommunications infrastructure fully  and 
effectively  by, 1 January  1998. The availability  of 
alternative  telecommunications  infrastructure  in 
Germany and France  r~nders competitors of Atlas 
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independent of DT and FT's infrastructure for  the 
purpo5es  of creating  trun~ network  infrastructure 
to proyide liberalized services.  ·.  ·  ·  ~;'Y. 
Early  alternative  infrastructure  liberalization  in 
France  and  Germany  adds  to  a  regulatory 
framework  in  the  .  home  countries  of  the  Atlas 
partners that is  des1gned  to ensure a  level  playing 
field  in the telecommunications markets. 
1.  France 
1.  Separation of regulatory and operative 
functions 
Pursuant  to  French  Law,  the  Minister  of 
Telecommunications shall ensure that regulation 
of  the  telecommunications  markets  is 
undertaken  separately  of  service  provision  in 
these  markets.  A·  specific  national  regulatory 
authority  (NRA),  the  Direction  Generate  des 
Postes  et  Telecommunications  (DGPT),  is 
competent  for  licensing  providers  of 
telecommunications  networks  and  services  in 
France  hased  on  objective  and  transparent 
criteria.  The  DGPT  shall  survey  FT's  market 
behaviour  and  approve  FT's  tariffs  for  (i) 
reserved  services  and leased  lines  and  (ii)  such 
liberalized services that are not in fact provided 
by  a third party active in  the French market. 
2.  Non-discriminatory access 
Further  to  the  adoption  of  the  Commission 
Services  Directive  and  Council  Directive 
90/387/EEC  ('ONP  Framework  Directive') (25) · 
Article  L  32-1-4°  of  the  French  Law  of 
29 December 1990 gtants all users equal access 
to the public networks on objective, transparent 
and non-discriminatory conditions. FT is  under 
an  obligation  to  effectively  grant  such  access . 
and must ·publish  information on the  network 
/  ·  (such  as  technical  features,  tariffs  and  usage 
conditions)  and  on  leased  line  offerings.  Tlie 
DGPT may  verify  Ff's compliance  with 'these 
obligations  and  investigate  complaints  filed 
against'  Ff  for  non-compliance  with  these 
obligations.  The  DGPT  is,  further,  to  ensure 
compliance  with  Ff's  obligation  to  share 
available  transmission  capacity  for  liberalized 
services  with  competitors  and  shall  publish 
annual  statistical  reports  on  FT's  compliance 
with these obligations. 
(
25
)  Council  Directive  90/387/EEC  of  28  June  1990  on  the 
establishment of·the internal market for telecommunications 
services  through  the  implementation  of  open  network 
provision; OJ  No L 192, 24. 7.  1990, p.  1.  , 
3.  Prevention  of cross-subsidies 
To allow  the  DGPT  to  supervise  FT's  market 
behaviour,  FT  is  under the  legal  obligation to 
:keep  ali  analytical  accounting  system  that 
relates  costs  to  each  individual  Ff  service. 
Where  an  offering  comprises  the  provision  of 
both reserved and liberalized services, FT must 
separate each kind of service in the contract and 
in  the  invoice.  In  this  conne,tion,  FT's  data 
communications  services  are  already  provided 
by  a separate legal entity. 
2.  Germany 
1.  Separation  of regulatory and operatir.1e 
functions 
Pursuant  to  the  German  1989  Poststruktur-
gesetz, the 1994 Postneuordnungsgesetz and the 
1994  Post- und  Telekommunikation-
Regulierungsgesetz, regulatory competencies are 
assigned  to a  Federal agency created under the 
Federal  Ministry  of  Post  and 
Telecommunications  (BMPT)  while 
telecommunications  operations  are  undertaken 
by  DT,  a  fully  State-owned  joint  stock 
corporation.  Regulatory  obligations of DT are 
policed  by  independent  bodies,  so-called 
regulatory chambers. 
2.  Non-discriminatory access 
Under  the  current  and  future  German 
regulatory  frameworK,  DT is  to  provide  third 
parties  with  both  access  to  monopoly 
infrastructure  and  reserved  or mandatory  ser-
vic~s on  a  n~n-discriminatory and transparentf 
bas1s  accordmg  to  objective  criteria.  Upon 
application,  DT  will  supply  state-of-the-art 
le~sed lines  over  service-neutral  access  points 
Without delay. With the only restriction of voice 
telephony service provision, leased lines may be 
freely  interconnected and used for any service. 
Leased lines must meet market demand and DT 
must  publish  data  concerning  availability  and 
quality of such lines. 
3.  Prevention of cross-subsidies 
The  BMPT  (i)  will  approve  both  tariffs  and 
other price-sensitive contractual terms for DT's 
reserved  services  and  (ii)  may  object  to  DT's 
tariffs  for  mandatory services.  The BMPT may 
also seize  DT's profits stemming from tariffs in 
excess  of the  app~oved amount  and  take  any 
measure  nece~sary to reestablish  an effectively 
competitive  environment  jeopardized  by 
unlawful  cross-subsidization.  Moreover  DT's 
subsidiaries  and  affiliates  are  to  use  r;served 




.. · (34) 
services for the provision of competitive services 
under  equivalent  terms  as  DT's customers and 
must  use  such  terms  to  account  internal 
services transfer. 
I.  1HIRD-PARTY OBSERVATIONS 
Following  the  publication  of a  notice  pursuant  to 
Article 19 (  3) of Regulation No 17 and to Article 3 
of  Protocol  21  of  the  EEA  Agreement(26),  10 
interested  third  parties submitted comments to the 
Commission.  These  comments  approved  of  the 
structural  changes  made  by  DT  and  FT  to  the 
original  project,  whilst  suggesting  that  a  swift 
divestiture of FT's  indirect German subsidiary Info 
AG  was  €rucial.  Third  parties  also  contributed  to 
the Commission's definition of the relevant markets 
emphasizing  the  indispensability  of (i)  an effective 
liberalization of 'alternative infrastructure in  France 
and  Germany,  namely  actual  access  to  alternative 
sources  of  infrastructure  in  these  countries,  before 
Atlas  is  exempted  from  Articles  85  (1)  of the  EC 
Treaty  and  53  (1)  of the  EEA  Agreement  and  (ii) 
surveillance  of technical  cooperation  between  DT 
and  FT  lest  it  extend  to  sales,  marketing  and 
pricing. 
As  for  proposed  behavioural  restraints  to  be 
imposed  on  DT  and  FT,  third  parties  submitted 
that  obligations  and  condition~ should  remain  in 
place until there was effective competition in France 
and Germany. Finally, third-party observations also 
pointed to the relevance of appropriate accounting 
systems  and  interconnection  terms,  including 
technically  equivalent  interf~ces  for  the  jo4tt-
venture companies and third  parties~ to ensure that 
Atlas's  competitors  are  not  , harmed  by 
cross-subsidies or discriminatory practices. 
The  Commission  carefully  reviewed  all  comments 
received·  and  concluded  that  most  concerns 
expressed  therein  had  already  been  raised  by  the 
Commission  and  discussed  in  detail  with  DT  and 
FT,  who  had  provided  adequate  answers  and 
safeguards.  Those  comments  have  not  therefore 
affected  the  Commission's  substantive  posataon 
outlined in the Article  19 (3)  notice  as  regat:ds  the 
notified  agreements.  However,  in  the  interests  of 
legai  certainty  the  Commission  has  spelled  out in 
more detail in this Decision the scope and duration 
of some conditions and obligations imp<)sed on DT 
and FT. 
(u)  See  footnote  2. 
(35)  Subsequent  to  third-party  observations  the 
Commission also requested that fT,  DT, Atlas and 
GlobalOne give the undertakings reproduced under 
recitals  et  seq.·  and  decided  to  attach  as  an 
additional condition to this  Decision  that DT and 
FT  sell  own  products  unbundled  from  Atlas 
products (see  recital  ~9 (5)). 
II.  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A.  ARTICLE 85  (1)  OF THE EC TREATY AND 
ARTICLE 53  (1)  OF THE EEA  AGREEMENT 
1.  Struc~ural cooperative joint venture 
The  Atlas  joint  venture  is  structural  and 
cooperative in nature. 
(36)  Potential  competition  in  markets  for  Europe-wide 
and national telecommunications services 
Atlas  will  initially  combine  and  develop  products 
largely based on DT and FT's existing products, in 
respect of which  DT and FT  will  act as  exclusive 
distributors  within  their  respective  domestic 
markets.  Although  certain  services  transferred  to 
Atlas·  in  third-country  national  markets  and 
Europe-wide  remain  with · DT  and  FT  in  their 
respective  home  markets  (see  recital  5), 
interconnection  allows  the  extension  of any  such 
service from the national home market into another 
geographic  market.  FT  for  instance  provides  an 
international · extension  to  its  domestic  and 
international  VPN  services  offerings.  For  both 
· offerings  this  extension  may  include  Germany 
where  DT's  national  VPN  services  remain  outside 
the scope of Atlas.  Mo~eover, DT and FT will keep 
a residual staff presence at all their current foreign 
locations  and  continue  to  provide  international 
leased  lines,  which  are  the  'building  blocks'  of 
self-provided private networks. 
In  this connection, Atlas will  undertake own R+D 
activities  but also  award important R+D  contracts 
to DT and FT. The parents will therefore keep and 
increase their proficiency and know-how in  respect· 
of  the  technologies  required  to  stay  in  (or  to 
re-enter) the relevant markets while keeping control 
of the  necessary  infrastructure in  the  single  largest 
Member  State  telecommunications  markets. 
Moreov~r,  although  Atlas  may  own  new 
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developments (see  recital 21  (5))  it is on the whole 
more  likely  that such  ownership will  revert to the 
developing  parent. In  any event,  Atlas  ~HI license 
ba~k  to  the  respective  parent  most  technology 
developed from  IPRs contributed by  DT or Fr. 
The Commission concludes that DT and Ff remain 
potential  competitors  for- Atlas  services  and 
other  services  in  neighbouring  and  upstream . 
(transmission capacity) markets.  · 
(37)  Structural joint venture 
(38) 
Atlas  combines  DT and  Ff's activities  in  a  range 
of  Europe-wide  and  third-country  markets  for 
liberalized telecommunications services and is set to 
develop  and  take  over  new  services  in  these 
markets. This venture entails major changes  in  the 
structures of DT and FT as  two undertakings with 
very  l~mited presence outside their respective  home 
countries.  Through  Atlas  the  parents  pool  a 
significant number of assets  in connection with the 
provision  and  marketing  of  telecommunications 
services.  Atlas  will  employ  2 500  people  across 
Europe. 
2.  Applicability of Article 85  (1) of the EC Treaty 
and Article 53  (1) of the EEA Agreement to the 
aeation of Adas  · 
the agreements  between  D'r and  FT  fall  within 
Article  85  (1)  of the EC Treaty and Article  53  (1) 
of the EEA Agreement as  they restrict competition 
and  affect  trade  between  Member  States.  The 
Commission  cannot  therefore  give  negative 
clearance to the Agreements as the Parties requested 
in their application  • 
The  Atlas  venture  eliminates  actual  and  potential 
competition  between  DT  and  FT  both  in 
Germany  and  France  and  Europe-wide.  DT  and 
FT  were  already  competing  in  some  segments  of 
the  market  for  Europe-wide  if  not  global 
provision  of  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications  services  to  corporate  users 
described  at  recitals  12  et  seq.:  prior  to  the 
implementation of their Eunetcom joint venture DT 
and  FT  tendered  individually  for  outsourcing 
contracts,  offering  similar  corporate  services.  As 
any  European  TO, DT and Ff also  competed  on 
features  and  prices  for  .  the  ·location  of 
telecommunication  hubs  of international  users (27). 
While currently targeting only large businesses, this 
competition was set to intensify along with further 
liberalization  and  ultimately  extend  to  private 
households.  With  the·  exception  of  outsourcing 
services and in spite of substantial market shares in 
their  resj)ecrive  home  markets,  the  parents  were 
actual competitors for Europe-wide services only in 
Germany (see  below). 
(39)  In  creating  Atlas,  DT  and  FT  each  abandon  their 
own  developments  and  activities  in  the  relevant 
markets  for  cross-border  and  ultimately  Europe-
. wide  telecommunications  services.  In  the  case  of 
FT, such activities were substantial to the point that  f 
FT's existing Transpac network is  the starting base 
for  Atlas'  envisaged  European  backbone  network. 
As  for  national  services,  the  large  numbers  of 
providers  of  liberalized  services,  including  FT's 
Transpac,  in  all  European  countries  targeted  by 
Atlas shows that the parents have the finanCial  and 
technological  capabilities  required  to  address 
national markets across Europe on their own. 
(40)  The elimination of competition between the parents 
is substantial as the Atlas venture is created by two 
internationally  active  TOs  and  covers  the  joint 
development  and provision of services  throughout 
the  European  Economic  Area.  DT  and  FT's 
respective  dominant  positions  in  the  two  single 
largest  Member  State  telecommunications  markets t . 
is  reinforced  by  a  legal  infrastructure  monopoly 
until  such  markets  are  fully  and  effectively 
liberalized,  as  is  scheduled  to occur  by  1 January 
1998,  and  will  continue  to  rely  on  a  dominant 
position  for  terrestrial  transmission  capacity  for 
years  thereafter.  Current ·prices  for  infrastructure 
access - leased lines tariffs or interconnection rates 
- together  with  DT  and  Ff's strengthened  joint 
market  position  impair  competitors'  ability  to 
create a competitive  n~twork of similar scope and 
density to DT and Ff's in these  coun~ies( 2'). 
(27)  BT-MCI  Decision  (footnote 7),  at recital 41. 
(21)  See  Commission Decision 93/49/EEC of 23  December  1992 
- Ford/Volkswagen,  OJ  No  L 20,  28.  1.  1993,  p.  14, at 
recitals  18  to 21;  Decision  94/322/EC of 18  May  1994 -
Exxon/Shell, OJ No L 144, 9.  6.  1994, p.  20, at recitals 42 
et seq.;  and  Decision  94/896/EC of 16  December  1994 -
Asahi/Saint Gobain, OJ No  L 354, 31.  12.  1994, p.  87, at 
recitals  16  to 22. 
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3.  Application  of  Article  85  (  1)  of  the  EC 
Treaty  and  Article  53  (1)  of  the  EE.A 
Agreement to contractual provisions 
(41)  The  following  individual  provisions  are  restrictive 
of competition: 
(42) 
1.  the  anti-competltlon  prov1ston  as  regards  the 
activities of Atlas  (Article XII JV  Agreement as 
amended  and  Article  VII  of both  Distribution 
Agreements); 
2.  the  obligation  on  DT  and  FT  acting  as 
distributors  to  obtain  from  Atlas  all 
requirements for  Europe-wide  products (Article 
VII  of both Distribution Agreements);  and 
3.  the  appointment  of  DT -and  FT  as  exclusive 
distributors of Atlas  products in  the  respective 
parent's' home  market  (Article  IV  of  both 
Distribution Agreements). 
The  Commission  considers  the  anti-competition 
provision and DT and FT's obligafion to obtain all 
requirements for global products from  Atlas to be 
ancillary  to  the  creation  and  operation  of Atlas. 
Therefore, these restrictions are not assessed under 
Article  85  (1) of the EC Treaty and Article  53  (1) 
of the  EEA  Agreement  separately  from  the  joint 
venture as such. DT and FT chose creating Atlas as 
a  way to  stren~hen their presence  in the relevant 
cross-border  and  ultimately  Europe-wide  markets 
and  as  a  first  step  towards  entering  the  global 
markets  for  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications  services.  In  this  respect,  both 
the  anti-competition  provision  and  the  exclusive 
purchasing  obligation  are  different  expressions  of . 
DT and Fr's same commitment to the other parent 
and  to  their  joint  venture.  Atlas  requires  both 
restraints 
1tO  successfully  establish  itself  in  the 
emerging market for customized packages of global 
corporate  telecommunications  services  given  the 
uncertainty  and risks  associated  with such  market 
entry,  the  ·level  of  investment  required,  and 
competition from similar ventures. 
1.  Anti-competition obligation 
Given  DT  and  FT's  substantial  investment  in 
Atlas,  this  clause  ensures  that  DT  and  FT 
concentrate their efforts in the relevant markets 
on  Atlas  lest  parallel  activities,  perhaps  in 
cooperation  with  other TOs,  jeopardize  Atlas' 
successful establishment in  the  market. 
2.  Exclusive purchasing obligation 
This  restraint  on  DT .  and  FT  as  exclusive 
distributors  of Atlas  services  aims  at ensuring 
Atlas a steady stream of funds and at increasing 
its credibilitY and market reputation. Were  the 
parents free  to obtain such products from other 
suppliers,  notably  in  cases  where  Atlas  is 
in  a  position  to  meet  a  particular  demand 
requirement, this  would affect Atlas' credibility 
and  financial  position  alike.  Inversely,  Atlas  is 
not  under  an  obligation  to  obtain  all  its 
requirements for  telecommunications and other 
products and services from  the parents. 
The  · Commission  usually  accepts  ancillary 
provisions for a limited period of time only. In this 
case,  however,  given  the particular features  of the 
market  in· which  Atlas  will  operate,  notably  the 
substantial  investment  ~equired  and  the  risks 
associated  to  such  investment,  the  Commission 
accepts  both  the  anti-competition  clause  and  DT 
and  Fr's obligation  to  obtain  all  provisions  for 
Europe-wide  services  from  Atlas  as  ancillary 
restraints for  the entire duration of this exemption 
Decision. 
(43)  Exclusive distribution 
DT  and  FT's  exclusive  distributorship  in  their 
respective  home  countries  is  caught  by  Article 
85  (1) of the  E~ Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the 
EEA  Agreement because it has the object or effect 
of isolating Germany and France against imports of 
Atlas services from other EEA Member States. This 
:may  adversely affect the conditions of ~ompetition 
within  the  EEA.  Unlike  the'  other  restrictive 
provisions,  the· Commission  cannot  consider  DT 
and Fr's exclusive distributorship to be ancillary to 
the creation of the  joint venture,  as non-exclusive 
forms of distribution are possible which would not 
impair  the  performance  or  marketing  of  Atlas 
services.  Given  that  Germany  and  France  taken 
together  account  for  more  than  40%  of  all 
telecommunications  revenues  in  the  European 
Community, the restriction is  appreciable. 
4.  Effect on trade between Member States 
(44)  Pursuant to the  Commission's  telecommunications 
guidelines,  agreements  concerning  non-reserved 
services,  equipment  and  space  segment 
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infrastructure  potentially  affect  trade  between 
Member  States (29).  The  creation  of Atlas  has  an 
effect on inter-Member State trade in that Atlas will 
provide  non-reserved  services  between  any  two 
Member States and within any Member ·State. The 
exclusive  distribution  provision  caught  by 
Article 85 (1)  of the  EC Treaty and Article 53  (1) 
of the  EEA  Agreement  protect the  parents  within 
their  respective  home  market  and  contribute  to 
dividing  the  single  market along national  borders. 
Therefore, this non-ancillary provision affects trade 
among Member States and between Member States 
and  the  EFT A  countries.  The  Commission 
concludes  that  the  loss  of  two  powerful 
independent  and  potentially  competing  service 
providers  in  the  relevant markets generally and m 
France  and  Germany ·  in  particular  has  a 
considerable impact on trade. 
B.  ARTICLES  85  (3)  OF THE EC  TREATY AND 
ARTICLE 53  (3)  OF THE EEA  AGREEMENT 
(45)  DT and  FT  pursue  different  aims  in  entering  this 
set  of  transactions.  DT  was  for  a  long  time 
restricted to domestic investments and additionally 
burdened  with  a programme  of  infrastructure 
modernization  in  the  former  German  Democratic 
Republic  territories.  DT  has  little  presence 
elsewhere  in  Eur.ope  and  aims  at  becoming  an 
international  telecommunications  services  provider 
worldwide,  albeit  seeing  European  markets  as  a 
priority. Cooperating with a major European player 
present in all of DT's target markets is  particularly 
important for DT to achieve its objectives, notably 
a  sufficiently  broad  European  base  to  justify  an 
extension  of  its  business  into  the  United  States 
market, where 40 % of multinational companies are 
located. 
(  46)  Ff's  main  interest  is  to  maintain  its  competitive 
position  as  a  cross-border  provider  of  business 
telecommunications  services  in  Europe  while 
addressing  increasing  customer demand  for  global 
services.  The increasing presence of BT and MCI's 
Concert  venture  in  Europe  convinced_  FT  of  the 
need  for  wide coverage  in Europe before adding a 
global  dimension  to  its  services;  given  that  the 
scope  of business  of Infonet, ·in  which  FT  held  a 
stake,  was  limited  compared  to  the  range  of 
envisaged  Atlas  services,  FT opted  for  an alliance 
with  another TO.  DT and  ET's  joint aim  now  is 
to  become  leading  providers  of non-reserved  tele-
(2
9
)  Footnote 9,  at paragraph 39. 
communications services in Europe. This requires a 
substantial  investment  in  creating  seamless 
networks in  Europe, where DT and Ff face  strong 
competition  from  Concert  and  possibly  from 
Uniworld (3°). 
(47)  The  notified  agreements,  to  the  extent  caught  by 
Article  85  (1)  of the  EC  Treaty and Article  53  (1) 
of the EEA Agreement, satisfy the conditions for an 
exemption  set  out  in  Article  85  (3)  of  the  EC 
Treaty and  Article  53  (3)  of the  EEA  Agreement, 
for  the following  reasons: 
(48) 
1.  Technical progress 
DT  and  FT  will  in  the·  framework  of  Atlas 
implement  a  se~mless  Europe-wide  network  by 
adding  value.  to  basic  transmiSSIOn  capacity 
purchased from  local TOs. To that end, Atlas will 
not _preserve  the  features  of each national network 
involved  but  will  instead  implement  harmonized 
technical'  features,  own  switching  systems,  call 
processing/routing, signalling and databases as well 
as  software  applications,  notably  fully  compatible 
interfaces.  This  approach  has  substantial  advan-
tages over most existing international services  that 
are provided  by  interconnecting national networks 
which  are  usually  incompatible  in  _  terms  of 
structure,  software,  hardware . and  maQagement 
systems.  Consequently, the number and features of 
services  available  is  determined  by  the  least 
sophisticated  national  network  involved:  The 
creation of a seamless trans-European network will 
allow the  technical  performance  already- requested 
by  large  business  customers  across  Europe,  which 
competitors  such  as  Concert  are  also  aiming  at 
through distribution agreements and ventures. 
(49)  Under the conditions attached to this Decision, the 
harmonized  joint  DT  and  FT  network  will  also 
improve  the  level  of  services  provided  by 
competitors  of Atlas  which  may:  (i)  interconnect 
with  the  public  packet-switched  data  networks 
operated  by  Transpac  F~;ance  and  T-Data  and 
eventually  by  Atlas  in  France  and  Germany  over 
X.75  interfaces;  (ii)  access  these  public  packet-
switched  data  networks  from  other  networks, 
notably  the  public  switched  telecommunications 
network (PSTN)  all:d  the integrated services digital 
·network (ISDN); and (iii)  interconnect' with DT and 
FT's other networks, notably the PSTN. The latter 
(3°)  See  notice  published  in  OJ No C 276, 21.  10.  1995, p.  9. 
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is  indispensable  for  the  viability  of  competitive 
voice  services  offerings.  Third  parties  shall  be 
offered  access  to  the  public  packet-switched  data 
networks,  the  PSlN  and  the  ISDN  on- terms 
technically  and  commercially  non-discriminatory 
with  regard  to  Atlas.  Any  service  provider  who 
wishes to make app_lications  for interconnection to 
DT and FI' will  be  able  to  rely  on a  substantive 
non-discrimination  duty  attached  to  this  Decision 
as a separate condition. 
(50)  The combination of Ff and  DTs technology  will 
enable Atlas  from  the outset to offer new services, 
albeit  initially  based  largely  on  parents'  existing 
services.  By  joining their R+D  in  the framework of 
the  joint venture  DT and  Ff will  enable  Atlas  to 
provide  more  advanced  features  than either parent 
would  be  capable  of  providing  independently 
. within  the  same  time  frame.  jointly,  DT  and  Ff 
will also be able to make the substantial investment 
required  to create  a  large  seamless  state-of-the-art 
trans-European  network.  This  is  a  major 
improvement over the current situation in  Europe, 
where  many modern  networks exist,  but can only 
·  be  interconnected at the price of a loss of features. 
At  present,  the  most  relevant  example  of 
shortcomings  of  interconnection  is  data 
transmission  over  state-of-the-art  networks.  Most 
advanced  features  of  packet-switched  data 
communications  services,  for  example  reverse 
charging, closed user group definition or end-to-end 
management,  are  lost  as  soon  as  several  data 
communications networks are interconnected unless 
the respective technical  s~ifications and interfaces 
are harmonized. As  the Commission acknowledged 
in  its BT -MCI Decision, successful  implementation 
of  trans-European  networks  will  allow  Europe's 
major  undertakings  to  chose  from  internat~onal 
telecommunications  services  improved  to levels  of 
quality  which  a:re  currently  available  only 
nationally  or  even  locally.  Availability  of 
international  state-of-the-art  telecommunications 
services  is  critical  to  face  increasingly  global 
competition  stemming·  from  parts  of  the  world 
where  advanced  telecommunications  tec_hnology 
and services are already widely available. 
2.  Economic progress 
(51)  DT  and  Ff  jointly  intend  to  undertake  the 
investment  necessary  to  bring  about  a  qualitative 
improvement  of  European  telecommunications 
which  Atlas  will  also  make  available  to SMEs.  As 
the  Commission  acknowledged  in  its  BT-MCI 
Decision, this requires a costly and time consuming 
(52) 
effort. DT and FI' will implement investment plans 
amounting to a total of ECU 5 billion linked to the 
creation or enhancement of services. Further to the 
Commission's preliminary position on the proposed 
alliance  as  expressed on 23  May  1995 the  parties 
have:  (i)  changed  their  agreements  in  respect  of 
Atlas'  role  outside  France  and  Germany;  an:d  (ii) 
entered into a global alliance with a  United  States 
operator. A sizeable presence across the EEA  is one 
requirement for the pr.ovision  of such non-reserved 
services  as  targeted  by.  Atlas.  DT  and  FI'  have 
submitted  data  showing  their  commitment  to 
substantial  investment  in  Europe.  Moreover,  DT 
and FI' have  changed the original  balance  between 
Atlas' own  services  and  services  outsourced  to the 
parents  in  Atlas'  favour.  Another  requirement  if 
service  offerings  are  to  progress  beyond  what  is 
already  available  in  the  European  market  is  tlu· 
global  extension  of  services  as  needed  hy 
multinational  companies,  so-called  glob;.tl 
connectavtty  of  services.  Atlas  meets  this 
requirement as a parent of the Phoenix alliance. 
Given the current cost of leased line  infrastructure, 
Atlas'  investment  will  initially  be  driven  by  the 
large multi-national companies (MNCs)  with most 
complex  requirements  in  countries  other  than 
France · and  Germany.  However,  as  a  result  of 
operating a single  high-speed  network architecture 
Atlas  will  allow  economies  of scale  at  both  the 
technrilogical  an,d  operational  level,  i.e.  reduce  the 
cost per channel.  Atlas  is  further  likely  to reduce 
infrastructure  costs  in  respect  of  interconnection 
agreements  with  other  TOs  by  generating  larger 
traffic  volumes  which  allow  lowest-cost  routing. 
The  effects  of  economies  of  scale  along  with 
increased availability of infrastr\lcture further to the 
implementation of recent Community legislation (l1) 
will  eventually  allow  service  offerings  with 
sophisticated  technical  features  to  develop  and 
become widely available. 
3.  Benefits to consumers 
(53)  Atlas will shorten the time  required by  the parents 
individually for marketing new  telecommunications 
(31 )  Commission  Directive  96/19/EC  of 13.  3.  1996  amending  · 
Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of 
full  competition in the telecommunications markets; OJ  No 
L 74, 22.  3.  1996, p.  1  J. 
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(54) 
(55) 
services  in  a  rapidly  changing  technological 
and  commercial  market  environment.  Business 
customers will benefit, more rapidly than if DT and 
·Ff acted separately,  from  both  the  provision of a 
larger product portfolio of newly developed services 
and  lower  pricing.  Increased  choice  of 
telecommunications  services  and  related  cost 
benefits  will  spill  over  to  other  segments  of the 
telecommunications  market  and  economic  sectors. 
Atlas  will  also  provide  an  alternative  option  for 
the  supply  of  customized  offerings  which  cover 
·the  complete  range  of  liberalized  business 
telecommunications services. 
Through  its  global  alliance  with  Sprint,  Phoenix, 
Atlas  will  also  offer  European  customers  an 
expanded  geographic  reach  of  its  customized 
packages of corporate telecommunications services. 
The  possibility  for  European  customers  to  reach 
remote  locations  worldwide  either  ad  hoc  or 
permanently without a loss  of quality or technical 
features  and  without changing  supplier  is  a  major 
.advantage  for  such  customers,  for  example 
European  companies  endeavouring  to  establish  a 
worldwide  presence  in  an  increasingly  global 
economy.  Customers  have  the  advantages  of 
seamless  cross-border  services  through  Atlas  in 
Europe  and  through  Phoenix  worldwide  at  their 
convenience.  Only global alliances can offer global 
con~ectivity of services.  Wh~le the scope of Atlas is 
not in  itself global,  DT and Ff's investment plans 
through Atlas ensure that a substantial number of 
European  business  customers will  have  the  option 
of global scope. 
The  exclusive  distributorship  in  Germany  and 
France  combined  with  the  agreements  concerning 
IPR licensing and grant-back licensing will  provide 
an incentive for DT and FT to share with the joint 
venture  any  technical  progress  made  in  markets 
related  to  the  relevant  markets.  This  is  an 
additional  benefit  for  large  non-reserved 
telecommunications  services  users  in  DT and FT's 
home countries, i.e.  two of the Member States with 
a  substantial  number  of  potential  customers  for 
Atlas services. 
4.  Indispensability 
(56)  The creation of Atlas 
Creating  Atlas  is  indispensable  for  the  parents  to 
bring  about  the  benefits  within  the  meaning  of 
Article  85  (3)  of the  EC  Treaty and 53  (3)  of the 
EEA  Agreement  discussed  above.  Compared  to 
individual  market  entry  or  other  forms  of 
cooperation  with  a  lesser  level  of integration,  the 
degree  of cooperation  between  DT and Ff in  the 
framework  of  Atlas  is  necessary  to  provide  the 
relevant  services.  Atla·s  will  shorten  the  time  DT 
and FT wo'uld have required to compete with other 
providers of cross-border and Europe-wide services 
and substantially reduce  the costs and risks  borne 
by each parent. In  rapidly changing markets Ff is 
forced  to update  its  Transpac network and DT to 
establish itself as a European player. Last, Atlas is a 
means  to  quickly  overcome  the  inadequacies  of 
most  services  and  features  currently  available  by 
creating  a  major  trans-European  network  which 
offers  what  multinationals  and  other  large 
international users  need. 
(57)  Exclusive  distribution 
Pursuant  to  the  Distribution  Agreements,  each 
parent  is  the  exclusive  distributor  for  Atlas 
products  in  its  own  home  market.  The  exdusi\'e 
distribution provisions are indispensable in  that: 
1.  exclusivity  together  with  the  grant-back 
licensing  provisions  in  the  Intellectual  and 
Industrial  Property and Licence  Agreements  in 
respect· of technology  Atlas  receives  from  each 
parent protects DT and Ff's technology against 
third  parties  and  against  the  other  parent 
respectively; and 
2.  using  one  such  network  instead  of several  is 
technically  easier  and  therefore  allows  more 
efficient  distribution.  Atlas  as  ~  provider  of 
Europe-wide  services  relies  on·  national 
distribution  networks  with  broad  geographic 
coverage.  The  alternative  to  using  the  TO's 
distribution  networks  is  either  distribution  by 
several  smaller distributors or the construction 
of an own nationwide network in  the  parents' 
hom~ countries.  Both  would deprive  European 
telecommunication~ markets of the benefits of a 
technical'harmonization of Europe's two largest 
existing public packet-switched data networks. 
(58)  Atlas  will  use  Transpac-France  and  T-Data  as 
national  distribution  networks  in  France  and 
Germany. Thus, DT or Ff will provide the national 
seryices  required  and  use  Atlas  to  provide  all 
cross-border and third-country connections needed. 
In the light of this, other distribution arrangements 
would  be  less  protective of the  parents intellectual 
property rights and less adequate to the importance 
11/180 .t 
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of  services  DT  and  FT  will  initially  provide  to 
Atlas. The Commission therefore concludes that the 
exclusive  distribution  arrangement is  indispensable 
within  the  meaning  of Article  85  (3)  of the  EC 
Treaty and Article 53  (3)  of the EEA  Agreement. 
5.  Non-elimination of competition 
(59)  The  conditions  imposed  on  DT  and  FT  and  the 
general  regulatory  framework  in  the  European 
Community  will  improve  the  environment  for 
competition  in  FT  and  DT's  home  countries. This 
applies  notably  to  the  conditions  regarding:  (i) 
interconnection  to the  public  packet-switched data 
networks  on  terms  non-discriminatory  and 
economically equivalent to those available to Atlas 
in  France  and  Germany;  (ii)  non-discriminatory 
interconnection  to  the  PSTN  and  the  ISDN  in 
France  and Germany;  and  (iii)  the  prohibition on 
DT  and  FT  to  take  advantage  of  their  market 
position  in  distributing  Atlas'  services  and  own 
services through joint contracts. 
.,.. 
(60)  The condition described  in  recital  29  (5)  requirin 
DT  and  FT  to sell  Atlas  products  under  separat 
contracts from the sale of own products will ensur 
that possible differences in calculation are verifiabl 
and  thus  that ·non-discriminatory  interconnectio 
works in practice. The outso~rcing and value-adde 
('managed')  leased  lines  services  provided  by  Ada 
are  open  to  competition  and  returns  on· the 
services  are  relatively  low.  Given  the  lega 
monopoly and eventually the dominant position fo 
infrastructure provision enjoyed by DT and Ff fo 
the  duration  of this  Decision~ DT and Ff coul 
eliminate  competition  by  using  discounts  o 
reserved  services  (such  as  leased  lines)  to  attract 
their clientS to use Atlas' non-reserved services. 
The sale of packages of different services under one 
single  contract  is  common  commercial  practice  in 
the telecommunications sector known as 'bundling.' 
In  liberalized  telecommunicati~ns  markets, 
dominant  providers  are  usually  prohibited  both 
·from  tying  sales  of  different  services  and  from 
granting discounts on packages 'of services witho1lt 
specifying:  (i)  the  terms  and  condit~()ns  of  ea~h 
individual  'unbundled'  service;  aQd  (ii)  fhe 
individual  serviccr(s)  subject  to  a  discount.  Also, 
dominant  providers  are  under  an  obligation  to 
publish all tariffs and must prove that discounts on 
packages  of  services  are  justified  by  savmgs 
specifically  due  to  the  offering  of  a  package  pf 
services. However, given:  (i)  the imbalance between 
DT and FT's ubiquitous monopoly networks on the 
one  side  and  the  small  presence  and  reliance  on 
interconnection  of  new  market  entrants  on  the 
other;  and  (ii)  the  lack  of  sufficient  regul~tory 
transparency requirements for the relevant services, 
allowing DT and  FT  to  negotiate  single  contractS 
for  both liberalized and reserved  services would at 
this  stage  effectively  impair  market  entry  by 
competitors  in  Germany  and  France.  DT and Ff 
could  inter alia  grant  quantity  discounts  or more 
favourable  conditions  in  respect  of  combined 
packages  of such  services  in  a  way  which  would 
make individual pricing and notably justification of 
any discounts non-transparent:. The requirement to 
sell such services  under separate contracts would in 
itself be  insufficient unless terms and conditions are 
set out for  each particular service sold. 
(61)  Moreover,  the  conditions  and obligations  imposed 
on  DT  and  FT  to  keep  and  supply  detailed 
accounting  information  ensures  that  the  entities 
created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas  Agreements  and 
Atlas' parents gather sufficient information to allow 
the Commission  a verification of their competitive 
behaviour.  Accounting-related  requirements 
attached to this Decision will  also make it possible 
for  national courts  to order discovery  of evidence 
of breaches  of the  substantive conditions  attached 
to  this  Decisions  and  of  any  alleged  anti-
competitive  behaviour  where  third  parties  seek 
remedies against such behaviour before the national 
courts.  The  Commission  concludes  that Atlas  will 
not afford the parents the possibility of eliminating 
competition  in  respect  of  the  envisaged  set  of 
services.  In  reaching  this  conclusion  the 
Commission  has  taken  into  account the. followjng 
elements. 
Markets for  cross-border and ultimately 
· Europe-wide services 
(62)  Competitors in the marketplace 
Atlas  is  one  of  .  several  alliances  between  TOs 
and/or other undertakings in  the  relevant markets. 
Several alliances have obtained regulatory clearance 
and are already active in the market(l1). DT and Ff 
will  also  face  competition,  at  least  for  certain 
non-reserved  services  that  will  integrate  Atlas' 
Europe-wide  packages  of corporate  telecommuni-
cations  services.  Competitors  range  from 
(31)  In  addition  to  BT-MCI's  Concert  (footnote  7),  the 
Commission  has  granted  regulatory  approval  in  Case  No 
IVIM.S9S  - BTNIAG,  OJ  No  C  15,  20.  1.  1996, p.  4; 
Case  No IV/1\1.618  - Cable &  Wireless/VEBA, OJ No 23, 
5. 9. 1995, p. 3, and Case No IV/M.689- ADSBIBelgacom 
(Decision of 29 February 1996; OJ No C  194  •. 5. 7.  1996, 
p. 4). 
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computer  and  data  processing  companies,  for 
example  IBM,  DEC  and  EDS,  to  ·iD,for'!lAJ.tion 
services companies such as  GElS  and Colifi'Userve. 
However,  most  of  these  competitors-1,bavc. small 
market shares and are dependent on a.  substantive 
change in current competitive conditions to develop 
their  presence  in  the  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications  services  m~rkets.  As  for  the 
provision  of  cross-border  and  ultimately 
Europe-wide  services  from  and  into Germany  and 
France,  these  conditions  will  change  as  soon  the 
two  main  elements  of competition  are.  :a_vailable, 
namely:  (i)  alternatives  to  using  DT  and  FT's 
infrastructure;  and  (ii)  access  to  DT  arid  FT's 
networks  on  transparent  and  non-discriminatory 
terms. 
Both  elements  are  of  particular  relevance  to 
innovative  offerings  ·of  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications  services  which  require 
state-of-the-art,  high-speed  lines  and  distribution 
networks  whose  use  does  not  entail  a  loss  of 
features. The mere presence of competing providers 
of cross-border and ultimately Europe-wide services 
has  had little  impact in  that market yet.  For  both 
economic and geographic reasons, service provision 
into  or  across  Germany  and  France  is  key  to 
competition  in  the  markets  for  Europe-wide 
non-reserved  corporate  telecommunications 
services.  DT and Ff will  no~ eliminate competition 
if  preven~ed from  abusing  their  market  positions 
and  from  preventing  effective  market  entry.  The 
Commission  concludes  that  the  following 
conditions are indispensable to that end. 
(63)  Availability of alternative infrastructure 
Alternative  infrastructure  options  and  competitive 
pressure  on  leased-line  rates  will  be  possible  iri 
Germany  and  France  when  at  least  two 
infrastructure  licences  for  the  provision  of 
liberalized  telecommunications  services  are 
awarded, as  is  scheduled to occur by  1 july 1996. 
Given  the  existence  of  several  infrastructure 
operators  in  both  Member  States  and  given  the 
chance  these  operators  have  had  to  prepare  for 
early  infrastructure  liberalization,  the  award  of at 
least  two  alternative  infrastructure  licences  in 
Germany  and  France  should  mean  choice  of 
infrastructure  there.  Only  from  that  moment  will 
other telecommunications services  providers he  in  a 
position  to  compete  with  Atlas· without  depen-
ding  on  Atlas'  parents  for  their  leased-line 
requirements. 
(  64)  Interconnection on non-discriminatory technical 
terms 
Atlas, as  any of its competitors, must:  (i)  crcatt'  ~m 
own  leased-line  network  to  provide  cross-borc.ft•r 
services;  and  (ii)  interconnect  to  the  public  f 
packet-switched  data  networks,  the  PSTN  or  the 
ISDN  in  France and Germany for  final  distribution 
of the  Atlas  services  to customers.  The  use  of DT 
and  FT's  networks  as  distribution  networks  will 
also  be  possible  for  competitors  from  the  date  of 
the exemption by interconnecting to such networks 
over X.75  interfaces. As  to voice  and sophisticated 
data  services,  DT and  FT  respectively  must  make 
available  upon  request  adequate  technical  infor-
mation relevant for PSTN or ISDN interconnection. 
This  enables  third-party  competitors  to  provide 
services from and into DT and FT's home countries 
offering essential advanced  features such as  reverse 
charging, closed user group definition or end-to-end 
management.  DT and  FT's  packet-switched  A  TM 
netWorks  are not integrated into the Atlas venture; 
as  was  stated  at recital  7,  such  integration  would 
require  a  new  notification.  Atlas  must  therefore 
interconnect  to  such  networks  if  so  required  for 
certain  high-speed  data  communications  services. 
The  condition  imposed  on  DT  and  Ff not  to .  .&_ ·:. 
discriminate  between  Atlas  and  third-party  •  , 
competitors as regards technical information on DT 
and  FT's  networks,  such  as  full  data  on DT and 
FT's  implementation  of  the  Signalling  System  7 
(SS7) (33)  for  voice  services  interconnection  to  the 
PSTN,  will  ensure  that  technical  performance 
options  for  Atlas'  non-reserved  services  involving 
interconnection  with  DT  and  Ff's  networks  are 
similar for any competitor (14). 
(
33
)  Major digital  protocoUsignalling  system  for  managing  and 
transmitting control and routing information in  networks. 
(
34
)  The  Commission  has  decided  similarly  in  previous  cases 
featuring  similar  market  structures  and  problems,  e.g. 
Decision  93/403/EEC  of  11  June  1993  - EBU/Eurovision 
System,  OJ  No  L 179,  22.  7.  1993,  p.  23,  at  recital  82; 
Decision  94/594/EC of 27 july 1994- ACI, OJ  No L 224, 
30. 8.  1994, p.  28, at recital 66; and Decision 94/663/EC of 
21  September 1994- Night Services, OJ  No L 259, 7.  10. 
1994,  p.  20, at recitals  80 and  82. 
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(65)  Interconnection  on. non-discriminatory  economic 
terms 
DT and  FT  are  con~trained under their  respective 
national  regulations  not  to  discriminate  against 
third  parties  and  to  comply  with  Open  Network 
Provision  (ONP)  obligations  such  as  providing  a 
minimum  set  of  lines  at  cost  oriented  and 
transparent  tariffs (35).  More.  importantly,  the 
exemption  of ,  the  Atlas  transaction  is  conditional 
upon  DT  and  FT  inter.  alia  granting  transparent 
and  non-discriminatory  terms  of · interconnection 
and  implementing  an  accounting  system  which 
discloses  the  fully  allocated  costs  of each  service 
in  anticipation  of  the  ONP  Interconnection 
Directive (l6).  While  the  existing  legal  framework 
already provides for  transparency, the  Commission 
considers the additional conditions imposed on DT 
and FT as  to separation and auditing of accounts, 
exclusion  of  cross  subsidies  and  economically 
equivalent rates for  interconnection to the German 
and. French  public  packet-swirched  data  networks 
are  indispensable  to ensure  that the  use  of DT or 
FT's  PSTN,  Transpac-France  in  France  and/or 
T-Data  in  Germany  as  distribution  networks  will 
be  possible  for  Atlas  and  its  competitors  under 
equivalent conditions. 
(66)  No privileged information 
Atlas  will  not have  a  competitive  advantage  over 
competitors  as  regards  access  to  DT  and  FT's 
privileged  commercial  information.  The  parents 
have  also deleted from the Atlas Agreements those 
clauses  originally  notified  that appointed  Atlas  as 
DT and FT's agent for half-circuits. Given that such 
international  lea-sed  lines  are  sought  either  by 
service  providers  competing  with  Atlas  or  by 
MNCs and other private network operators which 
are potential clients for Atlas' outsourcing services, 
the  agency  agreement  would  have  given  Atlas 
a  competitive  information  advantage  over 
competitors. 
(  67)  Consumer bargaining power 
MNCs  or other  la~ge companies  have  the  choice 
between either building their own private network 
(35)  Articles  7 and 10 of Council Directive  92/44/EC of 5 June 
1992 on the application of open network provision to leased 
lines,  OJ No L 165, 19.  6.  1992, p.  27. 
(36)  See  Articles  6  and  7  of  the  modified  proposal  for  a 
European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  on 
interconnection  in  telecommunications  with  regard  to 
ensuring  universal  service  and  interoperability  through 
application  of  the  principles  of  open  network  provision 
(ONP), OJ  No C  178, 21. 6.  1996, p.  3. 
solutions  across  national  borders  or  purchasing 
them from service providers such as  Atlas; they are 
not likely  to choose the latter option unless  this  is 
cost-effective. Given their knowledge of the market 
these  customers are  in  a  position to request offers 
from  different  competitors.  This  gives  MNCs 
considerable  bargaining  power,  reflected  in 
competition  between  the  suppliers.  This  may 
equally  apply  to  SMEs  when  lower  infrastructure 
prices  allow  small  suppliers  to  reach  the  scale 
necessary to enter the  market. 
French  and  German  markets  for  packet-switched 
data  communications services 
(68)  DT  and  IT have  substantial  market  presence  in 
their  respective  home  countries,  where  they  own 
the  only existing nationwide, packet-switched data 
communications  networks.  Actual  competltlon 
existed  in  Germany  and  will  not  be  eliminated, 
thanks to  the  divestiture  of FT's  indirect  German 
subsidiary  -Info  AG.  However,  the  restriction  of 
potential  competition  between  FT  and  DT  in 
France  and  Germany has  a  substantial  impact  on 
the  respective  markets  for  packet-switched  data 
communications  services.  More  than  80%  of 
customers  for  this  service  in  France and Germany 
are  SMEs,  which  would  not  have  sufficient 
bargaining  power  to  counterbalance  the 
strengthening  of  DT  and  FT's  market  position 
through  the  creation  of  a  joint  public 
packet·switched data network. 
(69)  For  the  purposes  of  this  assessment  the 
Commission  defines  two  different  albeit  partly 
overlapping  customer  segments  in  the  market  for 
packet-switched  data  communications  services, 
namely: (i) customers. demanding casual, low-speed, 
low-volume applications,  which  are  provided over 
the  public  packet-switched  data  networks  in each 
Member State and billed by volume sent according 
to published tariffs (recital 9 (1)); and (ii) customers 
that generate more substantial and regular demand 
traffic, which service providers meet increasingly by 
packet-switched  services  using  protocols  such  as 
Frame Relay, ATM and IP  or by switched services 
and  bill  according  to  individual  demand  features 
(recital 9 (2)). 
The  choice  of alternative  infrastructure  is  not  in 
itself sufficient  to  provide  competitive.  alternatives 
to X.25 data services T-Data and Transpac France 
offer  in  Germany  and  France  respectively  to  the 
first  customer  segment  described  above~  These 
services  require  dense  networks  with  wide 
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geographic  coverage,  which  DT  and  FT's 
competitors  will  continue  to  lack  for  som~ time. 
This  conclusion  is  based  on  two  considerations. 
First,  all  alternative  infrastructure  currently 
available  in  Germany  and  France  taken  together 
amounts  to  only  one  third  of total  infrastructure 
owned  by  DT and Ff respectively.  Secondly,  the 
market for  X.25  data  services  is  characterized  by 
low  margins.  Consequently,  inves~ment  .  in 
alternative infrastructure with nationwide coverage 
as  required  to  serve  the  first.  customer  segment 
described  in  the  previous  recital  will  not begin  to 
narrow  the  gap  with  the  incumbent  TO's 
infrastructure  until  ·new  infrastructure  can  carry 
any telecommunications service and thus provide a 
better  return  on  investment.  The  legal  and 
administrative framework necessary to provide such 
new  infrastructure  is  scheduled  to  be  in  place  in 
France and Germany by  1 January 1998. 
(70)  Competitive alternatives 
No adequate competitive alternative to Atlas would 
exist in  Germany and France for customers in  the 
first segment described at recital 9 (1) if DT and Ff 
were to integrate their respective nationwide, public 
packet-switched data networks  before  at least two 
competing nationwide carriers are licensed  in each 
of  these  Member·  States  to  provide  public 
telecommunications  services.  The  integration  of 
these  public. packet-switched  data  networks  into 
Atlas  would  reinforce  Transpac  France  and 
T-Data's existing dominant position in  the French 
and German markets for  national packet-switched 
data  communications  services  (more  than  70% 
market  share  respectively).  With  hardly  any 
competitive  alternative  yet  for  national  services, 
Atlas would at this stage lock in existing Transpac 
France  and  T -Data  customers  with  restrictive 
effects  in  the  cross-border  and  ultimately 
Europe-wide  geographic  market  as  the  Single 
Market develops.  Keeping the French and German 
public  packet-switched  data  networks  separate 
from  Atlas  and  prohibiting  Ff  and  DT. from 
selling  own  services  and  Atlas  services  in  the 
same  contract,  customers  have  the  possibility  to: 
(i)  compare Transpac France and T-Data's national 
X.25  data  services  to  emerging  competitive 
alternatives such as more advanced packet-switched 
data  communications  and  switched  services  (see 
below),  for  which  Ff  and  DT  face  stronger 
competition; and  (ii)  choose  between  Atlas  and its 
competitors for  separate provision  of cross-border 
and  ultimately  Europe-wide  X.25  data  services  if 
their requirements exceed the national scope. 
Generally,  competitive  alternatives  must  be 
effectively  available to have  an appreciable impact 
on  market  conditions:  However,  as  regards  the 
French  and  German  telecommunications  markets, 
the  Commission  envisages  that  competitive 
conditions  will  already  change  substantially  once 
telecommunications services and networks are fully 
and  effectively  liberalized  and  first  nationwide 
carrier licences granted, as  is  scheduled to occur by 
1 January 1998, and develop quickly  the~eafter. To 
reach  this  conclusion,  the  Commission  has  taken 
into  consideration:  (i)  the  decreasing  relevance  of 
public  packet-switched  data  networks  using  the 
X.25  protocol  for  the  provision  o~  corporate  f 
packet-switched  data  communications  services; 
(ii)  the  outstanding  economic  importance  and 
attraction  of  the  French  and  German 
telecommunications markets to telecommunications 
operators;  (iii)  the  existence  of  operational 
expandable alternative infrastructure there and (iv) 
the  positioning af a  number  of strong  competing 
alliances ahead of full and effective liberalization of 
telecommunications  networks  and  services  in 
France  and  Germany  by  1  January  1998  (see 
recital 18). 
Ahead  of  full  -and  effective  liberalization  of  the 
French and German telecommunications markets it· 
is  possible in Germany to provide nationwide X.25 
data services using the ISDN 'D' channel. Several of 
T-Data's competitors  use  this  alternative  to direct 
interconnection  with  DT's  public  packet-switched 
data  networks  (see  next  recital)  at  a  total  - ~~ 
investment cost of approximately ECU i,1 million. 
The ISDN 'D' channel is  accessible in France using 
Transpac  France  as  a  transit  network  and  direct 
access  will  be  possible  by  the  end  of 1996.  The 
Commission considers that increasing availability of 
the  ISDN  might  eventually  offer  a  competitive 
alternative for  the  provision of X.25 data services 
in  the  German  customer  segment  desq-ibed  at 
recital  9  (1).  As  for  France  however,  the 
Commission  concludes  from  the  density  of 
Transpac  France's  public  packet-switched  data 
networks that using the ISDN is unlikely to prove a 
sufficiently competitive alternative. 
(71)  Economically equivalent interconnection terms 
Any  third  party  can  obtain  non-discriminatory 
interconnection  with  T-Data  and  Transpac-France 
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(before  these entities  are  integrated  into Atlas)  or 
Atlas Germany and Atlas France (after T-Data and 
Transpac  France  have  been  integrated  into  Atlas) 
in  Germany  and  France  over  X.75  interfaces. 
Services  provided  over  two  or  more  networks 
interconnected  through  X.  7 5  interfaces  are  an 
alternative to using own networks in the market for 
packet-switched data communications services. This 
alternative is  competitive only for service provision 
to customers  in  the  second  segment  described  at 
recital 9  (2),  albeit demand for X.25 data services 
in  this  segment  is  decreasing  quickly.  In  t.his 
segment,  most value  is  ~dded to services  provided 
over  customized  networks,  and  service  providers 
rely  on  interconnection  merely  to  relay  customer 
data communications to third parties  unconnected 
to the customized network (call termination). 
While  Atlas  may  use·  proprietary  interfaces  to 
interconnect  with  T-Data  and  Transpac  France, 
non-discriminatory  third-party  access  to  T-Data 
and  Transpac  France  via  X.75  interfaces  is 
sufficient  to  prevent  Atlas  from  eliminating 
competition in the market for packet-switched data 
communications  services.  For  instance,  to  date 
T-Data interconnects to most third-party networks 
over interfaces which use the X. 75  protocol and do 
not therefore support certain advanced featcres. DT 
and fT's tariffs for interconnection to their public 
packet-switched  data  communications  networks 
must  disclose  the  mark-up  on the  fully  allocated 
costs  of  providing  such  interconnection. 
Third-party  interconnection  must  be  non-
discriminatory  compared  to  interconnection 
conditions  for  Atlas,  inter  alia  as  regards 
availability of ancillary services,  provisioning time, 
repair .  and  maintenance  levels  or  technical 
information· required. In the light of the above, the 
Commission  concludes  that  the  elimination  of 
potential·  competition  between  T-Data  and 
Transpac  France  in  Germany  and  France 
respectively will not allow the parents to foreclose 
their  home  markets  for  the  provision  of · 
standardized packet-switched data. communications 
services. 
Markets  for  national  services  in  countries  other 
than France and Germany 
(72)  At  the third-country national  level,  Atlas  is  set to 
develop into a significant competitor for incumbent 
TOs: Atlas aims at becoming the second player on 
the  data  communications  services  markets  of all 
major European markets. with the exception of the 
UK.  In  respect  of  these  services,  the  parents' 
submitted market share target for Atlas in all major 
national markets other than France ·and Germany is 
20%. Atlas  is  therefore set to offer an alternative 
to  dominant  incumbent  TOs  rather  than  to 
eliminate actual competition in third countries. 
Markets outside .the scope. of the Atlas venture 
(73)  The  liberalized  services  subject  to  cooperation 
within Atlas contribute less  than  10 %  to DT and 
FT's  respective  turnover.  Even  some  liberalized 
services such as national VPN  services and all  data 
communications involving the use  of DT and FT's 
A  TM networks are not Atlas services and therefore 
subject to competition  between  the  parents,  while 
Atlas may purchase these services  and access  these 
networks  under  equivalent  non-discriminatory, 
transparent. conditions  and  at  the  same  inter-
connection  rates  as  third-party  competitors.  The 
condition attached  to this  Decision  restricting  the 
exchange of sensitive information between DT, FT 
and  Atlas  limit  the  potentially  negative  effects  of 
the joint venture  both on competition between the 
parents acting as  Atlas distributors and on overall 
competition between the parents. 
Exclusive distribution  a"angements in  France  and 
Germany 
(74)  In  allowing  passive  sales  ·the  Distribution 
Agreements provide an 'opening for customers with 
bargaining  power  to  exploit  margins  for' 
competition  between  the  Atlas  parent  acting  as 
exclusive  distributor  in  its  home  country  and the 
other parent that may· offer the same Atlas service 
at a· lower price.  More importantly, the  restrictive 
effects of the exclusive distribution agreements att 
likely to be increasingly balanced by the availability 
of  alternative  infrastructure  and  the 
non-discriminatory  terftlS  of  interconnection  with 
T-Data and Transpac-France's networks, which 'will 
induce competition  for  Atlas  and for  DT and Fr 
acting as Atlas distributors. 
6.  Conclusion 
(75)  It  is  the  Co~mission's  conclusion  that  all 
conditions for an individual exemption pursuant to 
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Article  85  (3)  of the EC Treaty and Article 53 (3) 
of the  EEA  Agreement  are  met  in  respect  of the 
creation  of Atlas  and  in  respect  of the  individual 
restrictions discussed above. 
C.  DURATION OF THE EXEMPTION, 
CONDmONS AND OBLIGATIONS 
(76)  Pursuant to Article  8  of Regulation  No  17  and to 
Protocol  21  of the  EEA  Agreement  respect 1vely,  a 
decision  in  application of Article  HS  (3)  of the  EC 
Treaty  and  Article  53  (3)  of the  EEA  Agreement 
shall be  issued for a specified period and conditions 
and obligations may  be  attached thereto.  Pursuant 
to  Article  6  of Regulation  No  17, the  date  from 
which such a decision takes effect cannot be  earlier 
than the date of notification. In  that respect, in the 
present  case  the  Decision,  in  so  far  as  it  grants 
exemption, shall take effect: 
(a)  as  regards  the  creation  of  Atlas  and  related 
agreements  as  described  above, except  for  the 
integration  of  Transpac  france  and  T-Data 
into  a  joint  venture,  for  five  years  from  the 
date  on  which  the  second  new  infrastructure 
licence comes into force  in  both Gcrm;tny and 
France  authorizing  the  licensee  to  operate 
infrastructure  for  the  provision  of liberalized 
services  in  competition  with  the  respective 
parent and the respective first  licensee;  and 
(b)  as  regards  the  integration  of Transpac  France 
and T-Data into a joint venture company, from 
the  date on which  licences  to  new applicants 
for  the provision of nationwide  infrastructure 
and national and international voice telephony 
services  which provide two alternatives to DT 
and IT in a  substantial part of Germany and 
France  respectively  come  into  force  in  both 
Germany  and  France  to  the  expiry  of  the 
five-year  period  specified  in  the  preceding 
recital. 
(77)  This  exemption  l>ct:ision  shall  he  suhjccl  to  the 
<..onditmns  destribcd  in  recitab  2 S to  \0  (I). This 
exemption Decision shall further impose on I >T,  J<l 
and  the  entities  created  pur!-.uant  to  the  Atlas 
agreements  the  obligations described  in  rt."lltal  30. 
These  conditions  arc  indispcmahlc  to  pr('vcnt  an 
elimination of competition  in  the  relevant  ntarkets 
hy  the  largest  TOs  in  the  EFA.  The  Con11nission 
will,  upon  the  parties  request,  review  the  rHTd  for 
any  particular condition  or ohligation  att;H hcd  to 
this  Decision  if  circumstances change  suhst.mtially 
hdore the period of exemption expires. 
The  most  crucial  behavioural  requirements  to 
s.1feguard  competition  in  the  FEA  arc  attal hed  as 
conditions rather than obligations to this Decision, 
given the need to prevent an elimination of effective 
competition.  Strict  compliance  with  these 
requirements is  so important that the Commission 
must ensure  immediate  consequences  in  the  event 
of a  breach.  Given the  legal  consequences of such 
breach  of  a  condition,  national  courts  can 
adequately and swiftly contribute to a decentralized 
policing  of compliance  and  thus  ensure  that  the 
competition  rules  will  be  respected  for  the  benefit 
of private individuals (37). However, the principle of 
proportionality  requires  that  far-reaching  legal. 
financial  and  commercial  consequences  d1>  not 
ensue from occasional or individual  mi~t.tkcs whose 
effects  on  the  market  are  negligible.  Thndorc, 
violations  of  tht'  prohibitions  on 
cross-subsidization,  discrimination  and  bundling 
cannot  be  considered  to  breach  a  condition 
attached  to  this  Decision  unless  such  viol.ttions 
have a substantial impact on market conditions, for  f 
instance if practices are committed systematic.11ly or 
repeatedly. 
The  condition  relating  to  non-disaunin.ttory 
treatment of Atlas  and  its  competiton•  (  rt•cit.d  28) 
will also allow DT and FT to compete against each 
other  at  the  distribution  lcvd,  albeit  through 
passive  sales.  Such  competition  is  possihlt•  bc~:ausc 
the same Atlas scrvict•  may be  sold from t'ithcr t•nd 
of the requested circuits, namdy from  Ct•rm.my  or 
from  France.  To  limit  the  potentially  ncg.ttive 
effects of the  joint venture  on overall  competition 
between  the  parents,  the  Commission considers  it 
appropriate to impose restrictions on the exchange 
of sensitive  information  between  the  parents  and 
Atlas {recital  28 (4)). 
(78)  This  Decision  is  without  prejudice  to·  the 
applicability  of Article  86  of the  EC  Treaty  and  •  ·~ 
Article 54 of the EEA  Agreement,  ...,; 
liAS ADOPTED THIS OECISlt )N: 
Artidt·  I 
Pursuant  to  Artid  .. ·  M5  (3)  of  tlw  EC  Trc.tty  and 
Article  53  (3)  of  the  EEA  Agrccnwnt  and  sulwct  to 
Articles  2  to  5  of  this  Det·ision,  the  provisions  of 
(1
7
)  See  Commission  notice  on  cooperation  between  national 
courts and  the Commission in  applying Articles  85  and  86 
of the  EEC  Treaty, OJ  No C  39, 13.  2.  1993, p.  6. 
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Articles 85  (1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the 
EEA  Agreement  are  hereby  declared  in~pplicable, for  a 
period of five  years from the date on which two or more 
licences for the construction or ownership and control of 
alternative  infrastructure for  the  provision of liberalized 
telecommunications services take effect in  both Germany 
and France, to: 
(a)  the  creation  of the Atlas  joint venture  by  Deutsche 
Telekom  AG  ('DT')  and  France  Telecom  ('FT'),  as 
notified  to  the  Commission,  including  the  ancillary· 
obligations imposed on DT and on 1-T: 
(i)  to obtain from Atlas all requirements for  global 
products under Article VII  of both  Distribution 
Agreements; and 
(ii)  not  to compete  with  the  joint  venture  for  the 
provision of Atlas services under Article XIII  of 
the Joint Venture Agreement and Article  VII  of 
both Distribution Agreements; and to 
(b)  the  appointment of DT as  the  exclusive  distributor 
for  Atlas  in  Germany  and  of  FT  as  the  exclusive 
distributor  for  Atlas  in  France  under  Article  IV  of 
both  Distribution  Agreements. 
Article 2 
Pursuant  to  Article  85  (3)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and 
Article  53  (3)  of  the  EEA  Agreement  and  subject  to 
Articles  3,  4  and  5  of this  Decision,  the  provisions  of 
Article 85  (1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53  (1) of the 
EEA  Agreement  are  hereby  declared  inapplicable  to the 
integration into Atlas  of the German and French  public 
packet-switched  data  networks,  provided  that  only 
networks  providing  packet-switched  data  communi-
cations  services  using  the  X.25,  Frame  Relay,  SNA  or 
Internet protocols shall be  integrated, from  the date on· 
which both Germany and France have: 
(a)  removed all  legal  prohibitions on entities other than 
DT and IT and tlwir subsidiaries to: 
(i)  build,  own  or  control  both  national  and 
international  telecommunications  infrastructure 
and  use  such  infrastructure  to  provide  any 
telecommunications service, and 
(ii)  provide  a  national  and  international  voal·e 
tt·lcphony st·rvice;  and 
(b)  granted  and  made  effective  at least  two  licences  to 
applicants other than DT and FT for 
(i)  the  construction or ownership,  and  control,  of 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  either 
separately or in  combination, 
(ii)  the provision of national and international voice 
telephony  services,  provided  that  such  licences 
provide two suitable alternatives to DT and FT 
respectively to serve all or a  substantial part of 
the territory of Germany and France, 
until  the  expiry  of  the  five-year  period  specified  in 
Article  1. 
Article 3 
Until  the date specified in  Article  2 of this Decision,  the 
exemption  from  Article  85  (1)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and 
Article 53  (1) of the EEA  Agreement set out in  Article  1 
of  this  Decision  is  subject  to  the  condition  that 
cooperation between DT and FT in  developing common 
technical  network clements comprise the  following  are.ts 
only: 
{a)  the following product management and development 
tasks: 
(i)  product definition, 
(ii)  product marketing, 
(iii)  product life-cycle management, 
(iv)  specification of product n·quiremt'nts, 
(v)  technical specifications anJ devdopment ot the 
products, and 
(vi)  technical development of the  products; 
(h)  the following network  plannin~ functions: 
(i)  central  network  engineerin~ •md  optimt/;Hion 
of the common transmission  network  Ml  as  to 
avoid  an  unreasonable  duplication  of 
resources, 
{ii)  engineering  and  optimization  of the  networks 
for the various service platforms so as to ensure 
seamless services, and 
(iii)  central  planning  regarding  the  implementation 
of new network nodes; and 
(c)  the follo.wing aspects of information systems: 
(i)  definition  of  the  information  system  archi-
tecture, 
{ii)  specification  of  information  system  requin· · 
nwnts and applications, 
(iii)  technical  development  of  hardware  and 
software for  information .systems, and 
(iv)  central  implementation  planning  of  hard.wan· 
and software. 
llnttl the date specified in  A.rticle  2, all  other aspc.·cts  and 
fum tions of c:Kh  of the  Frc.·m:h  and  the.·  ( ;c.·nnan  puhlal 
pal ket-swih.:hed data nt·twnrks shall  lw controllc.·d  hy  two 
scp.t rate network management cent res. 
Article 4 
The exemption from  the application of Article  85  (  1)  of 
the EC Treaty and Article 53 {1) of the EEA  Agreement 
set out in  Articles  1 and 2 of this Decision  is  subject  to 
the  following conditions: 
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(a)  Divestiture of Info AG 
( 1)  FT shall: 
(i)  sell  Transpac's shares in Info AG  before 
[ ...  ] (38). The Commission may extend the 
period  granted  to  FT  for  divestiture  of 
Info AG by an additional six months after 
that  date;  FT  shall  be  deemed  to  have 
complied  with  this condition  by  1  ...  ] (3
9
) 
if  it  has entered  into a  binding  letter of 
intent or a  binding contract for the sale of 
Info  AG  to  a  purchaser  agreed  by  the 
Commission,  provided  that  such  sale  is 
completed within a  reasonable time  limit, 
after the signing of such  binding letter of 
intent or binding contract, agreed  hy  the 
Commission; 
(ii)  appoint  a  trustee  subject  to approval  by 
the  Commission  to  advise  on  the 
management  and  to  sell  Info  AG, 
provided that, subject to approval  hy  the 
Commission, J<j may 
terminate the trustee agreement should 
FT  decide  at  any  time  after  the 
appointment  that  the  trustee  is  not 
performing its duties properly, and 
replace  the  previously  appointed 
trustee  by  another  trustee  also 
approved by the Commission; 
(iii)  give the trustee an irrevocable mandate to 
sell  Info  AG, on best possible terms and 
conditions,  to  any  available  purchaser 
making an offer before [ ...  ](40); 
(iv)  remunerate  the  trustee  providing 
incentives for a  prompt divestiture; 
(v)  give all reasonable assistance requested by 
the trustee to sell  Info  AG  by  the  target 
·date; 
(vi)  establish  and  facilitat<~  the  managc·ment 
structure  agreed  with  the  trustee  in 
the  framework  of  the  dive:-.t iture 
negotiations; 
(vii)  provide  the  purchaser  of  Info  A<;  with 
any  licences  and  know-how  relating  to 
the provision of Info AG's services  to the 
extent possible under existing contractual 
obligations,  if  any.  FT  may  charge  the 
purchaser a market-based fee  for any such 
licence and know-how; 
(viii)  keep  all  administrative  and  management 
functions  relating to Info AG  which  have 
been  carried  out at  all  levels  within  }<j 
( 18)  Busim·ss scl n·r. 
('")  1\uo;irwss  !'.<"< n·t. 
(~
0 )  n  ...............  \('( rc·t. 
'and/or Transpac,  so  as  to  maintain  the 
viability,  marketability  · and  compe-
titiveness  of Info  AG  until  divestiture  is 
completed or until the trustee advises FT 
that  such  functions  are  no  longer 
necessary, whichever occurs earlier. 
(2)  FT  shall  at  all  times  use  its  best  efforts  to 
maintain  the  value  of  Info  AG  and  of  its 
business in every respect and, when the trustee is 
appointed  to  sell  Info  AG,  shall  consider tQe 
advice of the trustee to maintain this value.  FP, 
shall  in  particular  ensure  that  all  services 
provided  by  FT  or  any  of FT's  suhsidiancs  to 
Info AG continue to he  provided effil'icnth·  .md 
satisfactorily and that no incrcast• is  nude Ill tlw 
charge  (if any)  made  to  Info  AG  for  any  stKh 
service.  FT shall not, t'Xcept with the consent of  f 
the trustee, employ or offer employment tel  .my 
employee or officer  of Info  AG  until  .tftn  the 
salr of Info AG. 
(3)  The trustee appointed by  FT shall: 
(i)  advise  FT  and  Tr.msp.K  on  th1.·  best 
management  stnKturt'  tll  ensure  the 
continued  viability,  m.ukt•t.tbiltt\·  .md 
competitiveness of info AG's businc.ss ..  tlso 
in  the  event  of  a  restructuring  of  Info 
AG; 
(ii)  advise FT and Transpac with regard to the 
satisfactory operation and management of 
Info  AG,  so  as  to  ensure  the  contmued 
viability,  marketability  and  cnmpe- 6 · 
titiveness of Info AG's business, and shall  -.  ....  .": 
supervise,  monitor  and  control  tht.• 
implementation of the advice by  Infl,  AG; 
for  these  purposes  the  trustet.•  shall  h.t\'t' 
complete  access  to  Info  AG's  JWrsnnnd 
and  facilitit.•s  as  wdl  as  to  documents, 
books  and  records  of  both  FT  .Hh.l 
Transpac,  including  such  personnel, 
facilities, books and records which, evt·n if 
not directly rdatt•d to Info AG, may  have 
an  imp<Kt  on  tht.•  nmduct  of  Info  AG's 
operations; 
(iii)  act  as  FT's  investment  banker  in 
conducting  bona  fide  negotiations  with 
interested.  third  parties  with  a  view  to 
selling  Info  AG.  In  tht.'  event ·that  the 
trustee at any time prior to the target date 
determines together with the  Commission 
that  it  is  not  possible  to  identify  an 
acceptable  purchast.·r  for  the  business  of 
Info  AG  other than  tltt'  nastonwrs  whost• 
lwadquarll'rs arc locltt'd outsidt.• <  ;nm.tny, 
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the trustee, Ff and the Commission shall 
discuss  appropriate  alternatives  to  the 
proposed divestiture  of Info  AG,  notably 
an extended divestiture; 
(iv)  provide  the  Commission  with  a  written 
report before a  binding contract is  signed 
.  and  in  any  event  every  month  on  all 
developments in its negotiations with third 
parties interested· in purchasing Info AG; 
(v)  provide  the  Commission  with  a  written 
report  every  two  months  concerning  the 
monitoring  of  the  operations  and 
management of Info AG; 
(vi)  at any  other time  upon  the  Commis~10n's 
request,  provide  the  Commission  with  a 
written or oral report on any aspect of the 
duties  and  activities  of  the  trustee  in 
relation  to  Info  AG  and  its  possihle 
purchasers, indicating whether a propo-;cd 
purchaser  would  be  able  to  ensure  that 
Info AG remains a competitive participant 
in  the German telecommunications market 
and  whether  negotiation~  with  such 
proposed  purchaser should continue; and 
(vii)  cease  to  perform  its  duties  as  trustee  for 
the  purpose  of  this  condition  when  the 
sale of Info AG  or any alternative remedy 
within the  meaning of point (iii)  becomes 
effective. 
(4)  Multinational clients  to whom  Info  AG  ha~ so 
far  provided  network  services  as  part  of  the 
Transpac network  and whose  headquarters  are 
located outside Germany may  be  transferred  to 
Atlas  on  condition  that  the  Commission  is 
satisfied  that  these  services  can  be  separated 
from  the German activities of Info AG without 
significantly  lessening  the  value  of  those 
activities. 
(5)  With  immediate  effect  from  the  date  of 
notification of this  Decision  and until one  year 
after  the  date  of  signature  of  the  agreements 
hetwc.·en  Transpac  and  the  purchaser  of  Info 
A<;,  neither I>T,  FT,  Atlas nor <;lohaiOnt·  ">hall 
compete  with  Info  AG  for  tlu·  provision  of 
telecommunications  services  to  customer~  of 
Info AG  whose headquarters are located within 
Germany  except  where  such  customers  dt·dine 
to deal  with Info AG. 
(6)  l~tl  e sale of Info  AG's business does  not  ~cern 
lik  ly  to on:ur by  the date stated in  po~nt ( I) (i), 
F  shall,  at  least  two  months  hcforl'  that 
c.  tt_e •.  submit  alternative  n·mcdit·s  suffiu('ntly 
/<lt1slactory  to  safeguard  actual  competition  in 
./  ~he German market. These  alternative  remedies 
must be executed by the date stated in  point (1) 
(i). 
(b)  Non-discrimination 
(  1)  DT and Ff shall not grant to any entity created 
pursuant  to  the  Atlas  Agreements  terms  and 
conditions dissimilar to the terms and conditions 
applied  to  other  providers  of similar  services, 
nor  exempt  such  entity  from  any  usage 
restrictions  which  would enable  such  entity  to 
offer  services  which  competing  providers  are 
prevented  from  offering  .with  regard  to  the 
following  facilities-related  telecommunications 
services  provided by Ff and DT in  France and 
Germany respectively: 
(i)  leased  lines  services,  in  particular 
international leased  lines  (half-circuit'>)  anJ 
domestic  leased  lines,  includin~  an,· 
discounts, as the case may  he~ and 
(ii)  PSTN/ISDN  servin·s  including  horh  ;K~o·css 
to such  networks (n.und}·  analogut'  ;K..:c~~; 
basic  ISDN  access;  ISDN  access  to  the 
public  packer-switched  data  networks; 
special  access  from  the  puhli..: 
packet-switched  data  networks  to  ISDN; 
and 'national  and  intcrn;ltion<ll  voin·  VPN 
and  VPN  intt.·n·onm.Yti(m  servic.Ts)  .md 
tra  Hit:  over such twtworks. 
Atlas  shall  not  be  grantl~d  more  f.l\'our.tbk 
treatment than third parties  in  connection  with 
reserved  facilities  and  services  and  with  slKh 
facilities  and services which remain an esst.·nti.tl 
facility  after  full  and dkl·tivt·  liherali7;ttion  of 
telecommunications  infr.tstrm.·turc  and  scn·h:l'S 
in France and Germany. 
(2)  DT  and  Ff  shall  grant  any  entity  cre.ttt:d 
pursuant to the Atlas  Agreement and ;my  dmd 
party  operating  a  telecommunications  fac1hn· 
that  apply  for  the  interconnection  of  such 
facility  with  DT  or  Ff's  networks  such 
interconnection  on  non-discriminaton·  tt'rms 
that  enable  such  entity  or  person  to. prO\· ide 
telecommunications  services  or  provide  its 
telecommunications  facilities  without  limit;ttion 
in any respect within the  reasot~ahle l';tp.tbiliut·s 
of the Ollt"rator  conn•mt•d. 
(3)  DT and Ff shall  not  in  any  way  disl·rinun.Ht.' 
between any entity created pursuant to the Atlas 
Agreements  and  any  other  service  provider 
competing with such entity in  connection with: 
(i)  either  a  decision  substantially  to  mod1fy 
technical  intt.·rfan·s  for  the  an:t•ss  10 
reserved  services  and/or  t·ssential  faciiJtlt's 
or services,  or  tiH.'  disclosure  of  any  odwr 
technical  information  relating  to  thl' 
operation  pf  the  PSTN/ISDN;  competitor~ 
shall  in  particular  have  access  to  such 
software  and  interface  information  as  is 
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indispensable for  maintaining the technical 
features  of  voice  services  where  such 
competitors interconnect to the  G~~man or 
French PSTNnSDN; and 
(ii)  the  disclosure  of  any  commercial 
information that would confer a substantial 
competitive  advantage  and  is  not  readily 
and  equally  available  dsewhere  by  service 
providers competing with such entity. 
(4)  Breaches of the requirements set out in points 1, 
2  and  3  shall  not  be  considered  to  infringe 
this  condition  unless  such  breaches  have  a 
substantial impact on the  market. 
(c)  Interconnection  to  DT  and  tT's  public  p.Kket-
switched data networks 
( 1)  IT and DT shall  immediately: 
(r)  t''>tahli'>h  and  maintarn  '>l.rrrd;udrzcd  :\.75 
rntcrfau·'>  to  an:css  tht'ir  rratiorral  puhlit· 
packet-switched data  networks; 
• 
(ii)  offer  such  access  on  norr  discrimrrt.rtory 
terms,  including  pnce,  .tvailabilrty  of 
volume  or other discounts  and  the  quality 
of interconnection provided; and 
(iii)  publish  the  standard  terms  and  conditions 
for  such  X.75  interface  standards, 
including,  if  any,  volume  discounts  and 
other discounts  and  make  any  agreements 
relating  to such  X. 7  5  interfaces,  including 
all  specifically  agreed  terms,  available  for 
inspection by t.he  Commission. 
(2)  Transpac  France  and  T-Data  shall,  until  such 
time  as  Transpac  France  and  T-Data  are 
integrated  into Atlas,  not disclose to any mtity 
created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas  Agreemem  aRy 
such  specifically  agreed  terms  as  arc  idcnt rfied 
and  maintained  as  confidential  hy  riH.'  party 
oht.uuirw,  intt·rnmm·t·tiou  thrmrr.h  st.rrul.11  .lrt.t~tl 
X.'/\ 111tnfau·'>  to an·css tlrt'  ht'rrd1 or ( .nmau 
uatioual  publit.  pa<.:kct-swilt hcd  data  m·twc •rks. 
(3)  The  conditions  set  out  in  points  (  1)  aud  (2) 
shall  likewise  apply  to  any  generally  used 
CCITT  -standardized  interconnection  protocol 
that  may  modify,  replace  or  co-exist  as  a 
standard  related  to  the  X.75  standard  and  is 
used  by IT and DT. 
(  4)  Any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreements may access the French and German 
public  packet-switched  data  networks  through 
proprietary interfaces, even  for  the provision of 
data  nmununications  services,  providt·d  that 
.ll·n·s...  ~ranted  to  such  t'tHity  through  ... uch 
interfaces  is  economically  equivalent  to 
third-party access to those networks. 
(5)  Breaches of the requirements set out in  points 1 
to  4  shall  not  be  considered  to  infringe  this 
condition  unless  such  breaches  have  a 
substantial impact on the market. 
(d)  Interconnection to DT and FT's othe.r networks and 
facilities 
( 1)  DT  and  FT  shall  grant:  .. ··:to.  any  third  party 
that  operates  a  telecommunications  facility 
('telecommunications opt•rator')  and  applic.·s  for 
the  interconnection  of such  facility  or  systems 
facilities  with  DT  or  Fr's  networks,  such 
interconnection on  non-discriminatory  tc.·rms  as 
compared  to  the  terms  applied  to  Atl.ls.  Such 
terms  shall  enable  the  tdecommuni~o.·.uions 
operator to provide telecomnnmications scrvil't'S  f 
or  provide  its  teleconununications  f.tl"tl it ies 
without  limitation  in  any  rt•spc.·~o.·t  wtth111  thl' 
n•;tsonahlt•  ctp.thllitil's  ot  llw  tt'lt'lt'lllllllltll 
l·atious opcr.ttor nmn·nwd. 
(1)  Brl'.tdu·s of thl'  n·qum·mc11ts  Sl't  out  111  pt~•nt  I 
shall not  lw  nmsu.lnl'd to mhmgl' tlus lPIIdtttoll 
unlt•ss  such  hrt•;tdws  h.tn·  .1  subst.mtt.tl  llttp.tl"t 
on the marh·t. 
(c)  Cross-subsidization 
(1)  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreements  shall  be  established  as  distinct 
entities separate from DT and IT. 
(2)  Atlas  SA,  T-Data  and  Transpat:  Fr.uKe  shall 
obtain  their  own  debt  financing  on  their  own 
credit, provided that IT and DT: 
(i)  may  make  capital  contributions  or 
commercially  normal  loans  to  Atlas  SA,  ()·  · 
T-Data  and  Transpac  France,  to  enahlt· 
them  to  condtll't  their  rc.•sptYtivc.· 
businesses; 
(ii)  may  pledge  their  vc.·nturc.•  inrt•n·sts  m  sudt 
<'nt ities,  i11  numt'l'l ion  with  111111  "''''111M' 
f111aru:ing  hu  sud1  t'lltlltcs; .llld 
(iii)  may  guarantc.·c.·  <tllY  im.lt'lltc.·Jness  of  sw:h 
entities, provided that FT anJ DT may only 
make  payments  pursuant  to  any  such 
guarantee  following  a  default  by  such 
entities in respect of such indebtedness. 
(  3)  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreement,  T-Data  and  Transpac  France  shall 
not  allocate  directly  or  indirectly  any  part  of 
their operating expenses, costs, depreciation, or 
other expenses of their business to any parts of 
FT  or  DT's  business  units  (including  without 
limitation  the  proportionate  costs  based  on 
work actually performed that are attributable to 
shared employees or sales or marketing of Atlas 
produt·ts and St'rvicc.•s  hy  DT or FT cmployt"cs). 
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These  undertakings  may  bill  DT  or  FT  for 
products and services supplied to DT or FT by 
such undertakings at: 
(i)  the same  price charged third parties  in  the 
case  of products  or  services  sold  to  third 
parties in  commercial quantities; or 
(iD  on the basis of the full  cost reimbursement 
or other arm's length pricing method in the 
case  of products  and  services  not sold  to 
third parties in  commercial quantities. 
(  4)  Breaches of the requirements set out in points 1, 
2  and 3 shall  not be  considered to infringe  this 
condition  unless  such  breaches  haw  a 
substantial impact on the  market. 
f  (f)  Bundling 
t 
(  1)  DT  and  Ff  shall  sell  their  services  under 
contracts  separate  from  the  contracts  lor  the 
sale  of Atlas  services  concluded  as  distributors 
of  Atlas  in  Germany  and  France  respectively. 
Each  separate  contract  shall  set  out the  terms 
and  conditions  of each  individual  service  sold 
thereunder and notably attribute any quantity or 
other  discounts  to  a  particular  service,  as  the 
case  may be. 
(2)  Breaches of the above requirements shall  not be 
considered to infringe this condition unless such 
breaches  have  a  substantial  impact  on  the 
market.  . 
(g)  Accounting 
(1)  T-Data,  Transpac  France  (including  all  their 
subsidiaries)  as  well  as  all  entities  created 
pursuant  to  the  Atlas  Agreements  which  are 
operating  in  the  EEA  shall  keep  separate 
accounting  records  using  international 
accounting  standards  for  each  servin·  they 
provide  in  any  country.  DT and  FT  (including 
all  subsidiaries)  shall  keep  st·paratc.·  ~u.:nnmting 
records using international accounting st.utdards 
for  each  service  they  provide  to  auy  entity 
created  pursuailt  to  the  Atlas  Agreements, 
operating in  the EEA. 
(2)  DT and  ...  ..,.  shall,  within  one  year  of the  date 
defined  in  Article  1,  impkment  an  accounting 
system  which  generates  sufficiently  detailed 
records  of  the  services  covert"d  hy  po111t  (1 ). 
Those.·  n·cords shall detail  the  following: 
(i)  the n,st standard usc.·d; 
(ii)  the.·  accounting  nmvcntions  usc.·d  lor  the 
1 n·atmcnt of costs~ 
(iii)  the  a·llocation  and attribution  of expenses 
or  costs,  re.venues,  assets  and  liabilities 
shared between any entity created pursuant 
to the Atlas Agreements and DT and/or FT; 
and 
(iv)  the attribution method chosen. 
(3)  The accounting records rderred to in  points .( 11 
and (2) shall identify all services provided to any 
entity created pursuant to the Atlas Agreements 
by  DT  and  FT  or  transfers  to  or  from  DT 
and FT. 
(4)  No  entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreement, nor T-Data or Transpac France shall 
receive  any  m~Hl'ri~ll  subsidy  directlv  or 
indin·l·tly from DT or FT, nor ;my inwstml'nt or 
payment from  DT or FT th.tt  is  not  rc.·\.·onkd  m 
the  books of sudt l'ntitics  .ts  an  inn·stnwnt  m 
debt or equity. 
t\rtidc 5 
The exemption granted undl·r  this  Dt•\.·iston  i~  suhJt'l't  h' 
the following obligations: 
(a)  Auditing 
(  1)  Atlas  SA  and  any  consolid.ltl'J  suhtdi.u,·  ~_,~ 
Atlas SA,  Transpac FratKl' and T-D.1t.1  sluil  ~· 
audited  by  an  indepcndt•nt  t•xtcrn;ll  .tudih'r 
every  12 months, providl·d that such .mdit  sl1.1ll 
certify from an accounting viewpoint  tl1~1t: 
(i)  all  transactions  bctwt•en  those.·  undt·r-
takings, on the one.·  hand, .md FT and l YJ. 
on the other hand, h;\\'l' hl'l'n  l'Oth.htdl'd at 
arm's length; 
(ii)  the  undertakings  have  adhered  to  thl' 
accounting procedures; and 
(iii)  the calculation numbers are accuratl'. 
(2)  The  first  auditing  rt•port  •md  .l't'rttti~.:.Hl' 
complying  with  point  ( l ),  \.·m·t·rin~  thl' 
12-month pt·riod  starting on tlw  d.ttt'  nn  wht.:h 
this  Decision takt·s dfl'l't, sh;tlt  lw  suhnHttl·d  to 
the  Commission  within  l 5  months  ol  th.u 
date. 
(b)  Other obligations 
DT,  FT,  T-Data,  Transp<K  FratKl'  and  all  cntltll''> 
created pursuant to the  Atlas Agreements shall  t•a~.-h. 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  and  cnsurmg 
compliance  by  these  undertakings  with  thl' 
nmditions set out  in  Artidc.·  4: 
( l)  kt•ep  all  detailed  rt'l'orc.ls  and  dontmc.·m., 
awn·ssary  to  prove.·  nunplt·tc.·  nmtplianlT  '"uh 
the  terms of the conditions set  out  in  Anidc:  4 
ready  for  inspection  hy  the Commission  and  to 
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enable the Commission to verify the correctness 
of the  audit certificate  referred  to  in  point (a) 
(2); 
(2)  give  the ·Commission  access  to  their  business 
premises  to  inspect  records  and  documents 
covered by the obligations set out under heading 
(a)  and to receive  oral explanations  relating  to 
such  documents  on  reasonable  notice,  during 
office  hours,  and  without  the  need  for  the 
Commission to invoke the powers of inspection 
pursuant to Regulation No 17; and 
(3)  provide the  Commission with: 
(i)  any  records  and  documents  in  the 
possession or control of those undertakings 
necessary for  that determination; 
(ii)  unaudited  accounting  data  as  specified  in 
points  (  1)  and  (2)  every  six  months, 
\tarting one  year after the comml'lllTIIIent 
date  of  the  exemption  pursuant  to 
Article 1; and 
(iii)  further oral or written explanations  .. 
Article 6 
This Decision is  addressed to: 
Deutsche Telekom AG, 
Friedrich-Ebcrt-AIIee  140, 
D-531 05 BONN; 
France TCiccom, 
Place d'AIIeray, 
F-75505  PARIS. 
Done at Brussels,  17 July  1996. 
1-.:.ud  \'AN 1\tlrR I 
f 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 17 July 1996 
relating to a  proceeding under Article  85  of the EC  Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement 
(Case No IV/35.617- Phoenix/GiobaiOne) 
(Only the English,  French and German texts are authentic) 
(Text with EEA  relevance) 
(96/547/EC) 
TilE COMMISSION  OF TilE ELJROJ>EAN  COMMliNITII "· 
I laving  regard  ''' th<'  Treaty  t•stahlishing  llw  Furopt'.lll 
( :ommunity, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  on  the  Europc.m 
Economic Area, 
Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  No  17  of 
6  February  1962,  First  Regulation  implementing 
Articles  85  and 86 of the  Treaty(1), as  last amended  by 
the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, and 
in particular Articles 2, 6, and 8 thereof, 
Having  regard  to the  application  for  negative  clearance 
and  the  notification  for  exemption  submitted,  p'ursuant 
to Articles 2  and 4  of Regulation  17, on 29 June 1995, 
Having  regard  to  the  summary  of the  application  and 
notification  published  pursuant  to  Article  19 (3)  of 
Regulation 17 and to Article 3 of Protocol 21  of the ITA 
Agreement (2 ), 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Committee  for 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, 
Whereas: 
I.  THE FACfS 
A.  INTRODUCfiON 
I.  The  Phoenix  transaction  was  notificc.J  to  the 
Commission on 29 June 1995. The notifying pan1cs 
announcec.J a new name, GlobaiOne, at the signature 
of  the  agreements  on  5  March  1996.  'I his 
transaction  is  linked  to  a  separatt'  transact  11m 
creating a  joint  Vt'llturc,  Atl;ts, owtwd  a~ to SO%  hy 
FratH.T  Tt'·lt'·com  (IT) and  as  to  50 'Y.,  hy  I  h'llbt he 
(I)  OJ  No JJ, 21.  2.  1  <J62,  p.  204/62. 
(1)  OJ  No C  H7, 1  S.  12.  1995, p.  13. 
Tclckom  (DT),  given  that  Atlas  is  a  parent  to  tiH' 
joint  Vt'llllln'  t.'lltitics  l'IT.ttnl  pur~uant  to  tilt' 
Phoenix  a)~rt't'mt.·nts.  A  st•par.llt.'  Dt·l'istoll  in  l·.l,l' 
IV/3S.J37 ('thl' Atlas Pt.·l·ision')( 
1
)  l'\.t.'mpts the- Atl.1~ 
agrct.•mt•nts,  notifit•cl  on  16  llcn·mbt.·r  J994,  trom 
the  applicttion of Articles  85 (I) of tlw  FC Trc.m· 
anc.J  53 ( J)  of the EEA  Agret'lllt.'nt. 
2.  The  Phoenix  agreements  consist  of  two  main 
transactions.  involving  two  Community 
telecommunications  organizations  (TOs)  and  one 
United States telecommunications operator: 
(i)  FT and  DT each  acquired  an equity  st.lkt•  l't 
approximately  10%  in  Sprint,  worth  llnitt•d 
States  $3,7  billion.  Both  1-1  anc.J  DT ohr.tined 
proportionate board representation and investor 
protection as minority shareholders in Sprint; .ts 
detailed below, provisions have been included in 
the investment agreement to prevent DT anc.J/or 
FT, either separately or jointly, from omtrollmg 
or inflm·ncing Sprint; and 
(ii)  Atlas  and  Sprint  created  a  JO&nt  venture, 
Phoenix,  for  the  provision  of  non-resern-d 
global  telecommunications  services  and  otht•r 
telecommunications services to corporate users. 
carriers  and  consumers.  The  Phoenix  joint 
venture is  structured into groups of operation.tl 
entities  under  the  strategic  supervision  of  a 
Global  Venture  Board  (collectively  referred  to 
as the 'Phoenix entities'). One group of entities 
provides  Phoenix services  worldwide except  in 
Europe  and  the  United  States  (the  'Rest  Of 
World  (ROW)  entities'),  a  second  group  of 
entities  provides  Phoenix  services  in  Europt• 
except  in  France  and  Germany  (the  •Rest  of 
Europe  (ROE)  entities').  The  ROW  anc.J  ROE 
entities also manage· Phoenix's global backbone 
network  until  the  parties  reach  agreement  on 
management  by  an already createcl  third entity 
(the.·  'Global Uackbone Network (GBN) c.·ntiry'). 
Thc.·  Glohal  Vt•nturc  1\oard  shall  takt·  dc.·t.-isions 
on mattns of policy unly :md  nut  cn~a~c.· in  tlw 
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management  of individual  operational  entities 
created pursuant to the Phoenix agreements. 
B.  THE PARTIES 
3.  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  (DT)  and  France  Telecom 
(FT)  are respectively the German and French public 
TOs.  Details  of both undertakings  are  provided  in 
the  Decision  on the  Atlas  venture  published  in  this 
issue of the Official journal. 
4.  Sprint Corporation (Sprint) is  a holding company in 
the United States. The Sprint group of companies is 
a  diversified  telecommunications  group  prov1ding 
global  voice,  data  and  vidco-confcrencing  services 
and  related  products.  ·Sprint's  main  subsid1aries 
provide  local  (United  States)  exchange,  cellular 
wireless  as  well  as  domestic  (United  States)  and 
international  long-distance  telecommunications 
services.  Other  Sprint  subsidiaries  engage  m 
wholesale  distribution  of  telecommunications 
products and the publishing and marketing of white 
and  yellow  page  telephone  directories.  \Vorldwide 
turnover  for  Sprint  in  1994  was  ECU  10,9  billion; 
Sprint  is  the  world's  11th  largest  tele-
communications carrier in terms of revenues. 
C.  THE RELEVANT MARKET 
1.  Creation of the Phoenix entities 
5.  The  Phoenix  entities  address  several  product  and 
geographic  markets,  namely:  (i)  the  markets  for 
non-reserved corporate telecommunications  services 
both  globally  and  regionally,  (ii)  the  market  for 
traveller  services  and  (iii)  the  market  for  so-called 
carrier services. 
(  1)  Product markets 
The  markets  for  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications services 
6.  The  Phoenix  entities  target  the  same  markets  for 
both  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications  services  and  packet-switched 
data  communications  services  (jointly  referred  to 
as  'non-reserved  corporate  telecommunications 
services')  described  in  the  separate  Atlas  Decision. 
Pursuant  to  the  joint  venture  agreement,  the 
offerings of Phoenix include the following services: 
-- t·orporate  voin·  sc.·rviccs:  global  vinual  p• ivate 
network  (VPN),  international  toll  fn.•t•,  sdc·ctc.•d 
rani  ami  simplt·  n·salc.·  sc.•rv1c.T\  ami  swttd1cd 
digital, 
data communications services using  i111L'r ilhl tlu· 
X.2 ), Framl'  Rday and  IP  protolols, 
- dedicated  transmission  for  voice  and  data 
services:  managed bandwidth and VSA T, 
- custom  network  solutions:  systems/equipment 
procurement, tailored and managed services  and 
outsourcing, 
- platform-based  enhanced  services:  messaging 
including  access  to  telex,  local  area  network 
(LAN)  interconnection,  electronic  document 
interchange  (EDI),  video-conferencing  and 
audio-conferencing. 
7.  Phoenix  provides  voice  simple  resale  servin·s  undc.·r 
Sprint's  licence  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  undl'r 
FT's lin·ncc.·  in Sweden. This Dc.·c.·ision  rdatt•s only to 
Phoenix's  range  of products  and  husint·ss  scope  as 
notified.  Any  substantial  changc.·  of  products  or 
business  scope,  notably  (i)  tht·  contribution  to  f· 
Phoenix  of broadband  transmission  cap;Kity  (such 
as  Asynchronous  Transfer  Mode  (ATM)  networks) 
in  France  and  Germany  and  (ii)  the  offt•ring  hy 
Phoenix of public basic  telecommunications St'n'Kt'S 
(such  as  voice  telephony scrvin·s (4))  rc.•quircs  a  1\l'\V 
notification. 
The market for traveller services 
8.  The market for traveller telecommunications services 
comprises  offerings  that  meet  the  demand  of 
individuals  who  are  away  from  their  normal 
location,  either  at  home  or  at  work.  Among  the 
most relevant of these offerings are those offered by 
the  Phoenix entities, namely (i)  calling card services 
(prepaid cards with or without a code and postp.tid 
cards),  including  those  in  combination  with  t..'rt•dJt 
cards  and  other  branded  service  cards  ('.1hinity 
cards'), (ii)  specialized voice services  (such  as  c.•quo.tl  • 
access· and code-based  authorization  services).  and 
(iii)  selected data and enhanced platform (that is  to 
say, communications system software) services. 
9.  Customers  for  traveller  services  indudt•  both 
business  travellers  and other travellt•rs.  In  tht•  (.tr\t 
business targeted by  Phoenix. the.·  fornlc.'r  arc.·  by  t..u 
the  largest  group of buyers.  Business  travellers  are 
generally intensive card users, the main incentive for 
card  usage  being  the  ability  to avoid  paying  hotel 
telephone surcharges. 
The market for carrier services 
I 0.  The  market  for'  carric.·r  servin·s  comprise.'!.  tht•  lc.·asc.· 
of transmission cap:u:ity anc.lthc provt!.ion of  n·latt•d 
(
4
)  DdincJ  in  the  seventh'  indent  nf  Artidt•  I  of  Cnmnussinn 
Dirc.·t"tive  90/:\88/EEC of 2H  June  I 990 on l"ompt•titinn  in  tlw 
markets  for  teh:nmmunications  st•rvic.·c.·s,  OJ  Nn  L  I  'J2, 
24.  7.  1990, p.  10. 
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servic;:es  to  third-party  telecommunications  traffic 
carriers  and  service  providers.  Along  with 
liberalization  and  globalization  of  tele-
communications  markets,  demand  for  efficient, 
high-quality traffic transportation capacity has risen 
among old and new carriers. In this connection, the 
traditional  model  of  separate  arrangements  with 
other individual carriers is increasingly challenged by 
players with global network infrastructure that offer 
an  array  of  services.  The  most  relevant  of  such 
services are: 
(a)  switched  transit,  meaning  transport  of  traffic 
over  bilateral  facilities  between  the  originating 
carrier,  the  transit  carrier  and  the  term ina ti ng 
carrier;  neither  the  originating  carrier  nor  1  he 
terminating  carrier  need  bilateral  faciltr•cs 
between  themselves,  but  only  with  the  transit 
carrier; 
(b)  dedicated  transit,  meaning  leased  line  offerings 
for  the transport of traffic through the domestic 
network  of  the  transit  carrier;  leased  line 
facilities  used  for  this  purpose  may  include 
discrete  voice  circuits  or  a  high-bandwidth 
digital  circuit  that can  be  used  for  both  voice 
and data services; 
(c)  traffic  hubbing  offerings,  where  the  provider 
takes  care  of  all  or  part  of  international 
connections;  these  offerings  are  typically 
designed  for  emerging  carriers,  who  are 
interconnected with the  provider  over  bilateral 
facilities  and  whose  international  traffic  is 
merged  with  other  traffic  on  the  provider's 
global network; and 
(d)  reseller  services  for  service  providers  without 
international  telecommunications  facilities  of 
their own. 
As  international  telecommunications  markets  are 
deregulated,  demand  for  carrier  services  is 
increasingly driven by  alternative carriers concerned 
with  assigning  to  the  incumbent  TO  their 
international  traffic,  for  reasons  such  as  techni<:al 
dependency  and  commercial  sensitivity  of customer 
information. 
11.  Purchasers of carrier services include established and 
emerging  carriers.  Both  groups  of  clients  are 
sophisticated  purchasers.  Among  the  emerging 
carriers, one may distinguish facilities-based  carriers 
that  provide  telecommunications  services  over 
alternative  infrastructure  or  cable  television 
networks seeking greater efficiency  in  the  transport 
of  international  client  traffic,  while  non 
facilities-based carriers and service providers seek  to 
preserve  a  competitive  advantage  by  avoiding 
dependence  on  a  loeal  TO for  international  client 
traffic. 
(2)  Geographic markets 
12.  Along  the  lines  of the Commission's findings  in  its 
Decision  94/579/EC(5)  (BT-MCI),  the  geographic 
scope  of certain  markets  targeted  by  the  Phoenix 
entities,  as  well  as  the  market  that  must  be 
considered  in  respect  of the  investment  of DT and 
Ff  in  Sprint,  is  international  and  even  global. 
Although national hordt·rs suhsist  for  m.my  ~nvil't'~. 
strategic alliances  like  PhOl•nix  an· huilt  not  only  m 
anticipation  of  a  markt•t  unaffcrtt•d  hy  n.ttional 
boundaries  but  even  with  tht•  t'xprt·ss  purpost'  of 
offering  large  global  telecommunications  ust•rs 
seamless  end-to-end  services  anywhere  by 
overcoming  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  ~urrt·nt 
market  structure  split  along  national  borders. 
However,  the  service  offerings  of  the  Phoenix 
entities attain different existing geographic markets. 
The  markets  for  non-reserved  corporate  tele-
communications services 
13.  As  described  in  the  Atlas  Decision,  demand  from 
la'rge  users  for  customized  packages  of corporate 
telecommunications  services  exists  in  at  least  three 
distinct geographic  markets,  namely  at  a  gloh.l\.  ~' 
cross-border regional  and a  national  level.  Phoenix 
services have global reach given that DT, FT.  Sprint 
and  the  ROE and ROW entities  each  interconnect 
over  the Phoenix global  backbone  network.  In  the 
global market for ·customized packages of corporate 
telecommunications  services  the  Phoenix  venture 
therefore  creates  competition,  for  instance  for  BT 
and  MCI's  existing  Concert  venture.  In  the 
Community,  the  ROE  entities  will  cooperate  with 
DT, Ff and Atlas to provide customized packages of 
corporate  telecommunications  services  at  the 
cross-border  regional  level;  these  services  will  have 
glohal 'connectivity'- that is, tht•y will allow for an 
extension  beyond  the  Community  and  ultimately 
worldwide if a customer so requires. 
14.  Packet-switched  data  communications  services  in 
each  geographic  market mentioned  in  the  previous 
recital are a part of the Phoenix offerings portfolio. 
However,  the  regional  Phoenix  operating  entity 
decides  whether  to  provide  such  services  at  the 
(~)  Commission Decision of 27 July  1994 in  Case No IVH4.857 
- BT-MCI,  OJ  No L 223, 27. 8.  1994, p.  36. 
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national  level.  Therefore, the  ROE entities  provide 
Europe-wide  packet-switched  data  communications 
services  initially  based  on the  network  that results 
from  merging  the  existing  Transpac  and  Sprint 
networks. The extent to which the ROE entities will 
provide such services in national markets within the 
European Economic Area (EEA)  will depend on the 
coordination between Atlas and the ROE entities as 
the competent Phoenix entities in  the EEA. 
The market for traveller services 
15.  Along  with  the  globalization  of the  economy  the 
market  for  traveller  services  appears  to  be 
increasingly  global;  travellers  demand  offerings 
which  include  a  single  bill  and integrated  functions 
such  as  voice  messaging,  voice  response  and 
information  systems  everywhere.  Geographic 
limitations of current traveller  service  offerings  are 
generally  due  to  technical  shortcomings  due  to  he 
overcome  in  the  near  future,  such  as  the 
incompatibility  of mobile  communications  systems 
or differences in  prepaid cards without an individual 
user code.  As  illustrated at recital  8 above,  none of 
the  services  targeted  hy  the  Phoenix  entities  is 
affected  by  these  shortcomings;  however,  the 
geographic scope of the traveller services offered by 
Phoenix  can  be  left  open  for  the  purposes  of this 
case,  as  the  finding  of narrow geographic  markets 
would  not  affect  the  assessment  of  the  parties' 
competitive position. 
16. 
The market for carrier services 
Both supply of and demand for carrier services  are 
by  nature  international.  Geographic  proximity 
between  purchaser and supplier of switched transit 
capacity is hardly. relevant for switched transit which 
carriers use either as a  substitute for operating own 
international  lines  or to deal  with  peak  traffic  on 
such  lines.  Likewise, dedicated transit services offer 
cable- or satellite-based routing capacity across third 
countries.  Finally,  using  hubbing  services  is  an 
alternative to entering into an undetermined number 
of bilateral agreements with individual carriers. 
2.  DT and Ff's investment in Sprint 
17.  The  acqutsltlon  by  DT  and  l-1'  of  new  equity 
amounting to an approximate 20% stake in  Sprint 
aims at consolidating a strategic alliance to enter the 
global  telecommunications  markets  and  extending 
service  into new  market segments.  As  the  BT-MCI 
alliance  showed,  investment  in  a  United  States 
carrier  offers  one  efficient  way  of  addressing 
multinational  companies,  being  the  largest  target 
customer  group  for  global  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications services. 
D.  MARKET SHARES  OF PHOENIX 
The  markets for customized packages of corporate 
telecommunications seroices 
18.  Global market 
The  parents  estimate  the  global  market  for 
customized  packages  of  corporate  tele-
communications  services  market  addressed  by 
Phoenix (exclusive of data communications services) 
to be  worth approximately ECU  4,8  billion  ( 1993). 
Of  this  total,  end-to-end  services  accounted  for f 
approximately ECU  37,6 million,  VPN  services  for  . 
approximately  ECU  2,8  billion,  VSAT  services  for 
approximately  ECU  I ,4  billion  and  outsmm·ing 
services  for  approximately  ECU  527  milliun.  In 
1993, the aggregate turnover of DT, IT and Sprint 
in  the  different  market  segments  amounted  to 
approximately  ECU  3,8  million  for  end-hl-t'nd 
services,  approxim;ttdy  ECll  576  million  h1r  VPN 
services  and  approximately  ECll  6  miliHlll  fnr 
outsourcing  services,  giving  Phnt•nix  a  tht'llfl'ti"·al 
market  share  of  12,2%  in  the  glohal  nurkt·t 
for  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications services. 
19.  Cross:border regional market 
Services  in  the  Community  (exclusive  of  data 
communications  services)  accounted  for 
approximately ECU 505 million in  1993. According 
to  the  notification  the  Phoenix  pare~ts'  aggregate 
market  shares  in  the  Community  in  1993  were 
[ ...  ) % (6)  in  the  end-to-end  services  market, 
[ ..  ~]%  (') in the VPN services market, [ ...  ] % (8)  in 
the outsourcing services market and [ ...  ] % (")  in the 
VSAT  market.  However,  market  shares  for  VSAT 
services  are  difficult  to  calculate  given  th~tt  TOs 
mostly  ust•  VSAT tt•rmin•tls  •ts  hack-up f.Kilittt'S  lllr 
other  services  or  to  extend  the  geographic  scopt.• 
of  services  despite  terrestrial  infrastructurt• 
shortcomings. 
20.  National markets 
National  markets  for  customized  packages  of 
corporate  telecommunications  services  within  the 
EEA  are  discussed  in  the  Atlas  Decision.  In  this 
regard,  Sprint  has  a  significant  share  of  total 
outsourcing  turnover  generated  in  Member  States 
(
6
)  Business  secret  (less  than 30%  ). 
(1)  Business secret (less  than 30%  ). 
(
8
)  Business secret (less  than 5 %). 
('.1)  Business  secret (less  than 30%  ). 
• 
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such as the Netherlands ([ ...  ] o/o (10)) and the United 
Kingdom  ([ ...  % (11)),  where  DT  and  Ff's 
outsourcing joint venture, Eunetcom BV, has a lesser 
presence  (5%  of  total  turnover  in  both  Memhcr 
States).  As  for  France and Germany, adding Sprint 
to DT and Ff brings  Phoenix's aggregate  share of 
total turnover generated  by  outsourcing services  to 
[ ... % (12)  in France and to [ ... % (13)  in Germany, 
compared  with  31 o/o  in  France  and  33 %  in 
Germany  for  the  second-largest . provider  there, 
Col,lcert's Syncordia. 
The market for  packet-switched data 
communications services 
The global market for  packet-switched data services 
was worth approximately ECU  5",3  billion  in  1993, 
while  DT,  FT  and  Sprint's  aggregate  sales  were 
[ ..•  }  (14)  or  ( ...  ) % (15)  worldwide.  The  European 
market  for  data  communications  . services  is 
discussed in  the Atlas Decision. Sprint's turnover for 
packet-switched data services  was  1  .••  J(
16
)  in  199.1, 
bringing  DT,  IT and  Sprint's  aggregate  share~ of 
that market to 1  •..  ] % (17).  As  for  national  markets, 
Sprint  achieved  its  highest  turnover  in  France, 
Germany,  Italy  ami  the  United  Kingdom.  Neither 
DT nor IT  have a significant market presence in  the 
latter  two  Member  States,  where  Sprint  has  a 
[ ...  ] % (18)  and [ ...  ] % (19)  market share respectively. 
In turn, Sprint's turnover in France (ECU  [ ...  ](
20
)) 
and Germany  (ECU  [ ...  ] (21)) equals  market shares 
in these Member States of only ( ...  ) %  and [ ...  ] % 
respectively (22). 
The market for  traveller services 
Total calling  card revenue  in  the  Community  was 
approximately ECU  120,5 million in 1994, most of 
which was generated by  national dialling. In  1993, 
DT  had  issued  200 000  cards  (all  of  them  in 
Germany),  equivalent  to  2,1 %.  of  the  total  card 
subscriber  base  in  the  Community; IT had  issued 
1,5  million cards (all of them in  France), equivalt.•nt 
to  l.S,7%  of  the  card  suhscriht•r  hase  in  the 
Community; and Sprint had issued  12 million cu·ds 
worldwide, of which 500 000 (equivalent  to a 5,1 'X, 
market share)  were  issued  in  the  Community.  The 
aggregate  market  shares  of  the  parents  would 
(10)  Business secret (less  than 10%). 
( 11)  Business secret (less than 10 %). 
.  (12)  Business secret (less than 45 %). 
(13)  Business secret (less than 40 %). 
(14)  Business secret. 
(15)  Business secret (less  than 25 %). 
( 16)  Business secret. 
(
17
)  Business secret (less  than 40%). 
(18)  Business secret (less  than 5 %). 
(19)  Business secret (less  than 10%). 
(2°)  Business secret. 
(2 1)  Bu!jiJtess  secret. 
(22)  BtfSin~ss secret  (less  than 5% respcctivt•ly). 
23. 
24. 
therefore  make  Phoenix  the  largest  calling  card 
services  provider  in  the  Community  (23 %  market 
share)  in  terms  of  subscriber  numbers,  ahead  of 
AT&T  and  BT  with  a  21%  and  17,8%  market 
share  respectively.  In  terms  of calling  card  traffic 
within the Community, the aggre~te market shares 
of  FT  (21 %)  and  DT  (3 %)  are  equal  to  BT's 
market share of 24%. 
The market for carrier services 
The  market  for  global  switched  transit  services  is 
estimated  to  be  worth  approximately  ECU  301,1 
million  and  generates  1 500  million  minutes  of 
international  traffic  or  approximately  3%  of  the 
world's international telephony traffic. Of this total, 
approximately  ECU  165,6  million  are  services 
provided  by  European  carriers,  of  which  in  turn 
approximately  ECU  30,1  million  goes  to  other 
European  carriers.  Within  the  global  switched 
transit  market  (1994),  which  grows  at  an  annual 
rat<.'  of 5  to.  6 o;;,,  DT had  a  turnovt·r  of ECll  1  ...  1 
e1),  FT  of ECU  (  ...  )  (2~)  and  Sprint  of ECll ( ...  1 
(2-~).  The  aggregate  market  shares  of DT.  FT  and 
Sprint  make  Phoenix  the  third  largest  global 
switched  transit  provider  behind  AT&T  and  BT 
(20,2% each). 
E.  MAIN COMPETITORS OF THE PHOENIX 
ENTITIES 
The  markets  for  non-reserved  corporate  tele-
communications services 
The situation in these  relevant markets is  discussed 
in  the  Atlas  Decision.  The  parties  include  the 
following  players  among  their  · competitors: 
AT&T/Worldpartners,  Cable  and  Wireless  plc, 
Concert,  IBM,  Kokusai  Denshin  Denwa  Company 
Ltd.  (KDD),  Nippon  Telegraph  and  Telephone 
Corporation (NTf), Unisourcc and the Unitt•d  Sr~ltt's 
regional  Bell  operating companies (RBOCs). 
The market for traveller seroices 
25.  More than one-third of calling cards in  Europe  arc 
issued  by  United  ·States  operators.  AT&T  is 
estimated to have 2 million postpaid card customers 
in  Europe - 21 %  of all  cards issued  there.  These 
customers generate 59% of calling card traffic from 
Europe to the United States. MCI has an estimated 1 
million postpaid card customers in Europe (  10,5 %  ), 
which  generate  27%  of calling  card  traffic  from 
( 
11
)  Business secrets (market share less  than  1  0%  ). 
(1
4
)  Business secrets (market share less  than 15 %). 
(H)  Business secrets (market share less  than 5 %). 
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Europe  to  the  United  States.  Executive  T  elecard 
International (ETI)  markets calling cards in Europe 
through  agreements  with  local  operators or credit 
card companies; ETI's market position is similar to 
that of MCI. 
The market for carrier seroices 
26.  Major players in the market for carrier services and 
notably global switched transit services competing in 
the  EEA  include  AT&T,  BT  (each  holding 
approximately  one  fifth  of the  market),  Cable  & 
Wireless,  MCI  and  Teleglobe  Canada.  Along  with 
the growing numbers of new carriers that seck to be 
independent  of  the  incumbent  TO  for  their 
international traffic,  new suppliers of such services, 
some  with  substantial  infrastructure  resources,  are 
emerging or active in the market, an example being 
Hermes Europe Railtel (26). 
F.  THE TRANSACflON 
27.  The  transaction  notified  to  the  Commission 
comprises a  set of agreements  the  main  features  of 
which are described below. 
1.  Agreements as originally notified 
( 1)  Agreements  regarding  the  Phoenix  ;oint 
venture 
The  parties  have  submitted  the  following 
agreements: 
(a)  the  Phoenix  joint  venture  agreement  (the  'JV 
agreement')  sets  out  the  parties'  essential 
commitments and business objectives; 
(b)  the transfer agreements provide for the transfer 
by  Sprint,  Ff,  DT,  and  Atlas  (collectively 
referred to as the 'parents') of certain basic and 
rdatc.·d  businesses  to the  relevant  ROE,  ROW 
c.·ntities; 
(c)  the  intellectual  property  and  trademark  licence 
agreements  concern  the  grant  by  the  parents 
and certain affiliates  to  the  Phoenix entities  of 
non-exclusive,  non-transferable  licences  to  use 
certain  of  the  parents'  technical  information, 




)  Commission  Decision  in  Case  No  IV/M.683;  OJ  No  157, 
1. 6.  1996, p.  13. 
(d)  the  services  agreements  specify  terms  and 
conditions  of  trading  relationships  among 
Sprint, Atlas, and the ROE and ·RoW entities, 
including  the - supply  and  support  services 
needed  to  provide  Phoenix  services  world-
wide. 
(2)  Agreements regarding FT and DT's investment 
in Sprint 
(a)  The  investment  agreement  provides  for  the 
purchase  by  each  of  Ff  and  DT  of 
approximately  10%  of the  common  stock  of 
Sprint. 
(b)  The standstill agreement binds Ff and DT for  a 
period  of  15  years  not  to  acquire  additional 




bined aggregate voting rights to more  than  f: 
to. 
(c)  The registration  rights agn.•ement  is  requin·d  in 
order  fo'r  each  party  to  consummate  tht• 
transactions  contemplated  by  the  investment 
agreement. 
(d)  The investor confidentiality agreements between 
Sprint and DT, and Sprint and Ff, respectively, 
provide  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
confidentiality  of  all  Sprint  proprietary 
information received  by  DT and Ff as  a  result 
of the  investment  agreement  and  in  particular 
by the DT and Ff representatives on the Sprint 
board of directors, which  may  be  used  by  DT 
and Ff only for the purposes of exercising their 
rights under such agreement. 
2.  Main contractual provisions 
(1)  Concerning the Phoenix entities 
(a)  Structure of the Phoenix yenture 
The JV  agreement provides for  the creation of 
two  groups  of  operating  entities,  namely 
Phoenix  Rest  of  Europe  (ROE)  and  Phoenix 
Rest of the World (ROW). Each group consists 
of  the  following  entities:  a  sales  entity,  a 
dearing-house  entity  and  a  holding  c.·ntity, 
which  is  in  turn  held  by  an entity  able.·  to  ht• 
bound for  the  purposes of the  Consent  Decree 
entered  by  the  United  States  Department  of 
justice.  Each  of the  above  entities  within  the 
ROE  group  (the  'ROE  parent  entities')  has  a 
board  of six  members,  with  Atlas  having  the 
right to nominate four members and Sprint two. 
Each  of  the  above  entities  within  the  ROW 
group (the 'ROW parent entities') has a  board 
of four members, with each of Atlas and Sprint 
having the right to nominate two members. 
• 
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The  ROE parent entities  conduct  the  Phoenix 
business within the 'rest of Europe' region (that 
is,  outside  France  and  Germany),  while  the 
ROW  parent  entities  conduct  the  Phoenix 
· business  within  the  'rest  of the  world'  region 
(outside  Europe  and  the  United  States).  The 
· ROE entities and the ROW entities will initially 
own and operate a global transmission network 
over  which  Phoenix  services  and  other  traffic 
will  be·  routed:  Phoenix's  global  backbone 
network. The parties  have,  however,  created  a 
Global  Backbone  Network  (GBN)  entity,  a 
limited  liability holding company, which  is  due 
eventually  to  take  over  the  relevant  global  . 
backbone network assets and functions. 
Pursuant to section 2.1  of ~he operating entities 
services agreement, FT, DT and their respective 
subsidiaries  each  are  exclusive  distributors  of 
Phoenix  services  in  France  and  Germany 
respectively, while Sprint is  pursuant to section 
2.2 (b)  the  exclusive  distributor  of  Phoenix 
services  in  the  United  States.  However,  any 
parent,  Phoenix  and  their  respective  affiliates 
will  meet  unsolicited  customer  requests  for 
Phoenix  services  regardless  of  the  customer's 
location.  Moreover,  the  French  and  German 
subsidiaries of Atlas  provide  FT,  DT and  their 
respective  subsidiaries  with  (i)  sales  support 
services  regarding  Phoenix  products  to  the 
distributors  in  France  and  Germany;  and  (ii) 
services within the scope of Phoenix other than 
X.25  packet-switched data network  services  in 
France and Germany. 
A new, wholly-owned subsidiary of Sprint  (the 
'Sprint subsidiary') and Atlas each initially owns 
50 %  of the outstanding voting equity of each 
of the parent entities of the ROW. entity and the 
GBN  entity.  The  Sprint  subsidiary  and  Atlas 
initially ·owns 33 1h % and 66  2IJ %, respectively, 
of the voting equity of the parent entity of the 
ROE entity. 
A Global Venture Board was established to set 
global  policies  and  monitor compliance  of  the 
operating groups with their business plans.  Any 
initiative of the Global Venture Board genc.·rally 
requires a unanimous vote. 
Day-to-day operations are  the  responsibility  of 
the  chief  executive  officers  of  the  operating 
entities,  who are  under  the  supervision  of  the 
governing board of the relevant parent entir y of 
either  the  ROE,  ROW,  or  eventually  <  ;BN 
entity.  Most decisions of each  governing hoard 
are  adopted  by  simple  majority  vote  of  the 
members  present.  Unanimous  consent  is 
however  required  for  a  number  of important 
decisions  including  final  approval  of  business 
plans,  certain  changes  in 
capitalization,  and  certain 
technology and investments. 
structure  and 
decisions  on 
(b)  Purposes and activities of Phoenix entities 
The  business  of  the  JOmt  venture  initially  is 
provision of (i)  global international data, voice, 
and  video  business  services  for  multinational 
companies  and  business  customers;  (ii) 
international  services  for  consumers,  initially 
based  on  card  services  for  travellers;  and  (iii) 
carrier  services  providing  certain  transport 
services  for  the  parents  and  other  carriers. 
The  Phoenix  entitles  may  also  offer 
telecommunications  equipment  and  invest  in 
national operations. 
To market these services  Phoenix is  responsible 
for  the  planning and management  fun,tions  of 
operations, as  well  as  marketing and  customer 
support, including the following: 
(i)  central  coordination  of  product 
development  and  lll<.lllagcment  to  ensurt· 
seamless  global  services:  tht•  Phot>nix 
entities  notahly  ddint•s  futKnon.liU\', 
technical  standards,  and  St'f\'h.·c  lt•wl 
requirements for  Phoenix services; 
(ii)  implementation  of  a  common  global 
network and infor~ation systems platform 
rationalizing  and  integrating  the 
international  data,  voice,  and  overlay 
networks  of  the  parents  which  are 
~urrently  separate;  the  GBN  will  link 
overlay  and  backbone  networks  in  each 
operating area (i.e.  ROE and ROW)  while 
proprietary interfaces will  allow provision 
of seamless  services;  within  its  first  few 
years  of operation, Phoenix  will  begin  to 
deploy  the  next  generation  of  A  TM 
packet-switching  technology,  comprising 
any  and  all  of  transmission,  switching. 
signalling, network intelligence. and sC'r\'iCC' 
managemC'nt elements; 
(iii)  integration  and  development  of 
information  systems  for  coordinated 
·  billing,  customer  support,  and  other 
back-office  functions,  supporting  national 
distributors; and 
(iv)  development  of  a  sales  prcscncl'  in  till' 
ROE  and  ROW  territories  either  din·ctly 
or through distribution arrangements using 
a  common  'masterbrand';  in  particular, 
national  ' service  operations  will  be 
established  or consolidated  in  each  major 
country  to  distribute  Phoenix  services 
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there;  in  addition,  regional  sales  offices 
will be established to provide technical and 
sales  support,  including  identification  of 
potential  customers  and  assisting  in 
preparation of customer proposals. 
(c)  Provisions concerning dealings with/by Phoenix 
entities 
Pursuant  to  the  JV  agreement,  transactions 
among  the  Phoenix  entities,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  FT,  bT,  and  Atlas,  on  the  other,  shall 
generally  be  conducted on the  most  favourable 
terms  and  conditions  that· are  offered  to  third 
parties.  If  products,  services,  or  facilities 
relevant  to  these  transactions  are  not 
commercially  available,  such  transactions  shall 
be  conducted  in  accordance  with  an  arm's 
length  pricing  method,  using  full-cost 
reimbursement  or  such  other  arm's  length 
pricing  method  as  may  be  agreed  on  by  the 
parties. The parents have the first  right to offer 
to  supply  certain  products,  services,  and 
facilities  to  the  Phoenix  entities. 
Notwithstanding,  each  Phoenix  entity  may 
purchase  from  a  third  party  which,  on 
otherwise  compara.ble  terms  and  conditions, 
offers lower prices, either once the parties have 
been given the opportunity to match such terms 
and conditions or if a customer so requires. 
Each  of the  Phoenix entities  and their  parents 
have the first  right to offer to perform in  their 
respective  territory  any  facilities  or  services 
required  by  another  party  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements. Such services may be obtained from 
a third party at a lower price under comparable 
terms and conditions, or where  a  customer  so 
requires.  In  accordance  with this  principle,  the 
ROE  and  ROW  entities  will  be  required 
to  purchase  telecommunications  network 
transmission capacity  from  the  GBN  entity.  to 
the  extent available,  once  that entity  becomes 
operational. 
(d)  Anti-competition provisions; distribution 
Pursuant  to  the  JV  agreement  as  originally 
notified, albeit subject to various exceptions, ne 
party or affiliate of a party may  distribute any 
international telecommunications services which 
are  either  provided ·by  the  Phoenix  entities  or 
substitutable  for  such  services.  Likewise,  no 
party or affiliate  of a  party may  invest  in  any 
entity  that offers  such  services.  Moreover.  no 
party or any  of its  affiliates  may  offer  national 
ij. •• 
long-distance services in competition with either 
a  national  operation  of  Phoenix  or  a  public 
telephone  operator  affiliated  to  Phoenix  (such 
as  a  national distributor of Phoenix).  Nor may 
any  party  or  any  of  its  affiliates  make 
investments  in  any  entity  offering  such 
competing national long-distance services  or in 
any  national  operation  allied  with  a  major 
competitor of Phoenix. 
Sprint is under an obligation to cease competing 
actively  in  Germany  and  France  by  selling  its 
data  and  card  business  to  DT's  subsidiary 
T-Data  Gesellschaft  fiir  Datenkommunikation 
mbH  ('T-Data')  and  to  Ff's  subsidiary 
Transpac  . France  respectively.  Outside  the 
parents'  home  countries  exclusivity  will  he 
granted  to  distributors on a case-by-case  h~1sis. 
Passive  sales  hy  any  ont"  distributor  to  f:' 
customers in the respective sales territory of any 
other distributor are allowed  in  the  EEA. 
(el  Licences  to be granted to Phoenix entities 
Under  the  technical  information  licence  and 
access  master  agreement  and  agreements 
implementing· the framework applicable to IPRs 
(the  'IPR agreements'), each parent grants each 
of  the  Phoenix  entitles  non-exclusive, 
non-transferable· licences to use certain technical 
information  of  that  parent  in  the  respective 
territories  of  such  entities  to  conduct  the 
Phoenix  business.  Each  Phoenix entity  has  the 
right  to  sub-license  the  rights  granted  to any 
other Phoenix entity or any  affiliated  national  • 
operation  or  local  partner,  wherever  such  a 
sub-licence is  necessary to conduct the Phoenix 
business. Likewise, each Phoenix entity must on 
request  also  sub-license  such  rights  to  any 
parent or affiliate of such parent, to the extent 
that such  a  sub-licence  is  necessary  to condu\.'t 
the Phoenix business. 
Royalties  are  payable  as  customary  in  the 
market  and  negotiated  by  the  parties  on  an 
arm's-length  basis.  Licence  rights  granted  to  a 
party under the IPR agreements will continue in 
the  event of either  termination  of the  Phoenix 
venture  or transfer  of such  party's  interest  in 
the Phoenix venture. 
Similarly,  pursuant  to  the  trademark  licence 
master agreemeht and implementing agreements 
each parent grants each of the Phoenix entities 
non-exclusive,  non-transferable  rights  to  use 
certain  tradefTlarks  owned  by  or  licensed  to 
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such parent in connection with the marketing or 
sale of certain authorized products and services 
. in the respective territories of such entity_. 
(2)  Concerning FT and DT's investment in Sprint 
{a)  Restrictions on transfer of shares by FT and DT 
and limits on increases of their shareholding in 
Sprint 
Pursuant  to the  investment  agreement,  neitht•r 
FT or DT may dispose of its shares in Sprint for 
five  years  after  the  closing  date.  Therea{ter 
restrictions  apply  to  large  transfers,  which 
would  in  most  circumstances  give  Sprint  ~he 
right of first  refusal. 
Pursuant  to  the  standstill  agreement,  Ff  ~nd 
DT  each  have  the  right  to  acquire  additional 
Sprint  shares  to  reach  and  maintain  a  10% 
shareholding,  but  shall  not  for  15  years  after 
the  closing  date  acquire  additional  shares  that 
would  increase  their  aggregate  voting  rights  to 
more  than -20 %.  Once  this  initial  'standstill' 
period  has  expired,  FT  and  DT  may  acquire 
additional  shares,· but  may  not  increase  their 
aggregate voting rights above 30% nor conduct 
certain activities  intended  at taking  control  of 
Sprint. 
(b)  ·Consent rights  and board representation of FT 
and DT 
FT and DT have  the right to elect directors to 
the  Sprint  board · in  proportion  to  their 
shareholding,  provided  that each  has  the  right 
to elect at least one director. Neither FT nor QT 
• have  access  to  confidential,  competitive 
information  on  Sprint's  activities  in  the  EEA 
through their  representation on Sprint's board. 
Nor  may  these  representatives  provide  Sprint 
with  confidential  information  that  FT  or  1  >T 
may  have  obtained  from  United  States 
competitors  through  correspondent  relation-
ships. 
As  the sole holders of Sprint's class A common 
stock, FT and DT have been granted substantial 
consensual  rights  with  respect  to  certain 
corporate actions  of Sprint, which  nevertheless 
faO  considerably short of control. These actions 
include  major  equity  issuances,  disapproval  of 
investments  in  Sprint  by  major  competitors, 
participation  rights  in  transactions  involving 
change of control, and. other bilateral corporate 
transactions.  FT  and  DT have  a  right  of first 
offer  with  respect  to  l~ng-distance  assets  of 
Sprint for a fixed  period of time. 
G.  CHANGES MADE AND UNDERTAKINGS GIVEN 
FURniER TO THE COMMISSION'S 
INTERVENTION 
28.  Some  features  of  the  agreements  as  notified 
appeared  to  be  incompatible  with  the  Community 
competition  rules.  In  the  course  of the  notification 
procedure the  parties  have  amended certain clauses 
in  their  agreements  and  given  undertakings  to  the 
Commission. 
1.  Contractual changes 
29.  Non-appointment  of  Phoenix  as  an  agent  for 
international half-circuits. 
Following  an  announcement  made  in  the  Phoenix 
notificati<m,  which  did  not  yet  reflect  the  parties 
commitments  regarding  Atlas  further  to  the 
Commission's intervention, DT, FT. Atlas and Sprint 
have  deleted  FT  and  DTs  'international  pri\';.Ut' 
lines',  meaning  FT  and  DT's  international  · 
half-circuits,  from  the list of products that Phoenix 
would distribute as agent. 
30.  Anti-competition provisions 
Phoenix  will . provide  international  simple  resale 
(ISR)  services  and  call  termination  PSTN  services 
under  Sprint's existing  licences  in  Sweden  and  the 
United  Kingdom.  However,  the  parties  have  not 
sought an exemption pursuant to Articles  85 (3)  of 
the  EC  Treaty  and  53 (3)  of the  EEA  Agreement 
for  any  specific  agreements  regarding  national 
long-distance  services,  which  these  services  would 
require (see fecital 7). The anti-competition clause in 
the  original  JV  agreement  has  therefore  been 
-mended: the parties are now obliged to refrain only 
&om  either (i)  competing with or (ii)  investing in  a 
~ompetitor  of  · entities  providing  long-distance 
""ices  provided  such  entities  are  controlled  by 
Phoenix. 
2.  Non-discrimination 
31.  Just  as  DT  and  FT  are  prohibited  from 
discriminating  in  favour  of their  Atlas  venture,  so 
the  Commission,  prohibits  DT  and  FT  from 
discriminating  in  favour  of  any  entity  created 
pursuant to the Phoenix agreements. This condition 
includes  all  specific elements described at recital  28 
of the  Atlas  Decision,  in  relation to access· and  use 
of (i) the French and German PSTN, (ii) the French 
and  German  ISDN,  (iii)  reserved  facilities  and/or 
services  until  the  French  and  German 
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telecommunications  services  and  infrastructure 
markets  are  fully  and  effectively  liberalized,  as  is 
scheduled  to  occur  by  1  January  1998,  and  (iv) 
thereafter facilities and/or services for which FT and 
DT  respectively  are  dominant  and  which  are 
essential for the provision of a competitive service. 
32.  Specific services 
The  Commission  attaches  as  a  condition  to  this 
'Decision  that DT and Ff shall  not discriminate  in 
favour of any entity created pursuant to the Phoenix 
agreements  with  regard  to  the  facilities-related 
telecommunications  services  detailed  at  recital  28 
of  the  Atlas  Decision.  The  non-discrimination 
condition extends to all aspects of access  to and use 
of such facilities  and services,  namely the terms and 
conditions,  scope  of  services  available,  technical 
information and commercial information. 
33.  Correspondent services 
The Commission imposes a specific condition not to 
discriminate  with  regard  to correspondent services, 
for  which  (i)  DT  and  FT  shall  not  unduly  prefer 
Sprint  over  other  United  States  correspondents; 
(ii)  DT and Ff shall  not unduly  prefer  each  other 
over  other German  or French  correspondents  once 
telecommunications  services  markets  are  fully 
liberalized,  as  is  foreseen  by  1  january  1998;  and 
(iii)  Sprint shall not unduly prefer DT and FT over 
other European and eventually  over  other  German 
and French correspondents  .. The condition on Sprint 
relates  to  traffic  to  final  destinations  outside 
Germany and France  respectively  until  the German 
and  French  telecommunications  services  and 
infrastructure are fully and effectively liberalized, as 
is  scheduled  to  occur  by  1 January  1998, and  to 
any  traffic  thereafter.  A  correspondent  is  a 
telecommunications services provider in one country 
party to a  bilaterally  negotiated  agreement  with  a 
provider of telecommunications ·services  in  another 
country  by  which  each  ·party  undertakes  to 
terminate  in  its  country  traffic  originated  by  the 
other  party,  for  provision  of  an  international 
telecommunications service. 
3.  Other Conditions  and obligations  attached  to 
this Decision 
34.  Non-reserved corporate telecommunications services 
The  exemption  of  Phoenix's  customized  packages 
of  corporate  telecommunications  services  and 
packet-switched data communications services  from 
the  application  of Articles  85 (1) 'of the  EC  Treaty 
and 53 lt) of the EEA  Agreement is  conditional on 
DT  and  Ff's  compliance  with  the  conditions 
attached  to  the  separate  Atlas  Decision  and 
described at recital 29 of that Decision. 
35.  Carrier services 
36. 
37. 
Neither  Atlas,  Phoenix,  DT,  Ff,  Sprint  or  any 
affiliate  of  these  entities  shall  make  a  particular 
telecommunications operator's ability to use Phoenix 
·international carrier services conditional upon use or 
distribution by that telecommunication's operator of 
services  provided  by  Atlas,  Phoenix,  FT,  DT  or 
Sprint. Neither shall  Atlas, Phoenix, DT,  FT,  Sprint 
or  any  affiliate  of  these  entities  condition  its 
commercial  dealings  (i.e.  terms,  conditions,  pri..:e, 
discounts)  with  any  telecommunications  operator 
upon  use  or  distribution  by  ·that  tele- • 
communication's  operator  of services  provided  by  ~ 
Atlas, Phoenix, FT,  DT or Sprint. 
DT and  FT  shall  also comply  with  conditions  t:-l.u 
mirror  those  attached  to  the  Atlas  Oect!-lllll 
concerning  (i)  use  of  DT  and  FT's  public  :X .  .!5 
packet-switched  data  networks,  (ii)  '-·rC's~· 
subsidization,  (iii)  bundling,  and  accountin~  in 
respect  of  the  entities  created  pursuant  to  th~ 
Phoenix agreements operating in  the EEA,  and wtth 
recording and reporting obligations  matching  tht.lse 
imposed  on  DT  and  Ff  in  the  Atlas  Decision. 
Likewise, all entities created pursuant. to the Phoenix 
agreements  which  operate  in  the  EEA  shall  keep 
separating  accounting  records  using  international 
accounting standards  for  each  service  they  pro\ide 
in  any country. 
To the extent related  to existing obligations  under • 
national  or Community law,  these  obligations and 
conditions are  intended  to ensure  the  parties' firm 
commitment  to  comply  with  the  applicable  legal 
framework. 
H.  THE REGULATORY SITUATION 
38.  The  regulatory situation in  France  and  German~· is 
described  under recital 31  of the Atlas  Decision.  As 
for  the  United  States,  pursuant  to  the  J  9  34 
Communications  Act,  Sprint  is  required  to  publish 
tariff schedules and contracts describing its network 
arrangements  and  services.  Furthermore,  the  1934 
Communications  Act,  enforced  by  the  Federal 
Communications  Commission  (FCC),  prohibits 
Sprint  from  providing  services  that  unjustly  or 
unreasonably  discriminate  against  Sprint's 
competitors  or foreign  correspondents,  which  may 
lodge  a  formal  complaint before  the  FCC  if  Sprint 
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does  not  comply  with  these  obligations.  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 gives the FCC the 
authority  to  refrain  from  regulating  'charges, 
practices  or  classifications'  of telecommunications 
carriers,  albeit  only  where  the  FCC  finds  that 
regulation  is  not  necessary  to  ensure  that  these 
elements are just and reasonable or not unjustly and 
unreasonably discriminatory. 
39.  While  the  Commission  was  assessing  the  Phoenix 
notification  under  Community  law,  Phoenix  was 
authorized  under  United  States  anti-trust  law  by  a 
judicial  consent  decree  filed  by  the  Ur:aited  States 
Department  of Justice  and  signed  on  16  February 
1996. This consent decree imposes conditions on the 
parties  that largely  resemble  those  attached  to  this 
Decision. 
I.  THIRD-PARTY OBSERVATIONS 
40.  Follo~ing the  publication  of a  notice  pursuant  to 
Article 19 (3)  of Regulation No 17 and to Artide 3 
of  Protocol  21  of  the  EEA  Agreement(27),  six 
interested third parties submitted observations to the 
Commission.  Concerns  expressed  in  these 
observations  included  the  risk  that  Phoenix  might 
(i)  increase the dangers of DT and FT's cooperation 
in  the framework of Atlas for  Europe-wide markets 
given  the  elimination  of another  competitor  there, 
Sprint,  (ii)  further  facilitate  abuses  of  dominant 
position  by  DT and  FT  in  their  respective  home 
markets and  (iii)  distort competition in  all  relevant 
markets  through  an  extension  of  the  notified 
cooperation  to  reserved  services,  notably 
correspondent services.  As  for  the latter allegation, 
third parties feared most that DT and FT might link 
favourable  conditions  for  reserved  services  to  the 
purchase of Phoenix services. 
41.  The  Commission  carefully  reviewed  all  third-party 
observations and concludes that concerns expressed 
therein  have  been  addressed  during the  notification 
procedure.  Most  conditions  as  to  conduct  and 
obligations  attached  to  the  Atlas  Decision  take 
sufficient  account  of  anti-competitive  concerns  if 
extended  to  all  entities  created  pursuant  to  the 
Phoenix  agreements  and  to  Sprint  where..· 
appropriate.  Third-party  observations  have  not 
therefore  affected  the  Commission's  substantivt· 
position  described  in  the  Article  19 (3)  notice  in 
respect  of  the  transaction  named  Phoenix  at  the 
time.  However,  in  the interest of legal  certainty the 
Commission has spelled out in  greate.~ detail  in  this 
(27)  See  footnote  2  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  Article  19 (  3) 
notice).  · 
Decision  the  scope  and  duration  of  certain 
conditions and obligations imposed on the parties. 
42.  Subsequent  to  third-party  observations  the 
Commission attaches an additional condition to this 
Decision  requiring  that DT and  FT  unbundle  own 
services  for  which  they  are  dominant and· Phoenix 
services, which restricts the contractual rights of DT, 
FT  and  their  affiliates  under  Section  2.1.1  of the 
operating  ent1t1es  : services  agreement  dated 
31  january 1996.  As  the  Commission  explained  at 
recital 60 of the Atlas Decision, dominant providers 
are  prohibited  from  bundling,  widespread  as  it 
might  be  in  the  telecommunications  market,  under 
the  regulatory  framework  of most  countries  where 
that market is fully competitive. The same condition 
already  applies  to  DT  and  FT  in  respect  of  Atlas 
services,  as  described  at recital  29 (5)  of the  Atlas 
Decision. 
II.  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A.  THE R6LE OF A  TI.AS IN PHOENIX 
43.  The European parent company of Phoenix  is  Atlas. 
Within  the  framework  of this  transaction  Atlas  ·is 
merely a vehicle to coordinate DT and FT,  includin~ 
their  respective  European  networks,  as  European 
providers which obtain global 'connectivity' - that 
is,  worldwide  reach  of  a  service  with  constant 
technical  performance  and  features.  Phoenix's 
distribution agreements make a distinction  between 
DT, Ff arid  Sprint's  home  respective  countries  on 
the  one  hand  and.  'rest  of  Europe'  and  'rest  of 
world'  areas  on  the  other  hand.  Under  these 
agreements,  DT  and  FT  joindy  exercise  decisive 
influence on Phoenix' European business. · 
44.  Phoenix  ROE  entity  results  from  adding  Sprint's 
European  business  and  network  to  that  of  Atlas 
outside  France  and  Germany.  Indicative  of  the 
integration  of  Atlas'  Europe-wide  services  into 
Phoenix  is  that  Info  AG's  current  customers  with 
headquarters  outside  Germany  are  transferred 
directly to Phoenix and not to Atlas.  Moreover, the 
technical  aspects  of  network  cooperation  between 
DT  and  FT  which  are  exempted  from  tht' 
application of Articles  H.S  (1) of the  EC  Treaty and 
53 (1)  of the  EEA  Agreement  pursuant to Article  3 
of the Atlas Decision are under the responsibility of 
the  same  entity that provides  network  management 
services to the ROE entity. Given  that the relevance 
of Atlas  as  a  separate 
1entity  from  DT and  FT  for 
Phoenix  is  limited,  the  following  legal  assessment 
refers to DT, FT and Atlas  without distinction. 
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B.  ARTICLES 85 (1) OF~  EC TREATY AND 53 (1) 
OF THE EEA AGREEMENT 
1.  Structural cooperative joint venture 
The  Phoenix  joint  venture  is  cooperative  in 
nature,  since  Ath1s,  which  takes  over  FT's 
Europe-wide  Transpac  network,  and  Sprint 
(jointly referred to as the 'parents') are potential 
competitors  for  the  ·provision  of  Europe-wide 
services  and  certain  global  offerings  within 
Phoenix's  envisaged  offerings  portfolio 
(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  'Phoenix 
products'),  namely  customized  packages  ~f 
corporate  telecommunications  services.  Prior  to 
this transaction, Sprint was an actual competitor 
of DT in Germany and of FT in  France. 
45.  Potential  competition  in  markets  for  Europe-wide 
services. 
DT and Ff remain  potential competitors of' Sprint 
as  a  provider  of services  over  an  own  leased-line 
rietwork  in  Europe  and  worldwide  in  spite  of 
withdrawing  from  the  markets  addressed  by 
Phoenix.  While  licensing  some  technology  to 
Phoenix  the  parents · retain  their  respective  IPRs, 
know-how  and  R &  D  capabilities  and  receive 
grant-back licences for IPRs  transferred to Phoenix. 
Phoenix. will also award DT, Ff and Sprint R &  D 
contracts  and  license  them  to  use  any  own . 
developments  or  services  other  than  Phoenix 
products.  The  parents  will  thus  keep  and  increase 
proficien~y  and  know-how  ~ respect  of  st,~ch 
technologies  as  the  market  requires  from  time  to 
time. 
46.  DT,  Ff and  Sprint will  maintain  their commercial 
,/  presence, reputation and, as exclusive distributors of 
Phoenix  in  their  respective  home  countries,  keep 
tlieir  knowledge  of the  market up  to date.  In  this 
connection,  Phoenix's  global  backbone  network 
linking  the  ROW  and  ROE  entities  will  initially 
be  a  mere  cross-Atlantic  line  concentrating  traffic 
between  Germany or France  and  the  United  States 
which  implies that DT, FT or Sprint's own offering 
could be  competing directly with Phoenix's where a 
customer  prefers  favourable  terms  of an  agn.·ement 
on  domestic  telecommunications  services  to  the 
international  scope  of Phoenix.  The  above  implies 
that  .market  (re-)entry  by  DT,  FT  and  Sprint  is 
possible.  Moreover,  all  three  undertakings  directly 
develop  own  activities  outside  their  home  markets 
through subsidiaries or as  members of international 
organizations, while  Sprint is  providing private  line 
services  to  and  from  the  United  States  under  a 
United Kingdom licence. 
4  7.  Structural joint venture. 
Phoenix  combine~ Sprint's as  we'll  as  DT and FT's 
joint activities in a range of Europe-wide and global 
markets  for  non-reserved  telecommunications 
services  and  is  set  to  develop  and  take  over  new 
services  in  these markets. This venture entails major 
changes  in  the  structures  of  D'r  and  IT, 
undertakings with very limited presence outside their 
respective  home  countries,  and  of  Sprint  whose 
international presence was limited for  lack  of strong 
regional  partners.  Through  Phoenix  these  three 
undertakings  pool a  significant number of assets  in 
connection  with  the  provision  and  marketing  of 61 
non-reserved corporate telecommunicati9ns services.  W'' 
2.  Application of  Articles 85 (1)  of the EC Trraty 
and 53 (1) of  the EEA Agreement to the creation 
of  Phoenix 
The Phoenix agreements creating a joint venture as a 
means  of  cooperation  between  DT  and  FT,  and 
Sprint  eliminat~ competition in the relevant markets 
and  affect  trade  between  Member  States.  The 
Commission cannot therefore give negative clearance 
to the creation of the  joint venture as  requested  in 
the parties' application. 
48.  On the grounds set out under recital 38 of the Atlas 
Decision, Atlas and Sprint were competitors for  the 
provision of outsourcing services. DT, FT and Sprint 
were  also  competitors  for  the  obtention  of  large 
customers'  telecommunications  'hubs'.  Sprint's 
Sprintnet division also competed with Ff's Transpac 
for  the  provision  of  non-correspondent  services, 
· notably  Europe-wide  and  national  packet-switched 
data  communications  services  with  limited  global 
connectivity,  under  licences  in  several  European 
countries.  This  competition  is  eliminated  by  the 
creation of Phoenix. 
49.  Creating Phoenix each of DT, FT and Sprint refrain 
from  developing  similar  offerings  to  compete 
individually,  reducing  R &  D  competition  and 
choice  for  customers  in  the  relevant  markets.  In  a 
way  similar  t<;>  Atlas'  effects (28)  eliminating 
(28)  Recital  41  of the Atlas Decision. 
• 
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50. 
compet~t~on  between  DT  arid  IT,  the  anti-
competltlon  prov1s1ons,  intellectual  property 
agreements,  geographical  scope  of the  licences  and 
grant-back  licences  agreed,  and  the  terms  of  the 
exclusive  distribution agreements turn Phoenix into 
an  instrument  for  pooling  and cross-licensing  DT, 
FT and Sprint's respective IPRs. 
DT,  Ff and  Sprint  each  have  the  finahcial  and 
technological  capabilities  required  to  enter  the 
relevant  markets on their own. DT, Ff and Sprint 
are  among  the  world's  largest  telecommunications 
companies in terms of traffic. While DT and Ff are 
dominant  for  most  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications services in their respective home 
countries,  Sprint  is  the  third-largest  long-distance 
carrier  in  the  United  States.  Creating  Phoenix  is 
therefore  not  DT,  Ff and  Sprint's  only  objective 
means  to  enter  the  market  for  international 
non-reserved corporate telecommunications services. 
The  same  applies to carrier services,  which  at least 
initially  will  mainly  serve  the  purpose  of increasing 
efficiencies by selling unused network capacity. Atlas 
and  Sprint,  which  is  already  one  of  the  largest 
Internet carriers in  the United  States, could provide 
such  services  in  competition  with  each  other  by 
investing  in  an  own  global  or  intercontinental 
extension  to  its  network.  Individual  market  entry 
would notably raise the same issues,  for example in 
terms  of  regulatory  hurdles,  that  Phoenix  must 
address. 
3.  Applicability of  Articles 85 (l) of  the EC Treaty 
and 53 (l) of the  EEA  Agreement to  DT and 
Frs investment in Sprint 
51.  The  Commission  and  the  Court of Justice  do  not 
consider Article  85 (1)  of the EC Treaty applicable· 
to  agreements  for  the  sale  or  purchase  of shares 
uriless  these  agreements  affect  the  COJl!petitive 
behaviour of the· parties to the transaction(29). The 
Commission  analysed  whether  the  appointment  of 
DT  and  Ff representatives  to  Sprint's  board  and 
subsequent  access  to  confidential  business  data 
could  give  rise  to  coordination  of the  competitive 
behaviour  of  all  three  undertakings.  The 
Commission found that (i) the investment agreement 
signed on 31  july 1995 does not afford DT and FT 
the  possibility  of exercising  a  controlling  influence 
over  Sprint  and  (ii)  United  States  corporate  and 
antitrust laws are designed to prevent access to and 
misuse  of Sprint's  confi4ential  information  by  DT 
and  FT.  Sprint  and  DT,  and  Sprint  and  FT, 
respectively,  set  out  an  additional  prohibition  to 
(29)  See  BT-MCI  Decision  (footnote  4)  at  recital  44  and 
footnote  1 of that Decision  for  references. 
misuse  such  information  in  two  investor 
confidentiality  agreements  signed  on  31  january 
1996. 
The  Commission  therefore  concludes  that DT and 
FT's investment in  Sprint fa11s  outside the  scope  of 
Articles  85 (1)  of the  EC  Treaty and ·53 (1)  of the 
EEA Agreement. 
4.  Application of Articles 85 (1)  of the EC Treaty 
and 53 (l) of  the EEA Agreement to contractual 
provisions 
52.  The following  provisioos restrict competition: 
53. 
(a)  the  anti-competition  obligation  on  the  parents 
as  regards  the  activities  of  Phoenix  (sections 
10.2 and 10.3 of the JV  agreement as amended 
by  Amendment  1 to the JV  agreement); 
(b)  the  obligation  on  the.  parents  to  obtain  from 
Phoenix  all  requirements  for  global  services 
(section  2.1.1  of the  operating entities  services 
agreement) in Germany and France respectively; 
and 
(c)  the  appointment of DT and  FT  respectively  as 
exclusive distributors of Phoenix (section 2.2 (b) 
of_ the jV agreement  as  amended)  in  Germany 
and France respectively. 
Of  the  above  restnct1ons,  the  anti-competition 
provision  and  the  obligatio~  to  purchase  all 
requirements  for  global  services  from  Phoenix  are 
ancillary  to  the  creation  and  successful  initial 
operation  of  Phoenix,  and  are  therefore  assessed 
under A(ticles  85  of the  EC  Treaty and  53  of the 
EEA  Agreement together with the joint venture. 
Both  restr1ct1ons  reflect  the  parties'  commitment, 
towards one another and towards Phoenix. Both are 
also  required  if  Phoenix  is  to  enter  the  market 
successfully,  given  considerable  uncertainty  and 
commercial  risks,  substantial  investment 
requirements and strong competition in  the relevant 
markets. Thus: 
(  1)  the  anti-competition  clause  expresses  DT  and 
IT and· Sprint's commitment to withdraw from 
the relevant markets targeted by Phoenix and to 
concentrate their efforts in  the relevant services 
markets on Phoenix lest  other initiatives, alone 
or  in  cooperation  with  third  parties,  impair 
Phoenix's establishment in  the market; and 
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(2)  the  obligation  on  DT,  Ff  and  Sprint  as 
exclusive  distributors  of Phoenix  products  in  ' 
their  respective  home  countries  to  buy  all 
requirements for  global  services  from  Phoenix, 
aims  at  ensuring  Phoenix  steady  funding, 
credibility and market reputation, which would 
be  seriously  jeopardized  if  the  very  founding 
partners of Phoenix  used  other global  services 
providers. 
Ancillary provisions are usually acceptable only for a 
limited period of time.  In the  light  of the  BT-MCI 
Decision,  where similar volumes  of investment  and 
risks were at issue (3°), the Commission will  however 
accept the  above ancillary restrictions for  the  entire 
duration  of  the  exemption  granted  by  this 
Decision. 
54.  Exclusive distribution. 
DT  and  FT's  exclusive  distributorship  in  their 
respective  home  countries  is  caught  by 
Articles  85 (1)  of the  EC  Treaty  and  53 (1)  of the 
EEA Agreement because it has the object or effect of 
isolating  Germany  and  France  against  imports  of 
Phoenix services from other EEA Member States and 
from  outside the  EEA,  which  may  adversely  affect 
the  conditions  of  competition  within  the  EEA. 
Unlike  the  other  restrictive  provisions,·  the 
Commission cannot consider DT and Ff's exclusive 
distributorship to be  ancillary to the creation of the 
joint venture, as non-exclusive forms of distribution 
are  possible  which  would  not  impair  the 
performance  or  marketing  of  Phoenix  services. 
Given  that  Germany  and  France  taken  together 
account  for  more  than  40%  of  all  tele-
communications  revenues  in  the  European  Union, 
the restriction is  appreciable. 
5.  Effect  on  trade  between  Member  States  and 
between Member States and EFT  A countries 
55.  As  discussed  under recital 44 of the Atlas  Decision, 
a  joint  venture  designed  to  provide  cross-border 
non-reserved  corporate telecommuniCations· services 
in  the EEA  has an effect on trade between Member 
States which is set to increase over the coming years. 
The same applies to the appointment of DT and Ff 
as  exclusive  distributors  in  the  two  largest  single 
national  telecommuniGations  markets  in  the Union, 
namely  in.  Germany  and  France.  This  effect  is 
especially . substantial  given  that  the  purpose  of 
Phoenix  in  Europe  is  the  provision  of  services 
between Member States. 
56.  The  Commission  concludes  that  the  creation  of 
Phoenix falls· under Articles  85 (  1)  of the EC Treaty 
(1°)  Footnote at recital  46 in fine. 
and  53 (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement.  The  same 
conclusion  'is  drawn  as  regards  the  non-ancillary 
appointment of DT and FT as exclusive distributors 
in  Germany  and  France  respectively.  The 
Commission  considers  the  restrictive  effect  on 
competition and on trade between Member States to 
be  substantial in 'both cases. 
C.  ARTICLES 85 (3) OF THE EC TREATY AND 53 (3) 
OF THE EEA  AGREEMENT 
1.  Technical and eco11omic  progress 
57.  The creation of Phoenix 
The  combination  of  Atlas  and  Sprint's  technology 
will allow Phoenix to offer new services with global 
'connectivity'  at  lower  cost  and  better  than  either 
Atlas or Sprint are capable of providing alone given 
their  current  business.  Combining  different 
platforms  and  product  features  will  still  require  a 
considerable investment of time and money. Like  BT 
and MCI's  Concert and like  Atlas  at the  European 
_.. 
and  national  level (3
1 
),  Phoenix  will  add  value  to 
leased  line  capacity  by  implementing  .  own 
homogeneous  network  elements  such  as  switches, 
software platforms and signalling systems to provide 
seamless  international  telecommunications  services. 
Phoenix  will  also allow cost savings; given  that the 
operation of a single network architecture generates 
economies of scale and scope at a technological and 
commercial level,  and may contribute to downward 
pressure  on  infrastructure  prices  across  the • 
Community,  for  example  through  lowest  cost 
routing. 
58.  Seamlessness  substantially  improves  international 
services  as  currently  provided  over  different 
interconnected  national  networks.  If  successful, 
Phoenix will increase choice in  the relevant markets 
and  offer  businesses  across  the  Community 
state-of-the-art  telecommunications  services  which 
their competitors overseas can already use~ Although 
Sprint already operated a network in some European 
countries which  allowed seamless connectivity  with 
certain  foreign  locations,  Sprint's  market  shares 
reveal  that  it  would  have  taken  much  longer  for 
Sprint to  become  a globally competing supplier fo'r 
the  ever  increasing  number  .of  multinational 
companies  .  that  need  a  comprehensive  range  of 
customized  global  non-reserved  corporate  tele-
communications services. 
(1 1)  Recital  48 of the Atlas  Decision.· 
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59.  Exclusive distributorship in Germany and France 
60. 
The exclusive distribution arrangements in respect of 
DT  Ff and  their  respective  subsidiaries  aim  at 
ens:U.ing that DT and Fr concentrate their respective 
marketing  efforts  through  Atlas,  such  as  customer 
prospecting  or  investments  in  regional  and/or 
national networks and other facilities  in their home 
countries on making Phoenix successful, rather than 
considering alternative options. Only if DT and FT 
are seen as fully committed to Phoenix will the joint 
venture benefit from  the reputation and presence of 
its parents in the marketpla.ce. 
2.  Benefits to consumers 
The  benefits  of  seamless  network  implementation 
across national borders is  discussed under recital 54 
of the Atlas Decision. Phoenix makes it possible that 
consumers  benefit  from  a considerably wider range 
of new  services  that DT, FT and Sprint would  not 
be  capable· of providing separately within  the  same 
period  of time.  The  Commission  stated  before  the 
notification  of  Phoenix  that  only  a  truly  global · 
· dimension woulci make the cooperation between DT 
and  Ff  in  the  framework  of  Atlas  sufficiently 
important  to  consider  an  exemption  from  the 
prohibition of Articles  85 (1) of the EC Treaty and 
53 (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement.  The  volume  of 
investment required to ensure a worldwide presence, 
,  which is a requirement for global services provision, 
is  beyond the capabilities of most potential users of 
such  services,  including  MNCs  active  in  sectors 
other  than telecommunications.  The  creation  of a 
global  venture  committed  to  undertakin~  t~e 
investment  needed  to  be  present  worldwade  as 
therefore  crucial  for  the  choice  and  quality  of 
communications available to MNCs and eventually 
SMEs. 
Adding global 'connectivity' to Europe-wide services, 
Phoenix is  a substantial step forward  in  relation to 
Atlas.  Accordingly,  the  Commission concludes that 
both  the  creation  of  Phoenix  and  the  exclusive 
distributorship  of  DT,  Fr  and  their  respective. 
subsidiaries are beneficial to consumers. 
3.  Indispensability 
61.  The creation of (lhocnix 
Phoenix  is  indispensable  for  the  parents  to 
successfully  enter  the' relevant  global  and  n·gionnl 
markets.  Phoenix  will  allow  the  time  required  for 
the  relevant services  to be  marketed  in  competition 
with  longer existing competitors to be  substantially 
shortened.  As  further  companies  enter the  relevant 
markets,  Phoenix  enables  DT,  FT  and  Sprint 
substantially to reduce costs and risks inherent to an 
organization set to offer telecommunications services 
worldwide  to  multinationals  and other large  users. 
While cost savings are important, an. alliance such as 
Phoenix  is  also  a  decisive  means  to overcome  the 
technical · and  logistic  difficulties  of  p~oviding the 
sen·ices  and  features  (inter  alia  one-stop  shoppirtg, 
end-to-end  delivery,  seamlessness)  required  by  such 
users,  which  can.not  be  addressed  satisfactorily 
under the existing framework  of TO correspondent 
relationships. 
62.  Exclusive distribution 
63. 
DT  and  FT  are  exclusive  distributors  of  Phoenix 
products in their respective home countries. Article 4 
(2.)  of the  'technical  information  licence  and  access 
master agreement' of 31 January 1996 provides that 
the territory to which DT, Ff and Sprint are granted 
licence  rights  shall  generally  be  worldwide  and  not 
restricted  to  the  respective  party's  own  exclusi\'e 
distribution  territory.  Under  the  terms  of  this 
Decision,  DT  and  FT  are  prohibited  from  selling 
Phoenix  products  as  distributors  under  the  same 
contracts covering own reserved services. 
Exclusivity  is  a guarantee for  DT and FT to protect 
IPRs  contributed  to the  joint  venture  against  third 
parties  and  thus  an  incentive  to  contribute  more 
\'aluable  IPRs  than  would  otherwise  seem 
reasonable.  On the other hand, the combination of 
(i)  compet1tave  alternatives  in  the  market, 
(ii)  bargaining  power  of customers  in  the  market 
for  customized  packages  of  corporate  tele-
communications services to corporate users and  (iii) 
the opening for DT and Ff's passive sales into each 
other's  home  market  ensure  that  the  aim  of 
protecting DT and  Ff's IPRs  does  not lead  to an 
elimination of competition. 
64.  DT  and  FT  are  constrained  under  both  national 
legislation  and  the  terms  of this  Decision  not  to 
disclose  information  derived  from  operating  the 
PSTN  or providing  reserved. services  to the entities 
whose  services  DT  and  Ff are  distributing.  This 
ensures  that  exclusive  distribution  by  DT  in 
Germany and FT in France will·not give  Phoenix an 
unfair  advantage  over  competitors  in  these 
countries.  The  Commission  concludes  from  the 
above  that the  exclusive  distributorship of DT and 
FT  is  indispensable  within  the  meaning  of 
Articles  85 (3)  of the  EC  Treaty  and  53 (3)  of the 
EEA  Agreement. 
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4.  Elimination of  competition 
65.  The creation of Phoenix will  not in  itself afford the 
parties the possibility of eliminating competition in 
the  relevant services  markets.  The Commission  has 
addressed related concerns raised  by  the integration 
of DT and  Ff's public  X.25  packet-switched  data 
networks  into  Atlas.  The  combination  of 
(i)  competitive  alternatives  in  the  market 
(ii)  bargaining  power  of customers  in  the  marke; 
for  customized  packages  of  corporate  tele-
communications  services  to  corporate  users  and 
(iii)  the  opening for  DT and IT's passive  sales  into 
each other's home market ensure that the creation of 
Phoenix  does  not  eliminate  competition  in  the 
relevant markets. 
66.  As  to the impact of DT and IT's dominant positions 
in  Germany  and  France  respectively,  the 
Commission  concludes  that  the  terms  of  this 
Decision  are  sufficient  to prevent an  elimination  of 
competition  in  the  relevant  markets.  DT,  1-1  and 
their  respective  subsidiaries  are  prohibited  from 
selling  Phoenix  products  as  distributors  under  the 
same contracts covering  own reserved  services.  DT 
and  IT are  also  constrained  under  both  national 
legislation  and  the  terms  of this  Decision  not  to 
disclose  information  derived  from  operating  the 
PSTN or providing reser\red  services to the Phoenix 
entities whose  services  DT and IT are distributing. 
This ensures that d~stribution of Phoenix services by 
DT in  Germany and IT in  France will  not lead  to 
market foreclosure or constitute a barrier to entry. 
In  the  context  of  Phoenix,  the  following 
considerations are relevant:  · 
Markets for  non-reserved corporate 
telecommunications services 
... .67.  Global markets 
Two years after the Commission's BT-MCI Decision 
global  markets  are  still  only  emerging.  Corporate 
users  with  global  telecommunications  needs  still 
have  an  open  demand  for  seamless  services  with 
customized  fea.tures  such  as  24-hour  technical 
assistance  and  maintenance service,  one-stop  hilling 
across  language  barriers  and  currency  zones  and 
seamless  links  between  premises  spread  over  wide 
geographic  areas.  BT  and  MCI's  Concert  was  the 
first  player  to enter  that emerging  market,  with  a 
head-start  over  its  competitors.  Phoenix  is  set  to 
become  a  competitive  player  once  the  substantial 
required investment is  made and a reliable seamless 
backbone network created. At this point in  time the 
Commission  regards  entry  of  a  competitor  to 
Concert  into  this  immature , market  as  being 
dependant  on  the  participation  of  an  established 
United  States  provider  with  wide  geographic 
coverage (32). Recent legislative changes in the United 
States  .have  allowed  regional  Bell  operating 
compames  (RBOCs)  to  enter  the  long-distance 
market there. However, before such changes are felt 
in  the  market  and  while  AT&T  and  MCI  are 
engaged  in  alliances  of  their  own,  large  existing 
players  such  as  Sprint  or LDDS  are  DT and  IT's 
natural  choice  among  United  States  long-distance 
carriers.  The  Commission  therefore  sees  no 
elimination  of competition  in  the  emerging  global 
market. 
68.  Cross-border regional  market 
This  relevant  market  is  discussed  in  detail  under 
recitals  62  et  seq.  of  the  Atlas  Decision.  As  was 
"?ted  .above,  Phoenix  essentially  adds  a  global 
d1menston  to  DT  and  IT's  cooperation  in  the 
framework  of  Atlas  and  adds  Sprint's  existing 
European business in these markets. The elimination 
of Sprint as an independent supplier does not lead to 
a.n  .e~iminati~n  of  competition  in  the  light  of 
stgmftcant  thtrd-party  competition  stemming  from 
existing  alliances,  such  as  AT&T  WorldPartners, 
Concert and IPSP, and from future alliances between 
TOs that are not ye~ positioned, such as the RBOCs, 
NTT  and  European  TOs  such  as  Mercury. 
Moreover,  at  least  partial  competition  for  certain 
components  of  global  customized  packages  of 
corporate  tel~ommunications services  and  notably 
for  packet-switched  data  communications  services 
stems from  niche players (33). 
69.  National markets 
Phoenix  adds  to  the  restriction  of  competition 
brought about  by  Atlas  in  France and Germany  in 
that. one co:npetitor to Fr or DT there aisappears. 
Addmg  DT s  and  FT's  market  shares  to  those  of 
Sprint  in  France  and  Germany  makes  Phoenix  the 
market  leader  for  certain  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications  services  offered  in  customized 
packages,  notably  for  outsourcing  services. 
Outsourcing  is  relevant  only  until  the  market  for 
cross-border  and  global  services  has  evolved 
sufficiently to give current self-providers a choice of 
services  that suits their needs. The Commission  has 
ensured  in  the  context  of  the  related  Atlas 
(l2)  See  BT-MCI  Decision (footnote 4) at recital 51. 
(B)  Cf.  BT-MCI  Decision  (footnote  4)  at  recital  56,  first 
indent. 
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•  70. 
notification  and  in  its  'Full  Competition' 
Directive (34)  the  essential  prerequisite  of increased 
choice,  namely . infrastructure  liberalization.  The 
Commission  is  persuaded that competition will  not 
be  eliminated given  the conditions imposed  on DT 
and  FT  to  (i)  provide all  reserved  services  required 
for  the  provision  of  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications  services,  such  as  PSTN 
interconnection  with  all  relevant  information  on 
inter  alia  implementation  of protocols  such  as  the 
Signalling  System  7  (SS7)( 35)  on  non-discriminatory 
terms  to Phoenix and third parties, (ii)  sell  Phoenix 
products  in  contracts separate  from  those  for  own 
reserved  services  and  (iii)  gather,  submit  and  have 
available  the  informatiqn  required  to  verify 
compliance  with those commitments. 
• 
The  sale  of  Sprint's  ·data  and  card  business  to 
T-Data  in  Germany  and  to  Transpac  'France  in 
France  respectively  is  a concentration that does  not 
attain a Community dimension. This does not affect 
the  Commission's  assessment  of  the  Phoenix 
transaction  under  Articles  85 (3)  of the  EC  Treaty 
and  53 (3)  of the  EEA  Agreement.  As  was  shown 
under  recital,  Sprint  has  small  market  shares  in 
absolute  figures  for  packet-switched·  data 
communications services  in  the French and German 
markets,  but  is  an  important player  given  that·  all 
competito.rs  of  FT  and  DT  respectively,  taken 
together add  up  to less  than. a 20 %  market share. 
The  Commission  considers  that  this  will  not  be 
tantamount  to  an  elimination  of  competition.  ·A 
large  number of data services  providers is  active  in . 
Germany and in France, where six service providers 
have  been· licensed  to  provide  public  data  services 
under conditions similar to Sprint,  in  addition to a · 
number of players  that provide services  under class 
licences or in areas where no licence  is  required. 
71.  DT  and  FT's  public  X.25  packet-switched  data 
networks  shall  not  be  contributed  to  Atlas  until 
there is full  and effective liberalization of the French 
and  German  telecommunications  markets. 
Moreover,  the  Commission  considers  that  the 
conditions  attached  to this  Decision  for  its  entire 
duration,  such  as  non-discriminatory  inter-
connection of Phoenix ·and third parties to DT and 
FT's  public  X.25  packet-switched  data  networks 
over  X.75  interfaces  or  equal  technical  and 
(
34
)  Commission  Directive  96/19/EC  of  13  March  1996 
amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with  regard  to  the 
implementation  of  .full  competition  in  the  tele-
communications markets, OJ No L 74, 22. 3.  1996, p.  13. 
(lS)  Major  _di~ital  protocol/signalling  system  for  managing  and 
transrmttmg control and routing information in  networks. 
commercial treatment of Phoenix and competitors in 
respect  of interconnection  to  the  PSTN  and  other 
services  relevant  to  call  termination  and  services 
distribution,  will  ensure  a  level  playing  field  more 
efficiently than in the past. Nevertheless, the existing 
regulatory  framework  in  the  respective  home 
countries  of DT,  FT  and  Sprint  already  prohibits 
cross-subsidization  and/or  discrimination.  These 
regulatory constraints,  together with the  additional 
conditions  attached  to  this  Decision,  lead  the 
Commission  to  conclude  that  Phoenix  does  not 
afford  the  parties  the  possibility  of  eliminating 
. competition  by  either  discrimination  or  cross-
subsidization. 
Markets for  traveller services and carrier services 
72.  The Commission sees  no elimination of competition 
attributable  to  the  creation  of  Phoenix,  in  the 
releva~t markets.  Phoenix's  aggregate  market  share 
in  the  Community  is  far  from  giving it a dominant 
position;  it  includes  both  postpaid  and  prepaid 
cards,  although  in  the  latter  category  most  of the 
cards  issued  by  DT and  FT  are  usable  in  national 
public  telephones  only  and·  are  thus  possibly  not 
directly comparable to Sprint's cards. As  for carrier 
services,  Phoenix  will  be  a~ive  in  selling  excess 
capacity on its backbone network in a market which 
is  only emerging.  Phoenix's position as  third-largest 
global  switched  transit provider  is  due  to the  fact 
that  only  two  other  companies  meet  the  most 
valuable  requirement  in  this  market,  namely 
worldwide reach and ultimately coverage. 
· 5.  Conclusion 
73.  The  Commission  concludes  that  the  Phoenix 
transactions  meet  ~II  four  conditions  for  an 
individual  exemption  pursuant to Articles  85 (  3)  of 
the EC Treaty and 53 (3) of the EEA Agreement, as 
regards  both  the  creation  of  Phoenix  and  the 
indispensable  restriction  of DT and Ff's exclusive 
distributorship in Germany and France respectively. 
D.  DURATION OF THE EXEMmON, CONDmONS 
AND OBLIGATIONS 
74.  Pursuant  to  Article  8 of Regulation  No  17 and  ru 
Protocol  21  of the  EEA  A~reement respectively,  the 
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Commission  shall  issue  a  Decision  pursuant  to 
Articles  85 (3)  of the  EC Treaty and  53 (3)  of the 
EEA  Agreement  for  a  specified  period,  and  may 
attach  conditions  and  obligations.  Pursuant  to 
Article  6  of  Regulation  No  17,  such  a  Decision 
cannot take effect from an earlier date than the date 
of notification.  Accordingly,  this  Decision  shall,  in 
so far as it grants an exemption from Articles 85 (  1) 
of the EC Treaty and 53 (1)  of the EEA Agreement, 
take effect  for  seven  years  from  the date  on  which 
the  second  new  infrastructure  licence  comes  into 
force  in  both  Germany and France  authorizing the 
licensee to operate infrastructure for the provision of 
liberalized services  in competition with DT and FT, 
and  the  respective  first  licensee  as  regards  the 
Phoenix  agreements  as  described  above.  Unlike 
Atlas,  Phoenix  is  not focused  on  the  German  and 
French national markets, where the restrictive effects 
of  a  cooperation  between  DT  and  FT  are  felt 
strongest. These restrictive effects  in a  fast-changing 
market  that  is  not  yet  fully  liberalized  meant  that 
Atlas  had  to  be  granted  an  exemption  only  for  a 
relatively short period of time.  By  contrast, Phoenix 
targets  mainly  cross-border  and  ultimately  global 
markets, and only  to. a  certain extent third-country 
national  markets.  Given  that in  this regard  Phoenix 
resembles  BT  and  MCI's  Concert  venture,  the 
Commission considers that the same duration of the 
exemption is  justified. 
75.  Until  the  date  defined  in  Article  2  of  the  Atlas 
Decision, no entity created pursuant to the Phoenix 
agreements  should  receive  more  favourable 
treatment than any  third-party in  respect  of access 
to DT and  FT's  public  X.25  packet-switched  data 
networks,  provided  that  Phoenix  may  access  such 
networks  over  proprietary  interfaces  on  condition 
that such interconnection is  economically equivalent 
to third-party access  over interfaces  using the  X. 7  5 
protocol  or  any  other  generally  used  CCITI-
standardized  interconnection  protocol  that  may 
modify, replace or co-exist as  a  standard related to 
the  X.75  standard  and  is  used  by  DT  and  FT, 
T-Data  and  Transpac  France  and  eventually  Atlas 
Germany and Atlas France. 
· 76.  Given  the  link  between  Atlas  and  Phoenix,  the 
Commission  may  withdraw  this  Decision  if  the 
exemption  granted  to  the  ~tlas agreements  is  not 
renewed  by.  the  end  of  the  period  defined  in 
Article 1 of the Atlas Decision. Likewise, in  the light 
of the assessment of the Atlas agreements due at the 
end of the initial exemption period the Commission 
will  lift or modify those· conditions attached to this 
Decision  which  parallel  the  conditions  and 
obligations  described  in  recitals  23  to  29  of  the 
Atlas  Decision.  Moreover,  the  Commission  will, 
upon  the  parties'  request,  review  the  need  for  any 
particular  condition  or obligation  attached  to  this 
Decision if circumstances change substantially before 
the  period of exemption expires. 
77.  The  Commission  has  decided  to  attach  certain 
conditions  and  obligations  to  this  Decision  to 
exclude  the  risk  of collusion  between  DT,  IT and 
Sp~int and to prevent an elimination of competition 
in  the  relevant  markets.  To  this  end,  the 
Commission  must  ensure  that  DT and  FT.  whert• 
they are dominant in  the  provision of infrastructun.· 
and  services  used  by  Phoenix  or Sprint,  trt•at  both 
Sprint  and  all  entities  created  pursuant  to  tht• 
Phoenix  agreements on similar  terms  as  third-party At 
competitors  in  respect  of  such  provision.  Tlw W' 
condition  impost·d  on  DT,  FT  and  Sprint  not  to 
discriminate  in  ead1  otht•r's  favour  is  nen·ssary 
because Phoenix will  offa non-rt'St'rvt·d  st·n·11.:es  .md 
will  opt'f<\te  under  Sprint's  t•xisting  intl'l'nation.tl 
simple  rcsalt·  (ISR)  lin·at~.:t•  in  till'  United  kingdom 
and  undt•r  i-T's  cxistinr,  ISH.  lil.."l'lh .  .'t'  in  Sweden.  A 
distinction between  reserved  and non-reserved voice 
services  does  not exist  in  a  number  of geographic 
markets  targeted  by  Phoenix  and this  distinction  is 
due  to disappear  in  most  Mt•mha States  wirh  full 
liberalization of public voice telephony by  I .J.muary 
1998. Therefore,  in  the  absence  of such  condition 
the  parents'  cooperation  in  the  framework  of 
Phoenix  could  easily  spill  over  to  the  voice 
telephony  markets,  rhus  impamng  effective 
liberalization of such  markets and the  development. 
of competition in  the Community. 
The  non-discriminatory  treatment  of  Sprint,  of 
Phoenix · entities  and  of  third-party  competitors 
(recital  31)  will  allow  the  last-named  category  to 
compete  against  DT and  FT,  which  in  turn  have 
room to compete over distribution: passive sales art• 
possible  because  the  same  Pho~nix service  may  be 
sold  from  either  end  of the  requested  circuits,  for 
example from Germany or from France. To limit the 
potentially  negative  effects  of the  joint venture  on 
overall  competition  between  the  parents,  the 
Commission  considers  it  appropriate  to  impose 
restrictions on the exchange of sensitive ·information 
between the parents and Phoenix (recital 64  ). 
The  most  crucial  requirements  as  to  conduct, 
designed  to  safeguard  competition  in  the  EEA,  are 
attached as conditions rather than as obligations to 
this  Decision,  given  the  need  to  prevent  an 
• 
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elimination of effective competition. Given the legal 
consequences  of a  breach  of a  condition,  national 
courts  can  adequately  and  swiftly  contribute  to  a 
decentralized policing of compliance and thus ensure 
that  the  competition  rules  will  be  adhered  to  the 
benefit  of  private  individuals (36).  However,  the 
principle  of  proportionality  requires  that 
far-reaching  legal,  financial  and  commercial 
consequences  do  not  ensue  from  occasional  or 
individual mistakes whose effects on.  t~~ market are 
negligible.  Therefore,  infringenwnts  of  the 
prohibitions  on  cross-subsidizatior~,  ~iscrimination 
and  bundling  cannot  h(•  considcn:d  lp  hrc.·;H.:h  a 
umdition  attached  to  this  l>cc:i~ion  &m!ess  ~ud1 
mfnngcrncnt'>  have  a  '>uhstanrial  impac:r  on  m;~rkl't 
condition~,  for  instance  if  practices  arc  pur~1!ed 
systematically or repeatedly. 
•  78.  Thi':l  Deci':lion  is  without prejudice to the application 
of Article 86 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the 
EEA  Agreement, 
I 
HAS  ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article  1 
Pursuant to Articles 85 (3)  of the EC Treaty and 53 (3) 
of the EEA Agreement and subject to Articles 2 and 3 of 
this Decision, the. provisions of Articles 85 (  1) of the EC 
Treaty  and  53 (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement  are  hereby 
declared  inapplicable,  for a  period of seven  years  from 
the  date  on  which  two  or  more  licences  for  the 
construction  or  ownership  and  control  of  alternative 
infrastructure  for  the  provision  of  liberalized  tele-
communications  services  come  into  force  in  both 
Germany and France, to: 
(a)  the  creation  of  the  Phoenix  joint  venture  by 
Deutsche Telekom AG ('DT), France Telecom ('IT') 
and  Sprint  Communications  Corporation  ('Sprint'), 
as  notified  to  the  Commission,  including  the 
ancillary  ohlig:uion  imposed  on Sprint, on  DT and 
on Fr ro  ohtain  (rom  Phoc·nix  ttll  rc•ctuin·mc·nt~ lor 
glohal  products undc·r  sc·t·tion  2..1.1  ol  rhc·  opc·tattllJ~ 
C'llf it ic·s  SC'I'VIl'l'S  ilJ~I"t'l'lllt'llt  and  IIOl  to t'OIIIJWh'  Wll IJ 
the·  joint  vc·ntun·  for  the·  provisum  ol  l'hot·nix 
scrvin·s  mu.lc·r  stTl ions  I 0.2  and  1  O.J  of l he  joint 
venture agreement, as amended; and to 
( 
16
)  Cf.  Commission  notice  on  cooperation  between  national 
courts and the Commission in  applying Articles 85 and  R6 
of the EEC Treaty, OJ  No C  39, 13. ·2.  1993, p.  6. 
(b)  the appointment of DT as  the exclusive distributor 
of Phoenix in Germany and of FT as the exclusive 
distributor  of  Phoenix  in  France  under  section 
2.2 (b)  of the joint venture agreement as amended. 
Article 2 
The  t•xemption  set  out  111  Artidc  1  Js  subject  to  the 
following nmditions: 
(a)  Non-disaimination 
1.  DT and  FT shall  not  grant t'itlwr  Sprint  or any 
t•ntity  crt·ated  pursuant  to  thl'  Plwt'ntx 
agrcl'mcnts,  terms  and  ~o:onduions  dissimilar  to 
the  terms  and  nmditions  <lpplit•d  to  otlwr 
providers  of  similar  servi~..·es,  nor  shall  they 
exempt  Sprint  or  such  entity  from  any  usage 
restrictions  which  would  enable  such  entitv  to 
offer  services  which  competing  providers. an· 
prevented  from  offering  with  regard  to  the 
following  facilities-related  relecommunic.uil..'ll$ 
services  provided  by  FT and DT in  France  and 
Germany respectively: 
(i)  leased  lines  services,  in  particular 
international  leased  lines  (half-cin.·uits)  antt 
domestic  leased  lint'S,  including  .my 
discounts, as the ctst· may  ht•;  ;md 
(ii)  PSTN/ISDN  st•rvin•s,  induding  both  ;ll.:n·ss 
to  PSTN/ISDN  networks  (namdy  an;1loguc.· 
access;  basic  ISDN  access;  ISDN  access  to 
the  public  packet-switched  data  networks; 
special  access  from  the  public  packet-
switched  data  networks  to  ISDN;  and 
national  and  international  voice  VPN  and 
VPN  interconnection  services)  and  traffic 
over such networks. 
Similarly,  Phoenix  shall  not  he  granted  mMt' 
favourable  treatment  than  third  p;trtit•s  m 
connection  with  rcscrVt'd  fa~..·ilitit•s  <llh.l  st•n·h:t·s 
and with such faciliti<.·s  and services as remain an 
essential  facility  aher  full  and  effective 
liberaJi~ation  of  telecommunications  infra-
structure and services in  France and Germany. 
l.  I>T  ;JIId  Fr shall  J'.ranl  to Spnnt, In .Ill)'  cnllt y 
l"I"C';lft•d  pursuant  I o  l he  l'lu wui x  ''J~n·c·nu·nt,  .111cl 
to  any  third  patty  opn;lting  .1 
tdeTomm&mirations  fat·ilit y  II till  apply  for  tlw 
intt·n·onncrtion of such farility  wirh  J>T  or FT's 
networks,  such  interconnection  on  non-
discriminatory  terms  as  will  enable  it/them  to 
provide  telecommunications  services  or  provide 
its  telecommunications  facilities  without 
limitation  in  any  respect  within  the  reasonahle 
capabilities of the operator conccrnt•d. 
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3.  DT and  FT  shall  not  in  any  way  discriminate 
between  Sprint,  any  entity  created  pursuant  to 
the  Phoenix  agreements,  and  any  other  service 
provider competing with Sprint or such entity in 
connection with: 
(i)  either  a  decision  substantially  to  modify 
technical interfaces for the access to reserved 
services, and/or essential facilities or services, 
or  the  disclosure  of  any  other  technical 
information relating to the operation of the  ~ 
PSTNIISDN;  competitors shall  in  particular 
have  access  to such  software  and  interface 
information  as  is  indispensahlc  for 
maintaining  the  technical  features  of  voice 
~l'rviccs where such com1wtitors intcrconnet·t 
to the  <  it·nuan or Frt'IKh PSTN/ISI>N;  and 
(ii)  the  disclosure  of  any  commercial 
information  which  would  confer  a 
substantial competitive advantage and which 
is  not readily and equally available elsewhere 
to  service  providers  .competing  with  such 
entity. 
4.  Breaches of the requirements set out in points 1, 
2  and 3  shall  not be considered to infringe  this 
condition unless such breaches have a substantial 
impact on the market. 
(b)  Interconnection  to  DT  and  IT's  public  packet-
switched data networks 
1.  Ff and DT shall immediately grant to Sprint, to 
any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements,  and  to  any  third  party,  access  to 
their respective public X.25 packet-switched data 
networks on non-discriminatory terms, including 
availability of volume or other discounts and the 
quality of interconnection provided·. 
2.  Transpac  France  and  T-Data  shall,  until  such 
time as Transpac France and T-Data are yielded 
to  Atlas,  not  disclose  either  to  Sprint  or  to 
any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements any specifically agreed terms that are 
identified  and  maintained  as  confidential  by 
the  party  obtaining  interconnection  through 
standardized X.75 interfaces to access the French 
or German national public X.25  packet-switched 
data networks. 
3.  Sprint  and  any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the 
Phoenix  agreements  may  access  the  French  and 
German  public  X.25  packet-switched  data 
networks through proprietary intt·rfact.•s, cvt·n  for 
the  provision  of  X.25  data  conununic.:ations 
services,  provided  that  the  access  granted  to 
Sprint  or such  entity  through  such  intcrfat·es  is 
economically  equivalent  to third-party  access  to 
these  networks. 
4.  Breaches of the requirements set out in  points 1, 
2  and 3 shall  not be  considered  to infringe  this 
condition unless such breaches have a substantial 
impact on the market. 
(c)  Correspondent services 
1.  DT  and  FT  shall  not  give  more  favourable 
treatment to: 
(i)  Sprint  over  other - United  States 
corrcspondt.•nts; or 
(  ii)  eadt  ot hn  ovc.·r  ollwr  <. ;t•rm;lll  nr  Fn·ndt 
n )fl'l'Sp\ Hllkllt  S  t Hh  .. 't'  tdt•l't  HlllllUIIil'.ll h )JlS 
st•rvit·cs  m.ukt•ts  an· fully  lihc.·rali:t.t'll. 
2.  Sprint  shall  not give  mort·  favoumble ·treatment 
to  DT  and  Ff over  other  German  or  Frc:ndt 
correspondents once telecommunications services 
markets are fully  liberalized. 
(d)  Cross-subsidization 
1.  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements shall be established as distinct entities 
separate from  DT and FT. 
2.  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  tht•  Phol·nix 
agreements shall obtain their own debt  financin~ 
on their own crt.·dit,  provided th;u FT ;md  DT: 
(i)  may  mah·  any  C<tpit;tl  contributions  or 
commercially  normal  loans  to such  entities 
that are  required  to enable such entities to· 
conduct their respective businesses;  • 
(ii)  may  pledge  their  venture  interests  in  such 
entities,  in  connection  with  non-recourse 
financing for such entities; and 
(iii)  may  guarantee  any  indebtedness  of  su('h 
entities;  however,  IT  and  DT  may  only 
make  payments  pursuant  to  any  such 
guarantee  following  a  default  by  such 
entities in  respect of such indebtedness. 
3.  No  entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements  shall  allocate  directly  or  indirectly 
any  part  of  its  operating  expenses,  costs, 
depreciation, or other expenses of their business 
to  any  parts  of  FT  or  DT's  business  units 
(including,  without  limitation,  the  proportionatt• 
costs based on work  a(."tually  pt.·rformec.l  th.u an· 
attributable  to  shared  cmployet•s  or  salt•s  or 
marketing  of Phoenix  products  and  services  hy 
DT  or  FT  employees),  provided  that  any  StKh 
entity  may  bill  DT  or  FT  for  products  and 
services supplit•d  to DT or I·T by  such  t.•ntity  at: 
11/1122 • 
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(i)  the same  price charged third parties in  the 
case  of products  or  services  sold  to  third 
parties in  commercial quantities, or 
(ii)  on the  basis of the full  cost reimbursement 
or other arm's length pricing ·method in the 
case  of products  and  services  not  sold  to 
third parties in commercial quantities. 
4.  Breaclies of the requirements set out in points 1, 
2  and 3  shall  not be  considered to infringe  this 
condition unless such breaches have a substantial 
impact on the .market. 
(e)  Bundling 
1.  DT  and  FT  shall  sell  their  services  under 
contracts separate from the contracts for  the sal(.· 
of Phoenix  services  concluded  as  distributors of 
Phoenix  in  Germany  and  France  respectively. 
Each separate contract shall set out the terms and 
conditions  of  each  individual  service  sold 
thereunder  and  shall,  in  particular,  attain  any 
quantity  discounts  or  other  discounts  to  a 
, particular service, as the case  may be. 
2.  Breaches  of the  requirements  set out in  point 1 
shall not be  considered to infringe this condition 
unless such breaches have a substantial impact on 
the market. 
(f)  Accounting 
1.  Any entity created .under the Phoenix agreements 
in  France and Germany, any  ROE parent entity 
and any entity controlled by a ROE parent entity 
shall  keep  separate  accounting  records  using 
international  accounting  standards  for  each 
service  they  provide  in  any coun!ry.  DT and FT 
(including  all  subsidiaries)  shall  keep  separate 
accounting records using international accounting 
standards  for  each  service  they  provide  to  any 
entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements, operating in  the EEA. 
2.  DT and  FT  shall  within  one  year  of the  date 
defined  in  Article  1  above  implement  an 
accounting  system  which  generates  sufficiently 
detailed  records  of  the  services  covered  by 
point  1  above.  These  records  shall  detail  the 
following: 
(i)  the cost standard used; 
(ii)  the  accounting  conventions  used  for  the  · 
treatment of costs; 
(iii)  the allocation and attribution of expenses or 
costs,  revenues,  assets  and  liabilities  shared 
between any entity created  pursu~nt to the 
Phoenix  agreements  and  DT  and/or  FT; 
~nd 
(iv)  the attribution method chosen. 
3.  The  accounting  records  referred  to  in  points  1 
and 2 shall identify all  services provided to: 
(i)  any entity created pursuant to the  Phoenix 
agreements in France and Germany; 
(ii)  any ROE parent entity; and 
(iii)  any  entity  controlled  by  a  ROE  parcnr 
entity by  DT and FT or transfers to or from 
DT and FT. 
4.  No  entity  l"n·ated  pursuant  to  tlw  Phol·nix 
agreement,  ROE  pMcnt  entity  or  l'ntity 
nmtrollcd  by  ''  ROE  p;ll'l'nt  l'ntity  sh;lll  n·n·ivt· 
any  material  subsidy  directly  or indirel"tly  from 
DT  or FT,  or any  in\'CStment  or payment  from 
DT  or FT  that  is  not  recorded  in  the  books  of 
such enritics as ;m  investment in  debt or equity. 
Article J 
The exemption granted under this Decision  is  subject to 
the following obligations: 
(a)  Auditing 
1.  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements  in  France  and  Germany,  all  ROE 
parent  entities  and  any  entity  controlled  by  a 
ROE  parent  entity  shall  be  audited  by  an 
independent  external  auditor  every  12  months. 
provided  that  such  audit  shall  certify  from  an 
accounting viewpoint that: 
(i)  all  transactions between these und(.·rtakings, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  FT  and  DT,  on the 
other  hand,  have  been  conducted  at  arm's 
length; 
(ii)  thesl'  undertakings  h&lVC  <ldhercd  to  the 
accounting procedures; and 
(iii)  the calculation numbers are accurate. 
2.  The  first  auditing  report  and  certificate 
complying with  point 1, covering the  12-month 
period  starting  on  the  date  when  this  Decision 
takes  effect,  shall  be  submitted  to  the 
Commission within  15  months of that date. 
(h)  Other  ohli~ations 
DT,  FT,  all  entities created pursuant to the Phoenix 
agreements  in  France and Germany, all  ROE parent 
entities  and  all  entities controlled  hy  a  ROE  p:ut·nt 
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entity shall each, for the purpose of ascertaining and 
ensuring compliance by  these  undertakings with  the 
conditions set out in  Article 2, 
1.  keep  all  detailed  records  and  documents 
necessary to prove complete compliance with the 
terms of the conditions set out in Article 2 ready 
for  inspection  by  the Commission and to enable 
the  Commission  to verify  the correctness of the 
audit certificate referred to in point (a) (2); 
2.  give  the  Commission  access  to  their  business 
premises  to  inspect  records  and  documents 
covered by the obligations set out under heading 
(a)  and  to  receive  oral  explanations  relating  to 
such  documents  on  reasonable  notice,  during 
office  hours,  and  without  the  need  for  the 
Commission  to  invoke  the powers of inspection 
pursu;nt to Regulation No 17; and  -
3.  provide the Commission with: 
(i)  any  records  and  documents  111  tht· 
po~sc~sion or control of these  undertakings 
necessary  for  that determination; 
(i•)  unaudited  au:ounting  data  as  specifit·d  in 
points  1  and  2  every  six  months,  starting 
one  year  after  the  commcnccmt·m  date  of 
the exemption pursuant to Articlt•  I;  and 
(iii)  further oral or written explanations. 
Article 4 
This Decision  is  addressed to: 
Deutsche Telekom AG 
Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 140 
D-53105  Bonn 
France Telecom 
Place d'  Alleray 
F-75505 Paris Cedex 
Sprint Communications Corporation 




Dmw ;lt  Brussds,  17 July  199h. 
For  th,·  ( :.,,,,_,~/'  111 
1\.an·l  VAN  ~tiFR  I" 
Aft'mba of tht' ( :ommr~~~~  111 
• 
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II 
(Acts  whose  publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of  18  I>ecennbcr  1996 
relating to a  proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty and Article 53  of the 
J:EA  Agreennent 
(Case  IV/35.518  - Iridiunn) 
(Only the  English  text is  authentic) 
(fext with  EEA  relevance) 
(97/39/EC) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  on  the  European 
Economic  Area, 
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 Febn1ary 
1962,  First  Regulation  implementing Articles  85 and  86 
of the Treaty('), as  last amended by the Act of Accession 
""If  Austria,  Finland and Sweden, and in particular Article 
_  thereof, 
Having regard  to  the  application  for  negative  clearance 
and the notification for  exemption submitted pursuant  to 
Articles 2 and 4 of Regulation No 17, on  II  August  l'J9S, 
Having  regard  to  the  summary  of  the  application  and 
notification published pursuant to Article  19 (3)  of Regu-
lation  No 17  and to Article 3 of Protocol 21  of the  E EA 
Agreement (1), 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Couunillcc  for 
Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant  Po~iliom, 
Whereas: 
(I)  OJ  No  IJ, 21.  2.  1962,  p.  204/62. 
(1)  OJ  No  C  7'1S,  1.  9.  1'>96,  p.  2. 
(I) 
(2) 
I.  THE FAcrS 
A.  Introduction 
The  Iridium  system  was  conceived  by  the  llnitl'd 
States  company Motorola  Inc.  in  1987  to  provide 
global  digital  wireless  communications  services 
using a constellation of low earth orbit (LEO) satel-
lites. Services  will  include voice  telephony,  pa~ing 
and basic data services (such  as  facsimile)  and will 
be  provided via  portable  harid-held (dual  modl·  or 
single  mode)  telephones,  vehicle  mounted  tele-
phones,  pagers  and  other subscriber  equipment. 
Iridium expects to be the first  operational provider 
of global satellite personal-communications servil"t'S 
(S-PCS).  The  system  is  n:pt'l.'lt•d  to  hl'l'l'lllt' 
commercially  operational  by  I  0\.'tober  1  QQ~\.  For 
that purpose, 66 satellites will  have  to be launched 
and  placed  in  orbit  during  the  next  24  months. 
B.  Parties 
Motorola  Inc,  is  a  US  provider  of  wirck~s com 
mun  ication~  ;md  cln:twnic  cq u i  pmcnl,  sys~t·ut:., 
components  and  services  for  worldwide  markcb. 
Motorola  is  the  originator of  !lac  Iridium  coJu.:cpl 
and  is  the  primary  contractor  to  Iridium  for  the 
procuremcnl  of  the  space  sq~mcnt  and  a  rn;1jor 
supplier  for  other  componcnb  of  the  Iridium 
system. 
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(3) 
Motorola's  investment  percentage  in· Iridium  is 
20,1  %.  It  has  reserved  for  itself  the  Mexican/ 
Central American gateway(!), has an interest in the 
South  American  gateway  and  shares  the  North 
American gateway with Iridium Canada and Sprint. 
Under  the  Space  System  Contract  Motorola  has 
agreed  not  to  produce  for  itself  or  others  any 
similar  satellite-based  system  without  Iridium's 
prior  written  approval  until  31  July 2003  or  the 
termination  of  the  Space  System  Contract, 
whichever· is  earlier. 
Apart from Motorola, Iridium is  owned by 16 strat-
egic  investors,  including  a  number  of  telecom-
munication  services  providers  and  equipment 
manufacturers  from  around  the  world.  Each  of 
them (with the exceptions of Lockheed Martin and 
Raytheon)  is  expected  to  own  and  operate  a 
gateway (individually or jointly) and may also act as 
service  provider  (or  nominate  others  to  do  so) 
within its allocated exclusive gateway services terri-
tory. 
Investors  are  the  following:  Iridium  China (Hong 
Kong) Ltd (belonging to the corporate group China 
Great  Wall  Industry  Corporation:  investment 
percentage 4,4 %), Iridium Africa  Co.,  (formed  by 
the  Saudi  group  Mawarid  Overseas  Company: 
2,5 %  ),  Iridium Canada, Inc., (owned by a Motorola 
subsidiary:  33 %;  and  by  two  subsidiaries  of  the 
Canadian  company  BCE,  Inc.:  4,4 %),  Iridium 
India Telecom Private  Ltd. (India: 3,9 %  ),  Iridium 
Middle East Co. (owned by two Saudi groups: 5 %~ 
Khrunichev State  Research  and  Production  Space 
Center (Russia: 4,4 %), Iridium Sudamerica (owned 
by a  Motorola subsidiary, a Venezuelan consortium 
and a  Brazilian group: 8,8 %), Korea Mobile Tele-
communications {controlled  by  the  Soul h  Korean 
conglomerate  Sunkyong  Business  Group:  4,4 %), 
Lockheed  Martin  (USA:  1,) %),  Nippon  Iridium 
Co., (a  consortium formed hy two Japanese groups, 
DDI Co., and Kyocena Co., and a number of other 
Jctpane~e investors: 13,2 %). Pacific  Elet·t• ic Wire & 
Cable- Co.,  (l'aiwnn:  4,4 %),  Haytlu·on  < :o.,  (USA: 
0,7 %), Sprint (USA: 4,4 %) and Thai S:lldlite Tele-
communications  Co.,  Ltd  (fhailand:  4,4  %). 
.  Two European  companies are  also  strategic  inves-
tors;  Stet  {Italy:  3,8 %)  and  Vebacom  (Germany: 
10 %). Each of the two has its own gateway service 
territory covering different parts of Europe and the 
(
1
)  For  a  description  of  a  gateway,  see  recital  12. 
(4) 
associated exclusive right to construct and operate a 
gateway  within  its  respective  territory.  However, 
they have concluded an agreement to jointly install 
and operate their gateways. In order to do so. they 
will create a joint venture. The first gateway will be 
that in  Italy. 
Most of the above investors do not operate yet; they 
have  been created for  the  purpose of investing in 
Iridium.  In  the  building-up  phase  of the  system, 
many of the investors will provide some services to 
Iridium.  basically  as  subcontractors  to  Motorol<:. 
Thus,  China  Great  Wall  and  Khrunichcv  wdl 
provide  launching  services,  Lockheed  Martin  is  a 
principal subcontractor in  the  constructil'rl  of the 
Iridium satellites, Raytheon is  primarily responsible 
for  providing  the  satellite  antennas  and  Stet. 
through  its  subsidiary  Telespazio,  will  build  and 
operate  the  backup  system  control  facility. 
Iridium  LLC,  a  US-incorporated  comp.my  with 
limited liability,  has  been  formed  to  t·stahlish  :111d 
commercialize  t.he  Iridium  communications 
system. It will own the space-related portion of the 
system  including  the  satellites  and  the  related 
ground  infrastructure  for  the  delivery  of  Iridium. 
services. 
(5)  As  regards  distribution  of  Iridium services,  it will 
have  a  central  role,  issuing  guidelines  for  the 
appointment of service providers by gateway opera-
tors and establishing commercial and pricing poli-
cies.  In  addition  it  will  provide  some  business 
support  functions  required  by ,gateway  operators 
and service providers, including a  clearinghouse to 
calculate the amounts due to and from Iridium and 
each gateway operator. 
(6)  Iridium will  be  manah'"t'd  hy  a  Bonrd ot  Dirt'\."h'n; 
made  up  of  24  members.  Of  these,  2J  will  hC' 
elected by the investors and the Chairman will  hC' 
elected by the other 23. The Board of Directors will 
delegate certain executive authority to the  manaf~<'­
ment  lr-om  o( the nunpnny, whi<.·h  will  indudr  u 
Chid  Executive  Oflircr  nnd  a  Prc~idt·nl.  The 
Chairman of the Board of Directors will  also be the 
Chief  Executive  Officer.  The  Chief  Executive 
Officer will be  in the general and active charge of 
the  entire  business and  affairs  of the corporation. 
The  President  shall  have  general  charge  of  the 
business,  affairs  and  property  of  the  corporation 
under the supervision of the Board of Directors and 
the Chief Executive Officer. The management will 
be responsible for carrying out the directions of the 
Board of Directors and for informing it of progress 
in  the  company's  development  and  business. 
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(7) 
(8) 
Decisions  by  the  Board . of  Directors  will  be 
adopted  by simple  ~ajority. 
C.  The Iridium system 
1.  The  network 
The system (1) will consist of the space segment, the 
gateways and the user handheld terminals. Iridium 
will  own  the space segment, while gateway operator 
investors  will  own  and  operate  the  gateways  and 
subscribers  will  purchase  or  lease  the  subsniber 
terminal  equipment  from  service  providers  and 
other  retailers. 
(9)  The space segment includes the satellites (2) and the 
system control segment (SCS) necessary to monitor, 
manage and control the satellites and the provision 
of  services. 
(1 0)  Iridium intends to operate a constellation of 66 (l) 
satellites to be deployed in low earth orbit (780 km. 
above  the  earth's  surface).  The  satellites  will  be 
arranged in six planes of 11  satellites each, in near 
polar orbit. Each satellite will circle the earth every 
100  minutes and will  cover a  circular area with  a· 
diameter of  approximately 4 700  km. 
Satellites  are  equipped  to  communicate  with 
subscriber terminals and to send traffic direct from 
one satellite  to another. As regards  the latter, each 
Iridium satellite will  have four cross-link antennas 
to allow it to communicate and route traffic to the 
two satellites that are fore and aft of it  in the same 
orbital  plane  as  well  as  neighbouring satellites  in 
the  adjacent  co-rotating  orbital  planes.  Inter-
satellite networking provides access  to the  Iridium 
system irrespective of gateway location by routing a. 
call from satellite to satellite until it is connected to 
the gateway which is  most appropriate to the desti-
nation  of  the  particular  call.  In  that  respect,  the 
system  allows  any  user  in  any  country  that  has 
authorized  the  Iridium  service  to  receive  a  call 
originating  from  any  gateway. 
(') The  total  system's  implementation  costs  arc  estimated  at 
nearly  USD  4.7  billion  (not  including  handsets). 
(l}  The system will  usc a  (rcquency in  the  ran~e o( 1616-1616,.5 
Mhz  for  user  links  (as  rt·scrvcd  for  S-PCS  systems  dw ing 
WRC-92),  19,4-19.6 Ghz  and  29,1-2'J,.1  Ghz  for  fct•dt•r  and 
gatrway  links  (~pan· to  t•arth  :ul<l  t•mth  to  ~p;u t•)  anti  }_  1,1 H-
23..38  (ihz  for  the  intu-sarellitt~  link:;. 
(')  The system also includes a number of spare said  lilt's in 01 hit, 
intended  to  replace  failed  ones. 
(11)  The  SCS  includes  a  master  control  facility (4) 
(located in the USA),  a back-up control facility (to 
be located in Italy) and two tracking, telemetry and 
control stations (IT  &C) (S)  located  in Canada  and 
Hawaii. 
(12)  Gateways  are  switches  which  communicate  with 
subscribers'  units and other satellites via  the SCS 
and the constellation. They Will  serve as  the inter-
face  between  the  satellite  constellation  and  the 
public switched telephone networks (PSTN). As was 
stated above, they will be owned by investors. There 
will  be  13  gateways  in  operation. 
The  concrete  functions  of  a  _gateway  will  bl'  to 
support  the  subs<.·rilwr  hillin1~  function,  to  prol·t·ss 
calls,  to  keep  track  of  c~11.:h  usn  location  and  to 
communicate with PSTN to which it  will  be inter-
connected  (in  case  of  calls  to  fixed  users). 
(13)  Finally, handsets will  be  produced by major manu-
facturers  of  equipment.  Motorola  has  agreed  to 
license to other suppliers the right to use its propri-
etary information to manufacture and sell  Iridium-
compatible  subscriber  equipment  subject  to 
reasonable terms and conditions acceptable to  bot~ 
parties. Most handsets will be capable of dual-mode 
operation with both satellite and terrestrial cellular 
(including GSM)  systems, so that they will  be  able 
to select, either automatically or under user control, 
satellite  or terrestrial  modes  of  operation. 
2.  Distribution  of the  sen·ias 
(14)  Distribution  of  Iridium  services  will  involve  dif-
ferent  participants  in  the  notified  agreements: 
- Iridium  will  have  responsibility  for  central 
functions,  such  as  the  space  segment  and 
certain  business support systems  including the 
dearing-house, 
- gateway  operators  will  be . responsible  for  the 
gateway, 
and 
service  providers  will  provide  services  to 




)  'lbe master control  facility  will  control  the  pcrform<met·  and 
status of sah.·.llitcs  and manage tht•  rwlwork. ThC'  bat·k-up nm-
trol  fa<:ility  will  rt~placc tht•  rnastt·r  mntrol  facility  in  <":1St'  of 
(ailurt•  and  will  t·ontrol  sp:1re  s:atdlitc~  in  orhit. 
(~ 'IT&C stations will  track the movenwut.s of the satellites and 
adjust  their  orbits  to  maintain  the  nmstdlation. 
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(a)  Gateway operators 
(15}  Under  the  stock  purchase  agreements,  each 
investor  in  Iridium  designated  as  a  gateway 
operator  will  have  exclusive  rights  to  provide 
Iridium  services  within  the  geographic  territory 
provided in the contract. Iridium will  not authorize 
any  other  person  to  provide  gateway  services  or 
construct gateways  in  the  investor  territory. 
(16)  In  addition, gateway operators will  have  exclusive 
rights  to  act  and/or  designate  others  to  act  as 
service  providers  within  their  designated  gateway 
territory.  It  is  the  intention of  Iridium  that  every 
gateway  operator shall  create  a  network  of  service 
providers  within  its  allocated  territory. 
(17)  Finally,  under  each  gateway  authorization  agree-
ment,  Iridium  will  provide  the  gateway  operator, 
and  its  designated  service  providers,  with  con-
tinuous  access  to  the  iridium space  system.  Such 
right is  subject to continued compliance with  the 
applicable  mandatory  provisions  of  the  Iridium 
System  Practices (1). 
(1 8)  In  exchange, gateway  operators  have  to: 
- apply for, obtain and maintain all governmental 
authorizations and frequency allocations neces-
sary to construct and operate the gateway and to 
provide  services  in  each  of  the  countries 
included  in  the gateway  services  territory, 
construct, ope.rate  and  maintain  the  gateway, 
establish and maintain appropriate interconnec-
tion,  access  and  settlement  arrangements 
through and with every PSTN operating within 
the  gateway  services  territory, 
and 
provide  gateway  services  to  its  designated 
servtces  providers  in  each  of  the  coumries 
induded  within  its  allm:atcd  scrvit c  territory. 
(b)  Service  providers 
(19)  Service  providers will be responsible for  marketing 
and retail sale of the services and terminals and will 
have  primary contact with end users  within  their 
(')  Iridium Systems Practices (ISP) is the set of guidelines, recom-
mendations, rules, plans and other instructions related to tech-
nical and operational matters associated with the operation of 
the Iridium system. Some technical and operational  portions 
of these  practices  are  intended to  be  mandatory  in  order to 
secure a high degree of network integrity. The ISP has not yet 
been  completed  even  in  draft  form. 
territories.  They  will  also  be  responsible  for  all 
aspects of account-management and customer care 
including· customer credit, billing, accounting and 
customer  credit  risk.  In  addition,  they  have  to 
support ·gateway  operators"  efforts  to  obtain  regu-
latory  authorizations  and  frequency  allocation 
within  their territories 
(20)  Appointment of the service  provider will  in  prin-
ciple  be non-exclusive  in order to  allow access  to 
the largest  customer base  and to  ensure  adequate 
availability  of subscriber equipment and. customer 
service  within  the  gateway  service  territory.  Such 
would  be  the  case  in  wireless  markets  open  to 
competition.  However,  exclusive  servin·  provider 
agreements could also be possible in other markets 
It is  expected that most ·will  also  be  k'cal  cellub~ 
service  providers.  In  this  respect,  S-PCS  ser\'i(e~ 
will,  in  general,  be  offered  by  wireless  terrestrial 
networks  as  a  premium service  in  order to  exten  ..  : 
coverage  to  areas  outside  terrestrial  coverage  or 
where  terrestrial  roaming  is  not  possible. 
It is  contemplated tl1at  a  sing!~ company could act 
as  a  service  provider  for  more  than  t.llll'  g;acw.l\ 
operator investor. In addition, service  providers can 
operate in more than one country ·within a gateway 
service  territory. 
(21)  Service  providers  will  be  appointed  hy  gatcway 
operators  in  accordance  with  guidelines  provided 
by Iridium. According to the notification, an initial 
screening of the service  provider will  assess  finan-
cial standing, reputation, concern for customers and 
resources. The major determinants for selection ...,.'ill 
be the existence of a substantial subscriber base  of 
wireless  mobile users  and the  degree  of  perform-
ance of the potential service provider for customer 
care and billing services which are essential for  an 
adequate  provision  of the  service. 
(c)  Pricing 
(22)  Price  to  subscribers  will  be  made  up  of  four 
charges: 
1.  a  payment by the gateway operator to  Iridium 
for  use  of th:e  space segment to  be  established 
by the  Iridium  Board  of  Directors; 
2.  a payment to the gateway operator for use of the 
gateway link at a ·price to be  set by the gateway 
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operator,  albeit  following  Iridium's  guidelines 
and  recommendations  to  the  extent  permitted 
by .applicable  law  and · regulation; 
3.  a  payment to  the  service  provider, 
and 
4.  tail  charges,  if  any,  for  the  ongmation  or 
completion  of  calls  over  the  PSTN. 
(23)  Service  providers  will  be  the  collection  point  for 
charges  paid  by subscribers. Revenues  will  be  dis-
tributed by the clearinghouse operated by Iridium. 
The clearinghouse will  hence act as  a central point 
for collection of call detail record and will calculate 
and  execute  the  net  settlement  position  among 
Iridium  and  all  gateways. 
(24)  End  customers  for  voice  services  are  expected  to 
pay,  on  global  average  terms,  a  monthly  fee  of 
around USD 50 and a tariff per voice minute traffic 
of around USD 3 (1),  plus any applicable PSTN tail 
charges. 
D.  Relevant Market 
1.  Product  market 
(25)  The term S-PCS system denotes a network used to 
provide satellite  personal communications services, 
usually  on  a  worldwide  basis.  A  S-PCS  system 
encompasses  a  constellation  of  LEO  (low  earth 
orbit), MEO (medium earth orbit) or GEO (geosta-
tionary earth orbit) satellites (2),  their control earth 
stations  and  a  number of gateway  earth  stations 
through which access will be provided to terrestrial 
fixed or mobile networks. Such a configuration will 
support  full  user  mobility  and  identification  hy  a 
··single number anywhere in the world, using 'intel-
ligent'. features, similar to those of digital terrestrial 
cellular systems {such as GSM),  that will  be located 
( 1)  Iridium will  keep a part of the access fee and of the usage fee. 
In addition, Iridium expects to keep an  additional amount as 
compensation for  the  clearinghouse function. The remaining 
will  be  used  to  compensate  gateway  operators,  service  pro-
viders  and  other  parties. 
(2)  LEO satellites are located around 900 km over the earth. Full 
coverage  of the earth's surface  would  require  a  minimum of 
66 LEO sateJiites. This is  the kind of orbit chosen by Iridium. 
MEO satellites are  located  around  10 000  km  over the earth. 
Full coverage of the earth's surface would  require a minimum 
of  l 0  MEO satellites. 
GEO satellites are  locatt"d  at  .16 000  km  over  lhr e:.rth.  Full 
coverage of the earth's surface would  require only J  <ilH > ~;a­
tdlitcs. 
either in earth stations or, as  in the current case, in 
the satellites  themselves. 
(26)  It is expected that voice service will be the primary 
application  for these systems, but other significant 
segments  will  involve  so-called  mobile  personal 
digital  assistants,  data  transmission  and  paging. 
(27)  LEO and MEO systems (to be used by most of the 
currently announced S-PCS systems) do not present 
a  high  degree  of -substitutability  with  existing  or 
planned GEO systems.  Geostationary satellites  are 
more complex and expensive  than  other satellites. 
They require  more  cooperation  from  the  end-user 
to establish  an  unobstructed, clear line of sight to 
one of the satellites. In addition, power losses  over 
such  great  distances  from  earth  make  hand-held 
portability currently impossible (l).  Sheer distances 
from  earth  also  cause  echo  and  time  delays  (of  a 
magnitude of around  half a  second  that compares 
very badly with  the 20-151  milliseconds of  a  LEO 
system  like  Iridium)  that  seriously  degrade  and 
confuse normal voice communications. In addition, 
GEO subscribers  located  at  high  latitudes (that  is, 
nea.r  the Poles) experience a shadowing effect  that 
makes  the  successful  establishment  of  calls  dif-
ficult. 
(28)  S-PCS systems are expected to act as a complement 
to both GSM and digital cordless telephony within 
fixed  radius  (DECI)  wireless  terrestrial  mobile 
technologies. This will  be  particularly the  case  in 
areas where the cellular network has failed to pene-
trate (namely rural parts of the developed world and 
both urban and rural  parts of lower income coun-
tries)  or where  terrestrial  roaming is  not available 
because  of  incompatible  technologies.  In  this 
respect,  they  will  be  offered  by  GSM  network 
operators  as  an  additional  feature  priced  at  a 
premium  rate. 
However, S-PCS are  not intended to compete with 
terrestrial  cellular and paging systems in urban or 
other densely populated areas because of the advan-
tages  such  cellular  and  paging  systems  have  in 
terms of cost, voice  quality and signal strength. In 
that respect, the performance of S-PCS systems will 
deteriorate in  urban areas, given  the existence of  a 
large number of very densely spaced obstacles (such 
as  buildings). That deterioration will  be exacerbated 
in  moving  automobiles  without  external  antennas 
and,  in  particular,  inside  buildings. 
(1 )  The  smallest  GEO  rcccivt·r  is  as  hi1~  :1s  a  small  hrit•kasc-. 
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(29)  In addition, S-PCS systems are expected to act as  a 
complement and_ even  a  substitute  for  the  public 
switched  fixed  telephone  network,  enhancing 
service  coverage  in remote areas of low  population 
density and/or where the terrestrial infrastructure is 
very  poor. 
(30)  Major users  of S-PCS will  be international business 
travellers using their dual terminals (') in the terres-
trial  mode within a given network and switching to 
satellite in  areas outside terrestrial coverage or with 
incompatible networks. Other important categories 
of  user  will  be  rural  communities,  Government 
communications  and  aeronautical  users. 
2.  Geographical  market 
(31)  When fully  operational, the Iridium system will  be 
able,  from  a  technical  point of view,  to  provide  a 
global  coverage.  However,  the  exact  scope  of  the 
geographical  market  is  difficult  to  ascertain.  In 
addition,  the  conclusions  of  the  Commission  in 
this case will not be affected by whether the IJ?.arket 
is  finally  worldwide  or smaller than  that.  For that 
reason,  the  precise  dimension  of the geographical 
market  can  be  left  open. 
3.  Competition  in  the future S-PCS  market 
(32}  S-PCS  systems  represent  a  market  which  is 
expected  to  result  in  revenues  of  ECU  1  0 000 
million  to  20 000  million during the next decade. 
Competition is  expected to  be  very intense and to 
come not only from other S-PCS systems, but also 
from  terrestrial  networks. 
(33)  A number of alternative  projects  are  known  to  be 
trying  to  offer  hand-held  telecommunication 
services  through  satellite,  some  of  them  (the 
so-called  'little  LEOs')  having  a  more  limited 
product and/or geographical coverage, whilst others 
(the  so-called  'big  LEOs) are  aiming at  the  same 
relevant  market  as  Iridium.  Most  planned  S-PCS 
systems  are  US-led  initiatives.  However,  European 
industry  is  already  substantially  involved  in  the 
announced  S-PCSs.  The most  important competi-
tors  of  Iridium  will  be: 
(
1
)  It is  expected  that  the  price  differential  between  dual-mode 
(satellite and GSM) and single-mode terminals (GSM only) will 
be  as  low  as  10 %. 
- lnmarsat-P/ICO (2) 
(34)  ICO is a S-PCS system sponsored by Inmarsat and 
a  substantial  number  of  its  signatories.  Unlike 
Iridium  it  will  use  10  satellites  in  ICO  (inter-
mediate  circular orbit,  an  orbit which  is  included 
among MBO  orbits)  to  provide global  mobile  and 
other  ancillary  telecommunications  services.  The 
system is expected to be  op~rational by the end of 
the year  2000. The cost of  the system  approaches 
USD  3  billion. 
- Globalstar 
(35)  Globalstar intends to  set up a S-PCS  system  using 
48  LEO satellites. The Globalstar consortium is  led 
and sponsored by  the  Loral  Corporation, a leading 
US  defence  electronics  and  space  company.  Part-
ners/contractors  include  the  European  aerospace 
companies  Alcatel  (France),  Aerospatiale  (France), 
Alenia  (Italy),  Deutsche  Aerospace  (Germany)  and 
Tesa·m,  a  joint  venture  created  by  Alcatel  and 
France  Telecom.  The  total  cost  of  the  system  is 
estimated  at  USD  2 000  million. 
Globalstar expects  to  begin  launching satellites  in 
the second half of  1997 and to  commence  initial 
commercial  operations  via  a  24-satellite  constella-
tion  in  1998.  Full  global  coverage,  via  the 
48-satellite  constellation,  is  expected  to  be  estab-
lished  in  the  first  half  of  1999. 
-Odyssey 
(36)  The Odyssey S-PCS system is supported by the US 
aerospace  company TRW and  the  Canadian  tele-
communications  operator  Teleglobe  Inc.  Odyssey 
will consist of 12 MBO satellites and is expected to 
be  operational  by  1999. 
E.  The notified agreements 
(37)  The  notified  agreements  are  the following: 
- the  'terrestrial  network  development  contract' 
between  Iridium  and  Motorola, 
- the  'stock  purchase  agreements',  induding 
those  signed  with  Stet  and  Vebacom, 
- the 'space system contract' between Iridium and 
Motorola, 
(Z)  For details of the Inmarsat-P system see Article 19 (3)  Notice: 
OJ No  C  304,  15.  11.  1995,  p.  6.  . 
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- the 'Iridium communications system operations 
and maintenance contract' between Iridium and 
Motorola,  and 
- the  'gateway  authorization  agreements' 
concluded·  between  Iridium  and  Stet  and 
Vebacom. 
(38)  In a subsequent submission, the parties provided a 
standard  (non-b~ndii1g) MoU to be used 'by gateway 
operators for  the  appointment of service  providers 
and  the  'service  provider  appointment  guide  for 
Iridium gateway  operators'. 
F.  Third  party observations 
(39)  Following the publication pursuant to Article 19 (3) 
of Regulation  17 and Article 3 of Protocol 21  of the 
EEA  Agreement,  comments  were  received  from 
three interested parties. These comments were fully 
assessed  by  the Commission but proved  not to  be 
such  as  to  cause  the  Commission  to  modify  its 
original . favourable  position. 
II.  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A~ Application  of  Article  85  (1)  of  the  EC 
Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the EEA Agree-
ment to. the creation of Iridium 
(40)  On  the  basis  of  arguments  developed  below,  the 
partners of Iridium are  not to be considered to be 
actual  or  potential  competitors  in  the  S-PCS 
market: 
- the S-PCS concept is  yet untried. By  its  nature, 
S-PCS  network  implementation  is  a  complex 
programme  involving  considerable  risk,  and 
will  not  prove  itself  until  deployed  in  the 
operational  configuration  and  loaded  with  a 
significant volume  of  traffic,  something which 
will not happen until the early years of the next 
century, 
- no ·investor  in  Iridium  could  reasonably  be 
expected to make th·e  necessary financial invest-
ment to set up and operate a worldwide S-PCS 
system.  As  indicated  above,  the  investment 
required  for  the  setting-up  of  the  Iridium 
system approaches USD 5 000 million. Such an 
amount  is  furthermore  comparable  to  that  of 
competing S-PCS  world-wide  systems, 
in  addition, no investor in Iridium is  in a posi-
tion  to assume  the substantial  risk  o£  technical 
failure  inherent  in  space  opt~latiom. Launching 
failures ( 1~ satellites  which  are  unable  to  reach 
their final  position from their transit ·orbit, and 
satellites which do not work properly or which 
go out of control once in their final position are 
still quite common hazards in space operations, 
and if one of these  happens, it usually entails 
the  total  loss  of  the  satellite  (it  is  already 
possible to recover or repair a satellite in orbit, 
but doing so  is  prohibitively expensive). 
To  that risk  has  to  be added  the possibility of 
commercial  failure  inherent  in  the  fact  that 
S-PCS systems are a completely novel and even 
revolutionary concept which,  in  the developed 
part  of  the  world,  are  expected  to  encounter 
tough  competition  from  cellular  terrestrial 
mobile  services  and  from  competing  S-PCS 
systems, 
furthermore,  given  the  global  reach  of  the 
system, no investor in  Iridium holds the neces-
sary  authorizations  and  licences  to  provide 
international  telecommunication  services  on  a 
worldwide basis through satellite. In order to set 
· up  and  operate  a  S-PCS  system,  such  as 
Iridium, the following  regulatory  approvals  are 
required: 
(a)  the  international  allocation  by  a  World 
Radiocommunication Conference (WRq of 
the  International  Telecommunications 
Union  (ITU)  of  the  spectrum  required  for 
the  system  user, gateway  and  inter-satellite 
links. WRC-92 and 95 dealt with the spec-
trum  allocation  issues, 
(b)  a  licence  by  the  relevant  regulatory  au-
thority  for  the  construction,  launch  and 
operation  of  the  satellite  constellation  (as 
regards  Iridium,  the  Federal  Communica-
tions  Commission  of  the  US  granted  the 
required  licenses  in  January  1995.  Four 
other  US-based  S-PCS  systems,  including 
Globalstar  and  Odyssey,  were  also  granted 
licences), 
(c)  in  each  country  in  which  a  gateway  or a 
system  control  terminal  will  be  located, an 
authorization to  construct and operate those 
facilities, 
(d)  in  each  country in  which subscriber equip-
ment will  operate, authority to  operate that 
(') lbe level  of launch concentration in  Iridium (66 satellites to 
bt·  launched - launching several satellites at a time - in just 
24  months) has nor previously heen undl"rtaken on a  comnu~r­
t·ial  basi~. 
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equipment with  the  system,  including  the 
necessary  user  link spectrum(!), 
(e)  international  coordination  of  the  system 
with other entities using or proposing to use 
the  spectrum  required  for  the  system  in 
order  to  ensure  the  avoidance  of  harmful 
interference, 
and 
(f)  consultation  with  Intclsat  and  Inmarsat  to 
ensure technical compatibility and  to  avoid 
significant  economic  harm  to  them, 
finally,  the array of technologies  required for  a 
S-PCS  system  is  outside the  individual capabil-
ities  of investors  in  Iridium.  Even  if  Motorola 
has  title  to  many of  the  technologies  required 
for  the Iridium system, a number of  the inves-
tors have a crucial role in  developing important 
elements  of  the  system  that  are  outside  the 
capabilities  of  Motorola.  That  is  the  case  of 
Lockheed  Martin  for  the  satellites  themselves, 
of Raytheon  for  the  antennas,  of  China Great 
Wall and. Khrunichev for the launchers, and so 
on. 
(41)  In conclusion, in view of the above, the creation of 
Iridium  means  the  introduction  of  a  viable  com-
petitor in  a  completely new mobile telecommuni-
cations field and, as  such, falls outside the scope of 
both Article 85 (I) of the EC Treaty and Article 53 
(I) of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
B.  Application  of  Article  85  (1)  of  the  EC 
Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the EEA Agree-
ment  to  the  pricing  policies  of  Iridium 
and to the distribution of Iridium services: 
ancillary restraints 
(42)  According  to  paragraph  3  (1)  of  each  gateway 
authorization  agreement,  the  Iridium  BOD  will 
establish  the  charge  for  accessing  the  space 
segment (owned  by  Iridium).  In  addition,  it  may 
suggest  pricing  policies  as  guidelines.  Under  the 
guidelines,  which  take  into  account  Iridium's 
charge  for  access  to  the  space  segment,  gateway 
operators are  free  to set their own  prices within  a 
certain  range. The guidelines refer also  to  rules for 
the repartition of charges between gateways in calls 
(
1
)  In  the  Community,  although  exclusive  and  s~cial rights  in 
respect of the  use of terminal equipment and of the  provision 
of  telecommunication  services  (excluding  voice  telephony 
until  1998) have  been  recently abolished (Commission  Direc-
tive  94/46/EC  of  13  October  1994;  OJ  No  L 268,  19.  10. 
1995,  p.  15),  a common  approach  to  frequency-licensing  has 
not  been  developed  yet 
that use  multiple gateways,  currency  requirements 
and  exchange  rates.  Each  gateway  operator  is 
expected  to  comply  with  these  guidelines  to  the 
extent permitted by applicable law and regulation. 
The  guidelines  are  aimed  at  maintammg  the 
coherence  and  the  integrality  of  the  world-wide 
service that Iridium will provide. Such coherence is 
particularly  important  for  potential  users  of  the 
system. They will  most of  the time be  moving in 
different areas  of the world  but they will  neverthe-
less  want  to  receive  a  single  bill  in  a  single 
currency. On  that  basis,  as  was  recognized  in  the 
IPSP  Decision (1),  the  prinl·iplc  of  uniform  prices 
:md  other  conditions  in  diffcrt'nl  ll'nitoril·s,  ro-
gcthcr with the implementation of  markl'ting pr:K-
tices  in a decentralized  manner, seems appropri:1le 
to  fulfil  customers'  needs. 
(43)  The  distribution  of  Iridium  serviCl'S  will  he 
organised  around  on  the  one  hand  the  gateway 
operators - the  strategic  investors  in  Iridium  -
which  have.  exclusive  rights  over  their  respective 
territories and on the other hand the service  provi-
ders which are  nominated by gateway operators. in 
general  on  a  non-exclusive  basis.  Iridium,  as 
'producer'  of  the  services  will  keep  some  central 
functions  to  ensure  the  coherence  of  the  system. 
(44)  According to  paragraph  3  of every Stock  Purchase 
Agreement, investors in the Iridium system (that is, 
the gateway operators) will  get exclusive  rights  for 
the  territory  provided  for  in  that  agreement.  The 
exclusive  rights  basically  mean  that  no  other 
company  will  acquire  rights  from  Iridium  (i)  to 
build  and  operate  a  gateway  within  that  territory 
and (ii)  to  provid~ the  Iridium services  inside  the 
territory.  In  exchange,  gateway  operators  must 
build,  maintain  and  operate  the  gateway  and 
perform several  other tasks,  such  as  obtaining the 
necessary  regulatory  approvals  for  the  Iridium 
system in the countries included in their respective 
territories, which can be costly and cumbersome. In 
this respect, and taking into a.ccount  the very  high 
risks entailed by  the  Iridium system  and  the  need 
to attract gateway operators covering all  parts of the 
world, such exclusivity can be seen as  an incentive 
to  investors  to  assume  these  risks. 
(45)  In addition, any possible restrictive effect resulting 
from  the  exclusivity  is  reduced  by  the  following 
facts: 
1.  neither gateway  operators  nor service  providers 
are  prevented  from·  dealing  with  competing 
systems.  As  regards  services  providers,  it  is 
indeed  expected  that  some  of  them  (usually 
terrestrial  cellular  operators)  will  be  service 
(1)  OJ  No  L 354,  31.  12.  1994,  p.  75  (paragraph  55). 
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providers for as many S-PCS systems as possible 
in  order to  increase  the  attractiveness  of  their 
own  cellular  offerings  to  customers  (S-PCS 
systems  will  be  a  premium,  complementary 
service  to  cellular terrestrial  Qfferings). 
In  this  respect,  as  regards STET,  which  is  the 
only partner still having exclusive rights for the 
provision  of  telecommunications  services  and 
infrastructures,  the  parties  have  confirmed  that 
the Iridium agreements will not affect the ability 
of any other company or person to gain access 
to  the  telecommunications  infrastructure  of 
SfET other  than  those  SfET facilities  speci-
fically  developed  for  the  Iridium  system; 
2.  the agreements do not prohibit service providers 
from  selling  the  Iridium  service  to  customers 
which  are  not  lo!=ated  in  the  same  area  or 
country as  the  gateway  operator  investor; 
3.  the  intelligence  on  board  the  satellites  allows 
.any user to be reached from any gateway. In this 
respect, it is planned that subscribers (customers) 
of a  given  gateway  that  move  to  another  area 
will  keep  their former contract and will  not be 
obliged  to  sign  a  new contract  with  a  service 
provider of the gateway operator with  exclusive 
rights over  ~he new country to which they have 
moved; 
4.  given the global nature of the services, a single 
call  will  usually  involve  several  gateways; 
5.  the  intense  competition  for  Iridium  services 
expected  from  other S-PCS  systems  and other 
terrestrial  cellular systems; 
and 
6.  all  capacity provided for by the Iridium system 
satellites  will  be  used  by  Iridium,  its  gateway 
operators  investors  and designated  service  pro-
viders  for  their  telecommunication  services. 
There  will  be  no  spare  capacity  available  for 
third  parties. 
(46)  Finally, exclusivity is  also a result of the configura-
tion of the sateJiites: each satellite has antennas to 
link  at  any  one  time  with  only  three  gateways 
within  its  footprint  (a  fourth  antenna  is  kept  as 
reserve  in  case  of  failure).  This  feature  requires  a 
limited  number of  gateways. 
(47)  As for the guidelines for the appointment of service 
providers, it appears to the Commission that selec-
tion  criteria  described  above  are  objective  and . 
qualitative. 
(48)  On the basis of the particular circumstances of the 
present case,  it  can  be  concluded  that the  pricing 
policies  as  guidelines,  the  exclusivity  granted  to 
gateway  operators  and  the  guidelines  for  service 
' provider selection are directly related and necessary 
to the successful implementation and operation of 
the  Iridium  system.  Hence  they  have  to  be 
regarded  as  ancillary  restraints  to  the  Iridium 
system  under  the  competition · rules  of  the  EC 
Treaty and  the  EEA Agreement. 
However, the above conclusion regarding the ancil-
lary  nature  of  the  exclusive  rights  granted  to 
gateway operator investors could be revisited should 
the particular circumstances of the case change in a 
substantial manner. Such would be in particular the 
case should Iridium acquire a dominant position in 
respect  of the  actual  provision  of S-PCS  services. 
(49)  Ancillary restraints are to  be assessed together with 
the  creation  of  the  company.  In  this  respect,  as 
Iridium has been found not to fall  within the scope 
of both Article 85 (1) of the EC Treaty and Article 
53  (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement,  then  neither  do 
provisions  detailed  above, 
HAS  ADOPTED THIS  DECISION: 
Article  I 
On the basis of the facts  in  its  posse-ssion,  the Commis-
sion has no grounds for action under Article 85 (1) of th(' 
EC  Treaty and Article  53  (1)  of the  EEA  Agreement  in 
respect of the notified agreements relating to the creation 
of  Iridium. 
Article  2 
On the basis  of the facts  in its  possession, the Commis-
sion has no grounds for action under Article 85 (I) of the 
EC  Treaty and Article  53  (1)  of the EEA Agreement in 
respect  of  the  pricing  policies  to  be  established  by 
Iridium  as  guidelines  under  Paragraph  3.1  of  each 
Gateway  Authorization  Agreement,  in  respect  of  the 
exclusive  distribution  rights granted  to  gateway  investor 
operators  under  Paragraph  3  of  every  Stock  Purchase 
Agreement and  in  respect  of  the  guidelines  for  service 
provider  selection  as  notified. 
Article 3 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to: 
Iridium  LLC, 
1401  H.  Street,  NW, 
Washington,  DC  20005, 
USA. 
Done  at  Brussels,  18  December  1996. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member of the  Commission 
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Texte du document: 
COMMISSION DECISION of29 October i997 reiating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the 
EC Treaty and Article 53 of  the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/35.830- Unisource) (Only the Dutch. 
English and Swedish texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (97 /7RO/E(') 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, 
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of  6 February 1962, first Regulation implementing 
Articles 85 and 86 of  the Treaty (1), as last amended by the Act of  Accession of  Austria, Finland and 
Sweden, and in particular Articles 6 and 8 thereof, 
Having regard to the notification for exemption submitted pursuant to Article 4 of  Regulation No 17 
on 4 March 1996, 
Having regard to the summary of  the application and notification published pursuant to Article  1  g  ( 3) 
of  Regulation No 17 and to Article 3 of  Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement (2), 
After consultation with the Advisory Committee for Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions. 
Whereas: 
I.  THE FACTS 
A.  Introduction 
(1) Unisource NV (hereinafter 'Unisource') was established on 24 April1992 as a 50-50 joint venture 
between PTT Telecom BV, the Dutch telecommunications operator, and Swedish Telecom 
International, a subsidiary ofTeleverket, the predecessor ofTelia AB, a Swedish telecommunications 
operator, for the purpose of  concentrating the international value added networks of  the two parties. 
The parties actually transferred the corresponding networks as from I January 1993 . 
. The joint venture was first expanded on 4 November 1992 by the entry of  Schweizerische 
PTT-Betriebe (Swiss PTT) into a subsidiary ofUnisource, Unisource Satellite Services BV, and later, 
on 1 July 1993, by the entry of  Swiss PTT into Unisource. During 1994, Unisource and Telefonica 
started negotiations aimed at the entry of  Telef6nic~ into Unisource. The result of  those negotiations 
was the original agreements notified to the Commission pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 (3) (the Merger Control Regulation) on 29 September 1995, which provided for the creation 
ofUnisource International NV, a joint venture between Unisource and Telef(lnica. 
(2) On 6 November 1995, the Commission concluded that the notified operation did not constitute a 
concentration within the meaning of  Article 3 (2} of  the Merger Regulation and adopted a Decision to 
that effect in application of  Article 6 (1) (a) of  the Merger Control Regulation (4). Following ttte 
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Commission's decision and at the request of  the parties the notification was converted into a 
notification under Regulation No 17. 
(3) However, as a result-offurther negotiations between the parties carried out in parallel to the 
assessment by the Commission ofUnisource International NV, the structure of  the transaction was 
modified. Under the modified structure, Telef6nica was to contribute to Unisource its subsidiaries 
Telef6nica Transmisi6n de Datos SA and Te1ef6nica VSAT SA in exchange for a 25 o/o participation 
in the capit~ ofUnisource. The modified transaction was finally notified on 4 March 1996. 
On 18 April1997, Telef6nica and BT announced that they had entered into a strategic alliance. That 
alliance will at first cover joint activities of  the new partners in the Americas but it foresees, as 
subsequent· steps, further commitments in respect of  Spain, the rest of  Europe and the rest of  the 
world. 
Following that public announcement, the Commission requested information from Unisource and 
Telef6nica in respect of  the consequences of  that new alliance on the participation ofTelef6nica in 
Unisource. The answers from both confirmed that Unisource, its shareholders and Telef6nica were in 
discussions about the withdrawal ofTelef6nica from Unisource. The withdrawal will be formalized as 
soon as both parties agree on a number of  relevant issues. According to Unisource, Telefonica has not 
physically participated in any decision-making body of Unisource since 18 April  1997. 
Therefore, the position to be taken on the notification must be based on the tbllowing assumptions: 
-only the contribution agreement with·Telef6nica will not stay in force, 
-there will be changes regarding activities in Spain and South America; it is for that reason that all 
references to the participation ofTelef6nica and/or to Spain have been removed, 
- Telef6nica will recover the full ownership of  the assets originally contributed to Unisotirce, namely 
the Spanish public switched data network and Telef6nica's satellite unit. In addition, it \Vill sell its 
current shares in Unisource to the remaining shareholders, 
-finally, pending the conclusion of  the ongoing negotiations with Unisource, Telef6nica will continue 
to be responsible for the distribution of  Unisource products in Spain to existing customers of  such 
serv1ces. 
Should any of  these assumptions prove to be wrong, the Commission might have to reassess the 
present Decision in the light of  Article 8 ofRe~lation  No 17. 
B. The shareholders ofUnisource 
(4) PTT Telecom BV (PTT Telecom) is the incumbent telecommunications operator in the 
Netherlands, where it provides national and international telecommunications services and 
infrastructure. 
Royal PTT Netherlands NV (KPN), a public company, owns 100% of  the shares in PTT Telecom. 
Currently, the Dutch State holds approximately 44 % of  the outstanding ordinary shares of  KPN (it is 
also the owner ofPTT Post). 
KPN's turnover in 1994 was Fll8 592 million (ECU 8 769 million), ofwhich Fll2 686 n1illion (some 
ECU 6 000 million) was accounted for by PTT Telecom. 
(5) Schweizerische PTT  -Betriebe (Swiss PTT) is an incorporated public-law institution which is pa.rt 
of  the Swiss federal administration. It encompasses post and telecommunications. Total turnover of 
SwissPTT in  1994 was Sfrs 13  838 million (ECU 8 989 million) of  which telecommunications 
(services and infrastructures accounted for Sfrs 9 256 million (ECU 6 0 I 0 million). 
(6) Telia AB is a telecommunications operator providing domestic and international 
telecommunications services and infrastructure in Sweden. It is a limited liability company 
incorporated under Swedish law. All shares are owned ·by the Swedish State. 
Telia's turnover in  1995 was Skr 41,066 million (ECU 4,729 million). 
C. The joint venture: Unisource 
(7) Unisource is a holding company active in the telecommunications sector that incorporates seven 
operating subsidiaries. Total turnover of  the group in 1994 was Fl 933 million (ECU 443 million). Net 
result was losses ofFI41,072 million (ECU 20 million). 
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1.  Structure of  Unisource 
(8) Unisource is governed· by a Management Board and a Supervisory Board. 
- The Management Board, which is entrusted with the day-to-day business of  Unisource, is composed 
of  three members appointed by the general meeting of  shareholders acting unanimously. The three 
members are the President and Chief  Executive Officer, the Executive vice-pre~ident and Chief 
Financial Officer and the Executive vice-president and Direc.tor of  Business Services. All decisions by 
the Management Board are adopted by a majority of  the votes (5). 
- The Supervisory Board exercises supervision over the Management Board's conduct of  affairs and 
over the general course of  business in Unisource and the operating companies. The Supervisory Board 
is composed of  three members appointed by the general meeting of  shareholders. Each shareholder 
nominates one of  them. There is a chairman. The position of  chairman rotates every two years. 
Most resolutions of  the Supervisory Board (including the annual budget and business plan) are to be 
adopted by unanimity of  the votes cast (6). 
Every operational subsidiary has its own Board of  Directors or management team responsible for the 
day-to-day business of  the subsidiary. 
- The Supervisory Board is to report to the general meeting of  shareholders. 
2. Scope of  activities of Unisource 
(9) According to Unisource, the activities of  the group can be split into three main areas: business 
services, personal services and network services. The following subsidiaries operate in each of  those 
areas: 
(a) Business services 
{10) Unisource Business Networks (UBN) is responsible for the provision of  pan-European, seamless, 
end-to-end data network services, managed bandwidth services, messaging and outsourcing. UBN has 
subsidiaries in Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Italy. 
(II) In addition, the respective domestic packet switched data networks (PSDN) of  the Unisource 
initial parent companies were contributed in 1993 to the respective domestic UBN subsidiaries. 
The UBN subsidiaries own and operate the data nodes, the associated databases and the network 
control centres. Basic services (leased circuits) are provided to the UBN domestic subsidiary hy the 
relevant Unisource shareholder. The latter resells the Unisource services to its local customer hase. 
The networks are used to support the offering of  pan-European services and purely domestic services. 
The country-specific domestic services are branded Unisource. 
Each national network is based on the same technology. They are interfaced through a common 
backbone network owned by Unisource (Unidata). Furthermore, the respective PSDN services 
available in each country are being aligned with Unisource' Unidata PSDN service to create a basic 
PSDN service with a wider reach. 
Finally, the three packet switched data networks (PSDN) and Unidata share their international X.  75 
gateways. 
( 12) Unisource Voice Services (UVS) is in fact a business unit of  Unisource offering pan-European 
voice international virtual private network (IVPN) services and other closed user group services. 
(13) Unisource Satellite Services (USS) offers international value-added, voice, video, text and data 
communications using fixed and very small aperture terminal (VSAT) satellite terminals. It allows 
UBN services to be extended to remote areas outside terrestrial coverage. 
(b) Personal services 
( 14) Unisource Card Services (UC) offers personal and corporate post-paid calling cards. 
( I5) Unisource Mobile (UM) is a provider of pan-European GSM mobile services. It also applies for 
licences for mobile networks operators in Europe, outside the home countries. 
UM has three subsidiaries. GEAB AB in Sweden, GEAB Norge AS in Norway and TMG Gmbl-l in 
Germany which act as distributors and retail outlets for the national mobile services in these countries. 
For example, in Norway GEAB acts as distributor ofTelenor Mobile and Netcom and in Germany 
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TMG is a service provider for the German Dl, D2 and E Plus networks. 
(16) UM is currently developing a Virtual Mobile Network to provide seamless pan-European mobile 
telephony services based on GSM technology at a significant discount to standard roaming tariffs. 
(c) Network services 
(17) Unisource Carrier Services (UCS) is currently responsible for managing the international · 
networks (7) of  the shareholders ofUnisource. It is organized as a management company given that 
the Unisource shareholders are not permitted to assign their international networks and licences to it. 
At present, UCS only offers services to the shareholders ofUnisource and Uniworld. However, in 
1997 it is starting to provide network services to third parties in its own name on the basis of  network 
services purchased from the Unisource shareholders (and other operators) and resold in an integrated  , 
manner to service providers. The terms and conditions for the provision of  network services will be 
laid down in supply agreements between each Unisource shareholder and UCS (8). 
(18) UCS  i.s a crucial element for Unisource. In the future it will provide ·carrier's carrier services to 
other services providers. For that purpose, it is building a pan-European network (PEN) with global 
connectivity based on SDH (9) technology in those countries where regulation allows. 
The PEN will be an integrated, centrally managed network that will provide seamless 
telecommunications services in Europe. It will take advantage of  its presence in many European 
countries to offer an improvement on the current system of  bilateral settlements. 
The PEN will be deployed in two phases. The first phase, due to be completed in the third quarter of 
1996, consists of  a managed high-capacity network between the three home countries with centralized 
management and customer support. The second phase is due to be completed by  l January  l9lJ8. By 
then it will be extended to non-shareholder countries and enhanced in order to provide signalling and 
intelligent network services to customers. 
The services provided on the PEN will include switched transit services, switched hubbing services, 
managed bandwidth services, delivery of  PSTN and ISDN traffic and signalling services. 
(19) Outside that structure there is another subsidiary, Itema (to be renamed Unisource Information 
Services) active in the information technology field.  It provides information services (IS) and 
information technology (IT) services to the Unisource group and to identified cotnmon projects in the 
Unisource alliance. It also plays a leading role in the harmonization process between the IS/IT services 
of  the Unisource shareholders. 
A management agreement has been signed to subcontract the management, coordination and 
supervision of  certain projects and programmes to Itema. It receives a general management tee tor its 
activities. 
3. The Unisource alliance: the one telecom country 
(20) According to the Unisource 'Organization and Governance' document, one of  the aims of  the 
alliance is 'to improve time to market and cost-effectiveness by merging or coordinating activities of 
. the parent companies and creating service transparency between mother countries'. This is the 
definition of  what the parties call'the one telecom country'. That concept translates into a structure 
which is separate and independent from the structure of  Unisource and comprises the following 
alliance boards. 
Network Board (NB) 
Its mission will be the adoption of  strategic decisions concerning network questions to establish one 
transparent network and to use all opportunities to reduce costs, and the harmonization and 
integration of  national networks and architectures, both as between the shareholders and with 
Unisource Carrier Services (see below).  Its members will include the presidents of  the companies 
involved. 
Service and Distribution Board (S& DB) 
Its missions ·will be the adoption of  strategic decisions concerning the joint service portfolio and its 
coordination, the harmonization and integration of  national services of  the parent companies between 
themselves and with the relevant U nisource services. 
R&D Board 
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Responsible for the adoption of  strategic decisions regarding annual joint research and development of 
portfolios and regarding R&D optimization. It will also support the NB and S& DB. 
Purchasing Board (PB) 
Mainly responsible for creating common opinions and making decisions about areas suitable for 
common purchasing and for harmonizing the process of  purchasing and logistics both in support 
systems and in approach to the supplier market. 
IT Board  . 
Responsible for the adoption of  strategic decisions concerning planning, provisioning and 
implementation of  IT across the alliance members, the harmonization and integration of  national IT 
systems between the parent companies and with the IT systems of  Unisource. 
D.  The notified agreements 
I.  Agreements 
(21) The parties have notified the following agreements regarding Unisource: 
- the joint venture and shareholders' agreement and its appendices, 
- the contribution agreement, 
- the articles of  association, 
- the by-laws, 
- the share issuance deed, and 
- the non-competition agreements for UBN, USS, UC and UM. 
2.  Contractual provisions 
(a) The non-competition provisions 
(22) In accordance with Article 19 of  the joint venture and shareholders agreements, the parties are 
free to conduct, outside Unisource and independently of  each other, all activities whether or not 
within the areas of  cooperation. Nevertheless, at such time as they agree to develop or acquire or 
participate in an operating company, they must negotiate and conclude a non-competition agreement 
specifically geared to the business activities to be conducted by that operating company. 
So far,  four such non-competition agreements have been concluded in respect of  the activities of 
UBN, USS, UC and UM. 
-Under the non-competition agreement for UBN's activities, the parties decide to concentrate their 
international value-added data network services in UBN. Thus, and except with regard to lnfonet 
services, none ofthe three will offer comparable services in parallel to the UBN portfolio. Each of 
them will offer to their respective national markets the UBN product portfolio as an agent or 
distributor of  UBN. 
-Under the non-competition agreement for USS, none of  the parties will offer comparable VSAT 
services in parallel to the USS portfolio. Each of  them will distribute the USS product portfolio to 
their respective national markets as an agent or distributor ofUSS. 
- Under the non-competition provision for UC, the parties have decided to concentrate on UC the 
ownership and operation of  the technical platform for non-payphone calling card services and product 
development. .Consequently, none of  them will offer comparable services in parallel to the UC 
pan-European product portfolio. Nonetheless, each ofthem will continue to market their own 
non-payphone calling cards within their respective national markets, and UC will market and distribute 
its cards on a real pan-European scale. 
-Finally, the non-competition provision for Unisource Mobile (GSM and DCS 1800) services requires 
the Unisource shareholders not to act as pan-European mobile service providers outside their 
territories in parallel to the UM product portfolio. However, each of  them will continue otlering their 
GSM services at home and abroad through the relevant roaming agreements concluded under the 
framework of  the GSM Memorandum of  Understanding (MoU). 
(b) Distribution of  services 
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(23) The services ofUBN (IO), UVS and USS will be distributed through exclusive distributors. Each 
of  the Unisource shareholders is the exclusive distributor for its own country (Telia is also the 
exclusive distributor for Norway and Denmark). Exclusive distributors must not actively seek 
customers outside their territories and are bound by non-competitio~ provisions (II). 
E. Relevant markets 
(24) The relevant markets involved are the following (I2): 
I. Product markets 
(a) The markets for non-reserved corporate telecommunications services 
(25) Unisource, through UBN, UVS and USS, targets the markets for both customized packages of 
corporate telecommunications services and packet-switched data communications services, jointly 
referred to as 'non-reserved corporate telecommunications services'. The services to be offered fall 
within the following categories: 
-corporate voice services: global virtual private network (VPN), international toll free, selected card 
arid simple resale services and switched digital, 
-data communications services using in particular the X.25, Frame Relay and Internet protocols (IP), 
-dedicated transmission for voice and data services: managed bandwidth and VSAT, 
-custom network solutions: systems/equipment procurement, tailored and managed services and 
outsourcing, 
-platform-based enhanced services: messaging including access to telex, local area network (LAN) 
interconnection, electronic document interchange (EDI), videoconferencing and audioconferencing. 
(b) The market for traveller services 
(26) The market for traveller telecommunications services comprises offerings that n1eet the demand 
of  individuals who are -away from their normal location, either at home or at work. Among the n1ost 
relevant of  these offerings are calling card services (that is, prepaid cards with or without a code and 
post-paid cards), including those in combination with credit cards and other branded service cards 
('affinity cards'). 
{27) The pan-European GSM mobile services being developed by UM, are also mainly intended to 
serve the needs of  traveller services and for that reason are included here as well. However, they are 
also seen as a GSM mobile extension to corporate customers' fixed private or virtual private networks~ 
the possibility cannot be excluded now that in the future they will have to be included in the market for 
non-reserved corporate telecommunications services. 
(c) The market for carrier.services 
(28) The market for carrier services comprises the lease of  transmission capacity and the provision of 
related services to third-party telecommunications traffic carriers and service providers. Along with 
liberalization and globalization of  telecon1munications markets, demand for etlicient, high-quality 
traffic transportation capacity has risen among old and new carriers. In this connection, the traditional 
model of  separate arrangements with other individual carriers is increasingly challenged by players 
with global network infrastructure that offer an array of  services. The most relevant of  such services 
are: 
- switched transit, that is transport of  traffic over bilateral facilities between the originating carrier, the 
transit carrier and the terminating carrier; neither the originating carrier nor the terminating carrier 
need bilateral facilities between themselves, but only with the transit carrier, 
- dedicated transit, that is leased line offerings for the transport of  traffic through the domestic 
network of  the transit carrier~ leased line facilities used for this purpose may include discrete voice 
circuits or a high-bandwidth digital circuit that can be used for both voice and data services, 
- traffic hub bing offerings, where the provider takes care of  all or part of  international connections~ 
these offerings are typically designed for emerging carriers; who are interconnected with the provider 
over bilateral facilities and whose international traffic is merged with other traffic on the provider's 
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global network, and 
- reseller services for service providers without international telecommunications facilities of  their 
own:. 
Demand for carrier services is increasingly driven by alternative carriers concerned at entrusting their 
international traffic to the incumbent TO for reasons such as technical dependency and commercial 
sensitivity of  customer information. 
Purchasers of  carrier services include established and emerging carriers. Both groups of  clients are 
sophisticated purchasers. Among the emerging carriers, one may distinguish facilities-based carriers 
that provide telecommunications services over alternative infrastructure or cable television networks 
seeking greater efficiency in the transport of  international client traffic, from non facilities-based 
carriers and service providers who seek to preserve a competitive advantage by avoiding dependence 
on a local TO for international client traffic. 
2.  Geographic markets 
(29) With the exceptions described below regarding national markets, the geographic scope of 
services marketed by Unisource through its different affiliates, is cross-border regional, pan-European 
in this case. It is possible, however, that some services may be offered 'Yith a global reach, depending 
on. the needs of  particular customers. 
(a) The markets for non-reserved corporate telecommunications services 
(30) There is a direct relationship between cost and price of  services within the category of 
non-reserved corporate telecommunications services and the geographical coverage requested by 
customers. Differences are quite substantial and are mainly based on the cost of  either leasing lines or 
establishing an ad hoc infrastructure in other parts of  the _world and guaranteeing service levels even in 
respect of  very remote locations. In that respect, demand by large users for non-reserved corporate 
telecommunications services exists on at least three distinct geographic levels~ namely at a global leveL 
a cross-border regional level (pan-European in the present case) and a national level. 
Packet-switched data communications services within this category are offered by Unisource, through 
UBN (and the domestic subsidiaries thereof) at a cross-border regional and national level in the 
different Member States involved. 
(b) The market for.traveller services 
(31) The market for traveller services appears to be increasingly global: travellers demand services 
which include a single bill and which integrate functions such as voice messaging, voice response and 
information systems everywhere. Geographic limitations of  current traveller service offerings are 
generally due to technical shortcomings which are set to be overcome in the near future, such as the 
· incompatibility of  mobile communications systems or differences in prepaid cards without an 
individual user code. However, the geographic scope of  the services offered by Unisource can be left 
open for the purposes of  this case, since the finding of  narrow geographic markets would not affect 
the assessment of  the parties' competitive position. 
(c) The market for carrier services 
(32) By their very nature, both supply of  and demand for carrier services are at least cross-border 
regional. Geographic proximity between purchaser and supplier of  switched transit capacity is hardly 
relevant for switched transit which carriers use either as a substitute tbr operating own international 
lines or to deal with peak traffic on such lines. Likewise, dedicated transit services offer cable- or 
satellite-based routing capacity across third countries. Finally, using hubbing services is an alternative 
to entering into an undetermined number of  bilateral agreements with individual carriers. 
J. Market shares of  the parties 
(a) Cross-border regional markets 
(33) Unisource's estimates of  its own market shares for 1994 were slightly above 5% in the EEA. plus 
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Switzerland in respect of  value added services to corporations (encompassing most of  the services 
within the three markets above) and slightly over 15% for Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) 
services. 
(b) Nat~onal markets 
(34) As regards domestic packet switched data communication services, in 1995, Telia had 78% in 
Sweden {13), PTT Telecom over 95% in Netherlands and Swiss PTT nearly 100% in Switzerland. 
Market figures for the same year in respect of  the overall dome~tic telecommunications services were 
91  % for Telia, nearly 100 % for PTT Telecom and nearly I 00 % for Swiss PTT. 
4. Competition in the markets 
(a) Cross-border regional or global markets 
{35) Many players, acting alone or jointly with partners, have entered or are entering the cross-border 
regional or global markets defined above: 
-the market for non-reserved corporate telecommunications services: BT-MC'I's (14) Concert and 
Atlas/Global One are expected to become major players on a ·global basis~ to those it is necessary to 
add some other important players like Sita or IPSP (International Private Satellite Partners). 
-the market for traveller services: many companies are actively marketing calling cards, such as US 
firms like AT&T, MCI and Spring and alliances like Global One; in addition, most European 
telecommunications operators and some new entrants are launching direct-to-home or collect-call 
services in order to follow their customers abroad, 
- the market for carrier services: all telecommunications operators compete with each other in the 
provision of  transit and hub bing services; a few c~mpanies are entering the market on a cross-border 
regional or global basis; Global One and Hermes are, in principle, the most important ones. 
(b) National markets 
{36) Each of  the shareholders of Unisource faces a number of  competitors in its respective domestic 
markets for packet switched data communication services. Such services are completely lihcraht.t'd in 
Sweden, several licences were granted in the Netherlands on l July 1996 with full liberalization 
implemented on 1 July 1997, and several licences have been granted in Switzerland. Some of the 
companies concerned (such as Telenordia of  Sweden) are also the domestic extensions of  the global 
alliances. 
F.  Changes made and undertakings given further to .the Commission's interVention 
{3 7) Certain features of  the notified transaction appeared to be incompatible with Community 
competition rules. Consequently, the Commission, by letter of  7 May 1996, informed the parties of  its 
concerns. In the course of  the notification procedure,-the parties have amended the original 
agreements and given undertakings to the Commission. 
(38) In addition, the Commission wrote to the Governments involved enquiring about the exist in~ 
framework and the intended evolution thereof. It also sent letters, where required, requesting changes 
to that framework which in its view were necessary in order to create a level playing field.  The results 
of  such action are summarized in paragraphs 68 to 71. 
I . Contractual changes 
(39) The following undertakings retlect changes in the notified agreements: 
(a) Agency arrangements 
(  40) Unisource undertakes that neither it nor any of  its subsidiaries will act as an exclusive agent tor 
PTT Telecom or Telia in respect of  basic services and will not be involved with the provision of leased 
lines on behalf of  its shareholders until full liberalization in all the countries of  the shareholders of 
· Unisource has taken place, except as purchaser of  leased lines from shareholders for its own use. It 
will terminate as from the date of  the granting of  an exemption pursuant to Article 85 (3) ofthe Fr 
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Treaty and Article 53 (3) of  the EEA Agreement the exclusive agency agreement with PTT Telecom 
as far as it is concerned with leased lines. 
(  41) Unisource undertakes that neither it nor any of  its subsidiaries will act as an exclusive agent for 
the provision of  leased lines on behalf of  Swiss PTT until full liberalization in all the countries of  the 
shareholders of  Unisource has taken place. However, Unisource is allowed to purchase leased lines 
from each of  them for its own use. 
(b) Transit negotiations 
(42) Unisource undertakes that neither it nor any of  its subsidiaries, in particular UCS will act as the 
exclusive representative in any capacity for any of  the Unisource shareholders in respect of  the 
nego~iation of  transit tariffs. in/through the Unisource shareholders' countries on behalf of  the 
shareholders with licensed operators and that it will not be involved in these negotiations on behalf of 
the shareholders until full liberalization has taken place in all the countries of  the shareholders of 
Unisource. 
2.  Undertakings given by the parties: conditions attached to the present Decision 
(  43) The parties have also entered into certain additional undertakings. Compliance with each of  them 
will be a condition for the validity of  this Decision within the meaning of  Article 8 ( 1) of  Regulation 
No17. 
(a) Non-discrimination 
(  44) Each of  the parent companies of  Unisource is in a dominant position in its respective domestic 
market at least for the provision of  leased lines required by competitors of  Unisource in those 
domestic markets. In addition, as owner of  the PSDN networks in each of  the three domestic markets 
of  its shareholders, Unisource is in a dominant position in respect of  the provision of  such 
infrastructure and services provided over that infrastructure in those three markets. Accordingly, to 
ensure the absence of  discrimination, which would constitute an abuse of  a dominant position contrary 
to Article 86, and without prejudice to the compliance by the parties with the relevant Community and 
national legislation, the Commission intends to ask Unisource and/or its parent companies to  compl~· 
with the following conditions: 
(  45) All shareholders undertake that all dealings with (i) any other shareholder and (ii) any entity 
organized under the Unisource agreements will be on an arm's length basis, that is on terms and 
conditions similar to those offered to third parties, in connection with reserved facilities and services 
and with such facilities and services in respect of  which they retain a dominant position within the 
meaning of  Article 86 of  the EC Treaty after full and effective liberalization of  telecommunications 
infrastructure and services in each of  their respective countries. 
( I ) Leased lines ( 15) 
(  46) All shareholders 11:ndertake that, to the extent that this is not yet the case, the provision of  leased 
lines will be a separate service for which separate accounts will be kept pursuant to the principle's. 
rules and practices currently applying under national or Community law. 
(  4  7) All shareholders undertake to publish the standard terms and conditions tbr the leasing of  lines 
(national and international). The terms will refer to the technical specifications of  the lines, the 
provisioning time, repair time, tariffs and discounts. 
(48) All shareholders undertake that all types of  lines made available to any subsidiaries or to 
Unisource wil1  also be available under the same terms and conditions to third parties. 
(49) PTT Telecom undertakes to delete any clause from its general conditions containing references to 
the use of  leased lines (i.e. clause 11.1 0) and international half circuits in any way which would not he 
justified by technical considerations or mandatory provisions and undertakes not to introduce such 
clause or interference (16). 
(2) Interconnection 
(50) Unisource and its affiliates, in particular UBN, undertake to establish and maintain third-party 
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access to public data networks (X.75 or any standard that might replace it) of  domestic UBN•s on 
non-discriminatory cost-based terms including price, availability of  volume and other discounts and the 
quality of  interconnection provided to its own affiliates as from the grant of  exemption pursuant to 
Article 85 (3) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (3) of  the EEA Agreement. These terms will be publicly 
available. The price will be based on costs defined and attributed using an analytical accounting 
system. 
, (51) PTT Telecom will make public no later than on the date of  adoption of  the present Decision a 
standard interconnection agreement in respect of  the PSTN and ISDN networks, which will provide 
for timely and transparent interconnection and will include terms and conditions (including technical 
standards and specifications) which are non-discriminatory and cost based on a service-by-service 
basis. Costs will be defined and attributed using an analytical accounting system. A copy of  the 
interconnection agreement will be also provided to the Commission. 
Interconnection will be available at a reasonable range of  termination points in accordance with 
international technical standards to ensure adequate and efficient interconnections to the extent 
necessary to ensure interoperability of  services. There will be a number of  regional points of 
interconnection where international standardized interfaces and signalling systems are available and 
where it is economically feasible. In any event, all reasonable requests for interconnection, including 
special network access, will be met on terms which are non-discriminatory and cost based on a 
service-by:..service basis. 
(52) PTT Telecom undertakes that it will continue to grant access on a non-discriminatory basis to 
customer databases necessary for the provision of  directory services at cost-oriented pricing. 
(53) Swiss PTT wil1  make public no later than on the date of  adoption of  the present Decision a 
standard interconnection agreement in respect of  the PSTN and ISDN networks which will he in 
accordance with relevant Swiss regulations and be equivalent to similar requirements under 
Community regulations. This agreement will provide for timely and transparent interconnection and 
will include terms and conditions (including technical standards and specifications) which are 
non-discriminatory and cost based on a service-by-service basis. Costs will be defined and attributed 
using an analytical accounting system. A copy of  the interconnection agreement will be also provided 
to the Conunission. 
Interconnection will be available at a reasonable range of  termination points in accordance \Vith 
international technical standards to ensure adequate and efficient interconnections to the extent 
necessary to ensure interoperability of  services. There will be a number of  regional points of 
interconnection where international standardized interfaces and signalling systems are available and 
where it is economically feasible. In any event, all reasonable requests for interconnection, including 
special network access, will be met on terms which are non-discriminatory and cost based on a 
service-by-service basis. 
(54) Swiss PTT undertakes that it will continue to grant, in accordance with the relevant Swiss 
regulations, access on a non-discriminatory basis to customer databases necessary for the provision of 
directory services at cost-oriented pricing. 
(55) Tdia undertakes that its interconnection service will he provided on a tinwly and transpan.·nt 
basis and will  include terms and condi_tions (including technical standards and specifications) which arc 
non-discriminatory and cost based on a service-by-service basis. Costs will be defined and attributed 
using an analytical accounting system. 
All reasonable requests for interconnection, including special n~twork access, will be met on terms 
which are non-discriminatory and cost based on a service-by-service basis. 
(b) No misuse of  confidential information 
(56) Unisource and its affiliates, UCS in particular, will not make available to any other of its 
subsidiaries or shareholders confidential customer information received in its capacity as agent of  the 
Unisource shareholders. 
(57) All shareholders undertake that they will not misuse confidential information in respect of 
customer contract related data, such as prices, received in their capacity as shareholders in Unisource, 
because of  their representation on any board or committee in any entity established pursuant to the 
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Unisource agreements, or as distributors for any Unisource services. 
(58) All shareholders undertake that they will not misuse confidential customer information obtained 
from any other shareholder, because of  their representation on any board or committee in any entity 
established pursuant to the Unisource agreements. 
(59) All shareholders will furthermore ensure that Unisource or its subsidiaries will not have access to 
confidential information in respect of  customer contract related data, such as prices, acqui.red as a 
result of  the provision of  services by them to competitors of  Unisource. 
(c) Prevention of  cross-subsidization 
(60) The parties will not engage in cross-subsidization within the meaning of  the Commission's 
competition guidelines for the telecommunications sector (17). 
(  61) All shareholders undertake not to grant any cros·s-subsidies to any entity created pursuant to the 
Unisource agreements funded out of  income generated by any business which they operate pursuant to 
any exclusive right or in respect of  which they holq a dominant position within the meaning of  Article 
86 of  the EC Treaty. 
(~2) All shareholders will in particular ensure that any entity created pursuant to the Unisource 
agreements: (i) obtains its own debt financing; (ii) does not allocate operating expenses. costs 
depreciation or other expenses to any business unit of  the shareholders; (iii) charges the shareholders 
the same price as they charge third parties for the provision of~ervices  ~old to third parties in 
commercial quantities; and (iv) charges the shareholders on the· basis of  the full cost reimbursement or 
other arm's length pricing method in the case of  products and services not sold to third parties in 
commercial quantities. 
(63) All shareholders will ensure transparency by ensuring compliance with the accounting rules, 
principles and practices currently in use under national or Community law.  Such rules, principles and 
practices include the cost standard used, the accounting conventions used for the treatment of  costs 
and the attribution method chosen. Payments and transfers to Unisource and Unisource companies can 
be identified on the basis of  accounting reports that are periodically available. 
(d) Prevention of  tying 
(64) PTT Telecom undertakes that it will not tie-in the sale of  any service provided by Unisource with 
any service provided by PTT Telecom. It will moreover, for as long as it has a dominant position 
within the meaning of  Article 86 of  the EC Treaty in respect of  the provision of  telecommunications 
services and/or infrastructures, only make combined offerings ofUnisource services and its own 
services in such a way that the customer can identify in the contract forms the price charged as well as 
the other terms and conditions for these services and it will ensure· that each of  these components is 
separately available at equivalent conditions. 
(65) Swiss PTT undertakes that it will not tie-in the sale of  any service provided by Unisource with 
any service provided by Swiss PTT. It  will moreover, for as long as it has a dominant position in 
respect of  the provision of  telecommunication services and/or infrastructures, only make comhined 
offerings of Unisource services and its own services in such a way that the customer can identity in  tht' 
contract forms the price charged as well as the other terms and conditions for these services and it  wil1 
ensure that each of  these components is separately available at equivalent conditions. 
(  66) Telia undertakes that it will not tie-in the sale of  any service provided by U  nisource with any 
service provided by Telia. It will moreover, for as long as it has a dominant position within the 
meaning of  Article 86 of  the EC Treaty in respect of  the provision of  telecommunication services 
and/or infrastructures, only make combined offerings ofUnisource services and its own services in 
such a way that the customer can identify in the contract forms the price charged as well as the other 
terms and conditions for the$e services and it will ensure that each of  these components is separately 
available at equivalent conditions. 
(  67) All the above conditions will apply as from the date of  the exemption for the period of  validity of 
the exemption. 
3. Changes to the regulatory framework in the countries of  the Unisource shareholders 
II/ A  144 TXT - 39700780 - bas-cen  http://www.cc.eec/SO 1/SGConsult_  Acli?APP ... !CTXTID=4!UNIQID=7!ACTU=4VISUvisomO!Vi21 
12 of 18 
(  68) Discussions with the governments concerned have been conducted on the degree of  liberalization 
of  each national market directly involved and the existence of  regulatory mechanisms to ensure a level 
playing field in these telecommunications markets. The discussions involved several letters exchanged 
with each government as from 10 April 1996. 
-Sweden  -
(69) There is already full liberalization in Sweden. 
By letter of  25 April 1996, the Swedish Minister for Telecommunications added that the current 
Telecommunications Act of 1 July 1993 will be reformed in 1997. The reform has been adopted  ..  The 
most important ch~ges  concern the powers of  the regulator (the National Post and Telecom Agency), 
which have been extended as a consequence of  Directive 97/33/EC of  the European Parliament and of 
the Council (the Interconnection Directive) (18). 
-The Netherlands 
(70) The Netherlands Government confirmed its acceptance of  the dates for the liberalization of 
alternative infrastructures and for the introduction of  full competition. Confirmation was also given 
that an independent regulatory agency was in place. 
In her answer of25 June 1996, the competent Minister indicated that, since I January 1996, it has 
been possible to use cable television networks for liberalized telecommunications services and as 
leased lines. Furthermore, under new legislation adopted by the Parliament, the market was fully 
liberated on 1 July 1997. Two additional licences to install,rmairrtain and operate fixed infrastructure 
without territorial limitation were granted on 1 July 1996. Furthermore a large number of  regional 
licences with territorial limitations will be granted. All these new infrastructure licences will have the 
right and (after an interim period) the obligation to supply leased lines. All of  them will have rights of 
way. 
Further fixed networks can be installed by any person without a licence. Such networks will be used to 
provide leased lines or telecommunication services (except voice telephony). However, they will not 
·have rights of  way. 
Finally, an independent regulator was established by 1 August 1997. 
- Switzerland 
(71) The Swiss Government has confirmed its acceptance ofthe 1 July 1996 and 1 January 1998 dates 
for the liberalization of  alternative infrastructures and for the introduction of  full competition. 
respectively, and given confirmation that an independent regulatory agency is in place. 
By letters of  2 July and 13 September 1996, the Swiss Minister for Transport, Communications and 
Energy, stated that telecommunications in Switzerland will be fully liberalized by 1 January  1998 in 
parallel to the Community. A new law will be enacted shortly eliminating remaining restrictions. 
As regards alternative infrastructure liberalization, the Minister indicated that from 1 May 199 5,  I 5 
pilot licences had been granted (the majority to cable TV operators). Such pilot licences allow the 
provison of  some telecommunications services to subscribers (Internet access, data transmission, 
multimedia and telephony within closed user groups). The contents of  such licences were extended by 
the end of 1996 to offer the possibility to owners of  alternative .infrastructures in Switzerland to carry 
out commercial activities, in particular for the provision over them of  corporate telecommunications 
services. Competitors of  Swiss PTT for the provision of  such corporate telecommunications services 
will be allowed to use such alternative infrastructures. 
As regards the regulator, the existing regulator (Ofcom) will be supplemented by a Communications 
Commission independent from the Swiss federal administration. That Commission will be particularly 
responsible for decisions in respect of  which a conflict of  interests could exist between Of  com as 
regulator and the Confederation as owner of  Swiss PTT. 
G.  Comments from third parties 
(72) Following the publication of  a notice pursuant to Article 19 (3) of  Regulation No  17 and to 
Article 3 of Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement ( 19), seven interested third parties submitted 
comments to the Commission. The comments focused, in particular, on the changes and undertakings 
submitted by the parties. Generally speaking, comments were supportive of  the changes and 
undertakings submitted. Some third parties argued, however, that they were insufficient to redress the 
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competitive situation in the countries involved and made suggestions to specify and extend some of 
the undertakings. Many comments referred to the desirability of  imposing .auditing, recording and 
reporting obligations on the shareholders and the entities created under the Unisource agreements as a 
way of  ensuring compliance with the conditions. Finally, some comments also referred to the need for 
the Commission to treat all alliances on an equivalent footing and to ,create a level playing field 
between them. 
(73) Some other comments made reference to the regulatory situation in the countries involved and 
outlined very precise difficulties experienced in facing such regulatory situations. 
(7  4) The Commission carefully reviewed all comments received and concluded that most concerns 
expressed therein had already been raised by the Commission and discussed in detail with the parties, 
who had provided adequate answers and safeguards. Those comments do not therefore affect the 
Commission's substantive position outlined in the Article 19 (3) notice as regards the notified 
agreements. However, in the interest of  legal certainty it appears appropriate to specifY in more detail 
in this Decision the scope and duration of  some conditions, to extend some conditions to cover Telia 
and to impose auditing, recording and reporting obligations on Unisource and its shareholders. 
II. LEGAL ASSESSl\1ENT 
A.  Application of  Article 85 (1) of  the EC Treaty a..~d Article. 53 (1) of  the EEA Agreement 
I. Structural cooperative joint venture 
(75) Unisource combines the activities of  its parent companies in a range of  Europe-wide and 
third-country markets for liberalized telecommunications services and is set to develop and take over 
new services in those markets. This venture entails major changes in the structures of  the parent 
companies as it represents a decisive step for them towards providing services of  a nature and on a 
scale far greater than their current national activities. To that end, through Unisource, the parent 
companies are pooling a significant number ofassets in connection with the provision and marketing 
of  telecommunications services. 
(a) Joint control 
(76) The governing structure ofUnisource, as described in recitalS above, implies that no single 
parent company is in a position to separately exercise a decisive influence on the decision making of 
Uriisource. 
(b) Coordination of  the competitive behaviour of  the parent companies 
(77) Prior to the Unisource transaction, it~ members were at least potential competitors for the 
provision of  all services which have been transferred to Unisource. 
After the transaction, the Unisource shareholders remain actual. competitors of  each other in the 
cross-border regional markets for (i) non-reserved corporate telecommunications services, in 
particular in the provision of  international and/or national Virtual Private Network services ((I}VPN); 
and (ii) traveller services, in particular for post-paid cards and mobile GSM telephony. 
-As regards the market for non-reserved corporate telecommunications services, the Unisource 
shareholders can continue marketing to their customers their existing (I)VPN services (20) based on 
bilateral agreements concluded with other telecommunications operators. 
Furthermore, they are also· actual or potential competitors in respect ofthe distribution of  the lnf<>nct 
services. In accordance with existing plans, each Unisource shareholder will continue distributing 
Infonet services to its national territory outside the framework of  Unisource. 
- As regards the market for traveller services, it is possible for a national customer holding a card of 
one of  the shareholders to use it within its national territory and in the territory of  the other parties in 
competiton with the Unisource card and with the cards of  the other parties. 
-As regards GSM, each Unisource shareholder will remain a GSM network operator within its own 
territory. In addition, none of  the clauses of  the notified agreements prevents the partners from 
establishing roaming agreements with other GSM operators. So, any GSM user who is a .subscriber 
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with any of  the partners may use her/his terminal in the territory of  the other partners, in the same way 
as in the territory of  any other operator with whom a roaming agreement exists. 
(78) In conclusion, the Commission considers that Unisource still qualifies as a structural·cooperative 
joint venture even considering all changes to its structure which have taken place since the 
Commission adopted its Decision in application of  Article 6 ( 1) (a) of  the Merger Control Regulation 
in respect of  Unisource International NV (21 ). 
2. Applicability of  Article 85 (1) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (1) of  the EEA Agreement to 
Unisource 
(79) The agreements between the parent companies ofUnisource fall within Article 85 (1) of  the EC 
Treaty and Article 53  (1) of  the EEA Agreement as they restrict competition and affect trade between 
Member States  .. 
(80) Unisource restricts actual and potential competition between its parent companies at European 
level and in respect of  their respective domestic markets. 
- Unisource is owned by three telecommunications operators which are active outside their respective 
national markets. In addition, all of  them have a web of  bilateral agreements with other 
telecommunications operators, which allow services to be provided beyond the national borders of  the 
participating operators. In this respect, the creation of  an alliance like Unisource is not the only 
objective means for the parent companies.. to enter .those markets. 
- As for services provided on national markets, the large number of  providers of  liberalized services in 
all European countries, including the three national markets directly involved, where U  nisource will 
have activities, shows that the parent companies have the financial and technological capabilities 
required to address national markets across Europe on their own. 
That restriction of  competition is particularly serious with regard to the national markets directly 
involved, where each of  the parent companies has a dominant position for the provision of  national 
services and leased lines. While in Sweden full liberalization has been in place for several years 
already, the situation in the Netherlands was until 1 July 1997 that of  a monopoly for the provision of 
basic infrastructures and services. Such a monopoly will virtually exist in Switzerland until  I January 
1998. 
3.  Applicability of  Article 85 (1) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (I) of  the EEA Agreement to the 
contractual provisions 
(81) The following provisions may further restrict competition: 
1. the 'one telecom country' structure, as described in recital20; 
2. the general principle of  non-competition under Article 19 of  the joint venture and shareholders 
agreement and the non-competition agreements in, respect of  UBN, USS and UC and UM~  and 
3. the exclusive distribution arrangements for the activities ofUBN, UVS and USS. 
(82) Of  these, the 'one telecom country' structure and the general principle of  non-competition under 
Article 19 of  the joint venture and shareholders agreement and the non-competition agreements in 
respect ofUBN, USS and UC and UM are regarded as ancillary restrictions. Therefore, those 
restrictions are not the subject of  an assessment under Article 85 ( 1) of  the EC Treaty and Art ide :'-' 
(1) of  the EEA Agreement separate from that ofUnisource itself. Its parent companies created 
Unisource as a way to strengthen their presence in the relevant cross-border and ultimately 
Europe-wide rnarkets. 
-Although the 'one telecom country' structure could increase the degree of  coordination of  the 
competitive behaviour of  the parent companies in respect of  areas of  decision-making which are not 
directly within the current scope of  Unisource's activities, it is inseparable from Unisource because 
decisions adopted within the latter regarding, for instance, network architecture, technologies 
employed or R&  D coordination will have an implication not only on the specific networks that have 
been transferred to Unisource, but also on other networks not transferred to it but which are (or will 
be) used tbr the provision or distribution of Unisource's services. That is so because the successful 
provision of  services to international customers has to be made, as customers require, on a 
'one-stop-shop' and seamless basis. 
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- The general non-competition obligation and the subsequent non-competition agreements concluded 
in respect of  some of  the activities of  Unisource are expressions of  the firm commitment of  the 
shareholders towards Unisource. 
(83) On the other hand, the exclusive distributorship agreements in respect ofUBN, UVS and USS 
are caught by Article 85 (1) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (1) of  the EEA Agreement because they 
have the object or effect of  isolating each national market involved from imports of  those services 
from other EEA Member States. This may adversely affect the conditions of  competition within the 
EEA and Switzerland. Unlike the other restrictive provisions, the Commission cannot consider such 
exclusive distributorship agreements to be ancillary to the creation of  the joint venture, since 
non-exclusive forms of  distribution are possible which would not impair the performance or marketing 
of  the services. 
4. Effect on trade between Member States 
(84) By the very nature of  its business scope and of  the services provided by its affiliates, the creation 
of  Unisource, which covers the joint development and provision of  services throughout the European 
Economic Area and Switzerland, has a substantial effect on trade between Member States in that it 
will provide non-reserved services betweeri any two Member States and within any Member State to 
customers having a need for pan-European or even global services. 
Furthermore, that view is consistent  ... with that expressed in the Commission's telecommunications 
guidelines that agreements concerning non-reserved services, equipment and space segment 
infrastructure potentially affect trade between Member States (22). 
In addition, the exclusive distribution provision, by protecting the parent companies within their 
respective home markets, contributes to dividing the single market along national borders. Therefore. 
this non-ancillary provision affects trade between Member States and between Member States and the 
EFTA countries and is caught by Article 85 (I) ofthe EC Treaty and Article 53  (1) ofthe EEA 
Agreement. 
B. Article 85 (3) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53  (3) of  the EEA Agreement 
1. Technical and economic progress 
(85) Unisource is in the process of  developing truly pan-European services based on the purely 
domestic networks and services received from its shareholders. In addition, Unisource will be able to 
satisfy earlier than its parent companies acting separately the expressed demand for such services from 
big users. The provision of  those services requires at least a substantial presence abroad. 
(86) The Unisource transaction will also facilitate the building of  a trans-European network and will 
result in a structure that enables Unisource to provide better services to customers throughout 
Europe. This is partjcularly the case ofUCS, which, as indicated in recital  18, will become one of  the 
most important pillars of  the alliance. in the near future. 
(87) In addition, Unisource will lead to substantial cost savings. Cost savings will be realized in 
operational aspects like integration and rationalization of  networks, cost of  operation. technical 
development and maintenance, sharing of  overhead costs, sharing of  financial systems, customer care 
and billing systems, rationalization of  spare capacities or the pooling of  know-how and intellectual 
property rights. Cost reductions will amount to 1 %of  total costs in  1996 and up to 15% i·n 2000. 
(88) Finally, under the conditions attached to this Decision, the harmonized UBN networks will also 
improve the level of  services provided by competitors of  Unisource since they will be able either: (i) to 
interconnect with the public packet-switched data networks operated by Unisource or its shareholders~ 
or (ii) to access those public packet-switched data networks from other networks, notably the public 
switched telephone network (PSTN) and the integrated services digital network (ISDN); or (iii) to 
interconnect with the parent companies' other networks, notably the PSTN. The last possibility is 
indispensable for the viability of  competitive voice services offerings. The conditions relating to leased 
lines will further improve the competitive position of  competitors. 
(89) The exclusive distributorship arrangements will improve distribution by ensuring that distributors 
will concentrate their marketing efforts on their respective territories. In any event, the parties have 
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confirmed that the exclusivity does not preclude passive sales in the sense that customers will always 
be in the position of  choosing who they wish the lead distributor to be. Furthermore, the provision and 
distribution to customers of  pan-European services will nearly always physically involve the activities 
of  more than one distributor in order to be able to cover all the countries where the customer will have 
facilities. 
2. Benefits for consumers 
(90) Unisource will shorten the time required by the parent companies individually for developing and 
marketing new telecommunications services in a rapidly changing technological and commercial 
market environment. Business customers will benefit, more rapidly than if  they acted separately, from 
both the provision of  a larger product portfolio of  newly developed services and lower pricing. 
Increased choice of  telecommunications services and related cost benefits will spill over to other 
segments of  the telecommunications market and economic sectors and will help to improve the 
competitive position of  European companies vis-a  .. vis other competitors in markets that are 
globalizing. 
In addition, the consolidation of Unisource as a viable alternative will increase the choice of  customers 
for pan-European services. 
(91) The exclusive distribution mechanism will ensure that there is a single person to contact in 
respect of  any contract. :fhis·will substantially benefit customers, in particular those with transnational 
or global telecommunications needs, who up to now had to deal with several counterparts in the 
different countries or regions. 
3. Indispensability 
(92) Medium-sized telecommunications operators appear to feel the need to enter into structural 
strategic alliances covering as much of  Europe as possible if  they wish to serve an increasingly 
globalized customer base. It also appears that there is a requirement for an integrated management of 
any alliance in order for it to gain credibility with customers. That is the case for Unisource and its 
three current parent companies. 
In addition, it is only by joining forces that the parties will be able to field an array of pan-European 
services on a reduced cost and time basis as Unisource is doing. 
(93) As for exclusive distribution,  particip~ts in alliances reserve the right to distribute in their 
respective home countries in exchange for the investment made in the alliance. In this respect. the 
distribution of  Unisource's pan-European services is indispensable. In addition, as indicated above, 
passive sales are possible. Indeed it is not uncommon for customers to opt for another distributor 
within an alliance for particular reasons. Account must also be taken of  the fact that contracts will 
normally involve more than one distributor, which will reduce any negative effects stemming from the 
exclusive distribution agreements. 
In addition, in other similar alliances the Commission has recognized that exclusive distribution 
protects the intellectual property rights of  the parent companies better than other aiTangements (23). 
In that context, the exclusivity constitutes an incentive to share with the joint venture not only exist  in~ 
intellectual property rights but new developments made in other markets outside the scope of 
Unisource. 
4. Non-elimination of  competition 
(94) The competitive situation in the three markets concerned from the regulatory point of  view is 
such that in each of  them at least two licences for alternative infrastructures were granted by  1 July 
1996, the date on which such licences were granted in the Netherlands. In that respect, other 
providers of  telecommunications services are in a position to compete with Unisource without 
depending completely on Unisource's parent companies (24). 
(95) That fact reduced the concerns of  the Commission in respect of  this criterion under Article 85 
(3). However, in view of  the fact that it will take some time before the increased choice will produce 
its _beneficial effects, the Commission further assessed the fulfilment of  this condition at the 
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are the following: 
(a) National markets 
(96) The changes and conditions imposed on the parties and on Unisource with respect to the 
originally notified transaction will ensure that it will not reinforce the dominant position of  each of  the 
shareholders or ofUnisource (as owner- through the respective UBN subsidiary- of  the national 
PSTN in Sweden, the ·Netherlands and Switzerland) in their respective countries. In addition, as 
competition in national markets is coming in many cases from local branches of  other alliances of 
cross-border regional or even global scope, the effect of  these conditions will help to improve the 
position of  those other alliances as they will be in a better position to serve customers in the national 
markets of  the parent companies of  Unisource. 
- Conditions are basically aimed at ensuring that third-party competitors of  Unisource in any of  the 
countries of  its parent companies (where they have dominant positions) are not discriminated against 
in any manner whatsoever by the parent companies. Particular emphasis has, therefore, been put on 
access to infrastructure and lease of  lines ofthe parent companies. It  is clear that even if  alternative 
infrastructure is being made .available, in order to serve customers, third-party competitors still have to 
rely to a large extent on the infrastructure of  the incumbent, the only one with the necessary coverage. 
- As regards interconnection, the Commission has taken account of  the fact that, with the exception of 
Telia, the parent companies were not even offering interconnection services to third parties and asking 
the parties to introduce interconnection services was thus a necessary condition for allowing third 
parties to enter the market. In addition, in order for the interconnection conditions to have a real 
impact, the Commission imposed additional conditions regarding publication of  standard 
interconnection agreements and terms, on the one hand, and tariffs and terms of  leased lines, on the 
other hand. Finally, the ability of  third parties to offer competing services depends also on the 
possibility for them to gain the access to customer databases necessary for new entrants to provide 
directory services. 
- Moreover, additional conditions on absence of  cross-subsidies, separation of  accounts and use of 
analytical accounting systems are aimed at ensuring that the use of  any of  the PSTN or the data 
networks in the countries will be possible for Unisource anr! its competitors under equivalent 
conditions. 
-Third-party competitors are still very vulnerable given their dependence on the parent companies. 
That is why the Commission requested conditions precluding misuse of  confidential information. 
Customer information is extremely valuable and unless it is particularly protected, the position of 
third-party competitors. will be extremely difficult. The parent companies have also deleted from the 
Unisource agreements those clauses originally notified that appointed Unisource or any of  its 
subsidiaries as a parent company's agent for half-circuits. Given that such international leased lines are 
demanded either by service providers competing with Unisource or by MNCs and other private 
network operators, the agency agreement would have given Unisource a competitive information 
advantage over competitors. 
- The conditions requiring each parent company not to tie-in the sale of  any of Unisource's servict~s 
and its own services will ensure that possible diil'erenccs in calculation arc vcritiablc and thus that t  ht.' 
non-discrimination conditions work in practice. The sale of  packages of  different services under one 
single contract is common commercial practice in the telecommunications sector. In liberalized 
telecommunications markets, dominant providers are usually prohibited both from tying sales of 
different seiVices and from granting discounts on packages of  services without specifying (i) the terms 
and conditions of  each individual service; and (ii) the individual service(s) subject to discounts.  In 
addition, dominant providers are under an obligation to publish all tariffs and must prove that 
discounts on packages of  seiVices are justified by savings specifically due to the offering of  a package 
of  services. The condition reflects such obligations. 
(b) Cross-border regional markets 
{97) As described in recital35, Unisource faces significant competition in the cross-border regional 
markets for non-reserved corporate telecommunications services, traveller seiVices and carrier 
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services. Almost all alliances in the telecommunications sector are trying to enter those markets. 
In addition, the first customers targeted will be sophisticated corporations with an extensive 
knowledge of  the market (many have until now self-provided their telecommunications) and 
considerable bargaining power.  . 
Such customers are able to put pressure on alliances to better address their needs (and to reduce 
·prices). The European Virtual Private Network Users Association (EVUA) is a clear example of  this 
trend by big customers. The total expenditure of  the EVUA members for their voice 
telecommunications needs is US$ 2 billion a year. 
(98) Finally, the obligations to keep and supply detailed ·accounting information s~t out in recital 1  OS 
ensure that the entities created pursuant to the Unisource agreements and the shareholders gather 
sufficient information to allow the Conirnission to monitor their competitive behaviour. Such 
obligations will also make it possible for national courts to order discovery of  evidence of  breaches of 
the substantive conditions attached to this Decision and of  any alleged anti-competitive behaviour 
where third parties seek remedies against such behaviour before the national courts. 
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Treaty and Article 53 of  the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/35.738- Uniworld) (Only the Dutch and 
French texts are ~uthentic) (Text with EEArelevance) (97/781/EC) 
THE COI\fMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COM:MliNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, 
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of  6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing 
Article~ 85 and 86 of  the Treaty (1), as last amended by the Act of  Accession of  Austria, Finland and 
· Sweden, and in particular Articles 6 and 8 thereof,· 
Having regard to the notification for exemption submitted pursuant to Article 4· of  Regulation No 17 
on 29 September 1995, 
Having regard to the summary of  the application and notification published pursuant to Article 19 (3) 
of  Regulation No 17 and to Article 3 of  Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement (2 ), 
After consultation with the Advisory Committee for Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, 
Whereas: 
I. THE FACTS 
A.  Introduction  , 
(I) On 29 September 1995 the Commission received a notification of  a joint venture pursuant to 
Article 4 of  Regulation No 17 formed by Unisource Pan-European Services BV, a subsidiary of 
Unisource NV, and AT&T Pan-European Services, Inc. (3), a subsidiary of AT&T Corp., under the 
name 'Uniworld'.  · 
(2) This transaction is linked to the creation ofUnisource. Decision 97/780/EC (4) in Case 1V/3S.R30 
- Unisource (the 'Unisource Decision') exempts the creation ofUnisource from the application of 
Article 85 (1) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (1) of  the EEA Agreement. 
(3) As further described below, Unisource (now AT&T- Unisource Communication Services) has 
been created to provide pan-European telecommunications services with global connectivity to the 
European 'business market. 
(4) On 2 July 1997 the Commission was informed of  the strategic alliance to be developed between 
AT&T, Unisource and the Italian company STET concerning activities in South America and Europe. 
As one element of  that strategic alliance, STET will fully join Uniworld in the near future. The present 
Decision does not take any position regarding STET's entry into Uniworld. Furthermore, if  it does 
finally take place, the Commission will evaluate the impact of  such entry on the existing Uniworld and 
may reassess the present Decision in the light of  Article 8 of  Regulation No 17. 
B. The parent companies 
(5) Unisource NV (Unisource), as further described in the Unisource Decision, is a joint venture 
company the shareholders of  which are Telia AB, PTT Telecom BV and Swiss Telecom. Unisource is 
a holding company active in the telecommunications sector that incorporates seven operating 
subsidiaries. Total turnover of  the group in 1994 was Fl 933 million (ECU 443 million).  Net results 
were losses ofF14l,072 million (ECU 20 million). 
(6) AT&T is a telecommunications operator in the United States providing a broad range of  US and 
international telecommunications services and infrastructures to and from the US.  Its turnover in  1996 
was US $ 50,5 billion.  · 
On 9 May 1996, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted an Order declaring 
AT&T a non-dominant carrier for international voice services (5). 
Direct revenues of  AT  & T in the EEA and Switzerland (excluding bilateral services and calling cards) 
in  1995 were as follows: AT&T Easylink (messaging) [US$ ... (ECU ...  )]~AT&T  Istel (corporate 
services)[£ ... (ECU. ·  ..  )] and Business Communications Europe (hereinafter 'BCS-E') [£ ... (ECU 
...  )] (6a). 
C. The joint venture: Uniworld 
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1.  Structure of  Uniworld 
(7) Uniworld consists of  two companies: Uniworld VOF and Uniworld NV. 
(8) Uniworld·VOF is a general partnership under Dutch law. Unisource, through Unisource 
Pan-European Services) has a 59,94% shareholder interest, AT&. T, through AT&T Pan-European 
Services, a 39,96% holding, and Uniworld NV the remaining 0,1 %. Uniworld VOF is not a separate 
legal person distinct from its owners. In addition, it is tax transparent so that the income flows through 
directly to the parent companies. Uniworld VOF will actually provide the telecommunications services 
within the business scope of  Uniworld. 
Uniworld NV's Supervisory Board and Chief  Executive Officer (CEO) will be directly responsible for 
the partnership.  · 
(9) Uniworld NV has been created to supervise and act as general partner ofUniworld VOF. It is the 
only partner that governs and can bind the partnership and has legal title to aU tangible and intangible 
assets which it will hold for the benefit ofUniworld VOF. It also has the authority to manage the 
day-to-day operation and affairs of  the partnership and has all the resources necessary to manage and 
operate the business activities ofUniworld VOF. Unisource, through Unisource Pan-European 
Services, has a 60% shareholding interest in Uniworld NV, and AT&T, through AT&T 
Pan-European Services, owns the other 40%. Uniworld NV will earn an annual management fee tor 
its activities as general partner of  the partnership. 
Uniworld NV is governed by a Management Board of  one Chief Executive Officer nominated by 
Unisour~e (AT  & T nominates the Chief Operating Officer), .responsible for managing the company, 
and a Supervisory Board of  five directors, three nominated by Unisource and two by AT&T. The 
Supervisory Board approves the budget and business plan by supermajority (that is, unanimity of 
directors present or represented). AT  & T has been granted veto rights in respect of  all significant 
matters. 
(10) In what follows, all references to 'Uniworld' cover both Uniworld VOF and Uniworld NV. 
2.  Contributions by parent companies to Uniworld 
(11) Unisource will contribute to Uniworld the following companies or the relevant international 
assets thereof: certain of  the Unisource Business Networks (UBN) companies, Unisource Voice· 
Services (UVS), Unisource France SA, Unisource USA Inc., Unisource Business Services Inc. and 
Unisource World Partners Company Inc. 
In ·addition, Unisource will transfer to Uniworld its rights in the WorldPartners Company and 
WorldPartners Association (7) and AT&T will do the 'same with its rights in the WorldPartners 
Association. As a result Uniworld will become the exclusive distributor in the EEA plus Switzerland 
of  the telecommunication services bearing the WorldSource trademark (8). 
(12) AT&T will contribute the relevant assets of  the following entities: AT&T Europe SA, most of 
AT&T Istel Ltd, BCS-E and the AT&T companies in the Member States. 
After the Uniworld transaction, AT&T will still provide in the EEA and Switzerland, under its own 
name, the following services: new high value-added applications (such as AT&T network notes}, 
consumer cards and calling cards services, outsourcing (AT&T solutions) and in the UK the fttlt 
range of  voice telephony services to business and consumer customers by means of  AT  & T 
Communications UK's ·operating licence, which permits also international simple resale to the United 
States.  , 
3. Business scope  . 
( 13) The scope of  Uniworld's business will be the provision of  seamless (9) multilateral ( 1  0) 
pan-European telecommunications services with global connectivity to the European business market. 
Global connectivity outside the EEA and Switzerland will be mainly achieved through Uniworld's 
participation in the WorldPartners Company and the WorldPartners Association. In areas outside 
Europe or the WorldPartners Association, the bilateral agreements of  the Unisource shareholders, of 
Unisource and/or AT&T will be used to extend global connectivity. In the future, Uniworld could 
have its own bilateral arrangements.  · 
(14) Uniworld's services are based on end-to-end control by Uniworld of  the services to customers 
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·including the national.extensions of  such setvices. The services will initially include international 
virtual private network (IVPN) voice setvices, packet-switched, frame relay and other data networks 
and services, messaging and network related outsourcing. The home countri~s (II), France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Belgium and Italy represent primary target countries. However, Uniworld will 
not offer purely domestic setvices (I2). 
(IS) Uniworld will own and/or manage all frame relay, messaging, X.25 international backbone, X.25 
domestic switches with·exclusive or predominantly international usage, non-home country X.25 
networks and managed bandwidth assets. Asset selection will be made according to a set of  rules 
agreed upon by the parties in accordance with the given principles for asset selection. 
In addition, the existing backbone data network - Unidata - that links together the domestic data 
networks of  the shareholders ofUnisource will also be assigned to Uniw.orld. 
4. Uniworld's operating functions: sales, marketing and services 
(a) Sales 
(I6) Uniworld will be responsible for negotiating distribution agreements and third-party commercial 
sales agreements. In addition, it will work closely with distributors to ensure that offers to customers 
respond to their expressed needs and will provide sales training for Uniworld employees and 
distributors. Uniworld will also support the development of  a single integrated sales process 
incorporating technical support, bid management, contract support and service ordering. 
In respect of  complex bids, Uniworld will assist in or assume direct leadership responsibility. 
(b) Marketing 
(I7) Uniworld will be responsible for developing the service portfolio marketing strategy including the 
overall pricing strategy (retail pricing will however be the responsibility of  distributors). It will also 
conduct competitive assessment and customer analysis and assist product managers in developing 
individual service strategies. Uniworld will develop marketing communications products including 
advertising. It will also support bid management to non-standard requests tbr proposals requiring the 
integration of  multiple services. 
(c) Services 
(18) Uniworld will define, control and own service-definition and will also define and control service 
platforms (that is the software installed in the equipment that controls the voice and data traffic over 
the backbone network) and customer-care elements. It will also be responsible for the life-cycle 
management of  all services in its portfolio. In addition, it will determine the overall 
architecture/technology/platform evolution that enables the services to be competitive and efficient in 
terms of  features, functionality, customer service attributes and cost. In so doing, it will seek to 
accommodate the reasonable needs of  its affiliated suppliers and other key non-affiliated suppliers. 
The resulting plans will be approved by the Supervisory Board by supermajority. 
D.· Strategic Advisory Boards 
(19} Upon its incorporation, Uniworld will create three Strategic Advisory Boards to deal with the 
following matters:  . 
- service-portfolio development and offerings, 
-marketing and sales (the international sales board responsible for the global account-management 
plan), and 
-architecture and technology. 
All parties to the Uniworld transaction, including representatives of  the Unisource shareholders, will 
be represented in the boards. 
The boards are resources for achieving consistency in approach to an issue, as well as working 
committees to help make decision-making processes efficient. They are also a forum to solve disputes 
between the parent companies that might·have an impact on Uniworld. Uniworld can use them to 
forge a consensus for Uniworld's initiatives in advance of  Supervisory Board consideration. 
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E. The notified agreements 
1. Agreements 
(20) The original notification comprised the Joint Venture and Shareholders Agreement and the· 
following agreements and other documents annexed. to it:  · 
- the articles of  association of  Uniworld NV,  . 
- the limited partnership agreement of  Uniworld CV (now Uniworld VOF), 
-the by-laws ofUniworld NV and Uniworld CV (now Uniworld VOF), 
- the parent company support agreement, 
- principles for asset selection, 
-the supply agreement between Uniworld and Unisource Carrier Services (UCS), 
- the master distribution agreement, 
- principles for intellectual property rights (IPR) negotiations, and 
- the network evolution plan. 
2.  Contractual provisions 
(a) Supply agreement with Unisource Carrier Services (UCS) - -· 
(21) Uniworld will be a service provider and thus will not develop or operate its own basic switching 
and transmission systems, but will purchase these capabilities from suppliers. Under the supply 
agreement, the preferred (13) supplier will be UCS, a subsidiary ofUnisource responsible for 
managing the international networks of  the Unisource shareholders. 
UCS will provide to Uniworld interconnection and transmission capacity that will include 
international, national and local leased lines and international and national public switch telephone 
network (PSTN) terminations. 
UCS will have a contractual requirement to provide the capacity necessary to meet Uniworld's traffic 
forecasts at agreed performance levels: The price for UCS's services is guaranteed for five years. The 
average minute/price charged by UCS will be reduced pro;.;ldecl that Uniworld delivers the agreed 
total volume of  international traffic and uses the agreed capacity of  international bandwith. Should that 
not be the case, prices charged by UCS will be adjusted accordingly. 
The intention of  the parties is to use UCS's pan-European network for all internodal bandwidth needs 
of  the Uniworld services. 
Uniworld will collect customer-care information for billing, account inquiry, and so forth. In addition, 
Uniworld will also own the service-control points that maintain the real-time definition and realization 
of  the Uniworld services. Those points will be connected to the UCS network. 
Uniworld's CEO will attend UCS's board meetings- without the right to cast any vote- concerning 
network planning anq other matters concerning the supply agreement. 
(b) Commercial relationship between Uniworld and its parent companies 
(22) The commercial relationship between Uniworld and its parent companies will be governed by the 
terms set out in Article 10 of  the Joint Venture Agreement. Thus, Uniworld, 
-will purchase supplies on a 'best available' basis. 'Best available' refers to price, quality, features and 
functions, capacity and geographical coverage purchased from affiliated parties offered (or riot) by 
them to third parties. In any event, such purchases will be in accordance with rules, regulations and 
guidelines of  the European Commission and the relevant national regulatory agencies, 
- will be provided access to networks and underlying facilities of  any company involved directly or 
indirectly in Uniworld at non-discriminatory competitive prices. Such prices charged to Uniworld will 
be competitive in view of  prices charged for similar services by competitors of  the affiliated companies 
and consistent with applicable national and European law, including obligations of  non-discrimination 
and prohibitions of  cross-subsidizations. They must not be more advantageous than the prices charged 
for similar services in similar circumstances to other customers of such affiliated companies, 
-will have 'privileged subsidiary' status, with regards to terms and conditions for transactions between 
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parties for resources and setvices from these companies. In this respect, it Will be treated as though it 
was a subsidiary ofUnisource, its shareholders or AT&T in respect ofsetvices, to the extent that 
there are no contractual restrictions with third parties prohibiting it, 
-will have 'most favoured· customer status' from Unisource, its shareholders and its affiliated 
companies and AT  & T for the provision of  other related commercial setvices, such as the purchase of 
capacity. Uniworld will be offered 'best customer' prices for setvices which are in principle available 
both to Uniworld and to non-related customers in the marketplace. 
(c) Non-competition provision 
, (23) Under Article 12 of  the Joint Venture Agreement, the parent companies agree with Uniworld 
VOF that they will not incorporate a business or engage in exclusive (14) Uniworld services (as 
described above) or participate in any joint venture or other cooperative arrangement engaged in the 
provision of  exclusive Uniworld services. 
(24) The following activities are excluded from the non-competitive provisions: 
- the development and offering to customers of  a parent company's natiohal services and international 
services based on bilateral_ arrangements, 
- services that compete with non-exclusive Uniworld services, and 
- competing offers of  third parties (basically Infonet's services, but also those of  Concert or Atlas) 
which have decided to market their services through the Unisource shareholders. 
The non-competition obligation is not to affect the access by third parties to any reserved and basic 
network of  the parties and their affiliated companies, nor affect any parent company's obligation to 
make available reserved and basic setvices. 
(25) All-non-competition obligations of  the parent companies and their affiliated companies are to be 
valid until the termination of  the Joint Venture Agreement. After termination no participant may, 
during the original duration of  a customer 90ntract, solicit those existing customers with respect to 
which the other party has been assigned under the termination rules the right to provide Uniworld 
services (Article 16.3.1.F ofthe Joint Venture Agreement). Finally, Article 16.3.2.B (ii) of  the Joint 
·Venture Agreement provides that a company exiting (from Uniworld) will, under the non-permitted 
exit ( 15) provision, as from the date of  the non-permitted exit and for a period of 12 months, continue 
to be subject to Article 12 of  the Joint Venture Agreement. 
(d) Distribution of  services 
(26) Uniworld will distribute its services through local distributors. In most cases, Uniworld will own 
or control them. Distributors are responsible for managing (and can own) locaVnational networks. 
However, Uniworld will approve the delivery platforms to be used by distributors in delivering 
Uniworld setvices, the overall architecture of  the combined distributor/Uniworld network and the 
location and capacity of  the gateways to be used to interface the distributor's and Uniworld's 
networks. 
In the home countries, the respective Urusource shareholder will be the exclusive distributor. AT  & T 
UK will be the exclusive distributor in the United Kingdom and AT  & T will act as the exclusive 
distributor in the United States of  Uniworld's services to br delivered in Europe. In addition, AT  & T 
could sell Uniworld services to a European-headquartered firm which vested its European and/or 
world-wide telecommunications decisions in its US subsidiaries or locations. 
In other countries where Unisource, AT&T, the Unisource shareholders or any of  their afflliated 
companies have selected a national partner, the latter will be the preferred distributor. 
(27} Distributors will pay to Uniworld the established transfer price for any given service. Uniworld 
will provide distributors with lists of  recommended retail prices. Distributors are, however, free to set 
their own retail prices. Distributors can communicate such information to U  niworld to the. extent that 
they would like to benefit fully from Uniworld's central billing system. 
(28} An initial distribution of  potential customers has been made based on the location of  the 
decision-making units ·of the top target customers. However, the final assignment of  a customer to a 
distributor depends on the choice of  the customer ( 16). In any event, it is expected that most sales will 
involve a lead distributor, one or several support distributors and Uniworld. 
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(29) In addition, Uniworld plans to create a 'Uniworld Association' after the model of  the 
WorldPartners Association. It will have a light structure consisting of a  permanent secretariat and an 
executive forum chaired by the CEO ofUniworld. The Uniworld Association will serve as a platform 
for discussion between Uniworld and its distributors, so that the latter will be given an opportunity to 
influence Uniworld's services development, processes and technology (that is the growth of  the 
network). The Association will act as a central coordinator between distributors for ensuring that the 
European requirements of  customers are met in the most efficient manner. 
(30) The distribution licences extend to the Uniworld and WorldSource services in the territory 
granted. 
(31) The exclusivity provisions oblige Uniworld and the distributor not to actively seek customers for 
Uniworld's exclusive services and the distributor's territory, as regards Uniworld, and outside it, as 
regards the distributor, respectively. 
(32} Uniworld will·also organize an international support organization which will support a global 
account management programme created to enhance business relationships with multinational 
customers. It will focus on prospective customers which, because· of  size and/or strategic importance, 
will be selected by Uniworld's international sales board. Instead of  being attributed to a given 
distributor in accordance with the normal procedures, a global account team will be formed tor each 
of  these customers comprising a global account team leader and at least one regional or national 
account manager.  .. -·  ·  ·  · · 
The global account team will coordinate and involve the world-wide resources of  Uniworld, AT  &  T 
Business solutions, W orldPartners, Unisource and its shareholders as required in order better to serve 
the global needs of  that category of  top customers on a one-stop-shop basis. In this respect, the global 
account group will request support from any affiliated or related company through a defined 
World-wide Sales Support Process that will allow for a simple, low-cost sales support coordination 
process. 
F. Relevant market 
1. The market for non-reserved corporate telecommunicativns services ( 17) 
(a) Supply 
(33) Uniworld will offer the following categories of  services within that market: 
- Voice IVPN services 
(34) An IVPN service (Uniworld VNS), made up of  different packages with different features, will be 
offered to customers to cover their intra-European needs (18). The backbone network (basic 
transmission capacity) to be used will be that of  UCS and, in some cases, that of  third~party suppliers. 
The Uniworld VNS (19) service is defined as multilateral (20), as opposed to the existing virtual 
private network services (VPN (21 )) marketed by the Unisource shareholders to their national 
customer bases. VPN services can include foreign locations of  a customer. However, the availability 
(and features) of  the thus extended VPN depend on bilateral agreements concluded by the national 
provider with telecommunications operators (TO) in other countries. 
- Data services and networks 
(35) Uniworld's data services will initially be based on the current pan-European ·offerings of 
Unisource and AT& T's BCS-E, but they will offer a better geographical coverage than those existing 
offerings, given the different points of  presence (POPs) of  the existing data networks of  the parent 
companies. 
In addition, Uniworld will roll-out new data services like high-speed LAN (22) interconnect, 
high-speed bandwidth services, interworking and Internet access to big business users (offering 
improved quality and security). 
Alongside those services, other services to be launched are integrated (voice and data) services (23) 
like videoconferencing, fixed-mobile integration, teleworking, bandwidth on demand and call centres 
including automatic re-routing on real time (24), and remote netWork management for customer's data 
networks. 
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Uniworld will integrate the existing international data networks assigned by the parent companies. 
Since those networks are not currently interworkable, an important part of  the iritegration will involve 
the standardization of  delivery platforms for each service. The integrated network will be expanded by 
the setting up of  additional POPs, in particular in key markets like Germany and Italy, where current 
coverage is very poor. Integrated traffic will make it feasible to install POPs in countries where it 
would not be economical to do so for a single type of  traffic. 
(36) The domestic data services and networks in the home countries and the United Kingdom will not . 
be contributed to Uniworld but will remain in Unisource and AT  & T UK respectively. The respective 
Unisource shareholder will act as distributor ofUnisource for those domestic products in each home 
country. 
- Messaging  . 
(37) Messaging covers electronic mail and EDI (electronic data interchange). Current plans foresee 
the use by Uniworld of  AT& T's messaging platform (Easylink), instead ofUnisource's existing one 
(400Net). 
(b) Demand 
(38) Services within that market are mainly demanded by large multinational corporations, extended 
enterprises, as well as other intensive users of  telecommunications, often as an alternative to 
self-provision. In this respect, the parties-have identified a number of  global and European 
multinationals with very substantial international telecommunications expenditure as the initial target 
customers for Uniworld. However, such focus does not preclude the offering ofUniworld services to 
any other customer with similar needs. 
Very large companies with a presence in many different countries demand that all their locations which 
are geographically dispersed across different territories be linked. The services required in this 
connection must respond to a very particular set of  features which represent specific requirements by 
users. Such requirements include, in particular, the provision of  services across multiple borders at 
consistent service levels overcoming the possible inadequacies of  local infrastructures, the availability 
of  delivery schedules, the irrelevance of  time-zones, languages and currencies. 
In addition, customers expect providers of  such services to take full responsibility for all services 
provided from 'end to end' and to establish a single point of  contact for all kinds of  eventuality related 
to the provision of  the services. 
Much has been done by providers in respect of  all these requirements. However, the provision of  real 
seamless services is now only at a very rudimentary stage in particular as .regards customer care and 
global billing features, and the establishment of  infrastructure abroad, the latter as a result of 
differences in regulatory regimes between countries. 
2. Geographic market 
(39) Uniworld services are intended to cover the pan-European needs of  customers. Uniworld will not 
be active in the provision of  purely domestic services (other than the national extensions of  its 
pan-European services). In addition, as referred to in recital 13, coverage outside Europe will be 
possible only by relying on the bilateral agreements of  any of  its parent companies. In this respect, the 
geographic market to be c·onsidered is the.EEA plus Switzerland (25). 
As indicated above, Uniworld is not involved in the provision of purely domestic services. However, 
given the links between Uniworld, Unisource and its shareholders, Uniworld has an impact on the 
respective domestic markets of  the shareholders of  Unisource, where each of  them enjoys a dominant 
position. 
3. Market shares of  the parties 
The market for non-reserved corporate telecommunications services on a pan-European scale 
(  40) The current combined market share of  the parties in the EEA and Switzerland is around 1  0 o/o for 
data services and 10% for messaging. No data are available for IVPN voice services and network 
related outsourcing. 
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4. Competition in the markets 
The market for non-reserved corporate telecommunications services on a pan-European scale 
(41) According to the parties, the addressable size of  the European market will grow from US$ 1,9 
billio~ in 1995 to US $ 4,2 billion in 2005 for IVPN and from US $ 2, 9 billion in 1995 to US $ 4 
billion in 2005 for data services. 
BT-MCT's Concert and Atlas/Global One are expected to become major players on that market. To 
those it is necessary to add some other significant players like Sita or International Private Satellite 
Partners (IPSP). 
G.  Changes made and undertakings given further to the Commission's intervention 
(42) Certain features ofthe notified transaction appeared to be incompatible with Community 
competition rules. Consequently, by letter of  7 May 1996, the Commission informed the parties of  its 
concerns. In the course of  the notification procedure, the parties have amended the original 
agreements and given undertakings to the Co~ission. 
1.  Contractual changes in respect of  the communication of  retail prices to U niworld 
(  43) The parties will amend the notifed ·agreements to remove the stipulation that distributors are 
obligated to communicate price information to Uniworld regarding specific customers. However, 
where a distributor chooses not to comniunicate its retail prices to Uniworld, that distributor's 
customers would not be able to benefit fully from Uniworld's centralized billing capacity. 
2.  Undertakings given by the parties 
(  44) In addition, the parties have provided the undertakings set out below. Compliance with each of 
them will be a condition for the validity of  this Decision within the meaning of  Article 8 ( I) of 
Regulation No 17. 
(a) Non-discrimination 
(45) Every shareholder ofUnisource and Unisource itselfundertakes that neither it nor any of  its 
subsidiaries will offer terms and conditions to Uniworld in respect of  interconnection to the PSTN, 
ISDN and PSDN networks as well as leased lines in the home countries of  the Unisource shareholders 
which are discriminatory in favour of  Uniworld. 
(46) Every shareholder ofUnisource undertakes that all dealings with (i) AT&T and (ii) any other 
shareholder in respect of  correspondent bilateral traffic will be on terms and conditions similar to those 
offered to third parties in connection with reserved facilities and services and with such facilities and 
services in respect of  which they still have a dominant position within the. meaning of  Article 86 of  the 
EC Treaty after full and effective liberalization of  telecommunications infrastructure and se_~ices in 
each of  their respective countries. 
(b) No misuse of  confidential information 
(  4 7) U  nisource and every one .of its shareholders undertakes not to misuse confidential intbrmation 
obtained from third parties to the benefit ofUniworld and will in relation to Uniworld ensure and 
facilitate the respect of  the undertakings related to misuse of  confidential information given in the 
context of  the Unisource Decision. 
(c) Prevention of  cross-subsidization 
(  48) Every shareholder of  Unisource undertakes not to grant any cross-subsidies to any entity created 
pursuant to the Uniworld agreements funded out of  income generated by any business which they 
operate pursuant to any exclusive right or in respect of  which they hold a dominant position within the 
meaning of  Article 86 of  the EC Treaty. 
(d) Prevention of  tying 
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(  49) Every shareholder of  Unisource undertakes that it will not tie-in the sale of  any service provided 
by Uniworld with any service provided by each of  them. Each will, moreover, for as long as it has a 
dominant position within the meaning of  Article 86 of  the EC Treaty in respect of  the provision of 
telecommunications services and/or infrastructures, only make· combined offerings ofUniworld 
services and its own services in such a way that the customer can identify in the contract forms the 
price charged as well as the other terms and conditions for these services and it will ensure that each 
of  these components is separately available at equivalent conditions. 
3. Position of  AT&T 
(50) During the assessment of  the case, the Commission raised with AT&T its concerns regarding 
access by European telecommunications operators not involved in the present transaction to the 
United States via AT& T's infrastructure, which is still the most widely available one in that country. 
In the framework of  the ensuing discussions, AT  & T made a detailed description of  its obligations 
under US regulations in respect of  its international facilities and services, in .particular regarding 
interconnection to its networks. AT&T further confirmed its intention to 'abide by all relevant US 
legislation and FCC rules to which it is subject from time to time in respect of  its international facilities 
and services.  · 
(51) In addition, in order to further guarantee the access of  those European telecommunications 
·operators not involved in~the present transaction and to guarantee that there will be no negative effect 
on those other European telecommunications operators resulting.from the transaction, AT&T offered 
the following undertakings to the European Commission, which accepted them: 
{1) AT&T undertakes to advise the European Commission promptly of  any complaint filed with the 
FCC regarding access to or interconnection with AT  & T's international facilities. including any 
complaint filed with the FCC regarding bilateral· correspondent arrangements, by telecommunications 
operators or service providers from the EEA or Switzerland. AT  & T further undertakes to intbrm the 
~uropean  Commission of  any final decision taken by the FCC in regard to any such complaint. 
{2} With respect to operators with international facilities licences in the EEA and Switzerland with 
whom AT  & T today has an accounting rate agreement, and for traffic sent in the context of  the 
bilateral correspondent regime, AT&T undertakes to offer cost-based ac~ounting rates that, in all 
cases, would be no higher than the lowest accounting rate established between AT  & T and any 
Unisource shareholder. 
(3) With respect to operators with international facilities licences in the EEA and Switzerland with 
whom AT  & T may in the future establish an accounting rate agreement, AT  & T undertakes to offer 
cost-based accounting rates that, in all cases, would be no higher than the lowest accounting rate then 
in effect between AT&T and any Unisource shareholder. 
H. Comments from third parties 
(52) Following the publication of  a notice pursuant to Article 19 (3) ofRegulation No 17 and to 
Article 3 to Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement (26), three interested third parties submitted specitic 
comments to the Commission regarding Uniworld. These comments focused, in particular, on the 
changes and undertakings submitted by the pSrties. Generally speaking, comments were supportive of 
the changes and undertakings submitted. Some commentators pointed out, however, the need to 
introduce an additional condition regarding the absence of  discrimination by the Unisource 
shareholders vis-a-vis AT&T and each other in respect ofbilateral correspondent traffic. A general 
remark was also made regarding the need to impose auditing,  ~ecording and reporting obligations in 
respect of  the activities ofUniworld as a way to ensure compliance with conditions. Finally, some 
comments insisted on the need for the Commission to treat all alliances on an equivalent footing and 
to create a level playing field between them. 
(53) The Commission carefully reviewed all conunents received and concluded that most concerns 
expressed therein had already been raised by the Commission and discussed in detail with the parties, 
who had provided adequate answers and safeguards. Those comments have not therefore affected the 
Commission's substantive position outlined in the Article 19 (3) notice as regards the notified 
agreements. However, in the interest of  legal certainty the Commission introduces an  addition~:~! 
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condition regarding the absence of  discrimination by the shareholders ofUnisource vis-a-vis AT&T 
and each other and extends the auditing, recording and reporting obligations imposed on the 
Unisource-Decision to cover the activities ofUniworld. 
IT. LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A. Article 85 (1) of  the EC·Treaty and Article 53 (I) of  the EEA Agreement 
1.  Structural cooperative joint venture 
(54) Uniworld combines activities of  its parent companies in a range of  Europe-wide and third-country 
markets for liberalized telecommunications services and is set to develop in these markets. This 
venture entails major changes in the structures of  the parent companies as it  represents a major step 
for them towards providing services of  a real pan-European nature. To that end, through Uniworld the 
parent companies are pooling a significant number of  assets in connection with the provision and 
marketing of  telecommunications services. 
(a) Joint control 
(55) The structure ofUniworld implies that no single parent company is in a position to exercise 
separately a decisive influence on the decision making ofUniworld. The fact that most decisions have 
to be adopted by supermajority and the veto rights granted to AT  & T show that both parent 
companies jointly control Uniworld. 
(b) Coordination of  competitive behaviour 
(56) Prior to the Uniworld transaction, its parent companies were actual competitors for the provision 
of  data services and at least potential competitors in respect of  the provision of  IVPN/voice services. 
After the transaction, the parent companies will remain at least potential competitors in respect of  all 
services within the relevant market defined as 'non-exclusive services' (27). This is so because, as 
described above, those services are excluded from the non-competition provision. Furthermore it will 
not conduct its own basic research and development activitie:s. 1t will  ~ave access to research 
capabilities and proprietary technologies of  AT&T, Unisource and the Unisource shareholders by 
means of  intellectual property arrangements. 
(57) In conclusion, the Commission considers that Uniworld constitutes a cooperative joint venture. 
2.  Applicability of  Article 85 (1) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53  (1) ofthe EEA Agreement to 
Uniworld 
(58) The agreements between Unisource and AT&T fall within Article 85 (1) ofthe EC Treaty and 
Article 53  (1) of  the EEA Agreement since they restrict competition between the parent compani~s in 
respect of  some categories of  services included in the market for non-reserved corporate 
telecommunications services. Such restriction of  competition affects trade between Member States. 
(a) Data services networks 
(59) AT&T and Unisource are actual competitors in respect ofthe provision of  data services and 
networks. They each currently have their own international European data network and services. They 
themselves estimate their combined market share (based on an independent study) at around 10 o/o of 
the pan-European corporate data market (Unisource will have around 6,5% and AT&T less than 5 
%). However, in that estimate the parties have not included figures for the provision of  public data 
network services (X.25 and frame relay) in which Unisource is active now and will be active after the 
transaction both for its own account (domestic-only services in the home countries and presumably 
other countries within the territory) and as Uniworld distributor in the home countries (28) and in 
which AT&T is and will remain active. Market shares in the home countries and in the United 
Kingdom are far more important. 
In addition, both parent companies had already signed contracts for the provision of  services with a 
significant number of  customers in different countries within the EEA. 
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(60) Coverage and features Qfboth networks are very similar, although the individual points of 
presence networks sometimes cover different locations Within basically the sa.rtle countries. Unisource 
offers large coverage in the home countries of  its shareholders, and AT  & T has a substantial network  · 
in the United Kingdom. Coverage in other major markets (like Frapce, Germany or Italy) offered by 
them is similar and limited to a few nodes in some of  the major cities. 
(  61) As ·regards data services, Uniworld will market initially the existing d~ta services of  the parent 
companies. In this respect, at least for an initial period, Uniworld services will not be totally hew from 
a technical point of  view but will only offer a better geographical coverage in Europe. 
(b) IVPN/voice  . 
(62) For the following reasons, AT&T, Unisource and the shareholders ofUnisource have to be 
considered at least potential competitors in the provision of  such services.  · 
Before the current transaction, AT  & T and Unisourc·e had separate plans to field IVP~  services. 
- Unisource had even started to market a limited IVPN offering based on technology available through 
PTT Telecom and on the networks and platforms of  the individual Unisource shareholders (the 
so-called Phase I network,) 
-AT  & T ·has· since 1985 offered a VPN service branded SON (Software Defined Network) to its US 
customers. One feature of  the service, the Global Software Defined Network (GSDN), offers US 
customers the ability to add non-US locations to their SON network environment. GSDN allows calls · · 
from the US to be subject to the same originating features as any other intra-US call. However, calls 
terminating in the United States are controlled by whatever features are available on the non-US 
service. GSDN is offered on the basis ofbilateral agreements concluded by AT&T and foreign 
telecommunication operators, 
-in addition, Unisource, in the framework of  its participation in the WorldPartners Company and 
WorldPartners Association, and AT&T UK launched the WorldPartners VNS service towards the 
end of 1995 in 14 European countries. They are marketing it first to a limited set of  customers. The 
IVPN service to be marketed by Uniworld (Uniworld VNS) and the WorldSource VNS are 
substitutable for (i) any European potential customer for Uniworld's VNS, and (ii) any customer 
having intra-European needs (that is, with locations to connect in at least two European countries). In 
addition, both will be provided over the same backbone network. 
(c) Messaging 
{63) Unisource and AT&T are each active in the European messaging market where they claim to 
have a market share of 10% in the whole of  the Community (Unisource (29) 5% with its 400NET 
platform and service, AT&T 5% with the Easylink Messaging Network). 
3. Applicability of  Article 85 (1) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (1) ofthe EEA Agreement to 
Contractual Provisions 
(  64) The agreements contain provisions that further restrict competition between AT  & T, U nisource 
and the Unisource shareholders: 
(I) the commercial relationship between Uniworld and its parent companie-s concerning purchasing by 
Uniworld or supply to it, under Article 10 of  the Joint Venture Agreement; 
(2) the non-competition provision under Article 12 of  the Joint Venture Agreement; 
(3) the exclusive distributorship agreements regarding the countries of  the Unisource shareholders as 
included in the Master Distribution Agreements. 
(  65) Of  these, the relationship between Uniworld and its parent companies concerning purchasing by 
Uniworld or supply to it, under Article 10 of  the Joint Venture Agreement, and the non-competition 
provision, under Article 12 of  the Joint Venture Agreement, are to be seen as ancillary restrictions. 
Therefore, these restrictions are not assessed under Article 85 (I) ofthe EC Treaty and Article 53 (I) 
of  the EEA separately from Uniworld as such: 
- the comm~rcial relationship between Unh~orld and its parent companies as set out in the agreements 
ensures that U niworld will get continued access to the services and infrastructures of  the parent 
companies which it requires at the best conditions available. Such access and conditions are required U-3970078 i - bas~cen  http://www.cc.eec/SOl/SOConsult_Acli?APP  ... D-4!UNIQID•71ACTU-4VISUvisomO!VI30#texte 
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for a successful entry of  Uniworld in the market, 
- the non-competition provision is a reflection of  the firm commitment of  every parent company to the 
joint venture. It expresses the reality of  the lasting withdrawal ~fthe parent companies at least in 
respect of  those services defined as exclusive within the relevant market. 
(  66) On the other hand, the exclusive distributorship arrangements regarding the countries of  the 
Unisource shareholders are caught by_ Article 85 (1) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (1} of  the EAA 
Agreement because they have the object or effect of  isolating each national·market concerned, where 
the respective Unisource shareholders enjoy dominant positions for the provision of  most 
telecommunications networks and services, against imports of  those services from other EEA Met:nber 
States. That may adversely affect the conditions of  competition within the EEA. Unlike the other 
restrictive provisions, the Commission cannot consider such exclusive distributorship ·agreements to be 
ancillary to the creation of  the joint venture, since non-exclusive forms of  distribution are possible  · 
which would not impair the performance o'r marketing of  the services. 
4. Effect on trade between Member States 
(67) By the very nature of  the services within its business scope, Uniworld has a substantial effect on 
trade between Member States because it will provide non-reserved services between any two Member 
States and within any Member State to customers having a need for pan-European 
telecorru:nunications services. 
Furthermore, that view is consistent with that expressed in the Commission's Telecommunications 
Guidelines that agreements concerning non-reserved services, equipment and space segment 
infrastructure potentially affect trade between Member States (30). 
The exclusive distribution provision in respect of  the countries of  the Unisource shareholders caught 
by Article 85 (I) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (I) of  the EEA Agreement protect the parent 
companies within their respective home market and contribute to dividing the single market along 
national borders. Therefore, this non-ancillary provision affects trade among Member States and 
between Member States and the EFT  A countries.  · 
B. Article 85 (3) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (3) of  the EEA  .~'\greement 
1. Technical and economic progress 
(68) Uniworld will make possible the provision of  improved services with regard to the existing 
offerings of  the parent companies. It will thus become a more viable alternative than U nisource and 
AT  & T separately with regard to large customers. 
(69) The combination ofUnisource's and AT& T's forces in Uniworld will allow cheaper and earlier 
deployment of  pan-European services which are more advanced, in. terms of  quality, coverage and 
seamlessness, than the two could provide separately. Uniworld facilitates the structure necessary for 
the uniform provision of  the pan-European seamless services within its scope by defining the elements 
of  those services and by ensuring that the quality of  service is at the same high level throughout the 
structure. In addition, Uniworld organizes distribution of  the voice lVPN and other services beyond 
the customers belonging to the EVUA and improves the coverage offered to the US branches of 
European companies. 
New providers, including existing alliances like Unisource, are not .yet able to offer the range of 
services, the geographic breadth or the service quality that multinational corporations need to operate 
their increasingly complex and interrelated businesses. Moreover, according to the parties, real 
seamlessness does not yet exist in the provision of  international (pan-European) services to corporate 
customers. Current offerings available from service providers still involve low reliability, in view of  the 
cost and difficulties of  establishing the necessary infrastructure abroad, and rudimentary customer care 
systems ~d  global. billing platforms, which are crucial to fulfil the requirements of  big corporations in 
order for them to manage their increasingly international business. 
(70) The provision of  IVPN services constitutes an improvement over the existing situation. IVPN 
services are being developed at the request of  the biggest customers that want to· obtain on a 
transfrontier basis the features offered at home by national VPN offerings of  telecommunications 
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operators. It was not previously possible to arrange a multilateral international VPN solution through 
a single operator. In that connection, the EVUA launched a request for information to potential 
vendors of  such services because it was not possible to buy IVPN services in Europe. IVPN offerings 
were made on the basis pf  bilateral arrangements with other telecommunications operators, which 
affected the seamless nature of  the provision of  such services and the availability of  features abroad. 
Unisource and AT  & T plan to offer a multilateral IVPN service based on their own network. That 
service will be really seamless and on a one-stop-shop basis. 
AT&T is making very important contributions to .that service and network in terms of  know-how, 
IPR and expertise, including in particular its proprietary customer care and global billing platforms 
that are not commercially available and that are not licensed by AT&T to any other company, 
including the other members of  the WorldPartners Company and WorldPartners Association. For 
instance, the material and non-material contributions of  AT  & T serve to reduce the time to market of 
the Phase II service by nearly 12 months. 
(71) As regards data networks and services, Uniworld will first integrate and rationalize the networks 
and homogenize the different platforms for the different services and then enhance it by the 
introduction of  new transmission techniques. 
In addition, the assignment to Uniworld of  international data assets improves the geographical 
coverage (POPs) of  the individual networks currently existing, that is in the home countries in respect 
of  AT&T and in the United Kingdom in respect ofUnisource. More POPs will be installed in the 
short to medium term to improve coverage in key markets, such as Italy or Germany, where combined 
coverage is very poor. The combination will produce cost savings because the more POPs are installed 
the more it is possible to reduce the cost of  access in foreign countries. Access still accounts for the 
major part of  the direct costs of  alternative providers of  telecommunications services. 
(72) As regards services (31 ), new data services, based to a large extent on AT & T's technologies and 
know-how, will be rolled out. Further categories of  new services, in particular integrated (voice and 
data) services, will be launched to meet the requirements of  big customers (or associations thereof: 
like the EVUA). Such services are not currently available in Europe from a single vendor as is shown 
by the new tender that the EVU  A is to issue. 
(73) As regards messaging services, Unisource's current messaging platform (  400Net) has a wide 
, European coverage but has few locations outside Europe. In addition, it does not provide a number of 
features requested by customers such as cheap and easy connection to other LAN platforms, 
electronic data interchange (EDI), lower cost text to fax, text to telex, and so on. According to the 
parties, improving coverage and developing such features will be both expensive and time consuming. 
Current plans therefore foresee the use by Uniworld of  AT& T's Easylink messaging platform, which 
offers those features on a global basis. AT&T would transfer the relevant platform assets in Europe. 
No indication has been provided of  the fate of  400Net, but in view of  the above it will probably be 
discontinued. 
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(74) In conclusion, the fact that Unisource and AT&T are joining forces in Uniworld will allow the 
consolidation of  a viable competitor in the European telecommunications tield with the necessary 
credibility to compete in the market with major competitors like Concert or Atlas/Global One. 
(75) The exclusive distributorship arrangements will improve distribution by ensuring that distributors 
will concentrate their marketing efforts on their respective territories. In any event, the exclusivity 
does not preclude passive sales (customers will always decide who they wish the lead distributor to 
be) and is limited to the exclusive services ofUniworld. The nomination of  AT&T as the US 
distributor of  Uniworld services will help to improve the coverage and services offered by Uniworld 
and the US branches of  European customers. 
2. Benefits for consumers 
(76} Uniworld will mean that consumers, big users of  telecommunications services in the first place, 
will benefit more rapidly from an improved portfolio of  new advanced services than its parent 
companies would have been capable of  providing separately. It is worth noting in this respect that 
some of  these services, like the integrated services to be requested by the EVU  A, are not yet available 
in Europe.  · 
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In addition, the availability of  the improved portfolio will  allo~ business customers to operate more 
effectively on an European and global scale and to compete better with their EEA and global 
competitors. 
Finally, the consolidation ofUniworld as a viable alternative will increase the choice of  viable service 
providers available for customers.  · 
(77) The exclusive distribution mechanism will ensure, as further described above, that there is a single 
person to contact in respect of  any contract in the event of  any kind of  difficulties related to the 
provision of  the services anywhere within the territory. 
3. Indispensability 
(78) Uniworld is indispensable to achieve the benefits identified above: 
- AT & T's portfolio of  non-reserved corporate telecommunications services in Europe was 
incomplete, because it lacked a voice IVPN provided on a suitable network. AT & T evaluated in  1993 
the cost of  a unilateral entry into the IVPN field in Europe at US$ I billion in ten years. AT& T's 
current GDSN service in the US does not allow it to provide consistent service levels in Europe, to 
overcome inadequacies of  local infrastructure, to ensure seamlessness or uniform features/functionality 
across geography, 
- the current service provided by Unisource, the so-called Phase I, was an interim solution that did not 
achieve the W  orldSource minimum common denominator set of  features. The Phase· II service, as 
described above was only possible given the substantial contributions made by AT & T, in particular its 
proprietary customer care and global billing platform. AT & T's contributions also made it possible tor 
the Phase II service to be operationall2 months ahead ofthe original schedule. 
(79) In this particular case, less restrictive solutions such as the teaming agreements originally 
concluded by the parent companies are not enough to achieve the benefits, because they do not 
provide a stable framework for the relationship to develop. 
(80) In addition, the participation ofUnisource in WorldPartners as an alternative to the creation ·of 
Uniworld is not enough, because WorldPartners is not a service provider but a facilitator of  global 
connectivity between its members. It merely establishes common denominators of  features in respect 
of  specific services. Again, it does not provide a stable framc~w-ork which will allow the relationship to 
develop. 
In addition, Uniworld offers a more complete portfolio than that ofWorldPartners, which is limited to 
IVPN, Frame Relay and private lines. 
(81) As regards exclusive distribution, it is very common, in alliances like the present one, for 
investors to reserve distribution rights in their respective home markets in exchange for the investment 
made. In the present case, taking into account the fact that territories entrusted to distributors are not 
completely closed since it is ultimately customer preference that determines who will be the distributor 
and that, in any event, in respect of  most customer contracts more than one distributor will be 
involved (either as lead or support distributors). Such distribution rights can be said to be 
indispensable to secure firm commitment by the distributors towards Uniworld. 
In addition, in other similar alliances the Commission has recognized that exclusive distribution 
protects the intellectual property rights of  the parent companies better than other arrangements (32). 
4.  Non-elimination of  competition 
· (82) The Commission assessed the fulfilment of  this condition at the cross-border regional and 
domestic levels of  the relevant markets as described above. 
(a) Pan-European market 
(83) Uniworld faces significant competition in the pan-European market for. non-reserved corporate 
telecommunications services. Almost all alliances in the telecommunications sector are trying to enter 
those markets. 
The first customers targeted are by definition very big and have a substantial degree of  bargaining 
power. It appears to be of  the utmost importance to gain a few, very important customers in that 
segment which creates a substantial source of  revenue but above all m.eans a quantum leap in terms of 
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the track record and credibility of  the alliance. 
Such customers are well informed and are able to put pressure on alliances to better address their 
needs (and to reduce prices). The EVUA is a clear example of  this trend by big customers. The total 
expenditure of  the. EVUA members for their voice telecommunicat~ons needs  i~ US $ 2 billion a year. 
(b) National markets of  the shareholders ofUnisource 
(84) Concerns by the Commission regarding the position of  the Unisource shareholders on their 
respective national markets have been addressed by the conditions and obligations imposed and  th~ · 
changes to the regulatory situation referred to in detail in the U¢source Decision (33). However, the 
Commission has imposed conditions and obligations on the parties regarding non-discrimination, no 
misuse of  confidential information, prevention of  cross-subsidization and prevention of  tying, the main 
object of  which is to extend to the activities of  Uniworld the scope of  similar conditions and 
obligations imposed on the parent companies of  Unisource. 
(85) As regards exclusive distribution, the Commission concluded that passive sales provide an 
opening for customers with bargaining power to exploit margins for competition between the 
Uniworld parent company acting as exclusive distributor in its territory and the other parent company 
that may offer the same Uniworld service at a lower price. More importantly, the restrictive effects of 
the exclusive distribution agreements are likely to be increasingly balanced by the availability of 
alternative infrastructure and the non-discriminatory terms of  interconnection with the national PSTN, 
which will encourage competition for Uniworld and for each parent company acting as Uniworld 
distributor. 
5. Conclusion 
(86) It is the Commission's conclusion that all the conditions for an individual exemption pursuant to 
Article 85 (3) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (3) of  the EEA Agreement are met in respect of  the 
creation ofUniworld and in respect of  the individual restrictions discussed above. 
C. Duration of  the exemption, conditions and obligations 
(87) Pursuant to Article 8 of  Regulation No 17 and to Protocol 21 to the EEA Agreement 
respectively, a Decision in application of  Article 85 (3) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (3) of the 
EEA Agreement is to be issued for a specified period and conditions and obligations may be attached 
thereto. Pursuant to Article 6 of  Regulation No 17, the date from which such a decision takes effect 
cannot be earlier than the date of  notification. In that respect, in the present case the Decision, in so 
far as it grants exemption, should take effect as regards the creation.ofUniworld and related 
agreements as described above, from the date of  commencement of  validity of  the Unisource Decision 
to the end of  the period of  validity of  that Decision. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission has 
taken into account the link between the two cases, in particular the fact that Unisource is one of 
Uniworld's parent companies . 
.  (88) This Decision should be subject to the conditions described .in recitals 45 to 49 above. 
Furthermore, this Decision should be subject to a certain number of  obligations. These conditions and 
obligations are indispensable to prevent an elimination of  competition in the relevant markets in the 
EEA. The Commission will, at the parties' request, review the need for any particular condition and 
obligation attached to this Decision if  circumstances change substantially before the period of 
exemption expires. 
(89) In so far as relates to existing obligations under national or Community law, the obligations 
described below are intended to ensure the parties' firm commitment to comply with the applicable 
legal framework. These obligations will remain in force for the duration of  the exemption. Pursuant to . 
Article 8 (3) (b) ofRegulation No  17, the Commission may revoke this Decision ifthe patties breach 
any such obligation. 
( 1) Auditing 
All entities created· under the present transaction ~ust be audited every year, and that audit is to 
confirm from an accounting viewpoint that: 
(a) the transactions between these entities, on the one hand, and the shareholders ofUnisource, ort the L • 39700781 - bas-cen  http:llwww.cc:cec!SOl/SGConsult_Acli?APP  ... D-41UNIQID-71ACTU-4VISUvisomOIVI30#texte 
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other hand, have been conducted at arm's length; 
(b) the figures are accurate: 
The first auditing reports, covering the calendar year, must be submitted to the Commission within six 
months after the end of 1997.  · 
(2) Recording obligations 
All shareholders of  Unisource and all entities created pursuant to the Uniworld agreements must each 
keep records and documents suitable to prove compliance with the terms of  the above conditions 
ready for inspection by the Co.mmission.  · 
(3) Inspection of  records 
For the purpose of  ascertaining and ensuring compliance by the .shareholders of  Unisource or by 
Unisource itselfwith the above conditions, each of  the shareholders and· all entities created pursuant to 
the Uniworld agreements must, on reasonable notice, during office hours, and without the need for the 
Commission to invoke the powers of  inspection pursuant to Regulation No 17, give the Commission 
access to business premises to inspect records and documents covered by the above recording 
obligations and to receive oral explanations relating to such documents. 
(  4) Reporting obligations 
The shareholders of  Unisou:rce and all entities created pursuant to the Uniworld agreements must 
provide to the Commission, for the purpose of  determining whether they comply with the above 
obligations: 
(a) any records and documents in the possession or control of  the shareholders or any entity created 
pursuant to the Uniworld agreements necessary for that determination every six months, starting one 
year after the date of  the exemption pursuant to Article 1  ; and 
(b) oral or written c·omplementary explanations. 
(90) This Decision is without prejudice to the applicability of  Article 86 of  the EC Treaty and Article 
54 of  the EEA Agreement, 
HAS ADOPTED TillS DECISION: 
Article 1 
Pursuant to Article 85 (3) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (3) of  the EEA Agreement, the provisions 
of  Article 85 (1) of  the EC Treaty and Article 53 (I) of  the EEA Agreement are hereby declared 
inapplicable for the period of  validity of  the Unisource Decision to: 
(I) the Uniworld joint venture as notified to the Commission, including the ancillary obligations 
regarding (i) the relationship between Uniworld and its parent companies concerning purchasing by 
Uniworld or supply to it under Article 10 of  the Joint Venture Agreement and (ii) the non-competition 
provision under Article I2 of  the Joint Venture Agreement~ 
(2) the exclusive distribution arrangements in respect of  the countries of  the shareholders of 
Unisource. 
Article 2 
The exemption from the application of  Article 85 (1) ofthe EC Treaty and Article 53  (1) ofthe EEA 
Agreement set out in Article I of  this Decision shall be subject to the following conditions: 
(I) Non-discrimination 
(a) Every shareholder of  U  nisource and U  nisource itself shall undertake that neither it nor any of  its 
subsidiaries will offer terms and conditions to Uniworld in respect of  interconnection to the PSTN, 
ISDN and PSDN networks as well as leased lines in the home countries of  the Unisource shareholders 
which are discriminatory in favour of  Uniworld. 
(b) Every shareholder ofUnisource shall undertake that all dealings with (i) AT&T and (ii) any other 
shareholder in respect of  correspondent bilateral traffic will be on terms and conditions similar to those 
offered to thlrd parties in connection with reserved facilities and services and with such facilities and 
services in respect of  which they still have a dominant position after full and effective liberalization of 
telecommunications infrastructure and services in each of  their respective countries. 
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Unisource and every one of  its shareholders shall undertake not to misuse confidential information 
obtained from third parties to the benefit ofUniworld and will, in relation to Uniworld, ensure and 
facilitate the respect of  the undertakings related to misuse of  confidential information given in the 
context of  the Unisource Decision. 
(3) Prevention of  cross-subsidization 
Every shareholder ofUnisource shall undertake not to grant any cross-subsidies to any entity created 
pursuant to the Uniworld agreements funded out of  income generated by any business which they 
operate pursuant to any exclusive right or in respect of  which they hold a dominant position. 
(4) Prevention of  tying 
Every shareholder of  Unisource shall undertake that it will not tie in the sale of  any service provided 
by Uniworld with any serVice provided by each of  them.  E~ch  will, moreover, for as long as it has a 
dominant position in respect of  the provision of  telecommunications services and/or infrastructures, 
only make combined offerings of  Uniworld services and its own services in such a way that the 
· customer can identify in the contract forms the price charged as well as the other terms and conditions 
for these services and it will ensure that each of  these components is separately available at equivalent 
conditions.  · 
Breaches of  the requirements set out in points 1 to 4 shall not be considered to violate the conditions 
set out in this Article unless such breaches have a substantial impact on the market. 
Article 3 
This Decision shall be subject to the following obligations: 
(I) Auditing 
All entities created under the Uniworld transaction shall be audited every year and that audit shall 
·confirm from an accounting viewpoint that: 
(a) the transactions between these entities, on the one hand, and the shareholders ofUnisource. on the 
other hand, have been conducted at arm'S length; 
(b) the figures are accurate.  . 
The first auditing reports, covering the calendar year 1997, shall be submitted to the Commission 
within six months after the end of 1997. 
(2) Recording obligations 
All shareholders ofUnisource and all entities created pursuant to the Uniworld agreements shall each 
keep records and documents suitable to prove compliance with the terms of  the conditons set out in 
Article 2 ready for inspection by the Commission. 
(3) Inspection of  records 
For the purpose of  ascertaining and ensuring compliance by the shareholders ofUnisource or by 
Unisource itself with the conditions set out in Article 2, each of  the shareholders and all entities 
created pursuant to the Uniworld agreements shall, on reasonable notice, during office hours, and 
without the need for the Commission to invoke the powers of  inspection pursuant to Regulation No 
17, give the Commission access to business premises to inspect records and documents covered by the 
above recording obligations and to receive oral explanations relating to such documents. 
(  4) Reporting obligations 
AU shareholders and all entities created pursuant to the Uniworld agreements shall provide to the 
Commission, for the purpose of  determining whether they comply with the obligations set out in 
points (1), (2) and (3): 
(a) any records and documents in the possession or control of  the shareholders or any entity created 
pursuant to the Uniworld agreements necessary for that determination every six months, starting one 
year after the date of  the exemption pursuant to Article 1; and 
(b) oral or written complementary explanations. 
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Article 4 





NL-2132 JH Hoofddorp. 
AT&T SA/NV, 
1945, Chaussee de Wavre, 
B-1160 Brussels. 
Done at Brussels, 29 October 1997. 
For the Commission 
Karel VAN MIERT 
Member of  the Commission 
(I) OJ 13, 21. 2.  1962, p. 204/62. 
(2) OJ C 44,  12. 2.  1997, p. 4. 
(3) Unisource Pan-European Services and AT&T Pan-European Services have been created as 
special subsidiaries to hold the respective interests of  the parent companies in Uniworld VOF. 
(4) Seep. 1 of  this Official Journal. 
(5) By order released on 23 October 1995, the FCC reclassified AT&T as a non-dominant carrier in 
the market for interstate (US domestic) telecommunications services. 
(6a) Deleted, business secrets. 
(7) WorldPartners is a limited partnership promoted by AT  & T basically to set performance standards, 
agreed and respected by the members of  the partnership, in respect of  given telecommunications 
~ervices. Such standards are a way to extend connectivity for those services outside the borders of 
each of  its ·members. Members of  the WorldPartners Company have invested in it and participate, 
among other things, in the d~finition.ofthe standards.  Membe~s  of  the WorldPartners Association are 
distributors of  the services in given territories. The agreements regarding Unisource and AT&T UK's 
entry into WorldPartners have been separately notified to the Commission (Case No IV/35.490-
WorldPartners). 
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(Acts  fllbost  Jlllblit~~lion is not obligatoty) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION DECISION 
of 17  Pe~ruary 1'95  ·~  ..... 
cleclarias a concentration to be· eompadble with  the common market 
(Cue IV/M.461  - Siemena/ltaltel) 
(Only lhe Engliah tot il authentic:) 
(9S/2SSIEC) 
11IE  COMMISSION  OF niB EUROPEAN  COMMUNmES, 
Having  reprd to the Tatty establishing the  European 
· Community, 
Having regard  to Couna1 Reaulatioia (EEC) No 4064/89 
of  21  December  1989  on  the  control  of concentrations 
between  undertakinp  ('~ and  in  particultr Article  8 (2) 
. thereof. 
Having  reprd to the  EBA 'Asreem~nt and  in  partioular 
Artide  S7  (I) thereof, 
Having reprd to the Commitsion Decision of 14 October 
1994  to initiate  proceedinp in  this cue, 
...  Having reprd to the opinion of. the Advisory Committee 
on Concentrations (1), 
Whereas: 
(1)  The  abovementioned  operation  concems  the 
~lishment  of a joint venture between STET -
Societl  Piaaaziaria  Telefonica  - per  Azioni 
('STET) lllld Si:mens Aktienaesellschaft ('Siemens1. 
(')OJ No L 3,S, 30.12.1'8', p.l. Conipndum: OJ No L 1S7, 
21. '· lffO, p.  IJ.  . 
(2)  OJ  No  C 116.  11. 7.  1,$, p.  4. 
I.  THE OPERATION AND THE PARTIES 
(2)  On 26  March  1994, STET and  Siemens  signed  a 
·m~morandum of understanding aimed at the crea-
tion  of  a  European  Telecom  pup capable  of 
playing a major role u  an international ·supplier. In 
the  notified  operation. the  parties  will  transfer  to 
~e joint  venture  theit  Italian  subsidiaries,  ltaltel 
and  Siemens  Telecomunicazioni  (S1).  "for  deve-
loping. manufacturing. sales and service activities in 
the  field  of  telecommunications.  ' 
STET and Siemens will create .-.holding to which 
STET  will  trinsfer  initially  60 °/o  of  the  capital 
stock of  ltaltel (the  rema!ning 40 % equity ·being 
contdbuted  later)  and  Siemens  will  contribute  by 
transfening the whole capital stock of ST as well u 
an  amount  in  cash. 
(3)  STET is an  Italian company of which  46,61 % of 
the capital shares (64,20 °/o  of the ordinary voting 
shares) is owned by the lstituto per Ia Ricostruzione 
lndustriate SpA (IRI). STET coordinates  the  activ· 
ities of a pup  of companies opentinJ in the field 
of  telecommunications.  · 
(4)  STET operates  a fully  independent company  and 
its stock  is quoted  on  the  Milan  Stock  Bxchanp. 
IRrs  function  is  limited  to  that ·of  a  holding 
company on behalf of the Italian State, and for the 
purpose• of this notification, STBT1a conaidered to 
be· 'an  economic  unit with  an  Independent power 
of decialon' u described in recltalll of the Merser 
.. -aeplation. 
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ltaltel  is  dae  manufactu~nJ  and  marketina 
company  of  STET  in  d".e  telecommunications 
sector.  STET  holds  100 1/o  of  ltaltel's  registered 
shares. 
ltaltel  is  mainly  active  in  developina.  producina 
and marketin1 systems  and equipment for  public 
and  private  telecommunications  in  the  fields  of 
switching,  transmission  systems,  mobile  radio 
networks.  PBX's  and terminals. 
(S)  Siemens is  a  publicly held German industrial and 
·  electronics company and the ultimate parent of the 
Siemens group of companies. The principal  activ-
ities  of  Siemens  are :  industrial  and  buildinJ 
systems, drives  and standard  products. automation, 
automotive  systems,  power  generation  (K.~ 
power transmission  and  distribution. semiconduc-
tors,  medical  engineering.  public  communication 
networks,  network  systems,  passive  components 
and electron tubes, private communication systems. 
defense  electronics· and  transportation  systems. 
ST is a wholly-cnmed  l~lian subsidiary of Siemens. 
with  manufacturing, sales and services activities in 
the fields of public and private telecommunications 
equipment, systems and services,  including public 
and  private  switching,  transmission,  fixed  and 
mobilt radio  networks. as  well  as  terminal equip-
ment for  the private  market. 
(6)  Mter several  years'  work  on the  rationalization  of 
the  Italian  telecommunications  sector  in  the 
current year a  single  telecommunication  operator 
has  been established.  Further to the  resolution  of 
the sharehol~ers of SIP, ltalcable, lritel, Telespazio 
and Sirm on  19 ·May  1994, the deed merging the 
other  concessionaire  companies  into  SIP  was 
signed  on  27 July  1994  and  took  retrospective 
effect  in  accounting  and  fiscal  terms  u  of  I 
January 1994. 
The merser was implemented on 18 Aupst 1994. 
While retaining its present name, SIP has also been 
entided to adopt the name of Telecon:- ltalia SpA 
for  aU ·legal  purposes. As  a result of the operation 
STET  has  56,10 1/o  of  the  ordinary  shares  of 
Telecom  ltalia  and.  IRI  2,8 t 
0/o  of  the  ordinary 
shares. Telecom ltalia is listed on the stock market 
and the remai.nina part of the share capital is held 
by private  minority shareholders. 
· With the abovementioned operation and the other 
subsequent resolutions the major parts of the steps 
for the completion of the· plan for the reorpniza-
tion  of  the  Italian  telecommuniation  sector 
according  to  the  lines  approved  by -the  Italian 
Government have  been  taken. 
In particular the com·ptny which  is  active  in  the 
provision  of  the  telecommunication  services 
(felecom  ltalia)  has  been  separated  within  the 
STET pup from  the  companies  which  are  in 
charse of the equipment  ~anufacturing activities 
(ltaltel, ·sirti  and Aet). 
The  remaining  steps  of  the  reorpnization  plan 
concern  the  transfer  from  Telecom  ltalia  of  its 
mobile  phone  operations  and  space  divisions  to 
independent  compani~s. 
(7)  ltaltel had been looking~  a technological panner 
in the past. It first establftbed a number of agree-
ments with  AT&T which .  included the acquisition 
by AT&T of a minority stake in the capital share of 
ltaltel. 'fhe apements with AT&T have now been 
terminated  and  AT&T  has  sold  its  stake  back  to 
STET. 
II. ntE CONCENTRAnON 
Joint control 
(8)  STET  and Siemens shall  each  own  SO  •to  of  the 
share capital in the joint venture. The joint venture 
will have a nine-member Board of Directors. STET 
and  Siemens  will  appoint  four  members  each, 
while  the  ninth  member,  the  Chairman  of  the 
Board, will be designated by STET and approved by 
Siemens.  ·  -
(9)  'lne  Board  shall  be  governing  body  of  the  joint 
venture and shall have the authority to adopt reso-
lutions on any matter not reserved by vinue of law 
to the shareholders' meeting. The resolution of key 
decisions will be adopted by the Board of Directors 
whh the approval of the STET and Siemens' repre-
sentatives. These decisions inlcude amnng others : 
(10) 
- the approval of the strategic business plan and  . 
the yearly  budaet. 
- the proposals  of the  CEO as  to  the  appoint-
ment and removal of senior o(ficers of the joint 
entity  and  of  the  Board  members  of  the 
holding's subsidiaries. 
With rerrd to ma(ters reserved tO the shareholders 
meetings .  decision,  under the .shareholders agree-
ment each party cammil$ itself to wte its shares in 
conformity with the proposals previously approved 
by the  Board  according to  the above. 




Each  of  the  parties  wl11  have  the ript of veto  It 
least  over  the  principal  decisions  conceminJ  the 
joint venture, which are mentioned under point'· 
Therefore.  they  will  have  joint  control  over  the 
joint venture. 
Pull  funcdon endty 
The  parties  will  transfer to  the  joint venture  their 
Italian  subsidiaries  which  are  active  in  the  manu-
. facturinJ  of  telecommunicatior.  equipment.  The 
operation will brinJ about the _industrial  merpr of 
the activities of the parties i" the product areas of 
switchin& transmission, radio systems, mobUe radio 
and  private communication systems and tenninlls. 
The  joint  venture  will  have  all  the  assets  and 
resources nccawy to perform all the functions of 
.  an  autonomous  entity,  includinJ  R&D,  manufac-
turinJ and  distribution. 
Por t.'te main  productJ of the public telecommuni-
cation  sector (pUblic  switchinJ systems and  tnns-
~ission) the  bulk of the Illes of the joint venture 
will continue to be absorbed by the Italian telecom 
operator, which is controlled by one of the parents 
(STET). A hiJh level of sales to a parent in a down-
stream market could lead to qtlestionina the auto-
nomy of the  joint venture.  It is  true  tha~ for  the 
forescable  future  Telecom  ltalia  will  be  the  only 
buyer on the public telecom markets. This is due to 
the  infrastructure  monopoly  and  not  to  the  fact 
that the ·minufac:tutc of telecommunication equip-
.  ment is an auxiliary_.activity to the paovision of the 
service. 
Absence of coordinadon 
While  Siemens  will  remain  active  in  the  same 
product markets  u  the joint venture  ~tside Italy, 
STET is  to  withdraw from  the markets  concerned 
by  transferring  its  relevant  business  to  the  joint 
venture. The only exception  to this is that ABT, a 
subsidiary of  STET~ is active in one of the markets 
(transmission)  affected  by  the ·operation.  However, 
Siemens  does  rot retain  any  business  activity  for 
transmiuion  in  Italy.  At  European  level  AFr 
tumover in transmiaion is of minor importance ; it 
represents  less  than  I  ,S 1/o  of  the  total  market. 
Purthmnore, the potential for coordination arising 
&om  this situation  is  minimal  given 'the  fact .. that 
the activities. of AET.in the transmission market in 
(14) 
Italy  are  of  minor  importance  in ·relation  to  the 
overall activities of the meraed entity (around 2%). 
With repnl to the role of Marconi u  a compedtor 
of  ltaltel  on  the  relevant  markets.  it  hu to  be 
considered  that  recently  Marconi,  ~hich  is  an 
Italian  company  which  forms  pan  of  the  GEC 
aroup  and  Pinmeccanica,  a company  which,  like 
STET,  also  beiODJI  to  the  Italian  State  holding 
company,  IRI,  established  ·a  concentrative  joint 
venture (')  which  will  operate  in  a  number  of 
communications  market sepents includina some 
(P1i  network  mana,ement  and  supervisory 
systems.  infrastructure  for  cellular  radio  networks 
and tenninals for  public  cellu~J! radio  network) in 
which  the  parties are  present. 1Uthouah  IRI  is the 
ultimate  holdjng  company  of  both  finmeccanica. 
which  owns · SO  1/o  of  the  share  capital  of  the 
Marconi/Finmeccanica  joint  venture,  and  STET, 
which will have a SO 'I• stake in the Siemens/ltaltel 
joint. venture,  there. is  no  link  between  ~TET and 
Finmeccanica,  both  of  which  operate  u  separate 
economic units. conducting their business indepen· 
dently  from  each  other. 
Thus effectively only Siemens will remain active on 
the  join~ venture's  markets.  Having  transferred  its 
uscts  and  expertise  in  the  hiah-tech  products 
concerned,  it  would  be  costly  and  commercially 
unreuonable  for ·STET  to  anempt to re-enter  the 
market. There is therefore no relevant risk of coor-
dinttion  arising  f~m the  notified  operation·. 
IlL THE COMMUNITY  DIMENSION 
The  undertakings  concerned  have  a  combined 
asgrepte  worldwide  tum~r in  excess  of.  ECU 
S 000  million. STET· achieved  a turnover  of  ECU 
16 17-f million  in  1993  and  Siemens one of  ECU 
.f2 08i million  in  the finandal  year ending  ~n 30 
September  1993. They  both  have  a .Community· 
wide turnover of more than ECU 250 million. They 
do not achieve more than two-thirds of their awe-
pte  Community-wide  turnover  in  one  and  the 
same Member State. The operation  therefore  has a 
Community  dimension.  The  operation  is  not  an 
EEA  'cooperation'  case  within  the  meaning  of 
Article S8 and Protocol l.f of the BEA Agreement. 
(')  OJ No C  253,  10.  9.· 1994,  p.  10. 
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IV. THI RILIVANT PRODUCI"  MARKET 
(l  S)  The  proposed  transaction  concerns  broadl)·  the 
public and private telecommunications systems and 
equipment sectors.  For the  purposes of identifyina 
the  relevant  affected  product  markets.  the  parties  · 
have  subdivided the  first  of these sectors  into four 
product  markets :  · 
1.  public  switchina systems 
2.  transmission 
3.  radio  systems 
4.  mobile  radio  network 
and the second they have  likewise  subdivided  into 
two: 
S.  private  switching  and  key  telephone  systems 
. (KTS) 
6. communication  terminals 
(16)  Public telecommunications 
1.  Public switching systems allow the interconntc· 
tion  of service  users. The switched  services can 
cover  voice,  data.  image  and  text.  The  three 
main  network switching nodes are characterized 
by: 
(a)  local switching functions which  interconnect 
end-users; 
(b)  transit  exchanges  which  interconnect  trans· 
mission  links : 
(c)  international  · transit  exchanges  which 
provide  international  services. 
In  the  past, these switching nodes were  built in 
analope mode but, since the 1980s, public swit-
china  equipment  with  analope  technology  is 
bcina  pdually replaced  in  Europe  by  equip· 
ment  in  digital  synchronous  mode  and  new 
extensions  in  the  networks  are  likewise  being 
carried  out  1n  digital  technology.  In  Italy,  this 
process of diJitaliution of the network is now at 
around  60 % of· its completion  and  is  expected 
to reach  90 % by the end of  1998, according to 
the  parties. 
The  current  life  cycle  for  public  switching· 
s)'stems  is  around  1  S  years.  This .lengthy  life  · 
cycle, despite rapid progress, is ·due to the possi-
bility of adaptation and updatina of the software 
programmes  that run  the  switching equipment 
and to the ieengineering of parts of the systems. 
At present. the major technoloJical trend that is 
influencina developments in  public swirching is 
the increuina usc of software to  provide intclli· 
sen:e in the network. Examples of this trend arc 
TNM  (telecommunication  network  manase-
ment~ IN  (inteltisciu  network),  OS  (operator 
lystems)  and  AN  (access  network).  The  use  of 
.stand-alt~"e modules with open interfaces allo'tw'S 
for the continuous uparading and enhancina of 
the  network  by such  new  features  and  services. 
Software  is  frequently  updated  (e.g.  every  six 
months or year) on a tcBUlar buis and has a life 
1p:1n  of  from  two  to  five  yean. 
In  the  future,  the  next  major  development  in 
public  switchin&  systems  will  be  the  introduc-
tion of asynchronous iiinsfer mode (ATM) tech· 
noloBY  which  will  allow  the  broadband  irans-
mission  of  voice,  data,  imaae  and  text.  This 
technolo&Y  is  presently  undersoina  technical 
and commercial evaluation by telecom operators 
in  field  trials being carried out  in  several  Euro-
pean  countrie<,  including  Italy ..  However,  its 
actual introduction in the  public network .is not 
expected before the end of the 1990s. The future 
of ATM switching wiJI  depend  also on  the atti· 
tude of the telecom operators who may be reluc-
tant  to  rerlace  expensive  equipment,  that  has 
not been  fully  depreciated,  but  could  be  forced 
to do so by competition in  an  emer&ing  Iibera· 
lized  markeL  Consequently,  there  seems  to  be 
no great certainty with  rega.rd  to when ATM will 
find  a larae-scale application  in  voice  telephony 
and  it  is  possible that it  may  be  restricted  initi· 
ally  to  an  overlay  network  for  business/service 
applications. According to market sources, ATM 
switches are expected to  represent around  10 'lo 
of the sales of switches  in  Europe  in  five  years' 
time. 
With regard  to the evolution of the life cycle of 
public  switching  equipment,  it  is  thought  that 
the -'llajor new techno!ogy developments in swit· 
ching, both  in  software  and  hardware  proch.Kts. 
arc  more likely to expand the range of available 
functions,  and  therefore  to  serve  new  needs, 
than  to shorten  the  life cycle of existing equip· 
ment. This  trend  is  expecterl  to  continue  over 
the  next  five  to  I 0 yean. 
2. Transmission  provid~s  the  transport  .fun~tion 
for: 
(a)  traffic  bet:ween  local  central  switching  offices 
and  transit  central  switching  offices ; 
(b)  leased  line  tnffic  between  business  customen, 
by  cable  and  optics.  · 
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The  main  building  blocks  of  trwnsmission  Ire 
digital  multiplexers  and  optical  line  terminals 
(the parties are not active in the cable field). The 
latest major development in  transmission  is  the 
transition  to  synchronous  dijital  hierarchy 
(SDH)  technoloJY  from  plesiochronous  digital 
hierarchy  (POH) · in  network  mana,ement 
~tems  equipment. which ·is  already  underway. 
This  new  technology  enables  ATM broadband 
switching  and  it  is  expected  that.  within  five 
years, SOH will  represent 95 % of the transmis· 
sion  equipment  market.  It  is  operational  via 
TNM and  will,  in  the  future,  operate  via  the 
open  interfaces  of  AN.  It  is  thought  that  the 
introduction  of  AN  will  open  up  this  market 
and  enforce  competition  u  there  will  be  an 
increasing  migration  of  services  and  function· 
ality away from  cenual office switching into the 
local  access  networks. 
The life  cycle  for  transmission  has been around 
10 years when only major technological changes 
are  regarded.  This life  cycle  includes,  however, 
major  redesigns .every three to  five  yean of the 
PDH  equipment  which  is  hardware  intensive. 
The  life  cycle  of  SOH  equipment. being more 
software  intensive,  is expected  to  behave  more 
like  the  life  cycle  9f switching  equipmenL 
3.  In  radio systems,  line-of-sight  radio  technolog 
provides an  alternative to cables in information 
. transport  among  switching  offic~ or  between  · 
subscribers and central offices. A ~ent  impor-
tant role of radio is the interconnection of large 
· business customers to the switched  network. or 
to  corporate and  private virtual  networks.  Line· 
of-sight  radio  is  today. being  applied  in  the 
interconnection of mobile radio base stations. in 
particular in  the market segment of neW opera· 
tors  who  have  no  cable·  infrastructure.  Radio 
systems are, like transmission, migrating towards 
SOH.  R&D  expenditure  is  "estimated  at  IS 'lo, 
the same level u  for transmission, by the parties. 
The  parties  include  in  this  market  microwave 
and  UHF/VHF  n<Jio.  line-of-sight  antennas, 
feeder  cables  and  operation  support  systems. 
The  parties  have  confirmed,  however,  that 
neither ltaltel nor any other company controlled 
by STET is  active  in the radio systems  market. 
For  this  reason,  the  market  is  not  an  affected 
product market  at:~d will not be analysed further. 
4.  Mobile  radio  networks  allow  for  communic;a• 
cion: 
(a)  within  the  own  network ; 
(b)  to or from  another fixed  or naobile  network 
u  longer u  the user is within ndio coverage 
of  the  mobile  network. 
The  last  major  technological  innontion  in 
mobile  communication  networks  hu been  the 
introduction of GSM.  the  pan  European  ~igital 
mobile communications systems.  in·l~89. G~M 
architecture  has  been  clearly  defined  in  the 
GSM  ~rnendations  promulgated by ETSI in 
the  EEA  countries. 
The  evolution  in  this  area  is  expected  to  he 
towards  the  provision  of an  increasing  propor-
tion  of  nanowband  services  by  mobile  (e.J. 
cellular) systems.  It  is  thought  that the signifi· 
cant  growth  already  being  experienced  in  the 
customer demand .  for such  mobile services  will 
lead  to  the  introduction  of  new  technologies. 
~ 
The next generation of infrastfticture is expected 
to be direct satellite communications which it is 
thought  will  be  available  in  1998.  With  GSM 
technology,  innovation  cycles  of  two  to  three 
years  are  foreseen. 
(17)  Private telecommunications 
S.  In  private  telecommunications  systems.  private 
branch  exchanges  (PBX's)  and  kty  telephone 
systems (KTS) allow for communication within/ 
between  users,  whether  public or private. They 
are  connected to ·the  public  networks  via  trunk 
lines, operating  IS stand  alone  systems  or in  ~ 
networking environment. Modem (ISDN) PBX's 
and KTS  provide  services such  IS fax-PC  inter-
working, ·  video-conferencing,  and  nen."'rk 
management. 
In  the present case, data communication equip-
ment is excluded from  the market definition as 
neither  Siemens  nor  ltaltel  ever  specifically 
addressed  this  market  segment.  Their sales  of 
data  communication  equipment  are  marginal 
(I  0/o  of  their  turnover).  These  ules are  occa-
sional,  mainly  connected  to  the  integration  of 
OEM  data  products  into complex  projects.  For 
these  reasons,  the  analysis  of  the  notified 
concentration will  be  restricted  to  private  voice 
transmiuion  equipment.  The  question  o~ 
_whether data transmission should be included in 
the  market  may  be  left  open. 
The parties  point out· the constantly increasing 
cost  of  R&D  in  private  telecommunications  at 
10  to  IS 0/o  of  turnover,  due  to  heavy  R&D 
competition in  a  mor~et which  is r.haracterized 
by  the  rapid  introduction  of  ac!ditional/new 
tec_b:toloJies  in  increasingly  shorter  time 
~riods/life cycles. 
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6.  Within the ranp of communication terminals. 
the  parties  indicate  that for  the  relevant ytan 
Siemens and  ltaltel  ~ave only sold  telephones, 
fax  machines and cellular telephones. They have . 
included all  three products under one affected 
relevant  product  market,  although  they · have 
provided separate fisures relatina to market esti-
mates and market shares sepantely for each type 
of terminal. Since the notified  transaction docs 
not raise competition issues of dominance either · 
considerina  an  overall  product  market  for 
private terminals or separate narrow markets for 
each type of terminal, the question of the exact 
product  market definition  can  be  left  open. 
(18)  The above  relevant product markets, u  defined by 
the parties. were confirmed by the competitors and 
the telecom operators in the course of the invcsti· 
pdon. 
V.  THE  RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC  MARKET 
(19)  The overlap of the parties' activities and the main 
impact of the operaticm will be in Italy. Italtel only 
has limited sales of public tclecom equipment else· 
where : ECU  I  millio~ in Germany for public swit-
ching, limited sales  of transmission  equipment in 
Germany, the Netherlands. Portugal and Spain with 
a market share below 5% in all cases, and sales of 
mobile  radio  ·network· equipment worth  ECU  24 
million  in  Greece. 
Public telecommunications equipment 
(20)  The parties arsue in their notification that the strict 
application by SIP (now Telecom Jtalia) of Council 
Oire,1ive  90/531/EEC r)  (the  Utilities  public 
procurement  directive)  and  the  current  level  of 
standardization ensure that baniers to access to the 
Italian  markets  in  public  telecommunication 
equipment are  of little  importance. Although  the 
public  procurement  directives  have  not yet  been 
transposed into Italian law," according to the pirties 
since  1993 .SIP hu operated its own internal rules 
in  compliance  with  the  directivfl,  including  the 
creation of a qualification system and a register of 
qualified  suppl~ers. 
(21)  Until  now,  the  Commission  hu  only  defined 
JCOJTiphic  markets  in  public  telecommunication 
equipment in its Decision 91/251/BEC (1).  Alcatel/ 
Telettra, ~here the market for public telecommuni· 
_  (')  OJ No L 297, 2'. 10. IHO, p. 1, replaced by Dir«tivc 93/38/ 
EAC  (OJ  No  L 199,  9  •.  8.  1993,  p.  84).  . 
(l) OJ  No L  122.  17.  5.  1991,  p.  48. 
cation  equipment wu found  to be  national  for  a 
merpr affecting Spain. Some of the facton which 
motivated  this  national  market  definition  were 
specific to the= situation in ·the Spanish telecommu-
nications market 1t that time, su'ch as : that Tclefo-
. nica, the Spanish telecommunications· operator. had 
traditionally  purchased  froni  local  suppliers; that 
the ·application of the Utilities public procurement 
directive  would  not  take  place  in  Spain  for  the 
following  five  yeirs ; and  that  there  were  vertical 
linb between Telefonica and its major equipment 
suppliers through  minority shareholdings. ·  · 
(22)  Of  the  characteristics  outlined  in  the  decision 
which  were  specific  to  the  Spanish  market,  none 
applies fully to the Italian market in the context of 
the current cue. Throuah it is true that in the put 
Telecom ltalia and its predl:tessors htve purchased 
both switching and  transmission  equipment  from 
Jtaltel, they have more recently also sourced signifi-
cant quantities  from  other suppliers  outside  Italy. 
The Utilities  Directive  has  applied  to  Italy  since 
the beginnina of  1993 and internal rules have been 
drawn up within Telecom ltalia in order to comply 
With  it.  Finally,  there  is  a  type  of  link  between 
ltaltel  and  Telecom  ltalia  in  that  they  are  both 
separate  parts  of the STET pup. 
(23)  Traditionally, public telecommunication equipment 
markets  have  shown  c.lear  national  characteristics, 
arising from the different attitudes and strategies of 
the  national  monopolies  at  the  service  level. 
Usually,  domestic  suppliers  have  enjoyed  high 
market shares  in  their home countries. and other 
non-domestic  ·suppliers  have  often  served  other 
markets  from  national  subsidiaries  there.  some· 
times  with  local  manufacturing  facilities. 
(24)  The prevailing view  among .manufacturer.; of  tel~­
communications equipment and telecom operators 
is that the markets for  telecommunication's equip-
ment are in the process of opening up to intern•· 
tional competition. The following  factors  are  rele-
vant to  that judpent  : 
- technological  developments. 
- international  standtrds ·and  national  specifica· 
dons/type-approval  of equipment, 
- the  application  of  public  procurement  direc· 
tives, 
- liberalization  of  public  voice  telephony  ar:~ 
telecoalls  infrastructure: 
(a)  Pub/it switthing 
(25)  1'be technology of  pub,lic· switchina equipment is 
complex  and  has  an  important  impact  on  the 
geopphic  market  definition.  An  operator  will 
aenerally only use· a  maximum of three  different 
11  R/  6 ,,... 
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types  of  sWitches  in  sipificant  quantities  in  a 
network. Once the suppliers have  been chOsen  for 
a  partiCular  network,  then  those  supplien  will 
install the switc:hes  and provide software. uppdes 
to the operator. Should an  increase in capacity be 
net.ded  with  requires  additional  switches  at  that· 
location,  then  for  technical  reasons -the  same 
supplier is  likely  to be  u-.d. 
(26)  This  technology  'lock-in'  effect  leads  to  differing 
· conditions of competition at different stases in the 
life  cycle  ol  a switch. The opportUnity  to  supply 
new switches to a network is the subject of a hiah 
depe of competition  between  switch  manufactu-
rers. At that stage, competition takes place· amonpt 
the major public ~tch  manufacturers at least on a 
Europe-wide  basis  and  possibly  on  a  worldwide 
basis.  However,  once  the  two  or three  suppliers 
have secured the contracts. it becomes more diffi-
cult  for·  new  entrants  to  enter the ·market  whilst 
that  aechnoloJY.  remains  extanL  Only  in  excep-
tional  circumstances.  for  example  if  an  existina 
supplier fails  10 perform to the satisfaction  of the 
customer, will  a new supplier get the opportunity 
to  enter the  markeL  Market  strUctures  10  supply 
:»perators  then  remain  relatively  stable  until  the 
next  new  technology  is  introduced (which  in  the 
case of public swit~hing will be ATM switching). 
(27)  The international standards making bodies. and in 
particular ETSI,  are  in  the  process  of drawina up 
standards  for  public  switching  equipment.  Other 
standards  are  developed  independently  and  are 
subsequently validated by ETSI. Given  manufactu-
rers'  wishes  to  protect  their  intellectual  propeity 
and the continuing development of the standards, 
it  cannot be  said  that  international  standards yet 
exist  for  digia&l  switches. Therefore, though  stan-
dardizatio.n  is  breaking down  the barriers between 
markets. it. has not yet completely taken place and 
io sipificant differences  amongst  Member  States 
remain  fo~ existing digital  switch  technolol)'. 
(28)  For  new  technology,  such  as  A  TM  switches,  the 
picture  may  be  different.  A  TM  switches  are 
currently bcina pilot tested  in a number of Euro-
pean  countries and  the  testing .propmme is  the 
subject  of  some  cooperation  be~een  telecom 
operators.  It  may  be  expected  th~refore that once 
A  TM  ~ introduced, a  higher level  of standardiza-
tion  across  Europe  may  have-been  achieved  than 
was the case when  ~igital switches w~re introduced. 
The experience· of the :manufacturers and operaton 
in  BTSI  and elsewhere  i!'  cooperatina 10 produce 
standards may  also  m•.b a wider standards  more 
likely with  ATM  and  other new technolOJY. 
(29)  The application of public procurement directives in 
the switching sector is closely  related to the ·tech-
nology  and standardization  factors  outlined above. 
Punuant to Article  20  (2) (e) of Council  Directive 
93/38/EEC. Telecom  operaton  may  use  a  proce-
dure  without  a  prior  call  for  competition,  for 
example, where a change in suppliers would oblige 
the  contncting entity  to  acquire  material  having 
different  technical  characteristics  which  would 
result in incompatibility or ~proportionate tech-
nical  difficulties  in  operation  and  maintenance. 
Other  small  purchases  of  equipment  may  fall 
below  the  threshold  or  be  part  of  framework 
contncts  covering  more  than  one  individual 
purchase.  All  these  factos  tend  to  support  a 
national ·market definition. Conversely, when  new 
tech~oiOJY is  introduced,  then  the  procurement 
directives should be  applied fully,  with  invitations 
for  tender from  all  possible  suppliert. This would 
tend to imply a European or wider market defini-
tion. 
(30)  Liberalization  at the level  of the operator will  also 
have an effect on the geographic market definition. 
Uberalization  of  public voice  telephony.  which  is 
scheduled  for  1998,  the  open  network  provision 
directive  and,  most  importantly,  liberalization  of 
the  infrastructure  will  almost  certainly  lead  to  a 
broader market definition than- national markets as 
the  ~ew operators will  not  be 'Constnined  by  the 
existing  network  standards  and  will  have  a  free 
hand  when  choosing  their equipment suppliers. 
(31)  Competition  in  the  public  switching  market  only 
properly  takes  place  at  a  European  level  when  a 
new  technoloBY  is  introduced. Once  the  supplien 
of  that  technology  have  been  chosen  by  the 
network  operator,  competition  only  takes  place 
between  these  suppliers. This is  as  a result of d1e 
lock·in  of technology  and  rhe  current  infrequent 
use  of  tender  procedures  under  the  procurement 
directives for upgrades to and extensions to existing 
technology.  The  liberalization  of  services  and 
infrastructure appears  to  be  the main  ~actor which 
will  ensure a  European  or wide!  market with the 
continuins  process  of  European  standardization 
also  helping to .confirm  this  market  definition. 
, 
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(b)  Transmission 
(32)  For transmission equipment. not all  of the  facton 
listed for public awitchinsapply. Standudizatlon of 
transmiuion equipment is more widespread. partly 
because the interface upecta of the equipment are 
more important than for switch~  A hisher priority 
is, therefore, necessary for compatibility with other 
types  of  equipment  from  other  manufacturen. 
Operators do  not limit their sourcins. of transmis-
sion equipment to three supplien in the same way 
that  takes  place  for  switchina.  Market  shares  are 
therefore  l~r  u  more compinies can supply one 
operator. 
(33)  Transmission equipment is a market which is more 
open than  public switchins and the market shares 
of the parties in the Italian  market are lower. Even 
on  the  buis of  the  wont  case  scenario,  which 
would  be  a national  market definition, the  opera-
tions does not cause competitions problems,· so the 
precise  markn definition  can  be  left  open. 
(c)  Mobilt  radio  nttworlu 
(34)  Operaton  of  mobile  radio  networb  throuahout 
western  Europe haw confinned that they p!Jrchue 
telecommunic:ation  equipment  throusht  tender 
procedures. The JeOJI'Iphic location of the equip-
ment manufacturen hu little relevance in the deci-
sion to choose a supplier and in· all cases the main 
supplien worldwide were in a position to submit a 
bid. In any cue~ and in view of the position of the 
meqed entity  in  Italy  and  in  Europe,  the  exact 
definition  of  the  JCOJI'Iphic  makret  may  be  left 
open  in this case since the notified operation does 
not  raise  serious  competition  concerns. 
Private  telecommunications  equipment  and 
communication terminals 
(JS)  The markets of private switc:hina and related tenni-
nals and communication teminals seem  to be  rela-
Compeny 
I.  Alcarcl  Alathom 
2.  Siemens 
3.  AT&T 
4.  NBC 
S.  N.  Telecom 
6.  Eriason 
7.  IBM 
8.  Puji&au 
9.  lbch 
10.  Nokia 
11.  GEC 
12.  Philipa 
13.  Samsuna 
lively  more  open  to  competition~ :With  a  hiper 
penetration of non-Italian companies. None of the 
competiton or clients consulted durina the investi-
ption haw indicated the existence of lepl or tech· 
nical  burien to  accus to  Italy.  In  any cue, and 
Jiven  ~e  position of the notifying parties on these 
· markets,  the  precise  aeosraphic  market  does  not 
have  to  be  defined  in  thiJ  decision: The notified 
transaction  does  not  raise  any  major  concerns  in 
the  markets  of  private  telcommunication  equip· 
·  ment  and  communication  terminals,  either  at 
national  or .  Europel'n  l~el. 
VI.  AS.~ESSMENT 
(36)  In  order to  assess  the  competitive  impact  of  this 
operation,  the  followinJ  factors  have  to  be  taken 
into  acc:ount.  besides  the  market  positions  of  the 
parties: 
- public ,procurement  Nics, 
- chanps in  techt;aoloJY, 
- trends  in  Jiheralization,  and 
- venial aspects. 
(A)  Public telecommunication equipment 
(37)  A pnera,l  overview  of  the  worldwide  industry  of 
public  telecommunication  equipment  is  provided 
in  the  followinJ  rankina of companies, with  their 
respective  worldwide  turnover  in  communications 
equipment in million dollrs in 1993, tosether with 
their  respective  share  of  the  total  sales  of  these 
companies. 
S.ln  'It  lhiR 
14 544  15,70 
II 98.6  ll,Y4 
II 783  12,12 
8 714  9,41 
7861  8,49 
7703  8.32 
5300  5,72 
4388  4,74 
2655  2,87 
2161  2.33 
.I 917  2J)7 
I 813  1.96 
I 788  1.93 
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Company  Slla  %1ha1W 
14.  Ieaiie!  IS.fl  1.61 
IS.  Aacom  I S38  IM' 
16.  Mllr.\.  I S08  1.63  ·. 
17. Oki  1462  a  .sa 
·11.  Hicac:hi  14lf  .1.54 
19. s.acm  I 049  1,13 
20.  DSC  731  0,79 
21. DeTeWe  721  0,78 
Tocal  92609  100,00 
S••m: Communicacions Week lnrcmational. Compen~  spcdaliaed in prhacc nccwort .,.rcms. mobile  Mt'tfOfb 
or daca  ftftWOfb haw  noc  been  included. 
I. Marlttt  sharts  oftht partits 
Public switching 
(JI)  The  initial  market shms calculated ·by the  parties 
in their notification for public switchina n:fencd to 
a .market  inclusive  of  public switchina and  opera-
ting support systems (OSS).  power equipment and 
other relatina exclusively to the  purchases of .wit-
china and  OSS  by.  the  telccom  operator  (TO)  in 
Italy. The inclusion oriJinally of  the other products 
in  the  market brouJht in  supplien which  are  not 
able  to tell switches a  such and therefore are not 
· competiton of the  parti~  ·  in  the strict sense, with 
the  result  that  the  parties'  initial  market  shares 
were  underestimattd.  On  .  this  basis,  the- market 
value,  sales ·  and  respective  market  shares  of  the 
parties and their main competiton in Italy arc esta-
.  blished  as  follows : 
Purchua of Teleeom Iealia 








(  ...  )(') 
..,.. 
Market ahara{') 
(ill ...  ) 
1991  1991  1993 
hal tel  40-.SO  S0-60  40-SO 
Siemens  S·IO  S·IO  S-10 
Combined  .S0-60  60-70  .S0-60 
Alcatel  10·15  lO-U  IO·U 
Ericuon  JS-20  10-tS  l.S-20 
O~CII  lO·U  IO~tS  l.S-20 
Total  100  100  100 
(') Pm:ile fapres deleted  u  bulincu teeM. 
Competiton' have  broadly  confirmed  this  magni-
tude of market shares. although  they estimate that 
Siemens  and  ltaltel  combined  share  remained  at 
rouahly  60 %  in  1993. 
(39)  Market shares in  the Community imount to 20 'lo 
in  1991,  2J%  in  1992  and  24%  in  1993  for 
Siemens and 12 1/o in  i991, 12 1/o in  1992 and 8 •to 
in  1993  for  ltaltel.  The  combined  market  share 
represents therefore 32 %, 35 % .and 32 % respec-
tively.  · 
(40)  The  main  impact of the. notified  operation  from ·• 
competition point of view is in  prin~iple restricted 
to Italy, since the ales of ltaltel and the overlap of 
the  parties'  activities  are  basically concentrated  in 
this country. In a broader geographic market, ltaltcl 
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is  a smaller  player,  and  the  joint  venture  is  noc 
likely to have a aipificant impact on the competi-
tive  relations  between  dae  I  0  leading  worldwide 
suppliers  of  telecommunication  equipment.  The 
combined mJrket  s~re of the parties in  the sales 
of  public  switching  equipment  in  ltal~  will  be 
substantid  by  the  usual  standar~ applied  under . 
Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89 (about  S$  to. 60 •to 
depending  on  the  year  taken  as  reference). 
However, .it has to be noted than this madtet share 
is not higher than the market shares of the leading 
suppliers  in  other  Member  States.  Information 
submitted  by  the  parties  themselves.  compctiton 
and  the  public  telccom  opUators  (TOs)  in 
Germany.  Fnnce..  the  Unikd Kinpm.  Spain. 
Denmark. Netherlands. Bel&\um. and lrelaud ~how 
ill bet that-- halim 1DIIkd ~  is ma.i.tY 
less~--"'- '" .,  ~  Ncmbtf ~ 
of  a comparable  size,  reprdlm of  the  extent  of 
liberalization. 
(41)  The  high  concentration  of  the supply of  sV(itches 
in all Member States is largely_ explained by the fact 
that TOs  noK:ftlaUy  limit  the  number of  different 
technologies or systems coexisting in a network to 
a  maximum  of  two  or  three.  Factors · such  as 
network  management.  training,  service  logistics, 
security and the introduction of new services in the 
network  lock  operators  into a  limited  number of 
suppli:rs. furthermore, once a ~echnoloBY has been 
introduced  into  the  network,  given  the  long  life 
cycle of switches (around  IS years, never less  than 
I 0,  see  point  I  6).  demand  for  public switching  is 
buically driven  by upgrades and extensions of the 
network.  This  market · must  be  awarded  to  the 
original supplier of the already installed switch  for 
reuon~ of costs and efficiency. With the exception 
of the time when a new major technology (i.e. digi-
talization)  is  JOing  to  be  introduced  in  the  basic 
network,  demand  for  switching  equipment  is 
largely  determined  by  rhis  lock-in  effect  arising 
from  the  original  choice  of  suppliers  for  the 
'installed  base.  This  fact  has  been  confirmed  by 
both  competitors  and  TOs  and  it  is  funher 
confirmed  by  the  existing  situation  in  various 
Member  States. 
(42)  In Germany, rhe  public network  includes only two 
technologies:  Siemens'  and  Alcatel's.  There  are 
other  suppliers  of  public.  switcht •  (Bosch  .:and 
DeTeWe  for  instance~ but  rhe  supply  Siemens' 
technology  under licence.  In  ~ranee, ·Alcatel  and 
Ericsson  supply  all  the  purchases  of  Prance 
Telecom, since the Prench network is  cor.~posed of 
only  these  two  systems.  In  the  United  J(jngdom, 
the  installed  bale  comprises  nritchina  systems 
from  GFI' and  Ericuon.  It  Is  true  that  there  are 
ocher  companies  supplina  twitches  to . British 
Telecom (81). such  IS Alcatel,  Northem Telecom 
and  ATII.T.  However,  these  puR:hases  refemd to 
one-off  operations  for  fielfj  trials  or for  the  esta· 
blishment of  overlay  networb  to  provide  special 
services, such  IS a Yirtual  private  ne~rks  or free 
cell  services.  Their  share  of  B"r  1  puR:hues  is 
limited, and  their  J~resence does  nOI  alter the fact 
that BTs basic  netWOrk  comprises only two  swit· 
. ching  systems.  and  that  therefore  GPr  and 
Eriason  account  tOJClher  for  most  of  BT's 
puR:hasa of public switches. In BeJaium. only two 
systems are  used: Alcatel  and.  Siemms..  In s,.in. 
the t-ic ~  is composed a( Alatel switcha 
aacl  to a .katr a.\alt_ EhcaDa  ..S ATilT..  Ia 
~all  paKbasa of  tqllipmetlt in  1992  to 
1994 were  supplied  by eit)_er Siemens or Alcatel, 
since  these  Ire  the  only  systems  installed.  In 
Ireland.  the  network  is  based  on  Ericsson  and 
Alcatel  systems. finally, three different system  are 
installed  in  Italy : those  from  ltaltel,  Alcatel,  and 
Ericsson. Siemens' subsidiary  in  Italy sells  ltaltel's 
syst~ms  under  licence.  Consequently,  ltaltel, 
Alcatel  and  Ericsson  account  for  ·most  of  the 
purchases  .of  switching  equipment· of  Telecom 
ltalia. 
(43)  In  view  of  the  above  considerations.  it cannot  be 
concluded  that  aggregation  of  the  market  share 
within  the  merged  entity  in  Italy  constitutes  in 
itself  a  proof  of  possible  dominance.  A  hiJh 
concentration  of  the  supply  of  public  switching 
systems  is  the  nonnal  cqnsquence  of  the  basic 
rationale  underlying  demand  for  these  products. 
Transmission 
(44)  The sales and  respective  market share of  the main 
competitors for transmission equipment in Italy are 
as  follows  according  ro  the  notification : 








(Fn  ~~til/ion) 
( ...  ) 
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Market lhua  (1) 
(;,  ~) 
1991  1991  1993 
STET  30-40  40-50  30-40 
Siemens  IO·U  5·10  5·10 
Comhintd  50;.60  50-60  . 40·50 
Alcatel  ·25·30  20·25  25·30 
Marconi  15·20  .-5.20  15·20 
Othm  5·10  5·10  5·10 
Total  100  100  100 
(')  PrKilc  fiau~a deleted .. business sccm. 
(45)  Market shares in the Community amount to 18 % · 
in  1991,  20 °/e  in  1992  and  18 °/o  in  1993  for 
Siemens and 8 °/o  in 1991, 9 °/o  in  1992 a"d S % 
in  1993  for  ltaltel.  The  combined  market  share 
· represents therefore 26 %, 29 1/o  and 23 °/o  respec-' 
tively. 
(46)  The lock-in  effect arising from  the installed  base 
described above for public switching plays a much 
lesser· role  with  respect to  transmission. Standard· 
ization for tnnsmission is relatively mo:e advanced 
and generally TOs in the EC tend to diversify more 
their  sources  of  supply.  Detailed  information 
submitted by TOs in the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Denmark. Belgium and Spain as  well  as 
Telecom ltalia show that there are  usually at least 
.three  main  suppliers. of  t1•ansmission  _equipment. 
and in most cases seveml other less important ones. 
2.  Public procurtm~nt 
(47)  Purchases · of  public  switching  and  transmission 
equipment  in  the  EC  have  been  subject  to  the 
public procurement directive, Directive 93/38/EEC 
lot  almost  two  yean  now. 
Switching 
(48)  Purchases  of  public  switching .under  the  public 
procurement directive, however, ha-Ye  in most cases 
been  carried out without  using  a  call  for  tenders 
procedure. Most of these purchases have bee.n done 
either applyina the derogation  pursuant to Article 
20 (2) of the Directive which includes an exception·  . 
for  cechnial  reasons  or  reasons  connected  with 
protection of exclusive ri&hts, or under multiannual 
contracts entered in'o be the TOs with their tradi-
tional suppliers prior to the entry into force of the 
Directive. Supplien of public switching equipment 
have  also stated that the  situ~don is  not likely to 
change in the future, with  regard to the extention 
or uppin& of the installed base. A. stated above, 
there are technical reasons for awarding this type of 
con~ct  t~  a  jiven  supplier.  However,  public 
procurement is likely to play a more important role 
at those times when TOs are considering the intro-
duction of !:ew major technological developments 
(such  as  digitalization  or  ATM  bro:adband 
switchin&)  in their networks. This situation opens 
up  the  possibility  for  TOs  to  consider  new 
suppliers  and  for  supplien  to  enter  d~ no" a 
public network. In  this situation, tenderir.J p~· 
dures would indeed be justified. An example of this 
is provided by the pan  European ilot trials of A  TM 
switching. Telecom·ltalia. as  most of the other IS 
TOs involved in this trial, issued a call  for  tenders 
followina the procedures foresien in the Directive. 
The call for tenders was  published in  the  Official 
jonmal of tht  Europtan  Communiti~s and  the 
technical  specifications were  based  on  ETSI  stan-
dards.  Eiaht  manufacturers  were  in  a  position  to 
bid, includin&ltalteland Siemens. The competition 
·  was  won  by  Erricsson .and Alcatel.  · 
Transmission 
(49)  Because  of  the  lesser  constraints  to  diversify  the 
sources of supply and  the relatively  higher degree 
of  standardization  of  tranGmission  equipment. the 
impact  of  public  procurement  has  been  relatively 
higher  in  this  market.  In  1993,  three  TOs  had 
purchased  significant  amounts  of  their  require-
ments  after  calls  for  competition.  In  1994,  there 
has been a significant increase in the proportion of 
purchases acquired  after calls .for  tender, and TOs 
in other Member States  have  started  to use  them. 
However,  in  most  cases,  the  larger  pan  of  the 
purchases  were  still  attributable  to  multiannual 
contracts established before  the entry into force  of 
Directive  93/38/EEC,  notably  in  Italy.  .  . 
3.  Ttchnology 
(SO)  The public telecommunication equipment industry, 
and in particular the development and manufactt!"'C 
of  public  switching,  is  reseall:h  intensive.  Com-
panies typically spend around  IS to  20 % of their 
turnover  in · R&D.  The  cost  of  developing  a  new 
generation of tel!communicstion switches has been 
estimated as  high  as  ECU  4 billion by the  parties. 
The fipre varies dependina on whether it refers :o 
a  small  local  switch  or  a  major  internatio-nal 
exchan,e. Lifetime expenditures for a major family 
of  digital  exchange  systems  (such  as  EWSO  from 
II  8/  11 .. · 
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(52) 
Siemens or Linea  lTT  from  ltaltel) approach  ECU 
1,6 billion. ACtt.,ting to information submitted by 
the  parties,  the  main  suppl~en of public switches 
(JJcarel,  AT&T,  Erimon,  Northern  Telecom, 
Siemens) each invested .:lose to 500 million dollars 
or more in R&D for public switches in 1992.. These 
costs  must be  regarded  as  necessary to be  able  to 
maintain  a  competitive  position  from  a  techno-
logical  point  of  view.  Long-term  viability  in  the 
market  requires  therefore  a  certain  minimum 
amount of sales  in  order to  be  able  to develop  1 
new generation of switches and maintain the usual 
:atio  in  the  industry  of  R&D  expense  to  sales. 
Technology  constitutes  therefore  another  factor 
leading to a relatively high concentration of supply. 
The  major  technological  developments  regarding 
public switches  have  been described  abdve,  under 
product market definition. An  impona.nt effect  in 
this context is that major technological innovations 
typically  give  rise . to  operators  considering  new 
suppliers  and  supplien  C'>nsidering  opportunities 
to  enter into new markets. In  this contr.xt. and to· 
analyse  the  possible  impact of  the  notifed  opera-
tion,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  Telecom  ltalia  has 
already  made  its  choice  of  suppliers  of  digital 
switches (Ericsson, Alcatel and ltaltel). Although ST 
has sold switches in the past in  Italy,  it has  to be 
noted  that  these  were  not  Siemens  switches,  but 
UT  switch~  manufactured  under  licence  from 
ltaltel. 
The  digitalization  of  the  Italian  network  Wis 
decided according to an architecture defined during 
tht  1980s,  when  the  decisioal  to  move  from 
analogue systems to digital systems was ttken. This 
architecture  is  based  on  about  600  areas,  within 
eich  of  which  the  switching  system  is  homoge-
neous.  At  that  time,  SIP  assigned  each  single 
swit..:hing area through negotiations with all  manu-
facturers of switching equipment that were  able to 
guarantee  maintenance  service  and  assistance 
throughout  the  whole  national  territory.  The  last 
assignment  of  an  area  was  done  in  1991.  It is 
improtant  to  note  th:.t  with  the  transition  from 
analogue  to  digital,  SIP  considered  reducing  the 
number of  systems  in  its  network  from  three  to 
t'f:o.  in  line  with.  the  situation  in  other Member 
States. The choice has been described by  reprc~~Cn· 
-tatives  of  Telecom  ·Jtalia  as  a  trade  off  between 
increased operating costs (in  terms of maintenance 
and introduction of new  services) and maintaining 
leveaage  against suppliers. The decision  was  taken 




different systems in the network, unlike mosf other 
TOs  in  the  Community. 
The next technological  discontinuity that  may  be 
compared  to digitalization  is  the  introduction  of 
A  TM switching. At present, no competitor expects 
large  commercial  orders for  ATM  switches  in  the 
public·  sector  before  the  end  of  the  century. 
Furthennore, there is  at  present uncertainty about 
the  extent  to  which  ATM  switches  will  really 
replace digital  public voice  networks. The possibi-
lity remains that ATM  -.All  only be  introduced in 
overlay  networks  for  specific services  of  a  limite-d 
scope, or that it be restricted to LAN or LAN hater-
connections. In any case, it has to be n,ted that the 
next round of competition for public switching will 
take  place,  if  at. all,  unqcr a  market structure  that 
will  have  been substanti'Oly modified by liberaliza-
tion of basic services (anticipated in  Italy by  1998) 
and  infrastructures. 
·with resj,cct to ATM  switches, it' has  to  be  noted 
that  the  experience  in  those  countries  that  have 
started  to  introduce  overlay  networks  with  A  TM 
switches  or  in  the  commercial  applications  for 
ATM  in data transfer has shown  the emergence of 
non-traditional  public  telecommunication  equip-
ment  suppliers.  According  to  specialized  press 
. reports.,  there  arc  number  of  non-conventional 
suppliers of public switches that have  already won 
commercial  contracts  from  public  network  open-
tors in the United States of America, Finland. Swit-
zerland,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Denmark. 
4.  Lihtrali:ation  of strvicts  and  infr.-rstrutturts 
Competitors  contacted  by  the  Commission  in  its 
enquiries.  have  stressed  that  liberalization  of 
services and infrastructures· is  more  relevant to the 
t.ctual functioning of the public teleco:nmunication 
equipment  marittts  than  the ·traditional  approach 
based  on standardization  and  public  procurement. 
Liberalizati'ln  of  public  voice  service  is  planned 
from  1 January J  998 (1). Furthermore, the Council 
of Ministers agrcecl  on  17  November  1994 on the 
principle  that  public  telecommunications  infn-
structures should be  liberalized at the same time as 
the remaining services. It has to be  not~d that Italy 
is  not  among  the  countries  that  have  requested 
specific  derogations  to  these  objectives. 
(1)  Council resolution of ll  July 1993 on the review of lhe silua· 
cion  in  the  telecommunications  IC'.:tor  and  the  nftd  for 
further dnelopmcnt in that market (OJ No C 213, 6. 8.  1993. 
p.  I) 





According  to  son1e  competitors,  the  progressive 
liberalization  of  services  (private  telecommunica-
tions, GSM)  has reduced the potential for revenues 
of the TOs. TOs have  lost significant markets and 
when  they  have  still  maintained  a  presence  in 
those markets,  prices and marsins are  in any case 
constrained  by  crompetition.  The  ~stilt  of  the 
liberalization of services could therefore, indirectly 
induce  pressure  on  TO's  to  purchase  equipment 
competitively  even  in  the  non-liberalized  areu if 
they  want  to  maintain  their  overall  profits.  Most 
other competitors have nevertheless focu~d on the 
liberalization  of infrastructures as  the determin!lnt 
factor  to  introduce  actual · competition  in  this 
market. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  to be  considered  that 
even  if  infr:astuctures  are  fully  liberalized,  the 
current  monopolists  will  still  enjoy a  very  strong 
position  in  their home markets until new entrants 
progressively  set  up their  own  infrastructures.  In 
any case, the decisions as to the principle of libera-
lization  and  its  time  frame  have  been  already 
adopted. This -is of particular importance in view of 
the  long  life  cycle  of switches,  because  the  deci-
sions as to the infrastructure that TO's witl build in 
the following years will  have an irreversible impacl 
for  a long time frame, and consequently, the deci-
sions regarding the choice of systems and technolo-
gies that will  determine tht"  basic telecommunica-
tions infrastructure of a country cannot ignore the 
future  impact of  these  measures.  -
S.  Vtrtical  asptcts  in  pttblic  ttltcommrmication 
tqllipmtnt 
One  of  the  reasons  for  which  the  Commission_ 
decided  to  open  2  second  phas~ investigation .in 
this  ca~e relates to the fact  that one of the parents 
of the joint venture, STET, controls Telecom ltalia._ 
Telecom  ltalia  enjoys  exclusive  lights  to  provide 
public  telecommunication  services  and  to · install 
and operate the relevant infrastructure in  Italy and 
consequently, it is not subject to the usual competi-
tive  constraints  in  its  own  markets.  On the other 
hand,  the  other  parent  of  the  joint  venture, 
Siemens, is  a  European .  and  world  leader  in  tele-
communication equipment. Therefore the  notified 
operation raised serious doubts as  to its compatibi-
lity with  the common  market since  there  was,  in 
principle, scope for  STET and the joint venture to 
significantly  diston  competition  among  suppliers 
of  public·  telecom-munication  equipment  in  Italy. 
Mter the  second  phase  investigation,  and  having 




equipment  manufacturers  and  telecommunication  _ 
operators, the Commission concludes that the noti-
fied  concentration  does  not  create  or reinfon:e  a 
dominant  position  in  the  markets  of  public  tele-
communication  equipment  (switching  and  trans-
mission)  for  the  reasons  Biven  gelow. 
Pint of all, it is  necessary to examine the extent to 
which  the  notified  concentration  crea:es  a  market 
structure such that the objective interest of STET to 
force  Telecom  ltalia  to  pursue  an  anticompetitive 
purchasing policy, or give  privileged treatment to a 
supplier, is created or reinforced. In  this respect, it 
has to_ be noted that if the notified concentration is 
not implemented, STET will  continue to have  full 
control of ltaltel through the ownership of its share 
capital.  In  the  situation  wher~  the  concentration 
has  been  implemented,  the  benefits  of any  privi-
leged  treatment  to  the  joint  venture  imposed  on 
Telecom  ltalia  by  STET  would  be  shared  with 
Siemens. Prima iacie, the notified operation reduce 
therefore the objective interest of STET or Telecom 
ltalia to r  .. vour the joint venture at  the expense of 
·Telecom  ltalia,  for  instance  by  accepting  higher 
prices. for  equipment.  This  is  more  so  since 
Siemens  gains  a  direct  influence  only  over  the 
equipment supplier (ltaltel), and no influence at all 
over the telecom operator (Telecom  ltalia) or over 
its parent (STET). Such. an operation would be of a 
very  different  nature. 
STET's cr in the last instance, IRI's., economic inte-
rests  are  much wider with  respect to the provision 
of  telecommunication service  than with  respect  to 
the manufacture of telecommunication equipment. 
The  turnover  generated  by  Telecom  Jtalia  repre-
sents roughly 80 % of the total -turnover generated 
by  the  companies  belonging to  the  STET group. 
Although  STET  has  control  of  Telecom  ltalia,  a 
large  part of  the  share  capital  of  both  companies 
(over  40 %)  is  in  private  hands.  Both  companies 
cannot  be  identified  as  or1e  single  entity  and 
cenainly the interests of a large  pan of  the share-
holders of Telecom ltalia are clearly distinguishable 
from  tl.ose of the future  joint venture. The distinc-
tion  between  the  interests of  the  service  activities 
and the  manufacturing activities within  the STET 
group has been funher reinforced in  the framework 
of the reorganization of STET,' through the creation 
.of  Tecnitel,  a  100%  owned  company  of  STET. 
Tecnitel  constitutes a separate  organizational  level 
in  the  structure  of  the  STET group .  whose  main 
function  is  the  supervision  of  the  manufacturing 
activities. of  STET,  including  the  planning,  tech-
nical  and  economic  control  of. the  manufactOring 
II  B/  13 . ' 
No  L  161/40  (]EJ  Official  journal of  the  European  Communities  12.  7.  9S 
businesses and the exercise, on behalf of STET, of 
the voting  rights  in  the shareholders  meetings  in 
the manufacturing companies~ Furthermore, in  the 
course of the proceedings. STET stated  in  writing 
that it "'Iuld not interfere in the purchasing policy 
ot Telecom Jtalia, more in particular witb regard to 
the choice of suppliers. and that it will  maintain a 
clear _  separation  of  the  Boards  of  Directors.  the 
CEO, and in general the management of Telecom 
ltalia.  Tecnitel  and  the  companies  of  the  ltaltel 
group. 
(63)  The structural characteristics of the public telecom-
munication  markets  descaibed  above,  and  the 
evidence gathered during the in· •estigation. indicate 
th;lt  the entry of Siemens in  the capital  of  ltaltel 
·will  not result in a significant deterioration of the 
conditions  of  competition.  The  shareholder  link 
between Siemens and STET and STET and ltaltel is 
unlikely  to·  have  any  major  effect  during  the 
process of upgrading and extending of the existing 
network, since. the de-cisions  about the systems on 
which the network Will  be  based have already been 
taken. This is further confirmed by the forecasts of 
revenues  established  by  the  parties  for  the  joint 
venture,  where_  most  of  the  growth  of  the ·joint 
_venture's turnover will ~  ~chieved through exports. 
The joint venture  agreements set a  target  for  the 
joint  venture  attain  40 %  of  its  sales  on  export 
markets by 1997. Furthermore, none of the current 
competitors of the parties in Italy have approached 
the Commission during the second  phase  investi-
gation to express serious concern as to maintaining 
their  present  position  in  lta~y. 
(64)  With regard to 'the longer term, and in partieular to 
the introduction of new technologies,  the  markets 
for  telecommunications  equipment · are  in  the 
process  of  transformation  due  to  (i)  the  possible 
development of large markets because of technolo-
gical developments, (ii)  the fact  that the effects of 
standardization and public procurement legislation 
will  progressively have  a larger impact in  opening 
up  ::::ional  markets,  (iii)  the  further  progress 
towards liberalization of services and. foremost. the 
liberalization  of  infrastructures  which  will  lead 
more  and  more  to  the  creation  of  a  worldwide 
market  for  puhlic telecommunications equipment. 
The  efr~cts of  the combination  of  these  devtlop· 
ments have ·already been seen in the area of mobile 
communications, where· the  definition  of  a  Euro-
pean  standard (GSM),  the  liberaliution of services · 
and  the  liberalization  of  infrtitructures  have 
resulted today in 1he creation of a European, if not 
worldwide. market for  the supply of telecommuni-
cation  equipment. 
Mobile  radio  networks 
(6S)  ln. mobile  radio the market share of  ltaltel  in  the 
last three  years- has been oeclining (from  64 %  in 
1990/91  to 39%  i~  199U93~ while  Siemens has 
reached a 6% market share in  199U93. The main 
competitors  of. the  parties  are  Erics50n  with  ~ 
market share of 41  %  in  199U93 and Alcatel with 
a  market share of  aro•Jnd  10 %. 
Furthermore the marker for  mobile radio networks 
in Italy has _been  opened to com petition  with  the 
introduction  of  a  sec\lnd  GSM  mobile  phon~ 
- operator Omnitel-Pronto  ltalia  Consortium  which 
has  been  awarded  .  the  contract  by  the  Italian 
Government  after  bidding. 
From the inV'estigation  carri~d out in  the European 
countries already  open~d to  competition  it  can  be 
stat.:d  that the  access  of  a  s~cond mobile  phone 
operator  for  GSM  in  Italy  will  have  a  significant 
impact on the competitive situation of  the:  market 
of the equipment for  m(lt;ile  r~dio. In  fact  it  is  the 
usual  practice  of  the  new  operators  to  build  their 
own infrastructure for  th~ provision of  mobile tele-
communication services utilizing the equipment of 
a variety of manufacturers. Some of the GSM opera-
tors  have  more  than  one  supplier for  each  of  the 
·various  puts  of  the  mobiJc  radio  infrastructure 
(switching, base station, microwave equipment and 
terminals). 
GSM  is  an  autonomous  network,  interfacing with 
the rest of the telecommunication infrastructure at 
clearly defined  points. GSM  architecture  has  been 
defined in the GSM  recommendations promulgated 
by  ETSI  and adopted  as  national  stand:ards  in  the 
EEA countries. The clear architecture and interface 
structure of GSM  have  had  the effect  o!  &:reating  a 
truly  European-wide (and  subsequently worldwide) 
market  for  the  equipm~nt. 
. Generally the s""ppliers of infrastructure are chosen 
on a worldwide basis via  tenders. A lot of suppliers 
w.ere  invited to tender for contracts. These include 
Siemens,  Ericsson,  Sei-Alcntel,  Nokia,  Motorola, 
Matra,  AT&T,  Northern  Telecom  and  Orbitel. 
The  more  common  criteria  followed  by  GSM 
-operators  to  award  contract~ to  suppliers  a:e : 
- trchnology, 
-'reputation of ·the supplier, 
-price, 
- engineering and  technical  knowledge, 
- ability  to  meet  deJiyery  requirement.:i. 
The choice of equipment is  crucial  for  the compe-
titivr.ness  of  the  s~rvice of  GSM  operators.  Even  if 
the market of the service has a strong local_ compo-
'nent,  the  market  for  GSM's  equipment  is 
worldwide. 
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(B)  Private  telecommunication equipment 
(66)  With  reprd  to  private  telecommunication  equip· 
ment. for  the seament of  PBX.  KTS  and  related 
terminals.  the  market  share  of  ltaltel  has  been 
declining  (from  22.9 %  in  1990/91  to  17 %  in 
1992/93). whit: Siemens had a market share of 9% 
in · 1992/93. In  compliance with  the  Commission 
J?ire~vc 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on co~peti· 
lion  an  the  markets  in  telecommunications 
terminal equipment  r~. the individual  markets arc . 
now  fully  libemlized. There  is  a  large  number of 
manufacturers which  are  active  on the markeL  In 
line with  the fragmented  production sector  distri-
bution is carried out by a large number of sehers. 
·(61)  With  regard  to  private  telecommunication  equip-
ment, the customers contacted in· the investigation 
have  stated  that, even  after the completion of the 
transaction, they will  continue to. have  a sufficient 
number of  alternative  suppliers to  purchase  from. 
Generally  they  have  indicated  that they  purchase 
throuah SIP, which has given them the possibili'f 
of choosing the products of different manufacturers 
~Sie!"ens, Alcatel,  ltaltel, Ericsson). They have  also 
andacated  that  there  are  other  potential  suppliers 
like  Philips. Olivetti, IBM  ind Northern Telecom. 
The  ~ompetitors  contacted  by  the  Conimiuion 
have  in ·  P.ne~l stated  that  they do  not face  any 
major  o~tacle  · to selling  in  Italy. 
(68)  The  position  of  the  merged  entity in any of the 
private  telecommunication  equipment  markets  is 
comparatively weaker than  in  the  public telecom-
munication sector in terms of market shares. Also, 
ltaltel  has  lost significantly in its  market share in 
the last three years.  Even  though SIP continues to 
enjoy a very strong position  as  a distributor direct 
sales  from  suppliers  to  customers  are  possible  in 
the ·absence of legal barriers  •. The competitors have 
stated  that  they  can  address  the  Italian  market 
sellina directly or through channels of distribution 
.  other than  SIP,  like  independent distributors. 
(') OJ  No  L Ill, 27.  S.  1988,  p.  73. 
~II. CONCLUSION 
(69)  For  the  reasons  outlined  above,  the  Commission· 
considers that the proposed concentration does not 
lead to the creation or reinforcement of a dominant 
position in any of the markets identified above  in 
the sectors  of  public  and  private  telecommunica-
tion  equipment,  as  a  result  of  which  effective 
c~mpetition would be significantly impeded in the 
common market within  the meaning of Article  2 
(3)  of Regulation (EEq No 4064/89. The concen-
tration  can  therefore  be  declared  compatible with 
the  common  market, 
f-I;AS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION : 
Articlt I 
The proposed concentration b~twee~  and Siemens 
is declared compatible with the common market and the 
functioning of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
A.rticlt  2 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to: 
S'On"  Societa  Finanziaria  Telefonica  SpA 
Corso d'ltalia  4 t 
1-00198  Roma 
and 
Siemens  Aktienaesellschaft 
Wittelsbacherplatz  2 
D-80333  MOnchen 
Done  at  Brussels,  17  February  1995. 
For  tht Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Mtmbtr D/th.t _CDmmission 
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Commission  Decision 
\1 'l ., 
of ..  ..;.J 1995 
declaring  a  concentration  to be incompatible with  the  common 
market 
(Case  No  IV/M:490  - NORDIC  SATELLITE  DISTRIBUTION) 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89 
(Only  the  English text is authentic) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the  Trea~y establishing the European Community, 
'  \ 
Having  jregard  to  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of  21 
Decembet  1989
1  on  the  control  of  concentrations  between 
undertakings,  and  in particular Article  8(3}  thereof, 
Having  regard  to Article  57  of  the  EEA  Agreement, 
Having  regard  to  the  Commission  Decision  of  24  March  1995  to 
·initiate proceedings  in this case,· 
Having  given  the  undertakings  concerned  the opportunity to  make 
known  their  views  on  the  objections raised by  the  Commission, 
Having  regard  to  the  opinion  of  the  Advisory  Commit tee  on 
Concentrations, 
WHEREAS  : 
OJ  L 257, 21.09.1990, p.  13. 
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I  .  THE  . PARTIES 
1.  Norsk  Telekom  AS  (NT),  Tele  Danmark  AS  (TD)  and 
Industriforvaltnings  AB  Kinnevik  (Kinrievik)  have  set  up  a 
joint  venture  called  Nordic  Satellite  Distribution  (NSD) 
for  the  provision  of  satellite  transmission  services  and 
distribution services via cable networks  or direct-to-home 
broadcasts  for  television  programmes  in  the  Nordic  region 
(Denmark,  Sweden,  Norway  and  Finland) . 
2.  NT  is  a  Norwegian  company  controlled by  Telenor  AS,  which 
is  in· turn owned  by  the Norwegian State.  Telenor AS  is the 
principal provider of telephone services in Norway and owns 
and/or  leases  transponder  capacity  from  the  satellites 
Thor,  Intelsat  and  TV-Sat,  situated ·at  1  degree  West.  NT 
owns  through  Telenor  Avidi  AS  a  large  cable  network  in 
Norway.  Finally,  NT  also  provides  television distribution 
services to the direct-to-home market  in Norway,  Sweden and 
Finl~nd and  in  Denmark  through its subsidiary Telenor  CTV. 
3.  TD,  is  the  Danish  telecom operator,  51%  owned  by  the  Danish 
State.  It  operates  under  a  concession  granting  it  the 
e~lusive right to provide public voice  telephone services 
and  other  related  services  in  . Denmark,  as  well  as  to 
install  and  operate  the  Danish  public  telecommunications 
network  infrastructure.  TD  owns  a  national  broadband 
distribution  network  called  the  Hybrid  Network,  which  is 
currently used for the transmission of radio and television 
signals  to  local  distribution  networks.  TO's  cable 
subsidiaries  distribute  TV  channels  to  its  own  and  other 
local  networks. 
4.  Kinnevik  is  a  private  Swedish  group  of  companies  with 
activities  mainly  in  forestry,  farming,  packaging 
materials,  television and media,  and telecommunications.  In 
the latter are.as  Kinnevik owns or controls companies  in the 
Scandinavian  countries  which  are  mainly  active  in  the 
following  main  fields: 
satellite  television  broadcasting  (to  direct-to-home 
and  cable  subscribers)  of  commercial  channels  (TV  3, 
TV  G,  TV  6,  Z-TV)  and  pay-tv channels  (TV  1000,  Film 
Max  and  TV  1000  Cinema); 
distribution  of  satellite  television  (through  its 
subsidiaries  Viasat  Sweden,  Viasat  Norway  and  Viasat 
Denmark); 
Conditional  Access  Systems 
radio brqadcasting; 
In  addition,  Kinnevik  has  a  23%  shareholding 
commercial  TV  channel  TV  4  (a  Swedish  channel) 
represented on  the  Board of Management  of  TV4. 
in  the 
and  is 
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Finally,  Kinnevik  has  a  37.4%  shareholding  in Kabelvision 
AB,  a  cable  television operator in Sweden. 
II.  THE  OPERATION 
5.  The  operation  involves  the  creation,  by  NT,  TD  and 
Kinnevik,  of  the  joint  venture  Nordic  Satellite 
Distribution  AS  (NSD)  which  will  be  in  the  business  of 
providing  transponder  capacity  and  the  transmission  and 
distribution of satellite TV  channels to the Nordic market. 
6.  It is  the .aim of  NSD  to  establish  an  attractive satellite 
position  for  transmission  of  TV  signals  to  the  Nordic 
countries. 
7 .  NSD  will  provide  satellite 
operators  and  to  direct-to-home 
TV  channels 
households. 
to  cable  TV 
8.  It is  the  intention  that  the  distribution of  satellite  TV 
channels  to  direct-to-home  users  and  to  cable  TV  networks 
provided  by  NSD  shall  te3.ke  place  through  the  parents' 
distribution  companies  Viasat  and  Telenor  CTV  and  through 
the  parents'  cable  TV  operators. 
~  \  . 
j 
; 
III.  COMMUNITY/EEA  DIMENSION 
9.  NT,  TD  and  Kinnevik  have  a  combined  aggregate  worldwide 
turnover  of  5, 260  million  ECU.  TD  and  Kinnevik  have  a 
Community-wide  turnover  of  more  than  250  million  ECU  of 
which  not  more  than  two-thirds  is ·achieved  in  one  and  the 
same  Member  State.  The  operation therefore has  a  Community 
dimension. 
10.  At  the  same  time,  since  the  combined  turnover  of  the 
undertakings  concerned in the territory of the  EFTA-states 
equals  more  than  25%  of  their  total  turnover  in  the  EEA 
territory,  the  operation  is  also  a  cooperation -case  in 
accordance  with  Article  58  and  protocol  24  of  the  EEA 
Agreement  .. 
IV.  THE  STRUCTURE  AND  TECHNOLOGY  OF  THE  INDUSTRY 
1 1 .  The  provider  of  a  TV  channel  whether  this 
advertising  based,  mini-pay  or·  pay-TV 
broadcaster. 
is  a  public, 
is  called  a 
12.  If the  channel  is to be  transmitted via satellite  f~om the 
studio,  the  TV  signals are  sent  to  an  up-link station.  Up-
link  is  the  process  of  sending  a  TV  sign~l  from  an  earth 
station to  a  satellite.  The  TV  signals  can be  broadcast  in 
clear or  encrypted  form. 
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13.  From  the  up-link  station  the  TV  signals  are  sent  to  the 
satellite that retransmits them.  Satellites used for TV  are 
placed in  a~geostationary orbit position and are  therefore 
able to maintain a  constant beam on  a  given territory.  Each 
satellite contains  several  transponders  that  are  elements 
on  a  satellite used to receive and transmit TV  signals.  The 
geographical  area  where  the  TV  signals  transmitted  by  a 
transponder  can  be  received  by  direct-to-home  customers 
having  standard  receiving  equipment  is  called  the 
footprint.  As  a  rule,  with  the  present  technology 
(analogue}  each  transponder  will  have  a  capacity  to 
transmit  one  TV·  channel.  The  introduction  of  digital 
technology  is  expected  to  increase  the  capacity  of  each 
transponder  five  to  ten times. 
14.  The  TV  signal  is  received  by  a  satellite  dish  on  the 
ground.  The  receivers  can be  (1)  direct-to-home households 
with  (normally}  smaller dishes;  (2)  cable TV  operators with 
one  or more  much  larger dishes;  or  (3}  SMATV  operators
2
• 
15.  A  special  technical  infrastructure  is  required  to  operate 
pay-TV.  This  technical  infrastructure  is  called  a 
conditional  access  system,  ·and is required  to  ensure  that 
only authorised viewers,  ie.  subscribers  to  the particular 
encrypted  channel(s},  can  receive  the  ~hannel(s}.  Pay-TV 
are  invariable encrypted.  In  the Nordic area all channels 
br~adcasted by satellite are encrypted in contrast to other 
parts of Europe.  When  encryption takes place  a  datastream 
is  inserted  along  with  the  TV  signal  for  use  by  the 
conditional  access  system.  A  conditional  access  system 
consists  essentially, of  (1)  an  adaptor. for  decryption 
(decoder),  (2}  a  subscriber management  system  (SMS},  (3)  a 
Subscriber Authorization System  (SAS)  and,  finally,  (4)  an 
encryption  system. 
16.  To  receive encrypted  TV  signals  a  consumer  needs  a  decoder 
equipped  with  a  decryption  facility  and  a  security 
processor.  The  decoder  decrypts  the  television  picture, 
which  is encrypted when  the  TV  signal is transmitted. 
17.  The  conditional access  system requires  the  transmission of 
a  data  stream  together·  with  the  TV-signal,  containing 
information  on  the  channels  or  packages  of  channels 
subscribed.to  and  on  the entitlement of  the  subscribers  to 
receive  the  programmes.  If  an  open  encryption  system  is 
used  (see below)  a  "personal"  smart card is made  available 
to  the  viewer  which  is  inserted.into  the  decoder  to  scan 
2  The  SMATV  segment  consists  of  entities  receiving  the  TV  signals 
using  a  Satellite  Master  Antenna  and  retransmitting  the  signal 
within  a  smaller  network.  Normally  the  SMATV  operators  have  no 
system  for  operating  pay-TV  and,  if they  do,  it is carried in  the 
network  on  the basis of collective payment  from all residents.  The 
SMATV  operators will rarely contract directly with the broadcasters, 
but  wi~l normally be  customers  of local cable  operators. 
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through  the datastream that  comes  along with the  TV  signal 
to  find  out  if its identity is present.  If the  smart  card 
finds  its "unique  key",  the  decoder  decryPts  the  TV  signal 
and passes it on  to  the  TV  set. 
18.  The  conditional  access  system  is  based  on  the  use  of  an 
encryption  system  ~n  which  the·· messages  are  encrypted.  A 
broadcaster  needs  an  agreement  with  a  supplier  giving  him 
the  right  to  encrypt  and  decode  TV  channels  in  a  certain 
encryption system.  However,  this is not  the case  for  cable 
TV  operators,  since it is possible  for  cable  operators  to 
develop  and use  their own  encryption system.  An  encryption 
system can either be  closed or open. 
19.  A  closed  system  implies  that  only broadcasters  signing  an 
agreement  with  the  owner  of  the  system  are  allowed  to 
encrypt  in  this  system.  Normally,  such  an  agreement 
includes  a  right  for  a  particular operator to administrate 
the  SMS  and,  thus,  prevents other operators  from using  the 
system.  The  use  of  a  closed  system makes  it necessary ·for 
the  consumer  to  purchase  or  hire  a·  special  decoder  to 
receive .TV  channels  encrypted  in  this  system.  This  means 
that  the  households  have  to  buy  or  rent  an  additional 
decoder  if  they  want  to  receive  TV  channels  which  are 
en~rypted in another  system. 
I 
20.  Ad open  system means  that  decoders  are· available  from many 
sources  and  that  the  consumer  can,  with  the  same  decoder, 
receive  TV  channels  in  different  open  systems  by  using 
different  smart  cards.  Normally,  any  broadcaster  for  a 
minor  payment  can  acquire  the  right  from  the  owner  to  use 
such  an  open  system. 
21.  Nearly  all  European  encryption  systems  are  closed,  for 
examp-le  Videocrypt  (used by  BSkyB  and Adult  Channel  in  the 
UK  and  by  Multichoice  in  more  than  30  European  countries 
including  the  Nordic  countries)  and  Syster/Nagravision 
(used  by  Canal+  in  France  and  Spain,  Premiere  in ·Germany 
and  Austria  and  Teleclub  in  Switzerland) .  However,  as  a 
rule,  open  encryption  systems  are  used  in  the.  Nordic 
count~ies. 
22.  In addition to the decoder base and access  to an encryption 
syste~  a  subscriber  management  system  (SMS)  and  a 
·subscriber authorization system  (SAS)  are also needed.  SMS 
is the computer system in charge of managing the subscriber 
base  (the  billing  and  collection  of  s~bscriptions, 
telephone  answering,  statistics,  etc.).  SAS  is  a  software 
with  the  purpose  to  open  or close  the  authorization of  the 
individual  subscriber  to  receive  pay-TV  channels.  Control 
of  the  SMS,  which  contains  vi tal  information  about  the 
customers,  would  be  especially  important  for  a  pay-TV 
broadcaster or a  cable  TV  operator.  It must  be  assumed that 
such operators would be  very reluctant to  let a  competitor 
take  over  their SMS. 
...  r•  •  ....  ., 
...... 't  • 
~  .  ..· .. 
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23.  Transparent  transmission means  that encryption takes place 
when  the  signal  is  transmitted and  decryption  first  takes 
place  in  t:he  household.  At  the  moment,  direct-to-home 
households  receive  transparent transmission.  This is not 
currently  the  case  for  households  connected  to  cable  TV 
networks~  Cable  TV  networks  consists  to  a  large  extent  of 
several  separate  cable  units,  and.in  each unit  there  is  a 
"head-end"  in  which  reception  takes  place.  Currently  the 
cable operators  need to have  one  decoder  for  each head-end 
and for each TV  channel.  By. transparent transmission,  a  TV 
household  connected  to  a  cable  TV  network  receives  the 
signal directly from  the satellite and,  thereby,  the  cable 
TV  operator  could  save  an  encoding  and  decoding  system  in 
each  head-end~ 
V.  CONCENTRATION 
Joint control 
24.  NSD  shall  be  owned  33,3%  by  each  of  NT,  TD  and  Kinnevik. 
Its  board  of  directors  shall  consist  of  four  directors: 
each party shall nominate  one director and  one  independent 
director  who  shall  be  nominated  subject  to  agreement 
b~tween  the· parties  shall  also  be  the  chairman  of  the 
b9ard.  · 
.; 
25.  ·According to Article 5.2  of NSD's  Shareholders'  Agreement, 
board  resolutions  will  be  adopted  by  a  majority  of 
directors,  except  for.  a  number  of  matters  for  which 
unanimity is 'required.  These matters  include: 
approval  of  and  amendments  to  NSD's  operational  and 
investment  budgets  and  strategic plans; 
borrowing  exceeding  2  million  NOK  (approximately 
250.000  Ecu); 
matters  .entailing  substantial  or  extraordinary 
financial  commitments  for  the  company,  including  the 
lea·se  of  satellite  capacity  if  the  company  thereby 
assumes  substantial liabilities when  such liabilities 
are  not  included  in  the  last budget  approved  by  the 
board; 
use  of  other  satellite positions  than  1  degree  West 
and  5  degrees  East,  and decisions  on major  changes  in 
technical  standards  an  other operational  issues; 
employment  of  a  chief  executive  officer  who  will  be 
responsible  for  the  day-to-day  management  of  the 
company  and  the  approval  of  operation  guidelines  for 
this chief executive officer.  · 
26.  The  chairman  of  the  board  of  directors  shall  act  as 
chairman  of  the  general  shareholders'  meeting,  unless  the 
parties agree otherwise.  The  chairman of the shareholders' 
meeting  does  not  have  a  casting vote. 
Resolutions at the shareholders'  meeting wil'l be  adopted by 
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the  rnaj ori  ty  required  by  the  Norwegian  Companies  Act, 
except  for  issues  listed  in  Clause  s·. 2  for  which,  if 
brought  to ·the  shareholders'  meeting  ,  unanimity  will  be 
required. 
27.  As  a  result of the above,  it can be concluded that NSD  will 
be  jointly controlled by its three parent  companies. 
Full  function  joint venture 
28.  NSD's  main  activities will  be  the  following: 
to negotiate and  enter into agreements  with programme 
providers  (broadcasters)  for  distribution  of 
television channels  via satellite; 
to  establish  a  leading  satellite position  (named  by 
the  parties  as  a  Nordic  "Hot  Bird")  for  the  Nordic 
market  by  leasing  satellite  capacity  in  the  orbital 
positions  1  degree  West  and  5  degrees  East; 
to  create  a  programme  strategy based on  a  new ,package 
of  television  channels  adapted  to  the  Nordic 
countries; 
to. distribute  such  a  package  via  satellite  to  the 
cable television  (cable TV),  master antenna television 
(SMATV)  and  direct-to-home  markets  in  the  Nordic 
countries.  This  will  include  offering  Subscriber 
Management  Services,  distributing  smart  cards  and 
operating  a  Subscriber Access  System; 
to  promote  /and  implement  a  digital  transmission 
standard  and  a  joint Nordic  encryption  system  to  be 
used  for  cable  TV,. SMATV  and  direct-to-home; 
to  develop  new  products  and  services  related  to  the 
activities  of  the  company.·  This  will  not  include 
telephone  services  and  data  or  other  services  to  the 
business market. 
29.  NSD  has  been  established  for  an  indefinite  term.  It  will 
have  all  the  necessary ·assets  and  staff in  order  to  carry 
out  its business  activity on  a  lasting basis. 
30.  When  NSD  starts  to  operate,  NSD  itself  will  be  the 
contracting party to any new contracts to be concluded with 
broadcasters.  All  Viasat' s  and  Telenor  CTV' s  agreements 
with  broadcasters  shall  be  trans  fer  red  to  NSD,  provided 
that  such broadcasters  give  their consent. 
31.  NSD  will  provide  satellite  transponder  capacity  and 
satellite network services subleased from Telenor  ~nd other 
independent  satellite  operators  to  broadcasters.  Telenor 
owns  and  operates  the  Thor  satellite,  positioned  at  1 
degree  West,  and  has  res·erved  a  number  of  transponders  on 
the  Intelsat  satellite  in  the  same  orbital  position. 
Furthermore,  Telenor  controls  all  transponders  on  the 
satellite TV-Sat,  also  in the position  1  degree  West. 
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32.  According to the Cooperation Agreement  between Telenor  and 
NSD,  these  companies  will  have  a  mutual  right  of  first 
refusal  for  the  lease  and  provision  of  satellite 
transponder  capacity  for  ·the  transmission  of  television 
programmes  (internal  business  television  and  data 
transmission  services  are  excluded) .  This  means  that  NSD 
shall have  a  right of first refusal: 
for  the  lease  of  satellite  transponder  capacity  and 
satellite network  services  from  Telenor; 
for  the provision of satellite capacity and satellite 
ne~work services to third parties wishing to broadcast 
in  the  Nordic  countries  who  had  initially approached 
Telenor. 
33.  relenor has  a  right of first refusal  to provide  NSD  or its 
affiliates with all the transponder capacity and satellite 
network  services  they . may  need.  In  the  case  of  excess. 
capacity  in  the  satellite  network  service  leased  by  NSD, 
Telenor is entitled to use this capacity after offering NSD 
an  economic  compensation. 
34.  In  addition,  Kinnevik  and  TO  have  entered  into  lease 
agreements  with  the  Swedish  satellite  operator  Nordiska 
Satelitaktiebolaget  (NSAB)  for  the  lease  of  six 
tr~nsponders situated at  S  degrees .East.  On  this position, 
N~  owns  the  Sirius  satellite  and  the  Tele-X  satellite, 
each with  S  transponders.  Kinnevik and  TD  have  leased four 
transponders  on  Sirius  which  now  transmit  four  of 
Kinnevik's channels,  TV3  Sweden,  TV6,  ZTV  and Filmmax.  This 
agreement  went  into effect· on August  1994  and  runs  for  six 
years.  In  addition  Kinnevik  and·  TD  have  leased  two 
transponders on Tele-X,  of which one is currently not used. 
TD  and  Kinnevik  entered  into  these  two  agreements  on 
November  1994  and January  199S  and both will expire on July 
1997  or  with  end  of  life  of  the  satellites.  Under  the 
agreements  Kinnevik  and  TD  will  have  a  right  of  first 
refusal  until August  2000  with  respect  to  the  remaining  4 
transponders.on S
0  East  (one  on Sirius and three on  Tele-X) 
and,  furthermore,  for  the  same  period  the  two  companies 
will  have  a  right  of  first  refusal  with  respect  to  future 
capacity  at  S
0  East  becoming  available  to  NSAB.  All  the 
lease agreements containing the rights·of first refusal are 
in  tended  to  be  transferred  to  NSD  prior  to  the  date  of 
commencement  of operations. 
3S.  NSD  will offer an integrated satellite transmission service 
to  programme  providers.  The  fact  that  NSD  will  sublease 
satellite  transponder  capacity  and  network  services  from 
Telenor or TD/Kinnevik does not put into question its full-
function  character  at  this  level,  since  NSD  will  control 
the·use of this transponder capacity for  a  long time.  Lease 
contracts  for  satellite  transponder  capacity  are  usually 
concluded  for  a  long  period  (7-10  years)  which  normally 
coincides  with  the  life of  the  satellite itself.  NSD  will 
II  B/  2.1 9 
therefore be able to develop its own  commercial strategy on 
a  lasting basis. 
36.  NSD  will develop  a  new package of television channels which 
will  be  specifically  adapted  to  the  Nordic  audience  in 
terms  of programme  mi~ and  language. 
37.  ·Regarding  the  direct-to-home  distribution  of  TV  channels 
as  stated above,  before  the  setting up  of  NSD  both  NT  and 
Kinnevik  offered  television  distribution  services  in  the 
Nordic  countries.  NSD  will  ·now  grant  to  the  Viasat 
companies  the  exclusive  right  to  distribute  NSD's 
television  channels  to  the  direct-to-home  and  SMATV 
hous.eholds  in Denmark  and  to  the direct-to-home,  SMATV  and 
cable  TV  households  in Sweden.  Viasat  Sweden will  continue 
to  be  100%  owned  by  Kinnevik,  but  Viasat  Denmark  will  be 
owned  by  Kinnevik  and  TD  (51%  - 49%).  TD  has  a  conditional 
option to acquire  an  additional  6%  of the  share capital  in 
Viasat  Denmirk  in 1998. 
38.  In  Norway  NSD  will  have,  for  the  time  being,  two 
representatives: Viasat Norway  (100%  owned by Kinnevik)  and 
Telenor CTV.  It is foreseen that both entities should merge 
and  remain  under  control  of Telenor .. 
39.  A~ the  exclusive  distributor  of  NSD,  the  Viasat  companies 
w:j/11  have  : 
the right and obligation to distribute the  TV  channels 
ptovided by  NSD  · 
the  possibility  to  distribute  other  television 
channels  subject  to  NSD' s  approval.  The  only 
limitation here  is  that  in order  to  favour  NSD's  Hot 
Bird position,  if the  channel  in  question  is  located 
at  1  degree  West,  Sirius  or  Tele-X,  the  distributor 
will  not  be  able  to  distribute  the  same  channel  from 
another satellite  posi~ion. 
40.  The  price  to  subscribers  of  the  individual  channels 
included  in  NSD's  package  will  be  decided  .by  the 
broadcaster  itself,  when  NSD  acts  as  an  agent.  Where  NSD 
enters  into  a  distributorship  agreement  with  the 
broadcaster the price to the subscribers will be decided by 
NSD  or  by  NSD's  distributors  if  they  act  as  sub-
distributors  in  cooperation  with  NSD.  According  to  NSD's 
Programme  Strategy,  NSD's  distributors shall prepare every 
year  a  marketing budget per channel or package of channels, 
which shall reflect the agreements entered into between NSD 
and  the  broadcaster.  These  programme  budgets  shall  be 
presented  to  and  approved  by  NSD,  and  any  deviations  from 
them  shall  be  approved by  NSD. 
4~.  The  fact  that,  as  stated above,  Viasat's  and  Telenor  CTV's 
agreements  with  broadcasters  will  be  transferred  to  NSD 
with  effect  from  NSD's  start  of  operations,  and  that  NSD 
itself  will  negotiate  and  enter  into  any  new  agreements 
~ .  . 
~  ~  . .  .  ...  .. ... 
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shows  that  NSD  will  take- up  all  responsibilities  with 
respect  to distribution.  Although  the Viasat  companies  and 
Telenor  CT~ will  not  be  owned  by  NSD  (except  for  Viasat 
Finland),  they will carry out  NSD's  strategic decisions  on 
distribution,  on  the  basis  of  the  prices  and  budget 
approved by  NSD. 
42.  NSD  shall provide  and control its Subscriber Access  System 
(SAS)  .  Viasat  and  Telenor  CTV  will  keep  the  Subscriber 
Management  System  (SMS),  and will therefore make  available 
smart cards to customers,  and carry out the administration 
of subscriptions and payments,  but they shall pay a  monthly 
fee  per  smart  card  for  the  SAS  services  provided  by  NSD. 
NSD  also  intends  to develop  a  new  SAS  for digital services 
as  soon  as it is technically possible. 
4 3.  With  respect  to  cable  distribution,  NT  and  TD' s  cable 
operators  will  be  appointed  NSD's  representatives  for  the 
procurement  and sale of  TV  channels  on  the  cable  TV  market 
and  a  part of the  SMATV  market.  This  implies  that  : 
j 
,; 
NT  and  TD's  cable  operators  shall  have  the  right  and 
oblig-ation  to  procure  -the  sale  of  satellite  TV 
channels  provided  by  NSD  within  their  respective 
geographic  areas,  . but  NSD  is  entitled  to  sell  any 
channel to other cable or antenna operators within the 
same  area; 
the  two  cable operators shall be  able  to distribute  a 
TV  channel  which  NSD  cannot  provide  subject  to  NSD's 
prior approval; 
NSD  shall  have  the  exclusive  right  to  conduct 
negotiations  and  enter  into  agreements  with 
broadcasters concerning marketing and sale of channels 
via cable  in those  geographic areas. 
44.  In  a  similar  way  as  that  agreed  with  Viasat,  NT  and  TD's 
cable- operator~s  agreements  with  broadcsters  shall  be 
transferred  to  NSD  with  effect  from  NSD's  start  of 
operations subject to the approval of the broadcasters.  NSD 
will  therefore  assume  the  full  responsibility  for  the 
provision  of  satellite  TV  channels  to  the  cable  networks 
owned  by  the parties'. 
45.  Despite  of  the  fact,  that  NSD  will  be  relatively small  in 
economic  terms,  since it will only employ  around  20  people 
the first year and around  50  within two  or three years  and 
it will  have ·assets  for  a  value  of  around  25  million  Ecu, 
as  a  result of all the  above  elements,  it can be  concluded 
that  NSD  will  have  all  the  necessary  resources  to  perform 
all  the  functions  normally  carried  out  by·  companies 
operating in the same market,  and will therefore constitute 
a  full-function  joint venture. 
• ...  ·::.·  -•l0M0: ••  .  .  ·.· 
II  B/  25 11 
Cooperative  aspects 
46.  NSD's  paren~ companies  are currently competitors  mai~ly at 
the distribution level,  since in the direct-to-home segment 
in  Norway,  Denmark  and  Sweden  NT,  through  Telenor  CTV, 
competes  with  Kinnevik' s  Vias at  companies  and  in  some 
regions  there  is  competition  between  Viasat  and  the  cable 
operators of  TD  and  NT. 
47.  In  the  direct-to-home  distribution  market  the  parties 
intend to merge Telenor CTV's activities in Sweden,  Denmark 
and  Norway  with  those  of  Viasat,  which  will  become  the 
exclusive distributor of NSD's package of TV  channels these 
countries.  In  the  meantime,  the  transfer  of  all 
distribution  contracts  to  NSD  and  the  exclusive  right  to 
negotiate  new  ones  prevents  the  parent  companies  from 
providing direct-to-home distribution services on their own 
and  from developing a  distribution strategy to pursue their 
individual  interests. 
4 8.  The  parties'  cable  operators  and  Vias at  will  continue 
operating in the  same  areas,  but they will all act as NSD's 
representatives offering as  a  general rule the  same package 
of  satellite  TV  channels.  As  for  the  direct-to-home 
segment,  the  transferral of the cable operators'  contracts 
as!  well  as  the  right  to  negotiate  to  NSD  prevents  the 
pckent  companies  from  providing  these  services  on  their. 
own. 
49.  There  is also  competition at present  between  NT  and  TD  in 
a  very  marginal  market  in  economic  terms:  TV  up-linking 
services  to  the  satellite  (see  point  53).  Both  parents 
currently  provide  these  services  from  their  respective 
countries,  but  the  insignificance  of  this  market  in 
economic  terms clearly shows  that the operation has neither 
the  object or  the  effect of coordinating the activities of 
these  two  parent  companies  with  respect  to  up-linking 
services. 
50.  Finally,  the  activities  of  NSD's  parent  companies  in 
upstream  or  downstream  markets  are  not  likely  to  lead  to 
any  coordination  of·  their  competitive  behaviour.  NT  does 
not  compete  as  a  satellite  operator  with  TD  or  Kinnevik. 
Kinnevik will broadcast its pay-TV .and  commercial  channels 
through  NSD,  but  none  of  the  other  parties  are 
broadcasters. 
51.  The  facts  described  above  lead  to. the  conclusion  that  the 
setting up  of  NSD  has  neither the object nor  the effect of 
coordinating  the  competitive  behaviour  of  undertakings 
which  remain  independent.  It  can  therefore  be  concluded 
that  the  present  operation  constitutes  a  concentration 
withiri  the  meaning  of Article  3  of  the Merger  Regulation. 
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VI.  RELEVANT  PRODUCT  MARKE~S 
52.  The  operati~n.involves the following three product markets: 
(i)  provision  of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity  and 
related services to broad9asters;  (ii)  distribution of pay-
TV  and  other  encrypted·  TV  channels  to  direct-to-home 
households;  (iii)  operation of cable  TV  networks. 
(i) ·  Provision  of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity 
and related services to broadcasters 
53.  Several  companies  are  in  the  business  of  providing 
satellite transponder capacity.  These companies  - satellite 
operators  launch  and  operate  satellites  and  lease 
transponders  to  broadcasters  for  transmissions  of  TV 
signals.  According  to  the parties,  around  250  transponders 
are  available  for  transmission  of  TV  signals  to  Europe 
(turnover  approximately  625  Million  Ecu) .  The  most 
important satellite TV  channels in the Nordic countries are 
currently being provided by Astra,  Thor,  Intelsat  702  and 
Sirius.  These  transpo.nders  are  normally  leased  to 
broadcasters  who  through  licensing  arrangements  deliver 
their  TV  channels  to  the  distributors  of  cable-TV  and 
direct-to-home  consumers. 
54.  D~stribution of  TV  signals via satellite  (transponders)  is 
a.l  market  distinct  from  TV· distribution  by  terrestrial 
links,  since considerable differences exist between the two 
modes of distribution both technically and financially  (see 
the  decision  IV/M.469  MSG  Media  Se~vice).  The  NSD 
operation  will  result  in  a  reorganisation  of  existing 
transponder capacity and will not lead to an enlargement of 
satellite transponder capacity suitable for Nordic viewers. 
(ii)  Distribution of satellite pay-TV  and other encrypted 
TV  channels  to direct-to-home households
3 
55.  On  this  market  (hereafter  called  direct-to-home 
distribution),  the  distributor  of  pay-TV  and  other 
encrypted  channels  market  and  sells  the  channels  or  a 
package  of  channels  to  the  direct-to-home  households  and 
provides  the  households  with  the  necessary  smartcard.  In 
the  Nordic  area  most  direct-to-home  distributors  sell  the 
channels  in packages  (a bouquet of channels)  of which  some 
contain  up  to  25  channels  of  all  types.  Normally,  the 
distributor  will  offer  a  "basic  package"  that  contains 
mixed financed pay-TV and advertising-financed TV  channels. 
3  In the  statement of objections,  this market  was  named 
"Administrative and technical services in distribution 
of satellite pay-TV and other encrypted channels".  The 
change  has  been  made  in  order  to  emphasize  the 
commercial  relationship  between  the  distributer  as  a 
provider  of  TV  channels  and  the  direct-to-home 
households. 
I 
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In addition,  the customer has  the option of adding other TV 
channels  to  the package.  Several pay-TV channels  and  other 
encrypted channels  are marketed in the.Nordic countries. 
56.  There  are currently three major distributors  in the Nordic 
countries  :  Multichoice  (a  distribution  company  owned  by 
FilrnNet)  and  Kinnevik  and  NT's  di~tribution companies.  It 
is  intended  that  the  direct-to-home  distribution  of  TV 
channels  by  NSD  shall  take  place  through  the  parents 
distribuion  companies  on  an  exclusive  basis.  (see  points 
37-39) . 
57.  The  market  for  direct-to-home  distribution  has. a  high 
growth  potential.  Compared  to  transmission  via  cable 
networks,  direct-to-home  reception  is  currently  a  smaller 
segment  of  the  market  (see  point  59) .  According  to  the 
parties,  there  are  approximately  720  000  direct-to-home 
households  in  the  Nordic  countries  (Sweden  has  around 
360  000  direct-to-home households,  Denmark  170.000,  Norway 
160  000  and  Finla~d around  30  000)  ~  However,  the  parties 
estimate that at the  end of  1998  the Nordic  direct-to-home 
segment will  comprise  1,15 million households. 
(ii:l)  Operating cable-TV networks 
58.  Th~  cable  operators  provide  the  following  services  to 
hqbseholds  connected  to  their  networks  :  maintainance  of 
the  network,  sale  and  marketing  of  TV  channels.  In 
addition, ·the  cable  operators  target  the  SMATV  households 
in  order  to  sell  the  TV  channels  also  to  this  segment. 
Households wanting access to pay-TV normally rent a  decoder 
from  the  cable  TV  operator.  However,  cable  TV  operators 
normally operate  their  own  SMS  and  SAS  based  on  their  own 
encryption  system  and  sell  these  services  to  broadcasters 
wanting  to  transmit  pay-TV  or other  encrypted  channels  in 
the  network. 
59.  From the point of.view of the viewer there are considerable 
differences  between  the  possible  transmission  routes 
terrestrial,  direct-to-home  satellite  and  cable  .- which 
affect  both  technical  requirements  and  finance.  While 
terrestrial  transmission  and  satellite  television  only 
require  the viewer to install an  aeri~l or a  satellite dish 
at  his  own  expense,  cable  TV  is  dependent  on  the 
maintenance  of  a  cable  network,  which  is  financed  by  the 
viewer  by  means  of  cable  fees  (see  IV/M.469  - MSG/Media 
Service).  As  shown/ currently app~oximately 4.3 million of 
the  10 million Nordic  households  are  connected to cable  TV 
networks  and around  0.7  million are  connected  to  SMATV  of 
which  some  receives  the  signal  from  cable  TV  operators. 
..  ~  .. ;  .·. 
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DENMARK  SWEDEN  NORWAY  FINLAND. 
Households  2.3 mio  3.9 mio  1.9·mio  1.9 mio 
of which 
connected 
to  : 
cable  TV  1.05 mio  1.9 mio  0.565 mio  0.78  mio 
SMA TV  0.25  mio  0.3  mio  0.120  mio  0.10  mio 
60.  Cable  TV  is  currently  the  predominant  transmission  route 
for  satellite  distributed  TV  in  the  Nordic  countries. 
However,  the cable  TV  market has  reached a  saturation point 
and  is  currently  characterised  by  slow  growth,  and  it is 
expected that no  more  than  50%  to  60%  of  the  10  million  TV 
households  in  the  Nordic  countries  are  likely  in  the 
foreseeabie future to be cabled,  largely because of terrain 
difficultie~ and the'dispersion of the population in a  wide 
geographical  area which  would be  uneconomical  to cable.  It 
could  be  argued  that  there  exists  a  certain  competitive 
link between the cable TV  market and the market  for direct-
to-home satellite distribution. However,  the choice between 
transmission by cable or direct-to-home is not possible for 
a  ilarge  number  of  currently  not  cabled  households  in  the 
Ndrdic  countries  in the  forseeable  future. 
; 
A  further  element  which  can  limit  the  option  for  a 
household  is  the  fact  that  in  some  households  the 
acquisition of satellite dishes  is prohibited on aesthetic 
grounds  by  the  landlord  or  by  the  owners'  association  in 
the case of multiple dwellings.  Lastly,  a  household already 
·an  cable  or  having  a  satellite  receiver  is  normally  not 
ready  to  make  a  further  investment  in  another  form  of 
transmission  (lock-in  effect).  For  the  reasons  mentioned 
above,  it appears  that  the  operation of cable  networks  is 
an  independent  relevant market. 
61.  The  Nordic  cable  TV  market  consists  of  a  number  of  cable 
networks  of  different  size  each  consisting  of ·several 
separate cable.units. At the individual head-ends  the cable 
TV  operator  will  normally  have  satellite  dishes  directed 
towards  all relevant satellite alternatives. 
VII.  RELEVANT  GEOGRAPHIC  MARRET 
(i)  Provision  of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity  and 
related services  to broadcasters 
62.  A broadcaster wishing to  transmit to a  specific area needs 
a  transponder with a  footprint  (the geographical area where 
the  TV  signals  distributed by  a  satellite can  be  received 
by  direct-to-home  households  having  standard  receiving 
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equipment)  that  co~ers the  relevant  geographical  area. 
63.  Technically,  it  is  possible  for  the  households  in  the 
Nordic  countries  to  receive  signals  from  all  European 
satellites. Quality of reception depends  on the size of the 
recei:ving  dish  and  on  the  strength  of  the  transponder 
signal.  However,  economic  and  aesthetic  considerations 
will limit the dish size generally used and,  as  a  rule,  the 
Nordic  direct-to-home  households  will  only  have  equipment 
which is adequate to receive signals from certain satellite 
positions.  For  cable  TV  operators  the  situation  is  quite 
different,  since,  as  they  are  not  faced  with  the  same 
economic  and  aesthetic  restrictions  as  the  direct-to-home 
households,  they  will  be  able  to  receive  signals  from 
nearly ·all -European  satellite positions. 
64.  For  transmission  to  direct-to-home  households,  one  way  of 
defining  the  geographical  scope  of  transponders  is  to 
consider  the  size  of  the  dish  necessary  to  receive  good 
quality  signals  from  the  transponders  in  question. 
According to technical information provided by the parties, 
Societe  Europeenne  des  Satellites  (SES},. which  owns  the 
Astra  satellites,  has  specified  its  main  markets  to  be 
.areas  where  signals  can  be  received by dishes  of  up  to  60 
c~  in  diameter.  On  the  basis  of  a  60  em  dish  size,  the 
Nordic satellites  (Intelsat702/Thor/TV-Sat and Sirius/Tele 
xy,  the  Astra  satellites  and  the  Eutelsat  satellites  are 
relevant  for  Nordic  viewers. 
65.  The  transponders  on  the  Nordic satellites have  a  footprint 
which  enables  all  Nordic  viewers  with  a  60  ern  dish  to 
receive  the  signals  from  the  transponders.  Astra  and 
Eutelsat  are  also  relevant  for  the  Nordic  area  since 
direct-to-home  households  in  the  whole  of  Denmark  and  in 
the  Southern parts  of  Norway  and  Sweden  with  a  60  ern  dish 
could  receive  signals  from  some  of  Eutelsat  and  Astra's 
transponders.  Astra  cannot  be  received  in  Finland  with  a 
60  ern  dish. 
66.  From a  technical point of view,  for  a  bro&dcaster who  wants 
to  target  only  Denmark  the  transponders  on  Astra  and 
Eutelsat  would  be  as  relevant  as  the  Nordic  transponders. 
However,  a  broadcaster  who  wants  to  operate  on  a  Nordic 
basis,  transponde~s  which  only  cover  parts  of  the  Nordic 
market will not be considered as an attractive alternative. 
For such a  broadcaster there will be  imperfect substitution 
between  NSD's  transponders  and  the  transponders  on  Astra 
and  Eutelsat.  This  is  supported  by  ~nforma~ion  from  the 
parties  in  which  is  it  stated  that  prior  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Nordic  satellite positions  there  was 
no  transponder  capacity  with  an  ideal  foot-print  for  the 
Nordic  countries. 
67.  Furthermore,  it has.  to  be  borne  in mind  that  compared  to 
the Nordic satellites, Astra and Eutelsat are international 
businesses with  a  Central  European  scope.  Information  from 
..  ··>~-~~-,~.-...  ~~ ·:> .. 
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the  parties  indicates  that  the  fee  for  leasing  a 
transponder  on  Astra  or  Eutelsat  will  be  considerably 
higher  than~ the  fee will be  for  leasing a  Nordic satellite 
transponder.  If  NSD  maintains  a  con~iderable  price 
difference,  transponders  on Astra and Eutelsat will not  be 
an  alternative  for  a  broadcaster  who  wants  to  be  a 
competitive player  in the Nordic area. 
68.  However,  in  this  case,  technical  questions  relating  to 
footprints  and  sizes  of  dishes,  and  the  prices  of 
transponders are not determinant  for  the definition of  the 
relevant geographic market  since the operation will create 
such  barriers  to  entry  for  providers  of  transponder 
capacity suitable for  Nordic viewers  that the operation in 
itself  will  lead  to  the  creation  of  a  separate  Nordic 
market.  As  will  be  shown  in  the  assessment,  through  its 
control  over  the  transponder  capacity  and  the  links  to 
Kinnevik  as  an  important  broadcaster  and  distributor  of 
Nordic  TV  channels,  and  through  the  links  to  TO  and  NT  as 
important  cable  operators,  NSD  will  be  in  a  position  to 
foreclose  other  satellite  ope~ators  from  leasing 




Distribution  of  satellite 
encrypted  TV  channels 
hou.seholds 
pay-TV  and  other 
to·  direct-to-home 
69.  Direct-to-home  distribution  is  a  retail  operation  with 
direct local contact with the viewer,  FilmNet,  Kinnevik and 
NT  operate  national  companies  providing  these  services. 
Marketing  of  the  services  is  national.  Furthermore,  the 
operation  itself will  foreclose  the  Nordic  region  for  new 
distribution  companies,  since  it  will  in  effect  be 
impossible  for  a  potential entrant  to  create  a  smart  card 
with an attractive programme  package  (see points  135-138). 
The market is likely to be national,  but it will not change 
the  ass~ssment whether the market is defined as national or 
Nordic  and  therefore this question can be  left open. 
(iii)  Operation of cable  TV  networks 
70.  Provision  of  cable  TV  services  to  viewers  is  a  regional 
service.  Competition  between  operators  to  obtain 
connections  may  to  a  certain  extent  take  place  on  a 
national  scale  in  terms  of  marketing  efforts.  Cable  TV 
operators  are  faced  with  different  market  conditions  in 
different  countries  in ·terms  of  geography,  marketing  and 
legislation.  Operation of cable TV  networks is,  therefore, 
at least  a  national market. 
II  B/  31 
·  ...  "'  ,.· .  ·, ....  ·~  •· 
. ·.  :·.: ·  ..  ~ .  ;.  -~~ _..  ~: ... :  ...  ~; . ·:  .. ~ ~:~~ . 
17 
VIII.  AsSESSMENT 
71  The  operation essentially  involves  the  following  separate 
markets  : 
A.  Provision  of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity  and 
related services  to broadcasters. 
B.  Operation of  cable.TV networks. 
C.  Distribution of  satellite pay-TV  and  other  encrypted 
TV  channels  to direct-to-home households. 
The  operation will  have  an  impact  on  the  affected markets 
either horizontally or  through the vertical links created. 
NSD  will,  after  the  operation,  control  an  integrated 
infrastructure  for  the  provision  of  TV  services  to  the 
Nordic  area  as  well  as  the  right  to  transmit  some  of  the 
most  important  TV  channels  in the  area. 
The  assessment  first discusses  the effect of  the operation 
on  the  transponder capacity market  (section A}.  It goes  on 
to  deal  with  the  operation's  effects  on  the  markets  for 
cable  TV  (section  B)  and  distribution of  satellite pay-TV 
and  other  encrypted  channels  to  direct-to-home  households 
(section C).  Sections  D  [ ...  ]  discuss  issues  relating  to 
ecpnomic  and  technical  progress. [ ...  ]  The  Commission's 
copclusions  are set out  in section E. 
·' 
A.  Provision  of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity  and 
related services  to broadcastezs 
A.l.  Market  structure and capacity 
a)  Transponder capacity available for the Nordic  "Hot Bird" 
72.  Currently,  there  are  five  satellites  in  the  position  1 o 
West  and  5  degrees  East.  These  are  : 
Thor  with  5  transponders  (of  which  all  are  used  for 
NSD ' s  channels) 
Intelsat  with  10  transponders  (of  which  four  are  used 
for NSD's  channels;  three are used for public channels; 
the rest is used by other independent'broadcasters) 
TV-Sat  with  5  transponders  (of which  three are used for 
NSD 's  channels;  one  is  used  by  an  independent 
broadcaster; one is currently not used but contrqlled by 
NSD) 
Sirius,  owned  by  the  Swedish  state  owned  company  NSAB, 
with  5  transponders  (of  which  four  are  used  for  NSD's 
channels;  one is used by  an  independent broadcaster) 
Tele-X,  owned by NSAB,  with 5  transponders  (of which one 
is used for NSD's  channel;  one is currently not used but 
controlled by NSD;  one is used for a  public channel;  the 
rest is used by other independent broadcasters) . 
Telenor owns  and operates the Thor satellite,  positioned at 
.  ~.:  ~  .~ ·:- ·,  ..  '.;  ·  ..  ~  .. ·.-
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1  degree West.  Furthermore,  Telenor has leased  from German 
Telecom the TV-Sat satellite and,  in addition,  has. reserved 
all  the  transponders  on  the  Intel  sat  satellite,  both 
satellites also located at 1  degree West.  At  the same  time, 
Kinnevik  and  TD  have  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the 
Swedis~  satellite  operator  NSAB  for  the  lease  of  four 
transponders  on  the Sirius satellite and  two  on  the  Tele-X 
satellite,  both  situated  at  5°  East.  This  agreement  is 
intended to  be  transferred to  NSD  prior to  the  date  of  the 
commencement  of operations.[ ...  ] 
73.  NSD  and  its parents  will  directly or  indirectly control  a 
large majority of the capacity available for the Nordic  "Hot 
Bird".  Of  a  total of 30 transponders in the position 1° West 
and  5°  East,  NSD  will  immediately lease  19.  [ ...  ] 
bl  Competition  from  Astra  and Eutelsat 
74  The  parties  claim that  the  Astra  and,  to  a  lesser  extent, 
the  Eutelsat  satellites  are  actual  competitors  to  the 
Nordic  satellites,  since  direct-to-home  households  in  the 
Southern parts of Scandinavia can receive signals  from  some 
of  Eutelsat's  and  Astra's  transponders  with  standard 
equipment.  According  to  the  parties,  more  than  50 
transponders  on  Astra  and  Eutelsat  are  currently used  for 
ch)innels  which  are  aimed  at  or  of  interests  to  Nordic 
hduseholds. 
7 5  It  is  true  that  today  approximately  70%  of  the  Nordic 
direct-to-home  households  have  their  dishes  directed  to 
Astra.  In  addition;  practically all Nordic  ~able networks 
have dishes directed to Astra and  Eutelsat~ However,  it has 
to  be  borne  in  mind  that,  except  for  Kinnevik' s  four 
channels  and  a  pay-TV  channel  which  is  transmitted  from 
Astra to Nordic viewers,  all channels  on Astra and Eutelsat 
are  in  foreign  languages  and  aimed  at  other  non-Nordic 
countries.  Several  of  these  channels  can  be  said  to  be  of 
interest to Nordic households,  for example Eurosport and MTV 
Europe,  and  it cannot  be  excluded  that others  are  popular 
in certain regions  (for  example  German  language  programmes 
in  the  Southern parts  of  Denmark) .  Nevertheless,  national 
channels  are  by  far  the· most. popqlar.  National  language  is 
the  most  decisive  element  in the  selection of  a  channel  by 
the  viewer  and  to  make  cost-effective  TV  advertising,  the. 
industry has  to  use  national  TV  channels. 
76  In  addition,  Astra  and  Eutelsat  have  a  central  European 
scope.  They have  up  to now  not shown  a  particular interest 
in the Nordic area and the  foot prints of the satellites do 
not  cover  the  whole  Nordic area.  The  satellites which  NSD 
controls  have  foot  prints  aimed  at  Nordic  viewers  in 
·particular.  Consequently,  ·broadcasters  using  NSD's 
transponders will  obtain  an  advantageous  position compared 
to  competitors  without  access  to  NSD's  transponders. 
Anyhow,  because of the operation Astra and Eutelsat will not 
be  signifi~ant competitors  to  NSD's  Hot  Bird  as  providers 
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of  transponders  to  broadcasters  wanting  to  target  Nordic 
viewers.  The  reasons  are  as  follows  : 
(i)  The  importance of Kinnevik's  TV  channels 
Through the link to Kinnevik as  a  broadcaster,  NSD 
will be  able  to offer some  very popular Nordic  TV 
channels  on  an  exclusive  basis.  As  a  result,  the 
majority of Nordic  direct~to-home households will 
direct their dishes  toward NSD's  satellites. 
(ii)  The  link to Kinnevik  as  a  major distributor 
Getting  onto  the  Viasat  package  of  satellite  TV 
channels will be vital for broadcasters  aiming at 





,power  of  the  popular  Kinnevik  channels  being 
offered  there.  By  the  operation,  Viasat  will 
exclusively  distribute  these  channels  available 
from  the  NSD  satellites.  Therefore,  it will  be 
vital for broadcasters to be on the NSD  satellites 
so  as  to  be  on  the Viasat distribution package. 
The  link  to  the  parents  as  major  cable  TV 
operators 
Because of NSD's  link to .TD  and  NT  as major  cable 
TV  operators  a  broadcaster  must  anticipate  the 
possibility of not getting access  to  a  large part 
of the Nordic  cable networks  if it transmits  from 
Astra or Eutelsat. 
The  price difference 
Because  broadcasters  will  be  able  to  lease 
transponders  on  NSD  at  lower prices  than  on Astra 
and Eutelsat,  a  broadcaster targetting  the  Nordic 
market will obtain an  advantage  by being  on  NSD's 
satellites  compared  to  competitors  who  are  on 
Astra  or· Eutelsat. 
No  capac+ty on Astra an Eutelsat 
All  transponder capacity on Astra  and Eutelsat is 
currently occupied. 
The  importance of Kinnevik's  TV  channels 
77  The  relationship between  Kinnevik  as ·a  broadcaster  and  NSD 
as.a supplier of  transponder  services will be  instrumental 
for  the  parties  in  creating  a  "Nordic  Hot  Bird".  NSD  will 
offer a  package of approximately 25 programmes including the 
TV3  channels of Kinnevik.  The  TV3  channels will play a  major 
role  in creating the  ''Nordic.Hot Bird".  When  launched  (TV3 
Sweden  in  1989  and  subsequently TV3  Denmark  and  TV3  Norway 
in 1991)  they were  transmitted from·Astra.  The  TV3  channels 
became  very  popular  TV  channels  in  these  countries. 
According to the parties  TV3  can be watched by about  50%  of 
all  households  in  Sweden,  Norway  and  Denma'rk.  Information 
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from  cable operators  indicates that more  than  70%  of their 
viewers regularly watch TV3  and that the channel ranks among 
the  4  most~  popular  channels  in  each  country.  Cable  TV 
operators generally indicated that TV3  is the most important 
channel  to  carry,· apart  from  the  national  terrestrially 
distributed channels.  In  this  connection,  one  has  to  bear 
in mind that Nordic viewers  can watch the national channels 
without  having  to  buy~a dish  or  to  subscribe  to  cable  TV. 
Therefore,  the  reason  for ·a  household  to  buy  a  dish  or 
subscribe  to  cable  TV  is  to  get  access  to  additional 
channels,  of  which  TV  3  is the most  important. 
78  In  addition,  the  parties will  within  a  short  time  be  able 
to add more attractive TV  channels to the package.  Kinnevik 
owns  other  channels  (TV6,  TVG,  Z-TV)  which  will  also  be 
transmitted exclusively from  NSD's  transponders. 
79  It appears  that  following  the  operation Astra  will  not  be 
a  major  provider  of  satellite  TV  channels  to  the  Nordic 
market.  Currently,  five ·transponders  on Astra  are  used  for 
Nordic TV  channels and no Nordic TV  channels are transmitted 
from Eutelsat.  Four of the five Nordic transponders on Astra 
are  leased  by  Kinnevik  and  used  for  its  channels  TV3 
Denmark,  TV3  Sweden,  TV3  Norway  and  TV1000.  Because  of  the 
operation, Astra shall no longer transmit the Kinnevik owned 
ch~nnels which will then be exclusively transmitted from the 
No~dic satellites.  In  addition,  it is  likely  that  Astra 
will also stop transmitting the remaining national channel, 
FilmNet's  pay-TV  channel,  since  FilmNet  by  the  agreement 
with  Telenor  (see  point  134)  will  get  access  to  an 
additional  transponder  on  1  degree  Wes~. 
80  Kinnevik' s  four  transponders  on  Astra  will  not  become 
available for broadcasters of Nordic  TV  channels.  It is the 
stated  aim  of  Kinnevik  to  lease  the  four  transponders  to 
broadcasters  with  no  Nordic  interests.  In  a  market 
characterized by a  rise in demand  and~ shortage of supply, 
such  a  move  serves  to ·limit competition. 
81  Furthermore,  NSD  will  also  provide  Astra's  most. popular 
foreign  language  TV  channels  in  the  Nordic  countries: 
Eurosport,  Discovery,  Children's  Channel,  CNN  Int.,  MTV 
Europe.  The  first  four  mentioned  channels  will  be 
transmitted  in  a  more  attractive  Nordic  version  in  NSD's 
package.  According  to  the  parties,  other  international 
channels  are  also  considering  Nordic  versions  of  their 
channels  which  will  be  subtitled  or  dubbed.  It  is  most 
likely  that  these  channels  will  also  be  transmitted  from 
NSD '·s  satellites.  NT  has  exclusive  rights  to. distribute 
Eurosport  ~ordic,  CNN  Nordic  and  MTV  Europe  in  the  Nordic 
area.  Undoubtedly,  such rights will  be  transferred to  NSD 
and  it  is  likely  that  NSD  will  be  able  to  get  exclusive 
rights  to other popular channels. 
82  Based upon the above mentioned,  it appears that broadcasters 
will stop transmitting the Nordic channels on Astra and that 
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Astra will not  have  many  popular  foreign  language  channels 
to  offer  to  Nordic  viewers  which  they  cannot  get  from  the 
Nordic  sate1lites,  some  even  in  a  Nordic version. 
83  The position of NSD  is likely to.be further strengthened by 
the  fact  that  the  national  broadcasters  in  Denmark  are 
planning  to  launch .satellite  channels  as  supplements  to 
their  terrestrially distributed  channels.  It appears  that 
NSD  is the only realistic distribution possibility for these 
companies.  Furthermore,  the inclusion of these companies  in 
NSD  will  take  away  strong  potential .  broadcasters  for 
potential competitors to.NSD seeking to distribute satellite 
television to  the Nordic  area. 
84  The parties do not deny the strength of Kinnevik's channels. 
On  the  contrary,  they  consider  those  channels  a  decisive 
element  in  the  operation.  Information  provided  by  the 
parties  shows  that  they  concur  with  the  Commission's 
expectation  that,  after  and  as  a  result  of  the  operation, 
most dishes in the area will be turned towards  1  degree West 
or  5  degrees  East. 
85  The parties acceptance that most  dishes  in the area  (70%  of 
which  are  presently  directed  at  Astra)  will  be  turned 
to~ards the  Nordic satellites as  soon  as  TV3  moves  to  them 
frpm Astra  ,  seems  to  lead to the conclusion that TV3  is by 
f~~ the most  important satellite TV  channel to most  Nordic 
direct-to-home  households,  and  to  confirm  the  "pulling 
power"  of  the  Kinnevik  channels mentioned earlier. 
86  The  parties  state  that  TV  channels  carried  by  Astra  and 
Eutelsat  will still be attractive for Nordic direct-to-home 
households  and  mention  the  fact  that  it  is  possible  for 
households  to  receive  signals  from  more  than  one  satellite 
position by using certain equipment.  Such equipment includes 
motorised dishes  and  fixed dishes with side-feeds.  If they 
wish  to,  households  can  also buy  another ·fixed dish.  · 
87  However,  it seems clear that there are several_problems with 
such  equipment.  There  are  aesthetic  and  planning  concerns 
raised by the large size of the dishes required t6 fit side-
feeds.  They are also costly.  The  high cost of the motorised 
and  second  dish  solutions  also  militates  against  them.  A 
ratio  of  2: 1  in  price  difference  between  side-feed  and 
standard  e.quipment  has  been  mentioned  by  the  parties. 
Motorised  dishes  are  even  more  expensive,  and  the  cost  of 
buying  two  standard dishes  is obvious. 
Furthermore, even if such solutions were inexpensive and easy 
to  integrate  into  a  household,  it  seems  likely  that  a 
consumer  receiv~ng 25  TV  channels  from  NSD  using standard 
equipment  will  be  reluctant  to  spend  money  on  other 
equipment  so  as  to  receive  additional  channels  from  Astra 
or Eutelsat. 
88  It is  clear~  therefore,  that,  because of the operation,  very 
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few  Nordic  direct-to-home  households  will  dir~ct  their 
dishes  towards Astra,  Eutelsat or other satellite operators 
and,  therefore,  broadcasters  wanting  to  target  Nordic 
viewers  will  not  see  these  satellites  as  alternatives  to 
NSD. 
(ii)  The  link to Kinnevik  as  a.maior distributor 
89  A  broadcaster  transmitting  from  Astra  or  Eutelsat will  be 
excluded from NSD's package of satellite TV  channels.  In the 
Nordic countries satellite TV  channels are sold in packages 
and  by  the  operation  NSD  will  offer  very  attractive 
packages.  To  be  excluded  from  NSD's  packages  of  channels 
will  put  a  broadcaster  in  a  very  disadvantaged  position 
compared  to  NSD' s  broadcasters.  It is  very  unlikely  that· 
such  broadcasters  could  develop  new  packages  which  could 
compete with NSD' s  package of channels. Another option would 
be  to  get  onto  FilmNet' s  packages  of  channels.  However, 
compared to what NSD's  packages can offer (i.e. the Kinnevik 
channels  including  TV3,  the  Nordic  versions  of  other 
channels  see  points. 77-81  above)  FilmNet' s  package  {see 
point  132)  will  not  be  an  attractive  choice  for  a 
broadcaster.  Besides,  Filmnet' s  position .as  a  significant 
player  on  this  market  will  be  undermined  because  of  the 
operation  (see point  140) . 
t  .  . 
90 
(iii)  The  link  to  the  parents  as  major  cable  TV 
operators 
A  broadcaster  transmitting  from  Astra  or  Eutelsat  must 
anticipate  the  possibility of  exclusion  from  a  large  part 
of  Nordic  viewers  connected  to,cable  networks.  Currently 
the parties control about 25%  of the approximately 5 million 
households connected to cable TV  networks and SMATV  networks 
in the Nordic countries. However,  in the digital environment 
NSD  will effectively be  able  to control  a  much  larger part 
of the  cable  TV  network  in the Nordic  area  due  to its role 
as  a  "gate  keeper"  to . the  Nordic  cable  TV  networks  (see 
point 128). 
(iv)  The price difference 
91  It  seems  likely  that  broadcasters  will  be  able  to  lease 
transponders  on  NSD  at  lower  prices  than  on  Astra  and 
Eutelsat.  This  is  mainly  because  of  the  difference  in 
population covered by the Nordic  foot print of NSD  compared 
to  the central European  foot prints of Astra  and Eutelsat. 
This  means  that broadcasters  aiming at Nordic  viewers  will 
obtain  a  price  advantage  on  NSD's  satellites  compared  to 
competing broadcasters without  access  to  NSD's  satellites. 
In  addition,  a  broadcaster  transmitting  from  Astra  or 
Eutelsat can  reach only  approximately-70%  of  the potential 
Nordic direct-to-home households while competitors on NSD's 
satellites  can  reach  all  Nordic  households  using  standard 
receiving  equipment.  For  these  reasons  alone,  most 
broadcasters  wanting  to  target Nordic  viewers  will  not  see 
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transponders  on Astra or Eutelsat  as  relevant alte·rnatives 
to  NSD's  transponders. 
(v)  No  capacity on Astra and Eutelsat 
92  All  transponder  capcity  on  Astra  and  Eutelsat  is  occupied 
and  in addition,  the market  for  TV  transponder  capacity is 
for  the  moment  characterised  by  a  rise  in  demand  and  a 
shortage  on  the  supply  side.  Furthermore,  Kinnevik  which 
currently leases  4  transponders on Astra directed at Nordic 
region,  has  decided not  to  sub-lease  these  to broadcasters 
targetting the  Nordic  region when it moves  its channels  to 
NSD  satellites. 
c)  Potential  competition  from  future  capacity 
93  The  parties  expect  the  current situation in which  there  is 
a  shortage  of  transponders  to  change  because  of  a  net 
increase  in transponders  in the  near  future. 
(i}  Astra  I  Eutelsat  . 
94  The  parties  claim  that  Astra  has  plans  to  launch  a  new 
satellite  in  1995  which  will  increase  its  transponder 
capacity  from  64  to  82  and,  in  1996,  a  further  satellite 
will  increase Astra's  capacity  to  102  transponders.  Other 
satellite  operators  with  European  coverage,  for  example 
Eutelsat, ·will also launch new satellites in the near future 
and  thereby  increase  the  total  transponder  capacity. 
95  Undoubtedly,  Astra,  Eutelsat  and other satellite operators 
have  plans  to  (and  will)  increase  the  capacity  of 
transponder.s  in  the  ·coming  years  by  launching  new 
satellites.  However  I  according  to  information  currently 
available  to  the  Commission,  transponders  will. not  be 
available for Nordic broadcasters in the next three to four 
years  at  least.  Besides,  even  if  transponders  for  Nordic 
viewers  were  to  be  available  there  would  not  be  that  many 
that  it would  be  possible  to  create  a  package  that  could 
compete  commercially with NSD's. 
(ii)  NSAB 
96  The parties have  in a  letter of 12 April 1995 mentioned that 
the  Swedish satellite operator NSAB  has  announced plans  to 
launch  a  32  transponder satellite to  become  operational  by 
mid 1997.  This means inter alia that NSAB  shall not acquire 
additional capacity at 5° East without first consulting NSD. 
Furthermore,  NSD  will  have  a  right  of  first  refusal  with 
regard_to  satellite  capacity  at  5°  East  which  is  or  will 
beco~e  available  to  NSAB  or  which  NSAB  plans  to  have 
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•••  .  'ia,  .:. 
II  R/  3H 24 
available.  Consequently,  NSD  will  also  con.trol . those  32 
transponders,  if NSAB  carries its plan through.  These are 
non-ancillary agreements  subject to Art.  85  of the  trea~y. 
(iii)  New  players using new satellites 
97  It is  not  likely that  new  players  will  launch  and  operate 
TV  satellites for the purpose of targeting the Nordic area. 
According  to  the  parties,  the  construction  cost  of  a 
satellite  varies  between  40  and  100  million  Ecu.  To  this 
must  be  added  launching costs of between  20  and  75  million 
Ecu and  insurance costs of approximately 20%  of the  insured 
loss  (consisting of construction costs and launching costs). 
It usually takes  more  than  five  years  from  the decision is 
taken to built a  new satellite until the satellite can begin 
transmitting. ·' 
(iv)  New  players using second hand satellites 
98  The  parties  argue  that  there  is  a  second  hand  market  for 
operative  satellites  which  means  that  potential  operators 
can buy or  lease  an operative satellite and move  them  into 
the  position  they  prefer.  In  this  connection  the  parties 
point  to  the  fact,  that. the  satellites currently situated 
at.  1°  West  and  5°  East  are  "second-hand-satellites". 
Furthermore,  according  to  the  parties,  it is  possible  to 
tuit the  sat~llite so  that the entire  foot-print  is moved. 
99  However,  according  to  information  available  to  the 
Commission,  although  it  is  possible  to  re-point  the 
satellite to  a  different region of the earth,  the  footprint 
coverage is unlikely·to be ideal since the satellite was  not 
originally designed' to  cover  the  new  region.  In addition, 
even  if  an  independent  satellite  operator  chose  to  carry 
through  such  an  operation,  such  satellites  would  be 
competing  with  NSD's  "Hot  Bird"  with  all  its  competitive 
programming  advantages  transmitting  20  -25  TV  channels  of 
which  several  are Nordic  channels  not  accessible  for  other 
satellite operators  than'NSD.  · 
100  In  view  of  the  above,  it seems  unlikely that it would  be 
economically sensible for  a  new  company  to enter the market 
for provision of transponder capacity to the Nordic area by 
using  second hand satellites. 
[ ...  ] 
d)  Digitalization 
101  The  introduction  of  digital  technology  will  increase  the 
capacity  of  a  satellite  by  5-10  times.  According  to  the 
parties,  digitalization  ori  a  commercial  basis  will  take 
place  within  the  next  one  or  two  years.  However,  the 
transition from analogue to digital technology will require 
the  replacement  of  the majority of the  receiving equipment 
of  the  cable  networks  and  direct-to-home  households.  This 
means  significant  investments  for  cable  operators  and 
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direct-to-home  households.  The  d~rect~-to-home  households 
would  at  least  have  to  invest  in  a  digital  decoder  which 
will  cost  betwe~n 300  and  500  Ecu.  For  that  reason  alone, 
practically all  companies  which  have  supplied  information 
to  the  Commission  agree  that  it will  take  several  years 
.before a  majority of the Nordic satellite TV  households will 
invest in the necessary equipment. According to the parties, 
it  is  generally  accepted  that  there  will  not  be  a  pure 
digital environment before the end of this century,  but  for 
quite a  long period both analqgue and digital transmissions 
will·  . exist  side  by  side.  Consequently,  in  this 
transitional period there will be double illumination of the 
TV  channels  in both digital  and  analogue  transmission  and, 
therefore,  a  need  for  more  capacity  than  before 
digitalization. 
102  Furthermore,  NSD  will still control the transponder capacity 
of  the  Nordic  satellites,.  and  it  is  not  evident  why 
digitalization would make it more attractive for a  potential 
new  supplier of  transponder  capacity to  supply  transponder 
capacity  directed  towards  the  Nordic  area.  It  seems  more 
reasonable  to  conclude  that  a  potential  supplier  of 
transponder  capacity  in  the  digital  environment  will  not 
supply  transponder  capacity  for  the  Nordic  area,  for  the 
sa~e reasons  as  expressed above. 
! 
103  Thk need for more channels for specialized pay-TV,  video-on-
demand,  etc.  could  mean  a  strong  demand  for  digital 
transmission  capacity.  Information  supplied  to  the 
Commission· indicates that cap·acity created by digitalization 
could easily be  absorbed by  introduction of  new  capacity-
intensive  products  such  as  video-on-demand  etc.  On  that 
,basis,  it must  be  assumed  that the  increase  in  transponder 
capacity  for  the  Nordic  area  due  to  the  introduction  of 
digital  technology will  be  absorbed by  NSD  itself. 
A.2.  Conclusion 
104  In  its  communication  of  10  June  1994  on  satellite 
communications relating to the provision of  - and access  to 
space  segment  capacity,  the  Commission  announced  its 
intention  to  use  the  competition  rules  to  remove  all 
national  restrictions  within  the  European  Union  on  access 
to  space  segments.  This  was  stressed  again  in  the 
Commission's  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament  and 
the  Council  on  the  status  and  implementation  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC  on  competition  in  the.  markets  for 
telecommunications  services  (COM(95)  113  final  of  4.4.95). 
In  particular,  former  dominant  positions  held  by  national 
incumbent  telecommunications  operators  as  a  result  of 
national  legislation  should  not  be  directly or  indirectly 
replaced by dominant positions held by private companies  as 
a  result of  commercial  agreements. 
105  NSD  will  through  the  operation acquire  a  dominant  position 
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on the market for satellite TV  transponder services suitable 
for  Nordic  viewers.  [ ...  ] Currently  Telenor  controls  all 
three  satel:lites  in  the  position  1  degree  West  and  the 
present leasing agreements with NSAB  {the· swedish satellite 
operator)  ensures  NSD  control of[  ...  [  the majority of the 
transponder  capacity  situated  on  5  degrees  East.  As  a 
result,  NSD  and  its  parents  will  control  all  ·Nordic 
transponders.  [ ...  ]  · 
106  Through its control over the transponder capacity,  the links 
to  Kinnevik  as  an  important  broadcaster  of  Nordic  TV 
channels and distributor of satellite TV  channels to direct-
to-home  households,  and through the links to the parents as 
cable  TV  operators,  NSD  will be  in a  position to  foreclose 
other  satellite  operators  from  leasing  transponder  to 
broadcasters. 
107  Even  if  Astra  and  Eutelsat  could  be  considered  actual 
competitors,  they  will  not  have  transponders  to  offer 
eventual broadcasters wishing to transmit channels to Nordic 
households.  Of  the  five  "Nordic"  transponders  on  Astra 
Kinnevik  controls  four  and  in this connection it has  to  be 
borne  in  mind  that  Kinnevik  has  stated  that  the  four 
transponders  will  not  be  offered  to  broadcasters ·with 
Nordic interests.  This will contribute to the strengthening 
of!NSD's dominance  and shows that it is the intention of the 
pafties to prevent Astra  from being a  competitor.  For these 
reasons it can be concluded that NSD  in the short term will 
dominate  the  market  for  transponders  sui  table  for 
transmitting  TV  signals  to Nordic viewers. 
108  In  the  medium  to  long  term  (1996  and  onwards)  it is  very 
unlikely  that  new  satellite  operators,  Astra  or  Eutelsat 
would  be  able  to challenge  NSD's  dominant position.  In  the 
next  two  to.three  years  there will  be  no  capacity  left on 
Astra and Eutelsat or on other satellites not controlled by 
NSD.  It will take even more  time before digitalization will 
have  an  impact  on  the  supply of  transponder  capacity~  The 
additional  capacity  becoming  available  through 
digitalization is likely to be absorbed by NSD.  Furtl:lermore, 
competition  within  NSD  -will  be  defined  by  NSD,  since  NSD 
will  be  able  to  determine  which  companies  will  broadcast 
through  NSD.  For  these  reasons  it is  likely that  NSD  even 
in  the  medium  to  long  term  will  be  able  to  maintain · its 
dominant  position on  this market. 
109  The above conclusions are reinforced by the existence of the 
rights of first refusal on  5°  East even if these .are not· to 
be considered ancillary and therefore to be assessed under 
Art.  85  of the Treaty. 
B  Operation of cable  TV  networks 
B.l.  Market structure 
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110  In  the  Nordic  area  about  4.2  million  of  10  million 
households  in  total  receive  cable  TV.  The  number  of  cable 
TV  connections is only expected to grow slowly in the coming 
years,  since  most  of  the  areas,  where  it is  economically 
sensible to lay cables have  by now been cabled.  Compared to 
other  European  countries  the  Nordic  cable  TV  sector  is 
characterized  by  physically  smaller  units,  where  each 
network  tends  to  have  re~atively few  connections.  However, 
a  few  large operators  with many  units control  about  80%  of 
all connections  in the Nordic  area. 
a)  Denmark 
111  Denmark  has  around  2, 3  million  households  of  which  1, 05 
·million  are  connected  to  cable  TV  networks  and  250  000 
households  connected to  SMATV  networks.  TD  Kabel  TV,  owned 
by  TD,  operates  the  largest ·  network  and  .supplies 
approximately  625  000  cable  TV  and  SMATV  households 
(approximate~y 50%  of all households  connected  to  cable  TV 
and  SMATV).  The  second  largest operator  is  Stofa  A/S  with 
around 110  000 households.  Stofa is controlled by Telia,  the 
Swedish  telecom operator.  Besides  these  two  operators  the 
market  consists  of  a  large  number  of aerial  associations . 
. 112  Until now it has not been possible to enter the Danish cable 
TVjmarket  with  full  scale operations  as  TD  has  had  a  legal 
monopoly.  on  the  ownership  of  commercial  cable  TV 
infrastructure and  the  transmission of  TV  signals by cable 
across  municipal  borders.  However,  according  to  a 
parliamentary  decision  from  April  1995  the  Danish 
legislation  on  telecommunication  and  cable  TV  activities 
will  be  liberalized  in  two  steps:  The  first  step  will  be 
implemented  1  July  1995,  and  the  second  step  will  be 
implemented  not  later  than  1  January  1998.  The 
implementation of step one means  that cable operators other 
than TD  will be allowed to own cable network infrastructure. 
However,  until the implementation of step two  TD  will retain 
the  exclusive  right  to  provide  the  infrastructure  for 
transmission  of  radio  and  TV  signals  as  well  as  other 
telecommunication services  across municipal  borders  ..  Third 
parties  will  get  the  right  to  make  use  of  TD's 
infrastructure on  a  leased line basis,  but will be  excluded 
from  offer~ng cross-municipal-border  transmission  in their 
own  infrastructure.  Denmark  is  made  up  of  275 
municipalities.  The  average population of a  municipality is 
19,000  inhabitants  · 
113  The  fact  that,  despite  the  liberalization,  undertakings 
o~her than TD  are denied the right to provide infrastructure 
for·transmission of  signals  across  municipal borders  means 
that  competitors  are  denied  the  economies  of  scale  from 
which  TD  currently benefits.  Furthermore  TD  will  be  in  a 
position where it will obtain knowledge· about  the strategic 
considerations of  their competitors,  since all offers  made 
by  the  competitors  of  TD  will  necessarily  involve  a 
contractual  relationship with  TD  regarding the use  of  TD's 
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infrastructure.  In  contrast,  TD  can  make  an  offer without 
being  forced  to  negotiate  the  terms  for  using  another 
company's  infrastructure. 
114  As  a  result of its legal  monopoly,  TD  has  obtained  a  very 
strong  position  on  the  Danish  cable  TV  market.  The 
implementation  of  step  one  will  remove  some  of  TD's 
exclusive  rights,  but  TD  will  still  have  some  legal 
protection  from  which it will  be  able  to  maintain or  even 
develop  its  position.  Although  the  legal  situation  is 
expected to change,  the heavy investment needed to build up 
a  cable network together with the dominant position already 
-held  by  TD  make  new  entry  unlikely.  The  proposed 
concentratiorrwill lead to a  strengthening of TD's  dominant 
position  (see  section  B.2-3  below). 
115  It should be  noted,  that Stofa A/S,  a  private Danish cable 
TV  operator,  has  filed  a  complaint  with  the  Commission 
concerning  Danish  legislation  on  cable  TV.  The  Commission 
has  questioned
4  the  Danish  Government  on  the points  raised 
by Stofa.  In particular,  the Commission has asked the Danish 
authorities  to  lift  the  current  provisions  prohibiting 
private  companies  from  owning  cable  TV  networks  and  to 
ensure that companies other than TD  are allowed to transmit 
si~nals across municipal  borders  in Denmark. 
J  b) l  Norway 
116  Norway ·has  around  1,9 million  households  of  which  565  000 
are  connected  to  cable  TV  and  120  000  are  connected  to 
SMATV.  There  are  three  large cable  TV  operators  that cover 
approximately  70%  of  all  households  connected  to  cable. 
Telenor Avidi,  owned  by  NT,  is  the  largest  cable  operator 
with  about  190  000  connections  (approximately  30%  of  all 
connections).  Janco Kabel-'"TV AS,  owned by Helsinki Media SA, 
has  about  22%  of all connections,  and Norkabel  AS  has_about 
20%  of all connections.  Norkabel is owned by TCI  and others. 
117  Retransmission of satellite television programmes by way  of 
cable networks does not require a  special license in-Norway. 
Cable TV  companies are legally obliged to carry the -national 
TV  stations  NRK  and  TV2.  The  Norwegian  legislation  also 
states  that  agreements  concerning  retransmission  of 
satellite broadcasts  shall  contain  a  clause  to  the  effect 
that  Norwegian  cable  networks  may  enter  the  agreement  on 
equal  terms.  · 
118  Although  NT  is  the  market  leader,  the  Norwegian  cable  TV 
market  consists  of  three  competitors  of  almost  equal. 
strength and  NT  probably does  not  have  a  domin~nt position 
at  present.  According  to  the  Norwegian  competition 
authority,  direct competition between cable TV  operators is 
Commission  letter 
Government. 
of  23.12.1994  to  the  Danish 
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to  a  large extent possible since about 2/3 of all cortnected 
households  have  the possibility of  choosing  an  alternative 
cable  TV  s-upplier.·  Furthermore,  the  Norwegian  cable  TV 
market  is  expected  to  grow  by  ·2-3%  per  year  and  the 
penetration is  expected  to  reach  a  level  of  40-50%  of  the 
total  amount  of households. 
c)  Sweden 
119  Sweden has around 3,9 million households of which around 1,9 
million are connected to cable TV  networks and approximately 
600  000  are  connected  to  SMATV  networks.  Svenska  Kabel-TV 
AB,  which  is  owned  by  Telia  AB  (the  former  public  telecom 
operator  which  has  been  privatised)  is  the  dominant 
operator.with· approximately 1,2 million connections  (about 
50%  of  all  connections).  The  parties  had  invited  Svenska 
Kabel  to participate in NSD  but negotiations  are  no  longer 
taking place.  Kinnevik  has  a  37.4%  interest  in  the  second 
largest cable operator Kabelvision AB  (TCI  has  the majority 
shareholding),  which  has  around  300  000  subscribers  (about 
18%  of all connections) .  Two  other companies  - Stjern-TV AB 
and Sweden-On-Line AB  have  each around  150  000  connections. 
The  Cable  Act  was  adopted  in  1992  and  has  removed  all 
important  legal barriers  to  entry. 
120  Kihnevik  has  a  37.4%  interest  in  Kabelvision  and  appoints 
o~  member of the board of directors of Kabelvision.  In 1993 
Kabelvision stopped distributing FilmNet's pay TV  channels, 
and  it .  was  only  after  intervention  of  the  Swedish 
competition  authorities  that  Kabelvision  recommenced 
distribution of FilmNet in 1994. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to  conclude· that  Kinnevik  has  an  important  influence  on 
Kabelvision's  commercial  policy.  In  any case  the  fact  that 
potential  competitors  will  have  to  take  into  account  the 
possibility  that  Kinnevik  ·may  be  able  to  influence  the 
commercial  strategy  of  Kabelvision  is  enough  to  influence 
the  actions  of competitors. 
d)  Finland 
121  Finland  has  around  1,9  million  households  of  which 
approximately 780  000 are connected to cable TV  networks and 
about  100  000  to  SMATV.  networks.  The  largest  cable  TV 
operator is Helsinki Television OY,  owned by Helsinki Media, 
with  about  190  000  connected households  (approximately  20% 
of all connections) .  The  second largest is Telecom Kabel-TV 
OY,  owned by the public telecom operator,  with approximately 
120  000  connections.  Four  smaller  companies  have  shares 
between  4%  and  6%  of all connections while  the  rest  (about 
40%  of  all  connections)  are  operated  by  many  small 
companies. 
122  The  parties  to· the  operation are  not  active  on  the  Finnish 
cable  TV  market.  However,  the  parties  in  vi  ted  th~  two 
largest cable TV  operators  - Helsinki Media,  which are also 
active  in  Norway  (Janko  Kabel  TV  with  about  22%  of  all 
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connections),  and  the  public  Finnish  telecom  operator,  to 
participate  in  the  joint  venture.  No  agreements  have  been 
reached  but~ it is still the  aim of the parties to  included 
the  two  Finnish cable  TV  operat9rs  in the  joint venture. 
B.2.  Impact of NSD  on  the cable  TV  market 
123  The  cable  TV  operators  questioned  by  the  Commission  have 
said that they would,  for competitive reasons,  have to carry . 
the  NSD  package  of programmes,  at least in Denmark,  Norway 
and  Sweden.  Due  to  the· dominant  position  of  NSD  on  the 
transponder  market,  this  will  give  NSD  a  strong  position 
towards  the  cable  TV  operators,  since  cable  TV  operators 
will  have  to  negotiate  with  NSD  to  obtain the  TV  channels 
from  on  NSD,  instead of  directly with broadcasters,  as  is 
the  case  today.  The  establishment  of  NSD  will  therefore 
lead to  an  i~portant change  in the negotiating position of 
cable  TV  operators. 
124  The  parties have  arg.ued  that the creation of  NSD  would  not 
prevent  the  independant  cable  operators  from  negotiating 
directly with Kinnevik  in order  to obtain the  TV3  channels 
and  Kinnevik's  other  channels  if. operators  do  not  want  to 
negotiate with  NSD.  It is true that  the  NSD  agreements  do 
not prevent  such  arrangements,  however,  it must  be  assumed 
th~t the parties interest is to promote Kinnevik's channels 
or/  a  NSD  package.  In  addition,  in  order  to  carry  the 
channels  of  which  NSD  will  most  likely obtain exclusivity 
(Eurosport  Nordic,  CNN  Nordic  and  MTV  Europe  and  probably 
more  since  it  is  the , intention  of  NSD  to  obtain  such 
exclusivity  arrangements)  independant  broadc~sters  would 
have  to  negotiate  with  NSD.  Thus,  it  seems  that 
negotiations  directly  with  NSD  in  order  to  carry  NSD' s 
package will be  the most  realistic choice  for  the majority 
of cable operators.  In principle,  a  cable TV  operator could 
get programs  from Astra;  or  other satellites not controlled 
by NSD  and in such a  case they would negotiate directly with 
broadcasters.  However,  only non-Nordic  languaged channels 
will  be  available  on Astra or other satellites. 
125  Furthermore,  the independent cable TV  operators in Denmark, 
Norway  and  Sweden  would have  to negotiate prices  and other 
terms  with  a  competitor  (this applies  also if the  cable  TV 
operators·negotiate directly with  Kinnevik  since  Kinnevik 
is  a  part  of  NSD)  .  This  is  also  the  case  in  areas  where 
households  have  a  choice  between  being  connected  to  cable 
TV  or  buying  a  private  dish,  since  NSD  will  control  the 
dire~t-to-home  market  as  well.  NSD  would  thus  be  in  a 
position  to  price-discriminate  or  impose  terms  on 
independent cable operators in favor of the cable operators 
owned  by  ·the  parents  or  in  favor  of  its  direct-to-home 
operations. 
126  It should be noted that several independent cable operators 
which have supplied information to the Commission have shown 
a  great  deal  of  concern  about  the  possibility  of 
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discrimination by  NSD  in order  to  favor its own  interests. 
However,  even  if  there  was  no  discrimination,  NSD  would 
still  be  able  to  exploit  its  position  on  the  ·cable  TV 
markets  due  to  its  dominant  position  on  the  transponder 
market. 
127  ·According  to  the ·parties,  in the-digital  environment it is 
the  intention  of  the  parties  to  develop  and  implement  a 
joint Nordic encryption system and a  joint Nordic head-end. 
NSD  will control the system and the head-end,  and have plans 
to  offer  transparent  transmission  of  its  package  of  TV 
channels and provision of SMS  and SAS  to cable TV  operators, 
including the parents'  own cable operators. According to the 
parties,  such  a  solution  could  be  economically  attractive 
to  many  cable  TV  operators,  since  they  could  eliminate  an 
encoding  and  decoding  system  in  each  head-end  and  thereby 
reduce c9sts significantly.  This is of particular relevance 
in  areas  with  many  smaller  cable  TV  networks,  as  in  the 
Nordic  countries.  Some  independent  cable  TV  operators  have 
hundreds  of head-ends  or more  and  needs  a  decoder  for  each 
channel  in  each  head-end,  with  current  technology. 
Undoubtedly,  many cable operators would be reluctant to give 
up  providing  the  SMS  themselves,  since  this  is  a  critical 
part ·of  most  cable  TV  operations  and  would  make  them 
dependent  on  NSD.  Considering  the  economic  benefits  for 
ca~le households,  ~nd the  fact  that  subscribers  connected 
to/  the  networks  will  not  notice  any  difference  if  NSD 
provides transparent transmission toget_her with SMS  and SAS, 
it would  be  difficult  for  a  smaller  cable  TV  operator  to 
reject  such  a  solution,  if it became  a  reality. 
128  Consequently,  if NSD  develops  and  implements  such  a  system 
in  the  digital  environment,  it  is  most  likely  that  the 
majority  of  households  connected  to  cable  networks  in  the 
Nordic  countries  will  receive  transparent  transmission  of 
signals  using  NSD' s  joint  Nordic  encryption  system.  The 
parties have  not  yet decided what  technology to be used and 
whether  the  encryption  system  will  be  open  or  closed. 
C6nsequently,  it  is  also  difficult  to  assess  the 
competitive  and  economic  aspects  of  transparent 
transmission.  However,  it  must  be  foreseen  that  by 
controlling  such  a  system  NSD  will  be  in  a  position  to 
strengthen its function as  a  "gate keeper"  for broadcasters 
wishing to get access  to Nordic cable networks.  It would be 
very  difficult  for· a  broadcaster  without  access  to  NSD's 
system for encryption to get access to cable networks should 
such  a  system be  developed. 
B.3.  Conclusion 
Denmark 
129  TD  controls  approximately  50  % of  the  cable  connections  in 
Denmark,  and  has  a  dominant  position  on  the  Danish  market 
due  to  the  legal  regime  there.  The  creation  of  NSD  will 
result  in  the  strengthening  of  T~'s  dominant  position 
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because 
i  N$D  will  be  able  to  discriminate  in  favour  of  TD 
when·otfering channels  to Danish cable operators. 
ii  NSD's  monopolist position as  regards provision of 
programming  will  mean  that  the  terms  offered  to 
cable operators  will  be  those  most  favourable  to 
TD,  rather than  to others. 
iii  Cable  operators  in competition  with  TD  will  have 
to negotiate with  TD  as  an  NSD  partner. 
This  situation is unlikely  to  ~hang~_ after  the  first  step 
of  liberalisation,  as  TD  will still retain many  advantages 
over its compet.itors  due  to its past legal  monopoly~ 
The  Wider  Nordic Area 
130  The parties control or influence about 25  % of the cable and 
SMATV  connections in Norway,  Sweden and Denmark.  Because of 
NSD's  dominance of the transponder market,  point i. to iii. 
above  will  apply  to  the  competitive  situation between  the 
parties' cable opertors in Norway and Sweden as much as they 
do,in  Denmark. 
\  . 
131  HoJever,  there  will  be  no  reinforcement  of  a  pre-existing 
dominant  position  on  these  markets  other  than  in  Denmark, 
and  because  of  the  relative  strength  of  competitors  in 
Norway  and Sweden it seems unlikely that dominant positions 
of  the  parties  in  Norway  and  Sweden  will  be  created  as  a 
result of  the operation. 
132 
C.  Distribution of satellite pay-TV and other encrypted  TV 
channels  to direct-to-home households 
C.l:  Market structure 
There  are  currently  th~ee  major  distributors  in  this 
market  :  FilmNet  (Multichoice),  Telenor  CTV  and Viasat.  To 
be  competitive  a  distributor  must  have  a  TV  channel  or 
package  of  TV  channels  on  his  smart  card  which  a 
considerable number  of  viewers  find attractive.  The  three 
companies  use  competing  smart  cards  with  different  TV 
channels  : 
FilmNet's  card contains  its own  pay-TV  channel  FilmNet 
Plus,  The  Complete Movie Channel  and BBC.  In Denmark  the 
card  only·  contains  FilmNet  Plus  and/or  FilmNet  The 
Complete  Movie  Channel; 
Telenor  CTV  markets  the  CTV  card  which  includes  MTV, 
Eurosport  Nordic,  Discovery,  Children's  Channels,  CNN 
and  FilmNet  The  Complete  Movie  Channel ..  In  Sweden  (and 
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planned  for  Denmark)  the  card  also  includes  FilmNet 
Plus; 
The Viasat card includes  TV3  (TV3  Denmark,  TV3  Sweden or 
TV3  Norway and its own  pay-TV channels  TV  1000,  Film Max 
and  TV  1000  Cinema. 
According to the parties,  by March  1995 Viasat,  FilmNet  and 
Telenor  CTV·provided  the  following  numbers  of  smart  cards 
in the Nordic  countries: 
Denmark  Number  of Cards  sold 
Vias at  148  000 
FilmNet  30  000 
Telenor  CTV  4  000 
Norway 
Vias  at  122  000 
FilmNet  30  000 
Te~enor CTV  31  000 
f 
Sweden 
Vias at  272  000 
FilmNet  50  000 
Telerior  CTV  29  000 
Finland 
Viasat  0 
FilmNet  5  000 
Telenor  CTV  11  000 
Nordic Total  Number  of Cards  sold 
Viasat  542  000 
FilmN·et  115  000 
Telenor  CTV  75  000 
133  Measured  in  numbers  of  smart  cards  sold,  Viasat  as  a 
distribution  company  has  a  very  strong  position  on  this 
market.  It  can  be  noted,  that  according  to  the 
FilmNet/Telenor agreement  (see below)  Telenor's CTV  package 
will be available also on  FilmNet's smart card.  However,  it 
has  to be  borne  in mind that Viasat's smart cards will also 
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contain  the  CTV  package  and  include  Kinnevik's  channels, 
which will be sold exclusively·by Viasat.  On  that basis,  it 
can be  concluded that  the operation will create  a  dominant 
position of Viasat·on this market.  In this connection it has 
to be borne in mind that it is the intention of the parties 
to merge  the activities of Telenor  CTV  into Viasat. 
134  The  FilmNet/Telenor agreement  :  FilmNet  is currently being 
broadcasted  from  the  Thor  satellite.  FilmNet's  lease  of  a 
transponder  on  the  Thor  satellite  and  its  distribution 
company Multichoice's distribution of Telenor's CTV  package 
in  Sweden  is  based  on  an  agreement  with  Telenor  AS  dated 
October  1992.  FilmNet  saw  the  NSD  operation as  a  threat  to 
its  interest  as  a  distibutor  of  pay-TV  in  the  Nordic 
countries  and  has  filed  a  complaint  with  the  Commission 
concerning the proposed operation. In addition, Nethold  (the 
owner of FilmNet and Mul.tichoice}  has initiated arbitration 
against Telenor for alleged breaches of the above mentioned 
agreement.  In  december  1994  the  Norwegian  Court  granted 
an·  injunction  against  Telenor  by  which  Telenor,  among 
others,  was  forbidden  to  implement ·the  agreement  with  the 
Viasat  companies  by  which  Viasat  could  sell  Telenor's  CTV 
package.  The  Court  decision  would  have  blocked  the  NSD 
operation and made it necessary for the parties to negotiate 
a  ~ettlement with Nethold.  By  an  agreement  between Nethold 
an~ Telenor dated  29  March  1995  Telenor grants Nethold  an 
op_l:ion  to  lease  one  more  transponder  on  1  degree  West. 
Telenor' s  CTV  package  will  also  be  available  on 
Multichoice's  smartcard.  The  agreement only deals with the 
broadcasting  of  channels  in  the  analogue  format.  However, 
accordin~ to  the  agreement,  the  parties  will  establish  a 
joint  working  party  to  investigate  co-operation  on  the 
introduction of digital services. 
C.2  Foreclosure effects on the market for distribution 
of  TV  channels  due  to the NSD  operation 
135  The  NSD  operation  will  foreclose  competitors  from  this 
market  because  : 
(i)  By  its control of Nordic  transponder capacity and 
its link to Kinnevik as a  broadcaster,  NSD  will be 
the  dominant·  provider  ·of  TV  channels  to  Nordic 
viewers. 
(ii)  As  discussed above  (see points_123-128),  NSD  will, 
to  a  large  extent,  control  access  to  the. Nordic 
cable  sector,  by  means  of  its parental  links  to 
cable operators. 
For these reasons,  there would be very little room  for a  new 
distributor  in the  Nordic market.  It is thus  unlikely that 
a  potential  competitor  would  be  able  to  establish  a 
distribution business able to compete with NSD  in the Nordic 
area. 
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153  .The  dominant  position of  NSD  in transponders  would provide 
NSD  with  a  "gate  keeper"  function  in  the  supply  of  TV 
channels  to~the Nordic  area.  Kinnevik will  thereby be  able 
to  influence  which  channels  will  be  allowed  to  broadcast 
advertising financed  TV  channels to the Nordic area,  and in 
what  form·. 
154  The  vertical integration of NSD  means  that the positions of 
the  parties  in  various  markets  reinforces  each  other. 
Particularly it should  be  noted  that  the  positions  of  the 
parties  in  the  down  stream markets  (cable  TV  networks  and 
distribution  reinforces .  the  dominant  position  on 
transponders  by  deterring  potential  competitors  from 
broadcasting  from other transponders  to  the Nordic  area. 
155  Apart  from  the  three  markets  analysed  in  the  decision  the· 
Commission qas investigated the four other businesses - pay-
TV,  other  commercial  TV  channels,  up-link  services  and 
provision of encryption  systems  - in w~ich the parties are 
active.  The  Commission  has  found  that,  as  to  these 
activities,  the parties will not obtain a  dominant position 
due  to  the  operation. 
156  On  the basis of the  above  considerations,  it is considered 
that  the  proposed  merger  would  lead  to  the  creation  or 
sttengthening of dominant positions through which effective 
cq~petition in a  substantial part of the Community would be 
significantly  hindered.  The  concentration  is,  therefore, 
pursuant  to  Article  2 (3)  of  the  Merger  Regulation  and 
Article  57  of the EEA Agreement,  declared incompatible with 
the  common  market  and  with  the  functioning  of  the  EEA 
agreement. 
For  the  Commission 
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Nordic  region. 
147  The  Commiss1on  recognizes  the  long  term  economic  benefits 
of having an integrated system for transmission of satellite 
TV.  However,  as  stated by  the parties,  the  system has  not 
been  developed  yet  and  it is  not  possible  to  say  when  it 
will  be  developed  and  implemented.  Furthermore,  the 
decision  as  to  the  technology  to  be  used  and  the  decision 
as  to  whether  such  an  encryption system shall be  closed or 
open  has  not been  taken.  According to  the parties,  such  a 
decision  will,  among  others·,  be  based  on  the  competitive 
situation.  Thu~,  it is  impossible  to assess  to  what  degree 
NSD' s  plans  for  a  joint  Nordic  encryption  system  would 
enable·  NSD  to  exclude  broadcasters  from  transmitting  TV 
channels to Nordic viewers.  A closed encryption system could 
make the new infrastructure highly anticompetitive. The  same 
applies to an open system if the system becomes dominant and 
third parties cannot get access to such a  system.  According 
to  the  parties  whethe~ NSD  will  be  willing  to  licence  the 
rights  to  a  new  standard  to  third  parties  has  not  been 
d~cided. 
148  The  Commission  takes  the  view  that  an  infrastructure  as 
described  by  the  parties  could  be  highly  efficient  and 
bepeficial  to  consumers.  However,  it  must  be  an  open 
in/rastructure  accessible  for  all  interested  parties.  In 
paTticular  the  Commission  takes  the  view  that  the 
participation of  such  a  strong broadcaster  as  Kinnevik  in 
NSD  means  that  there  is  a  high  risk that  this will  not  be 
case.  Therefore,  it is likely that the  operation will  lead 
to less variety in the offer to Nordic  TV  households  in the 
future.  Furthermore,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Commission  the 
vertically integrated  nature  of  the  proposed  operation  is 
not  necessary  in  order  to  create  such  an  integrated 
infrastructure. 
149  Consequently,  the  reference  to  the  technical  and  economic 
progress in Article 2(1) (b)  of the Merger Regulation cannot 
be  taken  into  account. 
[ ...  ] 
E.  Conclusion 
150  As  a  result of  the  operation,  NSD  will  acquire ·a  dominant 
position on the market for satellite TV  transponder services 
suitable  for  Nordic  viewers  both  in  the  short  term  and  in 
the  medium  to  long  term. 
151  NSD' s  dominant  position  on  transponders  would  strengthen 
TO's  dominant  position on  the  cable  TV  market  in  Denmark. 
152  Viasat  will  obtain  a  dominant  position  on  the  market  for 
distribution  of  pay-TV  and  other  encrypted  channels  to 
direct-to-home  households  as  a  result of  the operation. 
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D.  Economic  and  technical progress 
142  According  to  the  parties  NSD  will  lead  to  economic  and 
technical progress.  In the short to medium-term the creation 
of  a  "Nordic  Hotbird"  will  thus  give  an  improved 
distribution of satellite  TV  in-the  Nordic  region,  and  in 
the  long  term,  after  digitalization,  NSD  will  make 
substantial rationalizations possible for cable TV  operators 
and  SMATV  networks  to  the benefit of  the  consumers. 
143  However,  the  establishment  of  NSD  will .not  in the  shor.t  to 
medium  term  lead  to  an  improved  distribution of satellite 
TV  to  the  Nordic  region,  since  NSD  does  not  add  any  new 
transponder  capacity. ~onsequently the  number  of satellite 
TV  channels offered to Nordic viewers in the short term will 
not be affected by the operation.  The-Commission recognizes 
th~t it is necessaiy for  a  satellite operator to be able to 
promote  its  satellite  position,  but  in  view  of  the 
Commission  the vertical integration of the operation is not 
necessary in order to do  so.  Rather the operation is likely 
to  affect  how  available  transponder  capacity  is  allocated 
to broadcasters. 
144  In,  the  long  term,  with  the  introduction  of  digital 
te~hnology, the parties wil+ use NSD  to create an integrated 
in.frastructure  for  the  distribution  of  satellite  TV  and 
other related services. 
145  According  to  the parties,  i~ the digital  environment it is 
the intention to develop and implement a  joint Nordic system 
for encryption to be used for  the direct-to-home,  SMATV  and 
cable  TV  market.  This  implies  that  the  individual  TV 
households  will  only  need  one  decoder  box  irrespectively 
whether  they  receive  the  signals  from  cable  or  via  a 
satellite  dish  antenna.  This  means  that  the  SMS  and  SAS 
systems  of  DTH,  SMATV,  and  cable  TV  networks  can  be 
integrated.  Furthermore,  cable  TV  networks  could  have 
considerable cost savings by not having to decode and encode 
signals in each of their head-ends. According to the.parties 
the system will allow independent cable-TV operators to use 
NSD  as  a  supplier and at the  same .time still be  able to  run 
their own  SMS  systems.  Furthermore,  the system will provide 
SMATV  networks with improved possibilities for reception of 
pay-TV  and  even  allow  them  to  run  their  own  SMS~  which  is 
.basically not-possible  today. 
146  Because  of  NSD's  dominant  position  as  provider  of  TV 
channels from Nordic transponders it is most likely that the 
majority of direct-to-home households  and independent cable 
operators  in  the  Nordic  countries will  be  forced  to  use  an 
encryption  system  used  by  NSD.  Broadcasters  who  want  to 
target  Nordic  viewers  will  have  to  lease  NSD' s  system. 
Thus,  if the plans  are  carried through,  NSD's  joint Nordic 
encryption  system  wo.uld  become  the  dominant  system  in  the 
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136  The  parties  claim  that  the  NSD  agreement  allows  an 
·independent  broadcaster  to  lease  a  transponder  from  NSD 
without  having  to  make·  distribution  agreements  with  the 
parent's distribution companies.  Such  a  broadcaster would 
be  free  to  enter  into  agreements  with  other distributors. 
The  parties  find  that  the  intention  of  such  a  policy  i$ 
confirmed by the above mentioned new agreement with FilrnNet. 
137  However,  such a  broadcaster would have  to make  an agreement 
with  NSD  which  is jointly controlled by Kinnevik.  Kinnevik 
could  thereby  influence  the  price  and  terms  for  the  lease 
contract  and  Viasat  would  be  able ·to  obtain  information 
about  such  a  potential competitor. 
138  Furthermore,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  NSD  will  lease 
transponders  to  broadcasters  without  making  the  lease 
dependent  on  a  distribution  agreement  between  the 
broadcaster and Kinnevik's distribution company.  It is clear 
from  information made  available by  the  par~ies that  NSD's 
transponders  first  and  foremost  are  a  means  to  develop  a 
Nordic  satellite  TV  distribution  system.  To  lease 
transponders  to  broadcasters  who  do  not  want  to  be 
distributed  by  NSD  would  counteract  the  purpose  of  the 
operation.  Furthermore,  in a  period with shortage of supply 
of.  transponders  it  is  not · necessary  for  NSD  to  lease 
trtnsponders  to  such  broadcasters.  The  attempt  of  the 
parties  to  confirm its "open"  lease-policy by  referring  to 
the  new  agreement  with  FilrnNet  is  not  convincing:  The 
FilmNet agreement is the outcome of a  negotiated settlement. 
Through a  court decision in Norway  FilmNet blocked parts of 
the  NSD  operation and it was  necessary for Telenor to  reach 
a  settlement with Filmnet.  Before the court decision it was 
not  the intention of the parties to reach such a  settlement 
with  FilmNet.  · 
C.3  Conclusions 
139  The  foreclosure  effect  of  the  operation  as  regards  new 
entrants  to  this  market  will  mean  that  the  only  likely 
competitors  in this market  will be Viasat  and  FilmNet. 
140  The  agreement between  FilrnNet  and Telenor allows  FilmNet  to 
sell  the  CTV  package  provided  by  NSD  and  to  continue  to 
market  its own  smartcards  and  therefore  to control  the  SAS 
and  SMS.  The  agreement,  therefore,  apparently  permits 
FilmNet  to continue to be  an  important player in the market 
for  distribution  of  TV  channels  to  direct-to-home 
households.  However Viasat will strengthen 'its position on 
the  distribution market  through  the  attractive  package  of 
channels it will put on the market,  and this will undermine 
FilmNet's position as  a  significant player  in this market. 
141  It  can  therefore  be  concluded  that  Viasat  will  obtain  a 
dominant  position  on·  this  market  as  a  result  of  the 
operation. 
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1· PUBLIC VBR$ION 
MERGER PROCEDURE . 
ARTIC~E  ·6(l)(b  )D~CISION 
To .the notifying parties, 
Dear Sirs, 
Subject : Case N  •. IViM.618 - CABLE AND WIRELESSNEBA 
Notifi~tion of a  concentration ·pursuant to ·Article 4 .of Council  Regulation  No 
4064/89  .. 
1.  The above  operation  concerns  the  formation ·  of· two jointly  controlled  companies  : 
I 
VEBACOM and Cable. &  Wireless (Europe) to  offe~ telecommunications services in 
Germ~y and  the EU (plus  Switzerland  but excluding  the  UK)  respectively.  After 
examination of  the notification, the Commission has conciuded that the notified operation 
falls within .the scope of the .Merger Regulation and that it does not raise serious doubts 
. as  t~ its compatibility ~th  the cc;>mmon market..  · 
THE PARTIES 
. 2.  Cable  and  Wireless  pic  (C&W).is an  international  provider of telecommunications 
services with activities in Asia, the Caribbean, Burop·e, · the. United States,  Japan,  the 
Middle East and Africa.  Its European activities are centred in the UK with its majority 
interest in Mercury CommuniCations, ·the second telecommunications.operator following 
liberalisation,of services in the UK.  C&W also has a worldwide strategic alliance called 
the C&W Federation. The C&W Federation is an umbrella organisation which provides 
the participants with .the opportunity to co-operate by  making facilities available and 
o.ffering joint services to multinational corporate clients. 
3.  VEBA AG is a· German holding company for subsidiaries with activities in electricity, 
chemicals,  oil,  trade,  transport  and .  se.Vices  and  telecommunications.  Its  existing 
telecommunications  interests  are  consolidated  in  VEBA  Telecom.  VE~A holds  a 
shareholding of 10.5% in C&W and is a m~mber of  ~e  C&W._~ederation  .. 
·Rue de Ia Lol200  - 8~1049  Brussels  - Belgium 
· Telephone: exchange (+32-2)299.11.11 
!elex: COMEU B 218n •  Telegraphic address: COMEUR ·Brussels 
..  ,· 
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ll·  .. _THE OPERATION 
4.  'The  operation  :consists  ~f the  fonnatiQn  of twQ  joint  ventures  Jn  Europe;  in  the·  .. 
telecommunications · sector.  The  first,  VEBACOM,  will  comprise  all  ·the  parties' · 
telecommunications  .  interests  in  .  Germany  (except. . for  ··certain  'dedicated 
telecommuni~tions  a~vities carrie4 out by and for other VEBA AG ooinpanie8).  The 
second,  Cable  & ·Wireless Europe. (CWB),  will  be  ~lished in Belgium  and  ~II  · 
contain substantially all  the _·parties' activities· in Europe other than in .Gennany· or the· 
· Ul(.  C&W  will  ·-keep  ~ercury .Communications  and. 'ihe  PCN  operator Mercury 
One20n~  O':JtSide the join~  v~ture8: 
5.  l)oth  partf~ hav~ acti~ities .in  P<:;N  networ~s i~ Europe.  C&W  has  a 50%  stake  in 
Mercury One20ne in the UK; a 20% $take in Bouygues -Telecom  in· France and a 5% 
stake in Mannesniann Mobilfunk·GmbH in Germany.  YBBA.has a 28.375% stake in 
E-Pius in Germany and a 1  S% stake in Bouygues Telecom.  The E-Plus stake  wil~ be 
transferred from  VEBA to VEBACOM at closing.  The two parents' stakes· in Bouygues 
TeleCom  will  be  managed  by  CWE  f.or  12  months  after  which  time  they  will  be 
transferred to C.WE or the new joint venture outlined below.  C&W has undeqaken, •t 
the request of VEBA to either dispose of or waive its rights .in Mannesmann.Mobilfunk 
(except those relating to diyidends).  The C&W stake in Merct!ry-9ne20ne will remain  · 
outside the joint venture.  ·  ·  ·  · 
· 6.  The interests 1n the SWiss cable TV acti_vity, Cablecom and the French paging business 
Infomobile will be transferred to CWE toll owing the consent of the other shareholders. 
In the meanwhile, the _stakes will  b·e  m~naged by  VEBACOM and CWE respectively. 
The transfer of shares. in the relevant C&W· subsidiaries will be completed within three 
months of dosing.··  C&W also  h&S··a -holding  in  Tele 2 (the Swedish PSTN operator) 
which may also be he'd for a short period before being transferred to the JV.  CWE will 
also manage the two parentS' stakes in Bouygues Telecom (C&W- 20%, VEBA_  - IS%). 
m  CONCENTRATION · 
Joint control 
7.  The shares in VEBACOM will  be held  55% by VEBA (through  VEBA Telecom) and 
45% by C&W.  VEBA -will haye .the management lead .in VEBACOM.  VEBACOM will 
have  four  lev~ls ·  of  corporate  governance:  Shareholders'  Meeting,.  Shareholders' 
Committee, Supervi-sory Board and Management Boord.  Day to day matters wilt ·be dealt · 
with at the latter.level.  Strategic decisions will be taken in the Shareholders' Committee 
and will require unanimity for inter alia future budgets and business plans following the 
expiry  of the  start  up  ~usiness plan  for  1995/97  and  the  budget  for  1995,  c&Rital 
~xpenditure of over  DM  50  mi11ion  and  the  entering  into  of any  interconnection 
agreement over DM  1.0 million.  · 
Accordingly,  VEBACOM will be jointly controlled by C&W and Veba. 
8.  The shares in CWE·will be held 50% each by C&W and Veba.  Day to day management 
of CWE will  be· delegated to a management committee which  ·~II  consis~ of at least 
three people and will be lead by C&W.  This committee will  manage CWE's affairs'in 
accordance with its bu~iness plan· and budget. 
CWE's board of  directors wi11 manage the companies' ordinary  ~ctivities :and wiil consist 
.. ·) 
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· of  no fewer t~an eight directors, four from ea~h parent.  Othe.r direCtors can be  ~ppointed 
with the agreement· of  both sharehold~rs. ··The .initial business plan (1995/97) and b~dg~t 
.-have been agreed by C& W and y  eba.  A revise.d business plan (1995/99) may be· agreed 
·.  pre-completion.  All  future  business  plans and  budgets will  require the  unanimous 
approval  of CWE's board of directorS  as  well  as ·decisions on capital  expendi~re in  · 
. excess of DM 50 million and .appliCations for licences from  regulatory authorities. ·  .  .  .  .  . .  . 
Aceordi~gly, ~WE  will  ~ejoi~.tlr cOntrolled by .C&W and .VEBA. 
. Autonomous full (unction entity 
The.activities of  the parent companies in the al~ocated.  territ~ry will be taken over by the 
joint v~ture  ...  VEBA's 'tel~m~unications interests in Germany will be taken: over ·by 
VEBACOM.  C&W will  transfer activities in the relevant territories· to CWB.  Both 
companies' telecommunications businesses in the territories of  the joint ventures will be 
contributed to the joint ventures together with their respective staff.  Therefore, the two 
joint ventures ~re autonomous entities on a lasting basis.  ' 
Absence of  co-or~ination of comJ)etitive behaviour 
(a)  Withdrawal ~tVEBA  from the market  .. 
10.  By the operation, VEBA will transfer all of  its principal activities in telecommunications 
into the joint ventures.  It  will~ however,  retain  certain  marginal  activities which are 
integrated into their subsidiaries which operate in other (non-telec.ommunications) sectors. 
These ·include  the  internal  telecommunications  activities  of the  VEBA  subsidiary 
companies  (for  example  the  remote  measurement of heat  consumption  by  energy 
companies via telecommunications networks) which are incidental to those companies' 
activities.  ·They do not undennine VEBA's withdrawal  from  the telecommunications 
market. 
YEBA's has a non-contr~Uing stake (10  .. 5%) in C&W and a standstill agreement has been 
signed  by  which  VEBA undertakes not to  increase  it any· further.  VEBA  has  one 
member of the board of c&yv by invitation of C&W. 
Accordingly, ·VEB.A doos not-exercise any control over C&W and therefore it cannot b~ 
· considered to retain ·any presence in telecommunications activities other than through the , 
'joint venl1:Jre. 
(b)  No likelihood of the re-entry of  parent.compa~ies into the markets of the joint 
·  venture 
II.  As both C&W and VEBA will  put all  their telecommunications activities (with certain 
minor exceptions as set out above) in the allocated territories into the joint ventures, it 
is not economi~lly feasible for· the parents to re  .. enter the market in competition with 
either of the joint ventures  ..  T~is is particularly true for C&W which  would,  outside 
VEBACOM, lack the local  knowledge for ·a successful  entry into the German market 
alone.  This withdrawal from the market is confinned by the non:.compete clause in the . 
-VEBACOM  agreement  which  excludes  the  possibility  of a  separate· entry  into  th~ 
German market by C&W with any.  other German partner. 
In respect of PSTN networks, certain activities in which VEBACOM: is expected to be 
active, may involve the use ~f  telecomm~nications infrastructure which belongs to the  . 
• 
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VEBA subsidif!Y Pr~ssenEiektra. According to the agreement; ~A  ha8 specified that 
it will  offer to VEI!ACOM use of that network on at le8st o~  market ann's 1~  . 
t~nns  which it Qtfers to third parties  .. The right ofVEBACQM ~  ~se  the nenyo~  cannot 
be of an  exclusive. natUre: since YEBA is obliged to offer use Qf the  ~reussenBI~ktra: 
network to thii'd  par:ties  by draft Gennan  l~slation which·· -will  _impl~eilt the Open 
Nenyork Provision direCtive (90/l87/CE). Howeyer, this provi$ion orily  appll~  io:~:fd. 
party access an~ not to the possibility of  VBBA offering telecommunications s~rVices in .  · 
competition  to:'VBBACOA_{.  Through  the  alliance  'Yi~ C&w,  ~ACOM  .shail 
financially  and  technologically  be  put into the  position· to compete  i._  ~cei  with 
Deutsche TelelcQ~ and other suppliers from 1998 onwards.·AJso; VEBA wiil transfer to 
VEBACOM both the· shareholding and any rightS in respect of  the. proposed joint ventUre 
with  D~Jt~  Bahn to establish a fi~re optic network.  A re-entty. of VEBA into the 
~~et  is therefore  ec(~ally very unlikely.  ·  · 
The VEBACOM agr~ment  contains.~.very  limii~ exception to the non-compete clause 
which allows for the possibility-of ftn.ancial investments by one of the parents alone .if 
·and only if they ~ot  a~ee  within VEBACOM.  · 
·  For these reasons there is no likelihood of the parent companies re-entering t~  market 
of either of the j<;>int venture companies. · · 
(c)  Conclusion on absence of co-o~dination 
12.  In  the  light  of the  above  information,  there  are  no  grounds  to  cons~der that  the 
establishment and operation.ofCWE or VEBACOM will lead to the co-ordina~on of  the 
competitive behaviour of  independent undertakings, falling within the meaning of  Article : 
3(2) second sub-paragraph of the Merger Regulation.  ·  · 
Conclusion 
13.  Thus, the notified operation Constitutes a concentnition within the terms of Article 3 of 
the _Merger Regulation  · · 
IV  CO~  PIMENSION . 
14.  C&W has a worldwide turnover of 6,615 million ECU in the last financial year whilst. 
VEijA has a worldwide tumover·of36,915 million  .. ~CU. C&W.has a tUrnover of2,219 
million ECU in the EU whilst Veba's EU turnover is 30,927 mitl~on ECU.  C&W makes 
over two-thirds of its EU tUrnover in the United Kingdom  whilst VEBA makes more 
than two-thirds of its EU turnover in Germany.  ·  ·  · 
15.  A~rdingly, the  concentration  has  a  Community  dimension  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 1 of the Merger Regulation. 
V  COMPATIBILITY WITH THE COMMON MARKET 
Market definitions 
16.  VEBACOM and CWE will be active in the following fields:  national and international 
fixed terrestrial teiephone networks, satellite telecoms services,  mobile PCN networks, 
_paging,  cable TV,  corporate networks,  managed  bandWidth  and ·value-added services. 
... •  . 
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and  also  signi.ficant ·actual  (eg  Del:ltsche  Telekom)  and  potential  (eg  the  emerging 
alliances mentioned below)  co~petitors are pr~t..  ,  ..  .  ' 
17.  ·There is no overlap betWeen  Veba'.~ and C&W's activities for national and jnteffiational 
terrestrial networks since for the· time bein8,' VEBA does. not operate ·those nenyorks for : 
.third parties  ... The optic cable system ofPreussenEie~  a subsidiary ofVEBA, cu.rrendy 
Qnly serves its ·in~mal .telecoms us.e, and  th~ proposed joint ventUre: between VEDA and 
Deutsche Bahn AG conce111ing ·the. installation of  fibre-optic .links alongside railway lines 
in  Germany  ~th regard. to  deregulation  in' l99~.  would. be  establis~ed  througb 
VEBACOM.  Fu~errnore,. ·  VEBA  has  no  activities·  i~  manaaM  bandwidth  .and-
interm~tioital voice access nor-is C&W.aCtive in· satellite telecoms serVices. 
18.  Mobil~leph~ne  networ~s. form  a distinct market from  fixed telephony markets.  ~ 
n,tworks,  in  particular,  have  some  charaCteristics  which  even  distinguish  them  from 
· GSM mobile networks.  PCN ("Personal Communication network") and GSM ("Global 
System for Mobile communication  .. ) operate on diff~rent  freql:lericies (900 MHz  fQr GSM 
and  1710-1880  ·MHz  for  PCN).  A  PCN  network  requires  a  denser· system· of 
transmitters  and  rather  aims  at .local  or regional  users.  .In  the  UK,  PCN  phones  are 
primrujly .~sed by. ~o~estic and small-trade users.  A PCN phone can, ful'tl\,..ermore,  not 
log into a GSM network at present.  PCN netWorks which are also licen~ea on a national 
.basis are .altogether younger·than GS~  network.s and the system infrastructure is ·still in 
the  developing  stage (see for example E-Pius  as  Compared  to  the  Dl and  D2  GSM 
networks in  Germany).  International  roaming agreements do  not yet exist,  and  even 
. t:~ational  coverage· is  not  yet  re~ched 'for  PCN  in  any  Member  State.  Due  to these 
·characteristics of PCN, there are strong· indications that PCN fonns  ~ separate product 
market which  i"s ·.different from  QSM and has to be considered as a national  market. 
19.  However,  the  precise market definition  can  be  left open  as,  even  o~ the  basis of the 
narrowest market definition, the concentration  ~aises no competition problem. 
20.  Mobile  radio  paging  systems  represent  a  separate  product  market  which  has  to be 
considered on a national basis due to national  regulatory  systems and  marketing  on a 
nationai  level.  ·  · 
21.  The markets for cable TY networks are equally national  in scope (see  Commission's· .. · 
decision of 19.7.1995, IV/M.490  -:-Nordic Satellite Distribution, no.  73). 
22.  Corporate networks exist for data transmission and for voice transmission between large 
closed user groups. The· co_ncentration involves daia network services which are provided 
on  a  national  or  international  level  accQrding  to. the  needs  required  by  corp9f8te 
customers. 
23.  YaJue-added services comprise a wide raAge of electronic communication applications 
· which are tailored to the needs of  customers. They may include messaging services (ED  I, 
~-mail, E-fax,  multi-messa,aina),  in-fliaht  telephony  or  aceeas  to  4atlbaea.  ID  the 
absence  of regulatory  or technical  barriers,  this marbt is EEA-wide,  if not  a.wortd 
market. 
24.  In  conclusion,  given  the abtence of any  compedtion  problems  in  any  (X·tbe poalble 
market segments  aft'~e<l.by the ~ation  (u .a  out above), there ia no ..S  to deft.-e 
either product or posraphic nwtets preci.ty. 
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25. 
.  6 
Assessment· 
Apart from the. above-mentioned markets where either of  the parent Companies has not 
· been active up to ~ow, the ar~  of_paging and ¢able IV  involv~ orily activities: ~n  the 
·side ofVEBA, w~ch  will be transferreCl ·to th~  JVs: ·a.4~%  -IntereSt. of  VBBA.in.Miniruf 
~GmbH  in  Germany  ·an~ a  i  00.4»  stake ·in· Iitfomobile  SA:  'i~ f~ce.  (botJt  in paging). 
CJt_W'  s paging. aCtivities  in  the UK·· will,  in·. any  case,  rem~n outside the  operation. 
VEBA · will  transfer  two · cable  Ty  bu~inesses;.  T~le  Co~umbus  -~ ·eoncepta 
Kommunibtions und Gebiudetechnik GnibH,, as well as a Swiss subsidiary (Cableoom) 
. into VEBACOM while C&W'  s·cable TV interest in the UK will remain separate.  In the 
. absence of.any overlap, rom petition  concern~.  do not arise.  In particular, ·VEBA copld 
not  ~e sren u·-a potentia!  entrant in the- UK in both· markets .which are det~~in~ by. 
licence·requirem.ents and-strong aCtual  competitors {BT Mobile, Vodapage, Hutchinson 
in paging; and. regional cable TV operators).  ' · 
' 
26.  As to corporate networJcs and yalue-added services,  VE~A  has a control_ling interest in 
Meganet,  which ·operates· a  dat~ network primarily for ·customers of the financial  and 
services  sector  in  ~rlnany, .and  in  LION  which  proyi.des.  different_  communicationr 
solutions. Apart from  its business in· the .UK, C&W is active in- Germany· only  as far as 
Germany-based multinational companies or the ."German end" of in.ternationat networks 
are concerned.  Sin~e  ~ number of  significant suppliers such as national telecom operators 
(e.g.  ~eutsche  Telekom), telecoms. and computing service providers (ffiM, EDI etc.) and 
a  growing  number  of ·recently  created  or  proposed  allia~ces  (e.g.  BTNiag. 
RWE/Generale des Eaux) are already active or will offer those ·services in these fields, 
the proposed ro,ncentration does not raise a competition problem. 
21:  Finally, both parent companies have interests in PCN networks which will, apart from 
C&W's UK  activities C'·On·e20ne"),  be part of the JVs'  businesses~ VEBACOM has  a 
28.375% st*e in  E-Pius  in  Germany,  and  both. have  interests  in  Bouygues Telecom, 
currently ·the only operator of PCN in.France (C&W 20%, VEBA  15  %). The parties 
might at a later stage  put  all  these  interests  together in  another joint  .. venture  as  it is 
foreseen  in  a non-binding Memorandum  of Understanding.  At  present,  E-Plus will  be 
. part of VEBACOM, and the two stakes in Bouygues  will~ as set out above, be managed  · 
hy  CWE  iuitil  the ·final  transfer  of' the  shares  within  12  months  time  pr~vided the 
agreement  of the  other  Bouygues  shareholders  has  been  secured.  The  three  PCN 
networks in which. the parties or the N s are  invol~e$1  op~rate in different member states. 
This would, on th~ assumption of  national markets, exclude any .overlap in rnark~t shares. 
On a European wide market for PCN and GSM combined, the market shares of  the two 
parties taken together would be well  below 10%.  · 
28.  As  a result,  the creation of VEBACOM and ·ewE will  not  lead  to  the creation or  'the 
strengthening Qf a dominant position in .any  market. 
VI  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
29.  In  each'of the Shareholders' Agreements,  C&W _and. VEBA each undertake to procure 
that none of their respective group  companies will -compete with  the two JVs.  These 
non-compete  covenants  are  necessary  to  reflect  the· lasting  withdrawat· of C&W  and 
VEBA from  the JVs' markets and  are integral to the concentration. 
II  B/  59 .. · 
Vll  CONCLUSION 
The proposed concentration therefore does not raise serious cloobts as to its compatibility 
with the- common market.  ·  .. 
For the 'above r~ns,  the Commission has decided .not to oppose the· n~fied  oPeration 
and to declare it ~mpatible with the _common _market  &Jld with  ~e  functi~ng.  of tfte 
BEA.Agreement.. This ·decision is adopted in application.of Article 6 (1) b of Council 
RegUlation No ·4W64/89.  ·  ·  ·  · 
Fo~ the Colnmi1sion, 
\  . 
.  . 
.. 
II  8/  60 COMMISSION OF iHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Dear Sirs, 
Subject:  . Case.No IV/M.604 - ALBACOM 
·Brussels, 15.09.1995 
I  PUBLIC VERSIO~ 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6(1)(a) DECISION 
To the poti[ying panies 
I 
Your notification  of 11  August  1995  pursuant to  Article  4  of Council 
Regulation _No.  4064/89 
1.  This  operation  concerns  the  creation  of  a  company  which  will  combine  the 
telecommunications.  activities  of British· Telecommunications  pic  (BT)  and  Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro SpA.(BNL) in Italy. The new compan·y- to be called ALBACOM 
SpA .. will initially offer business communication services based on the two companies' 
existing  networks  and · will  expand  their  activities  to  offer  other  types  o~ 
telecommunications services as the ·Italian market is. liberalized. 
2.  After examinati9n of the notification, the Commission has concluded that the notified 
operation involves the acquisition of sole control by BT of  a new joint venture company 
which incorporates ce.rtain·assets ofBNL. The-operation does not fall  within the scope 
of application of  Cou~cil Regulation 4064/89.  . 
L  THE PARTIES 
3.  BT's principal activity is the supply of telecommunications services and equipment.  Its 
main  services are local  and long-distance telephone calls in  the UK,. the provision of . 
telephone exchange lines to homes and businesses,' international telephone calls made 
from  and  to the UK and the supply of telecommunications equipment for customers' 
premises. BT and MCI Communications Corporation (MCI) are partners ip the "Concert" 
Rue de Ia Lol200  - B-1 049 Brussels  - Belgium 
Telephone:exChange (+32-2)299.11.11 
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II  B/  61 joint ven~re, for the provision of. advanced  t>usines~ telecom services to: multinational. 
·  companies<•>~· . 
4.·  BNL is one of  Itaiy•s iargest banks with a.totaJ turnover ofabo~t  2,5  billio~ Ecu. BNL•s 
·  · subsidiarY - Mulqservizi - has an exclusive private (X25, 1  oo· nOdes) telecommunications. 
·network.  Multiservizi. also·  op~rates  ·BNL's  primary  .data· n-etwork.  Multiservizi's 
telecommunications activities ·are offered to third parties· as weft  as BNL. The Italian 
Treasury hold.s a stake ·of about  ... 73% in BNL. ·  · 
ll.  THE OPERATION  ,.,-_. 
S.  The operation  is the creation  of ALBACOM  as  a  .-.ew  business telecommunications 
operator in ·ualy.  BNL will  contribute Multiservizi  and  the other telecommunications 
activities in which BNL is engaged: BT will contribute the activities of  BT Italy relating 
to its i1etwork  business  with~n Italy  but  not  its  international  correspondent  business. 
ALBACOM will  immediately  acquire  the·  BT  Italy  GNS  and  th'e  Multiservizi  TDM 
networks. The Multiservizi X2S network will be leased initially to ALBACOM, in order 
Jo  comply  with  [  ...  ](2>,  and  it  is  planned  that  that. network  will  be  autoniltically 
transferred to ALBA  COM after five years. In any event, Multiservizi will not be able to. 
s~ll capacity on the network.  · 
m.  .CONTROL 
6.  The parties' shareholdings in  ALBACOM will  be split 50.5% BT and 49.5% BNL. At. 
board  level,  BT is  expected to have four members to BNL's three.  There(  ore at both. 
shareholder  and  board  level,  BT  will ·have  an  inbuilt  majority of issues  where  no 
minority right provisions apply. 
7.  BNL retains certain joint rights, some of which are on a permanent basis (or until  BNL•s 
shareholding falls below 25%) and others of which are only applicable to the first three 
years (the Development Phase) of  ALBACOM's operations.' The permanent rights include 
the following: 
- approval of triennial reviews to the Business Plan; 
- approval of  annual update$ to the initi~l Business Plan. and Business Plan where these 
~ntail funding above the thresholds in the Initial Business Plan; 
- changes to the power or authority of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); 
shareholder related contracts; 
[  ... ](2>;  .' 
,··  changes in the scope of the company and the Articles of Association; 
.  [  ... ](2>. 
<&>  Case No.  IV/M.353- British Telecom./ MCI, of 13 September 1993 and Case ~~o. IV/34.857 BT.:.MCI. 
of 27 July .1994. 
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II  8/  61 8.  ·.-For the first th('ee years only, ~NL  enj~ys  rights~~~  ·in the foll~~ng  ~eas: 
.;  .  \ 
appointment and dismissal o( the CEO; 
.[  ••• ](3>;· .. ·.·.  ·:  .·  .. '  ' 
[  .•  ~]~>;. 
...  [  •• ~](3>. 
9:  The areas in  ~hich  a simple majority is sufficient inClude the approval of  the budget and 
long~term.  $trategic decisi()nS within ALBACOM's original scope. 
.  '  .  .  ~ 
10.  A P~Option.  exists for  BNL [.  ..  ]C3>.  -
It.  On a permanent basis, a Call Option gives BT the· right to acquire BNL's shareholding 
[  •  .".](3). 
12.  An  Initial  Bu~iness Plan  has been· agreed  between BT and  BNL.  This Business ?I an 
covers the first ten  years of operation of ALBACOM.  The Business Plan is updated 
annually (with the jo.int rights.listed above) and is subject .to a triennial  ~view  which is 
proposed [  ... f.> to the shareholders meeting where BNL [  ...  ](]>~ . ·  ~  . 
.  . .. 
13.  In the Commission Notice··on the notion of'a concentration, the relative importance of. 
veto rights· is assessed in· section 2.2.  In  general, the principal rights which a minority 
shareholder should hold  in order to be able to ex·ercise ·a  decisive influence are the 
appointment of  the management and· the determination of  the budget (see paragraph 25)  . 
. Next in order of importance is the· rights over the business plan (paragraph 26). In the 
.  ALBA  COM ~ha~eholder's agreement, the appointment of  the ·Chief Exec.utive Officer is 
subject to joint decision making  ~uririg the first three· years and is by simple majority 
thereafter. For the approval of  the budget, a simple majority is sufficient as BNL has no 
joint rights. at any  stage.  By  co~trast, BNL retains joint rights for both  the  triennial  · 
revjew of the  Business  Plan  and  for  the  annual  updates  where  these  involve major 
funding increases.  · 
14.  On  the  basis of th~ above  information,  it  could  be argued  that  for  the  time  of the 
Development Phase (3  years), BNL has joint rights in relation to the Business Plan jand 
to the appointment/dismissal of.the CEO and will therefore exercise joint control· over 
ALBA  COM. After the completion of  the Development. Phase, ·BNL's veto- rights will be 
·limited to the  updates  and  revi~ws of the .Qusiness  Plan  except of minor  funding 
increases where BT has a Call Option (see para.  15). Thus, BT will  subsequently not 
only  control  the  budget  and  iong  .. ter.m  strategic  decisions  of. the  N,  but  also  the 
appointment and dism_i.ssal  of the CEO, i.e. the management of ALBACOM. 
. 
15.  In the light of  the BS/BT case<•), the fact that after thre.e years BT will have the decisive 
influence over budget, management and long term strategic decisions in the context of 
a ten )'ears business plap means that the operation should be assessed as sole control by 
BT. In BSIBT, both BT and Banco Santander were deemed to  .have joint control during 
the first three years of  the operation of  the joint  ~enture. Due to a significant  change in 
()) 
(4) 
Deleted; business secret. 
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the consent rights of the parties and a  special·l)ut Option or'  BS, BT was .deemed to  ·· 
exercise a decisive influence over the JV after three years.  ~  .  . 
I  '  ''  • 
16.  In the present case.  B~L  will  re~injoint rights after three years· as to the updates of the 
Business Plan including  ~aj~r funding increases.·lt is·-true that a  veto right over the 
business. plan may be sufficient· to confer joint cpntrol even in the absence ~f  any other 
veto right as it is stat~ in paragraph 26 of the·  Com~ission Notice on ·the notion .of a 
··  concentration. H~wever,  the ~usiness  Plan of  ALBACOM is in particularly close relation 
·-with the .budget of  the joint venture. According to section l.ll.  of  the Business Plan~ the 
·annual budget wili b~  established on  ·a monthly basis, -alloWing for variance anal-ysis and . 
updates_ on actual figures to be submitted to the Board on a monthly basis  .. Through the 
continuous c.ontrol  over the budget, BT. will thus have a considerable influence on the 
regular updates of the Business Plan itself.  ·  ·  , 
17.  In addition, BNL will from year 4"  o~wards tosethe right to veto changes to the [  ... ]<
5>  • 
.  A part of  the Business Plan which is of  im'portance for the activities of  ALBA  COM will 
. thus be solely co~troled by BT after completion of the 'Development· Phase. 
'  ' 
I 
18.  Finally and as opposed to- the BS/BT case, the options~ which are granted to t~parent 
companies  under  the  Sh_areholde.rs  Agreement, ·are  not. appropriate  to  give decisive 
influence  in  one way· or the  other.  The  BNL Put Option  [ ...  ]<
5> which  can  only  be 
exercised in narrowly defined circumstances. Consequently, the Put Option cannot act 
as any sort of deterrent to BT to act in  a way that takes· account of BNL's views more 
than if  it did not ex.ist.  This is equally true for the BT Call  Option which can only be 
ex~~cised [ ...  ]<
5>.  · 
19.  It would appear, therefore, that on the basis of the traditional determ.inar.ts of control, 
BNL ~  have joint control  for the first three years. ·It will. however no longer have 
control  from  year· 4  onwards  since  it  has  no  longer  decisive  influence  on  the 
appointement of  the managn1ent and the budget, whi~h are (according to the Commission 
Notice on the notion of a concentration) the most important veto rights. As in the BS/BT 
case,  the  business  plan  covers  a  ten  year  period  and,  according  to  the  financial 
projections of the ·parties,  [  ... ]<
5>.  Given the long term  nature of this investment in  the 
telecoms sector in  Italy,  the three year period  is  insufficient to bring about a lasting 
change  with  regard  to  the  participation  of BNL  (see  also  paragraph  38  of the 
Commission Notice on the not~  on of  a concentration). BT will therefore have sole control 
over ALBACOM. ·consequently, the operation is the acquisition of control by ·s.T of a 
·new joint venture company which incorporates certain assets ofBNL. Therefore, for the 
purposes of calculating turnover; Article 5(2) is appircable.  · 
·IV..  ABSENCE OF COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
20.  BT and  the parts of BNL which are the subject of the transaction  have a  combined 
worldwide turnover .of more than  5000  million  ECU as BT ·alone  had a  worldwide 
turnover of 17,905 million Ecu in the financial year 1994/95. BT has a Community wide 
turnover of over 250.million ECU. The assets of BNL acquired by BT are about 20 
(S) 
· miiJion Ecu and do thus not have the Community wide turnover required by Article 1 
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II  B/  64 (2)  b_  of Council  Regulation  4064/89.  ~herefo.re,: the.  o~eration  docs  nol·  have  :1 
· Community dimension.  .  ..  .  \  ~·  . 
.  ·V.  CONCLUSION 
...... 
21.:  Based on the· above, the ·Commission has concluded that ti1e notified operation does ·\Ol 
hav~ a CommunitY dimension within the meaning of  Article l of the Merger Regulation 
· and therefore does· not fall  within the scope of  the. Merger·.Regulatiori.  This decision is 
a~opte:cf in  applica~on of Articl.e 6(.l)(a) .of COuncil Regulation No 4064/89.  · 
For the  Commissi~n, 
.  ~. 
s 
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Dear Sirs, 
Subject:  Case No IV/M.604 - ALBACOM 
Brussels,  15.09.1995 
PUBLIC VERSION 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
A:JtTICLE 6(l)(a) DECISION 
To the notjfyins parties 
Your  notification  of 11  August  1995  pursuant to  Article  4  of Council 
Regulation No. 4064/89 
I.  This  operation  concerns  the  creation  of  a  company  which  will  combine  the 
telecommunications  activities  of British  Te!ec<?.mmunications  pic  (BT)  and  Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro SpA (BNL) in. Italy. The new company - to be called ALBACOM 
SpA - will initially  o~er business communication services based on the two companies' 
existing  networks  and  will  expand  their  activities  to  offer  other  types  of 
telecommunications services as the Italian market is liberalized. 
2.  After examination  of the notification,  the  Commission  has concluded  that the notified 
operation involves the acquisition of sole control by BT of a new joint venture company 
which incorporates certain assets of BNL.  The operation does not fall  within the scope 
of application of Council Regulation 4064/89. 
L  THE PARTIES 
3.  BT's principal activity is the supply of telecommunications services and equipment.  Its 
main  services are  local  and  long-distance telephone calls in  the UK,  the provision of 
telephone exchange lines to  homes  and  businesses,  international  telephone calls  made 
from  and  to  the UK  and  the  supply  of telecommunications  equipment for customers' 
premises. BT and MCI Communications Corporation (MCI) are partners in the "Concert" 
Rue de Ia Lol200  •  B-1049 Brussels  - Belgium 
Telephone:exChange(.f-32·2)299.11.11 
Telex: COMEU B 21877  - Telegraphlcaddress: COMEUR  Brussels 
II  B/  66 joint venture, for the provision of advanced business telecom services to  multin~tional 
comp~nies<•>. 
4.  BNL is one of Italy's largest banks with a total turnover of about 2,5 billion Ecu. BNL's 
subsidiary- Multiservizi -has an exclusive private (X25, I 00 nodes) telecommunications 
network.  Multiservizi  also  operates  BNL's  primary  data  network.  Multiservizi's 
telecommunications activities are ·offered  to third  parties as well  as  BNL.  The Italian 
Treasury  hol~s a stake of about 73% in BNL. 
D.  THE OPERATION 
5.  The operation  is· the creation of ALBA  COM as  a  new business telecommunications 
operator in  Italy.  BNL will  contribute Multiservizi  and the other telecommunications 
activities in which BNL is engaged. BT will contribute the activities of  BT Italy relating 
to its network  business within  Italy  but not  its  international  correspondent business. 
ALBACOM will  immediately  acquire the BT Italy  GNS  and  the Multiservizi  TOM 
networks. The Multiservizi X25 network will be leased initially to ALBACOM, in order 
to  comply  with  [  ... ]<
2>,  and  it  is  planned  that  that  network  will  b~ automatically 
transferred to ALBA  COM after five years. In any event, Multiservizi will not be able to 
sell capacity on the network. 
lli.  CONTROL 
6.  The parties' shareholdings in ALBACOM will  be split 50.5% BT and 49.5% BNL.  At 
board  level, BT is expected to have four members to BNL's three.  Therefore at both 
shareholder  and  board  level,  BT  will  have  an  inbuilt  majority  of issues  where  no 
minority right provisions apply. 
7.  BNL retains certain joint  ~ights, some of  which are on a permanent basis (or until BNL's 
shareholding falls below 25%) and others of which are only applicable to the first three 




- approval of triennial reviews to the Business Plan; 
- approval of  annual updates to the initial Business Plan and Business Plan where these 
entail funding above the thresholds in the initial Business Plan;  . 
- changes to the power or authority of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); 
- shareholder related contracts; 
- [  ...  ]<l>;  . 
- changes. in the scope of the company and the Articles of  Association~ 
- [  ... ]<l>. 
Case No.  IV/M.353- British Telecom/ MCI, of 13  September 1993 and Case No.  IV/34.857 BT-MCI, 
of 27 July  1994. 
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II  B/  67 8.  For the first three years only, BNL enjoys rights also in the following areas: 
- appointment and dismissal of the CEO; 
[  •.• ](3>;  -
- [  ••• ](3>; 
- [  ••• ](3). 
9.  The areas in which a simple majority is sufficient include the approval of  the budget and 
long-tenri strategic decisions within ALBACOM's original scope. 
10.  A Put Option exists for  BNL [  ... ](3>. 
11.  On a permanent basis, a Call Option gives BT the right to acquire BNL'  s shareholding 
[  ...  ](3>.  . 
12.  An  Initial  Business Plan  has been  agreed  between BT and BNL.  This Business Plan 
covers the first ten years of operation of ALBACOM.  The Business Plan  is updated 
annually (with the joint rights listed above) and is subject to a triennial review which is 
proposed [  ...  ]<
3>  to the shareholders meeting where BNL [  ... ]<
3>.  · 
13.  In  the Commission  Notice on  the notion of a concentration, the relative importance of 
veto rights is assessed in section 2.2.  In general, the principal rights which a minority 
shareholder should  hold  in  order to  be able to exercise a  decisive influence are the 
appointment of  the management and the determination of  the budget (see paragraph 25). 
Next in order of importance is the rights over the business plan (paragraph 26). In the 
ALBA  COM shareholder's agreement, the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer is 
subject to joint decision ·making during the first three years and is by simple majority 
thereafter. For the approval of  the budget, a simple majority is sufficient as BNL has no 
joint rights at any  stage.  By contrast,· BNL  re~~ns joint rights for both  the triennial 
review of the  Business  Plan  and  for  the  annual  updates  where these  involve  major 
funding increases.: 
14.  On  the basis of the above  information,  it  could  be argued  that  for  the time of the 
Development Phase (3  years), BNL has joint rights in relation to the Business Plan and 
to the appointment/dismissal of the CEO artd  will therefore exercise joint control over 
ALBACOM. After the completion of the Development Phase, BNL's veto rights will be 
limited  to  the  updates  and  reviews  of the  J;lusiness  Plan  except  of minor  funding 
increases where BT has a Call Option (see para.  15).  Thus, BT will  subsequently not 
only  conirol  the  budget  and  long-term  strategic  decisions  of the  JV,  but  also  the 
appointment and dismissal of the CEO, i.e. the management of ALBA  COM.  · 
15.  In the light of  the BS/BTcase<•>, the fact that after three years BT will have the decisive 
influence over budget, management and long term strategfc decisions in the context of 
a ten year_s business plan means that the operation should be assessed as sole control by 
BT. In BS/BT, both BT and Banco Santander were deemed to have joint control during 
the first three years of the operation of  the joint venture. Due to a significant  change in 
< 3>  Deleted~ business secret. 
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the consent rights of the  parties and  a special  J>ut  Option  of BS,  BT  was deemed  to 
exercise a decisive influence over the JV after three years. 
16.  In the present case, BNL will retain joint rights after three years as to the updates of the 
Business Plan  including major funding  increases.  It is true that a 'veto right over the 
·business plan may be sufficient to confer joint control even in the absence of any other 
veto right as it is stated in paragraph 26 of  th~ Commi·ssion Notice on the notion of a 
concentration. However, th~ Business Phm of  ALBACOM is in particularly close relation 
with the budget of  the joint venture.  Acc~rding to sectic;m  1.11  of  the Business Plan, the 
~nnual budget will be established on a monthly basis, allowing for variance analysis and 
upda~es on actual figures to be submitted to the Board on a monthly basis. Through the 
continuous control over the budget, BT will thus have a considerable influence on  the 
regular updates of the Business Plan itself. 
17.  In  addition, BNL will from year 4 onwards lose the right to veto changes to the [  ... ]<
5>. 
A part of  the Business Plan which is of importance for the activities of ALBA  COM will 
thus be solely controled by BT after completion of the Development Phase. 
18.  Finally and as opposed to the BS/BT case, the options, which are granted to the parent 
companies  under  the  Shareholders  Agreement,  are  not  appropriate  to  give  decisive 
influence  in  one  way  or the  other.  The  BNL  Put  Option  [  ... ]<s>  which  can  only  be 
exercised in  narrowly defined circumstances.  Consequently, the Put Option cannot act 
as any sort of deterrent to BT to act in  a way that takes account of BNL's views more 
than if it did not exist. This is equally true for the BT Call  Option which can  only be 
•  d (  ](S)  exerctse  ...  . 
19.  It would appear,  therefore,  that on  the basis of the traditional  determinants of control, 
BNL ~  have joint control  for the first  three years.  It will  however no  longer have 
control  from  year  4  onwards  since·  it  has  no  longer  decisive  influence  on  the 
appo:ntement of  the managment and the budget, which ar.e (according to the Commission 
Notice on the notion of  a concentration) the··tnost important veto rights. As in the BS/BT 
case,  the  business  plan :covers  a  ten  year  period  and,  according  to  the  financial 
projections of the parties,  [  ... ]<
5>.  Given the long term  nature of this investment in  the 
telecoms sector in  Italy,  the three year period  is· insufficient to bring about  a lasting 
change  with  regard  to  the  participation  of BNL  (see  also  paragraph  38  of the 
Commission Notice on the notion of  a concentration). BT will therefore have sole control 
over ALBACOM. Consequently, the operation is the acquisition of control by BT of a 
new joint venture company which incorporates certain assets of BNL. Therefore, for the 
purposes of calculating turnover, Article 5(2) is applicable. 
IV.  ABSENCE OF COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
20.  BT and· the  parts of BNL which  are the subject of the transaction  have a combined 
worldwide  turnover of more  than  5000  million  ECU  as  BT alone  had  a  worldwide 
turnover of 17,905 million Ecu in the financial year 1994/95. BT has a Community wide 
turnover of over 250 million ECU.  The assets of BNL acquired by  BT are about 20 
million Ecu and do thus not have the Community wide turnover required by  Article  1 
<'>  Deleted~ business secret. 
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II  8/  69 (2)  b  of Council  Regulation  4064/89.  Therefore~ : the  operation  docs  not  have  a 
Community dimension. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
21.  Based on the above, the Commission has concluded that  tl~e notified opcratiori  doe~ ... )t 
have a Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1 of the Merger Regulat.iun 
and therefore does _not fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation.  This decision is 
adopted in application of Article 6(l)(a) of Council Regulation No 4064/89. 
For the Commission, 
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ARTICLE 6(1)(a) DECISION 
To the notifying parties 
Notification of29.09.1995 pursuant to Article 4 of Council  Regulation No 4064/89 
I.  Unisource International NV (Unisource International) is a proposed joint venture betw~t·n 
Unisource NV (Unisource) on  the  one  hand,  a company  whose  shareholders arc  PTT 
TeJ~com BV (the monopoly  tele·com  operator in the. Netherlands), Telia AB  (the main 
Swedish  telecom  operator)  and  Swiss  PTT  (th.e  monopoly  telecom  operator  in 
Switzerland),  and  1;elef6nica,  the  Spanish  telecom  operator,  on  the  other  hand.  The 
intention of  the parties is to pool their experience, business and efforts in certain business 
Jtreas,  mainly  value-added tel'ecom  se,rvices.  -After examination of the notification, the 
Commission  has  concluded  that  the  notified  operation  falls  outwith  the  scope  of 
application of Council Regulation n° 4064/89. 
I.  THE PARTIES 
2.  Telef6nica is the public telecommunications operator in  Spain  and  is engaged  directly 
·and/or indirectly ·in national and international telecommunications networks and services. 
I 
3.  The  current structure of Unisource was  created  in  1993  when  Swiss  PTT joined with· 
PTT Telecom  and  Telia.  There had  been  an  earlier agreement between Telia and  PTT 
Telecom  to  pool  their  satellite. services  and  later  to  create  a  international  data 
communications  company.  The· company  is  arranged  into  a  number  of difTerent 
subsidiaries for specific service activities.  These are:  · 
•  Unisource Business Networks (UBN). which has  1,208 employees and a turnover in 
1994 of 388 MEcu; 
Rue  de Ia Lol200  - B-1049 Brussels  - Belgium 
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- Unisource Voice Services ,(UVS) a business unit of~N  which offers voice services 
to multinational business customers. It represents 60/80 employees an.d a turnover of 
0.2 MEcu (est.  1994); 
- Unisource  Satellite  Services  (USS)  ·~  subsidiary  offering  international  satellite 
services. It has  25  employees and a turnover of 5.6 MEcu (est.  1991); 
- Unisource Card Services (UC) a subsidiary offering personal and corporate post-paid 
calling card  services.  It represents  13  employees and  a turnover of 3.9 MEcu  (est. 
1994)~ 
- Unisource  Mobile  (UM)  a  subsidiary  offering  mobile  services  (provision  + 
acquisition of licences). Ifrepresents 236 employees and a turnover of0.8 MEcu (est. 
1994)~  ·-
Unisource  Carrier  Services  (UCS)  a  subsidiary . dealing  with  synergies  in 
international networks.  It represents 70 employees and a turnover of 5.76 MEcu (est.-· 
1994);  -
- ITEMA is a subsidiary the prime mission of which is to strengthen the ability of the 
EDP organisations of the  Unisource shareholders to provide improved functionality 
and  quality of IT-services at lower cost for internal  use. 
II.  THE OPERATION 
4. .  The  Unisource  International  shareholders  will  pool  some  of their  businesses  in  value 
added  telecom  services.  Telefonica will  contribute its satellite services (VSAT - very 
small aperture terminal) business.  Unisourc~ will contribute UCS, ITEMA, UM,  UC, the 
UVS  business  unit  of UBN  and  USS.  Unis.ource  wiH  also  contribute  UBN  BV  the 
holding  company  of  the  data  comm.~nications  businesses  but  not  the  domestic 
subsidiaries where the' business is carried out. 
HI.  ABSENCE OF CONCENTRATION 
A.  JOINT CONTROL/ABSENCE OF JOINT CONTROL 
5.  Unisource International will be jointly owned by Unisource (75%) and Telef6nica (25%). 
The Unisource shareholding will  be known as the A shares and Telefonica will  hold the 
D shares. 
6.  The' Unisource International  structure of control  is  the following  : 
·  1) The Superyjsozy Board 
7. ·  The General  Meeting of shareholders will  appoint a Supervisory Board which  shall 
exercise  supervision  over  the  Management  Board,  in  charge  of the  day-to-day 
business of Unisource  International  and  over the  general  course of business  in  the 
joint venture. 
8.  The  Supervisory  Board  will  be  composed  of  12  members  appointed  by  the 
shareholders  : 9 for  Unisource  (divided  into  3 for  each  of PTT  Telecom  (the  A 
directors),  Telia  (the  B  directors)  and  Swiss  PTT  (the  C  directors))  and  3  for 
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Telef6nica (the D directors). The board will have a chairman and three vice-chairmen, 
each of them  representing one of the four telecommunications companies. 
9.  All  resolutions of the Supervisory Board will  be adopted by  unanimity of the votes 
cast. However, as far as budget and business phm related to the data communications 
business  are  c9ncerned,  it  is  expressly  stated  in  article  12  of the  shareholders' 
agreement that : 
- the UBN budget and business plan will  be adopted by the vote of the Supervisory 
Board members A,  B and  C (who represent  Unisource);  ·  .  ' 
- the  Telematica  budget  and  ~usiness plan  will  be  adopted. by  the  vote  of the 
Supervisory. Board members D (who represent Tel.ef6nica). 
10.  This means that the  two  parent companies will  decide separately on  two key  issues 
(budget + business  plan)  related  to  the. data  communication business of Unisource 
International. Moreover, there is no provision in the agreements 'that allow Unisource 
to  impose its conditions on  Telef6nica on  these issues.  There is,  therefore,  no joint 
control  at  the  Supervisory  Board  level  of Unisource  International  for  its  data 
communications activities. There is joint control  only for the remaining activities of 
Unisource International. 
2) The Management Board 
11.  The Management Board will  be appointed  by  the General  Meeting of shar.eholders 
and will  be the same as the management board of Unisource. Telef6nica will  not be 
represented at this level as a result ofthe operation. The Management Board will  be 
entrusted with the day-to-day business of Unisource International. 
12.  Although  there  is  no  transfer  of  assets  and  no  joint  control  as  far  as  data 
communications business is  concerned,  the  parties have entered into a management 
atsreement  in  which  it  is  agreed  that  Unisource  I.nternational  will  coordinate  the 
responsibility for the management and  operations of the domestic  UBN  subsidiaries 
and Telematica in order to avoid duplications of resources and to coordinate services 
development in  the data communications business area.  This coordination achieved 
through the Management Board of Unisource International does not amount to joint 
control  as exp,ained above, in  paragraph  10. 
Conclusion 
13.  In  the  light  of the  above  information,  Unisource  International  will  only  be  jointly 
controlled  for  the  non  data  cornmunications  areas  of the  business.  As  the  parent 
companies retain separate arrang~ments for the data communications businesses, they are 
not jointly controlled notwithstanding the co-ordination of  day-to-day management which 
is mentioned in  the previous paragraph.  · 
D.  FULL FUNCTION JOINT VENTURE/NOT A  FULL FUNCTION .JOINT 
VENTURE 
14.  As  i.t  is stated above  Unisource International  will  receive from  both  shareholders their 
satellite  service  businesses  and  from  Unisource,  UCS,  ITEMA,  UM,  UC,  the  UVS 
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business unit of UBN,  USS and  UBN  BV.  The domestic subsidiaries ·Of UBN BV will 
not be contributed to  Unisource International. 
15.  Unisource Carrier Service (UCS) is a subsidiary of Unisource which has been set up to 
exploit synergies in the international networks of the Unisource shareholders in order to 
reduce costs.  Under. the national  laws of The Netherlands, Switzerland and Spain,  ~TT 
Telecom,  Swiss PTT and Telef6nica respectively are not presently permitted to assign 
their international  networks· and  corresponding licences· to  UCS.  Consequently,  in  the 
current situation,  UCS  will  only  perform  the  role  of a management company  for  the 
international  networks of the  Unisource  International  shareholders themselves and  not 
as Unisource "International. Accordingly, the activities of UCS are not full function and 
therefore fall  outside the scope of the Merger Regulation. 
16.  The  primary  activity  of ITEMA  (which  is  to  be  renamed  Unisource  Information 
Services) is to  strengthen the  IT  operations of the  Unisource  shareholders in  order to 
improve quality and reduce costs for the shareholders.  Its secondary objective is to offer 
integrated IT solutions on  the market.  Most  of the resources of  ITEM A are hired  on  a 
secondment  basis  from  the  Unisource  shareholders.  On  the  basis .that  the  primary 
purpose of the company is to  provide services to the  Unisource  parents, and  that  most 
of the  resources are  provided  by  the parents,  ITEMA  is  not  in  a position  to  act  as  an 
autonomous economic entity and cannot therefore be considered as a full  function entity. 
Its operations therefore fall  outside the scope. of the Merger Regulation. 
C.  RISK OF CO-ORDINATION OF COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR 
17.  For those activities which  are jointly controlled and  are full  function  it is necessary to 
assess the likelihood of co-ordination of competitive behaviour between Unisource and 
Telef6nica.  ·  · 
ll1ohile telephony 
18.  Unisource  Mobile  (UM),  a  subsidiary  of Unisource,  specialises  in  mobile  service 
provision, is transferred to the joint venture. The Unisource shareholders and Telef6nica, 
through  its  100%  subsidiary  Telef6nica  Mobile,  retain  their.domestic services.  [  ... t> 
According to the parties, UM  is active as a mobile service provider outside the countries 
of the Unisource shareholders where each  of them  remains active on  its own  account. 
However,  Unisource  has  no  licence  on  its  own  account  in  any  country.  The  parent 
companies are investigating the possibility of transferring their licences to Unisourcc in 
their territories.  A non-competition agreement  between the four shareholders states that 
they will limit their offerings of  their national mobile services to their respective national 




UM  will  be a GSM  network operator as are each of the parent companies in  their own 
territory. One of the most important characteristics of a GSM  network  is that it enables 
the  consumer  to  use  the  mobile  phone  widely  across  Europe  as  a· consequence  of 
roaming agreements between  the different  network operators.  It  is 'only  the availability 
of roaming agreements that  affects the  consumer's use  of mobile phones regardless of 
the country in which the subscription is taken out. This integration of previously national 
mobile phone markets is occurring quickly  and  an  indication of this  is  the existence of 
Deleted business secret. 
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mobile  operators  independent  of the  national  telecommunications  network  provider 
offering  service~ to consumers irrespective of location. 
20.  In addition, as UM  has no licence yet,  UM  may  acquire a licence from  Telef6nica or 
from  one of the  sha~eholders of Unisource ·since nothing prevents it from doing so- and 
indeed  the  parent  companies  are  exploring  this  possibility.  In.  that  eve.nt,  the  parent 
companies may have a strong· interest in  n?t competing with each ·other. 
21.  In the light of the above, and on the basis of the Omnitel decision<
2>,  it.  i~ clear that this 
operation  will  increase  the  likelihood  for  Unisource,  Telef6nica and  the  three  parent 
companies  of Unisource:  PIT Telecom,  Telia  and  Swis~ PTT  to  co-ordinate  their 
activities  in  the  provision  of GSM  mobile  telephone  services  through  Unisource 
International. Because the shareholders of Unisource International  retain their domestic 
services, they.remain potential competitors, mainly within the framework of the roaming 
agreements  as  explained  above.  The  creation  of Unisource  International  docs  not 
remove  this  likelihood  of competition  between  the  parent  companies.  The  non 
competition agreement for the non parent company territories shows the non-withdrawal 
of the  parent  companies  from  their  domestic  markets  rather  than  a  long-lasting 
withdrawal from  the joint venture market. 
Cart/  sen,ice.~ 
22.  Unisource Card Services (UC) is a subsidiary of Unisource, which specialises in personal 
and  corporate  post-paid  calling  card  services.  This  subsidiary  will  be  transferred  to 
Unisource International. The Unisource shareholders and Telef6nica currently offer post-
paid  calling cards in  their respective territories.  UC  calling cards are  only  offered  to 
customers who live outside shareholder home  coun.~ries and  Spain . 
... 
23.  1-fpweyer, a subscriber of any of the four shareholders' card may use his card (or several 
24. 
(2) 
c;a.rds  of the  different  shareholders  or of UC)  all  over Europe  to  the  extent  that  the 
&orvice provider has  got freephone  numbers in  the different states.  The availability  of 
these  freephone  numbers is  therefore the only  constraint to  the  European  wide  use  of 
cttlllns cards in a similar manner to the roaming agreements in the mobile phone sector 
l'S mentioned above.  Because they remain active in their respective domestic territories, 
parent companies may have therefore an interest in n9t competing with the joint venture 
()r with each another. In that respect, there is a non-competition agreement between the 
fo&.Jr shareholders limited to marketing and distribution in  r~spective national markets and 
in the UC territory.  As for mobile services, this, non-competition agreement shows that 
the  parent· companies  remain  potential  competitors  from  their  respective  domestic 
territories. 
Voice sen,ices 
t.Jnisource  Voice  Services (UVS)  is  a business  unit  of UBN.  llowevcr,  as  the  areas 
which  are  covered  by  the  special  separate voting  arrangements  referred  to  above  are 
confined to the UBN Budget and Business Plan (which is clearly defined as the activities 
of the domestic UBN  subsidiaries)  these  arrangements do  not  cover  UVS.  Therefore, 
UVS  is  subject  to  the joint control  arrangements  which  apply  to  the  non-UBN  and 
Telematica areas of the joint venture. 
Cu~to No  IVIM.53K  - Omnilcl of 27  March  1995. 
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25.  UVS offers International  Virtual  Private Network services and other closed user group 
services on an European basis.  According to the parties, 40%. of  its purchases were from  -
the  parent  companies  in  1994.  Unisource  is  a partner  in  WorldPartners  and  is  the 
continental European member of  that grouping. This arrangement has be~n  notified under 
Article 85. In the home territories of the shareholders, UVS  serVices are distributed by 
the  relevant Unisource  shareholder whilst  distribution  outside  the  parent companies' 
home territories in carried out by the local UBN subsidiary. · 
26.  The market for IVPN services is at least European and possibly global. The demands of 
a customer for IVPN services will determine which provider they will look to to provide 
the service. Depending on the company's location in different countries, the solution may 
be  achievable  through  means  than  other  than  a European  or global  service  provider. 
National telecommunications operators may  be able to offer comparable services on  a 
bilateral  basis  by  entering into  bilateral  agreements  with  the  national  public  network 
provider.  Therefore, a company  may  look to the parent companies as well  as to other 
providers such as Unisource International for these ·services. Because they remain active 
in their respective domestic territory, the parents will therefore have an incentive to co-
ordinate competitive behaviour between themselves through Unisource International. In 
addition, the parent companies will be a supplier of capacity to Unisource International 
for leased lines in their home territories and even ·abroad. This will further increase the 
scope for co-ordination. 
Satellite services 
27.  Unisource  Satellite Services (USS)  offers value added  communications services using 
satellite terminals  based  on  VSAT  technology.  According  to  the  parties,  prior to  the 
establishment ofUSS the Unisource parents had no satellite services of their own. After 
the  transaction,  the  shareholders 'of Unisource  International  will  have  no  comparable 
VSAT services outside their respective national markets as a result of a non-competition 
agreement between the parents ofUnisoutce InternationaL In the parent companies' home 
territories,  USS  services  will  be  distributed  by  the  parents  themselves,  elsewhere  in 
Europe by the appropriate UBN national subsidiary and through distribution agreements 
in countries where UBN has no presence.  · · 
28.  VSAT _technology  is  used  where fixed  links  ~re impractical  or uneconomic or where 
there is a poor quality existing infrastructure. It can also be used instead of fixed  lines 
in  ·certain  circumstances  and  is  used  in  that  way  by  companies  with  widespread 
distribution networks. us's targets  ~t business customers in the automotive, banking and 
finance sectors as well  as government, transport and  retail  operations and customers in 
Eastern Europe. 
29.  The  non-competition  agreement  between  Unisource  and  Telef6nica  covering  VSAT 
services· provides that the parents will  distribute the  VSAT  services  in their territories 
and will riot offer a parallel product portfolio to Unisource International. This represents 
an  effective withdrawal  by  the  patents  from  VSAT  activities.  Though  there  is  some 
.  overlap with services provided through fixed lines, VSAT services can be considered as 
a distinct product segment in their own right. Accordingly, there is no likelihood of the 
co-ordination  of competitive  behaviour  in  the  provision  of VSA T services  between 
Unisource and Telef6ni.ca. 
1 
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. ·Conclusion on  lik~lihood  ·of co:-ordination 
30.  In conclusion, therefore, there is a likelihood of co-ordination of competitive behaviour 
between the parent companies in the fields of mobile telephony, card services and voice 
telephony but not in the area of satellite services.  In the light of this information  and 
taking into account the notice on the distinction between concentrative and  co~operative 
joint  ventures<
3
> (and  in  particular  paragraph  20  second  sub-paragraph),  there  is·  a 
likelihooq of co-ordination of comp~titiye behaviour between the parent companies as 
a result  of the  operation.  The  notified  operation  cannot  be  therefore  regarded  as  a 
·concentration as such.  ·  · 
CONCLUSION.ON ABSENCE OF CO~·CENTRATION 
31.  For'the above  re~sons. the Commission  has concluded that the ·notified operation  does 
not  constitute  a  concentration  within  the  meaning  of Article  3(2)  of the  Merger 
Regulation  and  consequently  does  not  fall  within. the  scope  of this  Regulation.  This 
decision is  ~dopted in application of Article 6(1)(a) of Council Regl:llation No. 4064/89. 
32.  The  Commission  will  treat  the  notification  pursuant  to  Article  ·s  of Commission 
Regulation  No 2367/90  as  an  application  within  the  meaning  of Article  2  or  a 
(3) 
· notification within the meaning of Article 4 of Council Regulation  17/62  as  requested 
by the parties in their notificati.on. 
For the Commission, 
OJ C 385 of 31.12.1994. 
II. B/  77 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 22.12.1995 
,.  PUBLIC VERSION 
.MERGER PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6(1)(b)DECISION 
To the notifying parties 
Dear Sirs. 






·Notification  of a  concentration  pursuant to  Articl~ 4  of Council  Regulation  No 
4064/89  .. 
On  24  November  1995,  the  Commission  ·re~eived  a  notification  of  a  proposed 
concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4064/89<
1
> by which 
the undertakings British Telecqmmunications (BT) and VIAG acquire within the meaning 
of Article· 3 (1) b of the Council  Regulation joint control  of their 50:50 joint' venture 
VIA  G Interkom (lnterkom). 
After examination of the notification. the Commission has concluded that the notified 
operation falls within the scope of Council  Regulation No 4064/89 and does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market and with the functioning 
of the EEA Agreement. 
THE PARTIES 
BT is the main telecommunic~tions operator in the United Kingdom. It has also activities 
outside the United Kingdom, in  particular the 'Concert' agreement with the US operator 
MCI.  for  the  provision  of  advanced  business  telecom  services  to  multinational 
companies.  as  well  as  o.ther  joint ventures  in  Italy,  Sweden  and  Spain.  Its  German 
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subsidiary BT Telecom. (Deutschland) GmbH had a turnover of less than [  ... ]<
2
> million 
in  1994: 
4.  VIAG is the holding company of  operating companies located primarily in Germany with 
acitivities mainly  in  the areas of energy,  chemicals,  packaging and  logistics.  VIAG'  s 
subsidiary TB &  D Telekommunikation Gesellschaft fur Betrieb und Dienstleistungen 
GmbH (TB&D) provides telecommunications services to VIAG subsicJiaries, but not to 
third  parties  which  is  also  not  possible  from  a  regulatory,  point  of view.  The 
telecommunications  services  ire  based  on  the  optical  fibre  netWork  owned  by 
Bayernwerk, in  which VIAG has a [  ... t
3
> share. 
II.  THE OPERATION 
5.  The  objective  of the  parties'  }oint  venture  Interkom  is  to  become  an  alternative 
. telecommunications operator in Germany, including on-the public voice telephony market 
as soon as this is possible from a regulatory ·point of view, and to start with the services 
already  liberalized  (mainly  data  transmi~sion and  se'rvices  to closed  user groups_,  i..e. 
private network services).  All  German activities of the parties in the field of Interkom 
·are  transferred  to  the  joint  venture.  These  co~sist  of  BT'  s  existing  German 
telecommunications business  and  certain  activities  which  VIAG currently  carries  out 
through its subsidiary TB&D as well  as VIAG' s domestic managed network services. 
Ill.  CONCENTRATION 
6.  The joint venture will  be jointly controlled by  BT and VIAG. Each partner has 50o/o of 
·the shares and votes in  the joint venture.  Each  party  is  initially  entitled  to  appoint 3 
members to the Partner's Committee which is responsible for taking strategic decisions 
including the approval of the budget.  · 
7.  Furthermore,  the  joint  v~nture will  perforin  on  a  lasting  basis  all  functions  of an 
autonomous economic entity.  Interkom  carries BT'  s and  VIAG'  s telecommunications 
activities i·n  Germany.  In  particular, the exi'siting .German· telecommunications business 
of BT will be transferred to the joint venture. The activities of VIAG'  s 'Subsidiary TB&D 
in  the business field of Interkom will  also be transferred to Interkom. 
8.  The creation of the joint venture· will  not give rise to coordination of the competitive 
behaviour of the  parties amongst  themseJv~S Of· between  them  and  the joint venture. 
lnterkom will basically be a domestic German telecommunications provider. VIAG will 
withdraw from  the markets on which lnterkom operates. ·In addition, it is economically 
implausible .that  VIAG. will  re-enter  the  markets. of lnterkom  because of the  size of 
investment required to achieve a criti,cal  mass on  the German market. 
IV.  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
C)  ,The  concentration has a Community dimension withi.n  the meaning of Article. 1 of the 
Merger  Regulation.  The  combined  aggregate  worldwide  turnover  of BT  and  VIAG 
amounts to more than  5.000 million ECU. The aggregate Community-wide turnover of 
each is  more than 250 million ECU. The parties do not achieve more than two-thirds of 
their Community-wide turnover in  one and the same Metneber State. 
(2) 
(3) 
[).:J.:t~d  hu~in.:).~  ~c:...:rc:t.  Lc:ss  than  I>M  :lO  millwn. 
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V.  COMPATIJ)ILITY WITH THE COMMON MARKET 
10.  Inierkom will  be a competitor of Deutsche Telekom. Its activities involve two distinct 
dimensions: 
a domestic German dimension  where Interkom  Will  offer all ·currently liberalized 
telecommunications  services and· voice services  to. closed  user goups;  when  full 
liberalisation· is. achieved, it will  also offer public voice telephony services; 
an  international . dimension,  as·  a  result  of  the  fact  that  Interkom  will  be  a 
subdistributor  of BT/MCI'  s 'Concert'  services,  which  are  by  definition  of a 
transnational  nature. 
ll.  The  servises  provided  by  Interkom  will  include  domestic  and  transborder  managed 
network services including data, voice, visual and integrated access services to customers 
. in  Germany.  The transborder services  will  be offered  by  'Concert',  the joint venture 
between BT and MCI. Interkom will establish and operate a domestic network to deliver 
these  services  which  will  be  interconnected  with  the  'Conce~' network.  The  parties 
identified these as  product mar~ets: 
domestic value added network services, 
private switched voice ·services  t~ large business customers, 
domestic corporate network services and 
public voice services. 
As  there is  no  risk of the creation of a dominant position in  any  relevant market, the 
precise market definition can how.ever be left open. 
12.  The primary area of activity, of the joint venture is Germany.  Therefore, the relevant 
geographical  market  is  Germany.  For some services including 'Concert'  services and 
certain value  added  and  corporate network  services,  the relevant geographical  market 
could be European- ·or worldwide.  ·· 
13.  As Deutsche Telekom  clearly dominates the German  market and  there are also other. 
alliances  which  are  trying  to  enter  the  German  market,  the  creation  of a  market 
domination position in Germany can not be foreseen. The operation seems to be positive 
from the competition point of view.  As far as the international dimension is concerned, 
there is also no threat of a market domination position. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
14.  The proposed concentration therefore does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibilitY 
with the common market  · 
15.  For the above reasons. the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation 
and to  declare  it.  compatible with  the common market and  with  the functioning of the 
· EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in  application of Article 6 ( 1)  b of Council 
Regulation No 4064/89.  · 
For the Commission 




ARTICLE 6(l)(b) DECISION 
To the notifying parties 
Dear Sirs, 







Notification of  a  concentration pursuant to  Article 4  of Council Regulation N. 
4064/89 
On 2 February 1996, the Commission received a notification of  a proposed concentration 
pursuant  to  Article  4  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  4064/89(
1
>  by  which  the 
undertakings GTS-Hermes Inc.  (GTS) and the parties from  2  to  12,  the latter acting 
through HIT Rail B.V. (HIT Rail), a~guire within·the meaning of Article 3 (1) b of the 
Council Regulatiortjoint control of  their 50/50 joint venture Hermes Europe Railtel B.V. 
(Hermes). 
After examination of the notification, the Commission has concluded that the notified 
operation falls within the scope of Council Regulation No 4064/89 and does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market and within the functioning 
of the EEA Agreement. 
THE PARTIES 
GTS develops and operates a broad range of value-added telecommunications services, 
primarily  in the  Commonwealth of Independent States,  Central  Europe and  Asia.  In 
We~tem Europe, its only activity is a joint venture with the PTO in Monaco. 
The ten European national railway undertakings, the parties from 2 to 6 and 8 to 12, are 
principally active in the transportation of freight and passengers, mainly within their 
national territories. In addition, most Railways have other business activities, e.g. travel 
agencies, banking, mechanical fabrication, electronic and data-processing services~ energy 
and real estate managen1ent. 
OJ No L 395 of 30.12.1989; Corrigendum OJ No L 257 of 21.09.1990, p.l3. 
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main  activity  is  the  provision  of the  business  and  operational  telecommunications 
services to British Railways Board in the United Kingdom excluding Northern Ireland 
together  ~th the maintenance of railway-specific terminal  systems. Racal's  ~etwork 
fa~ilities are those originally operated by British Railways Board ~d  therefore national. 
The Racal Electronics group does not provide international tl'an$mission capacity to third 
parties.  · 
II.  THE'OPERATION 
6.  GTS, the ten above mentioned national railway undertakings and Racal intend to create 
a  joint  venture  Hermes,  which  will  introduce  a  pan-European  telecommunications 
network dedicated to the cross-border transport of telecommunication traffic primarily 
along the rights of way of  the railway undertakings by public network operators, carrier 
consortia,  cellular  telephone  companies  and  other  authorised  tele.communication 
operators. 
III.  CONCENTRATION 
7.  Hermes will be 'controlled equally by GTS and the parties from 2 to  12,  who will act 
together through  HIT  Rail.  HIT Rail  is  used  in  order  to  facilitate  decision-making 
amongst the parties from 2 to 12 and to ensure that they speak and act as one. 
8.  HIT Rail is a Dutch company in which the parties from 2 to 12 have equal voting rights 
in the general meeting, where decisions are taken by a simple majority.  The supervisory 
board consists of 7  members, one  from  each of the parties  from  2  to  12,  rotating 
periodically.  The general meeting reserves cernun issues for its own decision, including 
the appointment of  the representatives of  HIT Ra1f on Hermes.  At least six of  the parties 
from  2 to  12  mus\ agree on a  proposal  in  the general  meeting.  This configuration 
ensures that the parties from 2 to  12  can exercise a decisive influence with the other 
acquiring company, GTS, over Henne~  and avoids the situation where that other acquirer 
could exercise sole control because of their inability to reach a unified position ·on any 
decision.  <
2
>  · 
9.  The railway undertakings and Racal act through HIT Rail which was originally formed 
in 1990 for the purpose of managing international IT projects for its members. In this 
role, HIT Rail has been involved in two or three joint projects of the Railways, the most 
important of which  is  Hermes-plus,  a  project providing  for  network  signalling  and 
ticketing systems. Its primary funGtion  now is to  serve as a vehicle through which the 
railway ~dertakings and Racal jointly participate in Hermes. Furthermore, Racal has a 
common· interest  with  the  railway  undertakings.  Racal  represents  the  privatized 
telecommunications activities of British Railways. It is partner of Hermes because with 
respect  to  Hermes  it  has  the  same  kind  of business  and  interest  as  the  railway 
undertakings. 
10.  GTS and HIT Rail basically have equal rights as shareholders. Decisions of the General 
Assembly are adopted on the basis of a two-thirds majority unless and until either GTS 
or HIT Rail holds two thirds of  the votes, in which case simple majority suffices, except 
(2) 
See Commission decision IV/M.l02- TNT/Canada Post and others 
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II  B/  82 for some decisions·which require unanimity. At the moment, both companies have a SO% 
share. GTS and IDT Rail are also equally represented on the Supervisory Board, where 
decisions are taken by simple majority. In case of  deadlock, there is no casting vote but 
provision exists for further discussions and fmal reference tp an independent committee 
of experts. The Supervisory Board has complete and exclusive power to supervise the 
policy of the Management Board and the general course of affairs of Hermes and its 
business. 
11.  Hermes will operate as an independent economic entity which possesses all the assets 
and resources to act autonomously on the market. It will obtain the necessary rights of 
way and/or dark fibre from the Railways, through negotiations at arm's length, or· from 
third parties. It  will have complete end-to-end operational cOntrol of  its network. Hennes 
acts  as  a  single entity  in selecting  its  prime  contractor  for  the  construction of the 
network.  It will act autonomously in relation to its customers, which may include the 
Railways and GTS. The provisions of  infrastructure facilities by Hennes to the Railways 
and GTS will.be on an arm's length basis. 
12.  The creation of Hennes does not give rise to --coordination of  the competitive behaviour 
of the parties. None of the parent companies is active in the market of  the joint venture,. 
which  is  the  market  for  carrier's  carriers.  According  to  the  Phoenix  notice  under 
Regulation 17/62 art 19 (IV/35.617, 15 December 1995), the market for carrier's canier 
services comprises the lease of  transmission capacity and the provision of  related services 
to  third-party  telecommunications traffic  carriers.  Some of the  parent  companies are 
active on a market which is downstream from  the joint venture's market, which is the 
market  for  carriers(3>.  GTS  and  Racal  are  presently  active  in  the  field  of 
telecommunications  services  but not in  the  same .  geographical  markets.  Even if the 
national  railway  companies  enter  into  national . joint  ventures  with  other" 
telecommunications services operators, it is unlikely that they will become competitors 
as they  will probably operate only  o.I).  a national ··basis.  The Railways are  active in a 
market which is up&tream from the Hennes's market as they will provide networks to 
Hermes. However, they will each provide a network for a different geographical market. 
IV.  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
13.  The present operation has a Community dhnension within the meaning of Article 1(2) 
of the Merger Regulation. The worldwide turnover of all  the  undertakings concerned 
amowtted,  in  1994,  to  more  than  ECU  5  billion  ([  ...  ]<
4>)  and  more  than  two of the 
undertakings achieved a Community-wide turnover of more than ECU 250 million. The 
undertakings  concerned  did  not  achieve  more  than  two-thirds  of their  respective 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. 
V.  ASSESSMENT UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE 1\iERGER REGULATION 
A.  Relevant product market 
14.  In the terminology used in the Commission's Phoenix notice Hermes will be a carrierrs 
carrier. More specifically Hennes will provide infrastructure services similar to dedicated 
transit services - ie the transport of  traffic over permanent dedicated facilities through the 
(3) 
(4) 
See par. 14  f. 
Deleted for publication 
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II  B/  83 network of  the transit carrier, using a high-bandwidth digital circuit us.ed for both voice 
and data services.  · 
15.  This kind of  business of a carrier of telecommunications carriers differs ·generally from 
the business provided by a teleconmtunications carrier, i.e of  a typical services provider. 
The latter typically provides services to end-users, i.e. the typical customer of  a services . 
provider. The business of a carrier's carrier is broadly described as providing capacity 
and rel~ted services for these telecommunications operators, i.e. a kind of wholesale. 
16  Two different types of business can be regarded as forming a pan-European carrier's 
carrier market: the provision of bandwidth (in Mbit/s) interlinking the switch locations 
of  carriers, and the provision of switched-minute services (in millions of  paid minutes), 
taking  telephone  calls  from  one  carrier  and  either  terminating  ~ese calls  upon  a 
company's own switched network infrastructure, or passing them to another carrier for  . 
the final stage. The traditional way of providing cross-border services to end users is to 
make separate arrangements with a range of other carriers. In future, especially because 
of the formation  of alternative  national  telecommunications  services providers, these 
carriers might seek to entrust the transport of  international traffic to a single provider or 
a small number thereof.  · 
17.  Hermes will provide two categories of transmission capacity: 
During its start-up period Hermes will supply cross-border basic transport capacity 
(point-to-point) targeted at carriers requiring large bandwidth capacity between two 
gateway points, 
With the commencement of the Iiberalisation of telecommunication infrastructure 
markets in the EU from  1996 Hermes will 'provide instead a pan-European virtual 
private transport network supplying bulk  \:;ap~dty to carriers who will sub-supply 
to end-users.  , 
18.  According  to  the  parties  these  services  should  be  located  in  two  separate  product 
markets: the first  is merely an alternative to the traditional point-to-point connections 
offered by PTOs .  by combining two or more half-circuits;  the second is a part of  a new 
and distinct product market - the provision of  pan-European transport networks - which 
in consequence of liberalisation will  develop  as  the  role of traditional  PTOs on the 
market for international infrastructure services gradually decreases. 
19.  For the purposes of the present decision the Commission can leave open the definition 
of both the product markets involved, since en the narrowest definitions -·those given 
by the parties  - no competition problems arise. 
B.  Releyant aeoKraphic market  '(' 
20.  Hermes  ~ill  initially  supply  its  telecommunications  network  between  some  of the 
countries whose railway undertakings participate in the operation; it will then extend its 
activities  to  other  countries  in  the  present  network.  It  is  possible  that  railway 
undertakings in other countries in the EEA will join the operation at a later date.  The 
Commission accordingly concludes that the relevant product market is at least EEA-wide. 
C.  Competitive Assessment 
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II  B/  84 21.  In the firSt market described by the parties - cross-border basic transport capacity (point- . 
tO-point) - Hermes will compete with PTOs and will have an insignificant share. 
.  / 
22.  The parties claim that, since the second market described by the parties - the provision  . 
of  pan-European transport networks - is new, no valid market share data are available. 
However, market play~rs with global network infrastructures or regional ones will be in 
a position to provide a variety of  services to teleconimunications carriers. If  the creation 
of a  pan-European network  like that  one  of ·Hermes  is  part of an already  ~xisting 
canier'  s carrier market, the creation of  a market dominating position cannot be expected 
because of the market power of the national  PTOs.  Only if the  provision of a  pan-
European network by the parties creates a new product ·market, will it be possible to 
conclude tha~, as the first entrant into it, Hennes will in the immediate future enjoy a 
very high share, possibly even 100 pc, of this new market. 
23.  Even if a seamless pan-European telecommunications network is a product of its own, 
the Commission is  confident that the potential  competitors of Hennes are equally or 
more powerful and that Hennes will have no opportunity to foreclose the market. The 
principal  source of such competition  is  the  national  PTO  operators;  as the  national 
regulation of  telecommunications, the main barrier to entry, dimihishes in the next few 
years, they will have the capacity to combine into a pan-European network resources 
(particularly infrastructure) which are much greater than those available to the parties. 
Furthermore, the national PTO operators are dominant in the field of  cross-border traffic 
with respect to the existing connections between the several PTOs which enable cross-
border telecommunications to take place at the moment. Another type of infrastructure 
suitable for telecommunications is that of the. national energy and water undertakings; 
. already  the  electricity  grid  ·in  Germany  is  used  as  the  infrastructure  for 
telecommunications,<s>  and  there  is  no  reason  why  following  the  liberalisation  of 
telecommunications  energy  and  water .  undertakings  should  not  in  cooperation  with 
telecommunications operators create cross-border· networks of comparable  strength to 
those  of Hennes.  <;ompetition  could  also  be  provided  by  such  telecommunications 
consortia as Unisource Carrier Services, Orion and Atlas/Phoenix; these consortia have 
the advantage of vertical integration both upstream and downstream, whereas Hennes 
will have to negotiate with each of the railway companies on an ann's length basis and 
will  not  have  the  resources  to  supply  telecommunications  services  to  end-users. 
Furthermore, one has to take into account that the proposed Hennes infrastructure still 
has to be set up. Further market entries can already be expected from  1 January 1998. 
24.  Therefore, even if the business of Hermes is  regarded as  a new product, it cannot be 
foreseen that the formation of Hermes will lead to the creation of a market-dominating 
position.  Furthermore,  this  conclusion ·is  underlined  by  the  fact  that  the  potential 
customers of Hermes are strong and well informed companies which have considerable 
buying power and will be able to  limit the market power of any  supplier of carrier's 
carrier services, especially with respect to existing alternatives. 
25.  The proposed concentration ther.efore does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility 
with the common market. 
VI.  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
(5) 
Commission decision IV/M.618 Cable &  WirelessNebacom 
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II  8/  85 26.  The  parti~s .have requested that certain restrictions. be ·considered as ancillary to the 
concentration. To answer their request, the assessment made below is also related to the · 
question whether a provision is an integral part of  the operation. 
27.  mT Rail and GTS agree not to &Ssist or cooperate in the development of  any other pan-
.  European Telecommunications operator while lDT Rail and GTS remain shareholders in 
Hennes;  for lllT Rail the obligation continues for a further year. The evaluation of  this 
clause must take account of the characteristics peculiar to concentrative jomt ventures. 
This prohibition on the parent undertakings competing with the joint venture aims at 
. expressing the reality of  the lasting withdrawal of  th~ parents from the market assigned 
to the joint venture. However, insofar as this clause is a restriction of  comp~tition, it can 
be regarded as an ancillary restriction. 
28.  The parties agree  not to  disclose confidential  information  relating  to  Hermes.  This 
restriction is directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration. 
Therefore it can be regarded as ancillary to the concentration. 
29.  Hermes agrees not to provide telecommunication network facilities services at a national 
level,  unless on the application of a customer the relevant national railway consents. 
Insofar as this is only a defmition of  the scope of  business of  Hermes, it can be regarded 
as  an integral  part of the  concentration,  since  it  reflects  the  decision of the  parent 
companies  to  limit  the  business  of  the  joint  venture  to  international  services. 
Nevertheless, the second part of  the clause leads to the conclusion that the limitation is 
not an integral part of the concentration as this part of the clause in question provides 
an exemption from the limitation. This part of the clause therefore cannot be regarded 
as an integral part of the operation. Furthermore, as this clause imposes an obligation 
only on Hermes, it cannot be regarded as ancillary to the concentration. 
30.  Hermes will  not be  obliged to  obt~tn dark  fibrt:  and  rights of way  from  the  railway 
companies; nor wiiJ the railway companies be obliged to supply those assets to Hermes. 
Rights of  way and related agreements will be concluded on an arm's length, commercial 
basis. This claus~ is not restrictive of competition. 
31.  However, Hermes will be obliged to negotiate with the railways concerning contracts for 
the installation and maintenance of  the network; only if  fair and commercial terms cannot 
be agreed will Hermes be entitled to contract with other suppliers. This provision cannot 
be regarded as directly related and necessary to the implementation of  the concentration. 
Therefore it cannot be regarded as ancillary to the concentration. 
VII. CONCLUSION· 
32.  For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation 
and to declare it compatible with the common market and with the functioning of the 
EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(l)(b) of Council 
Regulation N. 4064/89.  I 
For the Commission, 
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ARTICLE 6(1)(b) DECISION 
To the notifying parties 
Notification  of a concentration ·pursuant  to  Article  4 of Council  Regulation  No 
4064/89 
1.  On  26  January  1996  the  Commission  received  a notification  on  an  acquisition  of a 
shareholding in Belgacom by a Consortium consisting of Ameritech International, Inc. 
Tete Danmark A/S and Singapore Telecommunications Limited (the Consortium) from 
the Belgian State.  · 
2.  After examination of the notification,  the Commission  has concluded that the notified 
operation falls within the scope of Council Regulation 4064/89 and does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the common market. 
I  THE PARTIES 
3.  Belgacom is the principal  provider of domestic and international  telephone services in 
Belgium. The aelgian  Stat~ currently holds all  of the capital stock of Belgacom. 
4.  Ameritech International Inc. (Ameritech) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ameritech 
Corporation,  a US  corporation  and  one  of the  largest  full-service  communications 
companies in the world.  Ameritech International is the entity through which Ameritech 
Corporation conducts its international  activities and investments. 
S.  Tele Danmark A/S  is the  principal  provider  of domestic  and  international  telepho"e 
services in Denmark. 
6.  Singapore Telecommunications Limited (Singapore Telecom) is the principal provider 
of domestic  and  international  telephone services  in  Singapore.  It  also  provides  postal 
services. 
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II  B/  87 n  THE OPERATION 
7.  On  21  December  1995,  a Stock Purchase Agreement was  signed  between  on the one 
hand, the Belgian State and, on the other hand, the consortium consisting of Ameritech, 
Tete  Danmark  and  Singapore  Telecom  (the  Consortium),  pursuant  to  which  the 
Consortium  will  acquire  50% minus one share of the capital  stock of Belgacom  from 
the Belgian State.  The members of the Consortium  will  acquire the Belgacom  shares 
through a special purpose vehicle company:  ADSB Telecommunications B.V. (ADSB). 
ADSB  is a private limited liability  company incorporated in the Netherlands which is 
jointly owned by the members of the Consortium. 
m  CONCENTRATION 
JOINT CONTROL 
(a)  ADSB 
8.  The members of the Consortium currently own shares in ADSB  as· follows: 
Ameritech  40% 
Tele Danmark  33% 
Singapore Telecom  27% 
9.  A Belgian financial  partner may  be invited  to invest  up  to  5% of the share capital  of 
ADSB which would be subtracted from  the Ameritech shareholding.  [  ... ](1>. 
10.  At the shareholder level of  ADSB, 95% of the votes are needed for certain matters [  ... ](2>. 
At board level,  [  ... ]<
3>.  Each  shareholder must  have one representative present for the 
meeting  to  constitute  a  quorum  and· 'the  board  member(s)  representing  each  parent 
exercise the  voting' rights  in  proportion  to  the  shareholdings  of that  parent.  A [  ... ]<•> 
majority of the shares is required for  matters relating to the adoption or amendment of 
the Business Plan and Budget and to decisions relating to voting behaviour at Belgacom's 
shareholders meetings.  · 
11.  Accordingly,  Ameritech, Tele Danmark and Singapore Telecom will  have joint control 
over ADSB. 
(b)  Belgacom 
12.  The Belgacom shareholders' agreement (Article 3) provides that shares ofBelgacom will 
be divided into three classes. Class A will include all shares owned by the State or public 
institutions,  Class B shares will  be  owned  by  ADSB,  and  Class C will  include shares 
which could come to be held by  persons or entities other than those already mentioned 
[  ... ]<'>.  These C shares would  not have voting rights. 
<•>  Deleted business secrets 
(2)  Deleted business secrets 
(3>  Deleted business secrets 
<•>  Business secret - more than 7  5% 
<'>  Deleted business secrets 
2 
II  B/  88 13.  Belgian  company  law  requires  a majority  of 75%  within  eac~ class for  a number of 
matters  including the  increase or  reduction  of the  share  capital  or the  approval  of a 
merger or split-up and 80% for other issues including the redemption of own shares or 
the  change  of the  corporate  object.  The  shareholders'  agreement  requires  .that  the 
disposition of earnings and profits must be approved by a majority of  votes in both Class 
A and Class B ~.s long as [  ... ]c
6>. 
14.  The  management  of Belgacom  will  be  conducted  by  ·the  Board  of Directors.  The 
Belgacom Board of Directors will consist of eighteen members,  nine of which will be 
appointed by Belgian State (through Royal Decree) and the other nine by the Consortium 
Members.  The  chairman  of the  Board  will  be  appointed  from  among  the  directors 
appointed  by  the  Be~gian State.  He  will  have  a casting  vote.  However,  all  decisions 
relating to  the strategic  commercial  behaviour of Belgacom  including the adoption  or 
amendment  of the  Business  Plan  and  of the  Budget,  any  delegation  of management 
powers,  strategic acquisitions or alliances,  the appointment or removal  of Belgacom's 
Chief Executive O(ficer, will require a majority of two-thirds or m.ore of the votes cast 
at Board meetings. In addition, these strategic decisions ~ill demand a quorum of  at least 
two directors representing Class A and two directors representing Class B. 
15.  Class C shareholders would be entitled to board representation when their shareholding 
reached 5%.  Even if  these shareholders had board representation there are several factors 
which indicate that the structure of the various shareholdings will continue to ensure that 
ADSB and the Belgian State will  hold joint control for the foreseeable future.  Belgian 
law requires the Belgian State to hold at least 50% plus one share of the capital  stock 
.  (7)  ofBelgacom.  [  ... ]  . 
16.  The executive management of Belgacom  lies with  the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
assisted by one or two deputies who will together form the Executive Office. The CEO 
is formally appointed and removed by a Royal Decree which is taken in accordance with 
the proposal of the Board of Directors, which requires a majority of at least two-thirds 
of the votes cast.  · · 
17.  In  the  light  of the  above  information  and  the  Commission  notice  on  undertakings 
concemedc•>,  Ameritech,  Tete Danmark and  Singapore Telecom,  through  ADSB,  have 
joint control over Belgacom with the Belgian State. 
FULL FUNCf~ON  AUTONOMOUS ECONOMIC ENTITY 
18.  Belgacom has been operational as the Belgian national telecommunications provider for 
a considerable period.  Its net cash flow ofBelgacom in 1994 amounted to 1,351 million 
BF and at the end of 1994 it employed about 27,000 staff. 
19.  According  to  Article  11  of Exhibit  M. to  the  Stock  Purchase  Agreement  dated  21 
December  1995  the parties to the Joint Venture have entered into the Agreement for a 
tenn of thirty years which will  be automatically renewable for two successive terms of 
ten years.  In  addition,  as stated above,  the Belgian Government is required by law to 
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II  8/  89 20.  Accordingly,  Belgacom  will  perform  as  a Joint  Venture  on  a lasting  basis,  all  the 
functions of an autonomous economic entity, on grounds of disposal of assets, staff and 
financial  independence,  in  the field  of the provision of telecomm.unication services. 
ABSENCE  OF  SCOPE  FOR  CO-ORDINATION  OF  COMPETITIVE 
BEHAVIOUR 
21.  The Belgian  State  is  not  active  in  telecommunications  other than  through  Belgacom. 
Accordingly, the likelihood of coordination must be measured between the members of 
the Consortium. 
22.  The parent companies are potential competitors to Belgacom tbllowing the liberalisation 
of  telecommunications and services in Belgium.  It is ·unlikely that the parent companies 
would  enter the  market following  the substantial  investment which  they  have  made in 
acquiring  the  stake  in  Belgacom.  Even .  if they  were  to  offer  services  in  Belgium 
following  liberalisation,  the  number  and  strength  of the  other potential  competitors in 
Belgium would make any co-operative behaviour insignificant.  This is confirmed by the 
non-compete clause in which the Consortium members have undertaken not to compete 
with Belgacom directly or indirectly in the provision of telecommunications and related 
services offered in Belgium.  Limited exceptions apply for activities which account for 
less than 0.5% of Belgacom's revenues in any one year, for the publication of industrial 
directories  by  Ameritech  (through  Wer  Liefert  Was?)  and  for  electronic  commerce 
services through GElS. 
23.  With the exception of those services which are offered by Belgacom on a national basis 
(and where the Consortium members have agreed not to compete with Belgacom), most 
remaining services have geographical. market definitions which have been considered to 
be at least European wide.  These services include certain data communications services, 
cellular telephone services, certain non cellular mobile activities and certain value added 
services (as set out in the market definition section V bel.ow). 
24.  Tele Danmark's  international  activities  (which  account  for  under  2%  of its turnover) 
include paging services and Telenordia, a joint venture in Sweden with BT and Telenor, 
which offers communications services to companies in Sweden.  Ameritech currently has 
activities  in  the  EU  for  industrial  directories  (primarily  in  Germany  but  also  with 
turnover  in  neighbouring  countries)  and  certain  activities through  GElS  for  electronic 
commerce services on  an  European basis.  Singapore Telecom  has EU activities in  the 
UK  and  Sweden  through  cable  TV  operations.  There  is  no  overlap  between  Tele 
Danmark and Singapore Telecom's activities in Sweden and the Ameritech activities in 
Belgium  are  of such  a limited  extent  that  there  is  no  likelihood  of significant  co-
ordination. 
25.  As liberalisation takes place across the EU,  the opportunities for  new entrants to enter 
telecommunications markets on an EU wide basis will increase.  Even though all of the 
Consortium members will be potential competitors on these markets; and that they have 
activities already ·in the EU/EEA;  the potential  restriction of CQmpetition will  not -have 
a  significant  effect  on  competition  given  the  number  and  sfrength  of existing  and 
potential competitors on this market.  For those services which have world-wide market 
definitions, the absence of any anti-competitive effect is even stronger, given the relative 
absence of economic power of the parties against the competition which they do or will 
face. 
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II  B/  90 26.  In the light of the  above information, there is -no  likelihood of co-ordination amongst 
Ameritech, Tete Danmark and Singapore Telecom or between them and the Belgian State 
through Belgacom.  ·. 
27.  Accordingly,  the notified operation  is a concentration. 
IV  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
28.  The undertakings concerned  have a combined aggregate worldwide turnover in excess 
of 5,000 million ECU (Belgacom:  2,951  million ECU,  Ameritech Corporation:  10,747 
million  ECU,  Tete Danmark:  2,366 million  ECU,  Singapore  Telecom:  1,927 million 
ECU), following their latest reports and accounts.  At least two undertakings concerned 
have a community-wide turnover of more than ECU 250 million (Belgacom: [  ... ]<
10>, Tete 
Danmark: [  ...  ]<
11~.  The undertakings concerned do not achieve more than two-thirds of 
their  aggregate  Community-wide  turnover  within  one  and  the  same  member  State. 
Therefore, the operation has a Community dimension. 
V  COMPATIBILITY WITH THE COMMON MARKET 
A  RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS 
29.  The relevant product  market  in  this operation  are a wide range of telecommunications 
and related services. 
According to the notifying parties, Belgacom operates in the following product areas. 
Local telephone services (PS1N and ISDN) 
Domestic long distance telephone services 
International telephon-e services (inc. VPN) 
Leased lines 
Data communication services (inc. MAN&LAN, Telex, Telegraph, EDI) 
Cellular telephone activities 
Non-cellular  mobile  activities  (paging,  calling  card,  pay  phones,  maritime  radio 
services) 
Value added services (inc.centrex,operator services) 
Supply and service of CPE 
Telephone directories publishing . 
Telephone directories data 
Telecommunication and engineering consulting  --·-.. ....  ~- - .  ·-·-....  ~  ... _  .... 
..  ···-··-.. --~·"·~-~-- .... ~-- .. 
-~--~-~.~:~~-3a~··-However, a  pre~ise· ptoducf markefdefrniilon···i·s-·not. necessary  as,  given the respective 
market  positions  of the  parties  in  the  sectors  referred  to  above  or  even  in  separate 
narrower markets,  such  a definition would  not alter the Commission's conclusion with 
regard to dominance in this case described under Assessment below. 
oo>  Business secret - more than 250 million ECU 
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II  B/  91 B  RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS 
31.  Basic services related  mainly  to reserved  services in  Belgium (e.g.  fix~d national  and 
international voice,  leased lines,  telex) have traditionally been considered  as a national 
geographic  market  due  to  the  still  prevailing  regulations  and  the  role  of the  national 
telecommunications operators. 
32.  The geographic market for certain value added services is generally considered as at least 
European  and  possibly  worldwide.  In  any  case  the  markets  for  telecommunications 
services are evolving very rapidly as a result of  technical change and liberalisation of  the 
regulatory environment. 
33.  However, given that the operation does not result in any  problem of dominance in  the 
EUIEEA area,  for the  reasoris exposed  in  the assessment below,  it is not necessary to 
define the relevant geographic market in the present case. 
C  ASSESSMENT 
Belgium 
34.  The  market  behaviour  of telecommunications  operators  in  Belgium  is  controlled  by 
regulatory mechanisms which are being put into place.  A telecommunications regulatory 
authority  is  already  in  existence  and  legislation  which  will  provide  some  of the 
conditions necessary  for competition  is in  place.  Further measures are envisaged, and 
will be necessary, in order for the proper competitive conditions to exist for new entrants 
to  compete  effectively  with  Belgacom  on  the  markets  in  which  it  currently  has  a 
monopoly. 
35.  Belgacom holds very high market shares (including 100% for some services). Following 
the operation, it appears that this position will  not change \Jntil  liberalisation of services 
and infrastructure  b~comes effective in Belgium.  In European and worldwide markets, 
Belgacom should become a stronger competitor following the operation and will be able 
to take advantage of  the Iiberati sed telecommunications markets in most of  the EU which 
should take place by the beginning of 1998.  Belgacom will compete on those European 
markets with strong competitors such as BT, Unisource, Deutsche Telekom and France 
Telecom.  However, in the short term, the possibility exists that Belgacom may undergo 
a financial and technical strengthening without having. to face actual competition on the 
markets for its currently non tiberalised activities. 
36.  In  the  light of information  provided  by  the  notifying  parties,  the  products  in  which 
Belgacom  has  (  ... ]<
11> of sales  in  Belgium  comprise:  local  and  domestic long distance 
telephone services, international telephone services, leased lines, value added services and 
telephone  directories  data.  It  has  in  excess  of [  ...  .]<12> of sales  in  Belgium  for  data 
communication  services,  cellular  telephone  services,  non  cellular  mobile  services, 
payphone  services  and  paging  services  and  [  ... ]<
13> for  the  publishing  of telephone 
directories and [  ... ]<
14
> in the telecommunications and engineering consulting sector. Also, 
(II)  Business secret - close to  100% 
<
12>  Business secret - at least 90% 
<tJ)  Business secret • between 30% and 40% 
n
4>  Business secret - between 35% and 45% 
6  ll  B/  92 Belgacom  was responsible for  [  ... ]<
15> of the supply  and  service of Customer Premises 
Equipment in Belgium in  1995. 
There  are  only  two  very  limited  areas  of overlap  between  any  of the  Consortium 
members and Belgacom  in  Belgium.  These are a limited number of sal~s of industrial 
directories by a German subsidiary (Wer Liefert Was?) of Ameritech into Belgium and 
the activities of GE  Information  Services (GElS)  in  which  Ameritech  has  an  interest, 
which  offers electronic commerce services throughout  Europe,  including,  to a limited 
extent, Belgium.  Neither of these activities, combined with those ofBelgacom, give rise 
to  the  creation  or  strengthening  of a dominant  position.  This  is  because,  as  far  as 
directories are concerned, the addition of market shares is insignificant and With regard 
to  electronic  commerce  services  there  is  no  direct  overlap  between  Ameritech  and 
Belgacom.  The issue of potential competition is covered in paragraph 22 above. 
37.  There are  no  overlapping activities of any  significance  in  Belgium  between  different 
Consortium  members.  Ameritech,  Tete  Danrnark .and  Singapore Telecom  conduct the 
bulk of their operations in their. respective home territories. 
38.  Accordingly,  in the light of the above information, there is no creation or strengthening 
of a dominant  position  in  Belgium  within  the  meaning  of Article  2 of the  Merger 
Regulation. 
Outside Belgium 
39.  Belgacom  is  active  only  in  Europe.  Apart  from  its  activities  in .Belgium,  it has  the 
limited interests in Russia as described above.  Ameritech, Tele Danmark and Singapore 
Telecom also have activities in the EU/EEA as set out above.  This operation involves 
no addition of market shares in those countries. 
For the services which have a market definition which is Europe or even world wide, the 
combined market shares of Belgacom and Tele Danmark in Europe and Belgacom and 
all  the consortium  memb~rs on world wide markets, the transaction does not raise any 
competition problems. 
Conclusion 
In the light of the above information, the notified operation does not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the common market. 
VI  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
40.  [  ... ]<
16> the  Consortium  members  undertake  not  to  compete  with  Belgacom  in  the 
provision of  telecommunications services and related services in Belgium.  An exception 
is provided for operations which represent less than 0.5% ofBelgacom•s revenues for the 
publication of directories by  Ameritech  and  for electronic commerce services provided 
through  GElS.  Ameritech  has given  a similar non  com.pete undertaking for  it  and  its 
controlled  affiliates.  This  clause  is  a normal  consequence  of the  parent  companies• 
investment in the joint venture and reflects the parent companies• withdrawal as potential 
<U>  Business secret - between 50% and 70% 
< 16>  Deleted business secrets 
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ll  B!  93 competitors in the Belgian market.  Insofar as this is a restriction of competition, this 
provision is directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration. 
For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation and 
to· declare it compatible  with  the  common  market  and  with  the functioning  of the  EEA 
Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6{1)(b) of Council Regulation 
No 4064/89: 
For the Commission, 
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II  8/  94 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Suhjert:  Case No  JV/M. 802 - Telecom f!:ire;uua 
Brussels,  18.12.1996 
II  PUBLIC VERSION 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6( I  )(b) DECISION 
Registered with advice of delivery: 
To the notifying parties 
I 
Notification of 14.11.1996  pursu~n•t to Article 4 of Council  l~eguhation (EEC) 
No 4064/89 
I.  On  14.1 J .1996  the  C~ommission received  a  notification  of a  proposed  concentration 
pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 by  which PTT Telecom 
BV  (
11PTT  Telecom")  and  Telia  AB  publ  ("Telia
11
),  acting  together  through  a joint 
venture company called  Comsource,  and  the  Irish  State,  will  acquire joint control  of 
Telecom Eireann. 
I.  THE PARTIES ANI> TJIE OJ,ERATION 
2.  Telecom Eireann is a limited  liability  company incorporated  under  Irish  law.  It is  the 
national telecommunications operator in  Ireland of which all  shares are currently owned 
by  the Irish  State.  Through a 75% sharcholding in  Cahlelink Limited Telecom  Eireann 
is also active in  the provision of cable iclevision services in  Ireland. 
3.  The Irish State is in this operation represented by  the Minister for transport, Energy and 
Communications and by  the Minister for Finance ("the Ministers"), who are the present 
shareholders of Telecom  Eireann. 
Rue de Ia  Loi 200  - B-1049 Brussels  - Belgium 
Telephone. exchange (+32-2)299.11.11 
Telex: COMEU B 21877  - Telegraphic address· COMEUR Brussels 
II  8/  95 4.  PTT Telecom is a full  subsidia1y of Royal  PTT Ncdcrlai1d  NV.  lts.main activities arc 
telephony  services.  mobile communication  services and  sales of telecommunications 
equipment. Telia is a  limited liability company of which all  shares are owned by  the 
Swedish State. Its main activities are the provision of telecommunications services. 
5.  The concentration involves the establishment of  a consortium between PTT Telecom and 
Telia, named Com  source. and the acquisition by Com  source of 20% of the issued share 
capital of  Telecom Eireann. Comsource shall act solely as a holding company to perform 
the role of shareholder of Telecom Eireann.  As a  consequence of this acquisition of 
20% of the shares of Telecom Eireann Com  source will acquire control. jointly with the 
Irish State, of  Telecom Eireann. The Ministers will grant Comsource an option to acquire 
a further  15% of shares in Telecom Eireann. 
II.  CONCENTRATIVE .JOINT VENTtJRil: 
Joint control 
(a) Comsource 
6.  According to the information provided by the parties PTT Telecom and Telia will  each 
be entitled to appoint four Directors. The Board of Directors has to decide on the major 
issues of the business policy of Com  source.  In  such decisions neither of the parties has 
a casting vote and consequently both parties have a de facto veto right. 
7.  Accordingly. PTT Telecom and Telia will  have joint control over Com  source. 
(b) Telecom Eireann  . 
8.  With respect to decisions on major issues of the business policy of Telecom Eircann the 
follow.ing provisions apply.  [  .. .]l
1
' 
9.  It can be concluded that the Irish State and Comsource wiil  be able to veto the major 
strategic decisions on the business policy of Telecom Eireann and that they thus will  he 
controlling this company jointly. 
10.  It follows from the above that PTT Telecom and Tclia, through Comsource, and the Irish 




Autonomous full  function entity operating on  ~•  h1sting b:1sis 
Telecom Eireann is the 'national telecommunications operator in Ireland. The parties have 
entered  into  a  strategic  agreement  for  an  indefinite  period  of time.  The  parties  in 
Com  source will supply major contributions to a further development of the Irish market 
and  to enhance the competitiveness of Tel~com Eircann  in  the international  markets. 
These contributions will be related to human resources, technologies, operational support 
systems, and will  include mobile clfld  multimedia markets  .. 
It can therefore be concluded that the .Joint  Venture will  operate on a lasting basis and 
will  perform all  the flmctions of an  autonon1ous economic entity. 
Oclctcd; business St:(.;rcts.  Dt:s(.;ription of veto  ri~lils of the  parries. 
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II  8/  96 Absence of t'Oordiruafion 
13.  The Irish State is not active in telecommunications or cable television other than through 
Telecom  Eireann.  Accordingly,  the likelihood of coordination  must  be assessed  with 
respect to PTT Telecom and Telia. 
14.  PTT Tel~com and Telia can be considered as potential competitors to Telecom Eireann 
on  the  telecommunication  markets  and  the  market  for  services  supplied  by  cable 
operators in  Ireland which are liberalized or are to be liberalized. However, it  is unlikely 
that they  will  enter these markets other than  through  Telecom  Eircann,  f(}IJowing  the 
substantial investments to which th·-1  arc committed within the framework of the present 
operation. 
15.  With respect to telecommunications services for which the relevant geographic market 
is wider than national, PTT Telecom, Telia and Telecom Eireann are actual or potential 
competitors. it must also be noted that PTT Telecom and Telia are, together with Swiss 
PTT  and  Telef6nica,  partners  in  Unisource/Uniworld  (Case·  No  IV/M.S44  -
Unisource/Telcfonica).  It is foreseen  that Telecom  Eireann will  become the distributor 
of the services of Unisource/Uniworld in  Ireland. 
16.  The possible cooperative aspects of this operation are only of minor importance relative 
to the operation as a whole. The revenues derived from  the value added operations for 
which the market has to be considered international amount for PTT Telecom and Telia 
to a  very  small  proportion  of less than  I% of their total  turnover.  Also,  the  present 
operation can  not be considered as  a  cause  for  strengthening of the  already  existing 
coordination  between  the  partners  in  Unisource  in  any  significant  way.  (Cetsc  No. 
IV/M.570 -TBT/BT/TELE DANMARKITELENOR pt.  29). 
17.  It can be concluded t~at the present operation does not give rise to coordination between 
PTT Telecom and Telia. 
18.  Accordingly, the notified operation is  a_ concentration. 
Ill.  COMMUNITY ()JMENSION 
19.  The undertakings concerned  have a  comhined aggregate worldwide turnover of more 
than 5,000 million ECU (Telecom Eireann 1,367m ECU, PTT Telecom 6,25Sm ECU and 
Telia 4,743.26m ECU).  Each of these under1akings has a Community-wide turno.vcr in 
excess  of 250  million  ECll,  and  they  do  not  achieve  more  than  two-thirds of their 
aggregate  Community-wide  turnover  within  one  and  the  same  Member  State.  The 
notified operation therefore has a Community dimension according to Article I  (2) of the 
Merger Regulation. 
] 
II  B/  97 IV  COMPATIBILITY WITH THE C()MMON MARKET 
A. RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS 
20.  Telecommunications operators can be-regarded as engaging in several different activities. 
These include the provision of infrastructure to  terminate calls.  provide the local  loop 
and the provision of services.  Telecom Eireann provides. both  infrastructure (where it 
currently has a statutory monopoly) and services. 
21.  Telecommunications services could be grouped  into Basic Services and  Value-Added 
Services.  Basic services include voice telephony,  leased  lines.  mobile telephony  and 
telex. The main product, voice telephony. accounts for 70-80% of telecommunications 
services. 
22.  Value-added  services comprise non-public services,  as  well  as,  enhanced  services  to 
multinational corporations and other intensive users of  telecommunications services over 
intelligent networks.  Within this .group distinction should be made between a segnient 
concerned with advanced telecommunication sc'rvices to corporate users and a segment 
concerned with standardised low-level packet-switched data communication services (see 
Decisions  of  17  July  1996  in  Cases  No.  IV/35.337  - Atlas  (at  para.  5  et  seq)  and 
No.35.617 - Phoenix/GiobaiOne (at para 6) and Commission decision of 27 July  1994 
Case IV/34.857- BT-MCI). 
21.  In  previous cases involving concentration of  telecommunications' operators ({ :ase No. 
IV/570  - TBT/BT/TELE  DANMARK/TELENOR  and  Case  No.IV/M.6K<J-
ADSB/Belgacom). the question of the  precise delimitation  of the  telecommunication 
services market  has been  left open  by  the Commission.  In  the present case a precise 
segmentation of services is not required for the assessment of the operation since, even 
on the basis of the narrowest definition, the operation 1 does not  raise serious doubts as 
to strength the market position of Telecem Eireann. 
24.  Cablelink  Limited (which  is  75o/o  owned  by Telecom  Eireann) is a  provider of cable 
television  services in  Greater Dublin,  Galway  City  and  Waterford.  In  each  of these 
areas, Cablelink has a monopoly of cable TV services.  Other cable TV companies have 
similar geographic monopolies in  their own area.  Cablelink's infrastn1cture could  be 
used to provide telecommunications services. 
25.  The Commission hets  recognised the existence of a separate market for  servicl~S supplied 
by cable operators to their subscribers. Sec Commission Decision of 9  November 1994. 
Case IV/M.469 - MSG Media Service and Commission Decision of J I October  I  995. 
Case No.IV/M.490 - Nordic Satellite Distribution. 
B.  RELEVANT GEOGRAJ•HJC MARKETS 
26.  ·Basic  services  e.g.  fixed  national  and  international  voice,  leased  lines,  telex.  have 
traditionally been considered as a national geographic market due to the still  prevailing 
regulations and  the  role of the  national  telecommunications operators.  See Case  No. 
IV/570  - TBT/BT/TELE  DANMARK/TELENOR  and  Case  No.  [V/M.689  -
ADSB/Belgacom.  For public voice telephony  in  Ireland,  there  will  continue to  be a 
statutory monopoly until  I .January 2000 which is another  l~tctor indicating the national 
nature of the market. 
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II  B/  98 27.  Geographic market for  certain value added  services is  generally considered as at  least 
European  and  possibly  worldwide.  Markets  for  telecommunications  services  are 
evolving very rapidly as a result of technical  change and liberalisation of the regulatory 
environment. See Case No.  IV/570- TBT/BT/TELE DANMARK/TELENOR  and Case 
No.  IV/M.689 -ADSB/Belgacom.  However, given that  the operation docs  not  result  in 
any  problem  of dominance  in  the  EU/EEA·  area,  for  the  reasons  exposed  in  the 
assessment  below,  it  is  not  necessary·  to  define  the  relevant  geographic  market  for 
telecommunications services  in  the present case. 
28.  The Commission has considered  the market for services supplied by cable operators to 
their subscribers as national  in  scor ~ (Sec Commissio~ Decision of  <J  November  I  <J<J4. 
Case IV/M.469 - MSG Media Service and  Commission  Decision of 31  October  I  <J<JS. 
Case No.IV/M.490 - Nordic Satellite Distribution). 
C. ASSESSMENT 
29.  Telecom  Eireann  has  the  exclusive  privilege  of providing  within. Ireland  the  public 
telecommunications network,  voice telephony  services and  telex  services.  The  market 
behaviour  of  telecommunications  operators  in  Ireland  is  controlled  by  regulatory 
mechanisms  which  are  not  yet  in  place.  The. legislation  which  will  set  up  the 
independent regulatory authority  is currently being considered  by  the  Irish  Parliament. 
According to the notifying parties, the regulatory authority should  ~lc set  up  in  the early 
part of 1997. On 27 November 1996, the Commission took a Decision(l' to set out in the 
timetable for the liberalisation of services in  Ireland in  response to the request from  the 
Irish Government for a derogation from ·the deadlines for liberalisation proposed in  the 
various telecommunications liberalisation directives. 
30.  For the  provision  of telecommunications  infrastructure,  Telecom  Eireann  will  have  a 
monopoly until  I July  1997.  Potential aiternative infrastructure providers would include 
cable TV networks, the electricity network and  possibly some others.  Accordingly, the 
Cablelink  network  will  be  an  important  network  immediately  available  when 
liberalisation  takes  place.  This  is  because  of its ·network  in  Greater  Dublin,  which 
contains inuch of the population and  business activity in  Ireland. 
31.  The original acquisition of  a majority of  shares in Cablelink by Telecom Eireann in  1990 
was  examined  by  the  Fair  Trade  Commission<
3
'  in  Ireland.  At  that  time,  the  Irish 
Government secured commitments when  authorising the opcration(
4
> which  included  a 
commitment from Telecom Eireann that Cahlelink would he operated on an arms' length 
basis from  Telecom  Eireann  with  management separate from  that  of Telecom  Eireann 
Acc·ording  to  the  Irish  Government,  these  commitments  still  apply.  In  addition,  the 
Commission  notes  that  the  Irish  Government  has  stated  that  access  to  the  Cablelink 




Commission decision C (W>)  1142 of 27 November  I9W,  Voice telephony will  not  be  liberaliscd until 
I  January  2000. Providers of allern:llive infraslmcture will be allowed from  I July  1997.  Finally. direct 
internal iona I i ulerconncct ion of mobile networks wi  II be effective from  I  January  I 999. 
IJndcr the  Mergers. Take-overs and  Monopolies (Control) Acts  I  1J7X  and  I  9X7. 
Contained in a press  no lice from  the  Dep;u1mcnt  of Indus! ry  and  Comrm.:rce dated X June  I  'J'JO. 







and non-discriminatory basis.  This open access will be supervised by the new regulatory 
authority when it is formed. 
Value added  and  mobile services and  the  infrastructui·e for  the  prov1s1on  of mobile 
services is liberalised and subject to licensing by the Minister for Tnmspor1, Energy and 
Communications. In  the light of information provided by the.)lotifying parties, for the 
peri'od to March  1996, the products in  which Telecom Eireann has [  .. .Jf
5
'  market shares 
in  Ireland  comprise:  voice  telephony  services,  leased  private  circuits,  data  services, 
tclemessage  and  telegram,  mobile  telephony,  value  added  services  and  telephone 
directories. However, liberalised telecommunications services (mainly vaiue-added) arc 
presently  provided in  Ireland  by  38  licensed  se1vice  providers  including  the  main 
European telecommunications' operators. Value-added income represents approximately 
[  ... f'' of Telecom  Eireann  revenue.  E~at Telecom  ([ ... ]c
7
'  market share on  liberalised 
services), TCL ([  ... f'') and other important players such  us Cable &  Wireless and  BT 
are  currently  gaining  market  shares  in  various  market  segments.  In  addition,  BT, 
Mercury  and  Cabletel,  which  have  a  presence  in  Northern  Ireland,  are  expected  to 
expand their operations in  Ireland.  In  October  1995  the second  licence for GSM was 
awarded  to the  ESA  T  DIGIFONE consortium  with  Esat  and  Digifone as  the  major 
shareholders.  ESAT DJGIFONE ).Viii  start operating at the end of I  996. 
Geographically, the areas of market overlap between PTT 'Telecom, Telia and  Telecom 
Eireann are very  limited  since all  three conduct the bulk  of their  operations in  their 
respective home territories in  the markets for  basic services.  In  the market  for  value. 
added telecommunications services, which activity has been generally defined as broader 
than naHonal,  the activities of PTT Telecom, Tclia and Telecom Eireann arc relatively 
small.  Also even taken into account the fact that PTT Telecom and Tclia participate in 
Unisource/Uniworld the present operation does not give l-ise to dominance in this market 
as Unisource/Uniworld is one among other strong players. 
For non-liberalised services in  Ireland, the operation does not change the present position 
of Telecom  Eireann until  liberalisation takes place. ldecom Eireann is,  at  present and 
by itself,  strong enough and  well  rated  by  the financial  markets and  it  is  in  the short 
term  technologically ·sufficient.  The  support  of the  new  partners  will  improve  the 
efficiency of the company .but it is unlikely that,  in  the light of ongoing liberalization 
· proces, it will  strengthen its present market position. 
The support of the new partners consequent on  their shareholding is  likely to improve 
the  efficiency of the  company  and  strengthen  its  financial  and  technical  position. 
However,  this  developement  will  not  atl'ect  the  change  in  the  competitive  position 
brought about by the liberalisation due on  I July  1997. Telecoms liberalisation is to take 
place in  Ireland. according to  a  clear timetable set  out  in  the Commission's decision. 
Under that decision, alternative infrastructure providers will he entitled to obtain liccnl·.cs 
to enter the market from  I July  1997:  The present decision permits PTT Telecom and 
Telia to become shareholders in Telecom Eireann hut this joint venture agreement docs 
not  bring  about  the  development  of a  supplier  or  distributor  relationship  between 
Telecom Eireann and either Unisource or Uniworld. 
Deleted: business secrets - more  th:111  tJ5'Yc •. 
Deleted: husiuess secrets - Jess  than 5%. 
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If·  B/  JOO Even  if the  proposed  operation  will,  in  the  long  term,  strengthen  technically  and 
financially  Telecom  Eireann's  capacity  to  provide  services  on  liberalised  markets, 
Telecom  Eireann will  face competition from  other strong players such, as BT, Concert, 
GlobaiOne and  Atlas and other  telecommunications operators. 
36.  Cablelink has  313,000 subscribers in  Ireland  and  63% of the  Irish  market for  services 
supplied  by  cable operators to  their subscribers.  However,  neither  PTT Telecom  nor 
Telia  have  any  special  knowledge  or  expe11ise  which  would  strengthen  Cablelink's 
market position in  the provision of cable TV setvices over and above that  which would 
be provided by  another cable operator or consultant. 
37.  Accordingly, in the light of the above information, there is no creation or' strengthening 
of a dominant position  within the meaning of Article 2 of th.e  Merger  Regula~ion. 
V  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
38.  The notifying parties have requested  that the clauses and  agreements described  below 
be considered as  ancillary to the concentration. 
39.  Article  II of the Agreement on  Strategic Co-operation  provides that  Comsource,  PTT 
Telecom  and  Tclia shall  neither  indivi<hwlly  or collectively  nor  thro_ugh  subsidiaries, 
engage  in  certain  activities during the  Agreement  on  Strategic Co-operation  and  two 
years after. These activities include competition with Telecom Eircann, soliciting orders 
from  Telecom  Eireann's customers or soliciting Telecom  Eireann's employees.  This 
provision is directly related and -necessary to the implementation of the concentration and 
should be considered as ancillary to  the  t~peration.  · 
40.  The agreements provide for  the concltision of an  agreement between Telecom  Eircann 
and  Unisource and  liniworld whereby Telecom  Eireann  will  become the distributor of 
and the preferred supplier to  Unisource/Uniworld in  Ireland.  This provision should  not 
be considered as ancillary to the concentration.  Prior to this-operation, Telecom Eireann 
exists already as  a full  function telecommunications operator.  It can  not be considered 
that the acquisition of  control by PTT Telecom and Telia can only be implemented under 
the condition  of the conclusion  of these distribution/supply  agreements.  They  should 
therefore be assessed under the s,cope of Article 85  and  86 of the Treaty. 
For the above reasons, the  Commis~ion has decided  not to oppose the notified operation 
and  to declare it  compatible with  the  common  market  and  with  the  functioning or the 
EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted  in  application of Article 6( I  )(h) of Council 
Regulation  No 4064/89. 
For the Commission, 
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Prior notification  of a  concentration 
(Case 'No  IV/M.876  - Telia/Ericsson) 
(97 IC  24/15) 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
1.  On 17 January 1997,  the Commission received  a notification of a proposed concentration 
pursuant  to  Anicle  4 of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89 C)  by which  Telia  A.B.  and 
Telefonaktiebolaget  L.M.  Ericsson  acquire  within  the  meaning  of  Ani  de  3  (  1)  (b)  of  that 
Regulation  joint control  of the  AU-System  Group  by  way of purchase  of shares.  · 
2.  The business  activities  of the  undertakings  concerned  are: 
- for Telia A.B.:  the national Swedish telecommunications operator, 
- for Ericsson:  a Swedish  manufacturer of telecommunications  equipment, 
- for  AU-System  Group: a Swedish  group  active  in  telecommunications  consultancy services, 
software  development,  and  distribution  of information  technology  and  telecommunications 
equipment. 
3.  Upon  preliminary  examination,  the  Commission  finds  that  the  notified  concentration 
could  fall  within  the  scope  of Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89.  However,  the  final  decision  on 
this  point  is  reserved. 
4.  The  Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  to  submit  their  possible  observations  on 
the  proposed  operation. 
Observations  must  reach  the  Commission  not  later  than  10  days  following  the  date  of this 
publication.  Observations  can  be  sent  to  the  Commission  by  fax  (No  (32 2) 296 43 011 
296 72 44)  or by post,  under reference  number  IV /M.876 - Telia/Ericsson,  to  the  following 
address: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate  B - Merger Task Force, 
Avenue  de  Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
C)  OJ No L 395,  30.  12.  1989; Corrigendum: OJ No L 257, 21.  9.  1990,  p.  13. 
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To the notifying parties 
Dear Sirs, 
Subject:  Case No IV/M.900- BTtrELE DK/SBBIMIGROSIUBS 
Notification of 10.03.1997pursuantto Article 4 of  Council Regulation N. 4064/89 
1.  On  10  March  1997  British  Telecommunications  pic,  (United  Kingdom)  (BT).  Tele 
Danmark  A/S  (Denmark)  (fele-DK),  Schweizerische  Bundesbahnen  (Switzerland) 
(SBB),  Migros-Genossenschafts-Bund  (Switzerland)  (Migros)  and  Schweizerische 
Bankgesellschaft (Switzerland) (UBS) notified to the Commission an intended operation 
whereby  they  acquire  joint control  within  the  meaning  of article  3( 1  )(b)  of Council 
Regulation 4064/89 ofNewtelco AG (Switzerland). 
2.  After  examination of the  notification,  the  Commission  has  concluded  that  the  notified 
operation falls within the scope of  application of  Council Regulation No 4064/89 and does 
not raise  serious  doubts  as  to  its  compatibility  with the  common  market and  with  the 
functioning of  the EEA Agreement. 
I  THE PARTIES 
3.  BT's principal activity is the supply of  telecommunications services and equipment.  Its main 
services are  local  and  long-distance telephone  calls  in the  UK,  the  provision of telephone 
exchange lines to homes and businesses, international telephone calls made from  and to the 
UK and the supply of telecommunications equipment fbr customers' premises.  BT tmd  MCI 
Communications  Corporation  (MCI)  are  partners  in  the  "Concert"  joint  venture.  for  the 
provision of  advanced business telecommunication services to multinational companies 1  • 
Decisions IV/M.353- British Telecom /MCI, (13 September 1993) and IV/34.857 BT-MCI, (27 July  1994).  The 
Commission is currently examining a merger between BT and MCI (IV  IM.856 - British Telecom/MCI). 
Rue de Ia Loi 200, B-1049 BruxellesiWetstraat 200, B-1049 Brussel- Belgium 
Telephone: exchange 299.11.11 
Telex: COMEU B 21877. Telegraphic address: COMEUR Brussels. 
n  B/103 4.  Tele-DK, controlled by the Danish state,  is the principal provider of telephone services in 
Demnark.  Other activities  include the  supply of telecommunications  equipment, telephone 
directories and cable television. Tele Danmark opemtes under a concession granting to it the 
right to provide in Demnark, amongst other services, public voice,  leased lines and NMT 
mobile telephone services and to install and operate the Danish public telecommunications 
network infrastructure.  Tele  Damnark also  operates  one  of the  two  Danish  GSM mobile 
telephone services. 
5.  SBB is the national railway company of Switzerland, organised as a department of state. 
It owns a backbone telecommunications system, Difonet, connecting the main cities of 
Switzerland  and  used  to  provide  data  services  (DataRail)  and  voice  communication 
services (ISDN-SBB) in connection with its  opemtions.  Together with UBS it holds a 
licence for WANDA, an ATM-based network confmed to[  .... ] customers.  SBB also has 
an  indirect  non-controlling  interest  in  Hermes  Europe  Railtel  BV  (Hermes),  which 
provides carrier's carrier services for  international traffic  originating and  terminating in 
Switzerland and for international transit traffic passing through Switzerland.  2 
6.  Migros, organised as  a Genossenschafts-Bund (a fonn of cooperative) under Swiss law 
and owned by  12 regional Genossenschaften, is a leading Swiss supem1arket retailer.  It 
has its own data network (M-Net), with  de  minimis sales to third parties. businesses in 
Switzerland. 
7.  UBS is a leading Swiss bank.  It opemtes UBINET, a worldwide data network with a[  .... ] 
third party business based on lines leased from the Swiss PTT.  It operates WANDA with 
SBB.  It has an indirect minority shareholding but no active participation in  Aarc Tessin 
AG (Atel), a Swiss electricity utility which together with five  other utilities has created 
DIAX, a joint venture offering national and international telecommunications services in 
Switzerland. 
II  THE OPERATION 
a)  Introduction 
8.  Newtelco was established in 1996.  Its present shareholders are SBB (40 per cent). Migros 
(30 per cent) and UBS (30 per cent).  It has never been active.  The purpose of  the present 
opemtion is, by the introduction of BT and Tele-DK as  strategic partners into the joint 
venture,  to  create  the  second  national telecommWtications  opemtor  in  Switzerland  - a 
development made possible from 1 January 1998 by the Swiss Telecommunications Act. 
Newtelco will provide wireline and mobile communications (voice, data. multimedia and 
VANS) in Switzerland~ will offer BT services (including Concert) in Switzerland:  will 
operate  a  domestic  network  delivering  transborder  and  domestic  managed  network 
services  interconnected with the  global network platform  of Concert;  will operate the 
third-party business of  UBINET and the WANDA network of SBB and  UBS~ and will 
usc the telecommunications infrastructure provided by SBB. 
9.  It  is  also  likely  to  apply  for  a  mobile communications  licence  in  Switzerland  when 
applications are invited later in 1997 or in 1998.  However, neither the decision to apply 
for the licence nor the result of any application is sufficiently certain for the Commission 
to take either event into account for the purposes of  assessing the concentration. 
b)  Joint control 
Decision IV/M.683- GTS Hermes Inc/HIT Rail BV (3 March 1996) 
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II  B/104 10.  The control of Newtelco will be determined by four principal agreements - a framework 
agreement  between  all the  parties  a five-party  shareholder  agreement  between  all  the 
parties,  a two-party shareholder agreement between B)' and Tele-DK and a three-party 
shareholder agreement between SBB, Migros and UBS.  BT will hold[  ... ] per cent of  the 
shares in Newtelco and Tele-DK [  .... ]per cent- in tota149.24 per cent,  together they will 
appoint four directors.  SBB ([ .... ] per cent), Migros  ([ .... ] per cent) and UBS ([ .... ] per 
cent) will hold the remaining shares (tota150.76 per cent);  together they also will appoint 
four directors. 
11.  The two-party agreement requires that BT  and Tele-DK will reach a common position on 
issues to be decided by the board of  directors or by the shareholders meeting ofNewtelco 
and to vote together on those  issues;  the  three-party  shareholder agreement imposes a 
similar requirement on SBB, Migros and UBS.  For certain issues the board of directors 
can act only by a majority of  two thirds;  these issues include: 
commitments involving assets above ECU [  .. ] million. 
contracts involving expenditure above ECU [  .. ] million, 
amendments  to  the  10 -year  rolling  business  plan  which  change  the  funding 
requirements in excess of+(  ... ] per cent or-[  ... ] per cent from the previous. business 
plan or in excess of+ [  ... ] per cent or - [  ... ] per cent in aggregate from  the  initial 
business plan, 
transactions outside the scope ofNewtelco, and 
decisions relating to the participation ofNewtelco in a mobile operator's licence. 
12.  The effect of  these provisions is that the board cannot act on certain critical issues except 
with the consent of  all the parties. Newtelco will accordingly be subject to joint control by 
the two voting blocks BTffele-DK and SBB/Migros/UBS. 
c)  Autonomous long-lasting economic entity 
13.  The  parties  will  contribute  to  Newtelco  all  their  telecommunications  acttvattcs  in 
Switzerland  with  the  exceptions  discussed  below.  Thes~ activities  arc  those  of BT 
Switzerland (including the exclusive sub-distribution of  Concert services):  the right to lay 
cables along the tracks of  SBB;  the WANDA business of  SBB and UBS:  and the [  ... third 
party  business  of the ... ]  UBINET  network  of UBS.  TD  is  not  at  present  active  in 
Switzerland but will contribute to the capital ofNewtelco. 
14.  As a result of these  contributions and other cash subscriptions by  the  parties the  initial 
share  capital of Newtelco  will be  ECU  [  ... ] million;  it will  be  increased to  ECU  [  ... ] 
million  by  further  contributions  by  the  parties  (principally  Tele-DK)  when  Ne\\1elco 
receives a licence to operate a fixed telecommunications network. 
15.  The revenue which Newtelco will derive from  its sub-distributorship of Concert services 
is estimated by the parties to be [  .. .less than  10
1%  ... ) per cent of its total revenues.  The sub-
distributorship will accordingly  not make Newtclco dependent upon its parents tbr more 
than an insignificant part of  its business. 
16.  After the initial build-up phase (during which  BT and Tele-DK will  temporarily  second 
about [  ... ] staff to Newtelco) Newtelco  will  have  its  own organisation  and  will  engage 
sufficient staff to be able to perform all its functions independently. Each of the parties is 
prohibited  from  transferring  its  shares  in  Newtelco  (except  intra-group  or  to  strategic 
associates  approved  by  the  other  parties)  for  five  years.  Newtelco  will  accordingly 
perfonn on a lasting basis all the functions of  an autonomous economic entity. 
d)  Absence of coordination 
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is confirmed by provisions in the five-party shareholder agreement whereby each of the 
parties is prevented,' while it is a shareholder and for one year after, from competing in 
Switzerland  with  Newtelco  and  from  engaging  in activities  harmful  to  its  business. 
However,  a  party  can  after  three  years  compete  with  Newtelco  provided  that  the 
competing business. falls  outside the last approved business plan of Newtelco and that 
N ewtelco does not itself decide to include the competing business in its business plan 
18.  These restrictions are also subject to exceptions for particular activities:  The majo  rity of 
these exceptions are naturally confmed to Switzerland and accordingly do not give rise to 
the possibility of  coordination between the parties in the European Union. 
19.  SBB  retains  its  indirect non-controlling  interest  in Hermes  (a  wholesale  activity  - in 
contrast to the retail activities of Newtelco - in which no other party engages).  UBINET 
has limited third-party supply outside Switzerland;  this will migrate to Newtelco  r  .... l. 
UBS retains the right to supply banking and fmancial services to any  telecommunications 
company (but not without the consent ofNewtelco to engage in its mrutagcmcnt except for 
"workout"  for  bad  loans  or  credits)  and  to  control  small  companies  supplying 
telecommunications outside Switzerland.  Otherwise SBB, Migros and UBS will retain no 
activities outside Switzerland.  Accordingly the exceptions are principally for the  benefit 
ofBT and Tele-DK. The exceptions relevant to the EU are: 
- systems integration (creating integrated data processing systems and services and 
telecommunications systems and services solutions):  This activity  involves the 
provision of computer software and is  thus not connected with the activities of 
Newtelco.  BT, the only party which engages in it, has an insignificant market 
share. 
- existing and new correspondent reJa:ionships  and substituting services:  These 
bilateral  relationships  and  services  are  the  basis  for  international 
telecommunications under the  ITU.  Co-ordination of these  activities  will  not 
increase as a result of  the operation. 
- outsourcing  services  for  multinational  business  customers  with  headquarters 
outside Switzerland and facilities management services for multinational business 
customers:  Only BT engages in these activities.  TO. the only other party capable 
of  doing so, has no such plans. 
- Concert:  Tele-DK distributes the Concert joint venture services in Denmark. but 
its  turnover from  this  activity  is  [  .... ]  and  it  is  not otherwise  engaged  in  this 
activity. There is accordingly no appreciable risk of cooperation arising from  the 
joint venture. 
- telecommunications equipment and related software:  BT supplies these products 
in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe, but not in Denmark;  Tele-DK 
supplies them only in Denmark. 
- air-to-ground and ground-to-air communications on flights and satellite-to-air and 
air-to-satellite communications on flights:  Only  BT is  active  in  these markets. 
which nrc wholly unconnected with the activities ofNcwtclco. 
- international calling card services operated from  outs  ide  Switzerland:  BT and 
Tele-DK  provide  these  services,  but  they  are  wholly  unconnected  with  the 
activities ofNewtelco. 
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are unconnected with the activities ofNewtelco.  BT and Tele-DK supply these 
services in different member States. 
20.  In  addition  to  these  exceptions  BT  and  Tele-DK  retain  other  telecommunications 
activities: 
- In Belgium BT  through BT Worldwide Ltd supplies data and voice services to 
corporate users and closed user groups;  the turnover of BT Worldwide is [  .... ]. 
Tele-DK is a shareholder in Belgacom.  The joint venture gives rise to no serious 
prospect of  coordination in these activities. 
- BT and Tele-DK are separately parties to joint ventures in various member States. 
The  only  geographical  overlap  is  in  Germany,  where  VIAG-INTERKOM  (in 
which  BT  participates)  supplies  liberalised  telecommunications  services  (ic 
excluding  until  1998  public  voice  telephony)  and  Tele-DK  participates  in 
lntemetz, which resells telecommunications capacity in Hamburg and in Minim( 
which supplies paging services in major cities.  In Sweden BT and Tele-DK both 
participate  in  Telenordia,  which  supplies  voice  and  data  telecommunications 
services ·in  Sweden.  None  of these  activities  is  related  to  the  activities  of 
Newtelco. 
- BT and Tele-DK supply mobile telecommunications services in various member 
States. These activities have no connection with those ofNewtelco. 
21.  There is thus no possibility of coordination of the competitive conduct of the parties as a 
result of  the operation. 
e)  Conclusion 
22.  The operation accordingly constitutes a concentration within the meaning of  article 3( I){ b) 
ofthe Regulation. 
III  CONCENTRATION OF COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
23.  The  aggregate  worldwide  turnover of BT is  ECU  17,430  million.  of Tele-DK  is  ECU 
2,607 million, of SBB ECU 4,039 million, of Migros  10,893 million and of UBS 5.978 
million.  The parties therefore have a combined aggregate worldwide turnover in excess of 
5000 million ECU.  The aggregate Community-wide turnover ofBT is ECU [  .... )million. 
of Tele-DK ECU  [  .... ] million and of Migros  ECU  [  .... ] million.- each in  excess of 250 
million  ECU.  BT  achieves  more  than  two-thirds  of its  aggregate  Community-wide 
turnover  within  the  United  Kingdom.  Tele-DK  achieves  more  than  two-thirds  of its· 
aggregate Community-wide turnover within Denmark. 
24.  The operation therefore has a Community dimension within the meaning of  article 1(1) of 
the Regulation. 
IV  COMPATmiLITYWITHTHECO MMONMARKET 
a)  Relevant product markets 
25.  In IV/M.570- TBT/BT!fele Danmark!felenor (24 April  1995) the Commission accepted 
for the purposes of the  assessment the  defmition proposed by  the  parties of one of  the 
relevant product markets as - domestic and international voice and data telecommunication 
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and  business  participate)  and  the  data  market  (primarily  used  by  business),.and  further 
segmentation  into  domestic  and  international  markets.  In  this  respect  it  appeared  that 
enhanced global network services (e.g. Concert) would be a separate product market. 
26.  As in TBT/BT!fele Danmark!felenor  the precise relevant product market delimitation in the 
present case  can be  left open since  even on the  narrowest  possible  basis  ie four  separate 
relevant product markets,  the  proposed concentration does  not give  rise  to  the  creation or 
strengthening of  a dominant position. 
b)  Geographical reference markets 
27.  In TBT/BTffele Danmarkffelenor the Commission concluded that, h aving regard to  the 
licensing,  regulatory  and  supervisory  framework,  the  current market  participants  and  their 
market  shares  and  the  physical  interconnection  arrangements  for  telecommunications 
operators,  the  geographical reference market for  domestic  and international,  voice and  data 
telecommunication services could be considered to be at least national.  By the corresponding 
analysis in the present case the geographical reference market can be considered to be at least 
Switzerland. 
28.  The geographical reference market for enhanced global telecommunications was considered in 
TBT/BT!fele Danmarkffelenor to be  woddwide. 
c)  Competitive assessment 
29.  The joint venture will  primarily  operate in  Switzerland. which  is  outside  the  EEA. 
The domestic services provided by  the joint venture in  Switzerland will only  have an 
impact on  the  national Swiss market.  The  operation also concerns  enhanced  global 
network services, where the markets are  global.  However.  the  formation of the joint 
venture  and  the  consequent  changes  in  the  distribution  arrangements  for  Concert 
services  in  Switzerland  will  neither create  nor  strengthen  a  dominant  position  for 
enhanced global network services at a worldwide level . 
V  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
30.  The  parties  have  requested  that  certain  restrictions  be  considered  as  ancillary  to  the 
concentration. 
31.  All except one of these restrictions operate only in Switzerland and are  therefore outside 
the competence of  the Commission.  Those restrictions are: 
[  ... detailed description of  the restrictions applicable in Switzerland ... I 
The Commission accordingly makes no further observation on these restrictions. 
32.  By  the  remaining  restriction  parties which contribute  assets  to  Newtelco agree  not for 
three  years  to  solicit for  employment or consultancy  services  any  person  transferred  to 
Newtelco  by  the  operation.  This  provision  is  necessary  to  the  implementation of the 
concentration  and  can  therefore  be  considered  ancillary  to  it.  The  Commission's 
assessment of this  restriction  is  confined  to  any  effect  which  it  might  have  within  the 
European Union. 
VI  CONCLUSION 
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ARTICLE 6(l)(b) DECISION 
Registered with advice of  delivery 
To the notifying parties 
Subject: Case N° IV/M.902- Warner Bros./Lusomundo/Sogecable. 
Notification of  8.04.1997 pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation N° 
4064/89. 
1.  On  8  April  1997,  The  Commission  received  a  notification  of a  proposed 
concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council regulation (EEC) N° 4064/89 by 
which  the  undertakings  Warner  Bros.  International  Theatres  ('"WBIT  .. ). 
Lusomundo,  Sociedada Gestora de  Participa~oes Sociais, S.A.  ("Lusomundo  .. ) 
and  Sogecable  S.A.  ("Sogecable"),  establish  a  joint venture  named  Warner 
Lusomundo  Cines  de  Espana to  purchase  or lease  and  develop  and  exploit 
multiplex cinemas in Spain. 
2.  After examination of the notification,  the  Commission has  concluded  that  the 
notified operation falls within the scope of Council Regulation N°  4064/89 and 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market and 
with the functioning of  the EEA agreement. 
Rue de Ia Loi 200, B-1 049 Bruxelles/Wetstraat 200, B-1 049 Brussel- Belgium- Office: 
Telephone: direct line (+32-2)299.11.11, exchange 299.11.11. Fax: 29 ......... .. 
Telex: COMEU B 21877. Telegraphic address: COMEUR Brussels. 
n  B/110 I.  THE PARTIES 
3.  WBIT is a division of Time Warner Entertainment Company L.P.  (a US  limited 
partnership) and its sole business is the ownership and operation of cinemas and 
ancillary activities around the world. 
4.  Lusomundo is a Portuguese company whose principal areas of business are: the 
publication of newspapers  and  magazines; the operation of radio stations;  the 
distribution  of  films  for  television  broadcast  an  cinema  exhibition;  the 
distribution  of  films  for  videos;  and  the  operation  of  cinemas.  All  of 
Lusomundo's business activities (with the sole exception of its  interests in the 
present joint venture) are carried out in Portugal. 
5.  Sogecable  is  a  Spanish  company  whose  principal  areas  of business  are:  the 
operation of terrestrial  and  direct-to-home satellite pay  television  services:  the 
production and distribution of films; the acquisition and sale of sports rights: and 
the  provision  of technology  services.  Sogecable  is  owned  25%  by  Prisa 
(Promotora de Informaciones S.A.}, 25% by Canal+ S.A. and 50% by a number 
of  financial institutions. 
II.  THE OPERATION 
6.  Sogecable will become a partner in the existing joint venture between WBIT and 
Lusomundo named Warner Lusomundo Cines  de  Espafia  S. A.  which presently 
jointly control the joint venture with a 50% share in  the  capital each.  After the 
transaction  the new joint venture  company  ("NC") will  be  owned  in  equal 
shares by WBIT, Lusomundo and Sogecable.  Structurally, this is to be effected 
by an increase in JVC's share capital and the creation of a new Spanish company 
("Newco") jointly owned by  Lusomundo and Sogecable which will  own 2/3rds 
of the  future  JVC'  share  capital.  The remaining  l/3rd  of the  capital  will  be 
owned by WBIT. 
7.  On completion of the transaction, the existing joint venture agreement between 
WBIT and Lusomundo will be terminated and the parties' interests in the joint 
venture and the operation of  that joint venture will be governed by the new joint 
venture agreement. 
8.  The objectives of the NC are and will continue to be to purchase or lease and 
develop and exploit multiplex cinemas in Spain. 
III.  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
· 'J.  The operation has a community dimension. The joint worldwide turnover of the 
undertakings  concerned  exceeds  ECU  5,000  million  (only  Time  Warner"s 
turnover amounts to ECU 16.071  billion in its last financial year). 
1  0.  The aggregate EC-wide turnover of at  least two of the  undertakings concerned 
exceeds ECU  250 million:  Time Warner (ECU  1966 billion). Sogecable (ECU 
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("Canal+": ECU 1494 billion).1 
11.  The parties do not achieve more than two-thirds of their aggregate Community 
wide turnover within one and the same Member State. 
12.  The  notified  operation  therefore  has  a  Community  dimension  but  does  not 
constitute a cooperation case under the EEA Agreement. 
IV.  CONCENTRATION 
13.  The operation amounts to a change of  joint control by WBIT and Lusomundo on 
the JVC to  a situation of joint control by  WBIT, Lusomundo and SogecabJe on 
the same JVC.  As  the Commission has explained in  its  Notice on the notion of 
undertaking concerned (94/C  385/03) a change in the shareholding through the 
entry of a new shareholder acquiring control is considered as leading to a change 
in  the  quality  of control  and  the  operation  constitutes  a  concentration  under 
article 3 1 b) of  the Merger Regulation. 
V.  JOINT CONTROL 
14.  On  completion each of WBIT,  Lusomundo and  Sogecable will  have an  equal 
interest in the JVC .  The JVC's board will have six directors. two nominated by 
each  party.Certain  matters  will  require  the  prior  approval  of all  three  parties 
including each annual budget which will determine the precise framework of the 
activities  of the joint venture and  , in  particular,  the  investment it  may  make. 
Therefore, the core strategic commercial decisions of the JVC. i.e.  the decisions 
on  the  investments  to  be  made  in  the  purchase,  lease  or  development  of 
multiplex cinemas in Spain will be under the veto righ of each parent company. 
15.  Therefore, the JVC  will  be  under the joint control of WBIT,  Lusomundo and 
Sogecable. 
VI.  FULL FUNCTION 
16.  The JVC has and will continue to have sufficient financial and other resources to 
operate as  a  business  in  the  market  on  a lasting  basis.  The joint \'enture  will 
obtain third party debt finance of around [  ... } . Under a separate agreement. the 
JVC is licensed to use the warner name and Warner trademarks for the duration 
of the joint venture. 
Sogecable is  owned 25% by  Promotora de  Informaciones, S.A.  ("Prisa"), 25%  by  Canal  + and 
50% by  a number of financial institutions. For the putposcs of the  Merger Regulation, Sogecahle 
is jointly controlled by Prisa and Canal+ (Commission decision on  19.07.1lJ96, under article 6.1  c 
of the Merger Regulation). 
Deleted; business secret. 
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17.  Under Clause 6.1  of the Joint Venture Agreement the parties agree not to be 
involved in the exhibition market in Spain other than through the JVC. From the 
withdrawal  of the  parents  from  the  market  on  which  the  JV  will  operate  it 
follows  that  the  creation  of the  JV  will  not  give  rise  to  coordination  of 
competitive behaviour between WBIT, Lusomundo and Sogecable. 
Conclusion 
18.  On  the  basis  of the  above  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  notified  operation 
constitutes  a  concentration  within  the  terms  of  Article  3  of  the  Merger 
Regulation. 
VIII. COMPATIBILITY WITH THE COMMON MARKET AND THE EEA 
Relevant product market 
19.  The parties consider that there is a market for viewing films in  cinemas and that 
this will be the market affected by the operation._ 
20.  A distributor normally releases a film in successive periods to different outlets. 
starting  with  the  cinema  release  and  proceeding  through  video  rental.  pay 
television,  video  sale  and  free  television.  Thus consumers  wanting  to  see the 
latest releases have no alternative but to visit the cinema. 
21.  Cinema-going is a different kind of experience compared with watching films on 
television screens at home. It involves an outing, seeing the film on a big screen 
with appropriate sound equipment, and being in company of other members of 
the public. 
22.  It is however, for the assessment of the present operation. not necessary to define 
the relevant product markets since even the narrowest possible product market 
definition  does  not give  rise  to  the  creation  or strengthening  of a  dominant 
position. 
Relevant geographic market 
23.  The geographic market does  not extend  beyond Spain since cinemagoers will 
not travel to other countries to see films which will mostly exhibited in  a foreign 
language and  not dubbed  into  Spanish.  Similarly. distributors  seem to  see  tlw 
market on  a  national  basis.  Distributors  plan  their  promottonal  campaigns  for 
Spain as  a whole and much of their advertising, notably on  television. is  placed 
on a national basis. 
24.  However, it could perhaps be argued that the geographic market is  a series or 
local  markets  since  some  cinemas  are  geographically  isolated  from  other 
cinemas and therefore they do not face much competition from other exhibitors. 
The bulk of box office receipts is, however, derived  from  the main centres of 
population where,  in  most cases,  cinemas are in direct  competition with  each 
other. 
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the  relevant geographic  markets  since  even  the  narrowest possible  definition 
does not give rise to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. 
IX.  ASSESSMENT 
26.  WBIT and Lusomundo are only  active in the exhibition market through their 
interest in the JVC.  Sogecable currently  has no  involvement in the exhibition 
market. 
27.  The ownership of Spanish cinemas is  very  wide~y spread with  even the largest 
chain having a  market share by  number of screens of approximately  o'%.  The 
JVC currently operates only one 8 screen cinema in Madrid and its market share 
is  therefore negligible taking into account that following sources of the Spanish 
Ministry of  Culture there were 2,108 screens in Spain in  1995. 
28.  The JVC  invested  Ptas.[ ... p  in  building  its  first  multiplex  and  has  plans  to 
invest a further Ptas. [  ... r  in building a further 17 multiplexes throughout Spain 
over the next 3  1/2 years with a total of 197 screens.  Other operators are also 
planning  significant  ivestment  in  multiplexes  and  the  services  of  the 
Commission have been informed that 26  multiplexes  are expected to  open  in 
1997 in Spain. 
29.  Therefore,  given  the  negligible  market  share  of the  parties  in  the  Spanish 
Cinema  Exhibition  market  and  the  existence  of  substantial  investment 
undertaken by  other competitors in  the market, the concentration will not create 
or stren·gthen a dominant position in the EEA territory or a substantial part or it. 
30.  The  services  of  the  Commission  have  also  analysed  the  possible  \·ertical 
relationships between the JVC and Time Warner's and Sogecable's distribution 
interests. 
31.  The  Warner  Bros.  catalogue  is  distributed  to  cinemas  by  Warner  Espai\ola. 
Despite its name, Time Warner has no shareholding in this company and is  not 
involved in its management. Time Warner's distribution agreement with Warner 
Espafiola expires on 31st December 1997.  · 
32.  Sogepaq  Distribuci6n  S.A.  (which  is  owned  50/50  by  Sogepaq  S.A.  and 
Polygram Iberica,  S.A.)  distributes  Sogecable and  Polygram fims  to  cinemas. 
However,  given  the  small  market share of Sogecable  (approximately  H~l,  in 
I tJ9o)  in  the Spanish film distribution market in  contrast with the market  shar~s 
held  by  some  Hollywood  Studios  (UIP:  24o/o,  Buena  Vista/Lauren:  20'~~,. 
Columbia Tristar:  11 o/1,,  Fox: I 0%, all  1996 figures) and the agreement between 
the parties setting out that the dealings with the JVC will be conducted at arm·s 
length, this vertical relation does not raise any competition problem either. 
Deleted; business secret. 
Deleted; business secret. 
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33.  In  the  joint venture  agreement  the  parties  agree  not to  be  involved  in  the 
exhibition market in Spain other than through the NC. This clause reflect the 
permanent withdrawal of the parents from the market to be served by  the NC 
and can therefore be recognized as an integral part of  the concentration. 
34.  WBIT will sign three other agreements with the JVC in order to provide the joint 
venture  with know-how and  expertise:  a Supervisor's agreement under which 
WBIT provides expertise to the NC in relation to the acquisition, development, 
design,  construction,  management,  legal  affaires  and  operations  of the  JVC's 
cinemas~ a Licence· agreement to use the W amer name and W  amer trademark~ 
for the duration of the joint venture; and  a European Services Agreement under 
which  the  JVC  has  the  right  to  use  the  services  of various  WBIT  group 
employees.  Terms  will  be  agreed  on  arm's length  basis  and  these  agreements 
ensure that the JVC  will have the necessary resources for carrying on business. 
Each of these three supplemental agreements is  directly related to and necessary 
for the implementation of the concentration.  As  far  as  restricting competition. 
they can be regarded ancillary to the concentration. 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
35.  For the above reasons the Commission has  decided not to  oppose the notified 
operation and  to  declare it  compatible with  the  common  market  and  with  the 
functioning of the  EEA  Agreement.  This  decision is  adopted  in  application of 
Article 6(1 )(b) of Council Regulation (EEC) N° 4064/8 9. 
For the Commission. 
5  Including Looney Tunes slogans such as What's up Doc?, That's all folks !. .... 
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Fall Nr. IV/M.908- PTA 
I STET  I AfOBILKOM 
Nur der deutsche Text ist verfiigbar und verbindlich. 
VERORDNUNG (EWG) Nr. 4064/89 
UBER FUSIONSVERFAHREN 
Artikel 6, Absatz I, b KEINE EINW ANDE 
Datum: 11/06/1997 
Auch in der CELE  .. ){-Datenbank verfogbar 
Dokumentennummer 397M0908 
Amt  fiir  amtliche  Veroffentlichungen  der  Europaischen  Gemeinschaften 
L-2985 Luxembourg  · EUROPAISCHE KOMMISSION 
Briissel, den 11.06.1997 
OFFENTLICHE VERSION 
FUSIONSVERF  AHREN 
ARTIKEL 6(l)(b) ENTSCHEIDUNG 
An die anmeldenden Parteien 
Betriffi :  Sache Nr. IV /M. 908 PT  A/STET/Mobilkom 
Anmeldung  vom  05.05.1997  gema.B  Artikel4  der  Verordnung  (EWG) 
Nr. 4064/89 des Rates 
1.  Am 05.05.1997  erhielt die Kommission gemaB  Artikel4  der Verordnung (EWG) 
Nr. 4064/89 des Rates die Anmeldung eines ZusammenschluBvorhabens, durch das 
die Post und Telekom Austria Aktiengesellschaft ("PTA"), die von der Post und 
Telekom  Beteiligungsgesellschaft  m.b.H  ("PTBG"),  kontrolliert  wird  und  deren 
·einziger Gesellschafter die Republik Osterreich ist, und STET Mobile Holding n. v. 
("SMH"),  das  der  STET  Gruppe  angehort,  im  Sinne  des  Artikels3  Absatz I 
Buchstabe b der Ratsverordnung die gemeinsame Kontrolle iber Mobilkom Austria 
Aktiengesellschaft  ("Mobilkom")  erwerben.  PTA  ist  gegenwartig 
Alleingesellschafterin der Mobilkom. 
Der ZusammenschluB wird durch Aktienkaufvertrag bewirkt. 
2.  Nach PrOfung der Anmeldung hat die Kommission festgestellt, dafi das angemeldete 
Vorhaben  in  den  Anwendungsbereich  der  Verordnung  (EWG)  Nr.4064/89  des 
Rates fallt und hinsichtlich seiner Vereinbarkeit mit dem Gemeinsamen Markt und 
dem Funktidnieren des  EWR-Abkommens keinen Anlafi  zu ernsthaften Bedenken 
gibt. 
Rue de Ia lol200, B-1049 Bruxellestwetstraat 200, B-1049 Brussel- Belglen 
Telefon: Zentrale 299.11.11. 
Fernschreiber: COMEU B 21877. Telegrammadresse: COMEUR BrOssel. I.  DIE TATIGKEITEN DER PARTEIEN UND DAS VORHABEN 





nationale Osterreichische Post- uild Telefongesellschaft; 
Finanzholding  fi1r  intemati.onale  Beteiligungen der STET-
auf  dem Gebiet der Mobiltelekommunikation; 
Mobiltelefongesellschaft der PTA. 
II.  ZUSAMMENSCHLUSS 
1.  Gemeinsame Kontrolle 
4.  Das  Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen wird gemeinsam von PTA und  SMH kontrolliert. 
SMH  erwirbt  zwar  lediglich  einen  Anteil  von  [  ... p  an  dem 
Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen,  ·  wahrend  PTA  die  restlichen  [  ... f  beh4lt.  Die 
gemeinsame Kontrolle beider Gesellschafter wird durch die in dem zwischen ihnen 
abgeschlossenen Syndikatsvertrag  vorgesehenen  Minderheitsrechte  gewahrleistet. 
Eine Beteiligung von mindestens [  ... p gewahrt eine Sperrminorita.t fi1r wesentliche 
Angelegenheiten  der  Untemehmensfiihrung  [  ... p . Teil  der Vereinbarungen,  mit 
denen der ZusmmenschluB bewirkt wird, ist ein zwischen PTA, Mobilkom und der 
zur  STET  Gruppe  gehorenden  Telecom  Italia  Mobile  S.p.A.  ("TIM") 
abgeschlossener Technischer Service Vertrag, durrh den sich TIM verpflichtet, der 
Mobilkom fi1r  die  Dauer von hOchstens  fiinf Jahren gegen gesonderte Bezahlung 
Dienstleistungen  zur  V  erfO.gung  zu  stellen.  Diese  Dienstleistungen  bestehen  im 
wesentlichen in der Beratung und Untersto.tzung der Mobilkom beim Betrieb ihres 
Mobiltelefongeschaftes.  · 
2.  Vollfunktionsuntemehmen auf  Dauer 
5.  Das Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen ist bereits als Mobiltelefongesellschaft in Osterreich 
ta.tig  und  wird  wie  bisher  auf  Dauer  alle  Funktionen  einer  selbstandigen 
Wirtschaftseinheit erfo.llen. 
3.  Konzentrativer Charakter 
0 For die Veroffentlichung gestrichen; weniger als 50%. 
•  Ft\r die Verotl'entlichung gestrichen; mehr als 50%. 
•  For die Veroffentlichung gestrichen; weniger als von SMH gehalten wird. 
•  For die VerOffentlichung gestrichen, die Angelegenheiten werden im einzelnen uufgezahlt. 
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li {B{A~'8 6.  Die Beteiligung von SMH an Mobilkom wird keinen AnlaB zur Koordinierung des 
W  ettbewerbsverhaltens der Vertragsparteien untereinander oder zwischen ihnen und 
dem  Geineinschaftsuntemehmen  geben.  Die  PTA  hat  ihre  gesamten 
Mobilfunkaktivit!ten auf die Mobilkom ubertragen und ist in diesem Bereich nicht 
mehr  selbst  t!tig.  Soweit  der  Betrieb  von  Festnetzen  als  benachbarter  Markt 
anzusehen ware,  besteht zwischen heiden Muttem kein W  ettbewerbsverh!ltnis, da 
sie auf verschiedenen geographischen Markten t!tig sind. 
III.  GEMEINSCHAFTSWEITE BEDEUTUNG 
7.  Die  Untemehmen PTA,  SMH  und  Mobilkom haben  zusammen  einen  weltweiten 
Gesamtumsatz  von  mehr  als.  5Mrd. ECU.  Jedes  von  ihnen  hat  einen 
gemeinschaftsweiten  Gesamtumsatz  von  mehr  als  250Mio. ECU.  Allerdings 
erzielen sie nicht mehr als  zwei Drittel ihres gemeinschaftsweiten Gesamtumsatzes 
in  einem  und  demselben  Mitgliedstaat.  Das  Vorhaben  hat  folglich 
gemeinschaftsweite  Bedeutung,  stellt  aber  keinen  Kooperationsfall  aufgrund  des 
EWR-Abkommens dar.  ·  ··  ·  • • 
IV.  WE'ITBEWERBLICHE BEURTEILUNG 
A. Sachlich relevante Mirkte 
8.  Das  Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen ist auf dem  Gebiet der Mobiltelefonie (GSM.  D· 
Netz, C-Netz) und der Personenrufdienste (Paging) t!tig. Das Untemehmen wird auf 
dem Gebiet der Satelliten- und B\lndelfunkdienste und der damit im Zusammenhang 
stehenden  Leistungen  ta.tig  werden.  Die  anmeldenden  Parteien  erkl!ren.  daB 
Mobilkommunikation,  untergliedert  in  C-Netz,  D-Netz,  GSM  und  Paging,  den 
sachlich relevanten Markt bildet. 
9.  Nach Darstellung der Parteien ist das Osterreichische Autotelefonnetz-C ein analoges 
Mobilfun.knetz  ebenso  wie  das  Mobiltelefonnetz-D.  Letzteres  wurde  als 
AnschluBnetz an das C-N etz erforderlich, da im Jahre 1990 die Kapazit!tsgrenze des 
C-Netzes  erreicht wurde.  Das  zellulare digitate Mobilfunksystem der Norm  GSM 
(Global System for Mobile Communications) basiert auf einer Gemeinschaftsnonn, 
die  aber  auch  von  nicht  EU -Land em  ubemommen  wurde.  Das  Osterreichische 
Pagingnetz ist ein nicht zellularer, nationaler Personenfunkrufdienst, der auf einem 
Frequenzband im 150 Mhz-Bereich betrieben wird. 
I  0.  Eine Abgrenzung der sachlich relevanten Markte ist jedoch nicht notwendig, weil in 
allen  untersuchten  altemativen  Ma.rkten  wirksamer  Wettbewerb  weder  im  EWR 
noch in einem wesentlichen Teil dieses Gebiets erheblich behindert worde. 
B. Riumlich relevante Mirkte 
11.  Der r!umlich relevante Markt ist nach Darstellung der anmeldenden Parteien for das 
Pagingnetz  sowie  die  analogen  Netze  C-Netz  und  D-Netz  national.  Die  Parteien 
gehen hinsichtlich des .digitalen GSM-Netzes von einem europaweiten Markt aus. 
3 12.  Die riumlich relevanten Markte brauchen nicht naher abgegrenzt zu werden, weil in 
allen untersuchten altemativen riumlichen Markten wirksamer W ettbewerb weder 
im EWR noch in einem wesentlichen Teil dieses Gebiets erheblich behindert wiirde. 
C. Auswirkungen· des Zusammenschlusses 
13.  Soweit der wettbewerblichen Beurteilung der Oserreichische Markt zugrunde gelegt 
wird,  fo.hrt  der ZusammenschluB  nicht  zur  Starkung  einer  marktbeherrschenden 
Stellung durch Marktanteilsaddition.  Die STET  -Gruppe ist in Osterreich auf dem 
Gebiet der Mobiltelefonie in keinem der genannten Prodliktmarkte ta.tig: 
PTA hat ihre gesamten Mobiltelefonaktivit!ten in die Mobilkom eingebracht 
und  hat  sich  und  ihre  Konzemgesellschaften  vertraglich  gegenuber  SMH 
verpflichtet, in Osterreich nur uber die Mobilkom titig zu werden.  Mobilkom 
hilt nach Angaben der Parteien in Osterreich Marktanteile von  100% in  den 
analogen Netzen, 96,5% beim digital en GSM-Netz und 91,05% beim Paging-
Netz.  In  den  heiden  letztgenannten  Bereichen  ist  jeweils  ein  anderer 
Wettbewerber  lizensiert.  FOr  das  digitate  GSM-Netz "la.uft  gegenwartig  eine 
Ausschreibung fur die V erg abe einer dritten Lizenz. Die PTA, Mobilkom und 
verbundene Untemehmen und damit  SMH und  die STET Gruppe sind von 
dieser Ausschreibung ausgeschlossen. 
Die  STET  -Gruppe,  der  SMH  angehOrt,  ist  als  Mehrheits- oder 
Minderheitsgesellschafter auf dem Gebiet der Mobiltelekommunikation in einer 
Reihe von Landem titig. Es handelt sich innerhalb der Europruschen Union urn 
Italien, Griechenland und Frankreich, auBerhalb urn Bolivien, Chile, Indien und 
Argentinien. STET und SMH sind gegenwartig in Osterreich nicht auf diesem 
Gebiet t!tig. SMH hat sich und ihre Konzemgcsellschaften verpflichtet, dort nur 
Ober die Mobilkom titig zu werden. 
14.  Der  ZusammenschluB  fUhrt  auch  nicht  durch  einen  Ressourcenzuwachs,  sei  er 
finanzieller,  _administrativer  oder  technologischer  Art,  zu  der  Verstarkung  einer 
marktbeherrschenden Stellung der Mobilkom auf dem Osterreichischen Mark1.  Dies 
gilt  auch  fur  die  nach  dem  Technischen  Service  Vertrag  an  Mobilkom  zu 
erbringenden Dienstleistungen. Ziel  des Zusammenschlusses ist es, der Mobilkom 
einen strateglschen Partner zur V erfugung zu stellen, der Erfahrung im Bereich der 
Mobiltelkommunikation  besitzt.  Der  einzige  Wettbewerber  der  Mobilkom  in 
Osterreich, die max.mobil. Telekommunikations Service GmbH ("max..mobil"), hat 
mit Siemens und der Deutschen Telekom finanziell, administrativ und technologisch 
mindestens ebenso potente Partner wie die Mobilkom mit SMH.  Soweit die STET 
Gruppe in  einigen Technologiebereichen, zu denken  ware an  die "pre-paid card" 
Technologie, einen Entwicklungsvorsprung gegenuber der max.mobil haben sollte, 
den  sie  der  Mobilkom  zur  Verftlgung  ·stellen  kann,  so  ist  dies  lediglich  eine 
kurzfristige V erzOgerung.  · 
15.  Soweit der wettbewerblichen Beurteilung ein europfiischer Markt zugrunde zu leg  en 
ist,  ist  die  H6he  der  Marktanteile  der  Parteien  nicht  geeignet,  eine 
marktbeherrschende Stellung zu schaffen oder zu verstarken: 
4 1m Bereich der analogen Netze verfiigt die STET Gruppe nach Angaben der 
Parteien uber einen Marktanteil in der Europaischen Union von maximal [  .. ·'· 
Die Mobilkom verfiigt in dies em Gebiet iiber einen Marktanteil von [  ... f . so 
daB  beide Untemehmen gemeinsam europaweit iiber einen Marktanteil  von 
knapp  [  ... ]• verfiigen wiirden.  Die gr06ten Wettbewerber in dieseni Bereich 
sind Cellnet mit [  ... J-, Vodafone mit [  ... J- und Telef6nica M6viles mit [  ... p. 
Nach den Angaben der Parteien ist auf dem Gebiet der analogen Systeme ein 
Nachfragelilckgang  zugunsten  digitaler  Systeme,  die  nicht  zuletzt  wegen 
fortgeschritteneren technischen MOglichkeiten hohe Zuwachsraten verzeichnen, 
zu beobachten. 
Im Bereich der digitalen Netze verfiigt die STET Gruppe in der Europaischen 
Union  nach  Angaben  der  Parteien  iiber  einen  Marktanteil  von  [  ... ?- und 
Mobilkom uber [  ... ]M. zusammen haben beide Untemehmen also iiber etwas 
mehr als [  ... ]H Marktanteil. Die gr06ten Wettbewerber in diesem Bereich sind 
Mannesmann  Mobilfunk  mit  gemeinschaftsweit  [  ... pe  und  DeTeMobil  mit 
[  ... ] ... 
Im  Bereich  Paging  verfugt  Mobilkom  iiber  einen  gemeinschaftsweiten 
Marktanteil von[  ... ]"  wobei eine Teilnehmerzahl von knapp 95.000 zugrunde 
gelegt wird. 
STET ist in diesem Bereich lediglich in I  tali  en mit einer ·  Teilnehmerzahl von 
162.000 ta.tig.  Der kombinierte Marktanteil der Parteien in der Gemeinschaft 
im Bereich Paging diirfte daher unter [  ... peliegen. 
•  FOr die Veroffentlichung gestrichen~ 20-30%. 
•  FUr die VerotTentlichung gestrichen~ 1-10%. 
•  For die Veroffentlichung gestrichen~ 20-30%. 
•  For die Veroffentlichung gestrichen; 10-20%. 
•  For die Veroffentlichung gestrichen~ 10-20%. 
•  For die Veroffentlichung gestrichen; 10-20%. 
08  Fur die Veroffentlichung gestrichen~ 10-20%. 
M  Fur die VerOffentlichung gestrichen; 1-10%. 
H  Fur die VerOffentlichung gestrichen~ 10-20%. 
00 For die VerOffentlichung gestrichen~ 10-20%. 
oe For die VerotTentlichung gestrichen~ 10-20%. 
H  FUr die VerOffentlichung gestrichen~ 1-10%. 
oe For die VerOtl"entlichung gestrichen;.l-10%. 
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beherrschende Stellung, als  deren Ergebnis wirksamer Wettbewerb im EWR oder 
einem wesentlichen Teil davon erheblich behindert WOrde. 
V.  NEBENABREDEN 
17.  Die Parteien haben folgende V ereinbanmgen als N ebenabreden notifiziert: 
Zwischen  PTA  und  SMH  wurde  ein  Wettbewerbsverbot  zugunsten  von 
Mobilkom  vereinbart,  das  beide  Parteien  sowie  ihre  Konzemgesellschaften 
verpflichtet, weder djrekt noch indirekt mit der Mobilkom auf dem Gebiet der 
Mobiltelekommunikation, der Personelirufdienste oder zukOnftiger Dienste wie 
den Mobilen Datenservice in Osterreich zu konkurrieren und aile diese Dienste 
auf die Mobilkom zu konzentrieren. Das Wettbewerbsverbot gilt fOr die Dauer 
der  Beteiligung  der  Parteien  an  Mobilkom,  und  fur  SMH  und  deren 
Konzemgesellschaften darOber hinaus fOr zwei Jahre nach deren Ausscheiden. 
Sie  gilt  ebenso  fur  andere  Telekombetreibergesellschaften,  sofem  sie 
Syndikatspartner werden. 
Bei dieser V  ereinbanmg handelt es sich urn ein W ettbewerbsverbot zwischen 
den Grunderuntemehmen des  Gemeinschaftsuntemehmens, das  als  Ausdruck 
des  Ruckzugs  der  Griinderuntemehmen  vom  Markt  des 
Gemeinschaftsuntemehmens notwendiger Bestandteil des  Zusammenschlusses 
ist.I  Dies gilt entsprechend for den Fall, daB  SMH  auss~heidet, urn dem oder 
den verbleibenden Gesellschaftem den Wert der Mobilkom zu  erhalte~ Bin 
Zeitraum von zwei Jahren ist insoweit als angemessen anzusehere 
18.  Zwischen  der  zur  STET  Gruppe  gehorenden  Telekom  Italia  Mobil  SPA 
("TIM"),  der  PTA  und  der  Mobilkom  wurde  vereinbart,  daB  TIM  der 
Mobilkom dort bezeichnete Dienstleistungen gegen gesonderte Bezahlung zur 
V  erfugung stellt. 
Bei  dieser  V  ereinbarung  handelt  es  sich  urn  einen  entgeltlichen 
Dienstleistungsvertrag, der einen integralen Bestandteil des Zusammenschlusses 
bildet. Ziel des vorliegenden Zusammenschlusses war, fiir die Mobilkom einen 
auf dem Gebiet der Mobiltelefonie erfahrenen Partner zu finden. Es muB daher 
nicht tiber  den  Charakter dieser  Vereinbanmg  als  Nebenabrede  entschieden 
werden. 
VI.  SCHLUSS 
1 Bekunntmuchung der Kommission Ober Nebenubreden zu ZusammenschlOssen nuch der Verordnung 
(EWG)  Nr.  4064/89  des  Rates  vom  21.  Dezember  1989  Ober  die  Kontrolle  von 
UntemehmenszusammenschlOssen (ABI. C 203 vom 14. 8.  1990,  S.S~ Punkt V.A. 
2  Punkt III.A.l. der zitierten Bekanntmachung. 
3  Punkt Ill.A.2. der zitierten Bekanntmachung. 
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11/f..)-U~ 19.  Aus  diesen  Glilnden  hat  die  Kommission  beschlossen,  dem  angemeldeten 
Zusammenschlul3  nicht  zu  widersprechen  tmd  ibn  fOr  vereinbar  mit  dem 
Gemeinsamen  Markt  und  dem  EWR-Vertrag  zu  erklaren.  Diese  Entscheidung 
beruht  auf Artikel  6  (I) b  der  Fusionsverordntmg  tm.d  Artikel  57  des  EWR-
Vertrages. 
Fill' die Kommission 
7 20.9.97  Official Journal  of the  European  Communities 
Prior notification of a  concentration 
(Case  No IV/M.975- Albacom/BT/ENI) 
(97/C ·  285/08) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
1.  On  16  September  1997,  the  Commission  received  notification  of  a  proposed  concen-
tration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 e>  by which the Italian 
group  ENI acquires within  the  meaning of Article  3 (  1)  (b)  of the  Regulation  joint control of 
Al.bacom  SpA  (Aibacom),  currently under the control of British Telecommunications pic  (BT). 
Other shareholders  in  Albacom  include  the  Italian  bank  Banca  Nazionale del  Lavorc;>  and  the 
Italian  company  Mediaset. 
2.  The business  activities  of the  undertakings  concerned  are: 
- ENI: ENI is  the ultimate holding company of a group of companies involved  in  the oil  and 
natural gas  industries, 
- BT: its principal activity  is  the supply of telecommunication services  and equipment, 
- Albacom:  supply  of  voice  and  d~t~ ·telecommunication  and  value-added  products  and 
services  to business  customers in  Italy. 
3.  On preliminary examination,  the  Commission  finds  that the  notified  concentration  could 
fall  within  the  scope  of Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89.  However,  the  final  decision  on  this 
point  is  reserved. 
4.  The  Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  to.  submit  their  possible  observations  on 
the  proposed  operation. 
Observations  must  reach  the  Commission  not  later  than· 10  days  following  the  date  of this 
publication. Observations  can  be  sent by fax  ((32-2) 296 43 01  or 296 72 44) or by  post,  under 
reference  IV/M.975 - Albacom/BT/ENI,  to: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate B- Merger Task Force, 
Avenue  de  Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
(
1
)  OJ L 395, 30.  12.  1989; corrigendum: OJ L 257, 21.  9.  1990, p.  13. 
c 285/15 c 344i8  Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities 
Prior ·notification of a ·concentration 
(Case  No·IV/M.1046- Am.eritech!Tele  Damnark) 
(97 /C 344/03) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
t.·  On 4 November  1997, the Commission  received  notification of a proposed concentration 
pursuant to Anicle  4 of Council  Regulation  (EEC) No 4064/89 (') by  which  the  undertaking 
Ameritech  Corporation  (USA)  acquires  within  the  meaning  of Anicle  3 (1)  (b)  of the  Regu-
lation control of Tele  Danmark A/S (OK) by  way of purchase of shares. 
2.  The business  activities  of the  undertakings  concerned  are: 
- Ameritech  Corporation:·  telecommun~cation services, 
- Tele Danmark A/S: telecommunication services. 
3.  On preliminary examination,  the  Commission  finds  that the  notified  concentration  could 
fall  within  the  scope  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89.  However,  the  final  decision  on this 
point is  reserved.  · 
4.  The Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  to submit  their  possible  observations  on 
the  proposed  operation. 
Observations  must  reach  the  Commission  not  later  than  10  days  following  the  date  of this 
publication. Observations can be sent by fax  ((32 2) 296 43 01  or 296 72 44)  or by post,  under 
reference  IV/M.1046  ...,..  Ameritech/Tele  Danmark,  to: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate B- Merger Task Force, 
Avenue  de  Cortenberg/Konenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
(a)  OJ L 395, 30.  12.  1989; corrigendum: OJ L 257, 21.  9.  1990, p.  13. 
14.  11. 97 
(\  IB/-19..5 c 362/6  Official Journal  of the  European  Communities 
Prior notification of a  concentration 
(Case  No  IV/M.1069- WorldCom/MCI) 
(97/C 362/06) 
(Text with  EEA  rel~ce) 
1.  On  20  November  1997,  the  Commission  received  notification  of a  proposed  concen-
tration  pursuant  to  Article  4  of  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89 (')  by  which 
WorldCom Inc.  ('WorldCom') enters into a merger within  the  meaning of Article  3 (I) (b) of 
that Regulation  with  MCI Communications  Corporation  ('MCI'). 
2.  The bwiness  activities  of the  undertakings  concerned  are  the  provision  of telecommuni-
cations  services. 
3.  Upon  preliminary  examination,  the  Commission  finds  that  the  notified  concentration 
could  fall  within  the scope of Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89.  However,  the  final  decision  on 
this  point  is  reserved. 
4.  The Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  to  submit  their  possible  observations  on 
the  proposed  opera.tion.  ·  · 
Observations  must  reach  the  Commission  not  later  than  10  days  following  the  date  of  this 
publication. Observations can  be sent by fax  (No (32 2) 296 43 01/296 72 44) or by post, under 
reference  number .IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI,  to  the  following  address: 
European  Commission, 
DirectOrate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate ·B- Merger Task  Force, 
Avenue  de  Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brwsels. 
(
1
)  OJ L 395, 30. 12.  1989. Corrigendum: OJ L 257, 21. 9  . .1990, p.  13. 
28.  11.' 97 c 369/8  Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities 
Non-opposition  to a  notified  concentrati~n 
(Case  No IV/M.97S  - Albacom/BT/ENI/Mediaset) 
(97/C  369/07) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
On  13  November  1997,  the  Commission  decided  not  to  oppose  the  above  notified  concen-
tration  and  to  ·declare  it  compa~ible with  the  common  market.  This  decision  is  based  on 
Article  6 (1)(b)  of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89.  The  full  text  of the  decision  is 
available  only  in  English  and  will  be  made  public  after  it  is  cleared  of any  business  secrets  it 
may  contain.  It will  be  available: 
- as  a  paper version  through  the  sales  offices  of the  Office  for  Official  Publications  of the 
European Communities (see  list on the last page), 
- in  electronic  form  in  the  'CEN' version  of the  Celex  database,  under  document  number 
397M0975.  Celex  is  the computerized documentation system  of European Community law; 
for more information concerning subscriptions please  contact: 
EUR-OP, 
Information, Marketing and  Public  Relations {OP/48), 
2,  rue  Mercier, 
L-2985  Luxembourg. 
Tel: {352)  29 29 424 55,  fax:  (352)  29 29 427 63. 
Standing  mvttation  to  tender  pursuant  to  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  N~ 570/88  of 
16  February  1988  on  the  sale  of butter at reduced  prices  and the  granting  of aid  for  butter 
and  concentrated  bu(ter for  use  in  the  manufacture  of pastry  productS,  ice-cream  and  other 
foodstuffs 
(97/C  369/08) 
(See  notice in Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities  L  55  of  1 March  1988,  page  31) 
Tender No:  219 
Date of  Commission  Decision:  28  November  1997 
(FCU/100 /tt) 
Formula  A/C-D  8 
Incorporation  procedure  With  Without  With  Without 
tracers  tracers  tracers  tracers 
Minimum  Butter  Unaltered  227  230  - -
price  2':  82%  Concentrated  225  - - -
Unaltered  156  -
Processing  security 
Concentrated  159  -
Butter  2':::.  82 %  125  121  - 121 
Maximum  Butter  <  82%  120  116  - -
aid 
. amount  Concentrated  butter  154  150  154  150 
Cream 
\  54  - - -
Butter  138  - - -
Proces~ing  Concentrated  butter  170  - 170  - securaty 
Cream  - - 60  -
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II 
(Acts  whose publication is  not obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMI~SION  DECISION 
of 14 May 1997 
declaring a concentration to be compatible' with the common market and the functioning of the 
EEA Agreement 
(Case No IV/M.8S6- British Telecom/MCI (II)) 
(Only the English  text is  authentic) 
(Text with EEA  relevance) 
(97/815/EC) 
lHE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  on  ·the  European 
Economic Area, and in particular Article  57 thereof, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89 
of 21  December  1989 on the control  of concentrations 
between  undertakings (1),  as  amended  by  the  Act  of 
Accession  of  Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden,  and  in 
particular Article 8 (2)  thereof, 
Having regard to the Commission Decision of 30 January 
1997 to initiate proceedings in  this case, 
Having given the undertakings concerned the opportunity 
to make known their views on the concerns expressed by 
the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Advisory Committee 
on Concentrations (1), 
(1)  OJ L 395, 30.  12.  1989, p.  1; corrected  version,  OJ L 257, 
21.  9.  1990, p.  13.  ' 
(Z)  OJ c 372, 9.  12.  1997. 
Whereas: 
(1)  On  18  December  1996  the  UK  company  British 
Telecommunications  pic  ('BT')  and  the  MCI 
Communications Corporation' ('MCr) notified their 
intention  to  effect  a  full  merger  between  the  two 
companies. 
(2)  After  examination  of  the  notification,  the 
Commission  has  concluded  that  the  notified 
operation  falls  within  the  scope  of  Council 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  ('the  Merger 
Regulation  •). 
I.  THE PARTIES 
(3)  BT's  principal  actiVIty  is  the  supply  of 
telecommunications  services  and  equipment.  Its 
main  service'>  and  products  are  local  and 
long-distance  telephone  calls  · in  the  United 
Kingdom, the provision of telephone exchange lines 
to  homes  and  businesses,  international  telephone 
calls made from and to the United Kingdom and the 
supply  of  telecommunications  equipment  for 
customers'  premises.  BT  also  has  a  joint  venture 
(called  ~pringboard) with News International in  the 
United Kingdom for Internet access and content and 
also  has  a  United  Kingdom  marketing  agreement 
with  BSkyB.  BT  is  also  active  internationally, L 336/2  Official journal of the European Communities  8.  12.  97 
notably  in  Europe  through  the  ex1stmg  Concert 
joint  venture  with  MCI,  and  through  other 
European joint ventures. 
(4)  MCI  i~  a  diversified  communications  company 
which  offers  its- customers a portfolio of integrated 
services,  including  ~ong  distance,  wireless,  local, 
paging,  messaging,  Internet,  information  services, 
outsourcing and advanced global communications in 
the  United  States  of America.  MCI  ist  also  active 
internationally,  notably  in  the  rest of the  Americas 
through  Concert.  MCI  has  an  interest  in  a  joint 
venture  in  the  US  with  News  Corporation  for 
satellite  1V  services.  This  interest  in  the  joint 
venture  is  held  through  shares  in  various  News 
Corporation  companies.  MCI  currently  holds  a 
licence  for  satellit~ broadcasting in  the US. 
II.  THE OPERATION 
(5)  MCI  will  be  merged  into  a  BT  subsidiary 
incorporated  in  Delaware,  USA,  and  will  cease  to 
have  a  separate  legal  existence.  The  BT  subsidiary 
will  be  renamed  MCI  Communications 
Corporation. Thereupon BT's name will  be changed 
to  Concert  pic,  which  will  be  incorporated  in 
London but with headquarters in both London and 
Washington. 
(6)  Concert pic will  be  organized along geographic and 
customer lines.  Business  and consumer services  will 
continue to .  be  sold in  the United Kingdom and the 
United States, under the BT and MCI brand names 
respectively  and'  through  separate  operations.  A 
number of new  divisions  will  be  formed  from  the 
current operations of the two companies including a 
global systems integration division,· an international 
division, a division responsible for multimedia and a 
division  responsible  for  global  alliances  and  joint 
ventures. 
III.  CONCENTRATION 
(7)  The proposed operation ~  a full  merger between BT 
and MCI within the meaning of Article 3 (1)  (a)  of 
the  Merger Regulation.  Upon  the  merger  becoming 
effective,  the  existing  shares  in  MCI  will  be 
cancelled and MCI shareholders, other than BT, will 
receive  a  proportion  of  Concert  pic's  depositary 
shares. 
IV.  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
(8)  BT's  worldwide  turnover  in  the  financial  year 
1995/96  was  in  excess  of ECU  17  billion.  MCI's 
worldwide turnover for the calendar year 199  S was 
in  excess of ECU  11  billion.  BT's Community-wide 
turnover for the year  1995/96 was. also in excess of 
ECU  17 billion.  MCI  is  a US-based  company, and 
its  revenues  are  treated for  accounting  purposes as 
being earned in the United States. There ·are various 
possible approaches to the question of geographical 
allocation  of.  turnover  earned  by  telephone 
companies  on  international calls.  The  parties· have 
provided  figures  based  on  different  calculation 
methodologies. On all the variants proposed, MCI's 
Community-wide  turnover  in  1995  exceeded  ECU 
250 million.  The  parties do not achieve  more  than 
two  thirds  of  their  Community-wide  turnover 
within one and the same Member State. 
. (9)  Accordingly,  the  concentration  has  a  Community 
dimension  within  the  ineaning  of Article  1 of the 
Merger Regulation. 
V.  COMPAnBILITY WITH TilE COMMON 
MARKET AND WITH TilE FUNCTIONING OF TilE 
EEA  AGREEMENT 
A.  Relevant product markets 
(10)  In  their submission the parties contended that the~ 
was virtually no horizontal overlap between BT and 
MCI,  save  in  two  areas:  the  market  for  services 
provided  through  the  Concert  joint  venture;  and 
audioconferencing.  The  market  in  which  the 
Concert  joint  venture  is  active  is  the  global 
telecommunications services market, supplying value 
added  and  enhanced  services  to  multinational 
business users. 
( 11)  The  parties · are  both  carriers  in  their  respective 
domestic markets. This includes the following areas: 
domestic  public  switched  voice  services,  enhanced 
value  added  services,  private  leased  lines,  and 
international telecommunications. 
( 12)  Within  these  general  areas  several  markets  were 
identified  by  the  Commission  as  being  relevant  for 
the  assessment  of  the  proposed  merger,  including 
international  voice  telephony  services,  value  added 
and  enhanced  services,  telex,  audio  and 
videoconferencing  and  calling  cards.  However,  the 
subsequent inquiry has shown that on some of these 
markets  the  existing  competitive  conditions  would 
not be  affected  to any  significant extent as  a direct 
res~lt  of  the  proposed  operation,  either  because 
there  would  be  no  overlap  between  the  parties' 
activities  (telex  and  videoconferencing)  or  the 
overlap  would  be  minimal  (calling .cards  under  a 
broad  market definition).  Although  the  market  for 
value added and enhanced services has been defined 
in  previous  decisions  as  global  (see  part  V.B  -
Relevant  geographic  markets),  the  possible 
competition  concerns  arising  from  the  bringing 
together of the two companies' activities in this area 
were addressed  in  Commission Decision  94/579/EC 8.  12. 97  Official Journal of the  European Communities  L 336/3 
of 27 July 1994 relating to a  proceeding pursuant to 
Article  85  of the  EC  Treaty and Article  53  of the 
EEA  Agreement  (Case  IV/34.857  - BT-MCI)  the 
initial  BT/.MCI  Concert  joint  venture(l).  In  any 
event  this  is  not  an  affected  market  within  the 
meaning  of the  Merger  Regulation.  Therefore  this 
assessment  focuses  only  on  the  markets  for 
international  voice  telephony  services  and 
audioconferencing,  where,  according  to  the  results 
of Commission's investigations, the merger  between 
BT  and  MCI  would  have  an  impact  on 
competition. 
International voice telephony services 
(13)  Currently international voice  telephony services  are 
still  mainly  provided  through  the  use  of  public 
switched  networks  in  both  the  originating  and 
terminating  countries  of  a  call.  Interconnection 
between  the  domestic  networks  of  any  pair  of 
countries  is  provided  by  the  use  of  transmission 
capacity  on  the  international  facilities  existing 
between  the  countries  concerned.  A  preliminary 
question arises as  to whether satellite and cable are 
substitutable networks for the purposes of delivering 
calls,  or  whether  they  should  be  regarded  as 
separate.  The  parties  in  their  submission  have 
identified  a  number of ways  in  which  satellite fails 
to provide a satisfactory substitute for terrestrial or 
undersea  cable  (for  example,  inherently · greater 
signal  propagation  delay  time,  echo  effects, 
susceptibility  to  environmental  or  climatic 
conditions  such  as  heavy  rain).  These  views  have 
been  confirmed  by  numbers  of  respondents,  who 
said  they  did  not regard  satellite  as  a  satisfactory 
substitute  for  cable.  For  these  reasons  it  is 
considered  appropriate  for  the  assessment  of  the 
proposed merger to regard cable and satellite as not 
substitutable for the provision of international voice 
telephony services at the required standards. 
(14)  International  direct dialled calls  (IDD)  still  account 
for the largest share of international voice telephony 
services.  IDD  is  an automatic method of making or 
receiving  telephone  calls  over  the  public  switched 
telephone  network. Arrangements are made ' for  the 
calls  to  be  carried  by  international  operators over 
the  correspondent  transmission  facilities  provided 
between  them.  Customers  for  IDD  telephony 
services are either at the wholesale or the retail level. 
Wholesale customers are mainly telecoms companies 
who  buy  switched  interconnection  with 
international  transmission  facilities  owned  by 
existing  facilities  based  operators.  Retail  customers 
are both business and residential end-users. 
.  ("')  OJ L 223, 27. 8.  1994, p.  36. 
(15)  International  voice  telephony  s.ervices  also  are 
provided  through  the  use  of  international  private 
leased  circuits  (IPLCs)  hired  from  facilities-based 
operators.  IPLCs  are  thus  another  way  in  which 
international  facilities  are  made  available  to 
customers.  They  are  contracts  for  utilization  of 
international  transmission  capacity  on  a  purchase 
basis,  typically  by  either  telephone  operators  or 
retail business customers with high utilization needs. 
At present, IPLCs  are  provided and charged in half 
circuits.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  BT  or  Mercury 
provide  a  UK  termination,  and  a  notivnal  half of 
the  international  section,  and  a  distant 
correspondent  provides  the  other  half-circuit  and 
termination in  its country. 
Audioconferencing 
(16)  Audioconferencing  is  a  liberalized  service  pursuant 
to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  of 28  june 
1990  on  competmon  in  the  markets  for 
telecommunications services (4), as  last  amended  by 
Directive 96/19/EC(5), and consists essentially of the 
supply of telephone conferences.  It  involves  the  use 
of  a  computer  managed  system  (known  as  a 
'bridge')  in  which  telephone  conversations  with 
several  conference  participants  are  joined.  Tht.• 
conference may  be  facilitated  by  an operator or set 
up automatically. The bridging equipment maintains 
audio volume and clarity and permits participants to 
be  called  into  the  conference  by  the  conferen~e 
operator  prior  to  the  conference  ('call-out' 
conferences),  or to  call  in  at a  pre-arranged  time 
('call-in' conferences). 
(17)  From  the  point  of  view  of  end-users, 
audioconferencing  can  be  regarded  as  being  a 
distinct relevant market. Possible functional demand 
substitutes  (such  as  videoconferencing  or  the 
organization  of  meetings)  are  significantly  more 
expensive  and  it  is.  unlikely  that  users  of 
audioconferencing  services  would  switch  to  such 
alternative arrangements in  response to a small  but 
significant permanent increase  in  the  prices  for  this 
service. 
( 18)  The  parties  are  both  active  in  the  provision  of 
audioconferencing  services  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
MCI, through its indirectly wholly owned subsidiary 
Darome  Teleconferencing  UK  ('Darome'),  provides 
audioconferencing  services  in  the  United  Kingdom 
and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in  Europe. 
('')  OJ L 192, 24.  7.  1990, p.  10. 
(5)  OJ L 74, 22.  3.  1996, p.  13. L 336/4  Official Journal of the European Communities  8.  12. 97 
B.  Relevant geographic markets 
International voice telephony services 
(19)  The  parties  are  both  active  in  the  prov1s1on  of 
international  voice  telephony  services.  Both  are 
licensed  to  operate  as  international  facilities 
operators in their respective countries and MCI has 
been  recently  granted  an  international  facilities 
licence  in  the United  Kingdom.  Both  own  interests 
in  transatlantic  submarine  cables.  'From  the 
consumers'  point  of view,  the  relevant  geo.graphic 
market for international voice telephony services has 
to  be  defined  with  reference  to  call  traffic  routes 
between  any  . country  pair,  since  differ~nt 
international routes cannot be  considered as  viable 
demand substitutes. From the supply side, according 
to  most  of  the  operators  contacted  by  the 
Commission,  the  possibility  of  hubbing,  i.e. 
re-routing  US-UK  traffic  through  third  -countries, 
does  not  appear  to  be  a  viable  commercial 
possibility at present, since under the existing system 
·of  accounting  rates  and  proportionate  return  it 
would  be  more expensive  than using  direct routes. 
Furthermore,  two  distinct  geographic  markets  can 
be  identified  within  any  international  route,  each 
comprised  of the  originating  bilateral  traffic  from 
the  countries  concerned.  Although  some 
opportunities exist for customers to take advantage 
of price  differentials  between  any pair of countries 
(for  example  through  calling  cards  and  callback 
services), for the time being these alternatives do not 
seem  to  represent  a  significant  competitive 
constraint  on  domestic  incumbent  operators. 
Therefore the relevant market for the assessment of 
the  proposed  merger  is  the  UK  market  for  the 
provision  of international  voice  telephony  services 
on the  UK-US  route. 
(20)  The  parties  have  provided  maps  showing  existing 
transatlantic submarine cable capacity. According to 
those maps, there are five  principal cables- TATS, 
PTATl,  TAT9,  TATll  and  TAT12/13  - which 
carry that traffic and which run between the United 
Kingdom and the .East Coast of America. These are 
the cables identified as relevant to the assessment of 
the proposed merger. 
Audioconferencing 
(21)  In  their  notification,  the  parties  present  the 
audioconferencing  market  at  a  national  level, 
although they argue that the geographic scope of the 
relevant. market is  broader or moving  to  a  broader 
scope. Responses to the Commission inquiry suggest 
that the· market  could  in  principle  be  regarded  as 
national. 
(22)  According  to  market  sources,  the  bulk  of 
audioconferencing  takes  place  within  a  national 
market.  Customers  tend  to  look  for  supplies 
primarily  in  the  country  from  which  they  are 
operating, although there can  also  be  international 
arrangements,  in  particular  between  the  United 
States  and  the  United  Kingdom.  The  supply  of 
audioconferencing services requires a dedicated sales 
force  in  the  country  where  the  service  will  be 
supplied.  Customers  do  not generally  purchase  the 
service  globally  or  internationally,  even  if  an 
audioconference includes participants from  different 
countries. 
C.  Competitive assessment 
Market  shares  in  international  voice  telephony 
services on the UK-US  route 
\ 
(23)  With revenues  from  UK  customers of ECU  [ ...  ] (') 
million,  BT accounts for  [ ...  ]  (1)  of the  UK  market 
for  outbound  IDD  calls  along  the  UK-US  route. 
Mercury  has  [ ...  ](B)  of  the  traffic  and  others 
(mainly  resellers)  account  for  [ ...  ] (9).  In  terms  of 
settlements  paid  by  US  correspondents  on  the 
US-UK  route, BT's market share for  inbound traffic 
appears  to  be  even  higher,  with  revenues  of ECU 
[ •.••  ](6)  million, representing [  ...  ] (1)  of the  market. 
Mercury, with [ ...  ](B),  accounts for  the remainder. 
(24)  In  respect  of  IPLCs,  BT  has  a  market  share  of 
[  .•.  ] (1),  with  Mercury  accounting  for  the 
remainder.  These  shares  have  been  stable  over  the 
past three years. 
(25)  BT  still  also  enjoys  a  very  strong  posttaon  in  the 
domestic  markets.  BT's  market  shart"  for  national 
trunk  amounts  to  son1e  [ ...  )( 10),  with  revenues  of 
more  than  ECU  [  ...  ](6)  billion.  For  UK  national 
private circuits,  BT  has  a  market  share  of [ ...  ](10) 
by volume, with Mercury having[ ...  ] (9), and others 
accounting for the remainder. In  re.spect of the local 
loop,  BT,  with  revenues  of ECU  [ ...  ] (6)  billion, 
accounts for  [  ..  ·.](10)  of the market. 
(6)  In  the published version of the Decision,  some information 
has  been  omitted  and  some  figures  replaced  by  ranges, 
pursuant to  the  pro~isions of Article  17  (2)  of Regulation 
(EEC)  No 4064/89  concerning  non-disclosure  of  business 
secrets. 
( 7)  Between 50% and 70%. 
(1)  Less  than 35%. 
(9)  Less  than 15 %. 
( 10)  Over 75 %. 
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(26)  The  high  market  share  of BT  in  the  provision  of 
international voice telephony services on the UK-US 
route,  is  underpinned  by  its  current control of the 
local  loop  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Given  the  time 
leads and investments required for  the development 
of local  networks,  BT's  current dominant position 
in this market is likely to remain in place in the near 
future. 
The accounting rate  regime 
(27)  Currently, the  bulk  of international  telephone calls 
are  IDD.  These  are  handled  on  a  'correspondent' 
basis,  in  which at least two international operators 
are  involved  in  the  process  of  originating  and 
terminating (i.e.  delivering)  the call. The system  for 
determining  and  settling  the  required  level  · of 
payment  between  an  originating  and  terminating 
operator  for  the  exchange  of  international  call 
traffic is  known as the accounting rate regime. 
(28)  An  accounting  rate  is  a  negotiated  rate  between 
international carriers, premised on the idea that the 
carriers  jointly  provide  international  telephone 
services  by  handing off traffic  to each  other at the 
half-way point between two countries. Therefore, an 
accounting  rate  is  a  specialized  form  of 
interconnection  tariff,  that  treats  international 
traffic  differently  from  domestic  traffic, . in  effect 
bundling  the  provision  of  an  internatio.nal 
half-circuit,  the  connection  to  an  international 
gateway  switching  in  the  destination  country,  and 
the  domestic  termination  of the call  by  carriers  at 
each end. 
(29)  .  The accounting rate system was originally devised at 
a time when each country had a monopoly provider 
of international services. When the telecoms market 
in one country of a given country pai~ is  liberalized, 
the problem then arises of redressing the balance of 
the  relationship  between  the  monopoly  provider, 
and the suppliers of international  telecoms  services 
in  the  liberalized  country.  This  is  why  regulatory 
intervention took place in  the form of proportionate 
return and parallel accounting arrangements. Under 
the  proportionate  return  rule  any  international 
carrier in  the liberalized country that enters into an 
operating agreement with a foreign correspondent in 
a  non-liberalized  country  should  receive  an 
allocation  of  return  traffic  from  the  foreign 
correspondent that is  proportionate to the amount 
of traffic  that  the  carrier-sends  outbound  to  the 
foreign  correspondent.  Parallel  accounting  requires 
that no carrier can agree with a correspondent on a 
termination price which  is  different  from  the  price 
charged  by  the  same  correspondent  to  other 
competing carriers in the same originating country. 
(30)  The amount paid by the originating operator to the 
terminating operator for completing calls  is  usually 
half  the  accounting  rate,  and  is  known  as  the 
settlement  rate.  In  practice  operators  set  off  the 
settlement rates they owe to each other, and if call 
traffic  is  in  balance  between  the  two ··countries 
concerned,  very  little  money  changes  hands,  But 
where the traffic flows  are greater in  one direction 
than the other - as it is  currently the case between 
the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom,  with 
more  call  traffic  flowing  to  the  United  Kingdom 
than  is  returned  in  the  opposite  dire~tion - net 
cash flows  result. An  operator who terminates more 
. traffic  than  he  originates  will  find  his  settlement 
revenues  from  the  originating  telephone  operator 
exceeding  the settlement costs  he  is  obliged  to pay 
out for  the termination of his  own outgoing calls. 
(31)  Over  time  the  cost  of  international  tele-
communication  has  dropped,  in  recent  years 
quite sharply, as a result of the reduced cost of both 
switching  and  transmission  technology.  However 
accounting  rates  generally  have  not  fallen  in  lim· . 
with  the  fall  in  underlying  costs.  Furthermore, 
collection  charges  on  end  users  are  still  set  high 
enough  to  cover  all  the  notional  settlement  rate 
costs, despite these being well above the. costs to the 
telecoms  operators  on  each  side  of  handling  the 
traffic on the same  route. 
The  new  regulatory  framework  and  its  impact  on 
the. development of competition 
(32)  The proposed merger takes place in  the context of a 
progressive  move  of  many  national  regulatory 
regimes  towards full  liberalization of their telecoms 
markets.  Th~s  process  has  been  recently  taken  a 
stage  further  in  the  United  Kingdom  by  the 
Government's decision  to open up the  international 
facilities  market, followed  by  the  issuing of 45  new 
international  facilities  licences  (IFLs)  in  january 
1997,  many  granted  to  US  carriers,  and  by  tht.· 
removal of proportionate return requirements ;lt the 
UK  side. On the US  side, according to the new rules 
recently  laid  down  in  the  Flexibility  Order  of  the 
federal Communications Commission (fCC)( 11 ), US 
carriers  will  be  pc.·: .ni!ft•d  to  negntintr  nltt•flllltivt• 
settlement payment  arrangements that deviate  from 
the  accounting  rate  regime  with  foreign 
correspondents  in  countries  which  satisfy  the 
'effective  competitive  opportunities'  test  (ECO) 
adopted  by  the  FCC,  or in  any case  where  the  US 
carrier can demonstrate that the deviation  from  the 
existmg  regime  will  promote  market-oriented 
pricing and competition, while  precluding abuse of 
( 11)  FCC's Fourth report and order in the matter of international 
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market  power ·by  the  foreign  correspondent.  The 
new  rules  also  provide  that,  in  order  to  get  the 
relevant FCC authorization, carriers who negotiate 
alternative  settlement  arrangements  affecting  more 
than 25 % of the outbound or 25 %·of the inbound 
traffic  on  a  particular  route  will  have  td 
demonstrate  that  the  terms  are  not  unreasonably 
discriminatory, or will have to offer such terms on a 
non-discriminatory basis to competing carriers. 
(33)  As  a  result  of these  regulatory  developments,  the 
option  now  exists  for  an  international  carrier 
licensed  in  both the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom  of providing  telephony  services · between 
these  two  countries  on  an  end-to-end  basis,  by 
terminating  calls  at  the  foreign  end  of  its  own 
international  facilities  and getting  direct  access  to 
the unbundled functions of the domestic network of 
the foreign cpuntry, as well as whatever facilities  of 
its own it has established there. 
(34)  Although it seems reasonable to expect competition 
to develop further in the next few years on the route 
between the United States and the United Kingdom 
as  a  result  of  the  new  regulatory  framework 
described  above,  there  is  still  considerable 
uncertainty as  to how and within what time-frame 
the  market. will  actually  move  away  from  the 
existing  regime  of accounting rates  to a  system  of 
. genuine cost-based termination  charg~s. 
(35)  In  this  respect,  it  ~s  worth  considering  that  the 
prevailing  accounttng  rate  regime  provides 
incumbent  telephone  operators  with  very  few 
incentives  to  move  to  genuine  cost-based 
interconnection pricing  .. Present collection charges to 
end users  reflect the whole notional settlement rate 
paid  to  a  foreign  terminating  carrier,  whilst 
settlement  revenues  from ·incoming  traffic  are  not 
taken  into  account.  Therefore,  since  accounting 
rates  are  still  above  cost,  incumbent  telephone 
companies  earn  significant  net  revenues  from 
switched international traffic.  On the US-UK  route, 
this is especially true for UK  incumbents, for whom 
the  .existing  traffic  imbalance  with  US  carriers  is 
such as to generate a  volume of settlement inflows 
significantly  larger  than  their  settlement 
outpayments to· US  correspondents.  However, even 
for US carriers who currently have a net outflow of 
settlement . payments,  the  revenues  from  return 
traffic still leave them better off than th~y would be 
if collection charges to end users were to be  based 
on the true costs of processing calls. 
(36)  Given  the lack of incentives on current incumbents 
to move away from the accounting rate system, the 
growth  of  competition,  at  least  in  the  short  to 
medium· term,  is  likely  to depend to a  large extent 
·on  the  entry  of  new  operators.  However,  some 
possible  constraining  factors,  such  as  access  to 
transatlantic  transmission  capacity,  as  well  as 
domestic  interconnection  with  transatlantic  cable 
capacity  and  local  loop  termination  at either  end, 
appear to be  of key  relevance  in  this  respect,  and 
therefore  have  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the 
assessment of die proposed merger. 
(37)  During the investigation of this merger, a number of 
competitors have argued that equal access should be 
imposed  in  the  United  Kingdom  as  a  condition of 
approval  of  the  merger.  Other  competitors  have 
expressed the opposite view arguing that the current 
system  does  not  constitute  a  real  barrier.  Equal 
access  implies  that customers  making  international 
calls have to dial the same number of digits to select 
any  long  distance  carrier.  Under  the  current 
regulatory  framework,  BT  would  be  the  carrier 
selected  by  default, whereas customers need  to dial 
additional  digits  to  sl"lrct  any  other  carrier.  The 
Commission has concluded that the notified merger 
itself  has  no  impact  on  the  possible  difficulties 
competitors  might  have  as  a  resulr  of  the  UK 
regulations  regarding  numbering,  which  already 
existed before. 
Capacity on transatlantic transmission facilities 
(38)  Existing transatlantic submarine cable capacity was 
largely  developed  by  consortia  of  telephone 
operators, who each have percentage interests in  the 
cable  relating  to their  level  of contribution  to  the 
costs of the venture. At  the time of constructing the 
cable,  each  consortium  member  will  purchase  the 
capacity  it  requires  (referred  to  as  assigned 
capacity).  However,. a  cable  is  usually  built  with 
spare capacity, and this is normally held in common 
reserve.  Members  of the  consortium can  have  this 
capacity assigned to them, subject to the agreement 
of other  consortium  members,  provided  they  pay 
the  historic  costs  and  maintenance  and  servicing 
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(39)  Capacity in  the  common reserve  consists  of whole 
circuits and is  generally sold as such. However, the 
regulatory  rules  which,  until  recently,  prevented  a 
telephone operator from  holding a  facilities  licence 
at both ends  of an international cable,  meant that 
whole circuits as  ~uch could be used only for transit. 
If a circuit were to be  used  for  the direct exchange 
of  bilateral  IDD  traffic  over  the  public  switched 
network, it was necessary to configure it in the form 
of a matching half circuit, that is  to say, ownership 
of a whqle circuit would be split 50:50 between the 
two  facilities  operators  at  each  end  of the  cable. 
Each operator would have to be  in possession of the 
relevant international facilities  licence in  the country 
from  which  he  was  operating.  IDD  traffic  could 
then  be  exchanged  between  the  two  on  a 
correspondent  basis.  As  an  alternative  to  outright 
ownership  of  half  circuits  (only  possible  for 
operators who were  members  of the  original cable 
consortium) half circuits might be leased or assigned 
in the form of an indefeasible right of user (IRU-
see  recital- 41). On the UK-US  transatlantic route, a 
UK operator will own eastern half circuits (from the 
United  Kingdom  -to  mid-Atlantic)  which  are 
matched with western  half circuits  owned by  a  US 
operator. Whole circuits in the ownership of a single 
consortium  member  could  be  used  for  transit,  or 
might  be  of  value  against  the  possibility  of 
liberalization at the  foreign  end.  Alternatively  they 
might have been leased out as  IPLCs. 
(40)  Once the cable is  brought into service,  it is  usually 
impossible  to  enter  the  consortium  on  the  same 
equity  basis  as  the  original  participants.  Any  third 
party wishing to acquire access must obtain it from 
the  existing  incumbents.  It  has  a  choice  of trying 
either to obtain access  to circuitry already assigned 
to  consortium  members,  or  to  capacity  held  in 
common reserve. 
(41)  In  order to acquire already assigned capacity which 
has  been configured as  a matching half circuit, it is 
normally  necessary  to  obtain  the  agreement  from 
the owners of both ends of the relevant half circuit. 
Each  half of the circuit can be  leased  out, typically 
for  periods of about a  year,  but longer periods can 
be  available.  Alternatively  the  capacity  can  be 
assigned  on  an  IRU  basis  for  the  life  of the  cable 
(IRlJs  are  akin  in  many  respect  to  ownership,  but 
generally provide no equity in  the cable, nor do they 
confer  any  vote  on  the  relevant  management 
committees  for  the  cable) ..  Where,  as  would 
normally  be  the  case,  each  end  of  the  circuit  is 
owned  by  a  different  operator,  it  is  normally 
necessary  to get the consent of the  owners of both 
ends  before  any  one end of a  matched  half circuit 
can be  assigned. 
(42)  Where  a  third  party  wishes  to  obtain  access  to 
capacity  held  in  common  reserve,  it  will  need  to 
intercede with one or more consortium members in 
order to get the capacity assigned to the appropriate 
member(s), at which point IRUs can be  assigned  to 
the  ~hird  party.  The  mechanisms  by  which  such 
decisions  are  made,  or  how  prices  and  terms  are 
agreed, are not fully  transparent. 
Availability of capacity on  transatlantic cables 
(43)  As  regards current ownership of transatlantic C<lhle 
capacity,  BT  and  MCI,  together  with  AT&T,  are 
among the largest owners on the cables identified as 
relevant to this  assessment  (see  part B - Relevant 
geographic markets). 
(44)  The  question  of  how  much  capacity  is  actually 
available  to  BT  and MCI has  proved complex.  On 
both  the  eastern  and  the  western  ends  of  the 
relevant  transatlantic cables,  an  important share of 
existing capacity is  allocated  to non-US  or non-UK 
operators  who  are  not  licensed  to  provide  voice 
telephony  services  on  the  US-UK  route.  Therefore, 
their capacity is  currently used essentially for  transit 
purposes  (i.e.  as  an  intermediate  link  for  carrying 
traffic going to some other countries) on the basis of 
long-term  contracts  with  their  foreign-end 
correspondents,  which  in  turn  implies  that 
non-negligible  switching  costs  would  have  to  be 
borne if this capacity were to be  re-allocated to the 
UK-US  route.  On  the  basis  of calculations  made 
from  figur~s  provided  by  the  parties,  once  these 
operators  are  left  out  of consideration,  BT  owns 
some  [ ...  ) (12)  of  total  allocated  capacity  on  the 
eastern end of the relevant transatlantic cables, MCI 
about [ ...  ](13), AT&T about [ ...  )(u) and Mercury 
about  [ ...  ]'( 13),  whereas  other  US  carriers  such  as 
MFS/Worldcom  and  Sprint  would  each  have  less 
than  [ ...  ] (13).  On  the  western  end,  BT  would  be 
entitled  to  some  [ ...  1( 1.1),  MCI  about  1  ..•  1( 14), 
AT&T about  ( ...  )( 15),  MFS/Worldcom  and  Sprint 
each  about  1  •••  1( 11),  and  Mercury  about  1  ..•  1(
11
). 
These data imply that BT has the largest  sin~le share 
( 12)  Between  40 'Yu  and 50 'Yc,. 
( 11)  Less  than 25%. 
( 14)  Less  than 30%. 
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of capacity  on the eastern  end,  and  MCI  and  BT 
together  are  the  second  largest  owners  on  the 
western end. 
(45)  The  parties  have  confirmed  that  if  all  BT-MCI 
matched capacity and aU  BT and MCI whole circuit 
capacity  were  combined,  it  would  be  possible  to 
carry all of BT's and MCI's current US-UK traffic in 
both  directions.  They  also  say  that other  carriers, 
such as  AT&T, have enough capacity to be  able to 
self-correspond  for  the  entirety  of  their  current 
switched  traffic  on  the  US-UK  route.  They  have 
however,  argued  that  for  a  more  appropriate 
calculation of their capacity  entitlements  along the 
US-UK  route,  it  would  be  necessary  to  exclude 
capacity  wh.ich  they  either  currently  use  or  have 
acquired  for  transit  purposes  (i.e.  to  carry  traffic 
terminated  by  correspondents  in  countries  other 
than the  United  Kingdom  or the  United  States)  :~s 
well  as  their capacity in  cables  which  also  land  in 
countries other than the United Kingdom, as far  as 
this capacity is  assigned to different  ~outes. 
(46)  All  the  relevant  transatlantic  cables  also  have 
landing  points  in  countries  other  than  the  United 
Kingdom  (such  as  Prance,  Spain  and  Ireland)  and 
circuits  are  usually  bought  for  carrying  traffic  on 
specific routes. However, as confirmed by  responses 
from major competitors, unlike other cables, circuits 
bought  on  TAT  12113  for  the  US-France  route 
could in principle also  be  utilized  for  US-UK  traffic 
subject to the consent of consortium members, since 
the specific configuration of the cable (designed as a 
ring  system  between  the  United  States,  the  United 
Kingdom and France) allows for traffic to be  routed 
either way round the ring. 
(47)  The issue  of transit capacity is  more difficult since 
almost  all  of the  parties'  overlapping  capacity  is 
made up of whole circuits which have only recently 
been  acquired  on  TAT  12113  and  hence  are  still 
unused. Therefore, unlike the transit capacity owned 
by non-US or non-UK operators, this capacity could 
in .principle be allocated to the UK-US route without 
the  parties  having  to  incur  significant  switching 
costs.  In  any  case,  even  if  the  capacity  which  the 
parties claim  to  be  reserved  for  their  transit  needs 
was  left  out,  if  similar  deductions  were  also  made 
for  the  parties'  major  competitors  on  the  UK-US 
route, the  proposed merger  would still  result  in  an 
overlap of about ( ...  ](16)  of the overall eastern end 
capacity  (or  126  2Mbit  circuits  on  an  estimated 
total  of ( ...  )(17)  2Mbit circuits),  the  overwhelming 
( 16)  Less  than 15 %. 
(17)  Deleted. Business secret. 
part of 'which  is  on TAT  12113,  significant  enough  to 
reinforce the already strong position held  by  BT. 
(48)  Furthermore,  according  to  data  provided  by  the 
parties,  at the  date  of  notification  there  was  still 
sufficient  unallocated  capacity  in  TAT  12/13  to 
accommodate the needs  of newly licensed operators 
in  the  United  Kingdom.  However~  at  the  last 
allocation round in TAT 12/13, which took place in 
January  1997,  BT  and  MCI,  bought  signif~cant 
amounts  of  new  capacity  (( ...  ) (18)  and  f  .. .  J ( 18) 
2Mbitls  whole  circuits,  respectively).  Other 
consortium  members,  such  as  AT&T, also  bought 
capacity according to their percentage ownership in 
that cable.  These  acquisitions  have  been  on  a scale 
sufficient  to  provoke  complaints  from  prospective 
operators (i.e. those who have recently been granted 
international facilities  licenses  in the UK)  that there 
is  now virtually  nothing  left  for  new  operators on 
that  cable.  Indeed,  only  [  ...  ](19
)  of  the  design 
capacity  of  this  cable  (corresponding  to  about 
[ •••  ]  (
19
)  of  total  capacity  on  all  the  relevant 
transatlantic cables)  remains  unassigned.  However, 
currently  outstanding  request  from  consortium 
members  on  TAT  12113,  including  BT  and  MCI 
themselves,  greatly  exceed  the  amount  of  this 
common  reserve  capacity  making  it  even  more 
difficult for  new operators to enter the market. 
(49)  The  parties  contend  that,  irrespective  of whether 
there  is  currently  adequate  spare  capacity  on 
existing cables, large amounts of additional capacity 
will  soon be  made available as  a result of both the 
prospective upgrading of TAT 12113  (which, by  the 
introduction of new transmission technology, would 
double  the  system's  current  capacity)  and  the 
coming  on  stream  of  new  cables,  such  as  ~ 
planned  Gemini  cable  venture  between  MFS  and 
Cable &  Wireless  (which  is  expected to double the 
total existing transatlantic capacity). 
(50)  Notwithstanding  expected  new  capacity 
developments,  consortium  members  will  still  have 
options  in  the  allocation  of  any  extra-capacity 
resulting  from  the  upgrading  of  TAT  12113. 
Furthermore, since  the  additional capacity resulting 
from  the upgrading of TAT 12113  or the  full  entry 
into service of the new Gemini cable is  not likely to 
(11)  Deleted. Business secret. 
(19)  Less  than 15 %. 
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become  available  before  the  end  of  1998,  the 
question  still  remains  as  to  whether  it  will  be 
sufficient to keep pace with the continuing increase 
in  demand.  There  is  a  general  consensus  that the 
demands on cable capacity are set to rise and some 
respondents expect that, due to the extremely high 
capacity  requirements  of the  Internet  community, 
and the  large  number of prospective  new entrants 
following  the  forthcoming  liberalization  of 
European  telecoms  markets,  even  this  additional 
capacity  will  soon  be  insufficient  or,  will  at  best, 
offer only temporary relief.  It may  be  recalled  that 
TAT  12113  entered  into  full  service  only  at  the 
.  beginning of 1996, and that it took only six to nine 
months  for  requests  for  additional  allocation  from 
existing  operators  to  exhaust  virtually  all  of  the 
remaining capacity available on that cable. 
(51)  Consequently,  the entry of new facilities  operators 
in  the  market  for  international  voice  telephony 
services  on the  US-UK  route will  to a  large extent 
depend  on  whether  and  on  what  cost  terms 
sufficient capacity will be made available to them by 
the  incumbent  carriers.  As  far  as  the  parties  are 
concerned, there are no specific obligations on them 
to  release  capacity  and  they  could  refuse,  for 
example,  if  they  felt  they  needed  the  capacity 
themselves. 
Domestic  interconnection  with  transatlantic  cable 
capacity and local loop termination 
(52)  Any traffic carried on an international cable has to 
pass through the cable head facilities at each end in 
order  to  be  terminated  in  the  country  concerned. 
Through  backhaul  facilities,  international  calls  are 
run from the cable landing station to some suitable 
point of interconnection  with  a  domestic  network 
and then  to a  local  network  (the  'local  loop')  for 
final  delivery. 
(5.1)  International  calls  are  at  present  charged  to 
corresponding operators according to the settlement 
rate  system,  where  non-cost-based  charges  arc 
agreed  for  terminating  calls  originating  from 
abroad. This reflects the traditional market structure 
for  international  calls  where  nationally  based 
monopoly carriers  agree  to  terminate  each  other's 
traffic.  In  the  United  Kingdom  the  granting of 45 
new  international  facilities  licences  should 
encourage competition  in  this  area  and a  move  to 
cost-based termination. 
(54)  The Community directives currently in  force  in this 
area  (Directive  95/62  of the  European  Parliament 
and· of the  Council  of  13  December  1995  on the 
application  of open  network  provision  (ONP)  to 
voice telephony) (2°)  and Directive 90/388/EC set out 
specific rules to ensure that reasonable requests  for 
interconnection  are  met  on  the  basis  of 
non-discriminatory,  proportionate  and  transparent 
terms  and  conditions.  Under  those  rules,  Member 
States  are  to  establish  directly  the  necessary 
conditions  and  requirements  for  interconnection  if 
commercial  negotiations  do  not  lead  to  an 
agreement within a  reasonable  period and they  are 
to ensure  that the cost accounting sy!ttems  used  by 
the operators with regard  to the  provision of voice 
telephony and public  telecommunications  networks 
identify  the  cost  elements  relevant  for  pricing 
interconnection offerings. 
(55)  BT  is  also  obliged  under  its  licence  in  the  United 
Kingdom  to  publish  separate  accounts  for  its 
business  activities  (including  interconnection 
services). It is also obliged to publish, amongst other 
things,  its  cost-oriented charges  for  interconnecting 
services  and the costs  from  which  such charges Mt' 
derived.  BT  is  currently  obliged  to  provide  other 
operators with access  to cable  landing stations and 
interconnection  to  its  swit~.:"hed  network,  both  at 
cost-based  terms.  BT  is  also  subject  to 
no-undue-discrimination .md fair-trading conditions 
in its licence. Access to BT's fadlities  is  therefore to 
be provided on the same terms to other operators as 
those  on which  BT  provides  access  and services  to 
itself. 
(56)  Oftel, the UK telecomunications regulator, currently 
sets  the  interconnection charges  for  BT  services  to 
other  licensed  UK  network  and  ISR  operators. 
Charges are set on a  fully  allocated cost basis.  For 
the  future,  it  is  anticipated  that,  from  October 
1997, BT  will  set its  own charges within  a  defined 
framework.  BT's  interconnection  charges  will  bt• 
based  on  long-run  incremental  costs  and,  when· 
there is  no effective competition for services, will  bt· 
subject  to  price  caps.  Oftd  will  St't  tht'  initi>ll  r.\tt' 
which  will  be  subject  to  a  prit:l'  cap  reducin~ tlw 
real  charge  each  yt·ttr  to  rdlt'ct  expe  .. :ted  cffk·ienry 
improvements.  Under  this  framework,  two  baskets 
of interconnection services  will  be  established.  Call 
termination will  he  strictly regulated as a bottleneck 
service  in  separate  basket.  Other services,  such  as 
in-span handover and customer-sited hand  over, will 
be  subject to their own separate price caps. 
(57)  In  relation  to  backhaul,  prices  are  based  upon 
droit-de-passage prices which are comparable to the 
(2°)  OJ L 321, 30.  12.  199S, p.  6. 
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(58) 
price~  offered  for  other  inla~d  private  circuits. 
Separate  prices  have  been  offered  for  backhaul  in 
·the  market  for  some  months.  Oftel  .is  monitoring 
the  prices  offered  by  BT  closely.  The  entrance  of 
alternative  backhaul- providers  in  the  market, such 
as Energis and MFS,  makes it reasonable to expect 
that competition in the supply of these facilities will 
develop  further  in  response  to  increasing  demand 
from  the  newly  licensed  operators  in  the 
international voice telephony market. 
Impact of  the merger  :--.-... 
By  bringing together Brs and MCI's cable capacity 
on the UK-US  route, the merger would provide the 
parties  with  the  possibility  of 'self-corresponding', 
that is  to say,  they  could  carry  their  transatlantic 
traffic  over end-to·end connections  owned entirely 
by them. The merged _entity would therefore be able 
to  internalize  settlement  payments  for  all  of  the 
traffic  which  BT  and MCI currently send  to each 
· other on a correspondent basis as well as to benefit 
from the more efficient use of transmission capacicy 
which  it would  be  allowed  to  use  because  of the 
time zone differences between the United States and 
the United Kingdom. 
(59)  This possibility of self-corresponding is not available 
at present to any other existing competitor on the 
UK -US  route  having a  significant  outbound traffic 
from the United  Kingdom.  Given  their large traffic 
volume  and  the  internalizing  of  settlement 
payments,  the  parties  would  have  a  cost structure 
not easily  replicable  by  others.  In  its  decision  to 
open  a  second-phase  investigation  in  the  present 
·case,  the  Commission  had.  doubts  . that  this 
possibility  could  lead  to  hubbing  and  traffic 
diversion  on  US-Europe  routes  in  a  way  which 
could  have  weakened  the  competitive  position  of 
BT's  competitors  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The 
second-phase enquiry has shown, however, that the 
precise  pattern  of  such  traffic  diversion  would 
depend  also  on  the  reaction  of  competitors  and 
therefore  cannot  be  established  with  certainty. 
Moreover, since  the undertakings submitted  by  the 
parties  (see  part  VI  below)  will  facilitate 
self-corresponding  by  other  carriers,  the  issue  of 
traffic  diversion  does  not need  to  be  analysed  any 
further. 
(60)  In  principle,  any  move  away  from  the  accounting 
. rate regime to a system of cost-oriented termination 
charges  is  to  be  considered  as  a  positive 
development of competition, provided that sufficient 
competitive  ~onstraints  make  it  possible  for 
consumers  to  benefit  from  lower  charges.  Given 
BT's  and  MCI's combined  position  on the  UK-US 
(61) 
cable capacity and BT's position in the generation of 
outbound  traffic  from  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
merged  entity  would  be  in  a  position  to  prevent 
other  incumbents  from  providing  end-to-end 
services  for  a  significant  volume  of  traffic.  The 
merged  entity  could  thereby  prevent  the 
development  of a  sufficient  competitive  constraint 
on the UK-US  route for the expected benefits to  be 
passed  on  to  consumers  of  international  voice 
telephony services  in  the United Kingdom. 
That is  mainly due to the fact that, because of Brs 
dominant  position  in  the  market  for  international 
voice  telephony services  on the  UK-US  route,  most 
of the  US  carriers'  transatlantic  cable  capacity  is 
made up of western  half circuits currently matched 
with BT at the eastern end. BT's consent would thus 
be required in order for them either to obtain whole 
circuits  by  swapping part of their western ·capacity 
with  BT's  relevant  half  circuits,  or to  have  their 
western  half  circuits  matched  with  other  UK 
correspondents.  Since  commercial  agreements 
between capacity owners would have to be  reached, 
the  time  r~quired  for  any  such  reconfiguration 
would depend to a large extent on Brs willingness 
to cooperate. 
(62)  Furthermore,· the  ex1stmg  accounting  rate  regime 
generates few  incentives for all incumbent operators 
to move  to cost-based termination  rates  because  it 
allows  them  to  earn  significant  revenues  from 
setting  collection  charges  to end-users  higher  than 
the  true cost of processing calls.  It seems  therefore 
reasonable  to  argue  that,  in  the  market  for 
. internat!onal telephony services on the UK-US route, 
the  pace  at which  competiti~n can  be  expected  to 
take  place and benefits  from  lower  provision costs 
to  be  passed  on  to  consumers  depend  to  a  large 
extent on  the  entry  of new  international  facilities 
operators. In order to gain market shares, they will 
have to offer attractive collection rates to customers 
and  are  likely  to  be  more  willing  than  incumbent 
carriers to by-pass the accounting rate system, eitMr 
by  trying  to  negotiate  cost-based  termination 
charges with foreign  operators, or by  finding  ways 
of self-corresponding. 
(63)  ~any of the  new  facilities  licensees  in  the  United 
Kingdom  are  already  active  in  the  business  of 
international  simple  resale  (ISR).  They  provide 
services,  mainly  at the  wholesale  level  to domestic 
network  operators  and  to  large  retail  business 
customers,  on  authorized  international  routes 
(including UK-US),  by  hiring IPLCs  from  either BT 
or  Mercury  and  carrying  traffic  on  those  lines. 
However, although the use of private circuits allows 
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and enables them to offer rates usually below those 
of incumbent  facilities-based  .operators,  IPLCs  are 
only  provided  on  a  retail ·  cost-plus  basis,  which 
makes  them  sig.nificantly  more  expensive  than IRU 
capacity. Access to IRU capacity at reasonable terms 
and  conditions  thus  appears  to  be  an  essential 
requirement for permitting the entry of the new IFL 
operators,  and  thereby  the  full  development  of 
competition  on  the  UK  market  for  international 
telephony serviCes. 
(64)  As  illustrated  above,  there  is  currently  a  capacity 
shortage on existing  transmission  facilities  between 
the  United  Kingdom  and  the  USA,  as  well  as 
substantial  uncertainty  as  to  whether  additional 
capacity  on  planned  cables  will  be  sufficient  to 
acco'!lodate  the  needs  of  a  rapidly  increasing 
demand.  In  this context, given  the  parties' capacity 
entitlements particularly on the  UK  end of existing 
tran~atlantic  cables,  the  proposed  merger,  as 
notified  to  the  Commission,  would  be  likely  to 
strengthen BT's dominant position in the market for 
international voice telephony services on the UK-US 
route. 
1 
(65)  Such a reinforcement would result from the parties' 
increased control of cable capacities and from  their 
unique  position to self-correspond  in  a  way  which 
would not be available to their existing competitors. 
Furthermore,  the  combination  of BT's  and  MCI's 
cable  capacities  would  allow  the  merged  entity 
further to restrict or control the entry opportunities 
for  the  prospective  ~ew operators.  The  notified 
merger  would  therefore  enable  BT  to  weaken 
significantly  the  development  of  effective 
competitive constraints  on its  market behaviour  in 
the  provision  of  international  voice  telephony 
services  on  the  UK-US  route.  However,· the 
undertakings  submitted  by  the  parties  (see  part VI 
below)  to  make  available  all  their  overlapping 
transatlantic  cable  capacity  resulting  from  the 
merger and to ease self-corresponding by established 
competitors  remove  the  competition  concerns 
outlined above. 
Audioconferencing 
(66)  BT and MCI, (the latter through Darome), compete 
in  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  supply  of 
audioconferencing services. Darome also operates in 
the  Community  in  Germany,  France  and  Ireland. 
Darome's  main  revenues  in  the  Community  are 
generated  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Darome  also 
subcontracts services  to Mercury,  the  revenues  for 
which account for an additional[ ...  ]  (21)  of the total 
UK  market.  The  parties  estimated  that  BT  has  a 
market  share  of  about  [ ...  ]  (22)  in  the  United 
(11)  Less  than 15 %. 
(22)  Between 50% and 60%. 
Kingdom. and  [ ...  ] (23)  in  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
They  estimate  MCI's  shares  as  [ ...  ] (23)  in  the  United 
Kingdom and [ ...  ](24)  in  the  Community as  a whole. 
(67)  The  combined  market  shares  of  BT  and  MCI 
in  the provision of audioconferencing in the United 







( 1)  Deleted. Business Secret. 







1994  1995 
(')  (') 
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(')  (') 
(')  (') 
(68)  None of the other competitors account for a market 
share  exceeding  10%. The  combined  share  of BT 
and MCI has  been  gro\\;'ing significantly during the 
last  three  years,_  reaching  a  level  of  [ ...  ) (25)  in 
1995. 
(69)  The parties have stressed that those figures  represent 
their  best  estimates,  since  reliable  figures  on  total 
market  are  not  available.  Independently  of  the 
accuracy of the figures,  it  is  clear that the  notified 
merger  leads  to  the  combination  of the  two  main 
competitors in  this  market, the  remaining suppliers 
accounting  only  for  a  small  fraction  of  the 
combined BT/Darome value sales. 
Barriers  to entry 
(70)  The parties have argued that the notified transaction 
does  not create or reinforce a dominant position in 
the  supply  of  audioconferencing  services  in  the 
United  Kingdom  because  the  market  is  relatively 
immature and  growing at high  rates each  year  (the 
table in  recital 61  shows that the market has almost 
doubled  in  the  period  1993-95). This  high  growth 
should  attract entry,  in  particular  because  barriers 
are relatively low. The parties have indicated in this 
respect  that  ~xclusive distribution  does  not play  a 
(23)  Between 30% and 40%. 
(14)  Less  than 25%. 
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significant  role  in  this  market;  and  that  the 
mvestments  necessary  to  start  up  an 
audioconferencing  b.usiness  are  relatively  low. 
Furthermore,  they  have  indicated  that the  existing 
regulatory  controls  in  the  United  Kingdom  would . 
prevent  the  merged  entity  from  discriminating 
agairist  potential  competitors  regarding  terms  for 
granting access to basic services. 
(71)  The  Commission's  inquiry  has  ·confirmed· that  the 
necessary  investments  to  set  up·  an 
audioconferencing  business  are  limited.  A  small 
start-up  company  might  have  total  fixed  assets 
worth less than £ 1 million.  In  terms of equipment, 
basically  a  bridge  is  required,  costing  less  than 
£ 500 000. For audioconferencing, there  is  no  need 
for  on-premises equipment at the customers' site.  It 
has to be concluded that investment in equipment is 
not the main obstacle to entering the market. 
(72)  According to market sources, however, the fact that 
the  audioconferencing market is  expanding at high 
rates  doe$  not  make  entry  easier.  The  market  is 
growing  basi~lly by  reason  of  increased  use  of 
audioconferencing services by established customers, 
rather than by  reason of an increase in the number 
of  customers.  According  to  those  sources,  this 
renders entry more difficult, since the entrant has to 
make  BT  arid  Darome customers  switch  to a· new, 
unproven supplier. 
(73)  If  investment  requirements  are  relatively  low, 
barriers  to  entry  might  be  important  since 
audioconferencing is  more software/service led  th.an 
hardware/technology  led.  In  this  context,  the 
reputation and proven  record  of incumbents  might 
prove  difficult  to  challenge, , in  particular  since 
audioconferencing services typically represent only a 
fraction  of  the  costs  of  the  telecommunication 
services.  , 
(74)  Revenues  from  audioconferencing  arise  from 
inv01c1ng  the  client  for  the  service  as·  such 
(managing and monitoring the audioconference by a 
service  operator, typically the supply of minutes  or 
tapes·  recording  the  audioconference)  and  for  the 
call  minutes  used  by  the  participants . to  the 
audioconference.  The  revenue  arising  from  the 
minutes  of traffic  reverts  to the  telecommunication 
operator owning the  lines  over  which  the calls  are 
made,  and  not  to  the  audioconference  service 
provider.  This  makes  it  more  difficult  for  a  new 
entrant to generate sufficient revenues to make entry 
attractive.  Furthermore, the  very  strong position of 
a combined BT/Darome entity, accounting for about 
[ •••  ) (16)  of the·  market,  makes  it  more  difficult  for 
an entrant to generate the  minimum  revenue  to  be 
profitable. 
(U)  Over 80%. 
(75)  It appears,  therefore,  that barriers  to entry can  be 
substantial  and  can  effectively  prevent  entry  at a 
sufficient  scale  to  compete  with  a  merged 
BT/Da'rome. The  operation as  notified,  would then 
create  or  reinforce  a  dominant  position  in  the 
provision  of  audioconferencing  services  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  However,  the  undertaking 
submitted  by  the  parties  (see  part  VI),  by  which 
Darome will  be  divested,  should effectively  address 
the  competition concerns outlined  in  the  preceding 
paragraphs.  · 
VI.  UNDERTAKING  SUBMfiTED BY  THE  PARTIES 
(76)  In  order  to  resolve  the  concerns  raised  by  the 
Commission  about  the  proposed  merger's  likely 
impact· oh competition,  the  parties  have  offered  to 
enter into the  following  commitments: 
'1.  Cable  capacity  between  UK  and  US  at  the 
Eastern end 
The Commission's concern was that, in  the context 
of the UK-US  international direct dial  ("IDD") and 
international  private  leased  circuits  ("IPLCs") 
services,  there  was  a  potential  bottleneck  on  the . 
eastern end of the transatlantic cables used  to carry 
such services  between  the United  States  and  United 
Kingdom. 
In  order  to  achieve  clearance  of  the  proposed 
concentration  (the  "merger")  between  British 
Telecommunications  pic  ("BT")  and  MCI 
Communications  Corporation  ("MCI"),  the 
notifying parties undertake for  12 months from  the 
date  ·of  the  Commission's  decision  dearing  the 
merger: 
(a)  that  the  number  of  circuits  representing  the 
parties' current  "ov~rlapping"  (•) capacity as  is 
designated to provide such services between the 
United  Kingdom  and  United  States  will  be 
made available  without delay  for  sale  on TAT 
12/13 (either the eastern half or on a full  circuit 
basis)  on an  indefeasible  right of user  ("IRU") 
basis  to  any  new  international  facilities 
(•)  Overlapping  capacity  is  the  increment  to  eastern  end 
capacity  acquired  by  the  merged  entity  as  a  result  of the 
acquisition  of MCI's capacity.  Capacity  terminating· in  the 
United  Kingdom  and  used  or designated  for  extension  to 
third  countries,  or capacity  terminating  in  third  countries 
and  not  used  or designated  for  extension  to  the  United 
Kingdom, is excluded. 
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operators  ("IFL  operators")  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  (This  applies  to  126 2  Mbit  whole 
circuits). 
In  the  event  that  additional  "overlapping, 
capacity  is  acquired  from  the  currently 
remaining design capacity on TAT 12113  that is 
to  be  allocated amongst co-owners in  or about 
June  1997,  the  number  of  the  circuits 
representing the additional overlap will also  be 
made  available  without  delay  for  sale  on  an 
IRU  basis. 
Circuits made available in  accordance with this 
paragraph will  be  sold on a non-discriminatory 
cost  basis  agreed  with  the  Office  of 
. Telecommunications  ("Oftel"), i.e.  based  upon 
the  sum  of  the  capital  cost  of  the  capacity, 
interest  and  maintenance  charges  less  BT's 
share  of the  TAT  12113  consortium's  profits 
made by selling the capacity at a price above its 
modern  equivalent  asset  valuation.  BT  will 
apply this  formula  until  such  time  as  another 
basis may  be  agreed with Oftel. 
The  circuits. referred  to  in  this  paragraph  (a) 
will  be  offered for sale as a priority to UK  IFL 
operators  who  are  neither  co-owners  nor 
affiliated with a co-owner in TAT 12113; and to 
UK  IFL  operators  who  are  co-owners  or 
affiliated  with  a  co-owner  in  TAT  12113  but 
whose  existing  ownership  interest  does  not 
exceed  0,2%  of  the  design  capacity  of  the 
system, on the understanding that this capacity 
is  not designated for  tr~nsit. 
In  the  event  that  the  offered  capacity  is  not 
. fully taken up by 31  December 1997, it will  be 
made  available  to ·operators  on  a  basis  to  be 
agreed with the Commission; 
(b)  to convert BT's UK/US  IPLCs  (eastern end  half 
circuits)  currently used  for  international simple 
resale  ("ISR ")  into  IRUs  at the  request of the 
ISR  operator. (This applies to the equivalent of 
[  •••  ] (27)  half circuits). 
BT undertakes to convert such IPLCs into IRUs 
in ·such  a  .manner  that  ISR  operators  who 
become  IFL  operators  will  be  in,  the  same 
(27)  Deleted. Business secret. 
financial  position  as  if  their  IPLCs  had  been 
scheduled  to  terminate  on  the  dine  on which 
the conversion takes place; 
(c)  to  sell  to  US  correspondents  or  to  thei~  UK 
affiliates,  at  their  -request  and  without  delay, 
eastern  end  matched  half  circuits  currently 
owned  by  BT  and used  for  the  joint provision 
of IDDIIPLC service with these correspondents. 
(This applies to [  ...  ] (28)  half circuits); and 
(d)· upon  request  of the  Commission,  to  submit  a 
report  on  the  status  of the  implementation  of 
this  undertaking  (including  the  use  of  non 
US-UK  capacity on TAT  12113). 
The transfer of eastern end capacity  will  be  in 
accordance  with  BT's  UK  licence  conditions 
·and  subject  to  the  supervision  of  the  UK's 
independent regulatory authority, Oftel. 
2.  Audioconferencing 
The  Commission  expressed  its  concerns  over  the 
combined  share  that  would  result  if  the 
audioconferencing businesses of BT and MCI  in  the 
UK  were to be  merged. 
The· parties  agree·- to  arrange  for  the  divestment  of 
the  audioconferencing  business  carried  out  by 
Darome  in  the  UK  (the  "Business"),  as  ''  goinv, 
conce~n, on the  following  basis: 
(a)  ·the parties shall, with effect from completion of 
the merger, use their best efforts to arrange the 
sale  of  the  Business,  at  fair  market  value. 
including all  its assets and intellectual property 
rights required for  its current operations; 
(b)  the  parties  shall  maintain  the  Business  as  a 
legally  separate entity and  shall  operate  it  in  .t 
manner  which  enables  it  to  maintain  its 
viability,  marketability  and  value  pending  its 
sale and final  disposal; 
(c)  prior  to  the  sale  of  the  Business,  the  parties 
shall  hold  separate  the  Business  from  the 
audioconferencing  business  of  BT  in  the  UK. 
Structural  changes  to  the  Business,  until  the 
date  of such  sale,  shall  not  be  undertaken  by 
the  parties  until  two  weeks  after  the  parties 
shall  have  informed  the  Commission  of  any 
such  proposed  change  and  the  Commission 
shall not have explicitly opposed such proposed 
change in  writing; 
(11)  Deleted. Business secret. 
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(d)  prior  to  the  sale  of the  business,  the  parties 
ensure that the  Business  is  managed separately 
from  the  audioconferencing  business  of BT  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  with  separate 
management.  The  parties  shall  not appoint or 
second employees from ·BT's  audioconferencing 
business to the management of the Business; 
(e)  the  parties  shall  ensure  that  the 
audioconferencing  business  of  BT  does  not 
obtain  any  business  secrets  relating  to  the 
Business; 
............... ~( 
(f)  the  parties  shall,  as  soon  as  reasonably 
practicable  after  receipt  of  the  Commission's 
decision  clearing  the  merger,  submit  to.  the 
Commission  a  list  of  three  nominations  of 
accountancy  firms.  or  investment  banks.  One 
such firm or bank shall be appointed, subject to 
the  approval  of  the · Commission,  as  an 
independent  expert.  Such  expert  shall,  if  the 
Commission  so  requests,  report  to  the 
Commission  and  the  parties  on  whether  or 
not  the  parties  are  complying  with 
subparagraph (b)  above; 
(g)  if, after [  ...  ](29)  from the date of-completion of 
the merger (the  "first stage"), the  Business  has 
not been sold, the parties shall appoint, subject 
to the approval of the Commission, a trustee in 
relation  to  the  Business  (such  trustee  may  be 
the  expert  appointed  in  accordance  with 
subparagraph  (f)  above).  The  terms  of 
appointment shall be such that the trustee shall 
use  his  best efforts  to sell  the  Business  at fair 
~~uket value  and such  other terms  as ·may  be 
agreed between the parties and the Commission 
within  [ ...  ]  (29
)  from  the end of the first  stage 
(the  "second stage"); 
(h)  if  the  trustee  has  not  sold  the  Business  in 
accordance with subparagraph (g)  above by the 
end  of the  second  stage,  the  trustee  shall  be 
obliged to sell the Business for the best possible 
price  he  is  reasonably  able  to  obtain  within 
[ •••  ](30
)  from  the end of the second stage.  (The 
remaining terms and conditions of the trustee's 
appointment shall continue to apply.); and 
(i)  the  parties  or the  trustee,  as  the  case  may  be, 
shall  notify  the  Commission  in  writing  of the 
identity  of  the  proposed  purchaser  of  the 
Business.  If, Within  10 working days of receipt 
of such  notification,  the  Commission  has  not 
informed the parties in  writi.ng to the contrary, 
the  proposed  purchaser shall  be  deemed  to  be 
acceptable to· the Commission. 
(1')  Deleted.  Business secret. 
(10)  Deleted.  Business secret. 
3.  General matters 
These commitments shall cease  to have effect if the 
merger is  not completed'. 
VII.  ASSESSMENT OF THE UNDERTAKING 
Cable capacity between the  United Kingdom and United 
States at the eastern end 
(77)  The commitments offered by the parties with regard 
to  their  current  and  prospective  overlapping 
capacity on TAT 12113 should be sufficient to allow 
for  the  entry  of  new  IFL  OPerators  at  prices 
corresponding  to  BT's  true  cost  of  purchasing 
capacity  from  the  cable  consortium.  TAT  12/13  is 
the  newest  and  largest  transatlantic  cable  between 
the United Kingdom and United States and capacity 
on that cable  is  said  to  b'e  much  cheaper than the 
next cable  in  order of ascending cost on  the  same 
route.  Furthermore,  the  parties'  capacity  on  TAT 
12113  will  be  made  available,  on  request.  on  a 
whole circuit basis, which  is likdy to ease the entry 
of  prospective  competitors,  since  they  will  not 
necessarily  have  to pay  call  termination charges  to 
any  correspondent  on  the  other  end,  nor  to 
persuade  that  correspondent  either  to  offer 
cost-based termination rates or to sell to them IRUs 
on its matching half circuits. 
(78)  Many  of  the  new  facilities  licence  holders  are 
already active  as  resellers.  In  recent years  telecoms 
companies  practising  ISR  have  been  the  most 
effective  competitive  challenge  to the  BT-Mercury 
duopoly in  the United Kingdom.  However, resellers 
can only operate by  hiring IPLCs from either BT or 
Mercury at retail prices, which inevitably limits their 
competitive  impact  on  the  market  behaviour  of 
incumbent facilities-based operators. At  rresc-nt  they 
face  the  same  problem  as  any  new  entrant seeking 
cost-based facilities,  namely  little available capacity, 
but  their. problem  is  exacerbated  by  the  financial 
burden of existing llll.Cs, which thry must continue 
to pay  for  or face  penalties  for  early  cancellation. 
BT's commitments to allow ISRs  to convert existing 
IPLCs  to  IRUs  on  the  terms  and  conditions 
illustrated  above  should  address  the  problem  by 
enabling those companies  to transform  their leased 
lines  to cost-based facilities  networks. 
(79)  Finally,  the  parties'  exas.tmg  competitors  could  in 
principle decide  to respond to the merger either by 
self-corresponding  or  by  re-arranging  traffic  flows 
between  themselves  in  order  to  keep  up  with 




BT/MCI's enhanced competitive position.  However, 
they may  be  prevented  from  doing  this  as  long as 
many of the US carriers' existing half circuits· remain 
configured with BT at the eastern end, as at present. 
It would be relatively simple, from a technical point 
of view, to reconfigure such circuits in order to have 
them  no  longer  matched  with  BT,  but this  would 
require  BT's  consent,  which  might  not  be  readily 
forthcoming.  The  alternative  ef  acquiring  new 
capacity  would  not  be  available  until  new  cables 
came  on  stream.  The  offer  to  allow  BT's  US 
correspondents  to  reconfigure  their  half  circuits 
currently matched with BT. at the eastern end should 
increase  the  speed  at which  competitors can either 
get  access  to  end-to-end  transatlantic  circuits  in 
order  to  self-correspond  themselves,  or  to  change 
their  own  existing  correspondent  relationships  on 
the UK  -US  route. 
The  effect  of  the  commitments  submitted  by  the 
parties will  be  that (i)  cable capacity will  be  made 
available  to  new  entrants,  and  (ii)  established 
incumbents  which  already  have  access  to  cable 
capacity will  be  in  a position to self-correspond in 
the  UK-US  route  if  they  so  wish.  Therefore,  any 
reinforcement of a  dominant position  arising  from 
the  notified  merger  is  effectively·  removed  by  the 
commitments. 
Audioconferencing 
The  parties'  commitment  to  arrange  for  the 
divestiture  of Darome implies  that there  should  be 
no  further  concentration  of  supply  of 
audioconferencing  services  in  the  United  Kingdom 
arising  from  the  notified  operation,  nor  any 
addition  of  sales  and  market  shares  to  the 
pre-merger  position  of  BT's  audioconferencing 
business in  the UK. 
For these reasons the Commission considers that the 
parties'  undertaking,  provided  it  is  properly 
discharged, should serve  to address the competition 
concerns  outlined  above  and  ensure  that  the 
proposed merger does not result  in  a reinforcement 
of  BT's  dominant  position  in  the  market  for 
international voice telephony services on the UK-US 
route,  nor  in  the  creation  or  reinforcement  of  a 
dominant position  of the  merged  entity  in  the  UK 
market for audioconferencing services. 
(83)  The  Commission  will  monitor  the  implementation 
of that  undertaking  by  requesting  reports  as  and 
(84) 
whe~  appropriate  in  accordance  with 
paragraph 1 (d)  of the parties' undertaking. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION, 
The  concentration  notified  by  BT  and  MCI  on 
18  December  1996  relating  to' the  full  merger 
between  the  notifying  parties  should  be  declared 
compatible  with  the  common  market  and  the 
functioning  of the  EEA  Agreement  subject  to  the 
condition of full  compliance with  the .:ommitments 
made  by  the  parties,  in  their  undertaking  to  the 
Commission,  in  respect  of  their  current  and 
prospective  capacity  entitlements  on  submarine 
transatlantic  cables  and  the  Darome 
audioconferencing  business, as  set  out in  recital  76 
of this  Decis~on, 
HAS  ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article  1 
The  concentration  notified  by  BT  and  MCI  on 
18  December  1996,  relating  to the  full  merger  of their 
respective  businesses,  is  declared  compatible  with  the 
common  market  and  the  functioning  of  the  EEA 
Agreement  subject  to  the  condition  of full.  co"_lplian~e 
with  the  commitments  made  by  the  parties.  m  their 
undertaking to the  Commission, as  set out in  recital  76 
of this Decision. 
Article 2 
This Decision is  addressed to: 
British Telecommunications plc 
81. Newgate Street 
London EC1A  7AJ 
United Kingdom 
and 
MCI  Communications Corporation 
1801  Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20006 
USA. 
Done at Brussels,  14  May 1997. 
For the Commission 
Karel  VAN MIERT 
Member of  the Commission c 372/16  Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities 
OPINION 
of the  Advisory  Committee  on  Concentrations  given  at ·the  45th  meeting  on  9  April  1997 
concerning a preliminary draft decision rdating to Case  No IV/M.IS'- British Telecom/MCI 
(97 IC  372/05) 
In  respect of the  concentration  between  BT and MCI notified  pursuant to Council  Regulation 
(EEC)  4064/89: 
1.  The  Committee  agrees  with  the  definitions  of  the  product  market  contained  an  the 
Commission's  draft  decision. 
2.  The  Committee  agrees  with  the  definitions  of  the  geographical  market  contained  in  the 
Commission's  draft decision. 
3.  The Committee  considers  that the  proposed  merger,  as  originally  notified,  would  reinforce 
BT's  dominant  position  in  the  market  for  the  provision  of  international  voice  telephony 
services on  the UK-US route. 
4.  The Committee  considers  that the  proposed  merger,  as  originally  notified,  would  reinforce 
BT's dominant position  in  the OK market for audioconferencing services. 
5.  The Committee  agrees  with  the  Commission  that the  undertakings submitted  by  the panies 
are sufficient and  adequate to prevent the  reinforcement of the dominant positions  referred 
to above brought about by the notified concentration. 
6.  The  Committee  considers  that,  subject  to  the  condition  of  full  compliance  with  the 
commitments made by  the panies, the concentration is  compatible with the common  market 
and the functioning of the EEA  agreement. 
7. The Committee asks  the Commission  to take ·account of the other points  raised  during the 
discussion. 
8.  The Committee recommends publication of its  opinion. 
9.12.97 
,,  ls/4'13 c 385/14  Official  Journai  of the  European  Communities 
Prior notification of a  concentration 
(Case  No IV  /M.t027 --. Deutsche Telekom/BetaResearch) 
(97/C  385/18) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
1.  On 8 December  1997,  the  Commission  received  notification  of a proposed concentration 
pursuant to Article  4 of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89 C)  by  which  the  undertaking 
Deutsche  Telekom  AG,  the  unde~king CLT-UFA  SA  ('CLT-UFA')  jointly  controlled  by 
Bertelsmann  AG  and Audiofina  SA  and the undertaking BetaTechnik GmbH belonging  to the 
KirchGruppe acquire within  the  meaning of Article  3 ·  (  1)  (b) of the  Regulation joint control of 
the  undertaking  BetaResearch  Gesellschaft fur  Entwicklung  und  Vermarktung  digitaler  Infra-
strukturen  mbH  ('BetaResearch')  by  way  of purchase  of securities. 
2.  The  bwiness  activities  of the  undertakings  concerned  are: 
. - Deutsche  Telekom: ·telecommunication  services, 
- CLT-UFA:  Europe-wide 1V activities, 
. 
- KirchGruppe: film  trade, private 1V activities  in  Germany, 
- BetaResearch: developp1ent  and  licensing of digital  data transmission technology 
3.  Upon  preliminary  examination,  the  Commission  finds  that  the  notified  concentration 
could  fall  within  the  scope  of Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89.  However,  the  final  decision  on 
'this  point  is  reserved. 
4.  The Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  to  submit  their  possible  observations  on 
the  proposed  operation.  • 
Observations  must  reach  the  Commission  not  later  than  10  days  following  the  date  of this 
publication.  Observations  can  be  sent  by  fax  (No  (32 2) 296 43 01  or 296 72 44)  or by  post, 
under  reference  IV /M.1027  - Deutsche  Telekom/BetaResearch,  to  the  following  address: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate B- Merger Task Force, 
Avenue  de  Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
(
1
)  OJ L 395, 30.  12.  1989; corrigendum: OJ L 257, 21.  9.  1990, p.  13. 
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0 
UK]'  Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities 
Non-opposition  to a  notified  conceD.tration 
(Case No IV/M.1046  - Ameritech/Tele Danmark) 
(98/C  25/07) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
On 5 December  1997, the  Commission decided  not to oppose the above  notified  concentration 
and  to  declare  it  compatible  with  the  common  market.  This  decision  is  based  on 
Article  6 (1) (b)  of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89.  The  full  text  of the  decision  is 
available  only  in  English  and  will  be  made  public  after it  is  cleared  of any  business  secrets  it 
may  contain. It will  be  available: 
- as  a  paper version  through  the  sales  offices  of the  Office  for  Official  Publieations  of the 
European Communities (see  list on the last page), 
- i'n  electronic  form  in  the .  'CEN'  version  of  the  Celex  database,  under  document  No 
j97M1046. Celex  is  the  c~mputerized documentation system  of Europ~an Community law; 
for more information concerning subscriptions please  contact: 
EUR-OP, 
Information, Marketing and Public Relations  (OP/48), 
2·,  rue Mercier,  · 
L-2985  Luxembourg. 
Tel.: (352) 29 29 424 55,  fax:  (352) 29 29 427 63. 
24.1.98 c 32/6.  Official Journal of the European Communities 
Non-opposition to a notified concentration 
(Case No IV/M.t057 - Terra/ICI) 
(98/C 32/06) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
On 19  December 1997,  the  Commission decided  not to oppose  the  above  notified concen-
tration  and  to  dedare  it  compatible  with  the  common  market.  This  decision  is  based  on 
Article 6 (1) (b)  of Council Regulation  (EEC)  No .4064/89..  The full  text of the decision  is 
available only in English and will be made public after it is  cleared of any business secrets it 
may contain. It will be available: 
- as  a paper version through the sales offices of the Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities (see list on the last page), 
- in  electronic  form  in  the  'CEN'  version  of ·the  Celex  database,  under  document  No 
397M1057. Celex is the computerised documentation system of European Community law; 
for ~ore information concerning subscriptions please contact: 
EUR-OP, 
Information, Marketing and Public Relations (OP/48), 
2, rue Mercier,  ··  · 
L-2985 Luxembourg. 
Tel.: (352) 29 29 424 55; fax: (352) 29 29 427 63.· 
Initiation of proceedings 
(Case No IV/M.993- Bertelsmao.n/Kirch/Premiere) 
(98/C 32/07) 
(Text With  EEA relevance) 
On 22 January 1998, the Commission decided to initiate proceedings in  the abovementioned 
case after finding that the notified concentration raises  serious doubts as  to its  compatibility 
with the common market. The initiation of proceedings  opens  a  second phase investigation 
with regard to the notified concentration. The decision is based on Article 6 (1) (c) of Council 
hgulation (EEC) No 4064/89. 
The Commission invites  interested third parties to submit their observations on the proposed 
concentration. 
In  order to  be  fully  taken  into  account  in  the  procedure,  observations  should  reach  the 
Commission not later than  15  days  following  the date of this  publication.  Observations can 
be  sent  by  fax  ((32-2)  296 43 01/296 72 44)  or  by  post,  under  reference  IV  /M.993  -
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, to: 
European Commission,  . 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV), · 
Directorate B- Merger Task Force, 
Avenue de Cortenberg/Konenberglaan 150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
30.1.98 
11/P./.(4} c 37/4  Official Journal  of the . European  Communities  4.2.98 
Refe~nce  (
1
)  1itle  End  of three-month 





The specified  risk  mateiial  order .1997 
The specified  risk  material  Regulations  1997 
The specified.  risk  material  Regulations  (Northern  Ireland)  1997 
The specified  risk  material  ~rdcr (Northern  lrelind)  1~97 
( 1)  Year- regiStration number- Member State of origin. 
(
1
)  Period during which the draft may not be adopted.  . 
( 1)  No standstill period since dte Commission accepu the grounds of urgent adoption invoked by the notifying Member State. 
C>  No  standstill  period  since the  measure  concerns  technical  apecifications  or ocher  requiremenu  linked  to fiscal  or financial  measures,  pursuant  to the 
third indent of the second paragraph of Anide I  (9) of Directive 93/189/EEC.·  · 
~
1)  Infonnation  procedure  closed. 
t  • 
The Commission draws attention to the judgment given  on 30 April  1996  in  the 'CIA Security' 
case  (C-194/94),  in  which  the  Coun  of Justice  ruled· that  Articles  8  and  9  of  Directive 
83/189/EEC are  to  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  individuals  may  rely  on  them  before  the 
national coun which  must  decline  to apply a national  technical regulation which  has  not been· 
notified  in  accordance  with  the  Directive. 
This  "judgment  confirms  the  Commission's  communication  of  1  October  1986  (OJ  C  245, 
1.10.1986,  p.  4). 
Accordingly,  breach  of  the  obligation  to  notify  renders  the  technical  regulations  concerned 
inapplicable, ·sci  that they  are  unenforceable  against  individuals. 
Information on these ·notifications  can be  obtained from  the  national  administrations, .  a list  of 
which  was  published  in  Officialjoumal of  the  European  Communities  C  324  of JO  October 
1996. 
Initiation  of proceedings 
(Case  No  IV /M.t027 - Deutsche  Telekom/BetaResearch) 
(98/C  37/04) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
On 29  January  1998,  the  Commission' decided  to  initiate  proceedings  in  the  abovementioned 
case  after  finding  that  the  notified  concentration  raises  serious  doubts  as  to its  compatibility 
with  the  ~ommon market.  The  initiation  of proceedings  opens  a  second  phase  investigation 
with regard to the notified  concentration: The decision  is  based  on Anicle 6 (1) (c) of Council 
Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89. 
The Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  to  supmit  their  observations  on  the  proposed 
concentration. 
In  order  to  be  fully  taken  into  account  in  the  procedure,  observations  should  reach  the 
Commission  not  later  than  15  days  following  the  date  of this  publication.  Observations  can 
be  sent  by  fu  ((32-2)  296 43 01/296 72 44)  or  by  post,  under  reference  IV /M.t027  -
Deutsche  Telekom/BetaResearch,  to:  · 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate B - Merger Task Force, 
Avenue  de  Cortenberg/Kortenoerglaan  150, 
B-1 040  BruSsels. ·  Rapid Text File  http://www.cc.eec/rapidlcgilrapcgi.ksh?p ... ion.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/95/549101AGED&lg=EN 
I of3 
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COMMISSION LAUNCHES INVESTIGATIONS INTO GLOBAL MOBILE 
SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
DN: IP/95/549  Date:  1995-06-07 
TXT: FR EN DE DA ES PT NL IT EL 
PDF: 
Word Processed: 
By  the  year  2000  millions  of subscribers  worldwide  are  expected  to  be 
offered satellite personal  communications  services. 
In  this sector  global  consortia start  are being  set  up  involving  major 
american  and  european  companies.  This  new  phenomenon  which is  set to  become 
a  dominant  feature  of the international  satellite market  in the  second  half 
of this decade  has  attracted the  attention of the  European  Commission,  among 
others  as  far  as  competition policy is concerned. 
Hence,  Mr.  Karel  Van  Miert,  th~  European  Commissioner  in  charge  of 
competition matters  has  recently asked his  services  to  send out  requests  for 
information  regarding  two  mobile  $atellite systems  (MSS),  Globalstar  (led by 
the  US  companies  Loral  and  Qualcomm)  and  Iridium  (led by  the  US  company 
Motorola).  Inmarsat-P,  another major  MSS,  has  already  notified its system 
and partnership agreements  to  the  Commission's  competition services.  Since 
Iridium  and  Globalstar have  not  yet  followed  suit,  the  Commission  has 
commenced  investigations at its own  initiative. 
Although  MSS  systems  are  inherently  global  and  the establishment of  such 
systems,  in  principle  procompetitive,  it  is  important  that  they  are 
screened  from  the outset  under  the  EC  competition rules.  The  aim  of  the 
investigation  is  to  ensure  level  playing  fields  in  the  EU  and,  in 
particular,  to assess  the  impact  of  the  oonsortia  and their partnership and 
related agreements  on  future  competition  in  the  relevant  more  localised 
markets  within the  European  Union. 
As  part of its  examination of these ventures,  the  two  consortia have  been 
asked to  provide  a  comprehensive  description  of  their systems  from  the 
technical,  financial  and  commercial  point  of  view.  Moreover,  the 
investigation  also addresses  the  major  ar~as  of potential  concern  which 
these projects present  from  the point  of view of  the  competition  rules  of 
the  EC  Treaty;  in  particular  the  nature,  terms  and  conditions  of  the 
distribution  policies  chosen  by  the  con~ortia,  the  nature of  links  with 
cellular  terrestrial  networks  and  the  access  by  competing  MSS  to 
infrastructure owned  by partners  in one  of  them.  Most  of  these  areaB  of 
concern  have  also been  identified with  regard  to  Inmarsat-P. 
Satellite-based,  global  mobile  communic~tions  using  hand-held  terminals 
represent  a  market  which  is expected  to  re~ult in revenues  of  10  to  20 
Billion  ECU  during  the next decade.  The  indirect effects which will  ripple 
through  related markets  will  be  much  greater.  Due  to  the  scarcity  of 
frequencies,  the  very heavy  financial  implic~tions involved in launching  and 
operating the  large  number  of satellites needed  for  such  systems,  and  a  high 
level  of market  uncertainty,  however,  it is unlikely  that there will  be  mor:e 
than  a  few  major  players.  Given  this  small  number  of  alternatives  and  the 
potential market  power  of  these global  sat$llite system  operators,  it  is 
particularly important  that  competition is maximised  in the  European  Union 
for  the other,  "downstream",  elements  of  the market  involving local service 
provision,  distribution and  equipment  supply.  Open,  non-discriminatory  and 
fair  conditions  regarding  partnerships  and  agreements  will  need  to  be 
maximised. 
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The  Mobile  Satellite Systems  Services  Market 
The  general  service to be  offered involves  the  full  coverage of  a  roaming 
satellite  system,  using  LEO  (low earth  orbit)  or  MEO  (medium earth orbit) 
satellites,  which will also  support  full  user mobility,  as  well  as  offering 
the  user  a  light hand-held portable terminal  and identification by  a  single 
number  anywhere  in the world.  Entering  the global  age,  it is clear  that 
global  service  is  becoming  the  most  appropriate  solution to  solving  an 
increasing number  of  communication  needs.  It  is expected that mobile  voice 
service will  be  the primary  application  for  these  networks,  but  two  other 
significant  segments  will  involve  so-called  mobile  personal  digital 
assistants,  data transmission and  paging. 
In essence,  MSS  represent  the  ability to  maximise mobility  of users,  by 
providing global  roaming  and  coverage  in  remote  areas  where  terrestrial 
services  may  be  uneconomic.  "Global  coverage"  means  not  only that  the  user 
can  move  anywhere,  but also that  the  communications  system can  "move"  to 
serve  new  fixed  or  "stationary"  users.  Thus,  these  systems  are not  aimed 
only at the  international business  traveller.  In  fact  Commission  studies 
predict  that  by  far  the  greatest  potential  (in  terms  of  numbers  of 
subscribers)  in the  MSS  market  will be  for  communities  in less  developed 
regions  of  the  world  as  a  substitute  for  "fixed  service"  where  fixed 
networks  have  yet to  be  rolled out  or  are very poor.  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe  represent  an  important  customer base in this  context,  which  could  be 
accessed  from  gateways  within  the  EU.  A  third important  use  of  MSS  will  be 
as  a  substitute for  cellular mobile  telephony in areas  where  the cellular 
network  has  failed to penetrate  (i.e.  rural parts  of the  developed world  and 
both  urban  and  rural parts  of lower  income  countries). 
MSS  is  expected  to  act as  complement  to  both  GSM  and  DECT 
technologies  as  well  as  the public  telephone  network,  enhancing 






Motorola,  a  major  US  telecommunications  equipment manufacturer,  plays  the 
leading role in  the  Iridium consortium.  A  number  of  European  companies  are 
participating  by  way  of partnership  agreements  and/or  investment.  This 
includes  companies  such  as  STET  (the  Italian state holding  company,  majority 
owner  of  Telecom Italia)  and  Vebacom  (subsidiary of  the  major  German  telecom 
corporation VEBA  AG)  . 
Motorola Satellite  Communications  is  in  charge  of spacecraft  construction 
but  Iridium  itself will  own  and  operate the  system  once  in place.  Lockheed 
Corp.  (USA)  is  contracted to  actually build 125  satellites for  Iridium  by 
the  year  2003.  Other partners/investors  include  Krunichev Enterprise  (CIS) 
who  will  launch the satellites with  Proton  rockets,  Scientific Atlanta  Inc 
(USA)  who  will develop  and manufacture  the  hand-held units  as  well  as  the 
satellite  earth  terminals,  and  Sprint,  the  third  US  long-distance 
telecommunication  carrier.  The  total cost of  the  system  is estimated at 
US$  3.8 billion. 
In  1990  Motorola  filed  its  application  to  operate  a  global  satellite 
personal  communications  system with  the  US  Federal  Communications  Commission 
(FCC).  Approval  was  given  and  frequencies  allocated by  the  FCC  in  January 
1995.  Iridium  plans  to be  operational  with  a  limited number  of satellites 
by  1997-98,  and  expects  1.5 million  subscribers  by  the  year  2000.  It will 
offer voice,  paging  and data  services. 
Global  Star 
The  Globalstar  consortium  is  led and  sponsored by  the  Lora!  Corporation,  a 
leading  US  defence  electronics  company  which  acquired  Ford Aerospace  in 
1990.  Lora!  Qualcomm Satellite Service  has  bypassed  many  funding  problems 
experienced by  other players  in the  satellite industry by  use  of  existing, 
in orbit,  satellites.  Partners/contractors  include  the  European  companies 
Alcatel  (France),  Aerospatiale  (F),  Alenia  (I)  and  Deutsche Aerospace  (D). 
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The  total cost of the  system is estimated at US$800  million. 
Like  Iridium,  Globalstar has  been  approved  in the  US  by  the  FCC  in January 
1995.  It  expects  to be  operational in the  US  around  1999-2000  and globally, 
around  five  years  later.  Globalstar will  also be  offering voice  and data, 
as  well  as  tracking services 
Inmarsat-P 
Inmarsat-P is  a  MSS  system sponsored by the  International Maritime Satellite 
Organization  (Inmarsat)  and  a  large number  of its signatories,  including the 
European  companies  Telef6nica  de  Espana  (E),  Telecom Finland  (SF),  OTE  (Gr), 
Swiss  Telecom  (Swt),  CPRM  (P),  PTT  Telecom  (Nl)  and  Detemobil  (D).  The 
Inmarsat-P  system  which  will  consist of  12  satellites  in  intermediate 
circular orbit,  will be  operational around  the turn of the  century. 
*  *  * 
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In  the  wake  of  the Telecoms  Council  of  June  13,  Commissioner  Van  Miert,  in 
cooperation with  Commissioner  Bangemann  has  put  forward  an  Article  90 
directive  to  introduce  full  competition  in  the  EU  mobile  and  personal 
communications  market  by  1  January  1996.  Substantial  progress  has  already 
been  made  in the Member  States  as  EU  competition  rules  have  been  applied to 
abolish monopolies  in the provision  of mobile  services.  However  the  new 
measures  include  liberalisation of  the most  important  cost  factors  for  the 
new  market  entrants,  particularly  use  of  own  facilities  and  alternative 
infrastructure. 
With  the directive,  the  European  Union  takes  the  lead in setting  the  right 
regulatory conditions  for  encouraging  the  development  of mobile  and personal 
communications  into  a  vast mass  market.  The  EU  market will be  the  first  to 
enjoy the  combination  of liberalisation  of services  and  networks,  together 
with  the deployment  of harmonised,  leading edge,  digital standards  over  such 
a  large area.  These  are  GSM,  DCS  1800  (the  two  frequencies  available  for 
digital mobile  services)  and  DECT  (digital cordless  telephony within  a  fixed 
radius).  The  directive  is based on  the discussion  process  launched  last 
year by the  Green  Paper  on  Mobile  and  Personal  Communications.  It requires 
Member  States  to abolish  all exclusive  and  special rights  in the  area  of 
mobile  communications  and,  wherever this  has  not  yet been  achieved,  to 
establish  licensing procedures  to authorise the  launch of digital services 
GSM,  DCS  1800  and  DECT. 
Consensus  building 
Building  on  the  consensus  reached  by  EU  Telecoms  Ministers at  last week's 
Telecoms  Council  the  directive also  goes  further  on  specific issues,  most 
importantly  concerning  use  of  own  and  alternative infrastructure.  It thus 
removes  all existing restrictions  on  use  of facilities  for  mobile  networks, 
allowing  new mobile  operators  to make  full  use  of their  own  infrastructure 
as  well  as  that  provided by third parties  such  as  utilities'  networks.  The 
countries with less developed  networks  are to  be  given derogations  of  up  to 
five  years  to  take  account  of  their specific  situations.  This  concerns 
Portugal,  Greece,  Spain  and  Ireland.  Very  small  networks  (Luxembourg)  will 
have  a  two  year derogation  Alongside  this,  the directive  also abolishes 
restrictions  on direct interconnection  for  mobile  networks. 
Use  of infrastructure other  than  those  controlled by  the  incumbent  telecoms 
operator is essential to  the  success  of  new  entrants  to  the mobile  market  as 
it gives  them  much  greater control  ov~r  their cost  base.  Leasing  capacity 
currently represents  a  cost  factor  for  second  operators  of  between  30  and 
50%.  Furthermore,  the  right  to set  up  their  own  networks  and  choose 
alternative  infrastructure  and  connections  gives  mobile  operators 
significantly more  flexibility which  represents  an  important  push  tow<u:ds 
further  development  and  innovation in  the market. 
Competing  operators  in Member  States  have  complained,  for  example,  that  for 
the price  of  renting  capacity  from  the  incumbent  they  could already  have 
built  up  their  own  networks  but  regulatory restrictions  have  prevented  them 
taking  up  this  obviously preferable opportunity.  Current  restrictions  on 
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direct interconnection  means  that,  in most  Member  States  the  second mobile 
operator  is  obliged  to  pass  a  call  through  the  fixed  network  of  the 
incumbent  national  operator  for  interconnection  into another  Member  State, 
whereas  direct interconnection.  with  a  chosen  operator  in the  country of 
destination is often both technically logical  and  cheaper. 
A  booming market 
The  mobile  sector  is  by  far  the most  dynamic  in  the  telecoms  market 
experiencing levels  of  growth averaging  60%.  In just one  year  the  number  of 
cellular  subscribers  in  Europe  has  grown  from  around  9  million  (3/94)  to 
around  15  million  (3/95),  now  outstripping  growth  in  numbers  of  fixed 
subscribers. 
Commission  studies predict  38  million cellular mobile  users  in  Europe  by  the 
year  2000  and  around  80  million by  2010. 
On  top  of very  substantial analogue  networks  in countries  such  as  the  UK, 
Italy and  Scandanavia,  the  growth  potential of  GSM  is  now  also evident  in 
most  Member  States.  In  France,  for  example,  GSM  subscribers  grew  from  around 
112  000  to  around  500  000  over  the past  year~  In  Belgium there were  around 
11  000  GSM  subscribers  at the beginning of  1994  and  there  are  now  nearly  90 
000.  Italy  saw  growth  over  the  same  period  from  9000  in  1994  to  94  000  in 
1995.  Germany still  remains  by  far  the most  important  market  with over  two 
and  a  half million users,  of which  close to  two million are  now  on  the  GSM 
network.  However  progress  in countries with less  developed  networks  is also 
notable.  Last  year  GSM  subscribers  in  Greece  increased  from  45  000  to  180 
000,  and  in Portugal,  ·from 109  000  to  175  000.  The  Scandanavian are  now 
also experiencing massive  growth  in take  up  of  GSM.  Most  impressive  is 
Sweden  where  the  GSM  market  has  grown  from  around  38  000  to  465  000  over  the 
past  year.  ·This  growth is  evenly  divided  between  the  two  competing 
operators. 
Job  creation and  universa~ service 
Mobile  operations  are  increasingly significant  job  creators  in the members 
states.  Extrapolating  from  current  figures it  is estimated  that the market 
is  directly creating several  tens  of  thousands  of  jobs  across  the  European 
Union. 
One  of the most  important  aspects  of  development  of  the mobile  and  personal 
communications  market will be its  transformation into a  truely  mass  market, 
making mobile  communications  affordable  to  the  average  citizen  of  'the 
European  Union.  Wireless  communications  are also becoming,  in many  cases 
the  cheapest alternative  to  reaching  remote  users  and  regions,  and  thus 
improving universal  service. 
*** 
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COMMISSION CONFIRMS MEASURES ENSURING FULL COMPETITION 
IN TELECOMS BY 1998 




The  Commission  has  today  (19th  July  1995)  agreed,  at  the initiative  of 
Commissioner  Van  Miert  in  charge  of  Competition  and  Commissioner  Bangemann 
in charge of Telecommunications,  two  fundamental  measures  that  together will 
shape  the  telecommunications  market  in Europe  over  the  coming  years. 
i  The  first,  a  draft Directive  (under Article  90  of  the  Treaty)  implements 
the  political  agreement  among  Member  States  to  liberalise  all 
telecommunications  services  (i.e.  including public  voice  telephony)  and 
telecoms  infrastructure by  1st  January  1998,  with transition  periods  for 
certain Member  States.  It  also calls  on  Member  States  to  take  the 
necessary steps before  1998  in order to ensure that markets  are fully  open 
by  the agreed deadline.  In particular it specifies that restrictions  on 
use  of  alternative infrastructure  should be lifted by  1996  (except  for 
public  voice  telephony until  1998)  and  that  licensing  conditions  and 
interconnection rules  should be  set down  by  1997.  Following  the  procedure 
chosen  for  the  Article  90  cable  and  mobile drafts,  this  draft Directive 
will  now  be published for public consultation before full  adoption by  the 
Commission  by  the  end  of this  year. 
ii  The  second,  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  (based  on Article  100A),  sets out 
a  harmonised  framework  for  interconnection in telecommunications  in  the 
context  of  ONP,  with  the  aim  of  ensuring  universal  service  and 
interoperablity of  telecommunications  services  throughout  the  Union.  It 
will enable  new  entrants  to liberalised telecommunications  markets  to 
interconnect  their  facilities  with  those  of  the  existing  network 
operators.  This  proposal will  be  subject to approval  by  the  European 
Parliament  and  the Council,  and  should be  implemented before  1998. 
The  two  measures  continue the balanced  EU  approach  whereby liberalisation 
and harmonisation in  the  telecommunications  sector are  progressing hand-in-
hand.  They  represent  the  core of  a  package  of  regulatory  changes  that  the 
Commission  is preparing  for  the post- 1998  environment,  and are the  results 
of  extensive consultation  with  the  sector  over  the past  months.  Other 
measures  already  announced  in  the  Commission's  Communication  on  the 
Infrastructure Green  Paper  Consultations  are  expected to be published by  the 
end of  1995[1] 
I  Liberalising all telecoms  services  and infrastructure by  1998 
The  draft text adopted  today  fixes  the  basic principles  for  licensing new 
entrants  to  both voice  telephony  and  telecoms  infrastructure markets  by 
1998.  The  principles  not  only  safeguard the  introduction of  competition 
into  these areas,  but  also  allow  for  the  required measures  for  safeguarding 
universal  service in the Member  States. 
The  directive  sets  down  firm  dates  for  the  Member  States  to  issue 
legislation  so  that  the  aims  of  of  full  liberalisation by  1998  will  be 
effectively  realised.  By  January  1997  Member  States  must  notify  to  the 
Commission  licensing procedures  for  voice  telephony  and  public  telecoms 
networks,  and  by  July  1997  Member  States  must  publish  the  licensing 
conditions  and declaration  procedures  as  well  as  the  terms  and  conditions 
for  interconnection.  As  regards  the dates  set  down  Member  States  with  less 
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developed  telecoms  networks,  and very small  networks,  shall be  granted,  upon 
request,  extension periods  of up  to  five  years  and  two  years  respectively. 
Universal  service means  permitting access  to  a  defined minimum  telecoms 
service of  a  specified  quality to  all users  everywhere  at an  affordable 
price.  Currently the  main  elements  of this  concern subcriber  connection to 
the  network,  basic  voice  telephony  service,  emergency  services  and  public 
call boxes.  However it  is also  recogniced  that the  concept  of  universal 
service must  evolve  to  keep  pace with technical  and  economic  progress.  The 
directive  emphasises  that  universal  service  must  be  safeguarded but  that 
this  should  not  unnecessarily  distort  competition.  Thus  it  admits  the 
establishment of fair  schemes  for  sharing the net cost of  universal  service 
obligations  between  the  incumbent  operator  and  competing public  operators, 
but it also  obliges  the  Member  States to  communicate  such  schemes  to  the 
Commission  to  be  screened by  EU  competition  rules. 
This  directive  will also liberalise  use  of  alternative infrastructure  for 
already liberalised telecoms  services  by  1  January  1996.  This  means  that, 
from  this date,  use  of  the  telecoms  networks  of utilties  such  as  rail, 
electricity and  water may  be  not  be  restricted from  carrying  any  telecoms 
service  except  for public voice  telephony.  Such  alternative networks  will 
provide  high  capacity high  speed networks  at lower  prices.  Such  capacity is 
now  either  unavailable or prohibitively  expensive  on  the national  telecoms 
operator's  network in most  Member  States.  The  type  of  services  which will 
benefit will  include:  interactive  audiovisual  and  multimedia  services  for 
businesses,  educational  and  public  institutions;  information  services 
providing  access  to  data bases,  remote data  processing,  electronic mail, 
transaction  services  (such  as  financial  transactions,  commercial  data 
transfer,  teleshopping  and  telereservations),  corporate  voice  services  and 
other value  added services.  As  with  1998  liberalisation,  Member  States  with 
less  developed  and very  small  networks  _may  apply  for  an  extension  for 
alternative infrastructure liberalisation  of up  to  five  years  (and  two  years 
for  very  small  networks)  from  the  1996 date. 
Interconnection  between  the  new  entrants  (often  with  limited  coverage  of 
their  own)  and  the  national  network  operators  is essential  to  full  and 
effective competition in a  market  where  "any-to-any"  communications  is often 
a  pre-requiste.  The  general  features  and principles  for  interconnection in 
a  pro-competition environment  are  laid out  here,  representing  a  necessary 
complement  to the provisions  in the  ONP  Interconnection Directive. 
In  sum,  the  Article  90  full  competition  directive  will  create  early 
certainty with  regard  to national legislation and  the  rights  and obligations 
of market  players  in the liberalised  telecoms  environment.  Its provisions 
aim  to  give  full  effect  to  the  commitment  to  the  1998  date  for  full 
liberalisation. 
II  Ensuring  universal  service  and  interoperability:  Proposal  for  a 
Directive on  Interconnection in Telecommunications 
New  entrants  to  the  future  liberalised telecommunications  market  must  be 
able  to  interconnect  their  facilities  with  those  of  the  existing 
telecommunications  operators  in  order to  access  business  and  residential 
customers.  Clear  rules  on  interconnection  are  essential  in  order  to 
encourage  new  investment,  to  stimulate  the  rapid  development  of  effective 
competition,  to secure  universal service,  and  to ensure  that liberalisation 
brings  immediate benefits  to all European  users. 
Access  to  advanced  telecommunications  and  information  technology  networks 
and  services is  at  the  heart of  the  future  information society.  The 
evolving  European  telecommunications  ,infrastructure  will  comprise  a 
multitude  of  independently  owned  and  operated networks,  supporting  a  wide 
range  of  telecommunications  and  information  based  ::;ervices.  En;:>llr inq 
adequate  interconnection  and  interoperability of  these  networks  and  services 
is  crucial.  The  proposed  Directive  sets  out  the  basic  rights  .1nd 
obligations  of  the market  players  in this area,  under  the  supervision of  the 
national  regulatory  authorities  for  telecommunications.  Current 
prohibitions  on  cross-border  interconnection  within  the  EU  are  set  to 
disappear. 
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The  important  features  which  will be  ensured  by the  proposed regulatory 
framework  for  interconnection are  : 
application  of  the  principles of  transparency,  objectivity,  and  non-
discrimination to guarantee  a  fair deal  in interconnection  agreements 
in  particular  between  new  entrants  and  the  powerful  incumbent 
telecommunications  operators 
priority  given  to  commercial  negotiations 
parties while  reserving  some  conditions  to  be 
telecommunications  regulatory authorities 
between  interconnection 
set a  priori by national 
clear  responsibilities  for  national  regulatory  authorities,  in 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  including effective 
mechanisms  for  dispute  resolution at the national  and  European  level. 
Issues  addressed in the  Directive include 
Interconnection and  Universal  Service  contribution 
Requirements  for non-discrimination  and  transparency 
Principles  for  interconnection charges  and  cost accounting  systems 
Accounting  separation and  financial  accounts 
General  responsibilities  of  the national  regulatory authorities 
Essential  requirements  (security  of  network  operations,  maintenance  of 
network integrity,  interoperability of services,  protection of data) 
Numbering  (provision  of  numbers  and  numbering  ranges  for  all public 
telecommunications  services) 
Technical  standards 
Publication of  and  access  to  information 
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The  agreements  between  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  (DT),  France  Telecom  (FT)  and  the 
US  Sprint  Corporation  (Sprint)  were  notified to  the  Commission  on  29  June 
1995  and  have  been  subject  to  a  first  examination  by  the  Commission 
services.  The  agreements  include  the  creation of  a  global  telecommunications 
joint venture,,  PHOENIX,  between ATLAS,  itself a  joint venture  between  DT  and 
FT,  and  Sprint. 
This  notification  is  an  important  factor  in  the  ongoing  notification 
procedure  regarding  DT  and  FT's  proposed  ATLAS  venture:  PHOENIX  addresses 
one  of  the  aspects  raised in the  Commission's  administrative letter sent to 
DT  and  FT  (see  Press  Release  IP/95/524),  namely that  ATLAS  did not  appear  to 
be  in a  position to address  the  global  needs. of multinational  companies  in 
competition with other strategic alliances  (e.g.  BT-MCI's  Concert venture). 
The  Commission  is  now  further  assessing  the  remaining  aspects  of  the 
proposed ATLAS  venture which  raise concern  under  the  EC  competition rules. 
Mr  Karel  Van  Miert,  the  European  Commissioner  in charge  of  competition 
matters,  has  spelled  out  in detail  the  conditions  which  DT  and  FT  must 
fulfil if the  Commission  is to  consider authorising ATLAS.  The  parties  have 
been  given  a  deadline until  15  September  1995  at  the latest  to  reach  an 
agreement  on  these detailed requirements. 
*** 
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FORM, BUT REMAINS OPEN TO EXAMINE NEW PROPOSALS 
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Following  the  proposal  by  Mr.  Karel  Van  Miert,  the  Commission  has  decided  tv 
declare  the proposed  joint venture  NORDIC  SATELLITE  DISTRIBUTION  (NSD)  in 
its current  form  incompatible with  the  Common  Market  and  the  EEA  Agreement. 
However,  Commissioner  Karel  Van Miert  remains  open  to  examine  new  proposals 
from  the parties. 
NSD  is  conceived as  a  joint  venture  between  Norsk  Telekom  A/S  (NT), 
TeleDanmark  A/S  (TD)  and  Industriforvaltnings AB  Kinnevik  (Kinnevik)  with 
each parent  holding  one  third of the  company.  Th~ proposed  joint venture  was 
notified to  the  Commission  on  February  23,  1995.  The  Commission  opened  a 
phase  II in-depth investigation on  March  24,  1995  (IP/95/311). 
Dominant  position 
In its investigation the  Commission  found  that 
current  form  would  create  or  strengthen  a 
markets: 
(i)  On  the  market  for  provision of satellite 
Nordic  region  (Denmark,  Norway,  Sweden,  and 
dominant  position. 
the  NSD  joint venture  in  its 
dominant  position  on  three 
TV  transponder  capacity to  the 
Finland),  NSD  would  achieve  a 
(ii)  On  the  Danish  market  for  operation of  cable  TV  networks,  TO's  dominant 
position would  be  strengthened. 
(iii)  On  the market  for  distribution of satellite pay-TV  and  other '  encrypted 
TV  channels  to  direct-to-home  households,  NSD  would  obtain  a  dominant 
position. 
The  vertically integrated  nature  of  the  operation  means  that  the market 
positions  down-stream  (cable  TV  operations  and  pay-TV)  reinforce  the  market 
positions  up-stream  (satellite transponders,  'provision of  programmes)  and 
vice versa.  All  in  all,  the parties would  achieve  such  strong positions  that 
they  would  be  able  to  foreclose  the  Nordic market  for  satellite TV. 
In  this  respect  the  operation to  some  extent  resembles  the  joint venture  MSG 
Media  Service,  proposed  by  Bertelsman,  Kirch  Group,  and  Deutsche  Telecom, 
which  was  blocked  by  the  Commission  in  the  autumn  of  1994.  Through  the 
vertical nature of the  MSG  operation the parents  would  have  obtained control 
over  competitors  in the  German  pay-TV  market  and  thereby  competitors  would 
have  had  to accept  the  conditions  offered by  MSG  for its services. 
However,  there is  a  considerable difference between  the  ::;i  zt~  ."\nd  the  m  .. a  kt•t 
power  of  the  NSO  parents  and  those  of  the  MSG  parents.  Bertelsmann  c.md  K  i 1 d1 
together  as  suppliers  of  pay-TV  and  Kirch  as  supplier  of  films  and  TV 
programmes  represent  market  power  significantly  stronger  than  that  of 
Kinnevik.  Furthermore,  the position of  Deutsche  Telecom in the  German  cable 
TV  market  is  much  stronger  than  that  of  the  NSD  parents  in the  Nordic 
countries. 
The  affected  markets  are  currently  in  a  transitional  phase,  since  the 
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telecommunications  markets  are  about  to be liberalized  and  new  technologies 
and  services  are being  developed  and are  about  to  be  introduced.  In  this 
situation the  decision of the  Commission  takes  on  a  particular importance, 
since  this is  a  period  during  which  future  market  structures are  being 
defined.  It is  important that the  Commission  does  not·allow future  markets 
~o be  foreclosed. 
However,  the  Commission  recognizes  that  joint ventures  and  particularly 
transnational  joint ventures  can be  instrumental in developing  the media  and 
telecommunications  sectors  to their  full potential.  It should therefore  be 
noted that it  is the policy of  the  Commission  to  take  new  developments  into 
account.  Thus  the parties  remain invited to present  a  modified project which 
is  compatible  with  the  Common  Market  and  the  functioning  of  the  EEA 
agreement. 
The  parties  to  NSD  are  three  very strong players  in the Nordic  TV  and  media 
industry: 
NT  is  the  largest cable  TV  operator in  Norway  with 
connections.  NT  controls  the  satellite capacity  on  the 
position  (one  of the  two  Nordic positions),  and  it is 
distributor in Norway  through its company Telenor  CTV. 
about  30~  of  the 
lo  West  satellite 
an  ~mportant pay-TV 
- TD  is the  largest cable  TV  operator  in Denmark  with  about  50%  of  the 
connections,  and it will still enjoy  a  privileged situation for its cable  TV 
operations  possibly  until  January  1,  1998,  the  latest  date  for  the 
telecommunications  markets  to  be  liberalized.  TD  also,  together  with 
Kinnevik,  controls  most  of the  satellite capacity on  the  So  East satellite 
position  (the other Nordic position). 
- Kinnevik  is  a  Swedish  conglomerate  with  interests in  TV  programming, 
magazines  and  newspapers  as  well  as  in  steel,  paper,  packaging  and 
telecommunications.  Kinnevik  is  the  most  important  provider  of  Nordic 
satellite TV  programmes  with,  among  others,  the very popoular  TV3  channels, 
TV6,  Z-TV,  and the  TV1000  pay-TV channels.  The  company is the largest pay-TV 
distributor in the Nordic  countries  through its Viasat  companies.  Kinnevik 
also  has  an  important  stake  in Kabelvision,  the  second  largest cable  TV 
company  in  Sweden,  as  well  as  in  TV4,  the  largest  advertising-financed 
Swedish  channel. 
NSD  intends  to  transmit  satellite TV  programmes  to cable  TV  operators  and 
households  receiving  satellite  TV  on  their  own  dish  ("direct-to-home" 
market).  The  establishment  of  NSD  in its  current  form  would  in  effect  lead 
to  a  concentration  ~f the  activities of NT,  TD  and  Kinnevik,  resulting  in 
the  creation  of  a  highly  vertically  integrated operation  extending  from 
production of  TV  programmes  through operation  of satellites  and  cable  TV 
networks  to retail  distribution services  for  pay-TV  and other  encrypted 
channels. 
*** 
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COMMISSION APPROVES ESTABLISHMENT OF CABLE AND WIRELESS 
AND VEBA TELECOMMUNICATIONS JOINT VENTURES 
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The  European  Commission  has  approved the  formation  of  two  joint ventures  in 
telecommunications  between  Cable  and Wireless  and VEBA. 
The  first  - VEBACOM- will  bring together  the parties'  telecommunications 
activities  in  Germany  including  Personal  Communications  Network  (PCN) 
services,  paging  and various  value  added  services.  In the  future,  VEBACOM 
will  expand  its activities into public  service network  provisions  once  the 
German  telecommunications  market  has  been liberalized  and other  companies 
are allowed to  compete  with  Deutsche  Telekom. 
The  other  joint  venture  - Cable  and  Wireless  Europe  - will  combine  the  two 
parents'  telecommunications  operations  in  the  rest  of  the  EU  plus 
Switzerland but  excluding  the United  Kingdom.  Cable  and  Wireless  will 
retain  its  UK  telecommunications  activities  (Mercury  Communications  and 
Mercury  One20ne)  outside the  joint venture. 
The  operation presents  no  competition problems.  Cable  and Wireless  and  VEBA 
do  not  have  any  activities which  overlap in any significant manner.  In  any 
case,  on all the markets  on  which  the  two  joint ventures  will  operate,  there 
are  strong competitors  for  the  joint ventures  such  as  the  incumbent  national 
telecommunications  operators  and  the  emerging  multinational 
telecommunications  alliances.  In markets  where  liberalization  is envisaged 
in 1998,  such  as  Germany,  the  joint venture will  provide  a  new  a  potentially 
strong  competitor  to  the  existing  national  monopoly  telecommunications 
provider. 
*** 
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AS GSM MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS MARKET IS OPENED TO 
COMPETITION THE COMMISSION SCREENS THE LICENSING 
PROCEDURES 
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GSM  (Global  System  for  Mobile  communications)  is  the  digital  mobile 
telephony  system  developed  in  the  European  Union,  which  is  currently 
achieving large-scale  success.  Following intervention  of the  Commission, 
nearly  all Member  States  have  now  introduced  competition as  regards  the 
provision of this  new  service. 
The  Commission  welcomes  this introduction of  competition  which will  ensure 
better v·alue  and greater service  choice  for  consumers  in the  rapidly growing 
mobile market.  However  the  Commission  has  also intensified its  screening of 
the  GSM  licensing  processes  in the Member  States  to ensure  a  level playing 
field between  the  new entrant and  the  incumbent.  In nearly all cases  the 
latter is the  former  monopoly  telecoms  operator or one  of its subsidiaries .. 
In  July  1995,  Commissioner  Karel  Van  Miert  successfully  concluded 
negotiations with  the Irish  and  Belgian Telecommunications  Ministers  and is 
currently engaged in further  discussions  with Italy and  Spain.  Moreover  he 
intends  to  keep  a  close watch  on  others,  notably Austria. 
One  point of  concern is the  auction procedure  which  these Member  States  have 
included in  the  selection criteria  of  the  second operator,  whereby  the 
second licence is awarded not only  on  the basis  of  a  comparison  of intrinsic 
qualitative elements  such  as  intended coverage  roll out,  expertise in  the 
area  and  envisaged tariffs,  but also  on  the basis of  a  financial  bid above  a 
certain set threshold. 
The  Commission  has  always  criticized this  type  of  auction  approach  which 
implies  a  selective  burden  on  new,  innovative  technologies  which  will 
ultimately  disadvantage  future  users.  In  its  Green  paper  on  Mobile 
Communications  (27  April  1994)  the  Commission  emphasized  the  drawbac~s of 
auction procedures  for  granting mobile  licences. 
In  the selection  procedures  screened to date,  it  appeared moreover  that  the 
use  of auctions  for  the  selection  of  the  second  operator only,  lead to 
unfair  conditions  and  thus  threatened  to  thwart  competition  in  the 
developing  GSM  market.  The  Commission  therefore decided in  December  1994  to 
take  legal action  (under  Treaty  Article  90)  against  Italy and  considered 
similar  steps  against  the  other  governments  who  impose  such  conditions. 
Under  this  procedure,  when  the  Member  State  has  not  amended  the  offending 
regulations,  or  justified or compensated  for  them after  receiving  a  letter 
of  formal  notice  of  the  Commission,  the latter may  adopt  a  formal  Article  90 
(3)  decision  requiring the  government  to  end  the  infringement within  a  set 
time  period.  If it  still does  not  comply proceedings  under  Treaty Article 
169  may  be  launched which  result  in  a  judgement  from  the  European  Court  of 
Justice. 
The  Commission  takes  the  view that  imposing  a  significant  charge  only  on  the 
new  entrant,  threatens  to unfairly burden  this  undertaking  in competing  with 
the  incumbent  national  mobile  operator.  In general,  the latter,  not  only 
enjoys  all the  competitive  advantages  of its universal  network,  entrenched 
market  dominance  and  established  mobile  subscriber  base,  but  also  was 
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granted its  GSM  licence automatically and  for  free. 
In the  GSM  cases  the  Commission  stated  that it would  renounce  legal action 
if the  relevant Member  States,  either  abolished the  discriminatory  fee,  or 
required  the  incumbent  to pay  the  same  fee,  or,  by  implementing  regulatory 
measures,  adequately compensated  the  second  operator.  In principle,  the 
compensatory  measures  should  be  at  least as  "valuable",  vis  a  vis  the 
business plans  of the  latter,  as  the  imposed  cost of licence.  Compensation 
might  concern,  for  example,  better  conditions  of  interconnection with  the 
national operator's  network  and/or  a  commitment  to earlier liberalisation of 
infrastructure for  mobile  communications  than previously  foreseen.  Since 
interconnections  with,  and  use  of,  leased  line capacity  of  the  incumbent 
operators  currently  represents  around  30  to  40  %  of  the  second  operator's 
turnover,  the significance of  such  compensatory measures  is  clear. 
Following  discussions  with  the  Commission,  the Irish  government  agreed  to 
impose  a  similar  fee  on  the public operator Telecom Eireann  and  communic,ated 
further measures  to  ensure  a  level playing field in the  area.  For  example, 
the  regulator is  to ensure that efficient  and  fair  procedures  are  in pldce 
to deal  with  interconnection disputes  between  the  new  operator  and  the 
incumbent.  This  includes  a  clear  accounting  methodology  (vis  a  vis 
interconnect  charges)  which  is  in  line  with  EU  competition  principles. 
Furthermore,  the  Irish  Government  has  granted  the  second  operator  the 
immediate  right  to  use its  own  or alternative  infrastructure to carry  and 
terminate its  calls,  in line  with  the  wording  of  the  Commission's  draft 
directive  on mobile  communications  (see  below). 
In  view  of  these  circumstances  and,  assuming  that  the  measures  are 
effectively  implemented the  Commission  has  now  deemed  that  the  granting 
pro·cedure  followed by  the Irish  Government  does  not  favour  the  extension  of 
the dominant position  of the  incumbent  operator,  and  so,  there is  no  longer 
grounds  for  legal action against Ireland.  Accordingly  the  Commission  wrote 
to the  Irish authorities  on  July  14  1995  to officially close  the  case. 
Belgium who  had  also  chosen  to  include  an  auction element  in  the selection 
procedure  announced  the  second  GSM  licensee  on  September  7,  1995.  Subsequent 
to  contacts  between  Commissioner  Van  Miert  and  the  competent  Belgian 
Minister  concerning the  conditions  under  which  such  an  auction  element  could 
be  accepted,  the  Belgian  government  announced  that the  first licensee will 
have  to  pay  an  amount  equivalent  to  the  license  fee  the  second  licensee 
agreed to pay. 
In  the  Italian  case,  however,  the  Commission  is  still  pursuing  the 
procedure.  While  substantial progress  was  achieved,  in particular  with  the 
recent  announced  measures,  concerned  with liberalisation of  infrastructure 
for mobile  communications,  the  Commission  has  not  yet  received  the ultimate 
reassurances  regarding  the actual  implementation  of this  liberalisation. 
Thus  the  Commission will  soon  have  to  consider  the  adoption  of  a  formal 
Article  90  (3)  decision  against the  Italian Government.  A  final  warning 
letter was  notified to the Italian authorities  on  July  27  1995. 
The  screening of  the  Spanish  situation is  also  still in  progress.  The 
Spanish  Ministry  reacted to  the  Commission's  concern  about  the  <illct ion 
procedure  in Spain  with  a  list  of  clarifications  regarding  the measures 
taken  in  favour  of  the  new  entrant.  However  further details  are  needed  to 
allow  for  a  final  assessment  of  these measures.  For  example,  the  government 
does  propose  to  take  into  account  decreasing underlying  costs  to Telefonica 
in ensuring  reasonable  interconnect  fees,  but provides  no  appropriate  cost 
accounting  system  (e.g.  average  long  term  incremental  costs).  Implementation 
of  the  Spanish  agreement  to establish  cost accounting between  Telefonica's 
GSM  operation  and its  activities  as  a  monopoly  provider  of  fixed  and 
analogue  mobile  telephony is  also not  yet  clear.  Therefore,  in this  case 
the  Commission  has  sent out  a  request  for  more  i'nformation  from  the  Spanish 
Government  (July  18). 
Austria  has  recently launched  a  call  for  tender  which will  expire at  the  end 
of  October.  Upon  a  request  from  Commissioner  Van  Miert  the  Austrian 
government  provided  the  Commission  with  detailed  information  on  the 
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tendering  procedure  in  August 
Commission's  services. 
which  is  currently  analysed  by  the 
The  Commission  has  in  the meantime  approved the wording  of  a  draft  mobile 
communications  directive  on  June  14  1995  and published  it in  the Official 
Journal  on  1  August  1995  for  a  two  months  public consultation period.  The 
draft  text will also  be presented  to the  Council  and  the  Parliament  this 
Autumn  and  the  Commission  intends  to  adopt  this Directive before  the  end of 
this  year.  It will  apply  Article  90(3)  more  generally across  the  EU  GSM 
market,  specifying competitive  conditions  required by  the Treaty  and pre-
empting  a  growing  riumber  of complaints  in  the area.  In  particular  it 
requires  that  competing mobile  operators  be  allowed ·unrestricted use  of  own 
and alternative infrastructure,  direct interconnections  with  each  other and 
fair  conditions  of access  to the incumbent's  network. 
*  *  * 
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The  European  Commission  has  found  the  agreement  between  Banca  Nazionale  de 
Lavoro  (BNL)  and British  Telecommunications  (BT)  to  set  up  a  telecoms 
company  named  ALBACOM  in Italy to be  outside the  jurisdiction of  the  Merger 
Control  Regulation.  Consequently,  it has  not assessed  the  competitive  impact 
of the operation. 
BNL  and  BT  notified to  the  Commission  an  operation to set up  a  company  to 
offer  business  communication  services  and  subsequently  other 
telecommunications  services based on  the  two  companies'  existing  networks  in 
Italy.  This  company  would  compete  against  the  current  monopoly  supplier of 
telecommunications,  Telecom Italia. 
After assessing the operation,  the  Commission  found  that  BNL  and  BT  may  have 
joint control of  the  company  for  the  first three years.  After  that period, 
however,  BT  would definitively  have  sole control  as  BT  will  then  have  the 
decisive  influence  on  the  appointment  of  the management  and  on  the  budget 
of ALBACOM.  As  in  the  case  Banco  Santander/BT,  the  three  year period  was 
judged  to  be  insufficient to  decide  that the  company  would  be  jointly 
controlled.  The  operation  was,  therefore,  an  acquisition  by  BT  of  certain 
assets  of  BNL.  As  a  result,  the operation  did not  exceed  the  threshold  set 
out in the  merger  control  regulation which  requires  that  at least  two  of 
the  parties  to  an  operation  each  have  an  EU-wide  turnover  of 
250  million  ECU. 
The  Commission  has  declared  that the  operation  does  not  fall  under  the 
merger  control  regulation. 
*** 
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At  the  initiative  of  Commissioner 
Directorate  General  for  competition 
investigate  the  creation and  operation 
Europe  Online. 
Karel  Van  Miert,  the  Commission's 
(DG  IV)  has  opened  a  procedure  ~o 
of  the  online services  joint venture 
The  Commission's  main  objective in  dealing with  online  cases  will  be  to 
prevent at an  early stage the  establishment  of anti-competitive  situations 
which  could  stifle the development  of  online services  and  the  'Information 
Society'  by  ruling out viable competition before  an  effective market  has  had 
a  chance  to  grow.  In  the  Europe  Online  case,  the  Commission  would  like to 
know if  (i)  access  to  the publications  controlled by  the partners  would  be 
available  at  fair  conditions  to  other  online services,  both  concerning 
advertising  for  the  new  services  and online provision  of their content,  (ii) 
publications  not  belonging  to the  founding  groups  would  have  access  to 
Europe  Online's  subscribers  at conditions  similar  to  those  enjoyed by  ·the 
partners'  publications,  and  (iii)  anti-competitive agreements  with  other 
companies  would  be  avoided. 
DG  IV has  asked  the partners  of  Europe  Online  to provide  the  information 
necessary  for  this enquiry.  The  opening of this procedure does  not prejudice 
the  Commission's  ultimate position on  Europe  Online.  In  line with  European 
competition  rules  and with  its opinion  on'the  'information society',  the 
Commission is  committed  to providing  the  conditions  for  as  much  innovation 
as  possible;  it will take into  particular consideration  the benefits  which 
the  emergence  of new online service providers  represent  for  consumers. 
According  to  the  information presently  available  with  DG  IV,  the  joint 
venture  Europe  Online  brings  together important players  from  the publishing 
and  communication  fields  as  well  as  financial  participants with  broader 
interests.  The  three  main  shareholders  are  the major  publishing groups 
Burda  (Germany),  Matra-Hachette  (France)  and  Pearson  (UK).  It  seems  that 
another  German  publishing  group,  Springer  Verlag,  recently joined  as  well. 
In addition,  two  US  companies  would  contribute experience  from the  US  online 
services  sector.  These  are:  Meigher  Communications  (created by  certain 
founders  of America  Online)  and  Interchange Online  Network  (developer  of 
some  software  used  by  Europe  Online,  and  recently acquired by  the  leading  US 
telecom operator  AT&T)  .  The  financial  partners  include  the  Luxembourg-
based Societe  Nationale  de  Credit  a  l'Investissement  and  the  Banque  et 
Caisse d'Epargne  de  l'Etat,  Luxembourg,  both  of  which  are  also  involved in 
Societe  Europeenne  de  Satellites  (SES),  promoter of  the Astra satellites. 
In  competition with  existing online  companies  in Europe,  such  as  CompuServe, 
Europe  Online  aims  to provide domestic  and business  users  with  the  "gateway" 
linking their  personal  computer  with  a  range  of  online services.  Currently 
such  services  mainly  concern  electronic  mail,  specialized  d;\t<lb.t:>P:> 
providing  publications  and  other  data,  access  to  bulletin  boarcis, 
discussion groups  and  interactive  games.  Online  services  are,  however, 
developing  rapidly  and  will  increasing!~  include  more  sophisticatP.d 
audiovisual  communications  such  as  video-on-demand,  videoconferencing  and 
"virtual  shopping  malls"  together with tele-transaction  services  (shopping, 
banking,  reservations etc.  from  the  home).  They  will  become  increasingly 
accessible via personal  computers,  cable  TV  and  videotex·  services  such  as 
the  French Minitel. 
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These  services  which  mark  the  start of  the  Information  Society  have  been 
identified  in the  Commission's  'White  Paper  on  growth,  competitiveness  and 
employment'  as  major  areas  for  growth  of the  European  economy.  To  ensure 
stronger innovation,  investments  and benefits  to the  consumers  in  Europe,  a 
careful  monitoring  is  required,  especially  to  ensure  respect  for  the 
competition  rules.  Today,  Europe's  online  services market  is less  than half 
that of  the  US  market.  It is also  two  to  three  years  behind the  US  in terms 
of available  products  and  consumer  interest.  But  this  gap  is narrowing, 
particula·rly as  new  services  become  available in all European  languages.  The 
European market  for  online  services is expected to double  by the  year  2000, 
reaching around  ECU  5  to  6  bn. 
In  addition  to  a  number  of  existing  companies,  at  least  two  other 
international online  services  are to establish  themselves  in  Europe  by  the 
end  of  1995:  the  joint  venture  between  America  Online  (AOL)  and 
Bertelsmann,  and  the Microsoft  Network  (MSN)  .  AOL/Bertelsmann  has  already 
had  contacts  with the  Commission  and  MSN  is being monitored  carefully both 
by the  Commission  and by  the  US  authorities.  On  a  more  national  ~r  local 
basis  many  other  players  are  hoping  to  reach  that  critical  mass  of 
subscribers  which  makes  an  on-line enterprise  commercially viable. 
*** 
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On  the initiative of  M.  Karel  Van  Miert  the  Commission  has  today  decided. to 
ask  the  Italian Government  to  take  necessary measures  to establish  a  level 
playing  field between  the  two  competing  operators  on  the  Italian  GSM  market. 
The  Commission  has  indeed  requested that  the Italian  authorities  take  the 
necessary steps  to abolish the  distortion of competition resulting  from  the 
initial payment  imposed  on  Omnitel  Pronto  Italia  and  to  secure  equal 
conditions  for all operators  of  GSM  radiotelephony by the  following means: 
a  requirement  that Telecom Italia make  an identical payment;  or 
the  adoption,  after  receiving  the  agreement  of the  Commission,  of 
corrective measures  equivalent  in economic  terms  to  the  payment  made  by 
the  second operator 
The  Commission  recognises  and  supports  the significant progress  already made 
in  Italy  in  this latter  context,  with  the  recent  submission of  draft 
legislation to  the Italian  Parliament  for  fundamental  regulatory  reform of 
the  Italian telecoms  market.  Within  three months  the  Italian  authorities 
are  to indicate what measures  have  been  implemented. 
The  Commission  is  particularly concerned  with  the  auction procedure  which 
certain Member  States,  including  Italy,  have  included  in  the  selection 
criteria  of  the  second  operator.  In these  cases  the  second  licence  is 
awarded  not  only on  the basis  of  a  comparison  of  intrinsic qualitative 
elements  such  as  intended  coverage  roll  out,  expertise  in  the  area  and 
envisaged tariffs,  but also  on  the basis  of  a  financial  bid above  a  certain 
set threshold.  The  Commission  criticized  this type  of  auction approach  in 
its  mobile  Green  paper of  1994  since it implies  a  selective burden  on  new, 
innovative technologies  which will ultimately disadvantage  future  users.  In 
the  selection  procedures  screened to  date,  it  appears  that  the  use  of 
auctions  for  the  selection  of  the  second  operator only,  lead  to unfair 
conditions  and  thus  threatened to  thwart  competition in  the developing  GSM 
market. 
The  Commission  decided in  December  1.994  to  take  legal action  (under  Treaty 
Article  90)  against  Italy.  The  Commission  stated that  it would  renounc~ 
legal  action  if Italy either abolished  the  discriminatory  tee,  or  required 
the  incumbent  to pay  the  same  fee,  or,  by  implementing  regulatory measures 
which  adequately  compensated  the  second  operator.  Compensation  might 
concern,  for  example,  better conditions  of  interconnection with  the  national 
operator's  network  and/or  a  commitment  to  earlier  liberalisation  of 
infrastructure  for  mobile  communications  than previously  foreseen.  Since 
interconnections  with,  and  use  of,  leased  line capacity  of  the  incumbent 
operators  currently  represents  around  30  to  40  %,  of  the  second operator's 
turnover,  the  significance of  such  compensatory measures  is clear. 
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On  the initiative of M.  Karel  Van  Miert  the  Commission  has  tQday  decided to 
ask  the  Italian Government  to  take  necessary measures  to establish  a  level 
playing  field between  the  two  competing  operators  on  the  Italian GSM  market. 
The  Commission  has  indeed  requested that  the Italian  authorities  take  the 
necessary steps  to abolish the  distortion of  competition  resulting  from  the 
initial payment  imposed  on  Omnitel  Pronto  Italia  and  to  secure  equal 
conditions  for all operators  of  GSM  radiotelephony by  the  following  means: 
a  requirement  that Telecom Italia make  an  identical payment;  or 
the  adoption, .after  rece~v~ng  the  agreement  of the  Commission,  of 
corrective measures  equivalent  in economic  terms  to the payment  made  by 
the  second operator 
The  Commission  recognises  and  supports  the significant progress  already made 
in  Italy  in  this latter  context,  with  the  recent  submission of  draft 
legislation to  the Italian  Parliament  for  fundamental  regulatory  reform of 
the Italian telecoms  market.  Within  three months  the Italian  authorities 
are  to  indicate what  measures  have  been  implemented. 
The  Commission  is  particularly concerned  with the  auction procedure which 
certain Member  States,  including  Italy,  have  included  in  the  selection 
criteria  of  the  second  operator.  In these  cases  the  second  licence  is 
awarded  not  only on  the basis  of  a  comparison  of  intrinsic qualitative 
elements  such as  intended  coverage  roll  out,  expertise  in  the area  and 
envisaged tariffs,  but also  on  the basis  of  a  financial bid above  a  certain 
set threshold.  The  Commission  criticized  this type  of  auction approach  in 
its  mobile  Green  paper of  1994  since it implies  a  selective burden  on  new, 
innovative  technologies  which will ultimately disadvantage  future  users.  In 
the  selection  procedures  screened to  date,  it  appears  that  the  use  of 
auctions  for  the selection  of  the  second  operator only,  lead  to unfair 
conditions  and  thus  threatened to  thwart  competition in  the developing  GSM 
market. 
The  Commission  decided in  December  1994  to  take legal action  (under  Treaty 
Article  90)  against  Italy.  The  Commission  stated that  it would  renounce 
legal action  if Italy either abolished  the discriminatory  fee,  or  required 
the  incumbent  to pay  the  same  fee,  or,  by  implementing  regulatory measures 
which  adequately  compensated  the  second  operator.  Compensation  might 
concern,  for  example,  better conditions  of interconnection with  the  national 
operator's  network  and/or  a  commitment  to  earlier  liberalisation  of 
infrastructure for  mobile  communications  than previously  foreseen.  Since 
interconnections  with,  and  use  of,  leased  line capacity  of  the  incumbent 
operators  currently  represents  around  30  to  40  %  of the  second operator's 
turnover,  the significance of  such  compensatory measures  is clear. 
COMPARATIVE  TABLE  REGUARDING  THE  GRANTING  OF  COMPETING  MOBILE  LICENCES  IN 
THE  COMMUNITY 
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equivalent  amount  to be 
paid by public operator 
same  annual  fee 
same  annual  fee 
public operator excluded 
from  auction 
compensations  currently 
discussed 
same  annual  fee 
same  annual  fee 
limited weighing  (19%)  -
similar amount  requested 
from public operator 
no  similar  amount 
requested  from public 
operator 
no  intervention of  the 
Commission  taking 
account  size of  the 
country 
same  annual  fee 
Austria announced  same 
payment  by public 
operator 
same  annual  fee 
same  annual  fee 
same  annual  fee 
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At  the  initiative of  Commissioners  Van  Miert  and  Bangemann,  the  Commission 
has  today  adopted  a  directive  lifting restrictions  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
networks  throughout  the  Union  for  the  carriage  of  all  liberalised 
telecommunications  services.  It aims,  in  particular,  to  allow new  multi-
media  telecoms  services  to  be  carried  on  cable  networks,  throughout  the 
European  Union,  by  1  January  1996. 
In many  of  the Member  States  existing national  regulation still  restricts 
use  of  cable  TV  networks  to simple,  one-way televisionbroadcasting services 
(see  table) .  The  regulatory  restrictions  thus  effectively prevent  cable  TV 
operators  from offering carriage  or  prov~s~on  of any  of  the  new  switched 
(i.e.  interactive}  multimedia  services.  The  main  goal  of  the  Commission  is 
to lift those  restrictions in order to encourage  investment  and  foster pilot 
projects  and  new  initiatives in this  field.  Examples  of  such  new  services 
include:  tele-shopping  and tele-transaction packages,  interactive games  and 
education services,  on-line databases  including detailed/moving  images 
Lifting  restrictions  on  cable  network  usage  should  also  introduce 
alternative means  for  all telecoms  service providers  to  gain  switched access 
to end  customers  (instead of relying  exclusively on  the monopoly  telecoms 
operator)  permitting a  lowering  of costs. 
Scope  of  the  Directive 
Like  the satellite  directive adopted in  October  1994,  the  cable  directive 
involves  an  amendment  to the  1990  telecoms  services directive  (90/388)  .  The 
amendment  allows  service  providers  the  choice of  offering their  services 
over  cable  TV  networks.  This  does  not affect the  Member  States'  rights  to 
maintain monopolies  in provision of public voice telephony until  1998. 
During  the  consultation on  the draft  text,  the  European  Parliament,  as  well 
as  other interested parties proposed extending  the  scope  of the directive to 
cover  the provision of  cable  TV  services  by  telecom operators.  The  idea is 
based on  "symmetry"  of liberalisation:  i.e.  once  cable  operators  may  enter 
the  telecoms  services  market,  then telecom  operators  should  be  allowed  to 
enter the  TV  broadcasting market. 
For  legal  reasons  however it  was  not possible  to address  the  "symmetry" 
issue in this directive.  The  question will  certainly need  to be  addressed  in 
the  context of  the measures  surrounding  the  1998  date  for  fuli  telecoms 
liberalisation. 
Content  of  the  Directive 
*  Lifting Restrictions 
Article  1  of  the  cable  TV  directive  abolishes  restrictions  on  the  use  of 
transmission  capacity on  CATV  networks  for all telecoms  services,  apart  from 
public voice  telephony,  from  1  January  1996.  This  covers,  in  particular 
data  communications,  corporate  networks  and multi-media  services.  The 
article also  ensures  that  cable  TV  networks  are  allowed  to  (a)  interconnect 
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with  the  national  public telecoms  network,  and  (b)  directly interconnect 
with  each other  (i.e  in as  far  as  already possible in the  framework  of their 
broadcasting business). 
*  Competitive  safeguards  and  joint provision 
Article  2  of the directive  further  addresses  the  situation occurring in  some 
Member  States where  the  telecoms  operator also  owns  cable  TV  companies. 
The  Directive thus  asks  the  Member  States  to  impose  accounting  transparency 
and separation of  financial  accounts  between  the  two  business  activities  as 
soon  as  a  turnover of  50  million  Ecus  is  reached in the market  for  telecom. 
The  Commission  will  assess,  before  January  1,  1998,  whether  accounting 
separation is sufficient to avoid abusive practices. 
BACKGROUND 
The  current situation in the Member  States 
The  most  extensive  cable  TV  networks  are  in the  Benelux  countries with  over 
90%  of  households  passed.  They  are  generally provided by  local municipal 
monopolies.  Although  very developed  in  terms  of penetration  technological 
upgrading will  be  needed in  most  cases  in  order to  cope  with  demands  for 
transmission  of  new  interactive audiovisual  services  and  other  two-way 
telecoms  services.  Cable  networks  in  Denmark  and  Germany  cover  around  70~ 
of households.  Denmark  has  over  6500  cable operators,  but  Germany  only  one, 
that is  the public  telecoms  operator  DBPT.  · 
Ireland  has  a  relatively  developed  cable  network  with  around  50~  of 
households  passed and  around  13  cable  operators.  Services  are provided  by 
licenc'e  holders  in  conjunction  with  Telecom  Eireann.  The  latter  has 
recently announced  an  increase  in its  stake to  75%  in  the  leading  Irish 
cable operator and  programmer,  Cablelink. 
In Spain,  cable penetration is also  low  with  around  8%  of  households  passed 
and  a  subscription  rate of  1%  of all  households  .  Service  is currently 
provided  in  a  limited  number  of areas  by  regional  authorities  or  town 
councils.  There  are  28  of  these  local  cable  operations  which  generally 
started  as  local distributers of satellite pay  TV.  However,  Telefonica,  in 
the meantime  has  been  rapidly upgrading  its own  network  with optic  fibre 
capacity  and  claims  it  is  now  adapted  for  carriage  of  TV  signals  and 
multimedia  services  to  the  homes  of  the major part  of the population.  The 
Spanish  telecom  operator has  recently established  a  joint venture  called 
Cablevision with  the  leading media  group  in  Spain,  PRISA.  The  PRISA  group 
controls  the largest newspaper publisher,  and broadcasting  operation as  well 
as  the  only pay  TV  channel  in the  country.  A  complaint  to  the  Commission 
against  the  formation  of this  joint venture  was  lodged  this month  by  one  of 
Spain's  three private  TV  channels,  Antena  3. 
In  Italy there  is  no  significant cable  network  development  as  yet.  How~vet 
Telecom  Italia  has  recently  announced  its  own  $7.8  billion  ~socrdtes~ 
project  to  roll  out its own  nationwide  cable  n~twork,  like Teletonica,  by 
installing  fibre  optic lines  to  the  horne.  The  target is  to  pass  at least 
50%  of  households  by  1998.  In  a  first phase  Socrates  will  offer  cable  TV 
channels  and pay-per-view services.  In  a  second phase  interactive services 
including  video  games,  home-banking  and  home  shopping,  will  be  introduced. 
In  the  third  and  final  phase  Telecom  Italia  proposes  full  "services 
integration"  of  telecoms  and  broadcasting  services  over  a  common  network 
platform 
The  European  Commission  has  in  the  meantime  sent  requests  for  information 
have  been  sent  to  Telecom Italia,  Telefonica  and  Telecom  Eireann.  The  .tim 
is  to  clarify  the  plans  of  these  operators  and  to  assess  the  facts  rtnd 
possible  legal  implications  concerning  their  potential  use  of  monopoly 
telecoms  infrastructure to  provide  cable  TV  services. 
In  the  UK  cable  network  roll  out  is  still relatively  limited with  only 
around  10~  of  homes  passed  and  a  subscription  rate  in  1994  of  only  2.8~. 
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However,  early  infrastructure  liberalisation  in  the  UK 
investment  was  made  in making  these  networks  technologically 
that they  are generally  already capable  of providing  switched 
services. 
ensured  that 
advanced,  so 
multi-media 
In  Portugal  cable television only started at the  end of  1994  through  TV  Cabo 
Portugal  which is  a  part of the  Portugal  Telecom group.  It  is divided into 
9  regional  operational  companies.  By  the  end of this  year  TV  Cavo  Portugal 
hopes  to  have passed almost  400  000  homes. 
Greece  has  no  cable  TV  network  as  yet. 
Table 















Use  of  cable  TV  networks 
for liberalised services 
Non-voice  services  only 
No 
---------* 
No  legal provision 
---------*  (legislation 
pending) 
No  legal provision 
Limited use 
No 
No  (but  pending 
legislation) 
Yes 
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On  the initiative  of Mr  Bangemann,  the  Commission  has  decided  to  forward  to 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  a  communication  setting  out 
guidelines  on  the  directories  market.  The  introduction of  a  competitive 
environment  in  the  telecommunications  sector  requires,  on  the  one  hand,  an 
extension of  Community  telecommunications  rules  to  include directories  and 
information  services  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the maintenance  of  a  universal 
directory and  an information service that is easily  accessible to all users 
at  an  affordable price. 
To  the  extent  that  a  directory  is both  a  product  and  a  service,  the 
prov1s1ons  of the Treaty  relating to  competition  (Art.  85,  86,  90)  and  to 
the  free  movement  of  goods,  the  freedom  t.o  provide  services  and  consumer 
protection  (Art.  30  to  34,  36,  59,  60,  lOOa,  129a  and  several  directives 
based  on  these  articles)  must  be  applied.  The  Commission  will pursue  an 
application  of these provisions  taking into  account  the  guidelines  outlined 
in  the  communication.  Where  appropriate  they  will  be  incorporated  in 
proposals  to be  presented to  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council  in 
order to  complete  the  legal  framework  for  a  liberalised  telecommunications 
market. 
The  directories  and  associated information services  sectors  are at the  sharp 
end  of  telecommunications  and  publishing  and,  in  consequence,  their 
development  is  completely at  the mercy  of  any  changes  that  may  occur  ln 
these  two  sectors.  Directories  account  for  a  major proportion of  the media 
and  represent  7.5%  of  the advertising market  in the  European  Union. 
Directory services,  making  up  as  they  do  the  most  important  means  of  access 
to  telecommunications  services,  will play  a  central role  with  regard to the 
use  of  telecommunications  services in  a  competitive environment. 
Drawing  on  the  benefits  of  the  new  technologies  and,  in particular,  of  the 
interactivity  made  possible by  videotex  services,  this  sector is currently 
making  its debut  in the  world  of multimedia.  As  one  of  the major  elements 
in this  new market,  it should contribute significantly  to  the  development  of 
the latter. 
Telecommunications  directories  are  supplied in  a  variety of  forms:  printed, 
electronic  (on  line or  CD-ROM)  or via  a  telephone  hotline. 
The  Commission  is  proposing  the  following  guidelines  with  a  view  to 
developing  this  sector: 
1. 
2. 
Retention  of  a  universal directory and  a  telephone  information service 
in  a  competitive  environment.  In  each  Member  State,  users  of  voice 
telephony services must  have  at  their disposal  at  least one  complete 
"White  Pages"  directory  containing  the  telephone  particulars  of  the 
subscribers  to  fixed  and  mobile  services,  while at the  same  time  having 
access  to at least one  information service at affordable 
Abolition of  the  exclusive  and  special  rights  in  the  telecommunications 
directories market  which  exist  under  certain national  regulations.  ThesP 
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liberalization  measures  seek  to  promote  the  dynamic  development  of 
supply,  while at  the  same  time  respecting the  rules  of  competition  and 
taking  account,  on  the  one  hand,  of  recent  trends  in the  regulations 
applicable  to  telecommunications  services,  notably  the  complete 
liberalization  of  fixed  voice  telephony services  with  effect  from 
1  January  1998  and,  on  the other hand,  of the anticipated development  of 
the  trans-European  networks  and mobile  telephony services  in the  years 
to  come. 
3.  Conditions  governing  access  and marketing.  To  the extent that directory 
services  and other information services  for  subscribers  can  no  longer be 
regarded as  reserved activities,  access  to  raw  subscriber data,  pure  and 
simple,  should be provided on  the basis  of  objective,  transparent  and 
non-discriminatory  cri'teria  and  in accordance  with  the  Community 
provisions  in force,  notably with  regard to  the  rules  of  competition, 
the principles of  Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  and  the protection  of 
personal data  and  individual privacy. 
4.  Promotion  of  new  technologies  (electronic directory,  CD-ROM  and  XSOO 
service)  and  opening-up  to multimedia.  By  virtue of  the  facilities 
already  offered by  electronic directories  (speed of  interrogation on 
line,  continuous  updating  of  data,  diversification  of  applications), 
steps  should be  taken  to  encourage  the  development  of  interconnections 
between  the various  existing services  in the Union.  Furthermore,  the 
emergence  of  electronic media  and  the interactivity  developed  through 
videotex should facilitate the  evolution of directories  along multimedia 
lines. 
5.  Precautionary measures 
Protection  of individual  privacy.  In the  context of the  provision of 
directory services,  the protection  of personal data  must  be  guaranteed. 
Subscribers must  be  informed  of their rights  to  protection against  all 
forms  of  intrusion into their private  lives,  i.e.  the  right  not  to  be 
included in the directory,  the  right of access  and  the  right to  correction 
in respect of data  which  concern  them,  the right to  oppose  the marketing 
of data  relating to  them and  the  right to limit the  use  of  such data. 
Protection of intellectual property rights.  The  benefits  of the  national 
and  Community provisions  governing  copyright  should be  extended to include 
directories,  pursuant  to  the  criteria allowing  for  protection under  the 
regulations  currently in force. 
*  *  * 
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Mr.Karel  Van  Miert,  Commissioner in  charge  of  EU  competition  policy,  has 
informed the  European  Commission  about  commitments  made  by  the  French  and 
German  ministers in  charge  of telecommunications  and  the  CEOs  of  France 
Telecom and  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  regarding  the  notified  ATLAS  and  PHOENIX 
telecommunications  alliance. 
On  the basis  of  these main  and  other  commitments,  the  Commission  now  intends 
to  initiate the  formal  procedure,  the  first  step of  which will  be  the 
publication of  a  Notice  in the Official  Journal  setting out  the main  factual 
elements  of  the  notified  transactions,  including  the  amendments  and 
commitments  agreed  upon  by  the  parties,  and  inviting  interested  third 
parties  to  submit  any  comments  they  may  have  within  a  specified  period, 
normally  speaking one  month. 
The  procedure  also  involves  a  consultation  of  the Advisory  Comittee  of 
Member  State competition  authorities  on  the text of  a  draft decision by  the 
Commission,  which  could be  formally adopted during the first half of  1996. 
The  amendments  and  undertakings  offered  by  the national  telecommunications 
ministers  of  France  and  Germany  and  the parties  to  the  ATLAS  and  PHOENIX 
alliances  are  designed to  meet  the  concerns  expressed  by the  Commission, 
i.e.: 
- the  French  and  German  governments  have  undertaken  a  firm  political 
commitment  to  liberalize alternative  telecommunications  infrastructure 
for  the provision  of liberalized  telecommunications  services,  i.e.  not 
basic public voice  telephony,  by  1  July  1996  and  to liberalize  fully all 
telecommunications  services,  including public voice,  and infrastructure by 
1  January  1998; 
- the  public switched  data  networks  in  France  and  Germany,  Transpac  and 
Datex-P  respectively,  will until  1  January  1998  remain  separated  from  the 
ATLAS  joint venture set up  by  France  Telecom and  Deutsche  Telekom; 
- France  Telecom and  Deutsche  Telekom agree  to establish and maintain  access 
to their domestic public switched data  networks  in  France  and  Germany  on  a 
non-discriminatory,  open  and  transparent  basis  to  all service providers 
offering  low-level  (so-called X.25)  data  services;  to  ensure  continued 
non-discriminatory  access  in  the  future,  the  parties'  commitment  also 
relates  to  any generally  applied standardised  interconnection protocol 
that may  modify,  replace  or co-exist with,  the  current standard; 
France  Telecom  and  Deutsche  Telekom agree  not  to  engage  in  cross-
subsidisation;  to prevent  cross-subsidies,  all entities  formed  pursuant  to 
the ATLAS  and  PHOENIX  ventures will  be  established as  distinct entities, 
separate  from  the parent  companies  and  subject  to  regular  and  customary 
auditing,  to  ensure  that  dealings  between  these  entities  and  France 
Telecom  and  Deutsche  Telekom take place  on  an  arm's  length basis; 
- France  Telecom agrees  to sell the  INFO  AG  company,  an  important  competitor 
of  Datex-P  on  the  German  data  network  services market. 
*  *  * 
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On  a  proposal 
today adopted 
at  a  Union 
services".  The 
Council  by  the 
of  Commissioner  Martin  Bangemann,  the  European  Commission 
a  "Proposal  to  European  Parliament  and  Council  for  an  action 
level  in  the  field  of  satellite  personal  communications 
proposal  could be  adopted by  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
middle  of  1996. 
Satellite  personal  communications  services  will  provide  data  and/or 
voice(and  in the  future  also  video)  services  into  a  fixed or  protable 
personal  terminal,  approximately the  size of  today's  terrestrial  cellular 
phones,  by means  of  new  types  of  the satellite  systems  such  as  Low  Earth 
Orbit{LEO)  constellation of  some  40-70  satellites overflying the surface  of 
the  earth  at  around  1000  km.  These  systems  will  enable  global 
interconnectivity  and  mobility  via  the  use  of  personal  communications 
equipment  as  a  complement  to  world~wide  mobile  terrestrial  networks  {in 
particular GSM)  . 
The  current situation:  European action is urgently needed. 
There  is a  significant opportunity for  European mobile  and  space industry in 
both  equipment  and  services  in satellite  PCS.  Actual  European  industry 
contracts  are  valued  at about  500  million  ECU,  while  potential  further 
contracts  are estimated  to  reach  tens  of  billions of  ECU,  especially  in 
handsets. 
In  view of  limited  availability of  frequency  spectrum resources  and  the 
number  of announced satellite PCS  systems,  there is  a  need to  come  worldwide 
to  a  co-ordinated selection  of satellite PCS  systems  taking due  account  of 
the  economic,  industrial  and social implications  of the proposed services. 
The  operation of  the satellite systems is subject  to  two  inter-related sets 
of issues: 
formal  notification to the  ITU  (International Telecommunications  Union) 
for  the purpose  of technical  frequency  coordination,  and 
selection and  authorisation of the  systems  in nations  where  the  space 
segment  capacity is to be  used. 
Successful  completion of  the  ITU  frequency  coordination process  does  not 
provide  any  guarantee  that the satellite system will  indeed be  authorised to 
proviede  space  segment  capacity for  use  in  a  particular country. 
In  the  United  States,  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC)  hds 
considered six  applications.  In early 1995  the  FCC  issued orders  selecting 
and  licensing  three of  the proposed  concepts  for  global  service provision, 
namely  Globalstar,  Iridium,  and  Odyssey. 
Regulatory measures,  including  licensing,  in other  parts  of  the world  are 
yet  to be  taken  although many  countries  are evaluating  the  issues  arising 
from  the  introduction  of  these  services.  In  the  European  Union,  the 
Commission  has  undertaken  a  number  of  initiatives.  She  organised a  hearing 
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in September  1992  where  the industry  presented their  plans  to  interested 
regulators,  industry  and users.  In its  Communication  on  Satellite Personal 
Communications  of  April  1993,  the  Commission  underlined  the  strategic 
importance  of satellite personal  communications  systems  and services. 
There  needs  to  be  compatibility between  any  European  spectrum  usage  and 
usage  in  other  regions  of  the  world.  The  spectrum  is  to  some  extend 
controlled by those  who  lay  first claim on  the  spectrum in the  context  of 
the  ITU  procedure~ and  there is  a  danger  that,  unless  precautions  are  taken, 
systems  capable of  providing service in Europe  may  be  selected by  a  process 
outside  European  jurisdiction.  Therefore  a  European  approach  for  licensing 
is  urgently  needed  in  order  to  use  the  limited  frequency  resource most 
efficiently and  to  strengthen the  combined  European position on  this matter. 
The  proposed action 
The  objectives  of action shall be  to  ensur,  within  a  period of three years 
selection of satellite PCS  space  segment  operators; 
the  adoption of  common  conditions  to be  attached to  authorisations  for 
satellite PCS  spac  segment  operators; 
harmonisation of conditions  for authorisations; 
the  establishment  of  a  dialogue  and,  where  appropriate,  negotiations 
between  the  European  Union  and  third  countries  with  the  aim  of 
establishing  international cooperation in  order to  promote  development 
of satellite personal  communications  services  and  remove  the obstacles 
to their development. 
As  a  first  step,  the  Commission  has  decided  to  publish  a  Call-for-
Information in the  Officiel  Journal,  addressed to prospective  consortia  and 
other  relevant  industry  planning  to  provide  satellite  personal 
communications  services  and/or  equipment  in the  European  Union.  Through  this 
Call-for-Information,  the  Commission  seeks  detailed  information  of  all 
relevant  matters  which  may assist the definition of  the  scope  and modalities 
of  a  selection and  authorisation process,  including suitable criteria  for 
selection and  conditions  for authorisation. 
The  Commission  may  ask  the  European  standardisation  bodies  such  as  the 
European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute  (ETSI)  and  Cen/Cenelec,  as 
well  as  the  European  Radio  Committee  (ERC),  and  the  European  Committee  for 
Telecommunications  Regulatory Affairs  (ECTRA),  via  work  requirements  under 
the  relevant existing  framework  agreements  with  those  organisations,  to 
study the necessary technical  criteria and  conditions. 
Finally  the  Commission,  who  shall  be  assisted  by  an  advisory  and  a 
regulatory Committee  shall adopt  Decisions  on: 
common  conditions  to be  attached  to  the authorisations  of  the' selected 
satellite personal  communications  space  segment  operators; 
harmonised  conditions  for  the authorisation  of providers  of  satellite 
personal  communications  services,  gateway operators,  and,  if required, 
for  the  circulation and  use  of  equipment; 
any other  measures  aimed at facilitating  the  development  of satellite 
personal  communications  services. 
As  to  International aspects,  the  Commission  monitors  developments  outside 
the  Community  and  consults  with  third  countries  on  the  coordinated 
introduction of satellite personal  communications  at  a  global  level. 
Whenever  the  Commission  establishes  that  the  situation 
negotiations  with  third  countries,  the  Commission  will 
appropriate,  negotiations  in view of  these  aims.  The  principle 
action will  be  aimed  at  ensuring  effective  and  comparab~e 
Community  organisations  in all markets. 
Annex 
may  requi  t·e 
start,  where 
of  Community 
access  for 
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to  a  European  Parliament  and  Council  Decision of 
on  an action at  a  Union  level in the  field of 
satellite personal  communications  services  in the  European  Union. 
Time  schedule  for measures 
Sept.  96  Establishment of  categories  of  satellite personal  communications 
services  for  which  a  selection of satellite systems  is required; 
Oct.  96 
Dec.  96 
Mar.  97 
*** 
Publication of  a  Call-for-Declaration of Interest in  the Official 
Journal; 
Adoption  o'f  criteria for  the selection  of satellite  systems  and 
the principles  for  the authorisations  for  these  systems; 
Based  on  a  comparative bidding process  and  subsequent  evaluation, 
selection  of  satellite  systems  used  for  the  provision  of 
categories  of satellite PCS  services; 
Adoption  of  common  conditions  for  the 
selected systems; 
authorisation  of  the 
Adoption  of  harmonised  conditions  for  the  authorisation of  all 
aspects  of  satellite - personal  communicatio~s  as  they  concern, 
inter  alia,  service  provision,  equipment,  interconnection, 
numbering,  and  gateway access. 
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COMMISSION ADOPTS TWO PROPOSALS COMPLETING THE 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR A LIBERALISED 
TELE-COMMUNICATIONS MARKET. 
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At  the initiative of  Commissioner  Bangemann,  the  Commission  today  adopted 
two  proposals  for legislation  (both based  on Article  100A)  that constitute 
key  elements  of  the  future  regulatory  framework  for  the  telecommunications 
sector,  following  liberalisation by  1  January  1998. 
1.  The  first one,  a  proposal  for  a  European  Parliament  and  Council 
Directive,  will,  together  with  directive  90/388/EEC[1]  (based  on 
Article  90  of  the Treaty),  establish a  common  framework  for  general 
authorisations  and  individual licences  granted by Member  States  in  the 
field of telecommunications  services. 
While  full  competition will be  introduced in the  telecommunications  sector 
in most  Member  States  in 1998,  authorisation regimes  remain  necessary in 
order to ensure that certain public interest objectives  such  as  universal 
service are attained.  At  the  same  time  no  undue  burdens  must  be  imposed  on 
market players. 
In that context,  the proposed directive sets  up  rules  to be  implemented at 
national  level,  together  with  the  full  application  of  competition 
principles,  both  for  the procedures  for  the granting  of authorisations  or 
licences  and  the  conditions  that  can be  attached to these  authorisations. 
Such  a  common  framework  should facilitate,  for  undertakings  acting in  the 
field of  telecommunications,  the exercise of  freedom of establishment  and 
freedom  to provide services  in the-European  Union. 
The  most  important  features  of the proposed directive are: 
in  line  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  the  granting  of 
authorisations will be  the  responsibility of Member  States; 
there  should  be  no 
authorisation,  but if 
following principles; 
obligation 
they do  so 
for  Member 
they must  be 
States  to  require 
in compliance with 
the prohibition  of  any 
entrants,  except to the 
radio  frequencies; 
a  priori limitation  in  the  number  of 





the  priority  given  to  general  authorisations  (every  undertaking 
complying  with  conditions  set out  in  general  rules  may  offer  its 
services  or infrastructure),  as  opposed  to individual  licences; 
national  authorisation  or  licencing 
transparent  and  non-discriminatory; 
procedures  have  to  be  open, 
the  definition  of  harmonised  principles  and  the  provision  of 
harmonisation  mechanisms  both  for  the  procedures  for  the  granting of 
authorisations  and  the  conditions  attached  to  authorisations  (for 
example  conditions  related to  the protection of  users,  in particular in 
relation to prior approval  by  the  regulatory authority of  the  standard 
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consumer  contract,  provision of detailed and accurate billing,  provision 
of  emergency services  and special arrangements  for  disabled people) . 
the  introduction  of  provisions  designed  to  facilitate  cross-border 
services.  In  particular  an  undertaking  intending  to  provide  a 
telecommunications  service in more  than  one  Member  State may  request  the 
national  regulatory  authorities  concerned  to  co-ordinate  their 
authorisation  procedures  in  order  to  deliver  the  necessary 
authorisations  on  substantially the  same  conditions. 
2.  The  second  text adopted  today by  the  Commission is  a  proposal  to update 
two  existing Directives in the area  of  open  network provision  (ONP)  . 
Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  concerns  the  harmonisation of  conditions  for 
access  to,  and  use  of,  public telecommunications  networks  and  services. 
The  framework  Directive  90/387  EEC  describes  objectives  and  procedures.  It 
covers  the  use  of standards,  requirements  for  the  independence  of  the 
national  regulatory authorities,  and  the  ONP  Committee  procedures.  The 
Directive does  not place  any specific obligations  on  market  players.  These 
obligations are  covered by  two  individual  ONP  Directives: 
Council  Directive  92/44/EEC  on  the application of  ONP  to leased lines 
European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  on  the application of  ONP  to 
voice  telephony  (adoption expected by  the  end of  1995) 
The  ONP  framework  Directive,  first  adopted in  1990,  and  the  ONP  Leased 
Lines  Directive,  adopted in 1992,  are being  now  updated to  take  account  of 
the  introduction of  competition  after  1998,  and  to provide  a  common 
approach  for  the provision of important public telecommunications  services 
in the  European  Union. 
Given  the  crucial  role played by national  regulatory authorities  for  the 
telecommunications  in a  liberalised market,  a  new  requirement  is being 
introduced in the  ONP  framework  Directive to  reinforce  the  independence  of 
the national  regulatory  authorities  for  telecommunications  in each  Member 
State.  In particular,  where  a  Member  State maintains  a  significant  degree 
of  ownership  or  control  of  a  telecommunications  organisation,  it must 
ensure  the  effective  seperation  of  the  regulatory  activities  from 
activities related to  ownership  or control. 
The  objective  of  the  revised  ONP  framework  Directive  remains  the 
harmonisation  of  conditions  for  access  to  and  use  of  public 
telecommunications  networks  and  services,  but  the  emphasis  is  on  achieving 
this  through  voluntary observance  of  standards.  The  existing procedure, 
whereby  standards  can  be  made  compulsory  under  certain circumstances, 
would  be modified to  include  a  persod of public  consultation before  any 
decision was  taken. 
The  leased lines  Directive  requires  that leased lines shall  be  offered  ~nd 
provided  on  request without discrimination to all users. 
Non-discrimination  applies  to,  inter alia,  availability  of  technical 
access,  tariffs,  quality  of  service,  provision  time  (delivery period), 
fair  distribution  of  capacity  in  case of  scarcity,  repair  time  and 
availability of  network  information. 
The  revised  ONP  leased lines  Directive will  continue  to  require  that  the 
present  minimum  set of  leased  lines is available  to all  users  in  the  EU 
from at least one  organisation in each  Member  State.  This  obligation will 
be  placed  only  on  organisations  with  significant  market  power,  as 
determined  by  the national  regulatory  authorities  in  accordance  with 
guidelines  given in the  Directive.  Requirements  for  advance  publication of 
tariff changes  will be  removed  and  the  requirement  for  cost orientation of 
tariffs will be  relaxed where  there is strong competition in  the provision 
of leased lines.  A  new  annex  identifies  other  types  of  high  speed  leased 
line  whose  provision  is  to  be  encouraged,  and  recommends  suitable 
voluntary standards  for  connection  to  these  types  of  leased line. 
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Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  on  competition in  the markets  for 
telecommunications  services,  O.J.  L  192/10,  24.7.90,  and  in 
particular  its  amendment,  Draft  Commission  Directive  amending 
Commission  Directive  388/90/EEC  regarding the  implementation  of 
full  competition  in the  telecommunications  markets,  O.J.  C  263/6, 
10.10.95  (adopted by  the  on  19  July 1995). 
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Following  the introduction  of  a  legal procedure  (under  Article  90  of the  EC 
Treaty)  by  ·the  Commission,  the  German  Ministry  of  Posts  and 
Telecommunications  has  granted  a  new  licence  for  the  establishment  and 
operation of  a  major alternative telecommunications  network. 
Vebacom  is  the  telecommunications  subsidiary  of  the  VEBA  AG,  a  German 
utilities  holding  company.  The  former  filed  a  complaint  with  the 
Commission's  Directorate General  for  competition in  April  1995  after several 
unsucessful  attempts  to  obtain  a  licence  for  a  broadband  telecommunications 
network  based  on  SDH  (Synchronous  digital  hierarchy)  technology,  which 
would  allow  the  transfer of  data between  36  different sites of the  German 
public television broadcaster ARD. 
The  Commission  took  the preliminary view  that the  complaint  was  justified, 
in particular  since  Vebacom intends  to offer  a  service  based  on  a  new 
technology  (SOH)  which  is not offered by  Deutsche  Telekom AG,  the  holder  of 
the  infrastructure monopoly in  Germany.  The  refusal  to  authorize  the  new 
offering is thus  holding back technical progress. 
After informal discussions  with the  Commission  the  German  Ministry  of  Posts 
and  Telecommunications  has  now  agreed to grant the licence as  requested. 
Alternative  telecommunications  infrastructure  refers  in  general  to  the 
telecommunications  networks  owned  and  run  by  companies  other  than 
traditional  telecommunications  operators,  like  utilities  and  railways. 
Currently regulatory  restrictions in  most  Member  states limit  the  use  of 
these  networks  to the internal  needs  of the  company  who  owns  it.  That  is, 
they are  not  allowed to lease  spare capacity  to the third parties.  These 
restrictions  constitute  a  major  obstacle  for  the introduction  of  a  fully 
liberalised regulatory  environment  for  the  telecommunications  sector  up  to 
1998  since  such  leased capacity is in great  demand but mostly only  available 
from  a  monopoly. 
In order  to  avoid legal action in  similar cases  the  Commission  proposed  on 
the initiative  of  Commissioner  Van  Miert in  a  Draft  Directive of  19  July 
1995  to  generally  liberalise  alternative  infrastructures.  The  draft 
Directive  has  been  published on  10  October in  the Official  Journal  for  a 
two-months  public consultation period. 
*  *  * 
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Commissioner  Karel  van Miert  asked  the  Directorate-General  for  Competition 
of  the  Commission  (DG  IV)  to  analyse  the  creation of this  alliance  in  the 
field  of  online  services.  This  alliance  brings  together  the  companies 
America  Online  (leader  on  this market  in the  United States),  Bertelsmann 
(first publishing  group  in Germany  and  in  Europe)  and  Deutsche  Telekom 
(dominant  telecommunications  operator in Germany  and first  in Europe);  it 
could also be  opened to another  German  publisher:  Axel  Springer·. 
A letter of  intent has  already been  signed  by  the  partners,  and  specific 
contracts  are being prepared.  The  agreement  envisages  in particular  cross-
shareholdings  between  AOL  I  Bertelsmann  on  the  one  hand,  and  Telekom Online 
on  the other hand,  as· well  as  the  acquisition of shares  in America  Online in 
the United States by  Deutsche  Telekom.  The  partners  intend to  segment  their 
offerings,  Telekom Online  specializing in services  to businesses,  and AOL  in 
services  to  private  consumers.  An  extension  of  the alliance  to  include 
Springer is  also under discussion,  and  other partners  from.other  countries 
could  join it as  well. 
This  alliance  is important  due  to  the  size of  its  partners.  Deutsche 
Telekom,  in  particular,  holds  a  dominant  position  on  the  German  market  of 
online services  (through its subsidiary  Telekom Online,  comprising  the  BTX 
and  DATEX-J  services),  and also  controls  networks  that are essential  for 
the development  of  competing  online services  . 
DG  IV's  objectives  in relation  to  online  services  are  to  prevent  the 
establishment  of  anti-competitive  situations which  could  slow  down  the 
development  on-line services  and  of  the  'Information Society'. 
In the  case  of AOL  I  Bertelsmann  I  Deutsche  Telekom,  the  Commission  wishes 
to  know  in particular under  which  conditions  (i)  competing  online services 
would  be  able  t~ obtain access  to  the  content of publications  controlled by 
the partners,  or  to purchase advertising space  to  promote  new  services  (ii) 
publications  not belonging  to  the partners  would  be  able  to propose  their 
content online  (iii)  other online service  companies  would  be  able  to  use  the 
networks  and  services  of  Deutsche  Telekom  (iv)  agreements  with  other online 
services  companies  might  exist. 
DG  IV has  asked  the alliance partners  to provide  the  information  necessary 
for  this  enquiry.  This  enquiry  in no  prejudges  the  final  position of  the 
Commission.  In  accordance  with its  op~n~on on  the  'Information  Society', 
the  Commission  is  ready  to provide  the  conditions  for  the  greatest possible 
innovation,  including  alliances  and  joint-ventures,  while  respecting 
competition  rules.  It will  take  into particular consideration the  advantages 
that  the  emergence  of  new  online  services brings  for  consumers. 
BACKGROUND 
In  addition  to  numerous  existing  companies,  at  least  two  other 
international online  services  are  currently  being established  in several 
European  countries  in parallel:  Europe  Online  (grouping  the  German  publisher 
Burda  and  several  Luxembourg  financial  institutions)  and Microsoft  Network 
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(MSN).  DG  IV  opened  an  enquiry  into  Europe  Online in  September  1995,  the 
answers  to which  are being  examined,  and  MSN  is being monitored closely both 
by  the  Commission  and  by  the American  authorities.  On  a  more  national  or 
local basis  many  other  new  entrants  hope  to  reaGh  the critical  mass  of 
subscriber's  which  makes  an online service  commercially viable. 
The  commercial  online  services  provide  a  "bridge"  connecting  Personal 
Computers  (PC)  with  a  broad  range  of  online services,  including  a  screen 
interface,  telecommunication  .access  through  local  telephone  numbers  ,  and 
access  to  the services  themse·lves. 
These  services  are provided  either by the partners 
companies  taken  under  contract,  such  as  other 
worldwide  network  Internet. 
themselves,  or  by 
publishers,  or  via 
other 
the 
Currently,  such  services  concern  mainly  electronic  mail,  specialized 
databases  providing  publications  and other data,  access  to bulletin boards, 
to discussion  groups  and  to  interactive  games.  However,  online  services 
develop  quickly  and,  in  the  future,  will  comprise  more  sophisticated 
audio-visual  communications  such as  video-on  demand,  videoconference  as  well 
as  "virtual shopping malls"  including teletransactions  from  home  (purchases, 
banks,  travel  and entertainment  reservations).  Access  to  such  services will 
improve  gradually,  from  PCs,  from  cable  TV  and  from  videotex  systems  like 
France's Minitel. 
The.se  services,  which  mark  the beginning  of  the  'Information Society'  were 
identified  by  the  Commission's  White  Paper  on  'Growth,  competitiveness  and 
employment'  as  important  sectors  for  European  economic  growth.  To  ensure 
stronger innovation,  investments  and  the interests  of  the  consumers,  careful 
monitoring is necessary,  including in particular  compliance  with  competition 
rules.  Today,  the  European market  for  online services is less  than half  that 
of  the United States.  Europe is  also  a  few  years  behind  in terms  of  new 
services  availability and  consumer  interest.  But  this  gap  is  narrowing, 
particularly as  new  services  become  available in all European  languages.  The 
European market  for  online services  is expected to  double  between  now  and 
the  year  2000,  reaching  approximately  5  to  6  billion ECU. 
*** 
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The  Commission  has  today  formally  adopted  the  Article  90  directive,  put 
forward  by  Commissioner  Van  Miert  in  cooperation  with  Commissioner 
Bangemann,  opening  the  EU  mobile  and personal  communications  market  to  full 
competition. 
The  directive is  based  on  the discussion  process  launched last year  by  the 
Green  Paper  on  Mobile  and  Personal  Communications.  It  requires  Member 
States  to  abolish all  exclusive  and special  rights  in  the  area of  mobile 
communications  and,  wherever  this  has  not  yet  been  achieved,  to  establish 
open  and  fair  licensing  procedures  to  authorise  the  launch  of  the digital 
services  GSM,  DCS  1800  and  DECT.  This  includes lifting the  restrictions  on 
current licensees  for  one  of  these  frequencies  from  applying  to extend their 
services  into the others.  The directive stipulates that Member  States must 
cease  to restrict the  combination  of the mobile  technologies  or  systems,  in 
particular  where multistandard  equipment  is  available,  while  also  taking 
into account  the benefit  of  ensuring effective competition between  operators 
in the  relevant markets  by  allowing  new  entrants  gain  a  foothold. 
The  directive also  removes  all existing  restrictions  on  use  of  facilities 
for  mobile  networks,  allowing  new mobile  operators  to  make  full  use  of their 
own  infrastructure  as  well  as  that  provided by  third  parties  such  as 
utilities'  networks.  Use  of infrastructure  other  than  those  controlled by 
the  incumbent  telecoms  operator is essential to  the  success  of  new  entrants 
to the mobile  market  as it gives  them  much  greater control  over  their cost 
base.  Leasing  capacity  currently  represents  a  cost  factor  for  second 
operators  of between  30  and  50%.  The  right to set up  their own  networks  and 
choose  alternative  infrastructure  and  connections  also  gives  mobile 
operators  significantly more  flexibility representing an  strong push  towards 
further  development  and  innovation in the mobile market. 
Greater efficency  and  choice  bought  about  by  competition in  the  mobile 
market  is  particularly  important  in  the  run  up  to  1998  full  telecoms 
liberalisation  as it  will  dampen  the  potential  for  increases  in  (fixed) 
local  charges  to  the  consumer.  The  increasingly  commercial  incumbent  (fixed 
link)  operations  are  now  set to  position themselves  to  make  the most  of 
their  local  loop  monopoly  before  the effects of  full  network  competition are 
felt.  However,  the  rapidly  decreasing price of  competitive  mobile  serv.ice.•:; 
will set an  effective ceiling  for  the  wire  based local tariffs. 
The  Commission will  be  paying close  attention to price  adjustments  in  the 
telecoms  sector between  now  and  1998  in order  to secure  the maximum  benefits 
of liberalisation for  consumers  across  the  EU. 
Time  Table 
The  mobile  directive will enter into  force  twenty  days  after publication in 
the Official Journal  of  the  EC  which  is expected within  the  next  ten days. 
The  Member  States  then  have  nine  months  to  notify the  Commission  of  the 
appropriate national  measures  taken  to  implement  its provisions. 
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From  the  moment  the directive  enters  into  force,  in addition  to what  has 
already been  achieved in  opening  up  the  GSM  licensing process  across  the 
Union,  Member  States must  open  licence  a~location procedures  for  all public 
access/Telepoint applications,  including  systems  operating  on  the basis  of 
the  DECT  standard. 
By  January  1,  1998,  at the  latest the Member  States must  also  have  opened  up 
the  licencing of mobile  systems  according  to  the  DCS  1800  standard. 
Restrictions  on  infrastructure  and  direct  interconnection  for  mobile 
communications  must  be  abolished  immediately.  However,  Member  States  with 
less  developed  networks  may  apply  for derogations  of  up  to  five  years  to 
take  account  of their specific  situations.  This  concerns  Portugal,  Greece, 
Spain  and  Ireland. 
Some  figures  about  the Mobile  Market 
With  adoption of  these measures  the  European  Union  has  now  taken  the  lead in 
setting the  right  regulatory  conditions  for  encouraging  the  development  of 
mobile  and personal  communications  into  a  vast mass  market.  The  directive 
means  that the  EU  market will  be  the  first  region  in  the  world  to enjoy  the 
combination  of liberalisation  of services  and  networks,  together with  the 
deployment  of  harmonised,  leading  edge,  digital standards  over  such  a  large 
area.  The  standards  confirmed  for  the  EU  are  GSM,  DCS  1800  (the  two 
frequencies  available  for  digital mobile  services)  and  DECT  (for digital 
cordless  telephony  within  a  fixed  radius).  This  both reflects  and  further 
establishes  the  global  momentum  behind the  take  up  of  this  technology  for 
the  second generation digital mobile  systems.  The  wireless  market is  now  set 
to become  a  core  component  of the  information  society and  the development  of 
true person to person  communications. 
The  mobile  sector is by  far  the most  dynamic  in  the  telecoms  market  in  the 
EU  experiencing levels  of  growth  of over  60%.  In  the last year  the  number 
of  cellular subscribers  in Europe  has  grown  from  around  12  million  to  over 
20  million,  clearly  outstripping growth  in numbers  of  fixed  subscribers. 
The  vast majority of  the  new mobile  customers  are  enjoying digital services, 
particularly GSM,  which  allows  them to  roam  throughout  Europe  with  the  same 
handset  and  is also  much  more  efficient concerning  use  of  the  frequency 
spectrum. 
On  top  of very  substantial  analogue  networks  in countries  such  as  the  UK, 
Italy  and  Scandinavia,  the  growth potential of  GSM  is  now  also evident  in 
nearly all the  Member  States.  In  France,  for  example,  GSM  subscribers  grew 
from  around  337  000  to  around  797  000  over  the past  year.  In  Belgium there 
were  around  53  000  GSM  subscribers at  the  end  o~ 1994  and  there are  now 
nearly  146  000.  Italy saw  growth  over  the  same  period  from  45  000  in  1994 
to  170  000  in October  1995.  Germany still remains  by  far  the most  important 
market  with  almost  three  and  a  half million users,  of which  over  two  and  a 
half million are  now  on  the  GSM  network.  However  progress  in countries  with 
less  developed  networks  is  also  notable.  Over  the last  12  months  GSM 
subscribers  in  Greece  increased  from  125  000  to  255  000,  and  in  Portugal, 
from  122  000  to  241  000.  The  Scandinavian  countries  are  now  also 
experiencing massive  growth  in take  up  of  GSM.  Most  impressive is  Sweden 
where  the  GSM  market  has  grown  from  around  200  000  to  905  000  over  the past 
year. 
In total,  Commission  studies  predict  38  million cellular  mobile  users  in 
Europe  by  the  year  2000  and  around  80  million by  2010. 
The  Market  growth  and  lower  prices  brought  about  by  introducing  competition 
into  these markets  will  effect all sorts  of users:  residential,  both  young 
singles  as  well  as  families,  and  elderly or disabled people  who  benefit  from 
a  cordless  phone;  small  and  medium  sized businesses  benefitting  from  the 
organisational  flexibility implied by  the  cordless  office,  and  international 
business  travellers benefitting  from  cross  border  GSM  roaming. 
*** 
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The  Conunission  has  given  the green light  for  the acquisition, by  AT&T  Corp., 
the  American  telecommunications  company,of  certain  business  units  of  the 
Dutch  company  Philips  Electronics  N.V.  in  the market  for  the  provision of 
public telecommunications  equipment. 
AT&T,  the American  telecommunications  company,  provides  a  broad  range  of 
voice  and data  communications  services,  in particular  US  and  international 
long-distance carrier  services.  AT&T  is the  ultimate parent  company  of  a 
group  engaged in the full  range  of telecoms  operator activities. 
AT&T's  activities  are  organised into  a  number  of  different businesses.  The 
telecoms  equipment  manufacturing  activities are  in  the  Network  Systems 
Group.  The  acquisition·  takes  place  in the  framework  of  the  process  of 
restructuring  of  AT&T  which  will  lead  to  the  separation  of  the 
telecommunications  equipment  business  from other  groups  (including  telecoms 
services)  by  01.01.97. 
Philips,  the  Dutch  company,  is  one  of  the  world's  largest  electronics 
companies.  Its  products  include  lighting,  industrial  and  consumer 
electronics,  recorded music,  components,  semiconductors,  medical  systems, 
and  communications  systems. 
The  two  divisions  from  which  the Acquired Businesses  are  to be  divested are 
Telecommunications  Radioelectriques  et  Telephoniques  (TRT)  and  Philips 
Kommunikations  Industrie AG  (PKI).  Both  of  these divisions  are within  the 
Philips  Communication  Systems  division and  are  engaged in the  development, 
production  and distribution of telecommunication  equipment. 
A  number  of National  Sales  Organisations will also  be  acquired by AT&T  in 
the operation.  The  NSOs  concerned are  those  located  in Austria,  Belgium, 
D  e  n  m  a  r  k  , 
Greece,Ireland,Italy,Netherlands,Norway,Portugal,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland 
and  the United  Kingdom. 
The  operation  will mainly 
market  shares  of  AT&T  and 
markets. 
be  of  a  complementary character 
Philips  in  the  relevant product 
with  regard  to 
and  geographic 
The  Commission  investigation has  concluded  that  the operation  will  not 
create or  strengthen  a  dominant  position in the affected market. 
*** 
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discriminatory and  as  least  restrictive of  competition  as  possible  whilst 
still achieving  important policy goals  of public service,  interoperability 
and  use  of limited resources  such as  spectrum and  rights of way. 
Universal  service in  fact  the subject  of  the  recently adopted  (13/12/96), 
Parliament  and  Council  directive  applying  open  access  rules  to  voice 
telephony.  ·In the  coming  weeks,  the  Commission  will isssue  a  detailed 
Commission  Communication  which will  set out the  scope  of universal  service 
and  the ·future  approach of the  Commission  in this  regard. 
The  harmonisation  requirements  of  Member  State  rules  in  these areas  fall 
under  the  EU's  ONP  (Open  Network  Provision)  framework  which is  concerned 
with  open  and  efficient access  to,  and  use  of,  the public telecoms  networks 
and  services.  ONP  Council  and  Parliament legislation in these  areas,  issued 
under Article  100A,  is currently  under  discussion.  The  Commission  has 
ensured that  the  Article  90  framework  is  fully  coordinated and  coherent  with 
the draft ONP  framework. 
In  the meantime,  before  implementation of  ONP  rules is  achieved and/or  in 
areas  where  their  ·application  is limited,  the  rights  of  new  entrants  to 
liberalised  markets  under  the  Treaty  competition  rules  should  not  be 
compromised. 
Size  and  growth  of  telecoms  markets  and  impact  of  competition* 
Telecommunications  is  one  of  the  largest  and  most  profitable economic 
sectors  in the world.  In  1992  public telecoms  services  revenue  reached  $505 
billion.  The  global  telecoms  equipment market  came  to  $120  billion  in the 
same  year.  At  a  time  when  nearly  all  large  industrial  and  service 
corporations  faced  general  economic  slow  down  the  telecoms  sector  has 
thrived.  In  1993,  for  example,  the largest 25  public telecoms  operators  in 
the developed  world  were  more  profitable  than  the  largest  100  commercial 
banks.  Where  telecoms  services  (data,  long distance  .and mobile)  have  been 
subjected to the  greatest level of  competition is  where  the greatest  revenue 
growth  and  new  employment  have  been  created.  In those  countries  in the  EU 
and  around  the world  with  the  longest experience of  liberalisation,  it is 
demonstratable*  that  telecoms  employment  by  new  service suppliers  offsets 
jobs  shed  by  incumbent  PTOs  as  they take  on  the productivity gains  of  new 
technology. 
At  the  same  time,  the increasingly  strong link  between efficient  telecoms 
service  and  the whole  national  economy  is  shown  in the  growing  reliance 
which business  in general places  on  telecoms.  Over  the last  ten years  the 
ratio of business  telecoms  links  to  employees  was  around  one  to nine,  now it 
is more  than  one  to three. 
The  benefits  to business  of telecoms  competition are of  course  well  known. 
It is  important to  underline that  residential users  also  see  significant 
benefits  when  competition  is introduced as  is  shown  in the  following  graphs 
(based  on  OECD  research  on  countries  in the  OECD  region) . 
Source:  OECD  1995 
Communication  Outlook. 
*** 
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The  Telecommunications  Council 
1996,  beginning at 10.00 a.m. 
following  ones: 
is going to have its  next session on  27  June 
in Luxembourg.  The  topics  of the day are  the 
1.  Framework  for 
services. 
authorisations  and  licences  for  telecommunications 
The  proposed directive based on Art.  57(2),  66  and  100  A  sets  up  rules  to 
be  implemented  at  national  level,  together with  full  application  of 
competition  principles,  both  for  the  procedures  for  the granting  of 
authorisations  or licences  and  the conditions  that  can be  attached to 
these  authorisations.  Such  a  common  framework  should  facilitate  for 
undertakings  acting  in the  field of  telecommunications  the  exercise of 
freedom of  establishment and  freedom  to provide services  in the  European 
Union. 
The  Council  could reach  a  Common  Position in  principle with  a  view  to 
for.mal  adoption in September  on  this proposal. 
2.  Adaptation of  two  Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  Directives. 
Open  Network  Provi~ion  (ONP)  concerns  the har.monisation of conditions  for 
access  to,  and use of,  public telecommunications  networks  and services. 
The  ONP  Framework  Directive  (90/387  EEC)  and  the  ONP  Leased  Lines 
Directive  (92/44  EEC),  both based on.Art.  100 A,  are being  now  updated  to 
take  account  of the introduction of competition after 1998,  and to provide 
a  common  approach  for  the provision of important public telecommunications 
services  in the  European Union. 
The  objective  of  the  revised  ONP  framework 
har.monisation  of  conditions  for  access  to 
telecommunications  networks  and  services.  The 
requires  that  leased lines  shall  b~  offered 
without discrimination to all users. 
Directive  remains  the 
and  use  of  public 
leased  lines  Directive 
and  provided on  request 
Given  the  crucial role played  by national  regulatory  authorities  for  the 
telecommunications  in  a  liberalised  market,  a  new  requirement is  being 
introduced  to  reinforce  the  independence  of  the  national  regulatory 
authorities  for  telecommunications  in each Member  State. 
The  Council  could reach  a  Common  Position on  this proposal. 
3.  Postal  Services 
The  proposed Directive based on Art.  100  A  of  the  EC  Treaty.provides  for  a 
mandatory  level  of  universal  service  to  be  provided  throughout  the 
Community  to all  citizens,  wherever  they are located,  at affordable prices 
and  for  a  high degree  of  qual~ty of service. 
In order  to ensure  the  financial  viability of the universal  service,  the 
proposed Directive  defines  harmonised  criteria for  the  services  that may 
be  reserved  for  universal  service providers  and  a  timetable  for  a  partial 
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opening  of the market  (direct mail  and  incoming  cross-border mail). 
The  Council will  have  an  orientation  debate  on  the  definition of  _the 
universal service and  the reserved area. 
4.  Directive concerning the  Protection of Personal  Data. 
The  proposal  (based  on Art.  100  A)  defines  general  principles  for  the 
protection  of  personal  data  and  privacy  in  the  context  of 
telecommunication , networks,  in particular  the integrated services digital 
network  (ISDN) .  , 
The  Council  could - 6  years  after the first proposal  of the  Commission  -
~each  a  common  position.  This  would be  an  important step  towards  an 
efficient protection of the  ISDN  users. 
5.  Programme  to promote  the linguistic diversity  of the  Community  in  the 
Information Society. 
The  programme  covering language  aspects  of  the  Information Society  will 
run  for  a  period of three  years  1996-1998  and have  a  budget  of  15  MECU. 
The  three  action lines  proposed seek  _ to support  efforts  to  construct  a 
European infrastructure  for multilingual  language  resources,  to spur  the 
language  industries into  action by  stimulating  technology transfer  and 
demand  through  a  limited number  of shared-cost demonstration projects. 
Transf~rring the experience acquired  by the  European institutions in  the 
processing of multilingualism to the  administrations in the Member  States 
and  sharing the  language  resources  which  each produces  can  help  achieve 
economies  of scale  and  reduce  the  cost to  multilingual  communication  to 
encourage  cooperation between administrations  in the Member  States  and  the 
European  institutions  in  order  to  reduce  the  cost  of  multilingual 
communication in the  European public sector. 
The  Council  could  adopt this proposal,  which  is based on Art.  130  (3)  of 
the Treaty. 
6.  Universal  service in the  telecommunications  sector. 
The  Commission presented  on  13  March  1996  a  communication  on  the  future 
development  of the  universal service  in the  European Union.  In  a  fully 
liberalised environment,  every  citizen of  the Union,  whatever  his living 
standard  or the  region  he lives in,  will  benefit a  guaranteed access at 
affordable conditions  to a range  of telecommunication services  including 
voice  telephony,  fax,  electronic data,  allowing  him thereby to participate 
in the  Information Society. 
The  Presidencey  has  prepared  a  Council  resolution  which  follows  the 
C~mmissions communication  and  opens  the  way  for  the  proposed revision of 
the  ONP  voice  telephony directive  in order  to integrate  the notion  of 
affordability,  equivalent  level  of  service  to disabled  users  and  the 
introduction of  advanced  features. 
*** 
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The  Telecommunications  Council  on  27  June  1996  in  Luxembourg  reached 
political agreements  for  common  positions  on  two  important directives: 
1.  Directive concerning the  Protection of Personal  Data. 
The  Council  reached  a  political agreement  on  this proposal.  A  common 
position will be  adopted at one  of the next Council meetings. 
The  proposal  for  a  Directive  (based  on  Art.  100  A)  on  the protection of 
data and privacy  in the  telecommunications  sector,  dates  back  to  1990, 
when it was  submitted together  with  a  draft for  a  general Directive  on 
Data  Protection.  In  1994  both drafts  were  formally  revised  by  the 
Commission  to  take  account  of the  first  reading  in  the  European 
Parliament  and of the  new  tide of subsidiarity. 
However,  the  Council  suspended  work  on  the  telecommunications  data 
protection  Directive until work  on  the general  Directive was  completed. 
In  October  1995  the general  Directive was  formally  adopted and  the 
telecommunications  data protection directive was  put  back  on  the  agenda 
again  by  the Spanish  Presidency.  The  text represents  a  considerable 
added value in relation to the General  Directive on  Data  Protection. 
The  added value consists  in particular of the  coverage of legal persons 
(General  Directive  only covers  natural  persons),  the protection  .of 
privacy  (e.G.  by the  articles  on  unsolicited calls  and  on  automatic 
call  forwarding)  and of  the  translation  of the  principles  of  the 
General  Directive into  more  concrete  and operational  requirements  which 
limit the.  scope  for divergent  interpretations by Member  S~ates  and/or 
operators. 
2~  Adaptation of  two  Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  Directives. 
The  Council  reached  a  political agreement  on  this proposal.  A  common 
position will be  adopted at one  of the next Council meetings. 
The  ONP  Framework  Directive  (90/387  EEC)  and  the  ONP  Leased  Lines 
Directive  (92/44  EEC),  both  based on Art.  100  A,  are being now  updated 
to  take  account  of the introduction  of competition after 1998,  and  to 
provide  a  common  approach  for  the  prov~s1on  of  important  public 
telecommunications  services  in the  European Union. 
The  most  important  modification of  the  ONP  framework  Directive  is that 
given  the  crucial  role played  by national  regulatory authorities  for 
the  telecommunications  in  a  liberalised  market,  a  new  requirement  is 
introduced to  reinforce  the  independence  of  the national  regulatory 
authorities  for  telecommunications  in each Member  State. 
The  objective  of  the  revised  ONP  framework  Directive  remains  the 
harmonisation  of  conditions  for  access  to  and  use  of  public 
telecommunications  networks  and  services.  The  leased lines  Directive 
requires  that  leased lines  shall be  offered and  provided  on  request 
without discrimination to all users. 
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3 .~  Edicom  (Electronia  Data  Intercharge on  Commerce) 
On  the  26  March  1996,  the Court  of Justice  has  annuled  the Council 
Decision  94/445/EC  on  inter-administration  telematic  networks  for 
statistics  relating to  the  trading  of  goods  between  Member  States 
(Edicom)  because it was  adopted persuant Article  235  of the Treaty and 
not Article  129  D. 
As  the  European  Parliament has  not yet  given its position,  the Council 
could not take  a  formal  decision,  but it came  to  a  political agreement 
to  renew its decision,  this  time based on  Article 129  D.  The  decision 
will  cover the period 1997-1999 with  a  budget of  ECU  30 million. 
4.  Postal  Services 
5. 
The  proposed Directive based on  Art.  100  A  of the  EC  Treaty provides 
for  a  mandatory level  of universal service  to be provided  throughout 
the  Community  to all citizens,  wherever  they  are located,  at affordable 
prices  and  for  a  high degree  of quality of service. 
In order  to ensure  the  financial viability 
the proposed  Directive  defines  harmonised 
that may  be  reserved  for universal service 
for  a  partial opening of  the market  (direct 
border mail) . 
o~ the universal  service, 
criteria  for  the  services 
providers  and  a  timetable 
mail  and  incoming  cross-
After  a  debate  on  the definition  of  the universal  service and  the 
reserved  area,  the Council  charged the  COREPER  to continue its work  on 
the proposal. 
Framework  for 
services. 
authorisations  and  licences  for  telecommunications 
The  proposed directive based  on Art.  57(2),  66  and  100  A  sets  up  rules 
to be  implemented  at .national level,  together with  full  application of 
competition  principles,  both  for  the  procedures  for  the granting  of 
authorisations  or  licences  and  the  conditions  that  can be  attached  to 
these authorisations.  Such  a  common  framework  should facilitate  for 
undertakings  acting in the field  of  telecommunications  the exercise  of 
freedom  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services  in  the 
European Union. 
After  a  long discussion,  the  Council  was  of the opinion  that  the 
further preparation by  COREPER  was  necessary. 
The  most difficult  question is whether  scarce ressources  should  be  the 
only possible justification  for  a  limitation of the  number  of licences 
or whether other  criteria should be  introduced  (for example  size of the 
market). 
6.  Programme  to  promote  the linguistic diversity  of the  Community in  the 
Information Society. 
The  Commission  has  proposed  a  programme  covering language  aspects  of 
the  Information Society  which will  run  for  a  period  of three  years 
1996-1998  and have  a  budget  of  ECU  15  million.  The  three action  lines 
proposed seek to  support efforts to construct  a  European infrastructure 
for  multilingual  language  resources,  to  spur  the  language  industries 
into  action  by stimulating  technology transfer  and  demand  through  a 
limited number  of  shared-cost demonstration projects. 
Transferring  the experience  acquired by  the  European  institutions in 
the processing of  multilingualism to  the administrations  in  the Member 
States  and  sharing  the  language  resources  which  each produces  can  help 
achieve  economies  of  scale  and  reduce  the  cost  to  multilingual 
communication  to  encourage  cooperation between  administrations  in  the 
Member  States  and  the  European institutions in order to  reduce  the cost 
of multilingual  communication in the  European public sector. 
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As  the proposal  is based on  Art.  130  (3)  of  the Treaty,  an  unanimous 
Council  decision  is required.  Two  delegations  being  opposed  to the 
proposal,  the programme  was  not  adopted. 
7.  Universal  service in the telecommunications  sector. 
The  Commission presented on  13  March  1996  a  communication  on  the  future 
development  of the universal service in  the  European  Union.  In  a  fully 
liberalised environment,  every  citizen  of  the  Union,  whatever  his 
living standard or  the region he  lives in,  will benefit  a  guaranteed 
access  at  affordable  conditions  to  a  range  of  telecommunication 
services  including voice telephony,  fax,  electronic data,  allowing  him 
thereby to participate in the Information Society. 
The  Council  has  a  comprehensive 
communication but  took  no  decision. 
discussion  on  the  Commissions 
8.  Consequences  of  the  turn  of the  century  for  information technology 
systems. 
*** 
At  lunch the  Council  discussed the  problems  posed by  the turn of  the 
century  for  information  technology  systems.  Wherever  a  unique 
indication of the year  is required,  the use  of an  abbreviated 2  digit 
indication  is  no  longer  acceptable,  and  instead the  full  4  digit 
representation  will have  to be  used,  e.g.  1996  instead of  '96. 
Changing  the  software,  and where  necessary also the data,  represents  a 
major effort.  In  particular administrative,  financial  and  accounting 
applications will be  affected,  in public administrations  as  well  as  in 
the  private sector.  Furthermore,  it will have  to be  feared that not all 
problems  will,  or even  can  be  pinpointed before  they  appear,  and 
therefore  some  disruption and  artefacts have  to be  foreseen  for  the 
beginning of the next  century. 
The  Council  asked the  Commission  to  convoke  a  group  of experts in order 
to analyse  further  this question. 
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Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  Good  morning.  The  opening  theme 
conference is  Preparing  for  1998  and  Beyond.  There  are 
elements  of this which  I  want  to bring out this morning: 
of  .this 
four  key 
The  first is  the significance of the dramatic  breakthrough we  have  made 
in liberalisation of  EU  telecommunications  - not  just the  1998  deadline 
but the critical steps leading us  up  to it 
The  second  comes  out of the  first:  the  changing  landscape  calls  for  new, 
streamlined  procedures.  On  the  one  hand  we  are upgrading  resources 
devoted to  implementation of the  liberalisation directives and  speeding 
up  the impact of  infringement procedures.  On  the other hand  we  are now 
revising the merger  regulation,  ehsuring  more  agreements  can be  dealt 
with,  more  quickly  and  coherently  than  under  current  procedures. 
Another  important  procedural point concerns  the  question of  a  European 
Regulatory  Agency  for  telecoms.  If  this  is  finally  considered 
desirable,  it should  be  focused  on  certain specific technical  tasks  for 
the  telecoms market,  where  progress in  coordination  and  a  clear  EU 
perspective is urgently called for. 
The  third element  is  the  development  of competition  policy regarding 
bottlenecks  and  dominance  in telecoms  markets.  Here  we  are  concerned 
with:  access  to  networks,  access  to  customers  and  the  formation  of 
multi-media operations.  A  Notice will be  out  soon  on  the application of 
the competition  rules  to access  and interconnect  agreements.  We  have 
just published  a  major  study  looking into joint provision  of cable and 
telecom networks.  And,  we  are  also  keeping  a  close  watch  on  the ever 
changing  myriad  of  partner,ships  coming  together  to  offer  digital 
satellite TV  services. 
The  fourth  and last element  I  want  to  bring to your attention  concerns 
the external  face  of the  EU  and the  global  side of the  telecoms  market. 
As  concerns  telecoms  issues  such as  frequency  and  spectrum  management 
and  technical  specifications  we  need  to intensify coordination in order 
to speak with  one  voice  in  fora  such as  the  ITU.  On  competition  policy 
aspects  an  external dimension  is also  called for,  both  regarding  the 
impact  of  global alliances as  well  in  the  WTO  context as  a  necessary 
where  competition  principles  are  an  essential  underpinning  for  the 
market  access  offers  on basic telecoms. 
I  The  breakthrough in Liberalisation 
We  have  come  a  long  way  towards  setting up  the  platform for  realising 
the  huge potential  of  Europe's  communication  and  information markets, 
but  we  also  have  an  intense  and  challenging task  ahead.  In order to 
meet  the  demands  of the  next  five  to  ten years it  is crucial that  we 
hold  on  to,  make  full  use  of  and build  on  the best and  most  effective 
tools  we  have  to hand:  this means  competition policy. 
On  the other  hand,  we  also  need to  work  harder  on  those  areas  where 
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effective  tools  or organisational  frameworks  have  not  yet  been  fully 
developed:  in  particular  this means  clearer  coordination of  critical 
aspects  of  telecoms  specific regulation 
Let  us  begin,  in any  case,  with  the  "good  news":  the 
made  to date  and  my  vision  of the  full  and  enhanced 
co~petition policy in this  area: 
progress  we  have 
use  of effective 
As  most  of  you  will  no  doubt  be  aware,  the  EU  liberalisation  timetable 
is  now  fully  confirmed  and  set  into  legislation,  with  the  Full 
Competition  Directive  adopted  last  March.  It culminates  with  the 
lifting  of all  government  restrictions  on  provision  of all  and  any 
telecoms  services  or networks  by  January  1998.  But  the  real  work,  both 
for  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States,  of  course  starts  now  in the 
run  up  to  the deadline.  July  1  was  the deadline  for  liberalisation  of 
alternative infrastructure and  I  will  come  back  to this  in  a  moment.  By 
October  1st  member  states must  notify the measures  they have  taken to 
open  up  use  of  cable  networks  for  telecoms  purposes  and  by  November  15 
they  must  notify  liberalisati0n  measures  for  mobile  networks  and 
services.  During  1997  arrangements  for  licensing,  dealing  with 
interconnect  agreements  and  mechanisms  for  sharing  out  and  funding 
universal  service must  be notified to the  Commission  so  that  they  can  be 
scrutinised under  the  competition rules  and  so  that we  can· ensure  the 
framework  is in place  for effective market  entry in 1998. 
The  Member  States  are  committed,  politically  and  legally  to  this 
timetable which  is  a  great  achievement  in itself,  but  the true  impact  is 
of  course  only felt when  we  have  full  and  effective  implementation  of 
these  commitments.  I  am  determined  to  use  the  full potential  of  the 
Competition  Rules  of  the Treaty to maintain  a  tough  stance in this  area. 
We  cannot  tolerate tardy or incomplete  implementation at  this  stage,  and 
luckily we  have  the  legal tools  to  impose  this: 
On  the  one  hand  we  can  and  will  start  infringement  procedures 
immediately  a  deadline  has  passed or  a  notification has  been  found  to  be 
lacking 
On  the  other  hand  we  are  taking full  advantage  of  the  strong  and 
effective  link  between  implementation  of  government  commitments  to 
liberalisation  and  our  conditions  for  allowing  alliances  involving 
dominant  telecom operators.  Let  me  illustrate what  I  mean  by  this with 
some  recent  cases  in this  area. 
The  arrangement  between  the  French  and  German  national  operators  in the 
Atlas  I  GlobalOne  alliance  agreements  raised some  very  serious  concerns 
regarding  their  home  markets  in  the  relevant  services  where  both 
operators  were  holding legal  and  de  facto  dominant  positions.  One  of 
the main  conditions  for  us  to  give this  joint venture  the  go-ahead under 
competition  rules  is  that full  implementation  of  the  commitment  to 
liberalise alternative  infrastructure in both  Germany  and  France is not 
only notified  but actually effective  - this means  new  licences  granted 
and  new  players  entering  the market.  The  same  strategy  for putting 
pressure  on  governments'  commitments  is  being  used  in relation to  the 
Unisource  agreements.  We  cannot  look  favourably  upon  such  a  deal  unless 
the  relevant markets  are  really open  to  competition. 
Another  point  I  might mention  here  is that both these  cases  have  also 
involved  a  major  American partner.  We  are  being  no  less  tough  on 
ensuring appropriate  market  entry  conditions  in  AT&T's  home  market 
before  allowing  involvement  in  a  European  Operation  such  as  Unisource  I 
Uniworld. 
Another  illustration  of  this  link  between  competition  cases  and 
implementation  of  the  liberalisation timetable  was  the  recent  GSM  case 
in Italy.  As  part of  a  compensation package  for  what  we  regarded  as  an 
unfair  fee  being  charged  to  the  second  operator,  we  demanded  that  the 
Italian  government  make  firm and  specific  commitments  to  an  early 
opening  of  the  alternative infrastructure market  to  competition.  I  am 
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determined to insist on  this  commitment  in our current contacts with  the 
new Italian Government. 
These  cases  have  of  course  been very  much  in the  public eye  and  I 
believe  the general  momentum  caused by  them has  played no  small part in 
the success  we  have  had  with the  July  1  deadline  for notification  of 
alternative infrastructure under  the provisions  of the  full  competition 
directive.  Apart  from  four  of the  five eligible  countries  applying  for 
derogations  due  to  small or  less developed  networks,  all the  member 
·  states  are generally  on  track  and many  are  already in  advance  of our 
timetable  to lift restrictions  on all services  and infrastructure. 
The  other side of this  strong parallel link  between  applying  competition 
rules  to  key  cases  and  achieving  effective  liberalisation  concerns 
direct control of  the  commercial  behaviour of the dominant  operators  in 
the  market  once it  is  opened to  competition.  In particular  this 
concerns  terms  and  conditions  of access  and interconnection as  well  as 
the control,  more  generally,  of anti-competitive pricing behaviour. 
The  same  cases  I  just mentioned  are also relevant here.  In  the Atlas 
and Unisource  cases  we  are  imposing  conditions  not  just on  governments 
but  also  on  the parties  in terms  of  non-discriminatory treatment  of 
their competitors  and downstream service providers  vis  a  vis  access  to 
their  networks.  Just  so  in the  Italian GSM  case,  the  compensation 
package  also  involved  commitments  on  the  part  of  Telecom  Italia 
regarding  favourable  interconnection conditions  for  the·  second mobile 
operator. 
The  other important  case  I  am  thinking of is the  recent  concern  over  new 
tariff schemes  proposed by  DT.  It looked like the  German  operator  could 
be using its market  power  and monopoly profits in  order to target  just 
those business  customers  where it  faced  new  competition,  with discounts 
and  bundled  packages  which  the  new  entrants,  however  innovative and 
efficient they  might  be,  could not  reasonably match.  In  fact  we  also 
received a  formal  complaint  from  the latter  on  exactly these  grounds. 
The  concern,  to be more precise,  was  threefold:  cross  subsidy,  predatory 
pricing and  bundling.  Having  investigated the problem,  we  came  to  an 
agreement  with the  German  authorities  on  the minimum  conditions,·  or 
competitive  safeguards,  under which  the  proposed  discounts  could  be 
allowed. 





at  least  two  new  alternative  infrastructure  licences  must  be 
granted 
new  agreements  allowing  competitors  fair ~ccess DT's  public network 
must  be  concluded 
clear  and transparent  accounting separation  must  be put  in place 
between  DT's  monopoly  voice  telephony  business  and  the  liberalised 
corporate business 
rebates must  be  more  generalised,  ie  they must  also be  granted to 
domestic  customers 
This  case  again  shows  how  application of  EU  competition  rules  can  be 
used as  a  stimulus  and  engine  for  governments  to push  through  reforms 
which  are  really effective  "on  the  ground",  to the  benefit of both  a 
sustainable competitive .market  and  the  end  consumers. 
It  also highlights  a  general  issue of  concern which  should be  stressed: 
as  the  1998  deadline draws  in incumbent  operators  may  well  attempt  to 
gain  advantage  from their remaining  time  as monopolists  to  improve  their 
strategic and pricing position in ways  which  could  include  cross  subsidy 
and predatory  behaviour.  Commercial  behaviour which  may  appear  to 
result in attractive discounts  or  tailor made  products  may  in reality be 
defensive strategies which  are ultimately unsustainable in a  competitive 
environment.  Close scrutiny by  competition rules is  essential to ensure 
'that in·  this period of  flux  between  monopoly  and  competition,  ·pricing 
and  marketing  strategies  are  sustainable  and  are  designed  to  win 
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customers  not lock  them in. 
II  The  changing landscape  calls for  new streamlined procedures 
Having brought  you  up  to date on  our  record  to date  concerning use  of 
competition policy  'let me  go  on  to outline  how  I  see the  future  role of 
competition  rules developing in the  telecoms  market: 
Most  importantly  the full  and effective  use  of  these Treaty  articles 
must  be maximised in the  coming  months.  As  I  have  just outlined,  they 
are  the most  important  and  successful  tool  the  Commission  has  at its 
disposal  for  turning liberalising goals  into  reality.  For  this  reason 
we  must maintain  and  enh~nce competition controls  in the areas  for which 
they were  designed.  There  are  four  important strands  here: 
First,  we  will be  targeting increased  resources  and  energy at  ensuring 
effective  implementation.  This  will  include  streamlining  the 
infringement process  where  problems  occur.  The  competition policy  focus 
vis  a  vis  telecoms  legislation has  now  shifted from policy  development 
to ensuring its application on  the ground.  This  needs  to be  a  two  way 
process  between  the  competition  services  of the  Commission  and  the 
market  "out there".  Alongside  our  own  investigative powers,  we  hope  to 
be  increasingly receiving and  reacting to  feedback  from  competitors,  new 
entrants  and  users  as  to  what  is  working in terms  of  competition,  and 
what·  is not  and  why.  Once  it  is  clear  there  is a  problem  with 
implementation  the  new  streamlined  and  simplified  infringement 
procedures  will  be  put into  gear  to  ensure  the  earliest  possible 
satisfaction  for  aggrieved  parties.  I  also  want  to  stress  the 
importance  of  the  "direct  application"  of  the  Article  90  I 
liberalisation directives.  I  expect to  see  much  greater  use in  the 
coming  years  of  the  national  courts  for  complaints  regarding 
discrepancies  between  our  directives  and  the  de  facto  or  de  jure 
situation in the national market. 
Second,  is our planned revision  of the merger  regulation.  With  the  wave 
of alliances  and  joint  ventures  in  the  communications  and  information 
sector  this will  mean  that  more  agreements  can  be scrutinised,  more 
quickly,  coherently and effectively. 
III  Development  of  competition  policy  regarding 
dominance  in liberalised markets 
bottlenecks  and 
The  third  strand of  enhancement  of  competition  rules  in the  telecoms 
environment  concerns  the development  of  clear guidelines  regarding the 
commercial  relations  between  the  dominant  incumbents  and  their  new 
competitors  and  wholesale  customers.  Basically  I  am  talking  about 
access  and  interconnect agreements: 
We  will  soon be  publishing  an  important Notice  giving  general  and 
advance  guidance  as  to  the  application  of  the  Treaty  competition 
articles  in this  area.  This  should  represent  a  clear indication  to 
market players  as  to  the  way  complaints,  regarding  abuse  of  dominant 
position,  .discrimination and/or  collusive behaviour,  between  operators, 
will  be  decided.  In this  way,  and  with  a  few  precedent setting 
decisions,  we  hope  to discourage  anti-competitive  practices  from  the 
outset.  Thus  neither market  players  nor  the  Commission  services  need 
face  the untenable situation of having  each  and  every interconnection or 
access  agreement  scrutinised on  a  case by  case basis. 
The  other  strand  concerning  bottlenecks  and  dominance  is  the 
increasingly important  role of  EU  competition  rules  in applying  to  the 
converging  sectors  of  the  information  economy:  that  is  between 
telecommunications,  broadcasting  and  computing.  I  am  talking about,  of 
course,  the  development  of multi-media  networks,  multi-media  ventures 
and  of  course multi-media products. 
In  the  same  way  as 
competition  rules 
I  have  already outlined  above,  our application 
here  also  involves  tapping  the  potential  of 
of 
the 
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parallel  application  of  pro-competitiv~  policy  and  some 
decisions  and  investigations.,  In  particular  this  concerns 
dominant  network  operators into the  converged markets. 
key  case 
entry  of 
The  original versions  of  the Media  Services  Group  (MSG)  in  Germany,, and 
Nordic  Satellite Distribution  (NSD)  agreement in  the Nordic market  had 
to  be  blocked because  they  involved,  amongst  other things,  network 
operators,  enjoying essentially gatekeeper  functions  extending dominance 
into  related broadcasting  and  content  markets.  With  the  same  basic 
concerns  in mind  we  have  launched initial investigations into  the plans 
of  national  telecom operators  in  counties  like Spain  and  Italy  to 
venture into the  cable  TV  market. 
In parallel,  the whole  question  of  joint prov1s1on of telecoms  and  cable 
TV  networks  by dominant  operators is  being addressed  from  the  policy 
perspective by the  twin  reviews  announced in our  Cable  Directive  (1995) 
and  the  Full Competition Directive  (1996). 
We  have  recently announced  a  major  study in  this area which will assess 
different policy  options  based on  results  of the an  intensive  analysis 
of  the market  itself and of  actual  and  potenti~l policy  impact  on  the 
developing  multi-media  market  structure.  In  particular  we  will 
concentrating on  the  following policy options: 
* 
* 
maintenance  of the status  quo 
lifting of  existing  constraints  on  telecom  operators  to  provide 
cable  TV  capacity to their  custome~s 
*  divestiture of cable operations  of dominant  telecom operators. 
The  main  underlying  issue 
potential  for  development 
competition at the  customer 
stand  in  the  way  of  the 
perspective of either of  the 
in all  this is  the need  to leave  open the 
of a  viable infrastructure  platform for  real 
access  level.  On  the other hand  we  must  not 
realisation  of  real  synergies  from  the 
three converging sectors. 
The  results  of  the policy  review based  on  the  study results  will be 
issued for  consultation by the start of next year. 
Lastly in  the  multi-media  field  I  have  to  mention  the  spate of  new 
partnerships  and  agreements  coming  together across  Europe  for  the offer 
of digital satellite  TV  services  and conditional access  systems.  Until 
the  commercial  negotiations  between  the  likes of  Bertelsmann,  Vebacom, 
Canal  +,  CLT  and  Kirch,  finally  settle  down  to result  in  notified 
agreements  it rather difficult for me  to give  a  clear indication of  my 
attitude to such potentially  powerful  systems.  Let me  just say at this 
point  that  where  ventures  draw  together  content  provision  and 
transmission  systems  we  will  be  keeping  a  very  close  eye  on  the 
competition implications.  On  the  other,  to the  extent that there  are 
now  major projects developing in parallel their market  power  may  be  seen 
to counterbalance  each  other. 
In this brief run  down  of our track record to date  and  the major  strands 
of the  development  and  future  of the Commission's  competition  powers  in 
telecoms,  I  hope  some  clear messages  have  come  to the  fore: 
The  use  of  EU  competition policy has  played  a  key  role,  it  is proving to 
be  a  particularly effective tool,  and it is go1ng  to  be  enhanced  further 
in the  comi~g years,  both in the  run period to.199B  and its aftermath. 
IV  The  role  for  a  European  Telecoms  Agency? 
I  would like now  to leave  competition policy for  a  moment  and  focus  on 
some  institutional  questions  thrown  up  by  key  areas  of  telecoms 
regulation  which  represent  a  critical  underpinning  to  effective 
liberalisation  and  the  development  of  the  EU-wide  market  in 
communications  services.  Competition  rules  can  only really  work  and 
make  sense in  this  environment within an  appropriate  and  coordinated  EU 
regulatory  framework.  It is  all very  well  to  open markets  and lift 
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restrictions,  and  even  to  manage  and  control dominant  players  where 
necessary,  but  new market  entrants need more  than this. 
It is not  yet clear whether  a  European  Telecoms  Regulatory  Agency will 
finally be  considered  a  desirable  development,  as  concerns  certain 
specific  technical tasks  for  the  telecoms  market,  . areas  where progress 
in coordination and  a  clear  EU  perspective is being urgently called for. 
The  EU's  ONP  framework  is  now  of  course spelling  out clear  areas  of 
responsibility and  guiding  principles  for  the  telecoms  regulators  in 
each Member  State.  However,  the pressure  on  these  national authorities 
will be dramatically  increasing over the next  year,  especially  in terms 
of  their  resources,  their  independence  and  their  effectiveness  in 
correctly implementing  EU  harmonisation  legislation.  The  accelerated 
pace  called  for,  coming  up  at  the  same  as  many  countries  are  going 
through pri  vatisation reforms  is likely to  cause  considerable  tensi.on. 
On  top  of this  the  challenge  of true  cooperation  and  coordination 
between the national  regimes  is clearly intensifying.  This  is becoming 
most  urgent  in  fields  such  as  numbering,  frequencies  and  spectrum 
management  and  technical  specifications.  Not  only  do  we  need  EU 
coherence in these matters  for  our  own  internal market,  but  we  also need 
to be  in a  position to truly speak with one  voice in  international  fora. 
I  am  particularly thinking here  of the  International  Telecommunications 
Union. 
As  regards  numbering  the most  important  weaknesse~  currently concern  the 
lack  of  a  unified  numbering  space  and  Europe-wide  numbering  plan. 
Competitors  throughout  the  EU  will need much  greater access  to numbers, 
they need  more  numbers  and ultimately  number portability which must  be 
planned out at EU  level. 
My  concern  about  technical  standards  and  specifications  is  that 
essentially global  markets  such  as  mobile  communications  are  still in 
danger  of  being tied up  regionally with  a  limited range of technologies. 
Technical  restrictions  and  consequent divisions  of markets  help  no  one, 
least of  all our  telecoms.equipment  industries.  Even  though  we  did 
achieve  successful  internal coordination  through  framework  bodies  such 
as  the  CEPT,  and  now  ETSI  and  ERO,  to  agree  upon  the  EU  wide  GSM 
standard,  our  market  now  faces  the  challenge  of  competing  mobile 
standards  on  the other side of the Atlantic. 
The  need  for  effective  forward  planning and  negotiation at a  more  global 
level will test  our current coordination  mechanisms,  and  certainly the 
national  regulatory  bodies will need to  cooperate  closely if they  wish 
to deal with  the problems  satisfactorily. 
The  allocation of  frequencies,  management  of  spectrum  and granting  of 
orbital slots  for satellite systems  are  likewise problematic  areas  vis  a 
vis  the  current  ~oordination mechanisms  between  the  member  states.  I 
believe the  EU  market  and  pan-European services may  increasingly suffer 
from the  lack of  direct  EU  mechanisms,  in particular the absence  .of  a 
.joint  EU  representation  in decisive  international talks,  particularly 
the  ITU.  This  has  negative  repercussions,  both  for  our  own  internal 
policies and the efficacy of global  coordination as  a  whole. 
As  general  restrictions are  lifted,  both  by the  EU  timetable  and, 
assuming  success  next  February,  in  the  WTO  context,  divergencies  in 
national policies in  these  technical  areas  pose increasingly significant 
obstacles  to market entry. 
We  will  have  to  see if  the  need  for  consistency and  coordination and  the 
need  for  a  clear  EU  perspective  leads  us  to think  that institutional 
reform  is  necessary.  There  are  of  course  already  many  existing 
coordination bodies  drawing  together national  regulations  and  fostering 
cooperation.  There  is no  shortage of  acronyms  to  draw  upon  such  as 
CEPT,  ECTRA,  ERO,  ETO,  EUTC,  but  however  many  there are it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that these are not  sufficient. 
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The  main point  I  want  to make  is that  we  should focus  upon  exactly and 
only those areas where it is truly called  for.  In order to be  a  viable 
idea  and  a  workable  reality  a  European Telecommunications  Agency  should 
have  a  mandate  o~  clearly defined  and mainly  technical tasks  such  as 
numbering  and  spectrum management. 
Naturally  I  am  contrasting this with the tasks  which  competition policy 
is  concerned with  in the  telecoms market:  here the·  EU  perspective is 
strong and  the tools  are working well. 
V  WTO  and the External  Dimension to  EU  Competition  Policy in telecoms 
So,  I  have  now  underlined  the increasing  importance  of the  external 
dimension  of certain  regulatory aspects  in telecoms  due,  inter  alia,  to 
the global  implications of technical  impediments  and restrictions.  It 
is clearly in everyone's interest that  we  max~~se our potential here  to 
coordinate internally and  speak with  one  voice. 
But  this  now  leads  me  on  to another very important  aspect highlighted by 
telecoms  liberalisation - this  concerns  an  external dimension  to  EU 
competition policy: 
the  telecoms  market  is more  and  more  no  longer  essentially an  EU 
one,  it becomes  a  global  one 
the most  important  alliances  notified  to  me  are  fundamentally 
international not  just Euiopean 
the  customers  and  companies  served by  this  market  want direct 
access  to increasingly global  services  - whether  this may  be  a  web 
site  in  Australia,  or  a  corporate  communications  network  for  a 
multinational 
I  have  already mentioned the  extent to  which  joint ventures  involving 
international  partners  allow  me  to  set  down  certain  conditions 
concerning market  access  and  competitive  conditions  in  these partners' 
home  countries.  So  this is one  way in which  we  are already developing  a 
certain  external dimension  to the  competition rules  regarding mergers 
and alliances. 
As  such  ventures  increasingly and more·  intensively link in to  existing 
and  expanding international  networks  of  partnerships  around  the world 
(eg  AT&T  World  Partners)  the  scope  of this  instrument is growing. 
Other  important aspects  of  competition  policy,  however,  are also calling 
for  an  external dimension in the  telecoms  sector:  that  is,  the aspects 
dealing with unnecessarily  restrictive regulations  and abuse  of dominant 
position. 
As  we  have  learned generally  from development  of  Community  single market 
policy over the  years,  elimination of trade barriers and  application of 
competition  law need  to  go  hand in  hand,  especially where  the  newly 
opened markets  are still dominated by  incumbent monopolies.  We  can  say 
broadly  that  significant  international  market  access  barriers  are 
created by  both restrictive  regulations  (and  these  do  not  need to  be 
discriminatory against  foreign entrants· to  represent barriers);  as  well 
as  anti-competitive practices of  dominant  players.  The  latter includes 
behaviour  such as  hindering  access  to  essential facilities,  tying  and 
bundling,  excessive or  predatory pricing and vertical arrangements  often 
involving cross  subsidies. 
At  this  general level  I  have,  together with  my  colleague Sir  Leon 
Brittan,  put  forward  recently a  Communication  aiming  to move  us  toward 
an  international  framework  for  competition  rules  in  particular 
proposing that  the  WTO  ministerial meeting  in Singapore this  December 
establish a  working party on  the issue. 
But  what  direct relevance  does  this  have  to  the  European  telecoms 
market?  Telecommunications  represents  the first  and most  important  test 
bed  for  this  new  international  convergence  of trade  issues,  domestic 
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regulatory  issues  and  competition  issues.  The  WTO  group  now 
negotiating for  an  agreement  on  acces&  to  basic telecoms  markets  will 
also  adopt  a  framework  of  common  regulatory  principles  to  support 
effective competition.  These will  and must  go  hand  in hand with  the 
market  access  offers  on  the  table,  otherwise  the  offers  may  be 
relatively  meaningless.  The  common  principles  include  some  very 
important  competition  safeguards  which  essentially  reflect  our  own 
internal  application of  articles  90  and  86  to the  telecoms  sector. 
Amongst  other things  these  concern:  cross  subsidies,  interconnection and 
network  access,  licensing  procedures,  independence  of  the  regulatory 
authority and transparent international accounting rates. 
It is important to  emphasise that the  EU's  external ·voice vis  a  vis  our 
competition policy  and the application of  the  competition rules  of  the 
Treaty is,  I  believe,  proving to be  increasingly successful. 
VI  EU  telecoms  liberalisation in  the  framework  of the  information 
society 
Of  course  all  these  words  on  the  future  shape  of  the  European 
Telecommunications  market  and its regulation  make  little  sense without 
orienting them  within the  umbrella  of  goals  and  expectation which  we 
call the information society. 
The  information society  is  for  me  first  and  foremost  about  creating 
wealth  for  citizens,  employees  and business alike.  By  wealth,  I  do  not 
mean  simpl-y more  ECU  in  our pockets.  Creating  wealth means  creating 
more  jobs,  it  means  creating more  knowledge  and more  education,  and it 
also  means  more  pleasures  and  entertainment.  On  the  one  hand  European 
employees  are  relying upon  healthy  growing  competitive  economies,  and  on 
the other  European  citizens  must  be  guaranteed  access  to  increasingly 
rich and universal networks  of  communication  and information.  The basic 
infrastructure of all  this is telecommunications  networks.  To  make  get 
maximum potential  from  this infrastructure  we  must  consistently  take 
decisions  which  encourage  greater  and  greater  opportunities  for 
increasing access  and bandwidth. 
Too  often in member  countries  which  have  not yet  reaped the benefits of 
open  and  competitive markets,  it was  assumed that  competition policy was 
somehow antithetical  to public service  and  the interests of  unions  and 
employees.  Or  at  least.that there  was  some  sort of trade  off to·be had 
between  them.  Of  course this is muddled  thinking.  Competition is not 
in fact  an  end or goal  in itself.  It is simply  the most  effective and 
least  risky  strategy  we  have  for  achieving  our  real  policy  goals 
concerning  economic  growth  and  satisfactory  and  efficient  public 
service.  The  real  question we  need  to  tackle  is  not,  of course 
competition or public service.  They  are  two  sides  of the  same  coin.  It 
is,  rather,  how  and where  can  we  best use  the tool of competition policy 
to  further public service and  economic objectives. 
Let  us  re-focus  for  a  moment  on 
useful  to spilt  our  approach 
progressive 
the  issue of univer·sal  service:  It 
into two  parts:  one  protective and 
is 
one 
A  guaranteed level 
against  risk  in 
safeguards 
of universal 
a  competitive 
service must  be  completely 
environment  with  solid 
"protected" 
regulatory 
However  the  improvement  and  expansion  of universal  service is  itself 
enhanced,  even  ensured,  by the  competitive environment.  As  I  mentioned 
before,  the  broader  concept  of developing  universal  service is  about 
greater and  greater access  to  more. and more  bandwidth.  It relies  upon 
competition  and  could  actually  be  stifled  by  excessive  regulatory 
restrictions 
The  European  Commission  has  already set  certain basic principles at  EU 
level  for  the  scope  of the guaranteed level of universal  service and its 
funding.  This  is in order to  ensure  that different national  regimes  do 
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not create  barriers to trade.  This is 
not  create  unnecessary  distortions 
liberalised markets. 
also to ensure that the rules  do 
of  competition  in  the  newly 
At  the end of the day my  fundamental  concern is  to encourage  competition 
and  choice at  the  customer  access  level:  Access  to  the  end  user for 
service  providers  on  the one  hand;  and  access  for  the  end user  to  a 
growing  range of services,  on  tbe other. 
What  sort  of access?  What  sort of  terminal?  It doesn't  matter. 
Internet access  provided by Internet  Access  Providers  over local telecom 
networks;  broadband  cable access  provided-by cable  operators  or  PTOs; 
satellite  and  wireless  access  provided  by  broadcasters  and  mobile 
operators?  We  can  certainly  see  the  growth  potential  and  the 
possibilities of Europe's  telecommunications  market but  we  can  not,  we 
must  not,  predict or pre-empt its exact  shape.  I  see my  job as  simply 
ensuring  that as  many  possibilities are left open  as  possible so  as  to 
allow consumer  demand,  innovation and creativity in the  market  to- decide 
the  future. 
*** 
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ATLAS-GLOBALONE: COMMISSION GIVES GO-AHEAD TO GLOBAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ALLIANCE CONDITIONAL ON LIBERALISED 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 




At  the proposal  of  Mr  Karel  van  Miert,  Commissioner  in  charge  of  EU 
competition policy,  the  European  Commission  gave its authorisation today  to 
the  European  telecommunications  alliance between  France  Telecom  (FT)  and 
Deutsche  Telekom AG  (DT),  known  as Atlas,  and to the global  alliance between 
Atlas  and Sprint Corporation,  recently renamed  GlobalOne. 
However,  the  Commission's  decision  ties the potential  inclusion of various 
services  and  networks  in the  joint  venture to  regulatory  reform at  the 
national level.  Once  the  new  French  and  German  telecom liberalisation  laws 
are  fully  implemented  and  operative,  DT  and  FT  may  request  that  the 
Commission  review  specific  restrictions  attached  to  the  decision.  The 
Commission  will then  decide  depending  on  the  competitive nature  of  the 
markets.  Moreover,  the  Commission  approves  Atlas  for  a  relatively  short 
period of  5  years.  The  alliance will  come  up  for  review in 2001,  at  the  same 
time as  the  review of  BT  and MCI's  Concert  joint venture which  was  approved 
in 1994. 
The  European  Commission  only  agreed to  initiate  the  formal  authorisation 
procedure  (on  17  October  1995)  once  the  French  and  German ministers  in 
charge  of  telecommunications  had  committed  to  early  alternative 
infrastruc"ture liberalisation in  1996,  and,  furthermore,  once  FT  and  DT's 
CEOs  had  substantialiy changed  the  commercial  structure of  the  proposed 
alliance. 
The  final  Atlas  and  GlobalOne  agreements  signed  on  22  January 1996  are  a 
further  step  towards  a  positive  restructuring  of  the  European 
telecommunications  industry,  which  must  reposition in the wake  of increasing 
globalisation  of demand  and  given the prospect of full  competition in the  EU 
markets  by  1998.  To  ensure dominance is not abused,  nor markets  foreclosed 
in the  sensitive run  up  period  to effective competition,  strict  conditions 
on  agreements  and alliances  of  the  dominant  operators  are  vital.  The 
Commission  foresees  a  gradual  phase-out  of  restrictions  alongside  the 
establishment of  a  fully competitive  regulatory  framework  at national  and  EU 
level.  Further  liberalisation  as  regards  regulation  of  international 
services  in  France,  Germany  and  the  US  in  the  context  of  the  WTO 
negotiations  in this area,  may  also have  an  impact  on  the  future  conditions 
surrounding the global  venture. 
This  flexib!e  and  dynamic  approach,  tying authorisation  of  the  agreements  to 
implementation of general policy  opening  the  relevant markets,  received the 
support of the Advisory Committee  of Member  State competition authorities in 
June  1996. 
The  Commission decisions set out  a  two-tier approval: 
i  Atlas/GlobalOne's  European  and  global  services  as  well  as  most  value-
added services  in  France  and  Germany  are  authorised  from  the  date  on 
which  France  and  Germany  grant  the  first  two  alternative 
teleco~unications infrastructure  licences.  This  should be  imminent 
since  French  and  German  Telecom  laws  have  now  been  adopted  which 
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implement  the  EU  timetable  for lifting  restrictions  (i.e.  July  1  1996 
for  alternative  infrastructure).  These  infrastructure  licences must 
allow  the provision  of liberalised  telecommunications  services  (i.e. 
they may  exclude basic public voice telephony until 1998). 
At  a  second stage,  FT  and  DT  may  include within the Atlas  venture their 
national public switched  data networks,  Transpac and T-Data.  This  may 
be  authorised  only  when  France  and  Germany  liberalise  fully  all 
telecommunications  services,  including  public voice,  and all  network 
infrastructure.  The  granting  of  the  first  of  such  licences  is 
envisaged,  by both  French and  German  legislation,  by  1  January 1998. 
The  Commission  attaches· the  following  conditions  to Atlas/GlobalOne: 
*** 
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FT  and  DT  must  establish and maintain  access  to their domestic  public 
switched  data  networks  in  France  and  Germany,  even.  after  their 
integration into  Atlas,  on  a  non-discriminatory,  open  and transparent 
basis  to  all service  providers  offering low-level  data services  (i.e. 
using protocols  such as  X.25,  Frame  Relay,  Internet or  SNA);  to ensure 
continued non-discriminatory  access  in  the  future,  they  must  also 
implement  any  generally applied  standardised interconnection  standard 
that may  modify,  replace or co-exist with,  the  current standard; 
FT  and  DT  must treat Atlas/GlobalOne  and all third  party competitors  in 
a  non-discriminatory  way  in  relation  to  their  facilities;  this 
condition extends  to the  availability of facilities-related  services, 
to  the  terms  and  condi  tio·ns  of  service provision  and  to  relevant 
information on  such services; 
FT  and  DT  are  ·prohibited  from  any cross-subsidisation;  to  prevent 
cross-subsidies,  all  entities  formed  pursuant  to  the  Atlas  and 
GlobalOne  ventures  are established  as  distinct entities,  separate  from 
the parent companies;  FT,  DT  and their joint entities must  implement  an 
analytical accounting system,  subject  to regular external auditing,  to 
ensure that these entities deal  with  FT  or  DT  on  an  arm's  length basis 
at all times; 
FT  and  DT  acting  as  Atlas/GlobalOne's  distributors  in  France  and 
Germany  must  conclude  separate  one  separate  contract  for  their  own 
services  and  one  for  the  distributed  Atlas/GlobalOne  services 
respectively;  each of the  two  contracts must  identify the price  and  the 
rebate,  if any,  of each  individual service provided; 
FT  must sell INFO  AG,  an  important  competitor  of T-Data  on  the  German 
data  network  services market,  before a  specified deadline. 
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THE COMMISSION TAKES ACTION TO PREVENT ANTI-COMPETITIVE 
PRACTICES IN THE MOBILE PHONES SECTOR 




The  Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV)  has written to  GSM/DCS1800 
handset manufacturers  and network  operators  in the  EEA  limiting the  use  of 
the  "SIM  Lock"  feature  in mobile  phone  handsets:  the  feat;ure  effectively 
ties the  customer to one  GSM  operator or service  provider.  The  handset must 
be  able  to be  unlocked upon  demand  by the  consumer.  This will prevent  the 
anti-competitive effects of the  feature vis-a-vis  existing or new operators, 
and avoid  a  reinforcement  of the division of  the mobile  phone  market  along 
national lines. 
The benefit of  the  SIM  Lock,  for both  consumers  and operators,  is  that it 
helps  to deter  theft of  handsets,  but at  the  same  time  it "locks"  the 
particular  handset  (phone)  to  a  particular  operator or  service provider. 
This  raised serious  concerns  as it  would prevent  consumers  who  had purchased 
a  mobile  phone  handset  from later  choosing which mobile  phone  service best 
suited their  needs.  The  SIM  Lock  can in  fact be  deactivated in order  to 
allow a  customer to  switch to another network or  service provider once .they 
have  bought  a  handset,  but this  sometimes  requires  the  return of the handset 
to  the operator or service provider.  A  more  common  form of the  "lock"  does 
allow deactvation by the  customer him/herself but  operators  often charge  the 
latter a  significant  sum before they will provide the  information necessary 
to  unlock  the phone. 
On  30  May  1996,  the Commission  wrote  a  "warning letter" to all  GSM/DCS1800 
network operators  and all manufacturers  of  handsets  in the  EEA  alerting them 
to the anti-competitive effects of the  SIMLock  feature.  The  Commission  also 
wrote  to  ETSI,  the  European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute,  which 
was  proposing to  standardise this feature  as  part of the  GSM  standard.  A 
large  number  of  responses  were  received,  and  it became  clear that  most 
operators  do  not  feel it  necessary to  use  the  SIM  Lock  feature,  and in 
certain  countries  notably  France  and  Denmark  the  risk  of  anti-
competitive uses  of the  feature  had been  forseen  and would  be  avoided by  the 
establishment of  special rules  overseeing  its use.  This  was,  however,  not 
the  case  in all countries. 
The  Commission  has  now  written to  the manufacturers  to  ensure that they only 
supply  SIM  Locked handsets  which  can be  unlocked by  consumers  themselves. 
DG  IV has  also indicated to  ETSI  that  this  should be  taken  into account  in 
determining  how  the  SIM  Lock  feature  should be  standardised. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  has  also  written to  operators  indicating  that 
SIM  Lock  should only be  used if the handset  can be  unlocked by the  consumer 
on  demand.  In particular: 
The  end-user  should be  made  aware  at  the  time of  purchase of  the handset 
whether that handset  is locked to  a  particular network  operator I  service 
provider. 
A  form  of  SIM  Locking  which  allows  the end-user to  unlock  the handset,  on 
the  basis  of  information  provided  by  the  network  opera~or  I  service 
provider,  gives  the  Commission  s  services  no  difficulties. 
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Network  operators  or  service  providers  should  inform  end-users  of  the 
possibility of  unlocking the handset,  or provide the information  necessary 
to unlock the handset to all end-users  on  request. 
In  circumstances  where  the  sale  of  the  handset 
provision  of  a  telephony  service,  and  the sale  of 
subsidised by  the network operator  I  service provider: 
is  combined 
th'e  handset 
with  the 
has  been 
The  existence  and  amount  of any subsidy,  and the  conditions  for  repayment  of 
all monies  due  under  the contract  should be made  clear  to the end-user  at 
the time  of purchase. 
Network  operators  or service  providers may  need to  withhold the  relevant 
unlocking  information  from  end-users  until  one  billing  cycle  has  been 
completed,  thus  ensuring that  a  subscription has  been properly  set up  in 
respect of  the handset. 
The  handset  need not be  unlocked  (and the information  required to  unlock  it 
need not be pr.ovided)  until the outstanding amount  of the  subsidy has  been 
repaid by  the end-user. 
The  practical effect  of  this will  be  that  consumers  will  no  longer  be 
charged  what  were  often significant amounts  of money  for  the privilege of 
linking  their own  handset  to the  services of  another operator  I  service 
provider. 
*** 
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LIBERALIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: COMMISSION 
REMAINS FIRM 




At  its  meeting  this  week  in  Strasbourg,  the  Commission  examined 
field 
the 
of  derogations  available  to  some  Member  States  in  the 
telecommunications  liberalization. 
Mr  Van  Miert  gave  several  reasons  why  the  number  of such  derogations  should 
be  reduced to  a  minimum: 
under  the directives  concerned,  such  transitional periods  could  be 
granted only in the light of network  developments; 
the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  European  Council  and  the- Conunission  h,1d, 
on  several  occasions,  asserted the  importance  of  rapid  liberalization 
as  a  means  of  promoting  economic  growth  and developing  the  information 
society.  The  date of  1998  played  a  key  role in this  respect; 
lastly,  it  was  important  for  the  countries  concerned to  integrate 
themselves  as  quickly  as  possible into the  European  telecommunications 
market  in  order to  benefit  from  the  corresponding  investments  and 
services. 
The  liberalization of telecommunications  within  the  European  Union  can  also 
have  a  major  impact  on  the  international telecommunications  negotiations 
taking  place  within the  World  Trade  Organization.  The  European  Union's 
deadline must  be  as  close  a  possible  to  1998  in  most  Member  States  since 
that year  is also  the target date  for  global  liberalization.  This  would 
allow  an  improved  European offer  to be  made,  if  possible before  the  tvTO 
summit  in Singapore,  i.e. within  a  matter of weeks. 
Special attention was  paid to recent developments  in Spain.  In line  with 
the  approach  taken  in  the  Atlas/Global  One  case  (France 
Telecom/Deutsche  Telekom),  Mr  Van  Miert.  made  the  point  that an  alliance 
between  dominant  operators  was  not  acceptable in  the  context  of  a  market 
still closed to  competition.  Spain  is also particularly  important  in  the 
context  of  the  WTO  negotiations  given  the size  of its domestic market  and 
the presence of its dominant  operator in several countries  of  Latin America. 
For  this  reason,  Mr  Van  Miert  would like to see  Spain  rapidly confirm  that 
it was  prepared  to dispense  with  a  derogation  and  thus  to give  its formal 
commitment  to the date  of  1  January  1998  for  full liberalization  (services 
and  infrastructures).  He  stressed the  importance  of  such  a  commitment  if 
licences  were  to be  awarded to  new  operators  in Spain  in the  first half of 
1998. 
*** 
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COMMISSIONER  VAN  MIERT  LINKS  DT'S  NEW  BUSINESS  USERS  TARIFFS  TO 
COMPREHENSIVE  NETWORK  ACCESS 
Mr  Karel  van Miert,  Commissioner 
agreed  that  the  German  Federal 
in charge  of  EU  competition policy,  has 
Ministry of  Posts  and  Telecommunication~ 
(BMPT)  grant  Deutsche  Telekom's  application  for  certain  new  business 
customer tariffs  by  1  November  1996.  His  agreement  is conditional  on  the 
conclusion of  retroactive  network  access  agreements  between  DT  and  itH 
competitors  by  31  December  1996  and  on  the  BMPT  taking additiondl  reguldtory 
steps  required  for  competitive  network access  in  the  German  market  before 
that date. 
The  terms  a,nd  condi  t.ions  of these  agreements  shall  be  retroactive to  1 
November  1996.  The  settlement  follows  an  application by six  of  DT's  largest 
competitors  that  the  Commission  adopt  interim  measures  (i.e.  take  immediate 
action)  against  the  new  tariffs.  Under  its  powers  the  Commission  can 
substantially  accelerate  the  adoption  and  enforcement  of  preliminary 
decisions  to avert  serious  and  irreparable harm to competitors.  Mr  Van  Miert 
agreed  to stay proceedings  for  two  months,  but  warned  that  the  Commission 
would  act swiftly if  DT's  competitors  were  denied  network access  on  fair 
terms  by  the  31  December  deadline. 
The  Commission  challenged  DT's  new  tariff scheme,  which  requires  prior  BMPT 
approval,  earlier this year.  The  BMPT  and the  Commission  agreed in June  that 
DT  may  implement  some  of its  proposed tariffs once  the  BMPT  had  granted at 
least  two  alternative infrastructure  licences  and  provided  DT  satisfied 
certain conditions  (see  IP/96/543).  Most  importantly,  DT  had  to start trials 
of  residential  customer  rebate  schemes  and  conclude  network  access 
agreements  with its  competitors  for  traffic either  'breaking  in'  to  the 
competitors'  network  from  DT's  public  switched  telephone  network  (PSTN)  or 
'breaking out'  of  the  competitors'  network  into the  PSTN. 
Ill  63 The  BMPT  and  DT  have  satisfied five  out  of six conditions set  out  in June. 
Moreover,  DT  introduced  special  volume  rebates  on  end user  tariffs  for 
'break in'  and  'break  out'  traffic of closed  user group  (COG)  networks.  Mr 
Van  Miert  informed the  German  Minister,  Dr  Wolfgang  Betsch,  that mere  volume 
rebates  for  DT's  competitors  do  not  fully  satisfy the  remaining  condition 
under  which  the  Commission  halted its  investigation  in June,  i.e.  fair 
access  to  DT's  network  without  infringing the  fundamental  principle  of  non-
discrimination.  He  recalled  that  comprehensive  network  access  was  U1(~ 
cornerstone  of  telecommunications  market  liberalisation  in  Germany  and, 
accordingly,  a  condition attached to the  Commission's  authorisation of  DT's 
Atlas  and  GlobalOne  joint ventures  on  17  July. 
Messrs  Van  Miert  and  Betsch  agree  that  COG  operators  need  comprehensive 
network  access  on  fair  terms  to  compete  with  DT.  However,  negotiation  of 
appropriate  arrangements  requires  prior  regulatory action.  Therefore,  the 
terms  of  the  agreement  between  Messrs  Van  Miert  and  Betsch  provide  the 
following: 
1)  Before  31  December  1996  the  BMPT  shall allot  special  network  access 
numbers  to  applicants  and  change  current  regulations  allowing  DT  to 
charge  third-party network  operators  by the  second. 
2)  DT  shall  conclude  comprehensive  network  access  agreements  by  31 
December  1996,  which  must  integrate the  BMPT's  above  regulatory action 
and  include  certain  commercial  arrangements  (e.g.  c e r t a i n  t .1 r i t  t 
condition)  and  technical  features  (e.g.  provision  of  the  signalling 
system  #7). 
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MOBILE PHONES: NO EVIDENCE FOR HEALTH RISKS, BUT FURTHER 
RESEARCH ACTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION 




"There is  no  evidence  of  any  health risk emerging  from mobile  phones,  tut 
the  results  of present  research are  inadequate to draw  firm  conclusions  on 
this  issue.  Further  research  is  therefore  required."  This  is the  main 
conclusion of  a  report drafted  by  an  expert  group  which  was  asked  by  the 
Commission  to  prepare  an  action plan  for  comprehensive  research into  the 
effects  of  radio  frequency  radiation  on  health.  The  Commission  intends  to 
decide  before  the  end of  this  year  how  the proposed  action plan  can  be 
integrated in the  European  research and development  programmes. 
On  3  October  1995  the Commission  asked  a  group  of  t~n experts  (see Annex)  in 
biology,  neurophysiology,  epidemiology,  physics,  radiation  protection  and 
telecommunications  engineering  to prepare  an  action  plan  for  research  into 
the possible  health effects  related t'o  the use  ot  mobile  telephony.  The 
group's mandate  was  not  to  conduct  any  research,  but  to  review the  available 
results  of  the  research  conducted world-wide. 
Today  the  Commissioners  Martin  Bangemann,  in  charge  of  Information 
Technology  and  Telecommunications,  and  Padraig  Flynn,  in  charge  of  rubl.ic 
Health,  presented the  findings  of  the expert  group  to  the  Conunission. 
Having  examined  the  technology  of mobile  phones,  the  exposure  levels  to 
which  people  may  be  currently exposed  and  relevant publish7d  biophysical, 
biological  and  epidemiological  research,  the expert  group  concluded that  on 
the  basis  of studies  conducted  to  date,  there  is no  evidence  of  any 
increased  health  risk.  However  the  results  of  existing  research  are 
inadequate  to  draw  firm  conclusions  in either a  positive or  negative  sense. 
The  expert  group  makes  concrete  recommendations  for  further  research, 
focused  on  the  specifics  of mobile  communicatiqns  and  co-ordinated at  the 
European  level.  The  recommendations  include  a  call for  research studies  on 
possible  mechanis~  of interaction of  radiotelephone emissions  with  living 
tissues,  genetics,  cancer  induction,  immune  and  nervous  system  related 
effects  and  epidemiology. 
The  Commission will  examine  how  the  research plan  proposPd  by  t lw  t•xpt•t t 
group  could be  implemented  and  intends  to  take  q  decision  on  this  l.ttt'l  lhi::> 
year. 
European  Commission  Expert  Group 
Chairman  and editor 
Dr  A  F  McKinlay 
National  Radiological  Protection Board,  United  Kingdom 
Members 
Professor  J  B Andersen 
Center  for  Personkommunikation,  Aalborg University,  Denmark 
Professor  J  H  Bernhardt 
Bundesamt  fUr  Strahlenschutz,·  Institut  fUr  Strahlenhygiene,  Germany 
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Professor M Grandolfo 
Institute Superiore di Sanita,  Italy 
Professor  K-A  Hossmann 
Max-Planck-institut  ftir  Neurologische  Forschung,  Germany 
Dr  F  E  van  Leeuwen 
The  Netherlands  Cancer  Institute,  The  Netherlands 
Dr.  K  H  Mild 
National  Institute for Working  Life,  Sweden 
Dr  A  J  Swerdlow 
London  School  of Hygiene  & Tropical Medicine,  United  Kingdom 
Dr  L  Verschaeve 
Vlaamse  Instelling voor Technologisch Onderzoek,  Belgium 
-Dr  B  Veyret 
Universite  de  Bordeaux,  France 
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THE COMMISSION APPROVES TIMETABLE FOR FULL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALISATION IN IRELAND 




The  European  Commission  has  today  approved  a  timetable  for  the  full 
liberalisation  of  telecommunications  in  Ireland.  This  will  give  the 
opportunity  for  infrastructure competitors  to enter  the Irish market  from 
the  middle  of  next  year.  Indeed,  alternative infrastructure providers will 
be  permitted  from  1  July 1997.  Full liberalisation will  take place  from  the 
beginning of  2000.  In the meantime,  direct international  connections  tor  GSM 
mobile  phone  providers will  be  liberalised from  1  January  1999  and  voice 
telephony  will be  completely  liberalised from  1  January  2000.  Under  the 
liberalisation  directives,  Ireland  was  entitled  to  request  a  derogation 
period up  to 2003. 
In  reaching its decision,  the  Commission  investigated the Irish  government's 
argument  that  Ireland  has  been  carrying  out  major  development  of  the 
telecommunications  ~etworks.  This  required significant  capital investment, 
involving  high levels of  debt  and Telecom  Eireann has  been  constrained in 
its ability  to achieve  the necessary  structural adjustments,  particularly 
tariff rebalancing,  because  of the high  costs  in  several areas,  including 
debt  levels,  the  delivery of  telecommunications  services  in Ireland  and 
Telecom Eireann's  high cost structure. 
The  Commission  considered  each  of the  three 
account  of  comments  from  14  companies  as  well  as 
Unions.  All  except  the  latter  were  opposed 
derogations. 
requests  carefully  and  took 
the Irish Congress  of  Trade 
to  the  granting  of  the 
This  decision has  also  to  be  seen  in  the  context of  the 
concerning  the  opening  up  of  telecommunications  in  the 
Organisation.  This  decision  forms  part of  the  EU's  improved 
trading partners. 
Voice  telephony 
negotiations 
World  Trade 
offer to  its 
The  voice  telephony  date  was  granted because  Telecom Eireann  had  a  need  to 
rebalance tariffs  and increase telephone penetration  before  the introduction 
of full  competition. 
Alternative infrastructure 
The  Iri:;h  request  for  the liberalisation  of  alternative int1:astructures  w.t:> 
not  granted beyond  the middle  of  1997.  The  reason put  forward  by  the  Irish 
Government  Wds  that  the alternative  infrastructures  could be  used  to bypass 
the  voice  telephony monopoly.  The  Commission believed that there  were  other 
methods  of  enforcing  the  voice monopoly  and  that the extension to  July  1999 
which  the  Irish government  had  requested was  unjustified. 
International  GSM  connection 
The  Commission  has  partially  accepted the  request  concerning  the  direct 
international  interconnection of  GSM  operators.  The  Irish  Government  argued 
that  the prohibition  on direct  interconnection should  continue  until  voice 
telephony  was  liberalised as  the  second  GSM  operator  could  compete  using  its 
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in~ernational tariffs  with  those  of  the  fixed  voice  service  of  Telecom 
Eireann.  The  Commission  could only accept  this prohibition  until  1  January 
1999  as  Telecom  Eireann will  have  rebalanced  its tariffs in advance  of the 
voice  telephony liberalisation. 
The  obligation and  dates  requested and  granted  are  summarised in the  table 
below. 
obligation concerned  date  foreseen  in 
the Directives 
liberalisation of voice  1  January  1998 
telephony and  underlying 
networks 
liberalisation of  the  use  1  July  1996 
of own/alternative 




interconnection of mobile 
networks  with other 
mobile  or  fixed  networks 
Background 
World  trade negotiations 
February  1996 




1  Jan.  2000  1  Janu.ary  2000 
1  July  1999  1  July  1997 
1  Jan.  2000  1  January  19~~ 
The  reduction  of  the  Irish  derogation  is  also  relevant  to  ongoing 
negotiations  on  telecommunications  at the World  Trade Organisation  (WTO),  in 
Geneva.  Thanks  to  this  internal  liberalisation schedule,  and  to  other 
changes  concerning Spain  and  Belgium,  it was  possible  for  the  EU  to  improve 
its offer to  other trading partners.  This  show of  EU  leadership,  coordinated 
with  an  improvement  in the  US  offer,  was  very positively received.  It will 
help  develop  a  positive momentum at the  WTO  Ministerial  Summit  in Singapore, 
in December.  This  should contribute to  a  better telecommunications  agreement 
by  the  end  of  negotiations,  in  February  1997,  and  more  generally  to 
constructive talks  on  the other agenda  items  of interest  to  the  EU,  such  as 
future  discussions  on  competition  and  trade. 
Telecom Eireann  - strategic alliance 
The  Commission  is  currently investigating  the  strategic  alliance  \~hich 
Telecom  Eireann is  entering into with  PTT  Telecom  of the  Netherlands  and 
Telia  of  Sweden.  PTT  Telecom and  Telia are expected to  strengthen Telecom 
Eireann  both  financially  and technically to  operate  on  liberalised markets. 
This  investigation  is  taking  place  under  the  Merger  Regulation.  Th~ 
Commission  must  make  a  decision about  whether  the  operation  t·aises  .set·i"'U~ 
doubts  about  its compatibility  with  the  common  market  by  18  DecemhP.r. 
Comments  from  third parties are being  sought  by  the  Commission. 
Cablelink 
Telecom  Eireann holds  a  majority  stake in Cablelink,  the  cable  TV  operator 
for. Dublin,  Waterford  and  Galway  City.  This  stake  will be  examined  in  the 
context of  the  investigation  under  the  Merger  Regulation  procedure.  Tht• 
Commission  is also  conducting  a  more  general  review into  t.he  issue ot  cabl(• 
TV  companies.  The  issue of Telecom Eireann's  shareholding in Cablelink  wjll 
also  have  to be  seen in the  qontext  of  that  review. 
Other  derogations 
Portugal,  Greece  and  Luxembourg  have  also  submitted  requests  tor 
derogations.  The  public consultation period on  these derogations  has  almost 
finished  and  the  Commission  is  in the process  of preparing  further decisions 
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THE COMMISSION ADOPTS DRAFT NOTICE ON ACCESS TO 
TELECOMS NETWORKS AND INVITES FOR COMMENTS 
DN: IP/96/1152  Date: 1996-12-10 
TXT: FR EN DE DA ES PT NL IT 
PDF: DE DA PT NL IT 
Word Processed: DE DA ES PT NL IT 
The  European  Commission  today  decided  to  adopt  a  draft  notice  on  access 
agreements  in the  telecoms  sector.  This  Notice,  which  forms  part  of  the 
Commission's  Action  Plan  for  the  Information Society,  clarifies the  role 
that the  competition rules  will  play in resolving  such  access  proble1ns.  It 
does  not  establish new principles of  competition  law,  but  demonstrates  how 
the principles ·existing in current  case  law  of the  Commission  and  the  Court 
of  Justice  will  be  applied  to  a  new  type  of  problems  occurr·ing  in  t·ht:-. 
context of  the liberalisation of  the  telecoms  sector. 
The  Notice  aims  to  do  three  things.  First,  to set  out  access  principles 
stemming  from  EU  competition law in order to create greater market  certainty 
and more  stable conditions  for  investment  and  commercial  initiative in  the 
telecoms  and  multimedia  sectors.  Second,  to  define  and  clarify  the 
relationship between  competition  law and  sector specific legislation.  And, 
thirdly,. to explain  how  competition  rules will be  applied in a  consistent 
way  across  the  converging  sectors  involved  in  the  prov~s~on  of  new 
multimedia  services  especially to access  issues  and  gateways.The notice  . is 
being published in draft  form  for  comment. 
The draft Notice deals,  in its first part,  with  the  relationship between  the 
applications  of the  competition  rules  and  sector-specific regulation.  In 
particular,  this  refers  to  the  ONP  directives  issued  under  the  EC's  Open 
Network  Provision  framework  and  national  regulations.  This  section  also 
covers  procedural  issues  in the  area  of  access  agreements.  This  part  sets 
out  the  principle  that  priority  should  be  given  to  sector-specific 
regulation,  where  practicable  and  subject  to  the  rights  ot  companies  to 
complain  under  the  competition  rules.  The  second part  defines  in  general 
terms  relevant  markets  in the  context  of  access  agreements.  In  tht"  t hi ni 
part,  some  principles  regarding  the application of  Articles  85  and  86  to 
access  agreements  are developed. 
In  the  telecoms  sector,  access  agreements  are central  in allowing  market 
participants  to  reap  the  benefits  of liberalization.  Interconnection  to  the 
public switched telecoms  network is  one  typical  example  of  such access.  Once 
telecoms  markets  are  fully opened,  Community  competition  rules  also apply  to 
the sector  and will  grow in  importance.  This  notice is  vital to ensure  the 
success  of  the  liberalisation  of  telecoms  markets  in  the  Union  from  the 
beginning  of  1998.  It will  provide  a  rulebook  to help  telecoms  services 
companies  to gain access  to  existing telecoms  networks,  in  competition with 
the  existing providers. 
Comments  should  be  made  within  two  months  of  the publication of  the  draft 
notice  in  the Official  Journal.  In practice,  ·they  will be  accepted at  any 
time  up  to  the  end  of  February.  Comments  can  be  sent by mail,  fax  or  E  mail 
to  the  following  addresses. 
Mail 
European  Commission 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV) 
Di-rectorate  C 
c  158  3/48 
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access.notice@dg4.cec.be 
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SECOND GSM OPERA  TOR IN SPAIN : THE COMMISSION REQUESTS 
CLARIFICATION FROM THE SPANISH AUTHORITIES 




The  European  Commission  has  decided  to  request  the  Spanish  dUthorities  to 
provide clarifications  on  the initial licence  fee  imposed  on Airtel  M6vil 
for  the grant of  a  second concession  of  GSM  ~ervices in  Spain.  The  second 
operator which  started operating in  October  1995  was  selected  on  the basis 
of a'tender  process  which  resulted in  Airtel having to pay  Ptas  85  billion 
whereas  the public  telecommunications  operator,  Telef6nica,  was  granted its 
GSM  licence without  an initial licence  fee.  The  Commission  considers  that 
the initial  fee distorts  competition in  favour  of Telef6nica  and  gives  the 
Spanish  Government  three months  to  inform  the  Commission  on  the  steps  it 
will  take  to  secure equal  conditions  for  GSM  operators  on  the market. 
On  23  April  1996,  the  Commission  requested  the Spanish  Government  to  refund 
the  Ptas  85  billion  paid  by the  second operator  or  to  adopt  equivalent 
corrective measures.  The  Spanish authorities proposed  then  to  transfer,  from 
the principal  public operator  to  a  100%  subsidiary  which  operates  1nobile 
telephone  services  for  the  public operator,  the  cost  ot  providing  tixed 
cellular  connections  to  the  public network  in scarcely  populated  remott• 
areas  (TRAC-project),  this  cost  being  previously  borne  by  Telet6nica. 
However,  the  Spanish  Government  did  not provide sufficient  data  to  allow the 
Commission  to  consider  the  project  equivalent  to  the  initial  payment. 
Therefore,  the  Commission  decided  to ask  clarifications  on  the  corrective 
measures  the  Spanish  authorities  intend to  take  in order  to  remove  the 
distortion of competition. 
Under  the  terms  of the  concession granted to  Telef6nica in  1991,  the public 
operator  would obtain  a  GSM  concession  without  any  further  payment.  The 
Commission  considers  therefore that  the public  operator has  a  competitive 
advantage  allowing  it to  strengthen its  dominant position  to  the detriment 
of the  second  GSM  operator.  The  Commission  adds  that  any  strengthening  ~i 
Telef6nica  's  dominant  position  as  well  as  any  limitation of  production, 
markets  or  technical  development  in relation to  GSM  are likely to delay  the 
process  of steadily reducing  tariffs  for  GSM  telephony.  In  the  absence  ot 
the  licence  fee  imposed  on  Airtel,  price  competition  would  have  bt-•t•n 
stronger  and  GSM  tariffs would  have  fallen more  quickly. 
Four  other  Member  States  granted  their  second  mobile  licence  under  " 
procedure  which  had  anti-competi·tive effects  :  Italy,  Belqium,  In~.l.md  dlld 
Austria.  ~;ubsequent to  the  intervention of  the  Commission,  Ht'lqium,  llt-lo~nd 
and Austria decided to  impose  a  similar payment  on  the public  operator.  'l'lH• 
Italian  Government  proposed  a  package  of  corrective  measures  which  was 
agreed by the  Commission.  Second operators  started operating  commercially at 
the  following  times  :  Omnitel  Pronto Italia  (Italy)  December  1995,  Maxmobil 
(Austria)  July  1996,  Libertel  (Netherlands)  :  September  1996,  Mobistar 
(Belgium)  :  October  1996  and  Esat  Digifone  (Ireland):  December  1996. 
*** 
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COMMISSION CLEARS UK CABLE TELEVISON AND·TELECOMS 
MERGER 




The  Commission  has  cleared a  merger  which  will bring together  the current  UK 
cable-tv interests of Videotron,  Cable  &  Wireless,  Nynex  and  BCE,  with  those 
of Mercury  Communications  to  form  a  new  cable  television/telecommunications 
group.  The  new  venture will be  known  as  Cable  and Wireless  Communications. 
The  operation will  be  done  in  two  main  stages.  In  the  first,  Bell  Cable 
Media  will acquire Videotron,  and  Cable  & Wireless  and  BCE  will  assume  ioint 
control  of Bell  Cable  Media.  In  a  second,  the  interests  of  BCM,  Nynex 
CableComms  Inc  and Nynex  CableComms  plc will be  brought  together  under  the 
umbrella of  a  new  company,  Cable  & Wireless  Communications. 
The  new  company  will be  active  in pay  television,  cable  networks,  and 
telecommunications  services  and  networks.  In  the  UK  currently  BSkyB  is 
dominant  in  pay  television.  British  Telecom  is  dominant  in 
telecommunications  services  and  networks.  The  new  group will  have  access  to 
Mercury's  existing trunk lines,  as  well  as  to the  cable  companies  local !cop 
connections.  It  will provide  the  stimulus  for the  development  of  further 
competition in these areas. 
Because  of the structure of the transaction,  two  separate notifications were 
received by  the  Commission  under  Council  Regulation  No  4064/89  (the  Merger 
Regulation) .  After examination,  the  Commission  issued one decision  recording 
its conclusion that  the transactions described in each of  the notifications 
are  compatible with the  common  market. 
*** 
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The  European  Commission  has  given its formal  green  light to the  creation of 
Iridium,  a  company  led by  the  US  corporation Motorola,  which  intends  to 
provide  as  from  the  last  quarter  of  1998,  global  digital  wireless 
communications  services  using  a  constellation  of  66  low earth  orbit  (LE0[1] 
)  satellites.  Services  will  include  mobile  voice  telephony,  paging  and 
basic  data  services  (such  as  facsimile)  and  will be  provided via portable 
hand-held  (dual  mode  or  single mode)  telephones,  vehicle mounted  telephones, 
pagers  and other  subscriber equipment.  Because  Iridium  will  not  restrict 
competition,  its  creation has  been  concluded to  fall outside  the  scope  of 
both Article  85(1)  of  the  EC  Treaty and Article  53(1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
Indeed,  none  of  the  strategic investors  could  be  reasonably  expected  to 
separately  assume  the very high level of  investments  required  (nearly  USD  5 
billion)  and  the  very  high  risk  of  technical  and  commercial  failure 
associated with  such  a  new  system.  In addition,  no  investor  has  all  the 
necessary licences  to operate  such  a  system. 
Apart  from Motorola,  Iridium is  owned  by  16 strategic investors  including  a 
number  of  telecommunication  services providers  and  equipment manufacturers 
from  around  the world.  Two  European  companies  figure  among  those strategic 
investors:  Stet  (Italy;  3.8%)  and  Vebacom  (Germany;  10%).  Each  of  the  two 
has  its own  gateway service territory covering different parts  of  Europe  and 
the associated exclusive  right to construct and operate  a  gateway within its 
respective· territory. 
Satellite systems,  like Iridium  (commonly  referred to as  S-PCS  systems[2]  ) 
are  expected to  complement  wireless  terrestrial  mobile  technologies  (such  as 
GSM)  in areas  where  those  terrestrial technologies  have  failed  to penetrate 
(i.e.  rural parts of the  developed world  and both  urban  and  rural parts  of 
lower  income  countries)  or  where  terrestrial  roaming  is  not  available 
because  of  incompatible  technologies.  In  addition,  S-PCS  systems  are 
expected  to act  as  a  complement  and  even  a  substitute for  the  public 
switched  fixed  telephone  network,  enhancing service  coverage  in  remote  areas 
of  low population  density and/or  where  the terrestridl  inft·astructut:t."  is 
very poor. 
The  same  conclusion as  to  the inapplicability of  the  competition  rules  of 
both  the  EC  Treaty  and  the  EEA  Agreement  has  been  reached  in  respect  of 
several  ancillary  restraints;  namely  as  regards  the  distribution of  the 
Iridium  services  and  the pricing  policies  which  Iridium  may  suggest  as 
guidelines  to  gateways  investor operators.  The  distribution  of  Iridium 
services will  be  organised around,  first  gateway operators,  which  are  tl1e 
strategic investors  in  Iridium and  which  have  exclusive  rights  over  their 
respective territories  to install  and  operate  the  gateways  and  to act  or 
designate  others  to act as  services providers  within the territory;  second, 
service providers  nominated  by  gateway  operators,  in  general  on  a  non-
exclusive  basis,  which  are  responsible  for  customer  relationships;  and, 
finally,  Iridium,  which  as  "producer"  of  the  services  will  keep  some 
strategic central  functions  to ensure  coherence  of  the  system.  Taking  into 
account  the very high  risks  entailed by the  Iridium  system and  the  need  to 
attract gateway  operators  covering all parts  of the  worldr  the exclusivity 
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granted to gateway operators,  as  further described in the Decision,  has  been 
concluded to be  a  necess.ary incentive  for  investors  to assume  these  risks. 
Nevertheless;  in view  of  the very  strong  position of  STET  in  Italy  as 
regards  the  provision of  satellites services,  the Commission  requested  an 
additional safeguard  in respect of Italy.  Thus,  the  parties  have  confirmed 
that the  Iridium agreements  will not affect the  ability of  any other  company 
or person to  gain access  to  the  telecommunications  infrastructure of  STET 
other  than  those  STET  facilities specifically  developed  for  the  Iridium 
system.  In addition,  the  Commission  has  explicitly indicated in the decision 
that the  ancillary  nature  of  the  exclusive  rights  granted  to  gateway 
operator investors,  could be  revisited  should the particular  circumstances 
of the  case  change  in a  substantial  manner.  In  particular should  Iridium 
acquire  a  dominant  position in  respect of  the actual  provision of  S-PCS 
services. 
Iridium may  suggest  pricing policies as  guidelines  to its gateway operators. 
The  contents  of  such guidelines  has  been  described to the  Commission.  They 
would  refer  basically to  rules  for  the  repartition  of  charges  between 
gateways  in  calls  that use  multiple  gateways,  currency  requ~rements and 
exchange  rates.  Each  gateway operator would be  expected to  comply with  these 
guidelines  to  the extent  permitted by  applicable  law  and  regulation,  but 
will otherwise be  free  to set their own  tariffs. 
The  guidelines  are  basically  aimed at  maintaining  the  coherence  and  the 
integrality  of  the  worldwide  service  that  Iridium  will  provide.  Such 
coherence is particularly important  for  potential users  of  the  system·.  They 
will most  of the  time  be  moving  in  different areas  of  the world but  they 
will nevertheless  want  to  receive  a  single bill in  a  single currency.  In  the 
Decision,  the  Commission  has  accepted,  as  recognized in the  "International 
Private  Satellite Partners"  Oecision[3]  ,  that  the  principle of  uniform 
prices  in  different  territories,  together  with  the  implementation  of 
marketing  practices in  a  decentralized manner,  seems  appropriate to  fulfil 
customers'  needs. 
[1]  780  km.  above  the earth's surface. 
[2]  The  Commission  cleared also the  Inmarsat-P/ICO  S-PCS.  For.  details of 
the  Inmarsat-P  system,  see Article 19(3)  Notice published in OJ  noC304 
of  15.11.96,  p.6. 
[3]  OJ  noL354/75  of  31.12.94,  at paragraph  55. 
*** 
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THE COMMISSION CLEARS JOINT VENTURE IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR IN IRELAND 




The  European  Commission  has  decided to  clear the  proposed concentration  by 
which  PTT  Telecom  BV,  a  full  subsidiary of  Royal  PTT  Nederland  NV,  and Telia 
AB  publ,  a  company  owned  by the  Swedish  State,  acting  together through  a 
joint venture  company  called Comsource,  and  the Irish  State,  will  acquire 
joint control of Telecom Eireann. 
The  concentration involves  the establishment  of  a  consortium  between  PTT 
Telecom  and Telia,  named  Comsource,  and  the acquisition by  Comsource  of  20~ 
of  the  issued share  capital of Telecom Eireann.  Comsource  shall act solely 
as  a  holding  company  to perform the  role  of shareholder of  Telecom Eireann. 
As  a  consequence  of  this  acquisition of  20%  of  the  shares  of  Telecom 
Eireann,  Comsource will  acquire control,  jointly  with  the  Irish State·,  of 
Telecom Eireann. 
The  operation  relates  to  telecommunications'  infrastructu~e, 
telecommunications'  services  and  cable  television.  Value-added 
telecommunication services  are liberalised and  subject  to  licence.  Presently 
38  licensed service providers  including  main  European  operators  are present 
in Ireland.  A  second  GSM  operator· will start soon  to operate.  PTT  Telecom 
and Telia are not presently active in the  Irish market  and  the  concentration 
does  not  result in  a  direct  change in  market  shares.  For  non-liberalised 
services,  in  the light  of the  ongoing liberalisation  process  in  !~eland, 
Telecom  Eireann will not  strengthen its present market position. 
In this  respect  the  Commission  has  taken into account  the  approved  timetable 
for  full  liberalisation  in  Ireland:  alternative infrastructures  will  be 
liberalised by  July 1997,  international  GSM  connection by  January  1999  dnd 
voice  telephony  by  January  2000.  Ireland  was  entitled  to  request  a 
derogation  period up  to  2003.  In  addition,  the access  to  the  cablelink 
network  for  telecommunication  will  be  open  to  third  parties  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis. 
Telecom  Eireann,  owned  by  the  Irish  State,  is  the  national 
telecommunications  operator  in  Ireland.  Through  a  75~  shareholding  in 
Cablelink  Limited  Telecom Eireann is also  active in the provision  of  ~able 
television  services in  Ireland.  PTT  Telecom  is  a  full  subsidiary of  Royal 
PTT  Nederland  NV.  Telia is  company  owned  by  the  Swedish State.  They  are, 
respectively,  the  main  telecommunications  operators  in The  Netherlands  and 
in  Sweden. 
*** 
Ill  7t Rapid Text File  http://www.cc.eec/rapid/cgilrapcgi.ksh?p ... n.gettxt-gt&doc=IP/96/1231101RAPID&Ig=EN. 
I of2 
COMMISSION INDICATES A FAVOURABLE POSITION IN RESPECT OF 
UNISOURCE - TELEFONICA AND UNIWORLD AND INVITES COMMENTS 




M.  Karel  Van  Miert,  European  Commissioner  in charge of competition  policy, 
has  decided to  publish  two  notices  which  indicate  the  intention  of  the 
Commission  to  take  a  favourable  view  of  the  Unisource/Telef6nica  and 
Uniworld  cases,  subject  to  the  comments  .of  interested  third  parties. 
Unisource  is an  alliance of  PTT  Telecom of  the Netherlands,  Telia of  Sweden 
and  Swiss  PTT,  which  is being  joined by  Telef6nica of Spain.  The  Uniworld 
transaction is  an alliance  between Unisouice  and AT&T.  The  Commission's 
favourable  view  follows  discussions  with all the  companies  concerned as  well 
as  the  governments  of Spain,  Sweden,  the Netherlands  and  Switzerland.  In 
each · case,  interested  third  parties  have  one  month  to  send  their 
observations. 
Both  notices  explain in  detail  changes  to the  original  agreements  and 
undertakings  given by  the parties t9 make  the  transactions  acceptable under 
EU  competition  law.  In addition,  the Unisource-Telef6nica  Notice  explains 
discussions  with  the  Governments  of the  four  countries directly  involved in 
Unisource  (Sweden,  the Netherlands,  Spain and Switzerland). 
The  main  features  of the  outcome  of the discussions  are as  follows: 
the  full  liberalisation of the  telecoms  market  in Spain by  30  November 
1998,  with three licences  being granted by  1  January  1998  plus  limited 
licences  for  the  cable  TV  companies  to offer telecoms  within their areas; 
the  full  liberalisation of  telecoms  in  Switzerland  from  1  January  1998; 
and 
in respect of the Uniworld  transaction a  series of undertakings  have  been 
offered  by AT&T  in  respect of its conduct  on  interconnection,  access  and 
accounting rates. 
1.Full liberalisation of  telecommunications  services and networks  in Spain: 
The  Spanish  telecommunications  market  will  be  fully  liberalised by  30 
November  1998.  By  that date,  further  licenses  for  voice  telephony  services 
and  public infrastructure  will be  granted,  in  addition  to those  granted 
before that  date.  Such  further  licenses will  be  requested  from  1  August 
1998.  For  so doing,  a  new  General  Law  on  Telecommunications  will be  adopted 
and  enacted  before  the  end  of  1997.  Furthermore,  all  necessary 
implementation measures  will  be  adopted before  31  July  1998. 
In addition,  the  Royal-Decree  Law  6/96  of  7  June  1996  established a  second 
operator  -Retevisi6n- for  the entire  range  of  telecommunications  services 
and infrastructures.  80%  of its share  capital will be  sold  by  tender to be 
awarded  during  the  first  quarter  of  1997.  A  third  licence  for  the 
provision of  voice  telephony  and  public  infrastructures with  nation-wide 
coverage will  be  granted by  the beginning  of  January  1998.  By  the  Rdme  ddte, 
cable  television  operators  will  start offering  voice  telephony  and public 
infrastructures  within their respective areas.  On  that basis,  the  Commission 
has  considered  that  the  degree  of  actual  competition  in  the  Spanish 
telecommunications  market  by  the  beginning of  1998  will  be  comparable  to 
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that of most  Member  States  which  will abide.by the liberalisation date  of  1 
January  1998. 
2.  Full  liberalisation  of  telecommunications  services  and networks  in 
Switzerland: 
Telecommunications  in  Switzerland will  be 
1998  in parallel to  the  EU.  A  new  Law  will 
remaining.restrictions. 
fully libera1ised  by  1  January 
be  enacted shortly  eliminating 
Regarding  alternative infrastructure  liberalisation,  the  Swiss  Government 
indicated that  from  1  May  1995,  15  pilot licences  have  been  granted  (the 
majority to  cable tv operators).  Such  pilot licences  allow the provision  of 
some  telecommunications  services  to  subscribers  (Internet  access,  data 
transmission,  multimedia  and  telephony within  closed users  groups).  The 
contents  of such licences  will be  extended before  the  end of  1996  to  offer 
the possibility  to  owners  of alternative  infrastructures in  Switzerland to 
carry out  commercial  activities,  in particular  for  the provision over  them 
of  corporate telecommunications  services.  Competitors  to  Swiss  PTT  for  the 
provision of  such  corporate telecommunications  services will  be  allowed  to 
use  such alternative infrastructures. 
3.  AT&T  offerings: 
In  the  framework  of  the Uniworld  case,  AT&T  offered  to  the  Commission  the 
following: 
(a)  AT&T  undertakes  to advise  the  Competition  Directorate General  of  the 
European  Competition  (DG  IV)  promptly of any  complaint  filed with  the  US 
Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC)  regarding  access  to  or 
interconnection  with  AT&T's  international facilities,  including  any 
complaint  filed  with  the  FCC  regarding  bilateral  correspondent 
arrangements,  by  telecommunications  operators  or service providers  from 
the  EEA  or Switzerland.  AT&T  further  undertakes  to  inform  DG  IV of  any 
final  decision taken by the  FCC  in regard to  any  such  complaint. 
(b)  With  respect  to operators with international facilities  licences  in  EEA 
and  Switzerland with  whom  AT&T  today has  an  accounting  rate agreement, 
and  for  traffic  sent in  the  context of  the  bilateral correspondent 
regime,  AT&T  undertakes  to offer  cost-based accounting rates  that,  in 
all  cases,  would  be  no  higher  than  the  lowest  accounting  rate 
established between AT&T  and  any Unisource  shareholder. 
(c)  With  respect to operators  with international facilities  licenses  in  EEA 
and  Switzerland with  whom  AT&T  may  in the  future  establish an  accounting 
rate  agreement,  AT&T  undertakes  to offer  cost-based accounting  rates 
that,  in all cases,  would be  no  higher  than  the  lowest  accounting  rate 
then in effect between AT&T  and  any Unisource  shareholder. 
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Brussels, ~Oth January 1997 
The Commission initiates second phase proceedings on BT-MCI merger 
The European Commission has decided to open second  ... phase proceedings in the BT (British 
Telecommunications pic) and MCI (MCI Communications Corporation) merger notification. The 
merger would take place against a background of  rapid change in the telecommunications sector~ and 
in particular the granting of  44 new international facilities licences in the UK. And although many of 
the parties' .activities are complementary, the Commission's enquiries suggest a certain number of 
areas in which further investigations are required. 
These include whether the merger might have the capability of  impairi11g tile ct1n1petitive ptlsititln 
of  its major competitors on the UK-US route by reducing their net settleme11t rel't!llues; wl1ether 
the new entity could divert US-European traffic through the UK in a way not currently open to ill' 
European competitors, and whether the merger would have any impact 011 tl1e a1•ailability tif 
transatlantic cable capacity to n~w  entrants. Tl1e impact of  tl1e n1erger tin tl1e telet'tlnjereiiL"illg 
market will also need to be carefully examined, given the parties' current positio11.  Tl1e 
Commission will also examine any other relevant issues which come to ligllt as a result tiftlre 
investigation into these  fast-changing markets. 
BT is aUK-based supplier of  telecommunications services and equipment. Its main services and 
products are local and long distance telephone exchange lines to homes and businesses, international 
telephone calls to and from the United Kingdom, and the supply of  telecommunications equipment 
for customers' premises. 
MCI is a US-based diversified communications company, offering consumers and businesses a 
portfolio of  integrated services, including long distance, wireless, local, paging. n1essaging. Internet. 
information services, outsourcing and advanced global communications_. BT and MCI also operate 
jointly a venture known as Concert, which supplies value-added and enhanced services to 
multi-national business customers. 
The Commission now has a maximum of  a further 4 months (until II June I997) in which to 
complete its enquiries and take a final decision on the case. 
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The Commission approves timetable for full telecommunications liberalisation in 
Portugal 
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Brussels, 12 February 1997 
The Commission approves timetable for full telecommunications liberalisation in 
Portugal 
Upon request from the Portuguese Government, the European Commission has today approved a 
timetable for the fullliberalisation of  telecommunications in Portugal from  l January 2000. Voice 
telephony will be completely liberalised from that date. In the meantime, direct international 
connections for GSM mobile phone providers will be liberalised from 1 January 1999. 
As  far as infrastructures are concerned, the opportunity will be given for competitors to enter the 
Portuguese market  from the middle of  this year. Alternative infrastructure providers for already 
liberalised services will be  permitted  from 1 July 1997 and Portugal must liberalise without delay 
the market  for GSM  mobile  phone alternative infrastructure. Under the liberalisation directives, 
Portugal was entitled to request a derogation period up to 2003. 
Voice telephony 
On request of  the Portuguese Government, the voice telephony deadline of l January 2000 was 
granted because Portugal Telecom needed to rebalance tariffs and increase telephone penetration 
further before the introduction of  full competition. 
Alternative infrastructure  for already liberalised services 
The Portuguese request for the liberalisation of  alternative infrastructures for already liberalised 
services (such as telephone services for Closed User Groups) was not granted beyond the middle of 
1997. The Commission believed that any potential reduction in revenues on the provision of  leased 
circuits would be compensated by growth in the market and that the development of  the network 
could be continued with the additional implementation period granted for voice telephony. The 
Commission stated that an extension to July 1999 which the Portuguese Government had requested 
could not be justified. 
Jnterntltional (,:-;M connection 
The Commission has accepted the request in  fi11l  concerning the direct international interconnection of 
GSM operators. This was because there was a realistic risk of  substitution between international GSM 
and international fixed telephony which would threaten the development of  the telecommunications 
network in Portugal. 
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The Commission rejected Portugal's request to postpone the lifting of  restrictions on the provision of 
alternative infrastructure for mobile and personal communications services. The Commission believed 
that the liberalisation of  this section of  the market without delay did not pose a threat to Portugal 
Telecom's revenues and hence to the necessary structural adjustments and development of  the 
network. 
The obligation and dates requested and granted are summarised in the table below. 
r·;:·;;;;·;;.;·;;;.:;;;;;~.;;;;;·;;;;;·;·;;;·;·;·;·;·;·:··~~~-;~~~~~  ..........................................  ':':  ......  Tn~!;  .. £~;;;;~  ..  ~';";  ..  1J'Additi~~  ................  ~  ..  ~~~  ..  ~~lf.P;;I;;;;;;  ..  ~;·;  .... ;  ...... 1 
!  Obligation concerned  lin the  j!period requested 1!  1 
!  .............................................................................  ..!  ~!!.~~~~y~~  .............  .Jt~Y..~~~~S.~  .............. J  lf~~~~~~  ........... l 
!  Liberalisation of  voice  !  11  :11 J  l 
1 telephony and underlying  !  1 January 1998j! I January 2000  [!20:;uary  l 
l networks  l  li  ;i  i 
:  ..  ~ •••••••••••••••  ~ •••••••••••••••••••••••  ~ ...............  ~--~-~.;  ••  ;;  •••••••  ; .....  :  ••••  .:.,;.,;  .......  fl ••••••  ;;;·.;.·.:.;.:.  •••••••••  :~  ..................................  .:. ••••••••••••  : !  ............................... : 
1 Liberalisation of  the use of  1  !!  H  ! 
!  own/alternativ~  net~orks  for  j 1 Jul  1996  111 Jul  l999  !!J Jul  19971 
1  other already bberabsed  ~  y  l!  y  !!  ~  1 
!  ~~-~  ..  ~~·~  ... -.·.·.·.-.-...  ~-... - ... - ...  ~·.:·.:~·.·.-.·.~·  ...  ~·.:·  ....... ::·:.-.:·.:·.-.-...  ·.~-...  ~-...  ~·.:..J  ...  .:  ....... - ...  ~~-...  ·.·.:·:.~:~·.;·  ...  ~~::~·.:·:.:·.~-...  ~J~-.~~·.·.·.·.·.~~-...  ~~~::·.::::·.:·.~:~~~~·.:·.:·.·.::~::·.1 L~:::~·.:·.·  .  .-..  ·.·.~ .. - ... ·  ...  .-..  ·.·.-.1 
1 Direct international  1  !!  i!  i 
!  interconnection of  mobile  J F b  1996  j~ 1 J  1999  jll .ltlnlltll)'  !1 
l networks with other mobile or l  e  ruary  H  anuary  i! 1999  l  I 
l fixed networks  l  1!  j!  jl 
;w::::.=!.:.:····.-····~~~il::::.~~········~······~···  ..  ·····~ c=  .................  ~~~~!.:.::~::~=-=~~:~::::::~:::::::~j  [::~:::~~::::::::~::::::::~::::1 
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Background 
The Full Competition directive (Directive 96/19/EC) which provided for the introduction of  full 
competition the telecommunications sector on 1 January 1998 entitled five member states (Ireland, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) t~ submit requests for derogations from that deadline to 
the Commission. The Decision concerning Ireland was taken on 27 November  1996 and provided tor 
a date of  fullliberalisation by 1 January 2000. Greece and Luxembourg have also submitted requests 
for derogations. Spain will not apply for a full derogation and its request has been recently published 
(IP/96/1231).  . 
This decision creates certainty for the rapidly developing Portuguese market.  It also provides a 
positive environment for national and global alliances which may be shaped in that market. 
World trade negotiations 
The agreement of  the Portuguese· derogation is also relevant to the negotiations on 
telecommunications at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), in Geneva. Thanks to this internal 
liberalisation schedule, and to other changes concerning Spain and Belgium, it was possible in 
December for the EU to improve its offer to other trading partners. This show of  EU leadership, 
coordinated with an improvement in the US offer, was very positively received. This should contribute 
to a better basic telecommunications agreement by the end of  negotiations at the end of  this week, and 
more generally to constructive talks on outstanding agenda items of  interest to the EU. 
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Bruxelles, le  17 fevrier 1  997. 
NOTE BIO AUX BUREAUX NATIONAUX 
cc. aux Membres du Service du Porte-Parole 
WTO Telecoms Agreement 
Press conference by Sir Leon Brittan, Geneva, Feb 15 
(P. Guilford) 
This agreement is of  historic importance to the future of  the world trading system as well as to the 
world economy, not just in telecommunications. Estimated to cover over $600 billion years of 
telecoms business, it will boost sales and investment in the telecoms sector, cut costs for business and 
ultimately improve the cost and quality of  communications for ordinary people. It will also remove 
further obstacles to the development of  the information society. Taken together with the ITA (due to 
be finalised in April), which removes tariffs on telecoms equipment among other things. the WTO deal 
on telecoms services will give a powerful lift to the globalisation of  telecoms markets across the 
board. 
It  will also inject momentum into talks in other services sectors, notably financial services, due to 
begin in April and finish at the end of  this year. "The omens are good" for the conclusion of  financial 
services, Sir Leon said, for the telecoms accord had created' the right climate for negotiations. 
The telecoms deal has shown that the WTO was capable of  concluding negotiations successfully in 
individual sectors. Furthermore, it reinforces the case for a Millenium Round of  global trade talks at 
the end of  the century, revealing a thirst for further liberalisation of  the world economy. "Teleconts 
has shown that the world is not suffering from negotiating fatigue or an excess ofliberalisation", he 
said. We are already committed to further negotiations on agricultu~e, services and other areas, and 
Sir Leon predicted these and other issues would come together into a new trade round. 
The Ell led the negotiations from the front for the last  I 1/2 years, convinced from its own internal 
liberalisation process that open telecoms markets are good fbr business. America's last-minute request  · 
tbr an MFN exemption for direct-to-home services and digital broadcasting by satellite (DBS) was 
described by Sir Leon as an "unfortunate blemish" on the overall package. He dismissed it as illegal, 
and in breach of  US commitments on broadcasting made at the time of  the Uruguay Round, and said 
the EU reserved all its rights to challenge the exemption, although the US had made it abundantly and 
publicly clear that such an exemption would not be applied to the EU. 
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Helms-Burton 
The EU Council of  Ministers, gathered in Geneva for the telecoms talks, also discussed 
Helms-Burton. Sir Leon said the EU was actively negotiating a resolution of  the dispute with the 
United States, and had deferred the date for the composition of  a disputes Panel until this coming 
Thursday, February 20. The Council unanimously supported this stance at Saturday's meeting. Sir 
Leon said the EU was only asking the United States for something that was lawful under US law -
which would not need an act of  Congress to achieve - and which was moderate and reasonable. He 
cautioned that in the absence of  a better offer than had so far made by the US, a Panel would be 
named by Director-General Ruggiero on February 20. The Council was unanimous in the view that if 
no such offer is received, a Panel will be named. 
Best regards, 
N. G. van der Pas 
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Co~mission  services clear the Global European Network agreement to create high 
quality trans-European telecommunications networks. 
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Brussels, 20th March 1997 
Commission services clear the Global European Network agreement to create high 
quality trans-European telecommunications networks. 
The European Commission's competition services have given clearence to the Global European 
Network (GEN) agreement to provide high quality digital links between Member States. This 
agreement amongst the major European telecommunications operators will considerably improve the 
quality of  trans-European network telecommunications services. The European Commission's 
competition services have secured amendments to the agreement in order to preserve competition 
between the companies involved and ensure free and fair access for third parties. 
The main amendments are : 
(a)  Each signatory will refrain from entering into a collective concerted pricing arrangement and will 
negotiate on a bilateral basis the conditions under which it will give access to its GEN capacity. 
(b)  Each signatory will offer in its public tariff access to GEN capacity on a non-discriminatory basis 
to third parties. These will thus be able to access GEN capacity on the same basis as to the signatories. 
The GEN agreement was signed by British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom. Telecom 
Italia, Telefonica de Espana. It will create a 2 Mbit/s fibre optics telecommunications net\vork 
between the signatories' nodes using so-called PDH (Plesiosynchronous Digital Hierarchy) 
technology. The network will improve the speed of  circuit provision, the network availability and 
quality and reliability of  service. 
Although they take a favourable approach towards the improvements trans-European 
telecommunications networks can bring, the European Commission's competition services have stated 
that at the same time they will closely scrutinise such agreements which involve dominant operators in 
order to ensure the development of  pro-competitive structures. 
In particular, the conditions under which third parties can access European leased lines remain a 
strong concern for the European Commission. For that reason, the European Commission services 
have warned the parties that the negative clearance of  the agreement does not mean that signatories 
may abuse their strong if  not dominant positions in this market. At the same time, the European 
Commission is, in the context of  the ONP leased line Directive, examining the application of  the ONP 
principle in Member States. 
Should a complaint be made regarding access to European leased line capacities, or should the 
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European Commission become aware that the conditions under which access is provided are 
discriminatory or excessive, individual cases pursuant Article 86 EC. will be opened against the 
telecommunications operators in question. 
III  85 IP/11/212  - 11/4/11 
SeDie•eat reached With Belgace• II  lhiPIIIIicaUIIII 
telepbeae directeries -In  withdraws ce•plailt 
Settlement reached with Belgacom on the publication of  telephone directories - ITT withdraws complaint 
Competition Commissioner Karel van Miert's services have reached a settlement with Belgacom, the 
Belgian national telecommunications operator, on the conditions under which publishers of  telephone 
directories in Belgium have access to data regarding subscribers ofBelgacom's voice telephone services 
(access to listing services). Following the settlement, directory publishers in Belgium-will be charged a 
price which is set in such a way that Belgacom can recover the costs it incurs in the collection, treatment 
and provision of  the subscriber data required for publishing purposes, plus a reasonable profit margin. This 
cost-oriented approach will lead to a very substantial reduction of  more than 90°/o in the amount originally 
charged to telephone directory publishers. 
As a result of  this settlement, ITT Promedia N.V., the Belgian directory-publishing subsidiary of  the US 
ITT World Directories company, has withdrawn its complaint lodged with the European Commission. The 
company alleged inter alia that the conditions which Belgacom intended to apply for access to its 
subscriber data for publishing telephone directories were excessive and discriminatory and thus caught by 
Article 86 of  the EC Treaty. The initial price equal to 34% of  the turnover of  the directory publishers and 
200BF per line of  data was already in  1995 brought down to 16% ofturnover and 67 BF per line. 
At the end of 1995 the Commission issued a formal statement of  objections against Belgacom. 
During the course of 1996, Belgacom endeavoured to meet the Commission's concerns and submitted a 
business proposal regarding access to its subscriber data for publishers which has now culminated in the 
present settlement. ·In assessing Belgacom's proposal, the Commission's services were assisted by an expert 
consulting firm to verify the cost-oriented basis of  the proposal. ITT was invited to comment during the 
course of  these discussions. 
Belgacom has agreed to drop any variable component in relation to the turnover or profit of  directory 
publishers and instead to adopt a cost-oriented approach, allowing it to recover its costs plus a reasonable 
profit margin. Furthermore, as of 1997, a distinction will be made between basic data, i.e. data and updates 
which are essential for publishing telephone directories and which directory publishers \vill thus continue to 
acquire from Belgacom, and a range of  optional supplemental information, which can be acquired from 
Belgacom or from other market sources. 
For the years  I 995 and  1996, the cost allocation method applied in the particular circumstances of  this 
case produces total annual costs of  3  72 million BF to be divided equally between the two current directory 
publishers in  Belgium, ITT and Bclgacom's subsidiary Belgacom Directory Services (BDS). At  present, 
this translates into a price per line of  data of  3  7 BF per' line of  basic data and  I 0 BF tbr supplemental data 
(such data having already been imbedded in the data provided over the last two years). 
Belgacom has undertaken to continue its pricing for basic data, with respect to which publishers are 
dependent on it, following the cost-oriented method agreed for 1995/96. With respect to supplemental 
data, prices will be determined on a market-oriented basis. Several factors could lead to a change in prices 
for basic data in the future: 
- downward evolution: if, as could be expected in the light of  planned software changes or new 
technologies, the costs entailed in collecting, treating and providing basic data goes down (this downward 
evolution could possibly be limited by an upward evolution if  the number of  subscriber data increases) 
Ill  /86 - changed allocation of  the relevant cost base: if  the number or scope of  publishers using the data changes. 
The principles established in this case regarding access to data required for directory publishing on a cost~ 
otjented basis are not only relevant from the point of  view of  competition policy, but are likewise in line 
with the EU policy orientation on directories reflected in the ONP voice telephony directive and the 
Commission's communication on directories . The principle of  cost-orientation is applicable throughout the 
EU. 
Finally, the Commission will continue to closely survey future developments in this market, in close 
cooperation with the competent national authorities. 
Ill  /IJ IP/IJ/314 - 31/14/IJ 
Bo••ission reachesaureement with Spain concerning second ISM licence 
The European Commission has today approved an agreement reached in Spain which removes the 
distortion of competition resulting from the granting of the second GSM (mobile) licence in Spain. 
The agreement covers corrective measures which the Spanish Government proposes to take in 
respect of Airtel Movil, the licence holder. The Commission considers that the measures taken are 
globally equivalent to the 85 billion peseta licence fee which Airtel Movil paid when receiving the 
licence. This decision is important for the introduction of competition into the Spanish 
telecommunications markets and will enable genuine competition to take place in respect of mobile 
telephony. The decision on the timetable for the liberalisation of the remaining aspects of Spanish 
telecommunications markets will be taken by the Commission shortly. 
The corrective measures which the Spanish Government proposes to take are as follows: 
• Airtel Movil SA will be granted interconnection by Telefonica at asymmetric prices and without paying 
any cost for an amount equal to 15 billion pesetas; 
• extension of the duration of the licence of Airtel Movil from 15 to 25 years; 
• anticipated liberation and granting to Airtel Movil of an additional4.5 MHz in the 900 MHz band; 
• extension of Airtel Movil's licence, without additional licence fee, enabling it to operate its mobile 
service in the DCS-1800 frequency band; 
• granting on request of DECT frequencies; 
• right to bid for the third PSTN (licence to be granted on 1 January 1998; 
• right to set up own infrastructure or to use third party infrastructure and to directly interconnect with 
other domestic or foreign networks. 
The Commission considers that the granting of the DECT frequencies and the right to bid for the third 
PSTN licence are entitlements of Airtel Movil in any case and do not contribute to the overall economic 
impact of the proposed package. The other elements in the view of the Commission do amount to a 
globally equivalent economic set of measures to the licence fee originally charged to Airtel Movil. 
The Commission announced the fixing of a deadline for the Spanish authorities to remedy the position 
on 18 December 1996 (IP/96/1175). This decision reflects the solution to the problem, subject to the 
proper implementation of the measures described above. 
Background 
It is not possible to precisely quantify the economic impact of the measures proposed by the Spanish 
government. However, the Commission has concluded that the additional measures which the Spanish 
government has proposed, excluding those which are required under Community law in any case, are 
broadly equivalent to the 85 billion peseta licence fee which was originally charged to Airtel.  · 
This agreement represents a significant step in the liberalisation of telecommunications in Spain. In 
addition, it marks an important step in the full implementation of the mobile telephony directive 
(96/2/EC) in the Spanish market, in particular in respect of GSM services immediately and DCS-1800 
services in the future. The extension of the Airtel licence to DCS-1800 should enhance the conditions 
of competition. Under Directive 96/2/EC, the Spanish Government should nevertheless grant a 
headstart to the third mobile operator to establish itself in the market, before the GSM operators are 
allowed to market DCS-1800 technology. 
Ill  /88 The DCS-1800 technology has brought lower prices for mobile telephony to other markets in Europe, 
and following its introduction in Spain should increase the potential for prices for mobile 
telecommunications to be reduced still further there. The attached table indicates the state of play with 
all the GSM and DCS-1800 licences in the EU. 
CURRENT STATUS OF MOBILE LICENCES (GSM/DECS 1800) 
Member State  GSNILic  @lfcees  DCS 1800 Lie  elfC@II 
.AJ.J stria  rulol:ikom  -
rutax.mobil 
Belgium  Belgacom  -
rulol:istar 
Denmark  Sonofon  -
T  ele Dan  mark  lulobil 
Finland  Telecom Finland  Telecom Finland 
Radiolinja  Radioliri_a 
Telivo 
France  B OllfiJ.Ie& Telecom  B Ollf!IJ.Ie& T  elecon 
France Telecom· 
SFR 
Germany  T fulobil  E1 
E-plus  E2 
fulannesn .am 
Greece  Panafon  -
TeleSTET 
Ireland  Eircell  -
E  sat  D  igifone 
Italy  Onnitel  -
Telecom ltalia Mobile 
Luxembourg  Luxenlbourg P&T  -
N  ethe  t1 ands  PTT Telekom  -
Portugal  Telecel  -
Tr. 
Spain  Airtel  -
Telefonica 
Svveden  Convik  Convik 
E  uropolitan  E  uropolitan 
T  elia rutobile  fulobitel 
Tele8 
United I< ing dom  Cellnet  One-2-0rm 
Orange  Orange 
One-2-0ne 
Vodafone 
Ill  /89 IP/IJ/IJI  - 10/04/IJ 
·Greek government preuoses 11 speed up telecetnmunicauens llberallsauen 
The Greek Minister for Transport and Telecoms, Mr Charis Kastanides met yesterday with Mr Karel 
Van Miert, Competition Commissioner to explain how the Greek Government would accelerate the 
implementation in Greek national law of all European Telecommunications Directives of which the 
implementation deadlines have already elapsed. 
Last December, Commissioner Van Miert had expressed his worries about the implementation 
delays in Greece which were preventing undertakings to provide telecommunications services, 
already liberalised in all other Member States, such as data services and satellite communications. 
At the meeting, yesterday in Brussels, Minister Kastanides has forwarded a precise timetable to fill 
this gap so that Greece can join the rest of the Community in the area. Commissioner Van Miert 
thanked the Greek Minister for the efforts made and said the Commission would now follow up the 
implementation of this time schedule. While welcoming this positive move, the Commission will 
continue to process infringement procedures against Greece until it is satisfied that all the relevant 
european Telecommunications Directives have been properly implemented. 
The main measures announced are the following: 
1.  Greece will speed up the implementation of Directive 94/46/EC on Satellite Communications. A 
Presidential Decree will be published and enter into force by 1.8.97. In the meantime, applications 
for satellite communications may be submitted to the National Telecommunications Committee 
(EET). They will be examined without delay. As soon as this Presidential Decree is published, 
licences will be granted to these applicants, where they meet the criteria set out in the Decree. 
2.  Last year, a personal communications licence was granted to OTE, outside any comparative bidding 
procedure. The Greek Minister confirmed that existing Greek legislation did not preclude the 
submission of additional requests for the provision of DCS-1800 services. He announced that the 
possible license fee for future operators will be fixed in a non discriminatory way and taking into 
account the amount of the fees of the previous operators. 
Under Commission Directive 96/2/EC Member States must liberalise the markets for mobile and 
personal communications . This Directive had to be implemented by March 1996. Minister 
Kastanides announced that the Presidential decree implementing the Directive will be published and 
enter into force by December 1997. The draft, , which will set out the applicable procedure, will be 
submitted to the Commission by the end of May. 
3.  The Greek Law 2328/95 currently reserves the establishment of cable TV infrastructure· to the State 
Telecommunications operator OTE. This law will be. amended, simultaneously with the transposition 
to national legislation of Directive 95/51/~C, which requests the Member States to lift restrictions on 
the provision of liberalised telecommunications services on such networks. The Greek Minister 
announced that draft Presidential Decree for the transposition of this Directive 95/51 /EC will be 
submitted to the Commission by the end of May and that Law 2328/95 will be modified within twelve 
months at the latest. He added that pro.visional applications for the establishment of such networks 
could nevertheless be filed in the meantime, which would have to be completed after the adoption of 
the Presidential Decree. 
4.  In order to render the Greek independent regulatory authority fully operational, the Greek 
Government will adopt a Presidential Decree concerning the staff regulation of this body, 
established in 1995, and put in force by the first of August 1997. 
Ill  I  90 5.  Finally the Minister announced that the Presidential Decree completing the implementation of 
Council Directive 92/44/EC will be adopted and put in force by the End of 1997. This Directive 
requests in particular Member States to ensure that their national telecommunications organisation  ·. 
provide leased lines at cost oriented tariffs within reasonable time periods. 
The full implementation of this time table will be an important step forward for the Greek industry and 
the Greek consumers. In addition, this would clarify the current regulatory framework in the Greek 
telecommunications sector. 
The Commission will now decide on the Greek request for an additional period to the liberalisation of 
voice telephony and public networks on 1 January 1998. 
In June 1996 the Greek Government made a request to the European Commission to be granted an 
additional time period until 1 January 2003 for the fullliberalisation of its telecommunications market. 
The Greek request for a derogation is based in particular on the state of development of the public 
telephone network of OTE, which is now involved in a extensive exercise to upgrade its network 
towards a fully digitalised network. This modernisation investments are fina·nced by the monopoly 
revenues of the telephone service. The Cohesion funds of the EU are also contributing to this effort. 
The Commission will bring forward a decision on the Greek request for a derogation shortly, in line with 
decisions already taken for Ireland and Portugal and taking also into account the specific features of 
the telecommunications network in Greece. 
Background 
The Full Competition directive (Directive 96/19/EC) which provided for the introduction of full 
competition the telecommunications sector on 1 January 1998 entitled five member states (Ireland, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) to submit requests for derogations from that deadline to the 
Commission. The Decisions concerning Ireland and Portugal were respectively taken on 27 November 
1996 and 12 February 1997. They provided for a date of fullliberalisation by 1 January 2000. 
Luxembourg has also submitted a request for derogations. Spain will not apply for a full derogation and 
its request has been recently published (IP/96/1231). 
Ill  /81 IP/IJ/389  - 13/15/IJ 
l1161iPhOnie sur Internet, ISI-CI dlllliliphonie VOCIII de base : II 
Commission demande A  taus les lnt6ress6s de se manilester. 
(VOICE ON INTERNET I  PUBLISHED IN FRENCH ONLY) 
Salon certaines etudes recentes, Ia telephonie offerte sur le reseau Internet pourrait, a terme, etre 
jusqu'a 80 o/o mains chere que les tarifs actuels appliques aux appels internationaux utilisant Ia 
telephonie vocale "traditionnelle". A quelques mois de l'echeance du 1  er janvier 1998 qui marquera 
Ia liberalisation complete des telecommunications dans Ia grande majorite des pays de I' Union 
Europeenne, M. Karel Van Miert, le responsable de Ia politique de concurrence au sein de Ia 
Commission europeenne a charge ses services d'inviter toutes les parties interessees a  se 
prononcer sur le phenomene particulier de Ia telephonie sur Internet. 
A ce stade de !'analyse qu'ils ont menee, les services de Ia Commission estiment que Ia telephonie sur 
Internet ne tombe pas, a  proprement parler, sous Ia definition de "telephonie vocale". En clair. cela 
signifie que ces services offerts sur Internet ne doivent pas, au stade actuel, faire l'objet de procedures 
de licences individuelles ou d'autres obligations imposees pour pouvoir offrir sur le marche des services 
de telephonie vocale de base. En effet, actuellement Ia telephonie offerte sur le reseau Internet ne 
repond pas aux differents criteres retenus pour Ia definition de Ia telephonie vocale, a  savoir : 
•  les communications font l'objet d'une offre commerciale ; 
•  le service est fourni au public; 
•  le service est fourni au depart et a  destination de terminaux de commutation publique sur le reseau 
de telephonie fixe ; 
•  le service implique le transfert et Ia voix directs en temps reel. 
Pour l'avenir, cependant, il convient de definir, au niveau european, des regles:de jeu equitables qui 
mettent sur un pied d'egalite les operateurs traditionnels de telephonie vocale et les entreprises qui 
offrent de Ia telephonie sur Internet. La Commission n'entend cependant pas imposer. dans un secteur 
innovant, une quelconque "camisole de force" reglementaire : elle suggere au contraire un cadre 
juridique flexible qui puisse s·'adapter a  !'evolution technologique du secteur, tenant compte. en 
particulier, des aspects innovants des services de telephonie multimedia. 
Avant de finaliser sa politique quant a  Ia liberalisation totale des telecommunications au 1  er janvier 
1998, Ia Commission demande done a· toutes les parties interessees par l'aspect particulier de Ia 
telephonie sur Internet de se manifester formellement. La position de Ia Commission sera publiee tres 
prochainement au Journal Official (dans Ia serie C) et sur le site Web de Ia Commission 
(europa.eu.int). Tout commentaire devra intervenir dans un delai de deux mois apres Ia date de 
publication au Journal Officiel,aux adresses suivantes: 
•  par courrier normal : Commission Europeenne Direction gEmerale de Ia Concurrence (DG IV) 
Direction C Bureau 3/48 A  venue de Cortenbergh 150 8-1049 - Bruxelles 
•  par telecopie : au numero +32-2-296.98.19 
•  par courrier electronique: a  Christian.Hocepied@dg4.cec.be 
Ill  /92 IP/IJ/411  - 14/15/IJ 
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THE COMMISSION CLEARS THE BT-MCI MERGER SUBJECT TO 
FULL COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS SUBMITTED 
BY THE PARTIES 
The  European  Commission  has  decided  to  clear  the  merger  between  BT  (British 
Telecommunications  pic)  and MCI  (MCI  Communications  Corporation).  BT is  a  UK-based 
supplier of telecommunications services and equipment.  Its main services and products are 
local and long  distance  telephone  exchange  lines  to  homes  and businesses,  international 
telephone  calls  to  and  from  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  supply  of telecommunications 
equipment for customers' premises.  MCI is a US-based diversified communications company, 
offering consumers and businesses a portfolio of integrated services, including long distance, 
wireless,  local,  paging,  messaging,  Internet,  information services,  outsourcing and advanced 
global communications.  BT and MCI also operate jointly a venture known as Concert,  which 
supplies value-added and enhanced services to multi-national business customers. 
After investigation  the  Commission  has  concluded  that the  proposed  merger,  as  originally  notified, 
would have created or reinforced a dominant position in the markets for international voice telephony 
services on the UK-US route and for audioconferencing services in the UK.  However, the Commission 
has considered that the undertakings proposed by the parties during the proceedings are sufficient to 
address  the  competition  concerns  envisaged  in  the  above  mentioned  markets  and  has  therefore 
declared  the  merger  compatible  with  the  common  market  and  with  the  functioning  of  the  EEA 
Agreement subject to the condition of the parties' full compliance with proposed commitments. 
The Commission's inquiry suggested that, given the current capacity shortage on  existing international 
transmission  facilities  between  the  UK  and  the  US  as  well  as  the  parties'  significant  capacity 
entitlements, particularly on the UK end of these international facilities, the merger would have created 
or reinforced a dominant position in the market for international voice telephony services on the UK-US 
route.  In this respect a great deal of attention was paid to the parties' capacity entitlements on existing 
transatlantic submarine cables between the UK and the US because, according to responses obtained 
from  both  competitors and customers,  for a number of technical  reasons  satellite  does not currently 
provide a satisfactory substitute for cable in the supply of international voice telephony services at the 
required quality and performance standards.  As a result of the merger,  BT/MCI would be able to carry 
UK-US  traffic  over its  own  end-to-end  international  transmission  facilities,  thereby  internalising  the 
payments  (based  on  current accounting  rates  which  are  still  set  significantly  above  cost)  which  any 
telecoms operator has at present to make to a foreign correspondent carrier in  order to have outgoing 
international calls terminated in the destination country. 
At least in the short to medium term these cost advantages could not be easily achieved by the parties' 
existing competitors since in any event they would need BT's consent to a reconfiguration of their cable 
capacity holdings currently matched with BT's half circuits at the UK end in order for them to be able to 
replicate the merged entity's more  competitive  cost structure.  Furthermore,  the combination  of BT's 
and MCI's cable capacities would allow the merged entity to further restrict or control the opportunities 
forof  entry  byfaced  by  the  new  prospective  new  operators  which  have  been  recently  granted  an 
international facilities license in the UK. 
Ill  /93 The  impact  of  the  merger  on  the  UK  market  for  audioconferencing  services  was  also  carefully 
examined,  taking into account both the parties' very high combined market share (over 80°/o)  and the 
specific features of the market.  In this respect, the Commission's enquiry has shown that, despite· the 
relatively low investments necessary to set up an audioconferencing business, entry into this market on 
a sufficiently large scale might prove difficult.  This is mainly because market growth is to a major extent 
accounted  for by a  more  intensive  use· of the  service  by  established  customers  rather than  by  the 
customers' base becoming larger and the reputation and proven record of incumbents would be difficult 
to challenge,  as demonstrated by  both  BT's and  MCI's  increasing market shares over the last years. 
For these reasons the Commission has concluded that the merger was likely to create or reinforce a 
dominant position in the UK audioconferencing market. 
-~  Undertakings proposed by the parties 
In  order to  address  the  Commission's  competition  concerns,  the  parties  have  offered  the  following 
commitments  which will  be  monitored  by  the  Commission:  (i)  to  make  available to  new international 
facilities operators in the UK, without delay and at prices corresponding to BT's true cost of purchasing 
capacity from the cable consortium, all of their current and prospective overlapping capac.ity on the UK-
US  route  resulting  from  the  merger on  the  transatlantic  cable  TAT  12/13;  (ii)  to  sell  BT's  capacity 
currently leased to other operators on  the  UK-US  route  at their request and  on  the  same  terms  and 
conditions as illustrated above; (iii) to sell to other operators, at their request and without delay, Eastern 
end matched half circuits currently owned  by  BT  in  order for them to  be  able to  provide international 
voice telephony services on the UK-US route on an end-to-end basis; (iv) to arrange for the divestiture 
of MCI's audioconferencing business in the UK. 
In  view  of the  above  commitments  submitted  by  the  parties,  the  Commission  has  concluded  that, 
provided  these  undertakings  are  properly  discharged,  they  should  be  such  as  to  address  the 
competition concerns raised by the proposed merger. 
Ill  I 94 IP/91/462 - 29/5/1991 
Countdown to 1  Januarv 1998: Repon on implementation ol the EU 
telecommunications reuulatorv package 
On the basis of a proposal from Commissioners Martin BANGEMANN and Karel VAN MIERT, 
responsible for Telecommunications and Competition respectively, the European Commission today 
approved a report on the state of implementation by the Member States of the package of 
Community telecommunications regulation. With fullliberalisation of the 200 billion ECU telecoms 
market of the European Union set for 1 January 1998, the Commission wants to ensure that 
Member States are up to date in fulfilling their obligations under European Union (EU) law and the 
World Trade Organisation agreement on basic telecommunications services. The picture that 
emerges is broadly encouraging.-A significant number of Member States have either transposed the 
entire package or can be expected to have done so by end'1997. In a further substantial group of 
countries, the main principles will have been transposed, although the necessary secondary 
legislation may still need to be adopted. 
In assessing the state of implementation of the package, the Commission has taken account of the fact 
that Member States with less-developed networks or very small networks are entitled under the 
competition directives to request additional implementation periods for certain of the deadlines laid 
down for implementation, and indeed a number have done so. The Commission has already decided to 
grant such additional periods to Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg, and decisions are expected to be 
adopted shortly for Greece and Spain. 
The Commission's first priority,  in  line with the Treaty,  is to  ensure the full  and correct transposition of 
the EU  rules into national Jaw,  and its assessment at this stage is based closely on the extent to which 
t.his  has been done in  the Member States. Since certain of the deadlines under the package have not 
yet passed, this process will continue until end 1997, and beyond for Member States granted additional 
implementation periods.  The  next step  will  be  to  ensure that the  measures transposed  are  correctly 
applied,  implying  a shift of focus  to  the  market and  the  way  it operates.  The  Commission  has  also 
identified  a  number  of  regulatory  issues  which  are  not  part  of  the  EU  package,  such  as  carrier 
selection, number portability and unbundled access to the local loop, but which provide an indication of 
progress towards a fully-liberalised market. Evidence of the regulation of these issues in some Member 
States suggests that liberalisation is well advanced in those markets. 
In summary, the report shows that there has been very positive progress in the task of transposing the 
complex body of regulation making up the telecoms legislative package into national law. A 
considerable further effort lies ahead, however, in ensuring that application of the resulting national 
rules is effective in the market place. In this respect the Commission has signalled its intention of 
monitoring the situation pro-actively to ensure access to markets while safeguarding the quality and 
availability of services to the consumer. 
Commissioners BANGEMANN and VAN MIERT will present the report at the Council of Ministers of 
Telecommunications in Luxembourg on 27 June 1997. 
Ill  I 95 Background 
The process of regulating for liberalisation was completed with the adoption in 1996 of a Directive 
laying down 1 January 1998 as the date for the introduction of competition in the provision of voice 
telephony and infrastructure. The harmonisation framework aims at creating a European market based 
on common principles for access to networks and services, a common regulatory environment and 
harmonised standards for services and technologies. The Council and European Parliament are in the 
process of putting the finishing touches to this part of the package with rules on the interconnection of 
operators' networks and access to networks by service providers, and rules on licensing designed to 
encourage the entry into the market of operators and service providers. This process will be completed 
with rules on data protection and privacy. 
The obligation on the Member States to liberalise their markets is reinforced by the disciplines imposed 
under the WTO agreement on basic telecoms, which the Member States signed up to on 15 February 
this  year.  Under the agreement,  GATS general obligations will  apply to the  supply of all  public and 
private telecommunications services,  and Member States will  be  subject to  WTO dispute settlement 
rules and procedures. 
Ill  /96 IP/IJ/461  - 21/5niiJ 
TIWirds IIIIlS lllrkalllr Mabile Muld·llldil CIIIIIUniCIUDnS: Challenges 
and cbaices altha nextueneralian oltechnalan  . 
On the basis of a proposal of Commissioner Martin BANGEMANN, the European Commission today 
adopted a Communication on the issues affecting further development of mobile and wireless 
communication in Europe. Following the world-wide successes of European mobile technologies 
and services, mainly based on the GSM-Standard, the opportunities offered by competitive mobile 
services to activities in the whole economy, and the important employment this has created in 
Europe, the Commission now solicits a debate on the development towards the new generation of 
technology. The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), which encompasses both 
terrestrial and satellite components, will be introduced early in the next century. Will it be a new 
single technology, or a number of interoperable solutions based on different technologies? What 
should be the respective roles of private sector and public authorities in the transition towards 
UMTS? These are some of the questions raised by the Commission today. 
The Communication examines the present state of the mobile services sector and reviews tentatively 
identified developments trends. The mobile communications sector has come to cross-roads where 
answers to key strategic questions, both in the industrial domain as well as in the regulatory domain, 
need to be found urgently. This is argued against the general background of ensuring that user 
demand is satisfied whilst the competitiveness of the European telecommunications industry needs to 
be preserved. 
The Communication highlights the world-wide success of the GSM-family (GSM, DECT, DCS1800, 
DCS-1900) with now 187 GSM-networks in operation in 103 countries worldwide and a total subscriber 
base of about 33 million users; and the importance of this sector for the well-being of Europe's 
telecommunications industry and indeed its economy as a whole. 
However, the sector faces today an  entirely different environment since the inception of GSM  in  the 
mid-1980's with competition at all levels in the value chain and on a global scale as well as a shift of 
market paradigm from  niche to  mass  market.  Market  players  recognise  the  importance  of wireless 
technologies including the wireless local loop for opening up new market segments and thus creating a 
new wave of economic activity and bringing increased competition in the local loop. Another trend is the 
fast evolution of mobile cellular services towards covering the "Mobile Internet'' and other mobile multi-
media services. 
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Conlirence de presse coniointe des Commissaires Marlin BAIIIE•IIN at 
Karel VIII-MIEBT, 21 mai 1191 
Je vous propose done - aussi pour gagner du temps pour vous et les deux Commissaires - de donner 
tout de suite Ia parole aM. Bangemann et par Ia suite aM. Van Miert. Vous savez que nous allons 
parler des telecommunications et je vous renvoie aux deux notes de pre  sse qui ant ete diffusees en 
donnant tout de suite Ia parole a M.  Bangemann et en demandant a ceux qui seraient un peu mains 
interesses de vouloir quitter Ia salle ou de faire un peu mains de bruit. Merci beaucoup. 
M.  Bangemann Mesdames et Messieurs, aujourd'hui Karel Van Miert et moi aimerions vous presenter 
des documents que nous avons rediges ensemble et qui refletent l'etat actuel de Ia  transposition de 
notre legislation sur les telecommunications. C'est done presque une sorte de bilan des mesures que 
les Etats Membres ant appliquees et des consequences que ceci applique pour l'ouverture du marche 
des telecommunications.  Alors evidemment il  s'agit d'un instantane.  Les  chases changent de jour en 
jour, mais cet instantane et toute de meme utile puisque ceci nous aide a faire bien comprendre aux 
Etats Membres qu'il est extremement important que cette legislation  soit appliquee,  puis  d'autre part 
cet instantane est aussi necessaire pour faire en  sorte que le  Parlement et les  Etats  Membres aient 
une base de discussion et puis aussi parce que sur le plan interne nous nous preparons, et Ia,  M.  Karel 
Van Miert entrera dans le detail, nous nous preparons disais-je a controler exactement Ia situation pour 
eviter  que  le  1er janvier de  l'annee  prochaine  cette  liberalisation  ne  puisse  pas  avoir  lieu.  Nous 
aimerions  que  cette  liberalisation  du  marche  soit  en  realite  l'annee  prochaine.  a  part  quelques 
exceptions que certains Etats Membres souhaitent se reserver. Voila l'idee du document et les details 
vont maintenant etre  abordes  par M.  Karel  Van  Miert.  Ensuite je vous  dirais  encore  deux mots  de 
I'UMTS, mais on peut attendre !'intervention de M. Van Miert. 
M. Van Miert Mesdames et Messieurs, vous savez que Ia Commission, depuis plusieurs annees deja, a 
mis en place !'ensemble de Ia legislation necessaire et Ia mesure necessaire pour qu'a partir du 1er 
janvier de l'annee prochaine effectivement le marche du service des telecommunications et l'acces aux 
infrastructures sera completement liberalise, sauf pour quelques Etats Membres qui ant obtenu des 
delais supplementaires. II s'agit done de cinq pays, les quatre pays de cohesion et le Luxembourg, 
mais des delais plus courts que prevu a l'epoque parce que vous vous rappelez, il y avait en principe 
une periode supplementaire de cinq ans. Dans trois cas nous avons deja specifie ces delais, dans 
deux autres cela sera le cas rapidement, c'est-a-dire dans quelques semaines. Done les deux cas qui 
restent a regler c'est Ia Grace et I'Espagne, mais en ce qui concerne I'Espagne, vous le savez, il y a un 
accord avec le gouvernement au courant de l'annee prochaine. Effectivement le marche espagnol sera 
aussi pleinement liberalise.  · 
Maintenant  je  voudrais  rapidement  parcourir  differents  elements  de  ce  dispositif  en  constatant 
globalement qu'un progres satisfaisant a ete accompli.  Done globalement, je pense que sachant que 
normalement  il  y  a  toujours  des  delais  et  meme  des  retards  dans  !'introduction  des  principes 
communautaires ou Ia legislation communautaire dans les droits nationales. Done globalement on peut 
constater que Ia majorite des Etats Membres est bien avancee. Certains meme au-dela des delais qui 
avaient  ete  fixes.  Done  un  constat  global:  !'evolution  est  assez  satisfaisante,  mais  il  y  a  des 
preoccupations au  sujet de certains  Etats Membres et il  y a aussi des preoccupations par rapport a 
certains elements des dispositifs,  par example en ce  qui concerne les accords d'inter-connection,  ce 
qui  est absolument crucial,  il  y a encore  des  difficultes dans  certains  Etats  Membres  au  encore  on 
manque de precision en Ia matiere. Et tout le monde sait que justement les accords d'inter-connection 
sont cruciaux pour que le marche fonctionne.  Pour que Ia  liberalisation  ait effectivement lieu  sur le 
terrain.  II conviendra de rappeler aussi que notamment un Etat Membre n'a toujours pas liberalise les 
infrastrucutres alternatives. Et cala devrait etre fait depuis le 1  er juillet de l'annee derniere deja.  En ce 
qui conceme par exemple Ia mise en place de Ia legislation necessaire pour lancer les procedures pour 
accorder des licences, cela devrait etre fait accompli au debut de cette annee.  On constate que dans 
uncertain nombre de pays il y a du retard. 
Ill  /99 Puis on devrait pouvoir commencer Ia procedure pour accorder concretement les licences au plus tard 
a partir du  1  er juillet de cette an nee.  La  aussi,  il  y a encore des points d'interrogation dans certains 
Etats  Membres  s'ils  seront  prets  pour  qu'effectivement  les  compagnies  qui  sont  censees  faire  Ia 
concurrence a partir du 1er janvier de l'annee prochaine sachent rapidement s'ils auront une licence ou 
pas.  Done  il  ne  reste  finalement  plus  que  sept  mois  pour  mettre  ya  au  point,  pour  choisir  les 
concurrents et comme tout le monde sait les concurrents qui sont choisis ont tout de meme besoin d'un 
minimum de temps pour s'organiser pour avoir acces au marche. 
Done il y ace genre de preoccupation condition d'inter-connection, je l'ai deja dit, Ia fayon d'accorder 
les licences. II y a aussi des problemas en ce qui concerne les numeros telephoniques disponibles, 
parce que c'est une chose de donner une licence, une.autre chose encore d'avoir un accord sur !'inter-
connection. Puis il faut tout de meme qu'en pratique cela puisse fonctionner. C'est-a-dire que des 
numeras sont disponibles sans discrimination pour I' ensemble des concurrents. Done Ia aussi nous 
avons constate, et notamment dans ce creneau ou dans ce domaine que a peu pres Ia moitie des 
Etats membres s'est organisee en consequence et que dans six ou sept pays en ce qui concerne Ia 
numerotation il y a encore des problemas a resoudre et rapidement, sinon sur le terrain il y aura des 
desequilibres et il n'y aura pas une concurrence saine et balancee. 
Voila, Mesdames et Messieurs, encore un demier mot, comme Martin I' a deja indique, nous ne 
sommes organises a l'interieur de Ia Commission les deux services, le service de Martinet le mien, de 
fayon telle que nous pouvons reagir ad hoc tres rapidement tant que les problemas continuant a se 
faire jour. Quand certains gouvernements ne sont pas en mesure ou ne bougent pas assez rapidement 
pour mettre en place des regimes ou les mesures telles que convenues. Aussi parce que nous nous 
attendons a une serie de plaintes. II yen a deja. J'ai eu uncertain nombre de plaintes, je vous rappelle 
par example les plaintes qu'on a eues en Allemagne vis-a-vis des reductions tres considerables des 
tar~fs par "Deutsche Telekom" et en agissant ainsi voulait en quelque sorte rendre Ia vie impossible aux 
concurrents potentials. Done il y a deja une serie de plaintes qu'on doit gerer, mais on s'attend ace 
qu'il y en aura encore davantage dans les mois qui viennent. Done voila pourquoi nous nous sommes 
organises pour pouvoir faire ya tres rapidement, done d'ecourter, de reduire les delais a l'interieur de Ia 
maison, si bien que les deux services en collaboration avec le Service Juridique puissant agir de fayon 
forte, efficace et rapide. 
Voila en ce qui me concerne. Pour le reste nous referons le point, Martinet moi, d'ici uncertain temps, 
en esperant que les pays qui ont pris un certain retard vont mettre les bouchees doubles. II y a des 
indications que cela sera le cas et que Ia prochaine fois nous pourrons vous donner un bulletin ou vous 
pourrez vous rendre compte de fayon plus satisfaisante encore que ce soit le cas aujourd'hui. Merci. 
Merci beaucoup. 
Ill  /100 IP/IJ/501  - 11/08/IJ  ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
TIIICIIIIIberalisadan In Spain : 
Callmisslon accepts a shan addldanal perlad 
The European Commission has today, on a proposal by  Mr  Karel Van Miert, responsible for 
competition policy, granted a short  additional period until the 30 November 1998, for the.  · 
complete liberalisation of  voice telephony and of  public telecoms networks in Spain. No 
additional period of  implementation is requested concerning alternative networks, which are 
in principle already liberalised in Spain. 
The main provisions of this decision are as follows: 
•  the licence procedures for public voice telephony and for the provision of universal service have to 
be communicated to the Commission - as a draft - before 1 January 1998, and then published 
before 1 August 1998 ; 
•  the licences requested have to be actually granted on 1 December 1998 ; 
•  as provided under a directive of 1990 1 , as of 1 July 1996, all the restrictions on the supply of 
already -iiberalised services are lifted on networks established by the suppliers of services 
themselves, on third parties' infrastructures and on shared networks. 
Moreover, the Spanish government has to Inform the Commission of the status of the following 
timetable: 
•  during 1997, under certain conditions, cable operators are allowed to provide voice telephony ; 
•  before the end of 1997, a new telecommunications law (Ley General de Telecomunicaciones) has 
to implement the main provisions of European legislation for this sector ; 
•  at the beginning of January 1998, a third licence to supply public voice telephony will be granted, in 
addition to the second licence granted in 1996 ; 
•  before the end of July 1998, all the laws and regulations necessary for liberalisation have to be 
implemented. 
The derogation decided for Spain is entirely compatible with the WTO agreement on basic 
telecommunications reached on 15 February 1997. It was in fact in parallel to these negotiations, in 
November 1996, that the minister Arias Salgado and Mr Van Miert agreed to such an eleven-month 
additional period. This has enabled the European Union to improve its offer in Geneva substantially, 
and thus to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement at world level. This reduced request, among other 
conditions, also enabled the Commission to agree to the participation of Telefonica, the dominant 
Spanish operator, in the international alliances Unisource and Uniworld. 
This decision is also consistent with the decisions taken on other requests for derogation  . 
.  BACKGROUND 
International alliances In addition to Telefonica, Unisource includes the Dutch, Swedish and Swiss 
dominant operators. Uniworld includes Unisource's partners, plus AT&T (US). (The participation of 
Telefonica to Unisource and Uniworld has meanwhile been put into question by the parties, for 
unrelated reasons). 
Ill  /101 The other requests for exemptions. Five Member States- meet the conditions for a derogation to the 1 
January 1998 deadline for complete liberalisation of their telecommunication sector; they indeed asked 
for additional periods of implementation. The Commission has granted such additional periods of 
implementation to Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg, and now also to Spain. A decision on Greece will 
be taken later.  · 
The following table allows a comparison of the four cases of derogation already handled. 
MeniJerState  0  erogation reQJested  Directive  Asked  Justified 
Ireland  -voice telephony lnetv..orks  1.1 .1998  1.1 .2000  1.1.2000 
-al em ative infrastructures  1.7.1996  1.7.1999  1.7.1997 
Portugal  -voice telephony In etv..orks  1.1.1998  1.1 .2000  1.1.2000 
-alemative infrastructures  1.7.1996  1.7.1999  1.7.1997 
Luxembourg  -voice telephony lnetv..orks  1.1.1998  1.1 .2000  1.7.1998 
-al em ative infrastructures  1.7.1996  1  .7:1998  1.1 .1997 
Spain  -voice telephony lnetv..otks  1.1.1998  30.11.1998  30. '1'1.1998 
111/102 IP/9J/144,14/J/9J 
COMMISSION AUTHORISES A 
JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN 
CAllE & WIRElESS AND MAERSI DATA 
The Commission has authorised a proposed concentration by which the undertakings Cable and 
Wireless pic and Maersk Data A/S -a member of the Danish A. P.  Meller Group- will acquire joint 
control of a newly-created company: Cable&  Wireless Nautec Limited ("Nautec"). 
Cable & Wireless and Maersk Data will establish Nautec as a 50/50 owned joint venture in the market 
for the supply of telecommunications and IT goods and services to the container transportation market. 
Managed global network and IT services to the maritime container transportation sector is a new and 
developing activity. These type of services are marketable at international level. 
The Commission has taken into account in clearing the present transaction the fragmented character of 
the market and the existence of sufficient potential competition. 
111/103 IP/91ffl5, 5/9/91 
EU presses us further to change satellites rules 
The European Commission has warned the United States today that it risks violating its world 
trading obligations on satellite-based services by the way it is planning to put the recent WTO basic 
telecommunications agreement into US law on satellites. The EU is concerned that the draft US 
rules could enable the US to deny access for foreign operators to sell direct-to-home services and 
digital satellite services in the US. Furthermore, the draft rules could enable the US to withhold 
satellite licences to foreign operators because they pose an ill-defined threat to the public interest or 
to commercial competitors in the US. The EU is asking the US to change the rules, and reserves its 
right to challenge them under the WTO. The warning follows a broader complaint made last month 
about the way the US was implementing its general WTO obligations for other telecommunications 
services. 
On 16 July the US Federal Communication Commission (FCC) issued a Notice of Proposed Rule-
Making (NPRM) on international satellite services. This draft regulation aims to implement the 
commitments on satellite-based services made by the US under the Basic Telecoms deal reached in 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on February 15 this year. 
The Commission and EU member states are concerned about the compatibility of the draft rules with 
the WTO, in particular with the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). They have presented 
comments to the US authorities today requesting them to reconsider their proposal. The EU  and its 
member states have reserved their rights to challenge those rules under the WTO. 
The EU has the following two major concerns about the US proposal: 
The maintenance of an Effective Competitive Opportunities test of reciprocal nature for one way 
satellite transmission of Direct to Home, Digital Broadcast Services and Digital Audio Services. 
The maintenance of broad and unclear concepts such as 'public interest' factors in determining whether 
to grant or deny applications for licences and 'very high risk to competition' as a j4stification for refusing 
a licence. 
111/104 IP/91/859, ano/91 
liberalisalion ol telecom•unicauons : 
the Commission reviews the situadon a  few manlhs 
belarellll deadline If  1  Januanr 1998. 
Three months before full liberalisation of the European Union telecommunications market, scheduled 
for 1 January 1998, the Commission is encouraged by the situation. A large number of Member States 
have transposed the full regulatory framework or will have done so by the end of 1997, but the national 
legislation of other Member States is still deficient. The Commission considers this situation 
unacceptable and is instituting legal proceedings against the Member States concerned. These are the 
principal conclusions of a new report which Mr Martin Bangemann and Mr Karel van Miert presented to 
their colleagues on 8 October and which is a "snapshot" of the situation on 15 September 1997. The 
Commission intends to present an updated report early in 1998, on the basis of its next bilateral 
contacts with Member States. 
On the whole, the Commission considers the progress made with the transposition of legislation to be 
encouraging. However, a number of reports have been sent to the Commission concerning national 
measures which exactly transpose Community law but are not properly applied in practice, for example 
the long delays before licences are granted, prohibitive licence fees and interconnection charges 
entailing anti-competitive price reductions. 
A number of official and unofficial complaints have been made in this connection. In certain cases. the 
complaints have provided a basis for.legal proceedings.  ' 
Almost all the Member States (nine out of ten) required to withdraw special and exclusive rights over 
the provision of voice telephony by 1 January 1998 have adopted the necessary measures. In Belgium, 
draft measures are in hand. Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg have been granted a 
derogation regarding the date. Four Member States have abolished special and exclusive rights in 
advance of the deadline. 
The principal requirements relating to the granting of licences have been transposed by five Member 
States in advance of the end-of-year deadline. All other Member States have already adopted certain 
provisions (Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal), or have draft measures in hand 
(Belgium, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands). 
Under the Full Competition Directive, telecommunications organisations were required to publish their 
terms and conditions for interconnection by 1 July 1997. The Directive requires national legislative 
authorities to ensure that this publication take place. It is extremely important to ensure the necessary 
transparency for new market entrants, particularly with regard to the price of interconnection. which will 
in turn have an effect on investment. The incumbents in eight Member States have already published 
their terms and conditions; the incumbent's tariffs (but not the full terms and conditions) have been 
published in a further Member State (Portugal). Publication has not been carried out in three Member 
States (Germany, Greece, Sweden), whilst draft measures are in hand in Denmark, Ireland and 
Luxembourg. 
An equally important guarantee in the framework of the Full Competition Directive is the obligation for 
telecommunications organisations to adopt methods of cost accounting allowing them to monitor the 
relationship between interconnection tariffs and costs. Seven Member States have established 
accounting systems, whilst three others have no plans to issue provisions in this connection {Greece, 
Luxembourg, Portugal). 
In a liberalised environment, it is clearly important that sufficient numbers are available to be allocated 
to all the players on the market. Action has been taken in almost all Member States to ensure such 
availability. 
III/I  05 In twelve Member States, tariff rebalancing will have been carried out by 1 January 1998, or plans have 
been drawn up for phasing out unbalanced tariffs after that date. Three Member States will need to 
take remedial action to compensate for the lack of provisions (Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands). 
With regard to the establishment of National Regulatory Authorities independent of the incumbent 
operator and endowed with appropriate powers, virtually all the necessary transposition measures have 
been taken. 
III/I 06 111/81/418,13/10/81 
············································································································································································································································································ 
Conference de presse conjointe des Commissaires Martin 
BANGEMANN et Karel VAN MIERT du 8 octobre 1997. 
J.  Kubosch: 
We have two points which Mr Bangemann and Mr Van Miert are going to present. One is the 
communication on digital signature and encryption. As far as this subject is concerned we'll have a 
technical briefing, because it is a very technical matter. So a technical briefing for specialists, who are 
interested in the technical details. It will take place after the press conference of the two 
Commissioners. And the second point is the communication on the transposition of our legislation for 
telecommunications. Herr Bangemann kann mit der Datensicherheit anfal')gen. 
Mr M. Bangemann: 
Sie wissen aile,  da~  wir schon seit einigen Monaten auf das Problem der Datensicherheit aufmerksam 
gemacht haben in verschieden Stellungnahmen und wir haben das auch mit unseren Partnern 
diskutiert. Die Konferenz in Bonn, die wir vor wenigen Monaten organisiert haben, hat sich anderthalb 
Tage damit beschaftigt, da~  es bei der Einfuhrung des 'electronic commerce', im besonderen, aber bei 
der Nutzung vom Internet im Allgemeinen Unsicherheiten gibt, die die Nutzung beeintrachtigen konnen. 
Wir wollen ja, wie wir schon in unserer Mitteilung zu der Bedeutung von electronic commerce gesagt 
haben, diese Form der Nutzung elektronischer Datennetze als eine Art, Trager nutzen, denn wenn eine 
solche lnfrastruktur uber electronic commerce finanziert wird, kann man sie auch fur andere Zwecke 
nutzen, die vielleicht nicht so profitabel sind wie electronic commerce. Also wir haben ein doppeltes 
Interesse daran, daB es keine Hindernisse fur die Nutzung von Internet, insbesondere fur electronic 
commerce gibt, einmal wei  I das eine wichtige AppHkation ist und wei  I sie erlauben wurde, weitere 
Applikationen sozusagen obendrauf zu setzen, die dann nicht die lnfrastrukturkosten tragen mussen. 
Herr Kubosch hat das schon gesagt, und die technischen Fragen versteht glaub ich jedenfalls hier 
oben an dem Tisch, wenn ich das so sagen dart niemand, aber Sie konnen nachher Fragen dazu 
stellen wie das technisch gemacht wird. 
Politisch ist die Signatur weniger umstritten als die encryption. Ober die Bedeutung einer sol chen 
elektronischen Signatur sind sich aile im Klaren: hier mussen wir bestimmte Rechtsvorschriften andern 
der Mitgliedslander, oder die Mitgliedslander auffordem sie zu andern, beispielsweise bestimmte 
Formerfordernisse "schriftlich", die mussen angepallt werden an diese Moglichkeit einer elektronischen 
Unterschrift. Aber das ist politisch eigentlich nicht umstritten. 
Wesentlich umstrittener ist die Frage der encryption, also der Verschlusselung. Es gibt Techniken, mit 
denen man Botschaften verschlusseln kann und zwar in einem Umfang daB es, jedenfalls nach dem 
heutigen Stand, fast ausgeschlossen werden kann, daB sie ohne Mithilfe dessen, der verschlusselt hat, 
wieder entschlusselt werden konnen. Sie konnen unschwer erkennen; daB das naturlich fOr bestimtrtte 
Mitteilungen, gerade auch geschaftlicher Art, sehr wichtig ist, denn wenn man solche geschaftlichen 
Mitteilungen uber das Internet abwickelt und man mull sich mit der Gefahr auseinandersetzen, daB sie 
verandert werden konnten, oder daB sie gespeichert werden konnen, daB Daten verletzt werden, dann 
werden sich viele Leute gehindert sehen, das Internet zur Obermittlung solcher Mitteilungen zu nutzen. 
Deswegen gibt es ein klares Interesse der privaten und auch der Wirtschaftsteilnehmer daran, daB 
ihnen ein wirkungsvolles Verschlusselungsverfahren zur Verfugung steht. 
Auf der anderen Seite gibt es naturlich die Moglichkeit, da~  solche Verschlusselungstechnologien auch 
illegal genutzt werden: wenn man z. B.  Nachrichten innerhalb der organisierten Kriminalitat verbreiten 
will, oder uberhaupt illegale Nachrichten verbreiten will, kann man naturlich diese 
Verschlusselungstechnologien benutzen und so die Sicherheitskrafte, die Polizei, davon ausschlieBen 
Kenntnis von solchen Mitteilungen zu bekommen. Das kann naturlich auch in schwerwiegenden Fallen 
· die innere Sicherheit von Mitgliedslandern berl.ihren. Das geht so weit,  da~ die Sicherheitsdienste der 
Mitgliedslander ein Interesse daran haben, daB das nicht von Spionen oder anderen vielleicht noch 
schwerwiegenderen Kriminellen genutzt wird.  Das ist ein klarer lnteressengegensatz. 
111/107 Nun gibt es einen ersten Annaherungsweg urn diesen lnteressengegensatz zu losen, den haben wir 
auch in Bonn lang diskutiert, namlich die technische Unmoglichkeit Kriminelle davon abzuhalten eine 
seiche Verschlusselung zu nutzen. Das ist technisch nicht moglich. Sie konnen einen Kriminellen nicht 
daran hindern diese modernen Technologien zu nutzen, urn sich und seine Mitteilungen zu schutzen 
vor einem polizeilichen Zugriff. Da das so ist, ist es relativ witzlos, wenn ich das so burschikos sagen 
kann, Privaten oder legalen Nutzern des Internet besondere Verschlusselungsformen zu verbieten. 
Denn das wurde nur dazu fuhren, daB die legale Obermittlung von Nachrichten erschwert wird oder 
often wird fur irgendwelche Zugriffe anderer, wahrend die Kriminellen in jedem Fall seiche 
Verschlusselungstechnologien benutzen werden. Das heiBt also, wie haufig beim Internet, und das ist 
ein interessantes Faktum, die technischen Moglichkeiten des Internet beschranken, faktisch, den 
Eingriff im Sinne der Aufrechterhaltung von legalen Ordnungsstrukturen. 
Dennoch, wir wollen seiche lnteressen nicht einfach abweisen, das ware ja auch nicht in Ordnung, 
wenn wir sagen wOrden das geht uns nichts an, ob die Mitgliedslander fur ihre innere Sicherheit sorgen 
wollen. Wir schlagen vor eine Art von Abwagung vorzunehmen, wann was vorgeschrieben werden 
sollte, wobei wir in diesem Punkt uns auch sehr viel von der internationalen Diskussion versprechen. 
lch habe ja schon in Bonn, zusammen mit dem deutschen Wirtschaftsminister, diese Diskussion 
innerhalb der europaischen Union und daruber hinaus begonnen. 29 Minister haben die Bonner 
Erklarung unterzeichnet und ich habe vor kurzem in Genf und auch wiederholt danach den Vorschlag 
gemacht, an einer internationalen Charta zu arbeiten. 
Wir waren jetzt hier bei der Konferenz in Brussel Ober weltweite Standardisierung zusammen mit Herrn 
Magaziner, der Berater in diesen Fragen des amerikanischen Prasidenten ist. Der hat dart erklart, er 
finde diesen Vorschlag sehr gut und die USA sind bereit da mitzuarbeiten. lch war gestern und 
vorgestern in Moskau, zur ersten Tagung des ersten russischen Round Table of _Industrialists und dart 
hat auch Herr Urinson, der russische Wirtschaftsminister, erklart, daB er diesen Vorschlag interessant 
findet und daf3 auch die Russen bereit sind daran mitzuarbeiten, so eine internationale Charta zu 
begrunden und zu verabschieden. Sie sehen also, daB wenn sich international eine Losung findet. sie 
vermutlich nicht ganz dem sehr strikten amerikanischen Standpunkt entsprechen wird, der in dieser 
Frage die Hinterlegung von Schlusseln verlangt. Das heiBt, es muB bei einer amerikanischen Behorde 
ein Schlussel hinterlegt werden, mit dessen Hilfe man jede Verschlusselung wieder aufschlusseln kann. 
Das bedeutet praktisch, daB die amerikanischen Sicherheitsorgane, also FBI im besonderen, jederzeit 
die Moglichkeit haben in seiche Mitteilungen hinein zu gehen. Das hat Obrigens schon dazu gefuhrt, 
daB eine amerikanische Firma ein seiches amerikanisches System an europaische Banken nicht 
verkaufen konnte, weil sie nicht garantieren konnte, daB das FBI mitliest, und wer mochte das schon. In 
sofern sitzen wir, glaube ich, in einer ziemlich guten Position, und wir hoffen, daB wir jetzt mit unseren 
Mitgliedslandern sehr schnell zu den notwendigen rechtlichen Schritten gelangen konnen. 
Antwort auf Frage an Herrn Bangemann 
(  ... Kommissar Van Miert  ... ) 
Ja, ich mochte doch noch anfugen, daf3 ich mit dem Dokument sehr einverstanden bin.  Nicht daf\ der 
lndruck entsteht, als ob wir jetzt in dieser Frage unterschiedlicher Meinung sind. Ganz im Gegenteil. 
eines der wichtigsten Erfordernisse fur ein Unternehmen oder mehrere Unternehmen, die sich 
zusammenschlief\en wollen oder in anderer Form zusammenarbeiten wollen, ist naturlich, Klarheit von 
Anfang an zu haben uber die Bedingungen, die Ihnen auferlegt werden. Das ist deswegen schon sehr 
wichtig, weil haufig in der Zeit, in der diese Zusammenarbeit oder dieser Zusammenschluf\ sich 
realisiert, auch Auflagen erfullt warden mussen, die von der Kommission beschlossen werden. Das 
macht die Sache manchmal sehr kompliziert, wenn man nicht genau weir1 in welcher Richtung man sich 
entwickeln kann. Dann konnen seiche Auflagen so schwerwiegend sein, daf\ man praktisch gar nicht 
vorankommt und das dann hinterher aile nur einen Schaden davon haben. lnsofern ist die grof\ere 
Transparenz sehr zu begrupen, und wie Karel Van Miert mit Recht gesagt hat, ist es ja keine anderung 
unserer Politik, sondern es fapt das zusammen, was sich bisher als Tendenz ergeben hat. Aber da dart 
ich eine eigene Bemerkung hinzufOgen; und in dem Fall der Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie sind  wir ja 
Ober diese Auwirkung auch einig. Es ist ganz klar, wir haben in der Union in den vergangenen Jahren 
eine klare Tendenz gehabt, daf3 der relevante Markt mehr und mehr der Binnenmarkt geworden ist. 
Wenn man einen Binnenmarkt schafft und die Unternehmen sich darauf einstellen, dann ist es ja ein 
111/108 bipchen unlogisch, wenn man bei Wettbewerbsentscheidungen sich nicht auf die  sen Markt bezieht, der 
ja nicht nur unser politisches Ziel ist, sondern auch mehr und mehr Realitat wird. Und das gilt 
mindestens in bestimmten lndustriesektoren auch fur den globalen Markt. Es ware doch gerade zu 
abenteuerlich anzunehmen, dap der Markt fur Luft- und Raumfahrt nicht in der Tendenz, vielleicht 
abgesehen von gewissen wirklichen Ausnahmen, in der Tendenz .ein globaler Markt ist. Das heipt; es 
gibt zusatzlich zu dem was in dem Dokument steht, einen klaren Entwicklungsprozep, den man we  iter 
im Auge behalten mup. 
111/109 IP/91/932, 30/10/91 
Commission approves,  under conditions,  the creation of two 
telecommunications alliances,  Unisource and  Uniworld 
The European Commission has approved, the creation of the two telecommunications alliances 
Unisource and Uniworld. Unisource is composed of Telia of Sweden, PTT Telecom of the 
Netherlands and Swiss Telecom. Uniworld is a joint venture formed between Unisource and the US 
carrier AT&T. The Commission has granted the two alliances a derogation from competition rules 
until the year 2001, subject to changes to the agreements and conditions imposed on the parties. 
These conditions include provisions to secure fair and non-discriminative behaviour by the parent 
companies. Following its investigations of the alliances, the Commission concluded that the existing 
dominant positions of the three Unisource shareholders on many of their home markets will not be 
strengthened. 
The conditions attached to the Unisource agreements include undertakings to prevent discrimination by 
the parent companies in respect of leased lines and interconnection, to prevent the misuse of 
confidential information, to prevent cross subsidies between Unisource and its parent companies and 
the prevention of tying or bundling of services. In addition, the Commission has confirmed with the 
governments of Sweden and the Netherlands the implementation of the EU's telecommunications 
liberalisation programme and in the case of Switzerland, the Swiss Government has confirmed inter alia 
the liberalisation of telecommunications by 1 January 1998. 
Similar undertakings were made by the parties in respect of the Uniworld transaction on non-
discrimination, no misuse of confidential information and the prevention of cross subsidisation and tying 
of services. In addition, AT&T indicated to the Commission that for traffic sent as part of the bilateral 
correspondent regime, it will offer European telecommunications operators cost based accounting rates 
that would be no higher than the lowest accounting rate established between AT&T and any Unisource 
shareholder. 
The inclusion of Spanish operator Telef6nica in the alliance is not covered by these decisions, as 
Telef6nica has since announced its withdrawal from the alliance. Similarly, the decision does not cover 
any entry by STET of Italy into an alliance with the two joint ventures, a possible development which 
has recently been announced. 
Unisource has activities in carrier services, mobile telephony and calling cards, satellite services and 
corporate telecommunications (both data and voice). These are carried out through operating 
subsidiaries. Approval of the exclusive distribution arrangements of the activities of Unisource Business 
Networks, Unisource Voice Services and Unisource Satellite Services is also covered by the decision. 
The exemption for the two alliances will last for five years from the date of the liberalisation of 
alternative networks on 1 July 1996. It will therefore be valid until 30 June 2001. 
The present approval follows the clearance of the previous alliances between BT and MCI (Concert) 
and France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and Sprint (Atlas/GiobaiOne). The decision comes two 
months before the fullliberalisation of telecommunications across most of Europe on 1 January 1998. 
111/110 IP/91/953, 5/11/91 
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Mr Karel Van Mien comments the stateol plav olthe Kirch/Benelsmann tile 
On November, 4,  1997, Commissioner Karel Van Miert received, at their request, representatives of 
Kirch, Bertelsmann and Deutsche Telekom . The purpose of these meetings was to discuss the 
common plans of these companies in the field of digital television in Germany. According to these 
plans, Bertelsmann and Kirch intend to merge their digital TV activity. Beta research, the company 
providing the decoder infrastructure technology (the existing Kirch d-box) is intended to be jointly 
controlled by Bertelsmann, Kirch and Deutsche Telekom. On this basis, Deutsche Telekom is going 
to provide the new Kirch-Bertelsmann merged entity with a technical platform for the cable network. 
According to recent press reports in Germany, Bertelsmann and Kirch would have started to broadcast 
their respective digital TV programs Premiere and DF1. They also would have agreed with ARD and 
Deutsche Telekom to use Kirch's d-box. 
No formal notification has been filed with the Commission as yet. Such notification is required by the 
merger Regulation. The Commission can only start dealing with the case once it is provided with a 
complete notification. 
Mr Van Miert took the opportunity of these meetings to recall a basic principle of the Merger Regulation. 
i.e. that no merger can be put into force, unless the Commission gives its formal approval. He therefore 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that apparently part of the operation is already being 
implemented. The Commissioner announced that he requested his services to investigate further this 
question and collect the information necessary in view of possible action to be taken by the 
Commission for a full assessment of this matter. Should it be established that the parties have violated 
the suspensive effect of the Merger Regulation, Mr Van Miert made it clear that the parties would be 
well advised to stop such a violation immediately, otherwise the Commission could impose fines of up 
to 1  0 °/o  of the parties' aggregate turnover. 
Ill/Ill IP/91/954: 5n1/9J 
Commission takes acuon against eight Member States lagging behind in 
liberalisauon of telecommunications 
As announced by Commissioners Karel van Miert and Martin Bangemann, on 8 October 1997, the 
European Commission has today decided to initiate formal infringement procedures against seven 
Member States in order to force them to speed up transposition. The seven Member States 
concerned are: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. Moreover 
the Commission had already decided to address a reasoned opinion (the second stage of the 
infringement procedure foreseen in article 169 of the Treaty) to Spain. On 8 October 1997 1 ,  the 
European Commission adopted a Report which set out the state of transposition by the Member 
States of the regulatory package aiming at fullliberalisation of the telecommunications market 
scheduled for 1 January 1998. The conclusion of the Report was that three months before full 
liberalisation of the European Union telecommunications market, a large number of Member States 
have transposed the full regulatory framework or will have done so by the end of 1997. However. in 
this report the Commission identified Member States where national legislation is still deficient. The 
Commission considers that the Member States concerned can still remedy the problems identified . 
and hopes that they will soon adopt the lacking measures or amend their legislation in accordance 
with the requirements under EU Law. The Commission continues its assessment of the national 
measures already adopted and notified by the Member States and will, if necessary. start a new 
wave of infringement procedures. 
The procedures approuved by the Commission cover the following infringements of the EU rules. 
· by Denmark which did not ensure that its public operator, TeleDanmark, publishes standard terms 
and conditions for interconnection by 1 July 1997. Such publication is crucial to allow new entrants to 
quickly negotiate, on the basis of these standard conditions, the interconnection of their new network to 
the network of the incumbent. 
by Greece which did not 
- allow the two private Greek GSM operators to interconnect their networks directly with foreign fixed or 
mobile networks, without passing through the public operator's network; 
- ensure that these private GSM operators have access to the necessary points of intetconnection to 
the fixed public telecommunications network; 
- liberalise the establishment of new infrastructure for the provision of liberalised services (i.e. all 
services other than voice telephony). According to Commission Decision 97/607/EC of 18 June 1997, 
Greece had until 1 October 1997 to take the necessary measures. 
· by Italy, which did not 
- ensure full liberalisation of the establishment of new and the use of existing infrastructures tor 
liberalised services by 1 July 1996, given that it still considers to impose a new licensing procedure for 
this activity; 
- specify yet the future financial obligations which will be imposed on new entrants in order to share the 
net cost of universal service burdening Telecom ltalia. 
· by Luxembourg which did not: 
- liberalise the establishment of new infrastructure for the provision of liberalised services. According to 
Commission Decision 97/568/EC of 14 May 1997, Luxembourg had until1 July 1997 to take the 
necessary measures. 
- notify key measures which will be part of the declaration procedures it intends to impose on future 
providers of voice telephony and public telecommunications networks. Under EU  Law,  Luxembourg had 
to notify the complete procedure in draft form to the Commission no later than 1 July 1997 to enable 
the Commission to verify its compatibility with EU  Law; 
111/112 - correctly transpose a provision of EU Law prohibiting the limitation of the number of licenses to be 
granted to new entrants, except in case of scarcity of frequencies (which is the case for GSM). 
· by Germany which did not ensure that 
-Deutsche Telekom publishes standard terms and conditions for interconnection including prices as 
requested under EU  Law; 
-Deutsche Telekom operates a cost accounting system allowing the Commission to assess whether its 
telephone tariffs are cost oriented. This system should have been in place by 13 December 1996. 
· by Portugal which did not 
- liberalise the establishment of new infrastructure for the provision of liberalised services. According to 
Commission Decision 97/310/EC of 12 February 1997, Portugal had until1 July 1997 to take the 
necessary measures. 
-ensure that Portugal Telecom S.A. operates a cost accounting system allowing the Commission to 
assess whether its telephone tariffs are cost oriented. This system should have been in place by 13 
December 1996. 
· by Belgium, regarding which the Commission identified not less than 7 infringements: 
1 ltdid yet adopt the legal measures necessary to liberalise voice telephony and establishment of public 
telecommunications networks by 1 January 1998. Under EU Law, the Member States had to notify 
these measures no later than 11  January 1997, in order to allow future new entrants to plan their 
investments 
2 I only liberalised the use of existing infrastructures and not the establishment of new infrastructures 
for the provision of liberalised services, notwithstanding the fact that the Commission already in August 
1996 warned Belgium that its then draft legislation was contrary to EU Law; 
3.  it has not yet adopted the legislation which sets the financial contributions of new entrants to the net 
cost of universal service; 
4.  it did not abolish the restrictions in the GSM decree on direct interconnection between networks 
situated in different Member States; 
5.  it did not ensure that the cost accounting system implemented by Belgacom identifies the underlying 
cost elements on which the published interconnection terms and conditions should be based under EU 
Law, 
6.  it did not adopt any time-table for the future phasing out of the tariff imbalances that Belgacom 
claims cannot be completed before 2000; 
7.  it did finally not transpose a number of provisions of the Voice Telephony Directive (Directive 
95/62/EC) which_ should have been fully transposed by 13 December 1996. 
· In parallel the Commission decided to continue the infringement procedure already opened against 
Spain which, as Belgium, did not lift all restrictions on the establishment of new infrastructures for the 
provision of liberalised services. 
111/113 IP/97/1119, 15/12/1997 
···························································································································································································································-················································ 
BERTELSMANN ET KIRCH INTERROMPENT AVEC EFFET 
IMMEDIAT LA COMMERCIALISATION PAR PREMIERE DU 
DECODEUR D-BOX 
A Ia suite d'un entretien avec M. Karel Van Miert, vendredi dernier, les societes 
Bertelsmann et Kirch se sont formellement engagees aupres de Ia Commission 
europeenne a  interrompre avec effet immediat diverses operations de marketing 
relatives au programme numerique "Premiere Digital" ainsi que Ia commercialisation 
des decodeurs d-box. Des demarches en ce sens ont entretemps ete entamees. A Ia fin 
du mois de novembre, Ia Commission europeenne avait averti les deux entreprises que 
/'utilisation et Ia commercialisation par  Premiere de Ia d-box de Kirch constituait une 
application partielle de Ia fusion envisagee par  les deux entreprises dans /e secteur de 
Ia TV numerique payante et etait done en contradiction avec les reg/es europeennes en 
matiere de fusion. La Commission exigeait des deux entreprises de mettre un terme 
immediat a /'utilisation et Ia commercialisation du decodeur d-box par Premiere. Entre-
temps Ia Commission a decide de suspendre /'operation de fusion 
Bertelsmann!Kirch/Premiere notifiee le 1er decembrejusqu'a Ia fin de Ia procedure 
prevue par le reglement sur  les fusions. Sur Ia base des engagements pris par 
Sertelsmann et Kirch, Ia Commission part du principe qu'aucune autre action anticipant 
Ia decision finale de Ia Commission ne sera menee par les deux entreprises. 
Quant aux abonnes actuels de Premiere Digital qui ant acquis de bonne foi un abonnement au 
programme numerique, Ia Commission est prate a accepter que Premiere diffuse son programme 
numerique avec !'utilisation du decodeur d-box, pour Ia duree de Ia procedure. aux abonnements 
remqntant au debut du mois de novembre dernier. 
Bertelsmann et Kirch envisagent de faire de Premiere une plateforme numerique commune en y 
integrant les activites de television numerique actuelles de Kirch. Ce projet constitue une fusion qui 
tombe sous !'application des regles europeennes en Ia matiere. Le projet a ete formellement notifie a Ia 
Commission europeenne le 1er decembre. dernier et fait actuellement l'objet d'une analyse de Ia part 
des services de Ia concurrence. Un element essential du projet de fusion est le choix de Ia plateforme 
commune en faveur de Ia technologie d-box de Kirch aui etait utilisee jusqu'a present par l'emetteur de 
television numerique payante DF1  de Kirch. Premiere en revanche utilisait jusqu'a present un autre 
decodeur pour ses programmes numeriques, le Media-box. Depuis le debut du mois de novembre deja. 
Premiere Digital et DF1  sont disponible sur le reseau cable sur Ia base de Ia technologie d-box. Depuis, 
Premiere a offert l'abonnement a Premiere Digital a Ia fois sur le cable et sur satellite "en paquet" avec 
le decodeur d-box. 
Le 4 novembre dernier Karel Van Miert (voir IP 97/953 du 5.11.97), dans une discussion avec des 
representants de Kirch et Bertelsmann avait fait part de son mecontentement parce que visiblement 
une partie de !'operation de fusion avait ete mise en oeuvre. Une telle situation estimait M. Van Miert 
est contraire a un des principes de base du centrale european sur les fusions : aucune operation de 
concentration ne peut etre executee avant que Ia Commission n'y ait' donne son accord formel. 
Ensuite, Ia Commission a signifie a Bertelsmann et Kirch (voir IP 97/1062 du 1.12.97) que !'utilisation 
du d-box par Premiere anticipait une decision de Ia Commission et etait en contradiction formelle avec 
l'effet de suspension prevu par les regles europeennes en matiere de droit de fusion. La Commission 
exigeait des entreprises qu'elles mettent un terme ace comportement illicite et prennent les mesures 
necessaires pour corriger ses effets en matiere de concurrence. 
Ill/  114 Bertelsmann et Kirch se sont entretemps engages formellement pour que Premiere interrompe avec 
effet immediat diverses operations de marketing relatives a son programme numerique Premiere Digital 
ainsi que Ia commercialisation des d-box. En particulier toute forme de commercialisation directe par 
Premiere est arretee. Les demandes d'abonnement sur Ia base de cette commercialisation directe ne 
seront ni traitees ni acceptees. Par ailleurs, avec effet immediat egalement, Premiere ne conclura plus 
d'abonnement a Premiere Digital avec des detenteurs d'un decodeur DF1  et n'autorisera pas son 
activation. En outre Premiere suspendra diverses operations de publicite en faveur de Premiere Digital. 
Des demarches en ce sens ont deja ete entamees a partir du samedi 11  decembre. 
Premiere a declare que depuis le debut de novembre, environ 90.000 d-box ont ete vendus en 
"paquet" avec des abonnements a Premiere Digital et Ia reception du programme leur a ete offerte. 
Ceci est toutefois essentiellement le resultat d'un transfert d'abonnes a Ia TV payante analogique de 
Premiere qui ont pu acquerir a un prix avantageux l'abonnement a Premiere Digital et le d-box. Par 
ailleurs il s'agit d'abonnes a Premiere qui ont echange leur decodeur numerique Media-Box contre un 
d-box. Actuellement selon des donnees fournies par Premiere, quelque 30.000 "paquets" 
d'abonnements a Premiere Digital offerts en meme temps que led-box sont en circulation, soit 
disponibles dans le commerce soit deja vendus mais qui n'ont pas ete actives. 
La Commission constate que Bertelsmann et Kirch se sont dits prets a respecter les termes des n3gles 
europeennes en matiere de droit des fusions. Sur Ia base des engagements pris par les deux 
entreprises il n'est desormais plus a craindre que le d-box, soit presente, en anticipation de Ia decision 
finale de·la Commission, comme Ia norme de fait de television numerique pour le marche allemand. La 
Commission n'envisage pas de refuser a des abonnes Ia reception des programmes numeriques 
auxquels ils se sont abonnes. A cet effet, Ia Commission est prete a tolerer que pour Ia duree de Ia 
procedure d'analyse du cas, Premiere puisse diffuser son programme numerique utilisant le d-box aux 
personnes qui ant conclu un abonnement depuis le debut du mois de novembre. La meme tolerance 
est offerte pour !'activation des quelque 30.000 "abonnements paquets" se trouvant dans le commerce 
ou deja vendus. 
Ill/  115 IP/97/1139, 17/12/1997 
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To prevent former monopolies from becoming future 
supermonopolies, the Commission asks for the separation 
between telecom and cable activities 
Telecommunication and multimedia can be of vital importance to employment and growth in 
Europe. This is,  however, conditional upon full competition and upon former telecommunication 
monopolies not mutating into supermonopolies enjoying a strong position in the cable television 
sector too, or preventing others from accessing the telecom network to offer cable TV network 
services. 
It  is  therefore  at least  necessary,  in  the  Commission's  opinion,  to  legally  separate  cable 
operators  from  telecommunication  ventures.  Indeed,  as  the  Commission  notes,  the  current 
accounting separation is obviously not sufficient. On the basis of  an initiative by Commissioners 
Martin Bangemann and Karel Van  Miert, it proposes to implement further separation through a 
Directive grounded on  Article 90  of the  Treaty  - which  allows the  Commission  to  take  the 
necessary measures in order to establish or re-establish competition in areas of activity where 
firms benefit from special rights or a monopoly position. 
Moreover, it cannot be excluded that following a complaint, an application for exemption from 
the European anti-trust rules, or a merger project, the European Commission could be led, where 
applicable, to oblige a telecommunication company to simply abandon its cable activities. 
The  Commission reached this position in the light of the  conclusions of two studies it had 
requested. It intends to finalise the legislative text after having examined the possible comments 
which must reach it within two months of  the publication of  the text adopted today in the Official 
Journal. 
Two  Directives,  the  1995  Cable  Directive  and  the  1996  Full  Liberalisation  Directive  required  the 
Commission to review the Cable Directive from two particular points of view: 
- the impact on  competition of the joint provision of telecommunications and  cable TV networks by  a 
single operator; and 
- the restrictions on the use of telecommunication networks for the provision of cable TV capacity. 
Evolution  has  already  taken  place  on  the  telecommunication  market.  Thus.  Deutsche  Telekom  has 
announced  that it  is  to  undertake a structural  separation  and  a regionalisation  of its  cable  activities. 
while  also  opening  access  to  third  parties.  In  The  Netherlands,  KPN  has  substantially  reduced  its 
shareholding in the cable operator Casema. 
In  addition,  the Commission has just been  notified of two  important multimedia operations:  BiB  in  the 
United Kingdom and Kirch/Bertelsmann in Germany. 
In  its  analysis  leading  to  the  revision  of  the  Cable  directive,  the  Commission  reached  four  main 
conclusions: 
-- The  development  of  the  telecommunication  and  multimedia  markets  depends  on  four  factors: 
service competition,  infrastructure competition and  infrastructure upgrade, as well  as  other types of 
innovation. The joint provision of telecommunications and cable-TV networks by former monopolies 
can stifle the development of telecom and multimedia applications; 
- In  the  EU,  the joint provision,  inherited  from  past monopoly positions,  of telecommunications  and 
cable TV  networks by a single operator could  in  certain Member States allow former monopolies to 
delay  the  emergence  of effective  competition.  This  could  lead  from  the  start  to  an  asymmetrical 
situation favouring dominant telecommunication operators over new entrants; 
I  I I/ 116 - The  restrictions  on  the  provision  of cable  TV  capacity  via  telecommunication  networks  are  also 
significant as they can create an asymmetrical regulatory framework which again constrains optimal 
market development over time.  However,  given that the technology allowing  such  provision  is  just 
emerging, the constraints are not yet heavily felt in practice in most Member States; 
- The  accounting  separation  in  the  case  of joint  provision  of  competing  networks  by  dominant 
telecommunication operators, established by the Commission Directive 95/51/EC ("Cable Directive"}, 
has been shown to be insufficient to facilitate pro-competitive development in the multimedia sector. 
Minimum steps should include inter alia the effective separation of these operators from their cable 
TV  network  companies,  i.e.  the  operation  of these  activities  by  clearly  separated  legal  entities. 
Further action by the Commission will  be justified with  regard  to  specific cases  to  reduce the  anti-
competitive effect of dominant positions reinforced by the joint provision of both types of networks by 
one and the same operator, a situation inherited from previous legally protected monopoly positions. 
Comments on the draft directive may be sent to the Commission 
- by fax (No.(32 2) 296 98 19), 
- by e-mail (cable-review@dg4.cec.be) or 
- by mail to the following address: 
European Commission 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV) 
Directorate C 
Office 3/44 
158 A  venue de Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan 158 
B-1 049 Brussels 
These comments should arrive within 2 months of the publication of the notice in the Official Journal. 
Ill/  117 Brussels, 16th December 1997 
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PRESS DOSSIER 
NOTICE FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
COMPETITION RULES TO THE POSTAL SECTOR AND ON THE 
ASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN STATE MEASURES RELATING TO 
POSTAL SERVICES 
Subsequent to the submission by the Commission of a Green Paper on  the development of the single 
market for postal services  and of a communication to the European Parliament and the Council, setting 
out  the  results  of  the  consultations  on  the  Green  Paper  and  the  measures  advocated  by  the 
Commission  , a substantial  discussion  has  taken  place  on  the  future  regulatory  environment for the 
postal sector in the Community. In  1994, the Council invited the Commission to  propose measures i.e. 
defining a harmonised universal service and the postal services which could be reserved . In July 1995, 
the  Commission  proposed  a package  of measures  concerning  postal  services  which  consisted  of a 
proposal  for a European  Parliament and  Council  Directive  on  common  rules  for the  development of 
Community  postal  services  and  the  improvement of quality  of service  as  well  as  of  a  draft  of the 
present Notice on the application of the competition rules . 
This Notice, which complements the harmonisation measures proposed by  the  Commission,  builds on 
the  results  of these  discussions  in  accordance  with  the  principles  established  in  Council  Resolution 
(94/C 48/02) of 7 February 1994 on the development of Community postal services.  It takes account of 
the comments received during the public consultation on the draft of this Notice published in  December 
1995, of the European Parliament's Resolution on this draft adopted on  12 December 1996, as well  as 
of the discussions on the proposed Directive in the European Parliament and in Council. 
The  Commission  considers  that because  they  are  an  essential  vehicle  of communication  and  trade, 
postal  services are vital  for all  economic and  social activities.  New postal  services  are  emerging  and 
market certainty is needed to favour investment and the creation of new employment in  the sector.  As 
recognised by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Community law,  and in  particular the 
competition rules of the EC Treaty, apply to the postal sector . The Court explained that "in the case of 
public undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights,  they are neither to enact 
nor to  maintain  in  force  any  measure  contrary  to  the  rules  contained  in  the  Treaty  with  regard  to 
competition" and  that these rules  "must be  read  in  conjunction  with  Article  90(2)  which  provides that 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest are to be  subject to 
the rules on competition in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance. in 
law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them." 
Questions  are  therefore  frequently  put  to  the  Commission  on  the  attitude  it  intends  to. take  up.  for 
purposes of the implementation of the competition rules contained in the EC-Treaty, with  regard  to  the 
behaviour of postal operators and with  regard  to  State measures  relating  to  public undertakings and 
undertakings to which the Member States grant special or exclusive rights in the postal sector. 
This Notice sets out the Commission's interpretation of the relevant Treaty provisions and the  guiding 
principles according to which the Commission intends to apply the competition rules of the Treaty to the 
postal  sector in  individual  cases,  while  maintaining  the  necessary  safeguards  for the  provision  of  a 
universal  service,  and  gives  to  enterprises  and  Member  States  clear  guidelines  so  as  to  avoid 
infringements  of the  Treaty.  This  Notice  is  without prejudice to  any  interpretation  to  be  given  by  the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
111/118 Furthermore,  this  Notice  sets  out the  approach  the  Commission  intends  to  take  when  applying  the 
competition  rules  to  the behaviour of postal operators and when  assessing  the  compatibility of State 
measures restricting the freedom to  provide service  and/or to  compete in  the  postal markets with  the 
competition rules and other rules of the Treaty.  In addition, it addresses the issue of non-discriminatory 
access to the postal network and the safeguards required to ensure fair competition in the sector. 
Especially  on  account of the  development  of new  postal  services  by  private  and  public  operators, 
certain  Member States  have  revised,  or are  revising,  their  postal  legislation  in  order to  restrict  the 
monopoly  of their postal  organisations to  that considered  necessary for the  realisation  of the  public 
interest objective. At the same time, the Commission is faced with a growing number of complaints and 
cases  under competition  law on  which  it  must take  position.  At  this  stage,  a Notice  is  therefore  the 
appropriate  instrument to  provide  guidance to  Member States  and  postal  operators,  including  those 
enjoying special or exclusive rights,  to  ensure a correct implementation of the competition  rules.  This 
Notice,  though  it  cannot  be  exhaustive,  aims  to  provide  the  necessary  guidance  for  the  correct 
interpretation, in  particular,  of Art.icles  59,  85,  86,  90,  and 92  of the EC  Treaty in  individual cases.  By 
issuing  the  present  Notice,  the  Commission  is  taking  steps  to  bring  transparency  and  to  facilitate 
investment  decisions  of  all  postal  operators,  in  the  interest  of the  users  of  postal  services  in  the 
European Union. 
As  the Commission explained in  its communication  of 11.09.1996 on  "Services of General  Interest in 
Europe",  solidarity  and  equal  treatment  within  a  market  economy  are  fundamental  Community 
objectives.  These  objectives  are  furthered  by  services  of- general  interest.  Europeans  have  come  to 
expect  high  quality  services  at  affordable  prices,  and  many  of them  even  view  services  of general 
interest as social rights. 
As  regards,  in  particular,  the  postal  sector,  consumers  are  becoming  increasingly  assertive  in 
exercising their rights and desires. Worldwide competition is forcing companies using these services to 
seek out better price deals comparable to those enjoyed by their competitors.  New technologies. such 
as  fax  or electronic  mail,  are  putting  enormous  pressures  on  the  traditional  postal  services.  These 
developments have given rise to worries about the future of these services accompanied by  concerns 
over employment and  economic and  social  cohesion.  The  economic importance of these  services  is 
considerable.  Hence the importance of modernizing and developing services of general interest.  since 
they contribute so much to European competitiveness, social solidarity and quality of life. 
The  Community's aim  is  to  support the competitiveness of the European  economy  in  an  increasingly 
competitive world and to give consumers more choice, better quality and lower prices.  at the same time 
as  helping,  through  its  policies,  to  strengthen  economic  and  social  cohesion  between  the  Member 
States and reduce certain inequalities. Postal services have a key role to play here.  The Community is 
committed to promoting their functions of general interest, as solemnly confirmed in the new Article I d. 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty,  while improving their efficiency.  Market forces  produce a better 
allocation  of resources  and  greater effectiveness  in  the  supply  of services,  the  principal  beneficiary 
being the consumer, who gets better quality at a lower price.  However, these mechanisms sometimes 
have their limits;  as  a result the  potential  benefits might not extend  to  the  entire  population  and  the 
objective  of promoting  social  and  territorial  cohesion  in  the  Union  may  not  be  attained.  The  public 
authority must then ensure that the general interest is taken into account. 
The traditional structures of some  services of general economic interest,  which  are  organized  on  the 
basis of national monopolies, constitute a challenge for European economic integration.  This includes 
postal  monopolies,  even  as  these  are  justified,  which  may  obstruct  the  smooth  functioning  of the 
market, in particular by sealing off a particular market sector. 
The  real  challenge  is  to  ensure  smooth  interplay  between  the  requirements  of the  single  European 
market in  terms  of free  movement,  economic performance and  dynamism,  free  competition,  and  the 
general interest objectives. This interplay must benefit individual citizens and society as a whole. This is 
a difficult balancing act,  since the goalposts are constantly moving:  the  single  market is  continuing to 
expand and public services, far from being fixed, are having to adapt to new requirements. 
Ill/  119 The  basic concept of universal  service,  which  was  originated  by  the  Commission  , is  to  ensure  the 
provision  of high  quality service  to  all  at prices  everyone can  afford.  Universal  service  is  defined  in 
terms of principles:  equality,  universality,  continuity and  adaptability;  and  in  terms  of sound  practices: 
openness  in  management,  pric~-setting and  funding  and  scrutiny  by  bodies  independent  of  those 
operating the services. These criteria are not always all met at national level,  but where they have been 
introduced  using the concept of European universal service,  there have  been  positive  effects for the 
development  of  general  interest  services.  Universal  service  is  the  expression  in  Europe  of  the 
requirements  and  special  features  of the  European  model  of  society  in  a  policy  which  combines  a 
dynamic market, cohesion and solidarity. 
High quality universal postal services are of great importance for private and business customers alike. 
In view of the development of electronic commerce their importance will even increase in the very near 
future.  Postal services have a valuable role to play here. 
As regards the postal sector, an harmonization Directive has been adopted on  1 December 1997 by the 
European Parliament and the Council on the basis of a proposal made by the Commission in  1995 and 
amended subsequently. This Directive aims to introduce common rules for developing the postal sector 
and improving the quality of service, as well as gradually opening up the markets in a controlled way. 
The basis of the proposal is to safeguard the postal service as a universal service in the long term. The 
Directive imposes on Member States a minimum harmonized standard of universal services including a 
high quality service countrywide with regular guaranteed deliveries at prices everyone can  afford.  This 
involves the collection, transport, sorting and delivery of letters as well as catalogues and parcels within 
certain price and weight limits. It also covers registered and insured ("valeur declaree") items and would 
apply to both domestic and cross-border deliveries. Due regard is given to considerations of continuity, 
confidentiality, impartiality and equal treatment as well as adaptability. 
To  guarantee the funding of the universal service,  a sector may be  reserved  for the  operators of this 
universal service. The scope of the reserved sector has been harmonized in the Directive. According to 
the Directive,  Member States can  only grant exclusive rights for the provision of po'stal  services to  the 
extent that this  is  necessary  to  guarantee  the  maintenance  of the  universal  service.  Moreover,  the 
Directive  establishes  the  maximum  scope  that  Member States  may  reserve  in  order to  achieve  this 
objective.  Any  additional  funding  which  may  be  required  for the  universal  service  may  be  found  by 
writing certain obligations into commercial operators' franchises;  for example,  they may be  required to 
make  financial  contributions  to  an  equalization  fund  administered  for  this  purpose  by  a  body 
independent of the beneficiary or beneficiaries, as foreseen in Article 9 of the postal Directive. 
The  Directive  sets  up  a  minimum  common  standard  of universal  services  and  establishes  common 
rules  concerning  the  reserved  area.  The  Directive therefore  increases  legal  certainty  as  regards  the 
legality of some exclusive and special rights in the postal sector.  There are,  however,  State measures 
that are not dealt with in the Directive and that can  be in conflict with the EC Treaty rules addressed to 
Member  States.  The  autonomous  behaviors  of  the  postal  operators  also  remain  subject  to  the 
competition rules of the EC Treaty. 
Article 90§2 of the Treaty foresees that suppliers of services of general interest may be exempted from 
the rules in the Treaty, to the extent that the application of these rules would obstruct the performance 
of the  general  interest tasks  for which  they  are  responsible.  This  exemption  from  the  Treaty  rules  is 
however subject to the principle of proportionality. This principle is designed to  ensure the  best match 
between the  duty to  provide general interest services and  the way  in  which  the  services  are  actually 
provided,  so  that the means used  are in  proportion to  the ends  sought.  The principle is  formulated to 
allow for a flexible  and  context-sensitive  balance  that takes  account of the  technical  and  budgetary 
constraints  that may  vary from  one  sector to  another.  It  also  makes  for the  best possible  interaction 
between  market  efficiency  and  general  interest  requirements,  by  ensuring  that  the  means  used  to 
satisfy the requirements do not unduly interfere with the smooth running of the single European market 
and do not affect trade to an extent that would be contrary to the Community interest . 
111/120 The application of the Treaty rules,  including the possible application of the Article 90§2 exemption, as 
regards  both  behaviors  of undertakings  and  State  measures  can  only  be  done  on  a  case~by-case 
basis.  It seems however highly desirable, in order to increase legal certainty as regards measures not 
covered  by the Directive, to  explain the interpretation of the Treaty that the Commission  has and the 
approach that it aims  to  follow in  its  future  application  of these  rules.  In  particular,  the  Commission 
considers that, subject to the provisions of Art 90(2) in relation to the provision of the universal service, 
the application of the Treaty rules would promote the competitiveness of the undertakings active in the 
postal sector, benefit consumers and contribute in a positive way to the objectives of general interest. 
The postal sector in the  EU  is characterised by areas which Member States have reserved in  order to 
guarantee  universal  service  and  which  are  now being  harmonised  by  the  Directive  in  order to  limit 
distortive effects between Member States. The Commission must,  according to the Treaty,  ensure that 
these postal monopolies conform with the rules of the Treaty, and in  particular the competition rules,  in 
order to  ensure maximum  benefit and  limit any  distortive  effects for the  consumers.  In  pursuing this 
objective by applying the competition rules to the sector on  a case-by-case basis the Commission will 
ensure  that monopoly power is  not used  for extending  a protected dominant position  into  liberalised 
activities or for unjustified discrimination in  favour of big  accounts at the expense of small  users.  The 
Commission will  also ensure that postal monopolies granted in  the  area  of cross-border services  are 
not  used  for  creating  or  maintaining  illicit  price  cartels  harming  the  interests  of  companies  and 
consumers in the European Union. 
This Notice explains to the players on the market the practical consequences of the applicability of the 
competition  rules  to  the  postal  sector,  and  the  possible  exemptions to  the  principles.  It  sets  out the 
position  the  Commission would  adopt,  in  the  context  set by  the  continuing  existence  of special  and 
exclusive  rights  as  harmonised  by  the  postal  Directive,  in  assessing  individual  cases  or  before  the 
Court of Justice in.cases referred to the Court by national Courts under Article 177 EC. 
REVIEW 
This  Notice  is  adopted  at  Community  level  to  facilitate  the  assessment  of  certain  behaviour  of 
undertakings and certain State measures relating to postal services. It is appropriate that after a certain 
period  of development,  possibly by the year 2000,  the Commission  should  carry out an  evaluation of 
the postal sector with regard to the Treaty rules, to establish whether modifications of the views set out 
in this Notice are required on the basis of social, economical or technological considerations and on the 
basis of experience with postal cases.  In due time the Commission will carry out a global evaluation of 
the situation in the postal sector in the light of the aims of this Notice. 
Ill/  121 IP/97/1180, 19/12/1997 
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European Commission opens investigation into international 
telephone prices 
At the request of European Commissioner Van  Miert,  in charge of co·mpetition,  the Directorate 
General for Competition (DG  IV)  has opened procedures about charges for international phone 
calls paid to dominant telephone operators At  present, prices for telephone calls across borders 
are generally much higher than prices for calls within a single European country. An important 
part of these  charges  is what is  called accounting rates,  wlfich · ;Jmount  to  transfer prices 
between operators.  Originally, accounting rates were set at a level intended to cover the total 
cost of transporting the telephone call.  Nowadays,  as a result of technological changes and 
consequent reductions in costs, it is widely believed that these charges no longer reflect the 
true cost of  calls. The interest Qf users in the European Union - both consumers and commercial 
- demands that the pric~ of  international telephone calls be brought down to a fair and adequate 
level 
Two sets of policies require that acGounting rates (or their future substitute) charged by major European 
operators be  cost-oriented:  under competition rules,  the prohibition of abuses of dominant positions 
1
, 
and under harmonisation rules, the so called  "interconn~c;tion E>ir~ctive"
2 
The Competition services will scrutinise the current acco~nting rate arrangements within the EU,  with a 
view to furthering this goal of cost-orientation.  Requests for information have therefore been sent to all 
dominant telecommunication operators in the EU in order to collect the information necessary to assess 
the competition aspects of the accounting rate arrangements. 
This information includes: 
(i)  the procedures, agreements and minutes of meetings setting accounting rates, 
(ii)  the amounts of accounting ratesrates within the EU and on routes to the US and Japan, 
(iii)  the  costs  involved  in  the  various  aspects  of forwarding  international  calls,  including  the  local 
network, the national network, the international gateways, exchanges and transmission facilities, 
(iv)  the revenues and profits derived from the accounting rates activity. 
1 Article 86 EC Treaty 
2 97/33/EC (based on Article 1  OOA EC Treaty) 
111/122 In  parallel,  national  telecommunications  regulators  are  implementing  the  interconnection  Directive, 
which requires that the principles of cost orientation and non-discrimination be applied to  both national 
interconnection  and  cross-border  interconnection.  This  implementation  is  monitored  by  DG  XIII, 
Directorate  General  for Telecommunications,  under the  responsibility  of Commissioner  Bangemann. 
These  two  approaches  will  therefore  be  co-ordinated;  national  competition  authorities  and  national 
telecommunications regulators have already been informed. 
BACKGROUND 
The telecommunications markets of most of the  Member States of the  EU  will  be  fully  liberalised on 
January  1,  1998. This  liberalisation is  bound to  have an  important impact on  the price  for telephone 
calls, both nationally and internationally. 
An  "accounting  rate"  is  the  charge  agreed  between  the  telecommunications  operator in  the  country 
where the call originates and the telecommunications operator in the country where the call terminates 
for  carrying  a  call  of a  duration  of  one  minute  from  its  origin  to  its  destination.  Each  of  the  two 
companies  involved receives  a share - usually half- of this  accounting  rate.  This  share  is  called  the 
"settlement rate". The balance of amounts due and owed by each company is settled periodically. 
"Interconnection rates"  are amounts charged by an  operator in  order to  forward  calls  to  its  clients  by 
customers from another operator. 
The interconnection Directive requires Member States to ensure that incumbent operators provide cost-
based interconnection rates, also across borders within the EU. 
In  October 1997, the Commission published a Recommendation  giving  'best practice'  interconnection 
rates for use in the Community. 
The requests for information mentioned above have been sent to  telecommunications operators in  all 
15 EU countries, including all incumbent operators.  , 
111/123 IP/97/1188, 22/12/1997 
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Commission clears acquisition over Societe Fran~aise de 
Radiotelephonie 
The  European  Commission  has  authorised  the  operation  by  which  .  the  British  company 
Vodafone  and the  French  company  Cegetel  acquire  joint  control  of Societe  Fran~aise de 
Radiotelephonie (SFR) which was to date controlled by Cegetel. 
SFR f(lcuses its business in  France in  which  it  is a network operator in  the mobile telephony mark..:t  SI:R 
currently  is  the  second  French  network  operator and  its  number  of sul.,~cribcrs is  rapidly  incrl·asing,  tn 
particular in the GSM sector using digital technology. 
Vodafone  is  a telecommunic(J.tion  comp~ny which  is  engaged  in  particular  in  the  operation  of mobile 
telecommunications  networks  and  th~ provision  of related  services.  Vodatime  is  mainly  active  in  the 
United Kingdom,  in which the groijpe is amongst the leaders in mobile telephony, as well as  in  Greece and 
Malta.  To date,  Vodafone has been present in France only through a subsidiary providing services to end 
users of networks operated by the different pl&yerS,. 
The Commission assessed the effects of  the concentration at the European and  the French  k·Yl'ls  It t\.,und 
that  the  new  entity will  be  one  of the  lead~rs in  the  mobile  telephony  sector  in  Western  Fun'Jh~.  This 
region  is  experiencing an  important growth of subscribers as  well  as  the  entr)'  of numerous  operators or 
service providers, specially in digital telephony technology. 
In  France,  the operation does not lead to any market share addition t(x the network operations.  Till' nc\v 
participation  of Vodafone  in  control  over  SFR,  with  Cegetel.  is  taking  place  against  a  competitive 
background  which  is  characterised  by  a significant  development  of networks.  till·  each  of t hl'  current 
operators (France Telecom, SFR, Bouygues Telecom), by the continuous growth of subscriptions th'm the 
general public, and by the provision of  attractive services. 
For these reasons,  the Commission considered that the operation does not  raise  serious doubts  as  to  the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position, and therefore decided to clear it. 
111/124 IP/98/39, 15/1/1998  ........................................................................................................................................  , ....................................................................................................................................  . 
Commission defines its position on Internet telephony in the 
context of the liberalisation of the EU telecommunications markets 
In the wake of the full liberalisation of most of the telecommunications market of the European 
Union (EU) on 1 January 1998, the European Commission adopted a notice defining its policy on 
voice telephony in respect of telephony via the Internet. According to the notice, telephony via 
the Internet is not subject to the regulation applying to voice telephony until a certain number of 
conditions  have  been  met.  The  new  notice  is  a  supplement  to  the  Commission's  1995 
Communication on the status and implementation of  the Commission libera/isation Directives.  It 
is based on a broad public consultation held between May and July of  last year. 
Accordi~g to the latest technological  developments,  the  notice distinguishes  between  three categories of 
voice  services  :  (I) commercial  services  provided  from  PC  to  PC,  (2)  commercial  services  provided 
between  PC  and  telephone  handsets  connected  to  the  Public  Switched  Telecommunications  Network 
(PSTN)  and  (3)  the  provision  of calls  between  two  telephone  handsets  connected  to  the  PSTN.  The 
conclusion is that only type (3) is today close to being voice telephony. 
Under  EU  law,  the  provision  of voice  on the  Internet  is  not  "voice  telephony"  at  present.  and  may 
therefore not be subject by Member States to individual licensing procedures but at the most to declaration 
procedures. 
Internet telephony will  be defined as voice telephony and therefore be suhjed to  standard voice  tl'lephon~' 
regulation only if and when the folJowing conditions are met: 
•  the communications are the subject of a commercial otler 
•  the service is provided for the public 
•  the service is provided to and from public switched network termination points on the fixed 
telephony network 
•  it involves direct transport and speech in real time. 
Currently, Internet telephony does not meet all these criteria, and therefore will  not be considered as voice 
telephony for the time being.  This  assessment was broadly endorsed during the  public  consultation.  This 
will  keep  markets open  for  innovation  regarding  the  Internet  which  could  ll'ad  to  multimt·dia  tl.'lt·plH.'n'· 
being oflcred over it.  It also means that no contribution can be required tl·om  Internet  ac~ess pn)\'idcrs tl.)r 
the funding of universal service obligations. 
However, according to the criteria listed, with growing sophistication certain Internet telephony providers 
will quality as  providers of voice telephony, and therefore be subject to the regulatory regime aj)plicahll' to 
voice telephony in  the future,  as  soon as  they  will  oiler a quality of service equivalent  to  1  radii ional  voire 
telephony. 
Ill/  125 The notice also applies to those Member States which were granted additional implementation periods for 
the liberalisation of voice telephony after  1st January  1998
3
.  It makes  clear that these countries may  not 
block, for example,  any card based voice service over the Internet until the date of  fullliberalisation unless 
they can demonstrate that the relevant service is a mere substitute of the universal voice telephony service 
and consequently takes a significant share of  the long distance and international market. 
The text of  the notice has been published in the Official Journal C series of I  0. 0 I.  98 (OJ C6 of 1  0. 1. 98 
p 4  ).  It is also being made available on DGIV' s website 
(http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/lawliber/libera.htm). 
Background 
Studies  have  suggested  that,  though  still  in  most  cases  of lower  quality,  Internet  telephony  could  be 
considerable cheaper than the current levels of voice telephony,  possibly up to 80% on  international calls. 
While  providing a service which  due  to  it&  features  cannot  be  considered  as  voice  telephony  within  the 
meaning of the Services Directive,  Voic~ gn the  fnt~rn~t will  th~refore still  enlarge the scope of services 
available to consumers and is  lik~ly to  h~Jp  fqst~r ponsl-Jmer  acc~ss to the I-nformation Sodety. 
The full  application of the current regulatory framework,  ~onsisting of liheralisation  Directives  i'ssucd  hy 
the  Commission  and  harmonisation  dir~ctiv-~§ adopted  by  thf;'  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of 
Ministers,  will  avoid  that  unnecessary  r~gulatory r~~imes ar~ imposed  on  Internet  telephony  providers 
when  they  do  not  match the  universal  voice  t~I~phony &ervice  quality  or when  they  provide  additional 
features such as a combination of  voic~ and  hna~es. 
The  current  regulatory framework  has  the flexibility  to  adapt to  future  developments  and  will  then.·forl~ 
also ensure that the same regulatory regime applies to the 
But even  in this case, in order not to stifle the emergence of Internet Voice,  thl' principk· of  proportionalit~' 
fully applies. Therefore : 
•  any service where the voice service is ancillary to other elements of  the Internet 
Service is not to be considered as Voice Telephony (subject to a priori individual 
licences) Gust as video telephony is not considered voice today)  ~ 
•  should some operators provide Internet Voice services meeting all criteria of the 
Voice Telephony definition and other data services, only the former and not their 
whole Internet business may be subject to heavier regulation. 
Finally, the notice announces a review by  l January 2000 at the latest, to take into account the evolution of 
technical and market conditions as well as the state of  convergence. 
3 Luxembourg until 01.07.98, Spain until 01.12.98, Ireland and Portugal until 01.01.2000 and Greece until 
01.07.2001 
Ill/  12(, IP/98/141, 10/2/1998  . 
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Commission launches inquiry into mobile and fixed telephony 
prices in the European Union 
Commissioner Karel Van  Miert has asked the European Commission's competition department 
to launch an investigation concerning interconnection tariffs applied between fixed and mobile 
telecommunications operators  The same investigation will also cover the issue of prices for 
calls to mobile networks from fixed networks.  This investigation reflects concerns which have 
already been expressed in various EU member states.  The  objective of the Commission is to 
open up mobile telecommunications for more EU citizens.  Any citizen across Europe must have 
access to  mobile communications and pro-competitive markets are  an  essential element to 
achieve  this.  Mr  Van  Miert's  services  have  therefore  sent  requests  to  fixed -and  mobile 
telecommunications operators in all member states of the EU in order to collect information on 
the charges levied for different types of  interconnection between fixed and mobile networks, and 
the prices paid by end-users for the  corresponding type of call.  Replies  are  due  with  the 
Commission around the end of  February. 
The objectives of  the investigation are to verify that: 
•  public  switched telecommunications  network (PSTN) operators apply  the  same  (('nditiL"~ns  tL) 
mobile operators as to other fixed operators for call termination on their net\vork: and that 
•  mobile operators apply the same conditions to fixed and mobile operators for call termination on 
their (mobile) network 
The impact of these interconnection fees on the level of prices for calls for consumers from tixed networks 
to mobile phones will also be examined. 
At  present, mobile network operators have joint control amongst themselves over the termination or calls 
on  their networks, and  it  appears that in  some countries, the price of calling a  mobil~ phone  lhlln a lixcd 
network is often substantially more expensive than calling from one mobile phone to another mobile  phonL~. 
Where  information  is  available,  interconnection  rates  between  tixed  and  mobile  n~t\\'l)rks  ~.·an  b~..·  up  to 
fourteen times higher than rates applied between tixed networks.  As to charges paid  by  users.  th~o.'Y  ar~o.'  in 
certain cases  up  to  six  times  higher from  fixed  towards mobile  networks compared  to  th~d tn  th~..·d  or 
mobile to mobile networks.· 
Background 
Interconnection means the physical  and logical  linking of telecommunications networks in  order to allow 
the users of  one network to communicate with users of other networks. 
The Commission  indicated  in  its  Recommendation on  interconnection  in  a liberalised  telecommunications 
market
4 that: 
"the cost of conveying a particular call from  a point of interconnection to  its destination 
on  the terminating fixed  network  is  basically the same whether the call  originates on  a 
mobile network or another fixed  network,  and  therefore there  is  no justification for  the 
large  ditlercnces  in  interconnection  charges  imposed  by  tixed  network  operators 
4  Commission Recommendation on interconnection,  15 October 1997, C (97) 3148. 
111/127 depending  on  the  type  of network  on  which  the  call  originated.  The  best  practice 
interconnection  charges  set  out  in  this  Recommendation  are  applicable  for 
interconnection by  mobile  network operators as  well  as  by  other fixed  operators on  a 
non-discriminatory basis.  The fact that a mobile operator may have a different licence or 
authorisation does  not justify differentiation  in  interconnection tariffs  for  the  same  call 
termination  services  provided  by  a  fixed  network  operator  with  significant  market 
power." 
When  tariffs for  interconnection are  cost-oriented,  normally the charges imposed  by  an  operator for  call 
termination on its network should not depend on the type of network from which the call originated (fixed 
or mobile). 
If the  Commission  finds  that  the  interconnection  fees  (;barged  to  mobile  operators  are  higher  than  the 
corresponding fees for fixed operators, and  in the absence of objective justifications for the difference,  the 
Commission will have to check any discrimination of  possible  ~xcessive pricing. 
The  Commission  has  powers  to  launch  own  initiative  investi~ations under  Regulation  17 t':.  This 
investigation  is  EU  wide  on  a matter  which  rais~s issue!)  of substantial  Community  intcrcsl.  National 
regulators will  be kept closely informed of  the Commis!)ion's actions in this area. 
111/128 IP/98/147, 11/2/1998 
Commission proposed co-ordinated introduction of next 
generation of mobile communications in the European Union 
(UMTS) 
At the  initiative of Industry and Telecommunications  Commissioner Martin  Bangemann,  the 
European Commission adopted today a Proposal for a Decision of  the European Parliament and 
the  Council  of  Ministers  on  the  co-ordinated  introduction  of  mobile  and  wireless 
communications (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System - UMTS).  In addition to mobile 
telephony and messaging services,  UMTS  will offer wireless access to the Internet and other 
multi-media services. By means of  a co-ordinated regulatory framework, the proposed Decision 
aims to assist in the development of the next generation of mobile services in  Europe as a 
follow-up to the current world-wide GSM services. In particular, the Decision will stimulate the 
early licensing of UMTS  services in the Member States and ensure that users can  use their 
UMTS phone, PC or other handheld device anywhere in the European Union (EU) just as they 
can with GSM today.  This pan-European roaming will result from licences being based on the 
co-ordinated allocation of frequencies and the use of European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute's (ETSI) standards. The harmonised licensing environment is expected to be in place by 
2000 at the latest to allow UMTS services to be offered from 2002.  The Europe-wide availability 
of future mobile multi-media services will play a key role in ensuring broader access to new 
services in a "wireless Information Society". 
UMTS- the next generation of mobile communications 
This  proposal  comes  just days  after European  industry,  with  support  from  organisations  from  third 
countries,  has  reached  a consensus within  ETSI  on  the technology concept for _UMTS.  UMTS  is  the 
third  generation  of  mobile  communications  services  and  will  provide  access  to  a  broad  range  of 
multimedia and Internet services which current generation systems were not designed to support.  It will 
also allow land-based and satellite systems such as GSM to be combined within the same service.  The 
basic characteristics of UMTS are set out in the table annexed. 
At global level, European players will promote UMTS as a world standard. 
The aims of the proposed Decision 
The  proposed  Decision  responds  to  calls  from  the  mobile  sector for greater legal  certainty given  the 
scale of investments UMTS requires.  The need for certainty was also recognised by both the Telecoms 




On the basis of the existing telecoms framework
6
,  the proposed Qecision sets out urgent EU  action in 
certain  key  areas.  It  will  ensure  the  deployment of UMTS  networks  and  services,  thereby  helping 
Europe's citizens to  be able to  access the full  possibilities offered by  multimedia services,  even when 
away from their home or business. 
5  Council Conclusions of 1 December 1997 and European Parliament resolution of 29 January 1998 
6 
Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April1997 on a common framework for general  authorisations and 
individual licences in the field of telecommunications services (the Licensing Directive} and the Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996 
amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to mobile and personal communciations- these are fully applicable to UMTS even before the UMTS 
decision is brought forward. 
111/129 What the proposed Decision requires : 
•  Member States will  have to  put in  place  a harmonised  system  for authorising  such  systems  by  1 
January 2000 in order to allow the provision of UMTS services by 1 January 2002. 
•  UMTS licensing should seek to ensure the development of pan-European services.  This implies that 
the  systems  licensed  should  support  roaming.  Rights  and  obligations  to  negotiate  roaming 
agreements for UMTS networks providers will have to be ensured by Member States. 
•  Authorisation  systems  applied  by  Member States  for the  harmonised  provision  of UMTS  services 
shall  take  into  consideration  European  standards  developed  by  ETSI  with  particular  importance 
being attached to a common, open and internationally competitive air-interface standard. 
•  The timely availability of spectrum will directly impact on  how competitive the  UMTS  market will  be. 
This  will  be  achieved  by  way  of  mand~tes given  to  tha  European  Conference  of  Postal  and 
Telecommunications Administrations (see  ~nnex). 
•  End-to-end interoperability in a pan-Europ~~n WMTS envirgnment is vital. 
UMTS  .. Building on the success Qf GSM 
UMTS will be able to build on the  Europ~ctn lead in G.SM.  The ability to use GSM to phone, send a fax 
or  receive  e-mail  wherever  you  are  in  ~YfPPQ or  the  world  overcame  the  major  limitation  of  first 
generation analogue mobile systems which Wet$ that  §~rvices were generally limited to national borders. 
GSM has become a great success for Europe and delivers a high quality system at low cost due to the 
degree of competition at all level$ of the industry.  The global reach of GSM has been confirmed and it 
has  become  the  d*'-facto world  standard  for mobile  communications with  now more  than  70  million 
users and more than 250 GSM systems operating or under construction in every region of the world. 
As  a  result  GSM  has  been  a  major export  success  valued  at  several  tens  of  billions  of  ECU  for 
European equipment manufacturers and has stimulated employment in that sector. 
UMTS  now provides  an  opportunity  to  build  on  these  strengths.  The  European  market  for  cellular 
mobile services including UMTS  is  expected by  2005 to  be  more than  ECU  100,000 miilion per year 
with  some 200 million  subscribers.  The global  market is  expected to  grow even  faster.  particularly  in 
Asia.  Developing  a strong  home  market will  not only  benefit  European  users,  but  also  set  the  best 
conditions for European industry to compete at global level. 
111/130 ANNEX 1 
Long term forecast of world-wide mobile market 
Customers in  millions at  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015 
year end 
EU 15  22  113  200  260  300 
North America  36  127  190  220  230 
Asia Pacific  22  149  400  850  1400 
Rest of World  7  37  150  400  800 
Total  87  426  940  1730  2730 
Source: UMTS Forum 
Ill/  131 ANNEX 2 
Characteristics of UMTS 
Services 
l.  Multimedia capability with wide area mobility 
2.  Efficient access to the Internet, Intranets and other Internet Protocol (1/P) based services 
3.  High quality speech commensurate with that of fixed networks. 
4.  Service portability across distinct UMTS environments 
5.  Indoor,  outdoor and far outdoor operation of GSM!UMTS  in one seamless environment including  full  roaming 
between GSM as well as between the terrestrial and S«!tellite components of lJMTS networks. 
Tcrmin;Jis 
•  Dual  mode/band GSM/UMTS terminals. where appropriate., 
•  Dual mode terrestrial/ satellite UMTS terminals. where appropriate. 
Radio Access Networks 
•  New air interface in  for access to all  sgrvicc~ in(.;lu<tin~ to p<tckct data based sc1Yiccs 
•  Good overall spectral efficiency 
Core network 
•  Evolutiou  from  GSM  system  family:  call  control  mobility  management  im:luding  Iiiii  roaming  hnh.'llonaht~ 
based on core GSM  nctwort<. standar4 
•  Mobile/fixed convergence el~rnents 
111/132 TIMETABLE 
Mandates  to  the  "Conference  europeenne  des  pastes  et  Feb.  1999 
telecommunications'" (CEPT) on further spectrum allocation 
including availability of additional spectrum beyond 
W  ARC-92 FPLMTS bands and freeing or refarming of 
the 900.  I xoo.  1900 MHz bands for UMTS 
Mandates to CEPT for  harmonisation of conditions  Feb.  199') 
attached to authorisations 
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Third report on the implementation of the EU telecommunications 
regulatory package 
1 January 1998 marked the unrestricted opening of  telecoms markets in most Member States of 
the European Union (EU).  Following a proposal of  its Members in charge of  telecommunications, 
Martin Bangemann, and competition, Karel Van Miert, the European Commission today issued a 
report on the state of  national legislation transposing the package, while at the same time taking 
a first in  .. depth look at whether that legislation is being applied effectively and to which extent 
national markets are actually open to competition. The Commission's conclusion is that most of 
the legislative framework is in place and being applied,  under the $Upervision of the national 
regulatory authorities.  These  national measures also appear to  b~ producing their intended 
effects  In  practice,  although,  given  that markets  are  only just getting  into  their stride,  the 
Commission will continue to monitor this aspect for the foreseeable future. 
The telecoms services markets of the  Memb~r  States are together worth around  ECU  141,000 million, 
and growing at 8.2o/o a year. 
Since the liberalisation process began, there have been continuous improvements in  levels and quality 
of services,  with  corresponding  falls  in  prices.  Liberalisation  is  also  the  driver of,  and  driven  by.  an 
unprecedented take-up of new services and technologies. Europe has already seen enormous growth 
in  three areas:  mobile communications, with  more  th~n 45  million users throughout the  EU  today:  the 
use of fax, which has grown dramatically during the  nine~ies; and the Internet. 
Commenting on the situation Mr Bangemann said: "The signal going out to market players. consumers 
and  the  EU's  trading  partners  under the  WTO  agreement on  telecoms,  which  came  into  force  on  5 
February,  is first, that a regulatory framework is in place which will ensure that markets develop to their 
full  potential;  second, that the system  is  working,  with  licences being  issued  and  players entering the 
market;  and  third,  that the national regulatory authorities provided  for in  the package are  established 
and are taking steps at national level to ensure compliance." 
The report is based on a detailed analysis of the way in which the EU  legislation has been incorporated 
into national law, and of the way in which it being applied. 
The Commission's broad assessment of implementation, as at January 1998, is that: 
- The transposition measures laid  down  in  the  regulatory  package  are  very  largely  in  place  in  most 
Member States; 
111/134 - Emphasis will  now need  to  be  put on  effective application  of the  national  rules  to  ensure  market 
entry in all market sectors (in the already-liberalised sectors in the derogation countries). 
- The  state  of liberalisation  achieved  in  January  1998  is  encouraging.  Considerable  progress  has 
been made since last September, when the last assessment was made.  There is evidence that the 
national  regulators  now established  in  the  Member States  are  assuming  their responsibilities  for 
enforcing the provisions of the framework as laid down in the directives.· 
The status and general level of transposition of the directives is as follows: 
The  liberalisation  directives,  which  removed  exclusive  rights  and  most  special  rights  in  the 
telecommunications  services  and  equipment markets,  were  adopted  between  May  1988  and  March 
1996. The last deadline for notification under the liberalisation directives was 1 July 1997. In November 
1997,  the Commission  initiated infringement procedures against those  Member States which  had  not 
notified  the  relevant  transposition  measures.  Several  Member  States  (Belgium,  Greece,  Ireland, 
Luxembourg,  Portugal) have still  not notified specific provisions,  despite the  fact that they are  not,  or 
are no  longer,  covered by derogations.  However,  even  if not fully transposed,  clear and  unconditional 
provisions of these Directive·s have direct effect, and certain of the Member States concerned (Belgium, 
Ireland) have granted provisional authorisations based on this direct effect of EU law. 
The Commission's broad assessment of the state of transposition of the  harmonisation directives is 
as follows: 
The  level  of transposition  is  generally  very  good,  bearing  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  Licensing  and 
Interconnection Directives in  particular were required to  be transposed for 31  December 1997.  Where 
legislative delays have occurred, the drafts forwarded to the Commission show in the majority of cases 
that there will  be  substantial transposition once they are  adopted.  There are few cases  giving  rise  to 
major concern arising from non-conformity of transposed measures with the directives. 
- Framework Directive:  Provisions  on  national regulatory  authorities  have  been  adopted  in  all  the 
Member States. 
- Leased lines: Of the four findings of partial transposition, three relate to non-conformity with various 
specific principles (Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal), while one, the result of delay in  bringing forward 
the  necessary  legislation  (Belgium),  should  be  made  good  by  the  adoption  of  two  forthcoming 
decrees. 
- Voice telephony: Only one Member State has not notified measures (Greece).  Of the four cases of 
partial transposition, two arise from non-conformity with various specific principles (Spain.  Portugal). 
· one (Luxembourg) from legislative delays coupled with concern over specific principles. and one  the 
result  of delay in  bringing  forward  legislation (Belgium),  should  be  remedied  by  the  adoption  of a 
forthcoming decree. 
111/135 - Licensing: Three cases of non-transposition are the result of legislative delays (Greece, although a 
derogation  for certain  principles  has  been  requested;  Spain,  where  the  forthcoming  Act  should 
transpose  the  main  provisions;  and  Ireland,  where  the  current  draft  Regulations  provide  for 
substantial transposition). Three of the five cases of partial transposition are also the result of delay 
in bringing forward legislation (Belgium,  where draft secondary legislation is  at an  advanced stage; 
Luxembourg,  where  secondary  legislation  remains  to  be  adopted;  and  The  Netherlands,  where 
substantial  transposition  should  be  achieved  by  the  forthcoming  Act).  There  is  concern  in  one 
country  (France)  over a specific licence  condition  coupled  with  delay  in  introducing  legislation  on 
procedures,  although  secondary legislation  is  in  preparation  to  remedy  the  latter,  and  in  another 
(Italy) concerning specific licence conditions.  In  one country (Austria)  there is  concern  over certain 
procedural aspects. 
- Interconnection: The two  cases  of non-transposition  are  the  result  of legislative delays  (Greece, 
where  secondary legislation is  under way;  and  Portugal,  where  secondary legislation  is  due to  be 
adopted shortly).  Four cases  of parti~l transposition  are the  r~sult of delays in  adopting legislation 
(Spain, where the forthcoming Act should  tr~nspos~ the 111ain provisions; Italy, where amendment of 
the  framework  is  under  consideration  and  secondary  legisl~tion  is  ~t an  advanced  stage;  The 
Netherlands, where the forthc9ming Act should bring  substanti~l transposition;  and  Sweden.  where 
the forthcoming amendment of the Act should bring substantial transposition).  Two cases of partial 
transposition are the result of legislative  d~lays coupled with concern over specific principles in two 
Member  States  (Belgium,  where  amenqrnents  to  the  Law  and  secondary  legislation  are  under 
consideration;  and  Luxembourg,  wher~ ?econdary  legislation  remains  to  be  adopted).  In  one 
(France) there is concern over specific principles.  · 
- Terminals: The directive is substantiqlly transposed in all Member States. 
- Satellite  terminals:  The  three  cases  of  non-transposition  are  the  result  of  legislative  delays 
(Belgium,  where a decree is  at an  advanced stage;  Greece,  where  a presidential  decree  is  under 
draft; and Ireland, where draft regulations are in pre.paratipn). 
- Frequencies: The directives are  substanti~lly  tr~Hl$PO§ed in  ~II Member States. 
Systematic  verification  of the  correct  and  ~ffective  application  of  the  national  measures  adopted 
pursuant to these directives will be carried out in the light of their implementation in the coming months. 
But at a first view the picture looks very positive:  in the wake of the implementation of full  competition 
on  1 January 1998 in  the ten  Member States without a derogation,  all  but one (Italy)  of the ten  have 
granted  authorisations  to  new  market  players  for  the  provision  of  voice  telephony  and  public 
telecommunications  networks.  It  should  be  noted  that  Spain,  which  was  granted  an  additional 
implementation  period,  has  already  granted  a  second  nation-wide  licence  and  is  in  the  process  of 
granting a further licence. 
111/IJ(l The Commission will continue to follow closely the question of effective application, and will be listening 
in  particular to  what market players  have to  say  about this.  Some  complaints,  official  and  unofficial, 
have already been received and acted  on.  The Commission expects that the number will  increase as 
competition  develops,  and  will  take  full  account  of the  issues  raised  when  drafting  future  reports. 
Finally,  since  the  whole  object  of  the  exercise  is  open  and  competitive  telecoms  markets,  the 
Commission will  focus  in  future  reports  on  indicators  designed to  give the  fullest possible picture  of, 
amongst others, how new entrants and former incumbents are faring, how prices are evolving, and how 
consumers are being served. 
A further report will be issued in the middle of this year. 
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NOTE 810 AUX BUREAUX NATIONAUX 
cc. aux Membres du Service du Porte-Parole 
Minister Maccanico met today Commissioner Van Miert to discuss the open 
issues in relation to telecommunications in Italy 
In a bilateral meeting this morning, the Italian telecommunications Minister Maccanico gave an overview 
of the results achieved by Italy over the last 18 months and in  particular Law 249/97 which anticipates 
the  convergence  process.  Mr  Van  Miert  expressed  appreciation  for  the  work  done  by  the  Italian 
Government but underlined that importan~  st~ps still need to be undertaken.  They both agreed that the 
Italian Government will take action to  aQQress  the Commission's concerns,  in  particular in  relation to: 
compensatory measures for the  secom~ Italian GSM operator,  the granting of the  third  mobile licence 
and the conditions to operate PECT services. 
As  for compensatory measures for OMNITEL  Pronto  ltali~,  Minister Maccanico assured  Mr  Van  Miert 
that the Telecom  ltalia group will fully an(j fqrthwith  comply with  the terms  of the agreement between 
the Commission and the Italian Government. 
As for DCS-1800 mobile services,  a  rec~ntly adopted Italian law imposes a deadline of 31 :.I  May  1998 
for granting a third Italian mobile licence.  Minister Maccanico and Commissioner Van Miert agreed that 
discussion  should  start  immediately on  the  conditions  required  to  ensure  a level  playing  field  in  the 
Italian mobile market. 
As for DECT, both agreed that the operation of Df:CT  s~rvices through a structurally separate company 
is necessary to prevent fixed network oper~tors frorn cro3s-subsidising their DECT services. 
Mr Maccanico will  detail the  Italian  Government's commitments  in  writing  within  days.  Commissioner 
Van  Miert  will  however  closely  monitor  progre$s  and  meanwhile  take  any  necessary  measures  to 
contribute to the completion of this process. 
At the end of the meeting Mr Maccanico and Mr Van  Miert welcomed  the constructive atmosphere of 
their exchanges ahead of today's Telecommunications Council. 
Ill/  138 